Holding

Agreements falling within the categories listed in the deeming clause of Section 33(1) are automatically restrictive trade practices, but the Commission must still evaluate under Section 38 whether such practices are prejudicial to public interest before ordering their cessation.

Summary

Mis Voltas Ltd. entered into exclusive distribution agreements with numerous manufacturers, containing territorial and exclusive dealing clauses. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) issued notices under Section 10(a)(iii) and Section 37 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, declaring those clauses restrictive trade practices under clauses (a) and (c) of Section 33(1) and ordered their deletion and cessation of the practices. Voltas appealed, contending that the amendment to Section 33(1) introduced a deeming clause that automatically classifies such agreements as restrictive, thereby limiting the Commission’s power to re‑examine them, and argued a conflict with the definition in Section 2(o). The Supreme Court held that the deeming clause indeed makes the listed agreements automatically restrictive, but the Commission must still assess, under Section 38, whether the practice is prejudicial to public interest before issuing a cease‑and‑desist order. The Court found the Commission had failed to consider the Section 38 “gateways” and set aside its order, allowing the appeals and remitting the matters for fresh inquiry.

Issues considered

The effect of the amendment to Section 33(1) on the Commission’s power to determine whether an agreement falls within a restrictive trade practice under Section 37.
Whether there is a conflict between the definition of ‘restrictive trade practice’ in Section 2(o) and the deeming clause of Section 33(1).
Whether the Commission must examine the Section 38 ‘gateways’ to determine if a deemed restrictive practice is prejudicial to public interest before passing an order under Section 37.
The validity of the Commission’s order directing Voltas to discontinue the alleged restrictive practices.

Legislation cited

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969s. 10(a)(iii), s. 2(o), s. 33(1), s. 35, s. 37, s. 38, s. 48, s. 55

Subjects

restrictive trade practicedeeming clauseSection 33(1)Section 37Section 38public interestexclusive distributionterritorial restrictionMonopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act

Judgment

MIS VOLTAS LTD. BOMBAY A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 7, 1995

[AM. AHMADI, CJ, S. MOHAN AND N.P. SINGH, JJ.} B

Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969-Section 33 (i)
as substituted w.e.f. 1.8.84-Deeming clause-Limitation of Court to ignore
mandate of legislature-Trade practices enumerated in clauses (a) to (1) of
sub-section (1) of Section 33-Shal/ be deemed to have been statutorily deter- C
mined and specified as restrictive trade practices-Neither Commission nor
Court can question the wisdom of Parliament-Such agreement has to be
registered.

Sections 37 and 38-Scope of inquiry by Monopolies and Restrictive
Trade Practices Commission--// commission satisfied that any practice held D
to be restrictive trade practice does not restrict or discourage competition in
any trade or industry-No order u/s 37 to be passed to desist or discontinue
such practice or declare agreement void.
,
The appellant had entered into agreements with large number of E
companies in respect of distribution of different machineries and equip-
ments within different territories of India. Under the terms of the agree-
ments different types of machines and instruments were to be distributed
by the appellant as the Marketing Company. The appellant had been
appointed as Buyer (Sole Importer) on the terms and conditions men-
tioned in different agreements. F
In the year 1986, notices were issued u/s lO(a) (iii) r/w s. 37 of the
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, informing the ap-
pellant that the agreements between the appellant and the different com-
panies contained conditions which amounted to restrictive trade practices
under clauses (a) and (c) of Section 33(1) of the Act. The Monopolies and G
Restrictive Trade Practices Commission directed the appellant to discon-
tinue the restrictive trade practices as mentioned in the Notice of Enquiry, .
and not to repeat the same in future and further that the objectionable
clauses, as mentioned in the Notices be deleted from the respective agree-
ments, within 8 weeks of the receipt of the said order. H·
947
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995J 1 S.C.R.

A The appellant urged that inspite of the amendment in sub-sectiJn 1
of section 33 w.e.f. 1.8.1984, the power of the Commission or of this Court
has in no way been curtailed or abridged and the Commission or this +
Court, can examine an agreement for recording a finding as to whether
any of the clauses of such agreement relates to restrictive trade practices;
that for passing an order u/s 37, first it has to be examined as to whether
B the agreement relates to any of the restrictive trade practices and if the
Commission is satisfied that it relates to one or more restrictive trade
practices within tl1e meaning of Section 2(0) of the Act, then the Commis-
sion has to examine as to whether such agreement is prejudicial to the
public interest; that Section 37 contemplates and conceives inquiry in
C respect of any restrictive trade practice relating to an agreement which has
been registered u/s 35 as well as an agreement which has not been so
registered; that while amending sub-section 1 of Section 33, Section 2(0)
was not deleted or substituted and that has left an apparent conflict
between Section 2(0) and Section 33(1) of the Act, that after the amend-
D ment of sub-section 1 of Section 33, there is no forum where a person can
show that although it may appear that any of the clauses of the agreement,
relate to a restrictive trade practice specified in clauses (a) to (I) of .
sub-sec. 1 of Section 33, but such clauses cannot be held to be covered by
any of the clauses.

E Allowing the appeals, this Court

HELD : 1.1.The Legislature by the statute may create a legal fiction
saying that something shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and
truth has not been done, but even then Court has to give full effect to such
F statutory fiction after examining and ascertaining as ~o for what purpose
and between what parties such statutory fiction has been resorted to. In
the substituted sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the Monopolies and
Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, a deeming clause has been intro-
duced by the Parliament specifying that agreements falling within one or
more of the categories mentioned in clauses (a) to (I) to sub-section (1) of
G Section 33, shall be deemed for the· purposes of the Act, to be the agree-
ments relating to restrictive trade practices. By the deeming clause one is
not required to treat any imaginary state of affairs as real but to treat that
agreements specified and enumerated in sub-section (1) of Secti!>n 33 as
agreement relating to restrictive trade practices. It can be said that Par-
H liament after having examined different trade practices, has identified
VOLTAS LTD. v. U.0.1. 949 I

such trade practices which have to be held as restrictive trade practices A
for the purposes of the Act. To keep such trade practices beyond controver·
sy in any proceeding, a deeming clause has been introduced in sub-section
(1) of Section 33 saying that they shall be deemed to be restrictive trade
practices. [9S7-A, F-H, 9S8·A]

East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council, (19S2) A.C. B
109 (b); State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others, AIR [19S3] SC
244 = [19S3] SCR 773, Chief Inspector of Mines and another etc. v. Karam
Chand Thapar etc., AIR (1961) SC 838 = [1962) 1SCR9; Mis J.K. Cotton
Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another v. Union of India and others,
AIR (1988) SC 191 = (1988) 1 SCR 700; M Venugopal v. The Division C
Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Machilipatnam, Andhra
Pradesh and Anr., JT (1994) 1 SC 281 = (1994) 2 SCC 323 and Harish
Tandon v. The Add!. District Magistrate, Allahabad, JT (199S) 1 SC 291,
relied on.

1.2. After the amendment of sub-section (1) of Section 33 if an D
agreement falls within one of the clauses of the said sub-section, specifying
a restrictive trade practice, then it is no more open to the Commission or
to the Court to say that it shall not amount to restrictive trade practice.
Trade practices enumerated in clauses (a) to (I) of sub-section (1) of
Section 33 shall be deemed to have now been statutorily determined and E
specified as restrictive trade practices. Neither the Commission nor the
Court can question the wisdom of the Parliament for having statutorily
determined certain trade practices as restrictive trade practices unless in
this process there is contravention of any of the provisions of the Constitu·
tion. If any agreement contains a trade practice which falls in any of the
clauses of sub-section (1) of Section 33 then such trade practice shall be F
deemed to be restrictive trade practice and such agreement has to be
registered. (961-G·H, 962-A]

Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. v. Registrar, (1977) 2 SCC SS;
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC S29, distin· G
guished.

1.3. Under section 37, the Commission has been vested with the
power to inquire in respect of agreements which have been registered
under Section 3S as well as those which have not been registered. But the
fact remains that once the Commission is satisfied that a particular H
950 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A agreement has not been registered under Section 35, falls within any of the
clauses from. (a) to (1). of sub-section (1) of Section 33, then no further
inquiry is to be done, as to whether such agreement· relates to restrictive t
trade practices or not. The statutory fiction incorporated in sub-section 1
""- of Section 33 shall also be applicable in respect of such agreements apart
B from the penalty provided under section 48 of the Act. As such there is not
much scope for discrimination between persons who have got their agree·
ments registered and those who have not got their agreements registered.
. [962·F~H]

i.4 There is no conflict between Section 2(0) and 33(1). Clauses. (a)
C to (I) of sub-section 1 of Section 33 specify such trade practices which have
been statutory recognised as restrictive trade practices. But there may be
other trade practices, not covered by clauses (a) to (I) of sub-section 1 of
the Section 33, which can be examined by the Commission in the light of
Section 2(0). [963-B]

D t.S. Sub-section 1 of Section 33 specifies in different clauses various
(
types of trade practices, which have now been recognised a~ restrictive
trade practices. Any person who is a party to any agreement has to examine
t&e agreement iil li~t of those clauses. If according to such person, the
agreement in question does not contain any .clause relating to any of the
E restrictive trade practices specified in clauses (a) to (1), such person need
not get the agreement registered under Section 35. He will be at liberty to
satisfy the Commission oil that qu-:stton. But once the agreement ls
• registered, then such agreement cannot be inquired into by the Commls·
sion, for the purpose as to whether it relates to any restrictive .trade
· practice; of course inspite of registration of the agreement, the person
F concerned can satisfy the Commission that such practice is n.ot prejudtclal .y .
to the public interest. [963·E·F]

1.6 The Scheme of the Act appears to be that first it specifies some
trade practices, under sub-section 1 of Section 33, as restrictive trade
practices. Then it has prescribed a forum under Section 37, to inquire as
G to whether atty such trade practice is prejudicial to the· public interest.
This question has to be examined in the light of Section 38 which in many
judgments have been described as 'gateways'. In other words, inspite of a
finding that a particular agreement contains a clause which is related to
a restrittive trade practice, if the Commission is satisfied in respect of the
H existence of any of the circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (k) of
VOLTAS LID. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH,J.) 951

sub-section 1 or Section 38, no order under Section 37 is to be passed to A
desist or discontinue such practice or to declare any part or the agreement
-t as void. (964-A-8]

1.7. If the Commission is satisfied that any practice which has been
held to be restrictive trade practice does not directly or indirectly restrict
or discourage competition to any material degree in any relevant trade or B
industry then it can resist passing any order under Section 37 directing
the person concerned to desist or to discontinue the practice. (964-D]

Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. v. Registrar, (1977) 2 SCC SS and
Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC S29, relied C
on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2252 of
1994 Etc. Etc.

. From the Judgment and Order dated 14.9.93 of the M.R.T.P. Com- D
mission, New Delhi in R.T.P. Enquiry No. 200 of 1986.

D.N. Misra for J.B. Dadachanji and Co. for the Appellant.

Sanjay Kishan Kaul for the Respondents.
E
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N.P. SINGH, J. These appeals have been filed under section 55 of
the Monopolies ·and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the Act') against the judgment and order of the Monopolies
and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (hereinafter referred to ·as F
'the Commission').

The appellant had entered into. agreements with large number of
companies, who are respondents in different appeals, in respect of distribu-
tion of different machineries and equipments within different territories of
India. The Companies, who are respondents, to the different appeals have G
been manufacturing different types of machines and instruments, which
under the terms of the agreements are to be distributed by the appellant
as the Marketing company. The appellant has been appointed as Buyer
(Sole Importer) on the terms and conditions mentioned in different agree-
ments. H
'\
I

952 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.
I

A On 26.11.1986, notices were issued under Section lO(a)(iii) read with
Section 37 of the Act, informing the appellant that the agreements between
• the appellant and the different companies, some of which have their Head
·Offices in foreign countries contain conditions which amount to restrictive
trade practices under clauses (a) and (c) of Section 33(1) of the Act. In
B the notices aforesaid, the terms and conditions in different agreements
which are alleged to be violative of Section 33(1)(a) and (c) of the Act
were reproduced. Pursuant to the notices aforesaid, show cause was filed
in different cases initiated by the Commission against the appellant. Docu·
ments and affidavits were also filed on behalf of the appellant in support
of its stand that none of the !lgreements referred to in the notices issued
C to the appellant related to restrictive trade practices, calling for any action
under the Act. The Commission, however, by the impugned judgment. and
order directed the appellant in respect of each of the 15 inquiries to
discontinue the restrictive trade practices as mentioned in the Notice of
Enquiry and not to repeat the same in future. It was also directed that the
D objectionable clauses, as mentioned in the. Notices be deleted from the
respective agreements, within 8 weeks of the receipt of the said order.
·'
All the appeals were heard together, since the controversy, which
been raised, is more or less similar in· all the appeals, and as such facts are
being referred to from Civil Appeal No. 2252of1994, which was heard as
E the leading case; It appears that the agreement in that case had been
entered into between the appellant and Respondent No.. 4 M/s. Societe
Geneovise )), Instruments De Physique, Geneve, through.its Secretary, on
29.11.1956. The Director General of Investigation and Registration
(hereinafter referred to as the 'DG') took objection in respect of three of
F the clauses of the agreement and on his application being filed before the·
Commission, notice was issued to ~he appellant on 26.11.1986 saying that
the following terms of the agreenieilt amounted restrictive trade practices,
within the meaning of the Act : ·

"2. The Buyer shall not sell the goods of the Seller to any person
G who is not residing or carrying on business with the Territory nor
to any person residing or carrying on business within the Territory
for. the purpose of resale by such person outside the Territory."
~
I

"3. The Buyer shall use his best .endeavours to promote the
H interests of the Seller and specifically shall not deal in or sell goods
VOLTAS LTD. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH,J.] 953

which co:uld compete with those of the Seller" A
-+ "6. For the consideration aforesaid the Seller agrees not to sell
any goods as mentioned before to any individual or firm within the
territory other than the buyer and all enquiries and orders
received by the Seller. from the Territory shall be referred to the
Buyer. The Seller shall further not quote for not deliver his goods B
to any firm outside the Territory for import into the Territory
except with the previous consent of the Buyer and terms agreed
upon with the Buyer~·

It is proper to refer to some of the provisions of the Act. c
Section 2(o) defines "restrictive trade practice" :

(o) "restrictive trade practice" means a trade practice which
has, or may have, the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting
competition in any manner and in particular, D
(i) which tends to obstruct the flow of capital or resources into
the stream of production, or

(ii) which tends to bring about manipulation of prices, or
conditfons of delivery or to effect the flow of supplies in the market E
· relating to goods or services in such manner as to impose on the
consumers unjustified costs or restriction;"

In view of Section 10, the Commission may inquire into any restrictive trade
practice (i) upon receiving a complaint of facts from any trade association F
or from any consumer or (ii) upon a reference made to it by the Central
Government or a state government, or (iii) upon an application made to it
by the Director General, or (iv) upon its own knowledge or information.
Sub-section (1) of Section 33 which is relevant is as follows :

"33. Registerable agreements relating to restrictive trade prac- G
tice.-(1) Every agreement falling within one or more of the follow-
ing categories shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act, to be
an agreement relating to restrictive trade practices and shall be
subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter, namely- H
954 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995] 1 S.C.R.

A (a) any agreement which restricts, or is likely to restrict, by any
method the persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold
or from whom goods are bought;

(b) any agreement requiring a purchaser of goods, as a condi-
tion of such purchase, to purchase some other goods;
B
(c) any agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser in
the course of his trade acquiring or otherwise dealing in any goods
other than those of the seller or any other person ;

( d) any agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser in
c the course of his trade from acquiring or otherwise dealing in any
goods other than those of the seller or any other person;

(e) any agreement to grant or allow concessions or benefits,
including allowances, discount, rebates or credit in connection
with, or by reason of, dealing;
D
(f) any agreement to sell goods on condition that the purchaser
shall be the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated
that prices lower than those prices may be charged;

(g) any agreement to limit, restrict or withhold the output or
E supply of any goods or allocate any area or market for the disposal
of the goods;

(h) any agreement not to employ or restrict the employment of
any method, machillery or process in the manufacture of goods;
F
(i) any agr~ment for the exclusion from any trade association
of any person carrying on or intending to carry on, in good faith
the trade in relation to which the trade association is formed;

G) any agreement to sell goods at such prices as would have
G the effect of eliminating competition or a competitor;

Ga) any agreement restricting in any manner, the class or
number of wholesalers, producers or suppliers from whom any
goods may be bought;

H Gb) any agreement as to the bids which any of the parties ·
(
VOLTAS LID. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH, J.] 955

thereto may offer at an auction for the sale of goods or any A
agreement whereby any party thereto agrees to abstain from bid- ·
i ding at any auction for sale of gooqs;

(k) any agreement not hereinbefore referred to in this sectiOJ:!
which. the Central Government may, by notification specify for the
time being as being one relating to restrictive trade practice within B
the meaning of this sub-section pursuant to any recommendation
made by the ·Commission in this behalf;·

(1) any agreement to enforce the carrying out of any such
agreement as is referred to in this sub-section."
c
Clauses (a) to (1) of Section 33(1) specify different types of agreements,
which shall be deemed for the purposes of the Act, to be agreements ·
relating to restrictive trade practices and shall be subject to registration, in
accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the said Act. Section 35
requires the Central Government to specify a day by notification in the D
Official Gazette on and from which every agreement falling within section
33 shall become registerable under the Act. Section 37 vests power in the
Commission to inquire into any restrictive trade practice, the relevant part
whereof is as follows :

"37. Investigation into restrictive trade practices by Commis- E
sion. -(1) The Commission may inquire into any restrictive trade
practice, whether the agreement, if any, relating thereto has been
registered under Section 35 or not, which may come before it for
inquiry and, if, after such inquiry it is of opinion that the practice
is prejudicial to the public interest, the Commission may, by order, F
direct that -

(a) the practice shall be discontinued or shall not be repe.ated;

(b) the agreement relating thereto shall be void in respect of
such restrictive trade practice or shall stand modified in respect G
thereof in such manner as may be specified in the order.".

The Commission may inquire into any restrictive trade practice in connec-
tion with any agreement which has been registered under Section 35 or not.
If after such inquiry, the Commission is of the opinion that the practice is
prejudicial to the public interest, the Commission may direct that the H
956 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995) 1 S.C.R.

A practice shall be discontinued or shall not be repeated and the agreement
relating to any such restrictive trade practice shall be void and shall stand -t
modified in resp~ct thereof. In view of Section 38(1) the restrictive trade
practice shall be deemed to be prejudicial to the public interest unless the
Commission is satisfied about the existence of the circumstances specified
in clauses (a) to (k) in the said sub-section 1 of Section 38 and is further
B satisfied that restriction is not unreasonable having regard to the balance
between those circumstances and any detriment to the public.

It may be pointed out that originally the main part of sub-section (1)
of Section 33 said :
c "33. Registrable agreeme11ts relating to restrictive trade prac-
tices.-(1) Any agreement relating to a restrictive trade practice
falling within one or more of the following categories shall be
subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter, namely:-"
D
By Act No. 30 of 1984 that part was substituted w.e.f. 1.8.1984 :

"33. Registrable agreements relating to restrictive trade prac-
tices- (1) Every agreement falling within one or more of the
following categories shall be deemed, for the purposes of this Act,
E to be an agreement relating to restrictive trade practices and shall be
subject to registration in accordance with the provisions of this
Chapter, namely-"

(emphasis supplied)
F
In the substituted sub-section (1) of Section 33 a deeming clause ·has been
introduced by the Parliament saying that every agreement falling within one
or more of the categories mentioned in the said-section (1) shall be
. deemed, for the purposes of the Act, to be an agreement relating to
restrictive trade practices. While amending and substituting that part of
G sub-section (1) of Section 33, the Parliament determined and specified that
agreements falling within one or more of the categories mentioned in
clauses (a) to (I) to sub-section (1) of Section 33, shall be deemed,.for the
purposes of the Act, to be the agreements relating to restrictive trade
practices. This was not the position in the original sub-section (1) of
H Section 33.
(
VOLTAS LTD. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH, J.] 957

The effect of a statute containing a legal fiction is by now well settled. A
The Legislature by a statute may create a legal fiction saying that something
t shall be deemed to have been done which in fact and truth has not been
done, but even then Curt has to give full effect to such statutory fiction
after examining and ascertaining as to for what purpose and between what
parties such statutory fiction has been resorted to. In the well known case B
of East and Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough council, (1952) A.C.
109(B), Lord Asquith has said :

"If you are bidderrto treat an imaginary state of affairs as real,
you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as
real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative, state of C
affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or
accompanied it ........ The statute says that you must imagine a
certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you
must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to
the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs. 11
D
This Court in the cases of State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and
others, AIR (1953) SC 244 = [1953] SCR 773, Chief Inspector of Mines and
another etc. v. Karam Chand Thapar etc., AIR (1961) SC 838 = [1962] 1
SCR 9, Mis J.K Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and another v.
Union of India and others, AIR (1988) SC 191 = [1988] 1 SCR 700, M. E
Venugopal v. The Divisional Manager,. Life Insurance Corporation of India.
Machilipatnam, Andhra Pradesh & Anr., JT (1994) 1 SC 281 = [1994] 2
SCC 323 and recently in the case of Barish Tandon v. The Addi. District
Magistrate, Allahabad, JT (1995) 1SC291, has dealt with in detail the effect
of a statutory fiction and the limitation of the Court to ignore the mandate
• ·y.. of the Legislature, urJess it is violative of any of the provisions of the F
Constitution. So far sub-section (1) of Section 33 is concerned, it mandates
that agreements covered under different clauses of sub-section(!) of Sec-
tion 33 shall be deemed for the purpose of the Act to be agreements
relating to restrictive trade practices. By the deeming clause one is not
required to treat any imaginary state of affairs as real but to treat the G
agreements specified and enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 33 as
agreements relating to restrictive trade practices. It can be said that
Parliament after having examined different trade practices, has identified
such trade practices which have to be held as restrictive trade practices for
the purposes of the Act. To keep such trade practices beyond controversy
in any proceeding, a deeming clause has been introduced in sub-section H
\ I
\

958 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 s.c.~.
A (1) of Section 33 saying that they shall be deemed to be restrictive trade
practices. In this background, according to us, there is not much scope for
argument that although a particular agreement, is covered by one or the t
other clause of sub-section 1 of Section 33, still it shall not amount to an
agreement containing conditions which can be held to be restrictive trade
practices within the meaning to the Act.
B
According to Mr. Desai, the learned counsel, who appeared on
behalf of the appellant, inspite of the amendment in· sub-section ·1 of
Section 33, the power of the Commission or of this Court has no in no way
been curtailed or abridged and the Commission or this Court, can examine
· an agreement for recording a fmding as to whether any of the clauses of
C such agreement relates to restrictive trade practices. He pointed out that
Section·37 which vests power in the Coinmissionto examine and investigate
any agreement relating to restrictive trade practices is in two parts, (i) the
Commission is required to examine and ascertain as to whether any of the
tems of a particular agreement relates to restrictive trade practiees (ii) if
D such agreement relates to restrictive trade practices whether it is prejudi-
cial to the public interest. Unless the fiilding is recorded in respect of the
agreement in question on both courts, no order under Section 37 of the
Act can be passed. In other words, first it has to be examined as to whether
the agreement relates to any of the restrictive trade practices and if the
E Commission is satisfied that it relates to one or more restrictive trade
practices within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Act, then. the Commis-
sion has to examine as to whether such agreement is prejudicial to the
·pu1>lic interest. The Commission can direct that the practice be discon-
tinued or should not be repeated or, the agreement of part thereof shall be
void, only after the Commission is satisfied that any of the clauses of the
F agreement relates to any restrictive trade practice, within the meaning of
Section 2(o) of the Act and such restrictive trade practice is prejudicial to
public interests.. In this connection, reliance was placed on the judgment
of this Court, in the case of Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. v. Registrar,
[1977) 2 SCC 55. From the facts of that case, it will appear that Tata Engg.
G and Locomotive Co. (hereinafter referred to as the 'TELCO') used to sell
vehicles and had of its own initiative introduced certain procedures for
distribution ofits vehicles. It had notified to its dealers the inaximum price
for each model of vehicle which they can charge from consumers. When
the vehicles were sold it was the responsibility of TELCO to provide
facilities for servicing and repairing of the vehicles marketed by it. For that,
H
(
VOLTAS LID. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH, J.) 959

after sale service had been provided for in different parts of the country. A
It had a net work of dealers service centres and zc>nal offices ..An applica-
i tion was filed by the Registrar, Restrictive Trade Agreements, under
Section lO(a)(iii) of the Act before the Commission, for inquiry under
Section 37 of the Act into restrictive trade practices alleged therein. Special_
grievance in respect of territorial restriction and allocation of area or B
market for exclusive dealership was made. It was pointed out to the
Commission by the Registrar, Restrictive Trade Agreements, who had then
the power to file an application before the· Commission under Section
lO(a)(iii) that some of the clauses of the dealership agreement, imposed
restriction on the dealers in respect of territories, the maximum price at
which goods could be resold, and in respect of dealing in products of other C
manufacturers which amounted to restrictive trade practice. The Commis-
sion held that the practice of allocation of territories to Telco's dealers was
not justified. But this Court said :

"The decision whether trade practice is restrictive or not has D
to be arrived at by applying the rule of reason and not on the
doctrine that any restriction as to area or price will per se be a
restrictive trade practice. Every trade agreement restrains or binds
person or' places or prices. The question is whether the restraint
is such as regulates and thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To deter- E
mine this question three matters are to be considered. First, what
facts are peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied.
Second, what was the condition before and after the restraint is .
imposed. Third, what is the nature of the restraint and what is its
actual and probable effect." ··
F
It was further said in respect of sub-section 1 of Section 33 as it stood then
, that it deals with registration qf certain types of restrictive trade practices,
which had been prescribed in categories mentioned in clauses (a) .to (1) of
sub-section 1 of Section 33 of the Act. It was then said : ·
G
"An agreement will be registrable, when it will have both the
effect of restricting competition within the meaning of Section 2(o)
of the Act and also deal with the subject matter described in
Clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section (1) of section 33 of the Act.
Clauses (a) to (1) aforesaid described some species of agreement H
960 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R..

which require registration if they are within the genus of restrictive
"'
I
I

A
trade practice defines in Section 2(o) of the Act. A practice which
is not restrictive under Section 2(o) of the Act cannot be restrictive t
trade practice only because of Clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section {1)
of section 33 of the Act. Sectiqn 33 does not provide statutory
illustrations to section 2(o) of the Act but only enumerates some
B types of trade practices which if they are restrictive within Section
2{o) of the Act require registration.''

This Court in the aforesaid judgment on basis of sub-section 1 of section
33 as it was then held that a practice which is not restrictive trade practice
C under section 2{o) of the Act, cannot be held to be restrictive trade
practice, only because of clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section 1 of Section 33
of the Act. Again in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of
India, [1979] 2 SCC 529, after making reference to the aforesaid case of
Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. (supra) it was said :
D
"It is now settled law as a result of the decision of this Court
in the Telco case thaf every trade practice which is in restraint of
trade is not necessarily a restrictive trade practice. The definition
of restrictive trade practice given in Section 2(o) is a pragmatic
and.result-oriented definition. It defines 'restrictive trade praCtice'
E to mean a trade practice which has or may have the effect of
preventing, distorting or restricting competition in any manner and
in clauses (i) and (ii), particularises two specific instances of trade
practices which fall within the category of restrictive trade practice.
It is clear from the definition that it is only where a trade practice
F has the effect, actual or probable, of restricting, lessening or
destroying competition that it is liable to be·regarded as a restric-
tive trade practice, If a trade practice merely regulates and thereby
promotes competition, if would not fall within· the definition of
restrictive trade practice, even. though it may .be, to some extent,
in restraint of trade. Whenever, therefore, a question arises before
G the Commission or the Court as to whether a certain tra~e practice
is restrictive or not, it has to be decided not on any th~P,retical or
a priori rea.<;oning, but by inquiring whether trade practice has. or
may have the effect of preventing, distorting or restricting com-
petition. This inquiry obviously cannot be in vacuo but 'it must
IH depend on the existing constellation of economic facts and cir-
f
VOLTAS LTD. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGI-1,J.) 961

cumstances relating to the particular trade. The peculiar facts and A
features of the trade would be very much relevant in determining
+ whether a particular trade practice has the actual or probable
effect of diminishing or preventing ccmpetition and in the absence
of any material showing thes~ facts or features, it is difficult to see
how a decision cart be reached by the Commission that the par-
ticular trade practice is a restrictive trade practice."
B

But now with the amendment of main part of sub-section 1 of Section
33 with a statutory fiction the situation has changed. It can be said that
clauses (a) to (I) of sub-section (1) of Section 33 provide statutory illustra-
tions of restrictive trade practices. The framers of the Act have now in clear C
and unambiguous words said that ve-:y agreement falling within one or
more of the categories specified in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section 1 of
Section 33, shall be deemed for the purposes of the said Act, to be an
agreement relating to restrictive trade practices and shall be subject to
registration in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V. Now it is no D
more open to the commission or to this court to test and examine any of
the trade practices mentioned in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-section 1 of
Section 33 in the light of Section 2{o) of the Act, for the purpose of
recording a finding as to whether those types of trade practices shall be
restrictive trade practices within the meaning of Section 2(o) of the Act.
This exercise has to be done only in respect of such trade practices which E
have not been enumerated in any of the clauses from {a) to (1). Only such
trade practices have to be examined in the light of section 2{o) of the Act,
as to whether they amounted to restrictive trade practices. It need not be
pointed out that both judgments aforesaid of this Court interpreted the
scope of sub-section 1 of Section 33, as it stood prior to the amendment p
by Act 30 of 1984. But after the amendment of sub-section 1 of Section 33
if an agreement falls within one of the clauses of the said sub-section,
specifying a restrictive trade practice, then it is no more open to the
Commission or to the Court to say that it shall not amount to restrictive
trade practice. Trade practices enumerated in clauses (a) to (1) of sub-sec-
tion (1) of Section 33 shall be deemed to have now been statutorily G
determined and specified as restricth e trade practices. Neither the Com-
mission nor the Court can question the wisdom of the Parliament for
' -l
having statutorily determined certain trade practices as restrictive trade
practices unless in this process there is contravention of any of the
provisions of the Constitution. In this background, if any agreement con- H
962 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 1 S.C.R.

A tains a trade practice which falls in any of the clauses of sub-section 1 of
Spction 33 then such trade practice shall be deemed to be restrictive trade
practice and such agreement has to be registered.

Now the question which still remains to be answered is as to whether
B after the amendment in sub-section 1 of Section 33 and after registration
of an agreement; the scope of inquiry by the Commission under section 37
in respect of the agreement, has been curtailed and the Commission had
now to examine only one question as to whether such practice is prejudicial
to the public interest. ·

c
On behalf of the appellant, it was pointed out that Section 37
contemplates and conceives ·inquiry in respect of any restrictive trade
practice relating to an agreement which has been registered under Section
35 as well as .an agreement which has not been so registered. As such
D persons who have got their agreements registered on their own in order to
escape prosecution, ·although in such agreements there may not be any
clause relating to restrictive trade practices, cannot urge before the Com-
mission, after ·having got the agreements registered, that they do not
contain any clause relating to any restrictive trade practice. On the other
hand, persons who for one reason or other have not got their agreements
E registered under Section 35, will be in an advantageous position inasmuch
as in respect of their agreements, commission will. have to examine both
·aspects (i) whether the agreement relates to any restrictive trade practice,
(ii) even if it relates to restrictive trade practice, whether the said practice
is prejudicial to .the public interest. It is true that under Section 37, the
p Commission has .been vested with the power to iii.quire in respect of
agreements which have been registered under section 35 as well as those ,
which have not been registered. But the fact remains .that once the Com-
mission is satisfied ·.that a particular agreement which has not been
registered under Section 35, falls within any of the clauses from (a) to (l)
of sub-section 1 of Section 33, then no further inquiry is to be done, as to
G whether such agreement relates tO restrictive trade practices or not. The
statutory. fiction incorporated in sub-section .1 of Section 33 shall. also be
applicable in respect of such agreements apart from the penalty provided
under Section 48 of the Act. As such there is not much scope for dis-
crimination between persons who have got their agreements registered and
H those who have not got their agreements registered.
'/
VOLTAS LID. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH,J.] 963

It was also urged that while amending sub-section 1 of Section 33, A
Section 2(o) was not deleted or substituted and that has left an apparent
+ conflict between section 2(o) and Section 33(1) of the Act. According to
us there is no conflict between Section 2(o) and 33(1). Clauses (a) to (1)
of sub-section 1 of Section 33 specify such trade practices which have been
statutorily recognised as restrictive trade practices. But there may be other B
trade practices, not covered by clause (a) to (l) of sub-section 1 of Section
33, which can be examined by the Commission in the light of section 2(o).

It was pointed out on behalf of the appellant that after the amend-
ment of sub-section 1 of Section 33, there is no forum where a person can
show that although at a first look, it may appear that any of the clauses of C
the agreement, relates to a restrictive trade practice specified in clauses
(a) to (1) of sub-section 1 of Section 33, but such clauses cannot be held
to be covered by any of the clauses. According to us, in this respect a
decision has to be taken by the person who is a party to the said agreement
whether to get such agreement registered under Section 35. But once he D
gets the agreement registered, then he is debarred from questioning
whether it contains any clause relating to a restrictive trade practice.
Sub-section 1 of Section 33 specifies in different clauses various types of
trade practice, which have now been recognised as restrictive trade prac-
tices. Any person who is a party to any agreement has to examine the
agreement in light of those clauses. It according to such person, the E
agreement in question does not contain any clause relating to any of the
restrictive trade practices specified in blause (a) to (1), such person need
not get the agreement registered under· Section 35. He will be at hberty to
satisfy the Commission on that question. But once the agreement is
registered, then such agreement cannot be inquired into by the. Commis~ . p
. 'I- sion, for the purpose as to whether it relates to any restrictive trade
practice; of course inspite of registration of the agreement, the person
concerned can satisfy the Commission that such practice is not prejudicial
to the public interest.

At this stage it shall be proper to refer to Section 38 of the Act. G
Sub-section 1 of Section 38 also contains a statutory fiction because it says
that for purposes of any proceedings before the Commission under Section
37, a 'restrictive trade practice shall be deemed to be prejudicial to the
public interest' unless the Commission is satisfied of ~y or more. of the
circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (k) of sub-section 1 of Section 38. H
964 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1995] 1 S.C.R.

A Tiµ; scheme of the Act appears to be that first specifies some trade
practices, under sub-section 1 of Section 33, as restrictive trade practices.
Then it has prescribed a forum under Section 37, to inquire as to whether
any such trade practice is prejudicial to the public interest. This question
has to be examined in the light of Section 38 which in many judgments have
been described as 'gatewayes'. In other words, inspite of a finding that a
B particular agreement contains a clause which is related to a restrictive trade
practice, if the Commission is satisfied in respect of the existence of any
of the Circumstances specified in clauses (a) to (k) of sub-section 1 of
Section 38, no order under Section 37 is to be passed to desist or discon-
tinue such practice or to declare any part of the agreement as void. One
C of the circumstances specified in clause (h) of sub-section 1 of Section
Section 38 is :

"38. (l)(h) that the restriction does. not directly or indirectly
restrict or .discourage competition to any material degree in any
relevant trade or industry and is not likely to do so;
D
If the Commission is satisfied that any practice which has been held, to be
restrictive trade practice does not directly or indirectly restrict or dis-
courage competition to any material degree in any relevant trade or
industry then it can resist passing any order under section 37 directing the
E person concerned to desist or to discontinue the practice. It may be
mention~d that in connection with old sub-section 1 of Section 33 in the
case of Tata Engg. and Locomotive Co. (supra) this Court pointed out that
the exclusive dealings do not impede competition but promote it. It was
·said:. ·

F "The exclusive dealings do not impede competition but promote
it. Such dealings lead to specialisation and improvement in after ~·
sales service. The exclusive dealership agreements do not restrict
distribution in any area or prevent competition. The customer has
the choice of buying any make he hlces. The advantage of exclusive
dealership is that a dealer specialises .in his own type of vehicles
G with' all the attending advantages of trained personnel, special
service stations, workshops and spare parts."

/\ · It was also said that by specialising in each make of vehicle and providing
the best possible service that the competition between the various makes
H is enhanced. In that connection it was also said :
(
VOLTAS LTD. v. U.0.1. [N.P. SINGH,J.] 965

"By making its dealers exclusive to Telco, there cannot be said A
to be any prevention, distortion or restriction of competition in the
t territory in which a dealer operates, either between manufacturers
of the same type of vehicles or between dealers in these vehicles.
Any manufacturer or vehicles such as those of Telco may manufac-
ture and sell its vehicles in a territory in which Telco's dealers B
operate. Any other manufacturer of vehicles similar to those of
Telco is also free to appoint dealers of its choice in the same
territory covered by Telco's dealers. The channels for outlet for
vehicles have not been blocked by the fact that the dealers ap-
y
pointed by Telco are exclusive to Telco not it can be said that
Telco has by its exclusive arrangement with its dealers affected the C
flow of supplies of vehicles into the market."

Again in the case of Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India,
(supra), it was said that after the Commission is satisfied in respect of
restrictive trade practices then it has to proceed to consider whether any D
of the 'gateways' provided in Section 38(1) exist so that the trade practice,
though found restrictive, is deemed not to be prejudicial to the public
interest.

In the light of what has been said above, if the order of the Commis-
sion is examined, it shall appear that the Commission has set out briefly E
the facts of 15 cases. Then the Commission has pointed out that the
Director General in support of his case has tendered the various agree-
ments. Thereafter reference has been made to the affidavits filed on behalf
of the appellant and other documents. The real discussion is only in para
40 of the Order under appeal which is as follows : F

"We have gone through voluminous records and pleadings
pertaining to these enquiries, evidence produce by the parties, oral
argument, written submissions and cases referred to by the parties
and are of the view that no case for gateways under Section 38(1), G
as pleaded, has been made out by the Valtas in these proceedings.
Likewise the manufacturer Simtools Limited in RTP Enquiry No.
483 of 1987 has also failed to make out any case for the gateways.
Therefore, we hold that the respondents have indulged into the
restrictive trade practices, as alleged in the Notice of Enquiry, and
those practices are prejudicial to the public interest in each of the H
966 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1995) 1 S.C.R.
\
A 15 enquiries:Z_

According to us, the Commission was required to go deeper into the i
matter and to record findings in respect of different agreements whether
the objectionable clauses of the registered agreements were prejudicial to
the public inter~st. It need not be impressed that any finding recorded by
B the Commission under Section 37 and direction given in terms of clauses
(a) and (b) sub-section 1 of Section 37 has a far reaching effect. As such
every aspect of the matter is required to be examined in the light of the
provisions of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act before an order to 'cease and
desist' is passed by the Commission. \c.
c Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned order passed in
bY
the 15 enquiries the Commission Is set aside and the Commission is
directed to examine the questions involved afresh on the basis of the
. . . _ material produced on behalf of the parties. It will be open to the Commis-
sion to require any of the parties to adduce further evidence, oral
D documentary, in order to enable it to come to the conclusion one way or
the other. In the facts and circumstances of the cases, there shalt be no
orders as to cost.

R.A. Appeals allowed..