Holding

Import is complete when goods enter Indian territory; Section 9A(8) cannot be applied retrospectively, and the 2002 notification is prospective, so anti‑dumping duty could not be levied on the goods imported on 16‑April‑2002.

Summary

Sneh Enterprises imported lead‑acid batteries from Taiwan, which landed in Mumbai on 16‑April‑2002 and were trans‑shipped to Delhi where the Bill of Entry was filed on 22‑May‑2002. On the same day the Central Government issued a notification under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 imposing an anti‑dumping duty on such batteries. The appellant contended that the notification was prospective, that the taxable event occurred on the date of import (16‑April‑2002) before the duty was in force, and that Section 9A(8), which incorporates provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, could not be applied retrospectively as it was introduced only in 2004. The respondents argued that the import was complete when the goods crossed the customs barrier (i.e., when the Bill of Entry was filed) and that the duty could be levied. The Supreme Court held that, in the absence of a statutory interdict, import is complete when goods enter Indian territory, that Section 9A(8) cannot be applied retrospectively, and that the 2002 notification was prospective; consequently the anti‑dumping duty could not be imposed on the goods imported on 16‑April‑2002. The appeal was allowed and the tribunal’s order set aside.

Issues considered

When is the import of goods deemed complete for the purpose of levying anti‑dumping duty under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975?
Does Section 9A(8) of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975, which incorporates provisions of the Customs Act, 1962, apply retrospectively to imports made before its insertion in 2004?
Is the notification dated 22‑May‑2002 imposing anti‑dumping duty prospective or retrospective in operation?
Can the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 be applied to determine the rate of anti‑dumping duty prior to 2004?

Legislation cited

Subjects

anti‑dumping dutycustoms tariff actimport completionretrospective legislationstatutory interpretationstrict constructionincorporation by referencecustoms dutytaxable event

Judgment

M/S. SNEH ENTERPRISES A
V.

COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI

SEPTEMBER 8, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND DAL VEER BHANDARI, JJ.] B

Customs Tariff Act, 1975-Section 9A-Anti-dumping duty.
Import of goods for imposition of-When complete-Held-It depends
on contract between parties and/or statute-It is not common law that it C
would be deemed to be complete only when goods pass customs barrier-In
absence of statutory interdict common law principle applies and the import
is complete when goods enter territories of a country-On facts, held, though
goods landed in Mumbai and Bill of Entry was filed subsequently in Delhi
after transshipment there, taxable event of their import for purposes of
imposition of Anti-Dumping duty occurred in Mumbai. D
Applicability of provisions of Customs Act, 1962-Section 9A(8) of Act
of 1975 introduced by Finance Act, 2004-Making applicable to Act of 1975
provisions of Act of 1962 relating to date of determination of duty etc.-Effect
of-Held-As Section 9A(8) was enacted to achieve a specific purpose, its
operation was limited from the date it came into force, and it could not be E
applied with retrospective effect-Further, as it was enacted to suppress a
mischief, Section I 5 ofAct of I 962, prescribing date for determination of rate
of duty, could not apply in Section 9A of Act of 1975 prior to 2004-Also,
it was not a case of incorporation of provisions of law by reference.
On lead acid batteries originating from Taiwan-Notification dated F
....'\ 22.5.2002-Effect of-Held, on its face value, the notification was prospective
in operation.
Interpretation of statutes-Taxing provision-Held-Principle of strict
interpretation should be applied-Court shall not make interpretation in
such a manner as would create an additional fiscal burden on a person-
/I would never be done by invoking provisions of another statute which are G
not attracted-Also, while two interpretations are possible, Court should
ordinarily interpret the provisions in favour of a tax-payer and against
Revenue.
-~

817 H
818 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
'1
A Interpretation of statutes-Situation contemplated under one statute-
E.ffect of while applying provision of another statute-Held, this cannot be
done in absence of any express or clear intendment.

Interpretation of statutes-Incorporation of provisions of law by
reference-Held while doing so, it is obligatory for Parliament/legislature to
B say so.

Appellant imported batteries from Taiwan. Though the import took place
at Mumbai on 16.4.2002, batteries were transshipped to Delhi and the Bill of
Entry was filed there on 22.5.2002. However, on that day, the Central
Government exercising its powers under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff
c Act, 1975, issued a notification imposing anti-dumping duties on batteries
originating in or exported from Taiwan. The respondents, relying on that
notification, directed the appellant to pay the anti-dumping duty. Appellant
contended that the said notification was not retrospective and the taxable event
occurred on 16.4.2002 when no anti-dumping duty was in force. Respondent
D rejected these contentions of appellant. Hence the present appeal.

Appellant contended that the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs •
Act, 1962, prescribing the date for determination of rate of duty on imported
goods, could not be invoked for imposition of anti-dumping duty in view of the
fact that Section 9A(8) in Act of 1975, making applicable provisions of the
E Customs Act, 1962 relating to the date for determination of rate of duty etc.
to anti-dumping duty, was introduced in the year 2004 by Finance (No. 2) Act,
2004.

Respondent contended that the tal<:able event was the day when the goods
crossed the customs barrier and not on the day when the goods landed in India
F or entered its territorial waters.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. The question as to when import of goods is complete would
depend upon contract between the parties andior statute governing the field.
G It is not a part of common law that the import of the goods would be deemed to
.,.,
have been completed only when it passes the customs barrier. Such a provision
has been made for achieving definite purposes i.e., for the purpose of
calculating customs duty. 1826-E, FJ

1.2. Unless there exists a statutory interdict, common law principle would
H
-"-' SNEH ENTERPRISES v. COMMNR OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI 819
apply which would mean that import would be complete when the goods enter A
the terrifories of the country. Taxable event in terms of the notification issued
under Section 9A of the Act is on importation of the good and not when the
same passes the customs barrier. 1826-G; 827-AI

1.3. The goods in question landed at Mumbai. They were trans-shipped
to Delhi. They were, however, cleared at Delhi. The goods might have passed B
the customs barrier on the day on which the Bill of Entry was filed by the
appellant for the purpose of Customs Act. But such importation of goods, in
terms of the provisions of the Customs Act, was meant only for computation
of duty thereunder and not for any other purpose. 1827-Af

2.1. Section 9A(8) was introduced by Finance Act, 2004. Prior thereto, c
the statute did not contemplate application of the provisions of the Customs
Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder. By Section 76 of the
Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, indisputably, Sub-Section (8) was inserted stating
the provisions of the Customs Act would be applicable "relating to, the date
for determination of rate of duty, non-levy, short levy, refunds, interest, appeals,
D
offences and penalties" in respect of anti-dumping duty. 1823-D, El
•
2.2. Section 9A(8) of Customs Tariff Act was enacted to achieve a
specific purpose. Its operation is limited from the date it came into force. It
cannot be applied with retrospective effect. 1826-G I

2.3. It is a trite law that while interpreting the statute, the courts not
E
only may take into consideration the purpose for which the same had been
enacted, but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. Evidently, with a view to
suppress the mischief, if any, Section 76 of the Finance Act, 2004, was brought
into the statute book. It cannot, therefore, by no· stretch of imagination be
held that the Parliament intended to apply the provisions of Section 15 of the F
~
Customs Act in Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, prior to 2004.
f827-B, CJ

3.1. A situation contemplated under one statute cannot, in absence of
any express or clear intendment, be made to apply or be given effect to while
applying the provisions of another statute. (827-B] G
3.2. The anti-dumping duty does not attract the provisions of the Customs
Act. If the provision of law is incorporated by reference, it was obligatory on
the part of the Parliament to say so. Such a provision was brought for the
....
' first time in the year 2004. The doctrine of incorporation by reference is,
therefore, not attracted. (824-A, B] H
820 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R. '-\

A Nagpur Improvement Trust etc. v. Vasantrao and Ors., 120021 7 SCC
657, Kanak (SMT) and Anr. v·. UP. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad and Ors., (2003]
7 SCC 693 and Surana Steels Pvt. Ltd. etc. v. Dy. Commissioner of Income
Tax and Ors. etc., (199911 SCC 306, relied on.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Tenth
B Edition (2006), pp. 294-295, referred to.
4. The notification dated 22.5.2002, on its face value, is prospective in
operation and not retrospective. It, in no uncertain terms, states that Central
Government thereby may impose duty only, inter a/ia, on lead acid batteries
originated from the countries specified therein and imported into India. The
c proviso appended to the notification provides for a clue in the sense that by
reason thereof no duty was to be imposed on industrial lead acid batteries
manufactured by the manufacturers named therein. The anti-dumping duty
imposed thereby was to remain effective only for a limited period i.e., upto
21st November, 2002. (827-E, F]
D 5. While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of Strict
Interpretation, should be applied. The Court shall not interpret the statutory
provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden on
a person. It would never be done by invoking the provisions of another Act,
which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are
E possible, the Court ordinarily would interpret the provisions in favour of a
tax-payer and against the Revenue. 1827-D, El

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 706 of2005.

From the Final Order No. I078/04-NBA dated 7.10.2004 of the Customs,
Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, Bench NBA in Appeal
F
No. C/353/04-NBA. r,

P.C. Jain; Rajesh Kumar and Sandeep Jain for the Appellant.

K.P. Pathak, A.S.G., Binu Tamta and B. Krishna Prasad for the Respondent.

G The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.B. SINHA, J. Sealed maintenance free lead acid batteries manufactured
in Taiwan for being used ip Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS) were imported

" ,
by the appellant at Mumbai on 16.4.2002. The goods were trans-shipped from
Mumbai to Delhi. The Bill of Entry, however, was filed by the appellant with
H the customs authorities at Delhi on 22.5.2002.
~)
SNEH ENTERPRISES r. COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI [SINHA, J.] 821

Anti-dumping duty, indisputably, can be levied on issuance of a A
notification by the Central Government in terms of Section 9A of the Customs
Tariff Act, 1975 (for short, 'the Act'). The said provision reads thus :

"9A. Anti-dumping duty.- (1) Where any article is exported from any
country or territory (hereafter in this section referred to as the exporting
country or territory) to India at less than its normal value, then, upon B
)· the importation of such articles into India, the Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, impose, -

(a) if the article is not otherwise chargeable with duty under the
provisions of this Act, a duty; or
(b) if the article is otherwise so chargeable, an additional duty,
c
not exceeding the margin of dumping in relation to such article;"
The Central Government, in exercise of its power thereunder, issued a
notification on 22.5.2002 on lead acid batteries, originating in or exported,
inter alia from Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. The respondents, relying
D
on or on the basis of the said notification directed payment of anti-dumping
duty on the said imported goods by the appellant.

The contention of the appellant, inter a/ia, is that the said notification
dated 22.5.2002 being not retrospective in operation the impugned order was
wholly unsustainable. It was urged that the taxable event having occurred on E
the day of importation of goods, i.e., on 16.4.2002, no anti-dumping duty,
admittedly brought in force by reason of the said notification dated 22.5.2002,
was applicable. The said contention of the appellant, however, was rejected
by the respondent, and affirmed by the Customs, Excise and Service Tax
Appellate Tribunal by reason of the impugned order, stating :
F
~ "It is thus settled law that the import is completed only when the
goods are to cross the Customs barriers and that is the time when the
:
import duty has to be paid and not on the date when goods had
'
landed in India. Under Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, anti-
dumping duty is imposable upon importation of the goods. The import
is completed only when the goods are to cross the customs barrier. G
In the present matter on the date of crossing the customs barrier, the
anti-dumping duty was leviable in terms of Notification No.55/2002-
Cus and, therefore, anti-dumping duty under Section 9A of the Customs
~
,.,.. Tariff Act is payable by the Appellants. The decision of the tribunal
H
822 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.
'<
A in the case of Suja Rubber Industries is not applicable as it has been
passed per incuriam the judgment of the Supreme Court ir. Kiran
Spinning and Garden Silk Mills. Thus, the ratio of the decision in
Fenner India Ltd., is also not applicable."

Mr. P.C. Jain, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant
B would submit that in view of the fact that Section 9A is an enabling provision
and the notification thereunder having been issued on 22.5.2002, the provisions
of Section l 5A of the Customs Act could not have been invoked in the
instant case, particularly, in view of the fact that Sub-Section (8) of Section
9A was introduced in the year 2004 by reason of Finance (No. 2) Act, 2004.

c Mr. K.P. Pathak, learned Additional Solicitor General, however, would
submit that in view of the judgment of this Court in Kiran Spinning Mills v.
Collector of Customs, ( 1993) 113 EL T 753 (S.C.), the taxable event must be
held to be the day when the goods crossed the customs barrier and not on
the day when the goods landed in India or entered its territorial waters.
D Customs Tariff Act, 1975 was enacte9 to consolidate and amend the law
relating to custom duties. Section 2 of the said Act provides for the rates at
which the custom duty should be levied under the Customs Act, 1962 as
specified in the First and Second Schedules. Imposition of anti-dumping duty,
however, is not a part of the duty, which can be levied under the Customs
E Act.

Customs Duties under the Customs Act would include additional duty
under the Customs Tariff Act. Additional duty can be levied in terms of
Section 3 of the said Act. For computation of additional duty, in terms of Sub-
Section (6) of Section 3, the provisions of the Customs Act, 1962 and the rules
F and regulations made thereunder, including those relating to drawbacks, refunds
and exemption from duties, shall so far as may be, apply to the duty chargeable q
under the said section shall apply as they apply in relation to the duties
leviable under that Act. Sub-Section (6) of Section 3 of 1975 Act, therefore, c
provides for incorporation QY reference the provisions of the Customs Act,
1962 and the rules and regulations made thereunder, as applicable in relation
G to the additional duty framed thereunder.

Section 9A was inserted in the year 1985. It contains an enabling
provision. The said provision envisages that the duty would be imposable if,
in the opinion of. the Central Government, the value of the goods is less than
·;..
its normal value. Normal value has been defined in Explanation (b) to Section "
H
·~}
SNEH ENTERPRISES "· COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI [SINHA, J.] 823 ;
9A to mean: A
"(b) "normal value", in relation to an article, means -

(i) The comparable price in the ordinary course of trade for the said
article or like article when meant for consumption in the exporting
country or territory as determined under sub-section (2); or B
) (ii) where such comparable price cannot be ascertained because of
t!ie particular market situation or for any other reason, s·uch
value shall be either -

(A) the highest comparable price for the said article or like article
from the exporting country or territory to any third country in C
the ordinary course of trade as determined under sub-section
(2); or

(B) the cost of production of the said article or like article in the
country of origin along with reasonable addition for selling and
any other cost, and for profits, as. detennined under sub-section D
(2)."

Sub-section (8) of Section 9A was introduced by Finance Act, 2004 .
. Prior thereto, the statute did not contemplate application of the provisions of
the Customs Ac! and the rules and regulations made thereunder. By Section
76 of the Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, indisputably, Sub-Section (8) was inserted E
stating the provisions of the Customs Act would be applicable "relating_.to,
the date for determination of rate of duty, non-levy, short levy, refii'nds,
interest, appeals, offences and penalties" in respect of anti-dumping duty.

Sub-Section (I) of Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 reads as under:
F
"15. Date for determination of rate of duty and tariff 1•a/uation of
imported goods. - (I) The rate of duty, and tariff valuation, if any,
applicable to any imported goods, shall be the rate and valuation in
force,-

(a) in the case of goods entered for home consumption under Section G
46, on the date on which a bill of entry in respect of such goods
is presented under that section;
(b) in the case of goods cleared from a warehouse under section 68,
on the date on which the goods are actually removed from the
H
824 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A warehouse;

(c) in the case of any other goods, on the date of payment of duty;"

The anti-dumping duty, as noticed hereinbefore, does not attract the
provisions of the Customs Act. If the provision of law is incorporated by
reference, it was obligatory on the part of the Parliament to say so. Such a
B provision was brought for the first time in the year 2004. The doctrine of
incorporation by reference is, therefore, not attracted.

In Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh, Tenth
Edition 2006, at pp. 294-295, the law is stated in the following terms :
c "When an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated
by reference into a later Act, the provision so incorporated become
part and parcel of the later Act as if they had been "bodily transposed
into it". The effect of incorporation is admirably stated by LORD
ESHER, M.R.: "If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference
D some of the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has
often been held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they
had been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it." The result
is to constitute the later Act along with the incorporated provisions
of the earlier Act, an independent legislation which is not modified or
repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act."
E
The question was considered at some details by a Three Judge Bench
of this Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust etc. v. Vasantrao & Ors., [2002]
7 sec 657, opining:

"...... The law on the subject is well settled. When an earlier Act or
F certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference into a later Act,
the provisions so incorporated become part and parcel of the later Act
as if they had been bodily transposed into it. The incorporation of an
earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative device adopted for the sake
of convenience in order to avoid verbatim reproduction of the
provisions of the earlier Act into the later. But this must he
G distinguished from a referential legislation which merely contains a
reference· or the citation of the provisions of an earlier statute. In a
case where a statute is incorporated, by reference, into a second
statute, the repeal of the first statute by a third does not affect the
second. The later Act along with the incorporated provisions of the
H earlier Act constitutes an independent legislation which is not modified
SNEH ENTERPRISES r. COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS. NEW DELHI [SINHA, J.] 825
or repealed by a modification or repeal of the earlier Act. However, A
where in a later Act there is a mere reference to an earlier Act, the
modification, repeal or amendment of the statute that is referred, will
also have an effect on the statute in which it is referred. It is equally
well settled that the question whether a former statute is merely
referred to or cited in a later statute, or whether it is wholly or partially
incorporated therein, is a question of construction." B
j
The said decision has been followed in Kanak (SMT) & Anr. v. U.P.
Avas Evam Vikas Parishad & Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 693.

The Tribunal unfortunately did not address itself on the said question.
It, inter alia, relied upon Kiran Spinning Mills (supra), wherein the provisions c
of Sub-Section (6) of Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act were attracted.

We are herein not dealing with a case of additional duty of excise. In
Kiran Spinning Mills (supra), only because Sub-Section (6) of Section 3 was
held to be attracted in that case, additional excise duty was held to be payable
on the date when the Bill of Exchange was filed. D

Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act clearly states that imposition of
anti-dumping duty on dumped articles is required to be determined "upon the
importation of such article into India, the Central Government may, by
notification in the Official Gazette, impose an anti-dumping duty not exceeding
the margin of dumping in relation to such article". Quantum of additional duty, E
therefore, was required to be determined when the goods have been imported
and is subject for clearance. Such is not the case here.

In Surana Steels Pvt. Ltd. etc. v. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax &
Ors. etc., [ 1999] 4 SCC 306, it is stated :
F
"Section 115-J explanation clause (iv), is a piece of legislation by
•• incorporation. Dealing with the subject, Justice G.P. Singh states in
" Principles of Statutory Interpretation (7th Edn., 1999) -

"Incorporation of an earlier Act into a later Act is a legislative
device adopted for the sake of convenience in order to avoid verbatim G
reproduction of the provisions of the earlier Act into the later. When
an earlier Act or certain of its provisions are incorporated by reference
into a later Act, the provisions so incorporated become part and
parcel of the later Act as if they had been 'bodily transposed into it'.
/,.. The effect of incorporation is admirably stated by LORD ESHER, H
"
826 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A M.R.: 'If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of the
clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been
held, is to write those sections into the new Act as if they had been
actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it.' (p.233)

Even though only particular sections of an earlier Act are
B incorporated into later, in construing the incorporated sections it may
be at times necessary and permissible to refer to other parts of the
earlier statute which are not incorporated. As was stated by LORD
BLACKBURN : 'When a single section of an Act of Padiament is
introduced into another Act, I think it must be read in the sense it
bore in the original Act from which it was taken, and that consequently
c it is perfectly legitimate to refer to all the rest of that Act in order to
ascertain what the section meant, though those other sections are not
incorporated in the new Act."' (p.244)"

Anti-dumping duty would be payable in respect of the goods which
D have already entered Indian Territory and are warehoused.

In this case, goods were cleared by the Customs Authorities without
imposing any anti-dumping duty. It was at a later date the duties were sought
to be imposed, wherefor a show cause notice was issued.

A Judgment, as is well known, is the authority for the proposition which
E it decides and not what can logically be deduced from. Kiran Spinning Mills
(supra) does not militate against a contention of the appellant. It, in fact,
supports its contention. The question as to when import of goods is complete
would depend upon contract between the parties and/or statute governing
the field. It is not a part of common law that the import of the goods would
F be deemed to have been completed only when it passes the customs barrier.
Such a provision had been made for achieving definite purposes, i.e., for the
purpose of calculating customs duty. O

In absence of a statute, the contract between the parties would not be
superceded. Sub-Section 6 of Section 3 or Sub-Section 8 of Section 9A of
G Customs Tariff Act was enacted to achieve a specific purpose. Its operation
is limited from the date it came into force. It cannot be applied with retrospective
effect. Unless there exists a statutory interdict, common law principle would
apply which would mean that import would be complete when the goods enter
the territories of the country. Taxable event in terms of the notification issued
H under Section 9A of the Act is on importation of the goods and not when .,_ ...
SNEH ENTERPRISES v. COMMNR. OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI [SINHA, J.] 827
the same passes the customs barrier. The goods in question landed at Mumbai. A
They were trans-shipped to Delhi. They were, however, cleared at Delhi. The
goods might have passed the customs barrier on the day on which the Bill
of Entry was filed by the appellant for the purpose of Customs Act. But such
importation of goods, in terms of the provisions of the Customs· Act, was
meant only for computation of duty thereunder and not for any other purpose.
In other words, a situation contemplated under one statute cannot, in absence B
)
of any express or clear intendment, be made to apply or be given effect to
while applying the provisions of another statute.

It is a trite law that while interpreting the statute, the courts not only
may take into consideration the purpose for which the same had been enacted, C
but also the mischief it seeks to suppress. Evidently, with i. view to suppress
the mischief, if any, Section 26 of the Finance Act, 2004, was brought into the
statute book. It cannot, therefore, by no stretch of imagination be held that
the Parliament intended to apply the provisions of Section 15 of the Customs
Act in Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, prior to 2004.
D
While dealing with a taxing provision, the principle of 'Strict
Interpretation' should be applied. The Court shall not interpret the statutory
provision in such a manner which would create an additional fiscal burden
on a person. It would never be done by invoking the provisions of another
Act, which are not attracted. It is also trite that while two interpretations are
possible, the Court ordinarily would interpret the provisions in favour of a tax- E
payer and against the Revenue.

The notification dated 22.5.2002, on its face value, is prospective in
operation and not retrospective. It, in no uncertain terms, states that Central
Government thereby may impose duty only, inter alia, on lead acid batteries
originated from the countries specified therein and imported into India. The F
proviso appended to the notification provides for a clue in the sense that by
reason thereof no duty was to be imposed on industrial lead acid batteries
manufactured by the manufacturers named therein. The anti-dumping duty
imposed thereby was to remain effective only for a limited period, i.e., upto
2 Ist November, 2002. G
For the aforementioned reasons, the impugned judgment cannot be
sustained, which is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed. No costs.

vs Appeal allowed.
H