Holding

The Supreme Court’s 25 August 2022 judgment was erroneous on the limitation and specific performance analysis and is set aside, restoring the High Court’s order.

Summary

The petitioner, Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd., entered into two agreements to sell agricultural land with the respondents in 1997, paid a substantial portion of the consideration, and sought specific performance after the respondents refused to execute the sale deed. The trial court dismissed the suit, the High Court partially allowed it, and the Supreme Court in 2022 held the suit barred by limitation and denied specific performance, interpreting the contract as making time of the essence. The petitioner filed a review petition alleging errors in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the contract clauses, the calculation of limitation, and the application of the doctrine of lis pendens. The Court examined the Limitation Act, Transfer of Property Act, and Specific Relief Act, finding that the contract did not fix a performance date, that limitation began only upon receipt of the respondents' refusal notice, and that the petitioner was ready and willing to perform. It also held that the review petition was properly instituted, triggering lis pendens, and that the Supreme Court’s earlier judgment contained errors apparent on the face of the record. Consequently, the review petition was allowed, the 2022 judgment was set aside, and the High Court’s decision restored.

Issues considered

Whether the suit for specific performance was barred by limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Whether the contract made time of the essence, affecting the limitation period and the entitlement to specific performance.
Whether the Supreme Court erred in its interpretation of clauses 3, 21 and 23 of the sale agreements.
Whether the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies to the review proceedings.
Whether the review petition satisfies the grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XLVII Rule 1
Constitution of Indias. Article 137
Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 54 (Schedule)
Specific Relief Act, 1963s. Section 10, s. Section 12, s. Section 16(c)
Supreme Court Rules, 2013s. Order XLVII Rule 1, s. Order XLVII Rule 2
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 52

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose, whether the judgment of this Court suffers from an error apparent on the face of the record which warrants the exercise of the review jurisdiction; whether the suit instituted was barred by limitation; and whether the suit for specific performance must be decreed. Headnotes† Constitution of India – Art. 137 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Ord. XLVII r.1 – Review of judgments of Supreme Court – Suit fo specific performance –

Subjects

Review of judgments of Supreme CourtSuit for specific performanceBar by limitationAgreement to sellNon-execution of sale deedSale considerationExecution of irrevocable power of attorneyReceipt of balance considerationSuit barred by limitationLimitationDoctrine of lis pendensPetition for review lying in registry in defective stateReview proceedingsPeriod of limitation of thirty daysThird-party purchaserDiscretionary powerEarnest moneyReadiness and willingness to perform contractPendencyActive prosecutionPendency to commence from date of institution until disposalReviewReview jurisdictionGrounds for exercising review jurisdictionPrinciples on exercise of review jurisdiction

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 667 : 2024 INSC 861

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.
Review Petition (C) No. 1565 of 2022
in
C.A. No. 5822 of 2022
08 November 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI,*
J.B. Pardiwala and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose, whether the judgment of this Court suffers from
an error apparent on the face of the record which warrants the
exercise of the review jurisdiction; whether the suit instituted by
the petitioner was barred by limitation; and whether the suit for
specific performance must be decreed.

Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art. 137 – Supreme Court Rules,
2013 – Ord. XLVII r.1 – Review of judgments of Supreme
Court – Suit fo specific performance – Suit instituted, if
barred by limitation – Agreement to sell land between the
original owners and vendors – Sale deed not executed,
though the full sale consideration paid – However, execution
of irrevocable power of attorney in favour of the vendors –
Three years later, vendors executed agreement to sell in
favour of the petitioner – Issuance of two legal notices by the
petitioner to the respondents calling upon them to execute
the sale deed upon receipt of the balance consideration –
Thereafter, petitioners filed suit for specific performance of
the agreement to sell, which was dismissed – High Court
partly allowed the appeal decreeing the suit in favour of the
petitioner only to the extent of the consideration paid by the
petitioner – In appeal thereagainst, this Court held that the
suit was barred by limitation – Review petition filed seeking
review of the judgment – Exercise of review jurisdiction, if
warranted:
* Author
668 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Held: Petitioner had notice that performance is refused only by the
reply dated 14.04.2000 to the first legal notice of the petitioner –
Limitation prescribed by Art. 54 sets in from the date when the
petitioner received the reply refusing performance – Irrespective
of whether the suit was instituted on 9.08.2002 (as concluded
by trial court) or 30.07.2002 (as concluded by the High Court),
it was within limitation – Further, doctrine of lis pendens applies
where the petition for review was lying in the registry in a defective
state – Review proceedings were “instituted” within the period of
limitation of thirty days – Doctrine of lis pendens kicks in at the
stage of “institution” and not at the stage when notice is issued
by this Court – Thus, s. 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would
apply to the third-party purchaser once the sale was executed
after the review petition was instituted before this Court – Any
transfer made during the pendency is subject to the final result
of the litigation – Furthermore, even assuming that the grant of
relief of specific performance continued to be discretionary to a
suit instituted before the date of the amendment to s. 10 of the
Specific Relief Act, this Court erred in its analysis of whether
the Court ought to use its discretionary power in this matter – It
cannot be concluded that the petitioner was not ready or willing
to perform his part of the contract merely because the balance
sale consideration was due to be paid – Petitioner with the
payment of the additional sum above the earnest money, has
proved his readiness and willingness to perform the contract –
On application of the facts to the principles in ss. 10 and 16 of
the Specific Relief Act, it is a fit case for this Court to exercise
its discretion to direct specific performance – Thus, in view of
the errors apparent, both on the issues of limitation and specific
performance, the judgment of this Court recalled and that of the
High Court restored. [Paras 30, 31, 41, 42, 49-52]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s. 52 – Doctrine of lis pendens –
Application of – Conditions to be fulfilled:
Held: There must be a pending suit or proceeding; suit or
proceeding must be pending in a competent court; suit or proceeding
must not be collusive; right to immovable property must be directly
and specifically in question in the suit or proceeding; property
must be transferred by a party to the litigation; and the alienation
must affect the rights of any other party to the dispute – Doctrine
of lis pendens that s. 52 encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 669

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

property during the pendency of litigation – Only exception to the
principle is when it is transferred under the authority of the court
and on terms imposed by it – Where one of the parties to the suit
transfers the suit property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter
is bound by the result of the proceedings even if he did not have
notice of the suit or proceeding – Purpose of lis pendens is to
ensure that the process of the court is not subverted and rendered
infructuous – In the absence of the doctrine of lis pendens, a
defendant could defeat the purpose of the suit by alienating the
suit property – This purpose of the provision is clearly elucidated
in the explanation clause to s. 52 which defines “pendency” –
Amending Act 20 of 1929 substituted the word “pendency” in
place of “active prosecution” – Amending Act also included
the Explanation defining the expression “pendency of suit or
proceeding” – “Pendency” is defined to commence from the “date
of institution” until the “disposal”. [Paras 46, 47, 49]

Review – Review jurisdiction – Grounds for exercising review
jurisdiction – Principles on the exercise of review jurisdiction –
Stated – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order XLVII – Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord. XLVII r. 1. [Paras 18, 19]

Case Law Cited
Babulal v. Hajarilal Kishorilal [1982] 3 SCR 94 : (1982) 1 SCC 525;
R Lakshmi Kantham v. Devaraji (2019) 8 SCC 62; Mademsetty
Satyanarayana v. G. Yelloji Rao AIR 1965 SC 1405; Chand Rani
v. Kamal Rani [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 798 : (1993) 1 SCC 519;
Saradamani kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi [2011] 8 SCR 874 :
(2011) 12 SCC 18; Jaswinder Kaur v. Gurmeet Singh [2017] 5 SCR
430 : (2017) 12 SCC 810; Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan
[2023] 3 SCR 47 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185; Karnail Singh v.
State of Haryana 2021 SCC OnLine SC 961; Kamlesh Verma v.
Mayawati [2013] 11 SCR 25 : (2013) 8 SCC 320; Sanjay Kumar
Agarwal v. State Tax Officer [2023] 15 SCR 225 : (2024) 2 SCC
362; Nagubai Ammal v. B Shama Rao [1956] 1 SCR 451 : 1956
SCC 321; Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon [2005] 3 SCR
509 : (2005) 11 SCC 403; Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami [1973]
1 SCR 139 : AIR 1973 SC 569; GT Girish v. Y Subba Raju 2022
8 SCR 991 – referred to.
Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G&J 566 – referred to.
670 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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List of Acts
Limitation Act 1963; Transfer of Property Act 1882; Specific Relief
Act 1963; Constitution of India; Supreme Court Rules 2013.

List of Keywords
Review of judgments of Supreme Court; Suit for specific
performance; Bar by limitation; Agreement to sell; Non-execution
of Sale deed; Sale consideration; Execution of irrevocable power
of attorney; Receipt of balance consideration; Suit barred by
limitation; Limitation; Doctrine of lis pendens; Petition for review
lying in registry in defective state; Review proceedings; Period of
limitation of thirty days; Third-party purchaser; Discretionary power;
Earnest money; Readiness and willingness to perform contract;
Pendency; Active prosecution; Pendency to commence from date
of institution until disposal; Review; Review jurisdiction; Grounds
for exercising review jurisdiction; Principles on exercise of review
jurisdiction.

Case Arising From
INHERENT JURISDICTION: Review Petition (C) No. 1565 of 2022
In
Civil Appeal No. 5822 of 2022
From the Judgment and Order dated 25.08.2022 of the Supreme
Court of India in C.A. No. 5822 of 2022
With
Review Petition (C) No. 1839 of 2024 In C.A. No. 5823 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Harin P Raval, Naveen Kumar Pahwa,
Sr. Advs., Mohan Rao, S Uadaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Bina Madhavan,
Tushar Singh, Ms. Lavanya Goinka, Ms. Urmi H Raval, Ms. Shreya
Bansal, Ms. Shrestha Narayan, Siddharth H Raval, Krishna Kumar
Singh, Advs. for the Petitioner.
Mukul Rohatgi, Rakesh Dwivedi, Sr. Advs., Mahesh Agarwal,
Rishi Agrawala, Ankur Saigal, Ms. Madhavi Agarwal, Divyanshu
Srivastava, Ms. Deepsikha Mishra, Yash Jain, E.C. Agrawala,
Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 671

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Table of Contents*

A. Background ........................................................................ 3
B. Judgments of the Trial Court, High Court and this Court ...... 7
C. Submissions ....................................................................... 16
D. Grounds for exercising review jurisdiction .......................... 17
E. Limitation ........................................................................... 19
F. Specific performance ......................................................... 25
G. Lis pendens ....................................................................... 32
H. Relief ................................................................................. 36

1. The petitioner has instituted proceedings under Article 137 of the
Constitution read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules
2013 seeking a review oft he judgment of a three-Judge Bench of
this Court dated 25 August 2022. By the judgment, this Court allowed
the appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Telangana
dated 23 April 2021 by which the suit for specific performance was
partially decreed by directing the registration of the suit property in
favour of the petitioner proportionate to the extent of the consideration
paid. The issue for the consideration of this Court is whether the
judgment of this Court dated 25 August 2022 suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record which warrants the exercise of
the review jurisdiction.

A. Background
2. On 19 March 1994, Shri Debbad Narayana, Shri Vishweswara Rao
(represented by the tenth to twelfth respondents who are his legal
representatives), the third respondent, fourth respondent and fifth
respondent (“original owners”) entered into an agreement to sell a land
admeasuring 127.29 acs to the first, second, sixth, seventh and eight
respondents (“vendors”). On the date of the agreement, possession

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
672 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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to the extent of 65.23 acs was delivered to the vendors. Upon the
payment of the balance sale consideration, the possession of the
entire property was delivered. A sale deed was not executed, though
the full sale consideration was paid. However, on 28 March 1994, an
irrevocable power of attorney was executed in favour of the vendors.
3. On 26 March 1997,the vendors executed an agreement to sell in
favour of the petitioner. This agreement will be referred to as the
“first agreement to sell”. By the agreement, the first and the second
respondents offered to alienate the scheduled property of 38.15 acs1
for a sale consideration of Rs. 38,37,500. The agreement notes that
the petitioner paid a sum of Rs. 5,30,000 in cash and Rs. 6,00,000
in cheque as advance and earnest money. The relevant clauses of
the agreement to sell are extracted below:
“3. The purchaser shall pay a sum of Rs. 27,07,200/-
(Rupees Twenty Seven Lakhs seven thousand five hundred
only) towards the balance sale consideration within three
months from this date to the parties of the second part
herein and if the purchaser does not honour to pay the
balance sale consideration of Rs. 27,07,500/- (Rupees
Twenty Seven Lakhs Seven Thousand and Five Hundred
Only) within a period of three months from the date of
this date, the advance amount paid will be forfeited and
this agreement of sale will be cancelled if the vendors
fail to furnish the non-encumbrance certificate, income
tax exemption certificate, agricultural certificates to the
purchaser within three months.
[…]
6. The parties of the first part and the parties of the second
part herein undertake that they will execute a registered sale
deed or deeds or any other nature of documents as desired
by the purchaser in favour of the purchaser or its nominee
or nominees, after receiving the balance sale consideration.

1 “All that the agriculture land bearing Sy. Nos. 301 part, 302, 303, 304 part totally admeasuring Ac. 38-
15 guntas situated at Budwel village, the then Hyderabad West Tq., now Rajendernagar Mandar, R.R.
District, which is bounded by as under:-
East: Sy. No. 381, 380 and 326
West: Sy. No. 54 Village boundary of Irsalgandi
North: Sy. No. 381, 380 and 326
South: Sy. No. 300 and 306”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 673

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

[…]
20. The parties of the first part and the second part herein
undertake to execute the documents either registered or
un-registered as desired by the purchaser after receiving
the balance sale consideration to the extent to the schedule
property.
[…]
21. The parties of the first part are not at all concerned to
the sale consideration agreed by the parties of the second
part herein with the purchaser as already they received the
agreed sale consideration from the parties of the second
part herein as per the agreement dated 19th March 1994.
[…]
23. The parties of the second part herein undertake on
any pretext they will not make any claim for enhancing
the agreed sale consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)
4. The first agreement to sell refers to the “original owners” as the
“parties of the first part”. The agreement refers to the “vendors” as
the “parties to the second part”. The petitioner is referred to as the
“purchaser”. It must also be noted that the recital to the first sale
agreement states that the “parties of the first part and parties 1,3,5
and 6 of the parties of the second part” have been made a party to
the agreement only to ensure that there is no “cloud over the title”.
5. On 27 March 1997, an agreement to sell was executed by the
first and second respondents in favour of the petitioner to sell the
scheduled property of 1.33 Acs2 for a consideration of Rs. 1,82,500.
This agreement will be referred to as the second agreement to sell.
6. On 8 February 2000, the petitioner issued a legal notice (“first legal
notice”) to the first and second respondents calling upon them to

2 “All that the agricultural land bearing Sy. Nos. 304 part totally admeasuring Ac. 1.33 guntas situated
at Budwel village, the then Hyderabad West Tq. Now Rajendernagar mandal, R.R. District, which is
bounded by as under:-
East: Sy. No. 308
West: Sy. No. 3030
North: Sy. No. 326
South: Sy. No. 305”.
674 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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receive the balance sale consideration and execute the sale deed.
On 14 April 2000, the second respondent responded to the legal
notice claiming to not have received the part-payment and refusing
to execute a sale deed in the petitioner’s favour. On 6 July 2002,
the petitioner issued another legal notice (“second legal notice”)
to all the respondents calling upon them to execute the sale deed
upon the receipt of the balance consideration. The first and second
respondents replied to the legal notice by a letter dated 22 July
2002 claiming that (a) the execution is barred by limitation; (b) they
were ready with the documents required under Clause 3 of the first
agreement to sell but the petitioner was not willing to pay the balance
consideration; and (c) the first legal notice dated 8 February 2000
was ante-dated to overcome limitation. The first legal notice was
posted on 30 March 2000 by registered post.
7. On 9 August 2002, the petitioner instituted a suit seeking a decree
for specific performance of the first and the second agreements to
sell. The case of the petitioner in the suit was:
a. Rs.34,70,000 towards the sale consideration for the first
agreement and Rs. 10,850 as advance for the second agreement
was paid. Thus, of the aggregate sale consideration of Rs.
40,20,000, Rs., 34,80,850 was paid and only a balance of Rs.
5,39,150 remained outstanding;
b. The possession of the suit land was delivered under the
agreement; and
c. The petitioner has always been ready and willing to perform
his part of the agreements. Both the agreements required the
respondents to furnish the petitioner with necessary permissions
and certificates,which they failed to do.
8. The petitioner prayed for a decree for specific performance upon
the receipt of the balance sale consideration of Rs. 5,39,150. The
petitioner sought alternative reliefs of (a) delivery of possession
of the suit land; or (b) a direction to refund the consideration of
Rs. 34,80,850 paid with interest of 36% per annum.

B. Judgments of the Trial Court, High Court and this Court
9. By a judgment dated 12 December 2010, the Additional District Judge
dismissed the suit instituted by the petitioner. The Trial Court held
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 675

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

that the petitioner is not entitled to a decree or specific performance
for the following reasons:
a. The respondents did not dispute the execution of the two
agreements to sell. There is also no dispute over the identity
of the property. The petitioner is only required to prove that he
was always willing to perform his part of the agreement;
b. It can be inferred from the evidence on record that the petitioner
does not have possession of the suit property and that a false
plea that possession has been delivered has been made
because:
i. The alternative prayer of the petitioner in the suit was to
put him in possession of the property if, for any reason, the
Court concludes that the possession of the suit property
was not delivered. The petitioner would not have sought
the alternative prayer if he were confident about being in
possession of the suit property;
ii. The petitioner did not plead when he was put in possession
of the property. PW-1 (the petitioner) was not able to
respond to a question during cross-examination on when
he was put in possession of property;
iii. Though PW-2 (the owner of the land adjacent to the suit
property) deposed that the petitioner developed the suit
property by fencing it and constructing internal roads, these
aspects did not find a mention in either the deposition of
PW-1 or the plaint. Further, the photographs of the suit
property also did not reflect these developments;
iv. The sale agreements also did not conclusively indicate that
the petitioner was put in possession of the suit property;
v. The first legal notice issued by the petitioner does not
mention that possession was delivered. The claim is only
made in the second legal notice; and
vi. The draft sale deed that the petitioner allegedly prepared
and sent to the respondents also does not mention that
possession was delivered.
c. A cheque of Rs. 5,40,000 issued by the petitioner towards
consideration was dishonoured. So, the petitioner paid Rs.
676 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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29,30,000 towards the sale consideration and not Rs. 34,70,000,
as claimed by him. The petitioner made a false plea that he had
paid Rs. 34,70,000. The table indicating the payments made
by the petitioner is below:

26.3.1997 Rs. 5,40,000 (cheque dated 2.4.1997 which
was dishonoured)
26.3.1997 Rs. 11,30,000 (Rs. 5,30,00 by cash and Rs.
6,00,00 by cheque)
26.3.1997 Rs. 13,00,000 by cheque
9.4.1997 Rs. 5,00,000 by cheque
d. Clause 3 of the sale agreements states that the petitioner is
required to pay the balance consideration and the respondents
must furnish certificates within three months. The clause
prescribes a consequence for non-payment, that the agreement
would be cancelled. However, the clause does not prescribe any
consequence if the respondents fail to furnish the necessary
certificates within three months. It cannot be concluded that
time is of the essence only because the agreement requires
the petitioner to pay the balance consideration within three
months. The respondents had not obtained the permissions
and certifications required under Clause 3 and they did not
inform the petitioner about any steps taken to obtain them. The
cross-examination of DW-1 (first respondent) indicates this.
Thus, time is not of essence in the agreement;
e. The petitioner claims that he issued the first legal notice on 8
February 2000. However, the postal cover and postal certificate
indicate that it was registered on 31 March 2000. Thus, the
petitioner ante-dated the legal notice to overcome limitation;
f. The petitioner is not entitled to the discretionary relief of specific
performance if a false plea is made. In this case, the petitioner
made three false pleas;
g. The petitioner has been unable to prove that he was willing to
perform his part of the contract within three years from the sale
agreements and specifically, within three months according to
the agreement. If the petitioner was able to perform his part,
a notice would have been issued earlier or the balance would
have been deposited in the bank;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 677

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

h. The first part of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation
Act 1963 applies to the facts of the case. The petitioner was
required to pay the balance consideration within three months
from the date of the sale agreement. The suit should have been
filed on or before 26 June 2000 (three years from the date fixed
for the performance). However, the suit was filed on 9 August
2002, nearly two years after the limitation expired. Thus, the
suit was time barred; and
i. The suit was barred by time for recovery of the advance amount
in terms of Article 47 of Schedule to the Limitation Act.
10. The petitioner preferred an appeal before the High Court against the
judgment of the Additional District Judge. By a judgment dated 23
April 2021, the High Court partly allowed the appeal for the following
reasons:
a. The Trial Court did not distinguish between the time fixed for
payment of sale consideration and the time for the performance
of the contract. The first part of Clause 3 of the agreements
only fixes the time for the payment of sale consideration.
The performance of the contract hinges on the respondents
furnishing the documents. The agreements do not fix a time
for the performance of the contract. Thus, the second part of
Article 54 of the schedule to the Limitation Act applies. The
limitation begins from the date of refusal of performance. The
suit was filed on 30 July 2002, which is within three months
of 14 April 2000 (the date when the respondents’ responded
to the first legal notice). Even if the first legal notice issued by
the petitioner was ante-dated, it would not affect the merits of
the issue since limitation ought to be calculated from the date
of refusal. Further, the conclusion that the petitioner did not
file a suit immediately after the issuance of the second legal
notice is erroneous. The second legal notice was issued on 6
July 2002. The suit was filed on 30 July 2002. The suit was
numbered on 9 August 2002;
b. It cannot be concluded that possession was not delivered merely
because there was no mention of it in the sale agreements or
the first legal notice. The finding of the Trial Court on the aspect
of possession and that the petitioner made a false plea in this
regard is erroneous. Even otherwise,the issue of whether the
678 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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petitioner has possession of the suit property is immaterial for
the relief of specific performance. The delivery of possession
is inherent and ancillary to the relief of specific performance
under Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. (Relied
on Babulal v. Hajarilal Kishorilal3);
c. The respondents received a substantial amount of the sale
consideration of Rs. 38,80,850 out of the total sale consideration
of Rs. 40,20,000. The respondents failed to provide the
certificates. The first respondent admitted that she received the
amount in her cross-examination though she had denied the
same earlier in her written statement and chief examination.
The sale deed could not be executed because of the fault of
the respondents. It cannot be concluded that the petitioner
did not approach the respondents for the payment of the
balance consideration merely because he could not depose the
particulars of when he approached them. Further, though the
first and the second respondents pleaded that they had obtained
the necessary documentation as required by Clause 3 of the
sale agreement in both the written statement and evidence, this
version was denied during the cross-examination of DW-1 and
DW-2 (husband of DW-1). The Trial Court concluded that the
respondents were not ready with the certifications. This finding
was not assailed by the counsel for the respondents;
d. The petitioner would not benefit from not performing the
remainder of the contract when he already paid 90 percent
of the sale consideration. The petitioner filed an Interlocutory
Application to deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs.
5,39,150 which was allowed. The petitioner has shown bona fides
by depositing the balance consideration. Thus, the oral evidence
of the petitioner (PW-1) that he approached the respondents
to fulfil the contract cannot be disbelieved. The petitioner has
proven his readiness and willingness to perform the contract;
e. The conclusion of the Trial Court that the petitioner made a
false plea that he paid Rs. 34,70,000 when he has only paid
Rs., 29,30,000 is erroneous. DW-1 in her deposition admitted
the payments of the petitioner and admitted that the balance

3 [1982] 3 SCR 94 : (1982) 1 SCC 525
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 679

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

amount of Rs.5,39,150 was deposited in the Court in her cross-
examination. Upon the dishonour of the cheque dated 2 April
1997, the plaintiff issued a Demand Draft of Rs. 5,00,000 on
9 April 1997;
f. Merely because the plaintiff did not institute a suit immediately
after the reply to the first legal notice in 2000, it cannot be inferred
that he was not willing to perform his part of the contract. The
suit was filed within limitation (relied on R Lakshmi Kantham
v. Devaraji (2019) 8 SCC 62; Mademsetty Satyanarayana v.
G. Yelloji Rao (AIR 1965 SC 1405));
g. Time is not of essence to the contract for the reasons recorded
in the Trial Court’s judgment; and
h. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act 1963 was amended in
2018, by which the relief of specific performance is no longer
a discretionary power. Section 10 is a procedural provision.
All procedural laws are retrospective. The amended provision
applies to all pending proceedings.
The High Court directed that since the petitioner had paid 90 percent
of the sale consideration, the suit for specific performance can be
decreed in favour of the petitioner to the extent proportionate to the
consideration paid. The High Court further directed that the amount of
Rs. 5,39,150 deposited by the petitioner pursuant to the Interlocutory
Application must be refunded along with any interest that is accrued.
11. Proceedings under Article 136 were instituted against the judgment of
the High Court. By a judgment dated 25 August 2022, a three-Judge
Bench consisting of Chief Justice NV Ramana, Justice Krishna Murari
and Justice Hima Kohli allowed the appeal. This Court referred to
the judgment in Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani,4 in which it was held
that there is no presumption that time is of essence in a contract
for a sale of immovable property and the Court may infer if it was
of essence based on (a) the express terms of the contract; (b) the
nature of the property; and (c) surrounding circumstances such
as the object of the contract. Relying on the judgment, this Court
held that in the facts of the present case, time is of essence for the
following reasons:

4 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 798 : (1993) 1 SCC 519
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a. Both the vendors’ and the purchaser’s obligations in Clause 3
of the sale agreements were required to be completed within
the stipulated time period of three months. The consequences
of (in)actions are different. There are no consequences if
the vendors do not produce the certificates and permissions.
However, the clause spells out a consequence of forfeiture of
the advance amount if the purchaser does not pay the balance
consideration; and
b. According to Clause 21 of the sale agreements, the parties
had entered into an earlier agreement to sell dated 19 March
1994. This agreement did not materialize and the agreed price
was no longer applicable. Fresh agreements were entered
into “to provide a last opportunity to successfully enter into a
sale-purchase agreement.” This intention of the parties is also
clear from Clause 23 of the agreement.
12. This Court held that the suit was barred by limitation since the suit
had to be instituted within three years of the time fixed for completing
the performance (which was three months from the sale agreements).
The three years ended in June 2000 and the suit ought to have been
instituted within that period to not be barred by limitation.
13. This Court also held the following on merits:
a. Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act is not procedural but
substantive. Thus, the 2018 amendment to the provision does
not apply retrospectively to pending proceedings;
b. Under the unamended provision, the Court’s power to grant
specific performance was discretionary. This discretion ought
not to be exercised arbitrarily.5 The purchaser must be vigilant
to enforce his right. Clause 3 of the agreements was drafted to
provide “one last opportunity for the purchaser to make good
their lapse which had happened on the earlier occasion.” The
time for performance of the contract, including payment lasted
till June 1997;
c. The plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform the contract.
The purchaser did not voluntarily adhere to the time stipulated
under the contract. However, the vendors fulfilled their obligation

5 Saradamanikandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi (2011) 12 SCC 18
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 681

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

to provide documentation. DW-1 averred that all documents were
available and that the petitioner entered into an agreement only
after he was satisfied with the title. Specific performance cannot
be enforced in favour of a party who has not proven that he
was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract;
d. The Trial Court’s reasoning on the question of whether the
petitioner has possession of the suit property is correct; and
e. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act does not apply to situations
where the inability to perform the contract arises out of the
party’s own conduct.6 In the instant case, there was no inability
on the part of the parties to perform the contract. The petitioner
was not willing to perform the contract after entering into a
“time-sensitive agreement”.
14. This Court directed the respondents/vendors to repay the sale
consideration received with an interest of 7.5 percent from the date
on which the payment was made till the time the entire amount is
paid back. The payment was directed to be made within six months.
15. The petitioner filed a review petition against the judgment of this Court.

C. Submissions
16. Mr Neeraj Kishan Kaul, senior counsel submitted that the judgment
of this Court suffers from the following apparent errors that warrants
the exercise of the review jurisdiction:
a. Clause 21 of the agreements to sell refers to the sale agreement
executed by the original owners in favour of the vendors in
1994. Though petitioner was not a party to that agreement, this
court has proceeded on the incorrect premise that the 1994
agreement was between the parties;
b. The Trial Court, after analysing the evidence on record, concluded
that the vendors did not produce certificates and permissions
as required by Clause 3 of the sale agreements. This finding
was not challenged before the High Court. This Court wrongly
records that the vendors produced the certificates without
referring to the direct evidence on record to the contrary; and

6 Jaswinder Kaur v. Gurmeet Singh, (2017) 12 SCC 810
682 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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c. Clause 3 does not state that the agreement will be cancelled
if the petitioner does not pay the balance amount within three
months.
17. Mr Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, senior counsel for the
respondents argued that this is not a fit case for the exercise of review
jurisdiction. It was submitted that the judgment of this Court was
sound,independent of the (mis)reference to the 1994 agreement. The
learned counsel further submitted that the suit property was alienated
after the judgment of this Court and before the review petition was
registered. It was argued that the doctrine of lis pendens does not
apply when the petition was in the registry in a defective state.

D. Grounds for exercising review jurisdiction
18. Before proceeding with the analysis, we will refer to the grounds
for exercising review jurisdiction. Order XLVII of the Supreme Court
Rules 2013 states that an application for review must be filed on
the grounds mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure 1908 (“CPC”). Order XLVII Rule 1 of CPC lays down the
following grounds for review:
a. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence, which after
the exercise of due diligence was not within their knowledge or
could not be produced by them at the time the decree was passed;
b. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; and
c. Any other sufficient reason.
19. This Court has laid down the following principles on the exercise of
review jurisdiction7:
a. Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be
strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC;
b. Error on the face of record must be an error which must strike
one on a mere perusal and must not on a long drawn process;
c. The power of review must not be exercised on the ground that
the decision was erroneous on merits;

7 See Murali Sundaram v. Jothibai Kannan, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 185; Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana,
2021 SCC OnLine SC 961; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320; Sanjay Kumar Agarwal v.
State Tax Officer, (2024) 2 SCC 362
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 683

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

d. The phrase “any other sufficient reason” means a reason that is
analogous to the grounds specified in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC; and
e. The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a
ground for review.
20. Let us proceed to analyse if the judgment of this Court satisfies the
grounds for review. The issues which arose for the consideration
of this Court were two-fold: first, whether the suit instituted by the
petitioner was barred by limitation; and second, whether the suit for
specific performance must be decreed. The finding that time was
of essence to the contract was central to the Court’s reasoning on
both the issues.

E. Limitation
21. The Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 prescribes the period of
limitation. Article 54 of the Schedule prescribes the period of limitation
for a suit for specific performance of a contract:

Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period
begins to run
54. For specific Three years The date fixed for the
performance of a performance, or, if no such
contract date is fixed, when the
plaintiff has notice that
performance is refused.
22. The provision has two parts. The first part deals with situations where
the contract fixes a date for performance. The period of limitation of
three years runs from the date fixed for completion of performance.
The second part deals with situations where the contract does not
fix a date for the performance of the contract. In such situations, the
period of limitation runs from the date when the plaintiff has notice
that the defendant has refused performance.
23. The issue for consideration was whether the sale agreements fix a
date for the performance of the agreement. This Court referred to
Clauses 3, 21, and 23 to hold that the agreement fixes a date of three
months for performance. This Court interpreted Clause 3 as follows:
“31. At the outset, this Court has perused Clause 3 of
the agreements, which is in two parts. The first part
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provides for the purchaser’s obligations, while the second
part details the obligation of the vendors to provide the
requisite certificates. Although both the obligations were
required to be completed within the stipulated period of
three months, there is a substantive difference between
these two sets of obligations. The obligation upon the
vendors concerned was production of certain certificates,
such as income tax exemption certificate and agriculture
certificate. No consequences were spelt out for
non-performance of such obligations. Whereas the
obligation on the purchaser, was to make the complete
payment of the sale consideration within three months.
The clause further mandates forfeiture of the advance
amount if the payment obligation is not met within the
time period stipulated therein.”
(emphasis supplied)

24. This Court observed that Clause 3 casts two obligations: one on
the petitioner/purchaser and the other on the respondents/vendors.
To this extent, we find no error. However, the conclusion that
the Clause only provides consequences for the non-payment of
the balance consideration by the purchaser and not for the non-
production of certificates by the vendors is an error apparent on
the face of the record. The judgment correctly notes that Clause
3 prescribes that the advance amount paid will be forfeited if the
balance is not paid by the petitioner in three months. However,
this Court missed that the Clause also provides a consequence
for not producing the documents within three months, which is the
cancellation of the sale agreements. This Court seems to have
missed the phrase “and this agreement of sale will be cancelled..”.
If this Court had read “and this agreement of sale will be cancelled”
as a consequence of the non-fulfilment of the obligation cast on the
purchaser, it could still be argued that it was a probable (though
in our opinion, erroneous) view and not an error apparent on the
face of the record. However, the judgment completely disregards
the phrase “and this agreement of sale will be cancelled” in Clause
3. In paragraph 32 of the judgement, this Court further notes that
non-payment of the balance consideration would lead to a severe
consequence of “forfeiture”:
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 685

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

“33. Coming to the aforesaid indicators, the language of
the agreements makes it clear that severe consequences
of forfeiture would ensue if the payment is not made within
three months of the date of the agreements.”
25. Clause 3 has two parts. The first part casts an obligation on the
purchaser/petitioner and prescribes consequences for it, that is,
the forfeiture of the advance paid. The word “and” disjuncts this
part from the second part which casts an obligation on the vendors.
The second part prescribes the consequence if the vendors do not
furnish the documents.
26. This Court further noted that the “language of the agreements” ensures
severe consequences of forfeiture if the balance consideration is not
paid within three months. This Court further referred to Clauses 21
and 23 to substantiate this interpretation:
“32. […] It may be noted that as per Clause 21, the
parties had entered into an earlier agreement to sell dated
10.03.1994, which did not materialize and accordingly
the agreed price therein was no longer applicable. It is in
this context that the fresh agreements were entered into
between the parties, so as to provide a last opportunity for
them to successfully enter into a sale-purchase agreement.
The aforesaid intention of the parties is also made clear
through Clause 23 of the agreement to sell, which reads
as under:
[…]
33. The aforesaid clause clearly freezes any enhancement
of the agreed sale consideration, which cannot be
independent of a fixed time period. A contrary interpretation
would render the contract commercially unreasonable
and unworkable. The moratorium on the enhancement of
rates prescribed under Clause 23 should be interpreted
to be predicated on a fixed time and be executable within
a reasonable period. The same should not be utilized to
render the commercial wisdom between the parties otiose,
which is inherent in drafting such clauses.”
27. To recall, Clause 21 stipulates that the parties of the “first part” are
not concerned with the sale consideration as they have already
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received the agreed sale consideration from the parties of the
“second part” by an agreement dated 19 March 1994. This Court
has interpreted the reference to the agreement dated 19 March
1994 as the agreement between the petitioner and the respondents
which did not materialise. This is an obvious and apparent error
on the face of the record. The agreements refer to the original
owners from whom the vendors purchased the suit property as
parties of the “first part”. The vendors are referred to as parties
to the “second part”. The agreement dated 19 March 1994 is the
agreement to sell that was executed by the original owners in favour
of the vendors. The petitioner was not a party to this agreement.
The 1997 agreements in favour of the petitioner were executed by
the original owners in addition to the vendors because though the
vendors were put in possession of the suit property after the sale
agreement, a sale deed was not executed. Instead, an irrevocable
power of attorney was executed in favour of the vendors. Though
only the first and the second respondents offered to alienate the
suit property to the petitioner, the agreement is executed by the
original owners and vendors other than the first and the second
respondent as well to prevent any litigation in the future. The
relevant clauses of the recital to the agreement dated 26 March
1997 are extracted below:
“4. Whereas parties of the Second part herein have
entered into an agreement of sale with the parties of
the first part herein dated 19 March 1994.
5. Whereas the parties of the second part herein have
purchased from the parties of the first part to an
extent of Articles 127-129 guntas only in lad bearing
Sy.No. 301 part 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308
and 309 for a valuable consideration and on the date
of the agreement possession was delivered to an
extent of Articles 65-23 guntas and it was specifically
agreed that an irrevocable general power of attorney
will be executed through a registered document in
the names nominated by the parties of the second
part herein, as such parties of the first part herein
have executed and irrevocable power of attorney on
28 March 1994 which was registered on 30th day of
April 1994.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 687

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6. Whereas parties of the second part herein have paid
the full sale consideration to the parties of the first
part and the parties of the first part herein have also
delivered the possession of the remaining extent
of Ac. 50-00 gts and to that effect admitting and
acknowledging the same the parties of the first part
herein have passed receipts and also got executed
another regd. Irrevocable power of attorney in favour
of the parties of the second part herein, as such
the parties of the second part herein become the
possessors of the total extent of Ac. 115-29 guntas.
7. Whereas parties 2 and 4 of the second part herein
have offered to alienate and extent of Ac. 38-15
guntas in land bearing Sy. No. 301 part, 302,303
and 304 part out of the total extent of Ac. 127-29
guntas @ Rs. 1, 00, 000/- per acre which comes to
a total sum of Rs. 38, 37, 500/- (Rupees Thirty Eight
Lakhs Thirty Seven Thousand give hundred only) and
infact, parties of the first part as well parties 1,3,5
and 6 of the parties of the second part herein have
no concern either for the agreed sale consideration
or for the extent under alienation but they have been
made as parties to this agreement not to have a
cloud over the title and also to get convey the title in
a better way along with the rights for not to give any
scope for the litigation in future on any pretext and
the parties 1,3,5, and 6 of the parties of the second
part herein shall be at liberty either to enjoy or to
alienate to their choice of the extent of their share
of land situated at Budwel village, Rajendernagar
mandal, Ranga Reddy District.”
28. Thus, the conclusion that Clause 21 indicates that an agreement
was executed in 1994 with the petitioner which did not materialise
is an error apparent on the face of the record. The argument of
the respondent that the Court concluded that time is of essence
independent of the interpretation of Clause 21, in our opinion,
does not hold merit. This Court placed considerable weightage on
Clause 21. This Court referred to Clauses 3, 21 and 23 to interpret
if time was of essence in the backdrop of the principles laid down
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in Chand Rani (supra). To recall, in Chand Rani (supra), this Court
held there is no presumption that time is of essence in a contract
for a sale of immovable property and the Court may infer if it was
of essence based on (a) express terms of the contract; (b) nature
of the property; and (c) surrounding circumstances such as the
object of the contract. Clause 21 was interpreted to cast light upon
the surrounding circumstances/the object of the contract and was
crucial to its decision.
29. Having concluded that the interpretation of Clauses 3 and 21 of the
Sale Agreements was erroneous, there is nothing in Clause 23 alone
that could be interpreted to prescribe a time for the performance
of the contract. Further, the judgment also does not take note of
Clause 6 of the agreements to sell which provides that a sale deed
will be executed after receiving the balance sale consideration. This
clause does not prescribe any time period within which the sale
deed must be executed. Another question is whether Clause 3 can
be independently interpreted to prescribe a date for the performance
of contract. The consequence of the non-payment of the balance
consideration in terms of Clause 3 is the forfeiture of the advance
amount paid by the purchaser and not all the consideration paid by
the end of three months. The consequence is not that the sale deed
shall not be executed.
30. For the above reasons, Clauses 3, 21 and 23 cannot be interpreted
to mean that a time is fixed for the execution of the sale agreements.
Thus, the limitation is governed by the second part of Article 54. The
limitation of three years prescribed by the second part of Article 54
runs from the date when the plaintiff has notice that performance has
been refused. The petitioner/plaintiff had notice that performance is
refused only by the reply dated 14 April 2000 to the first legal notice
of the petitioner. A portion of the reply is extracted below:
“That our client alongwith Smt. Kotta Sujatha Reddy have
not received the alleged amount of Rs. 34,80,850/- as part
sale consideration of the alleged agreement.
That our client has no any liability to execute the sale
deed in your clients favour on any account under the
alleged agreement of sale deed 26.3.1997 or 27.3.1997.
As such the execution of any sale deed in your client’s
favour does not arise.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 689

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

31. Thus, the limitation prescribed by Article 54 sets in from the date
when the petitioner received the above reply refusing performance.
Irrespective of whether the suit was instituted on 9 August 2002 (as
concluded by the Trial Court) or 30 July 2002 (as concluded by the
High Court), it was within limitation.

F. Specific performance
32. The next issue is whether the petitioner is entitled to a decree for
specific performance. This Court held that the 2008 amendment to
Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act does not apply retrospectively
and decided the matter based on Section 10 before the amendment.
Section 10, before the amendment,conferred courts with the discretion
to provide a decree for specific performance. In exercise of review
jurisdiction, we must not disturb a finding unless there is an error
apparent on the face of record. Even assuming that the grant of
relief of specific performance continued to be discretionary to a suit
instituted before the date of the amendment, we are of the opinion
that this Court committed a grave error in its analysis of whether the
Court ought to use its discretionary power in this matter. Section 10 of
the Specific Relief Act before the 2018 amendment read as follows:
“10. Cases in which specific performance of contract
enforceable.- Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter,
the specific performance of any contract may, in the
discretion of the court, be enforced-
(a) when there exists no standard for ascertaining actual
damage caused by the non-performance of the act agreed
to be done; or
(b) when the act agreed to be done is such that
compensation in money for its non-performance would
not afford adequate relief.
Explanation.- Unless and until the contrary is proved, the
court shall presume
(i) that the breach of a contract to transfer immovable
property cannot be adequately relieved by compensation
in money; and
(ii) that the breach of a contract to transfer movable property
can be so relieved except in the following cases:
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(a) where the property is not an ordinary article of commerce,
or is of special value of interest to the plaintiff, or consists
of goods which are not easily obtainable in the market;
(b) where the property is held by the defendant as the
agent or trustee of the plaintiff.”
33. This Court referred to the judgment in Saradamani Kandappan
v. Rajalakshmi,8 which laid down the factors that the Courts must
consider while deciding whether to exercise the discretion of decreeing
specific performance of a contract:
“43. Till the issue is considered in an appropriate
case, we can only reiterate what has been suggested in
K.S. Vidyanadam [(1997) 3 SCC 1] :
(i ) The courts, while exercising discretion in suits for
specific performance, should bear in mind that when the
parties prescribe a time/period, for taking certain steps or
for completion of the transaction, that must have some
significance and therefore time/period prescribed
cannot be ignored.
(ii ) The courts will apply greater scrutiny and strictness
when considering whether the purchaser was “ready and
willing” to perform his part of the contract.
(iii ) Every suit for specific performance need not be decreed
merely because it is filed within the period of limitation
by ignoring the time-limits stipulated in the agreement.
The courts will also “frown” upon suits which are not
filed immediately after the breach/refusal. The fact that
limitation is three years does not mean that a purchaser
can wait for 1 or 2 years to file a suit and obtain specific
performance. The three-year period is intended to assist
the purchasers in special cases, as for example, where the
major part of the consideration has been paid to the vendor
and possession has been delivered in part-performance,
where equity shifts in favour of the purchaser.”
(emphasis supplied)

8 [2011] 8 SCR 874 : (2011) 12 SCC 18
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 691

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

34. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act states that specific performance
of a contract cannot be enforced in favour of the person who fails to
prove that he is ready and willing to perform the essential terms of
the contract which are to be performed by him, other than the terms
which are prevented or waived by the defendant. The explanation
to clause (c) states that it is not essential for the plaintiff to tender
money to the defendant where the contract involves the payment
of money, unless directed by court. Section 16(c) reads as follows:
“16. Personal bars to relief.-Specific performance of a
contract cannot be enforced in favour of a person-
[…]
(c) who fails to prove that he has performed or has always
been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of
the contract which are to be performed by him, other than
terms the performance of which has been prevented or
waived by the defendant.
Explanation.- For the purposes of clause (c),-
(i) where a contract involved the payment of money, it
is not essential for the plaintiff to actually tender to the
defendant or to deposit in court any money except when
so directed by the court;”
35. This Court concluded that the petitioner was not ready and willing to
perform his part (as required by Section 16(c)) because the balance
sale consideration was not paid within three months as required by
Clause 3:
“58. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the purchaser ought
to have been vigilant in the case at hand to enforce his
right and could not have been lackadaisical in his approach.
From the facts, it is clear that the purchaser had entered
into an agreement way back on 26/27/.03.1997, which had
a clause mandating completion of the contract by payment
of the remaining consideration within three months. The
aforesaid clause was drafted, as alluded to earlier,
for providing one last opportunity for the purchaser
to make good their lapse which had happened on the
earlier occasion. In this context, the time for performance
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of the contract including the payment lasted till the month
of June 1997.”
(emphasis supplied)

36. It is clear from the above extract that this Court held that the
petitioner was not ready and willing to perform the contract in which
time was of essence. The conclusion that time was of essence was
derived based on an interpretation of Clause 3 read with Clause 21.
The reasoning based on which this Court held that the petitioner
was not ready and willing to perform the contract falls in view of
the conclusion that the interpretation of Clause 21 and Clause 3 by
this Court is erroneous because of the factual misconception and
omission, respectively.
37. In paragraph 67 of the judgment, this Court also held that the first
and the second respondents were ready and willing to perform their
obligation of providing the documents:
“67. On the aspect of the vendor’s obligation to provide
requisite and necessary documents, DW1 (Smt. Katta
Sujatha Reddy), has averred that all the documents
were available. It is only after the purchaser was satisfied
about the sound title that he entered into the agreement
to sell.”
38. There is an error apparent on the face of the record in the factual
finding recorded above. The Trial Court recorded that the respondents
did not produce the records. The Trial Court expressly noted that
DW-1 initially stated that they produced the certificates. However,
during the cross-examination, DWs 1-3 deposed that they had not
obtained and produced these documents. The observations of the
Trial Court in this regard are extracted below:
“70. […] It is in the written statement and as well as in
the reply lawyers notice as if the defendants got secured
these documents. But, the fact remains and undisputed
is, the defendant have not obtained such certificates and
they have not furnished them to the plaintiff and they
have not even informed to the plaintiff what are the steps
taken by them in obtaining these documents and the
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 693

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proceedings taken by them in that context. But it is in the
pleading and in the evidence of DW-1 at the earliest
part of time that they have obtained these documents.
But from the later part of evidence of DW-1 by
filing further chief examination affidavit and from
the cross-examination of DW-1 to 3 it is made out
the defendants have not obtained and they are not
informed to the plaintiff and that they have secured
such certificates.”
(emphasis supplied)

39. In the appeal, the High Court categorically noted that the above
finding of the trial court was not challenged:
“40. It is also pertinent to note about categorical admission by
the defendants 6 & 8 that they have not obtained certificates
and documents for completing the sale transaction. But
the defendants 6 & 8 pleaded that they have obtained
necessary documents both in the written statements and
also in the evidence. In the cross-examination that
version of D.W.1 is dismantled and trial Court also
comes to the conclusion that the defendants without
obtaining documents and certificates simply pleaded
that they are ready with the certificates. However,
that finding is not attacked in this appeal, which goes
to show that the defendants are at fault in not obtaining
certificates for fulfilling their part of the contract, though, the
plaintiff paid 90% of the sale consideration requesting the
defendants 6 & 8 to receive balance sale consideration.”
(emphasis supplied)

40. The judgment of this Court in paragraph 67 only refers to the
deposition of DW-1 without referring to her cross-examination or the
fact that the respondents did not challenge the finding of the Trial
Court on this aspect. This is another error apparent on the face of
the record.
41. Having held that the basis of the reasoning of this Court on whether the
petitioner was willing to perform the contract has an error apparent on
the face of the record, we are required to decide the issue of whether
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the petitioner was ready and willing to perform the contract. We are
of the considered opinion that the petitioner was ready and willing to
perform the contract in terms of Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief
Act. The first agreement to sell noted that the purchaser paid a sum of
Rs.11,30,00 as earnest money. Subsequently, the petitioner paid Rs.
13,00,000 on the same day by cheque and paid another Rs. 5,00,000
by Demand Draft on 9 April 1997. If the petitioner was unwilling to
perform the contract, he would not have paid nearly 75 percent of
the sale consideration. Thus, the petitioner with the payment of the
additional sum above the earnest money, has proved his readiness
and willingness to perform the contract. Further, this aspect must
be analysed in the backdrop of the explanation to Section 16(c)
of the Specific Relief Act which states that if the contract involves
the payment of money, it is not necessary that the plaintiff actually
tenders the money. It cannot be concluded that the petitioner was not
ready or willing to perform his part of the contract merely because
the balance sale consideration was due to be paid.
42. Section 10, before the amendment in 2018 stated that the Court can
exercise its discretion to award specific performance of contract where
(a) there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused
by the non-performance of the act agreed to be done; or (b) when
the act agreed to be done is such that compensation in money for its
non-performance would not afford adequate relief. The Explanation
provided that unless there is anything to the contrary, the court shall
presume that the compensation in money is not an adequate relief
for the breach of a contract to transfer immovable property. There is
nothing in the agreements to sell to rebut this statutory presumption.
On an application of the facts to the principles in Sections 10 and 16
of the Specific Relief Act,we are of the considered opinion that this
is a fit case for this Court to exercise its discretion to direct specific
performance.

G. Lis pendens
43. The respondents submitted that a sale of the suit property was
executed after the judgment of this Court (25 August 2022) and
before the review petition was registered (13 December 2022). It
was submitted that the third party is in possession and enjoyment
of the suit property.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 695

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

44. On 23 September 2022, the petitioner filed a review petition against
the judgment of this Court dated 25 August 2022. The review was
filed within thirty days, the prescribed period of limitation in terms of
Order XLVII Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules 2013. On 14 October
2022, the Registry sent a letter to the petitioner asking him to cure
defects. On 11 November 2022, the petitioner cured the defects. On
13 December 2022, the review petition was registered. On 27 January
2023, the counsel for the petitioner sought six weeks to bring some
documents on record. On 1 March 2023, the matter was listed before
a three-Judge Bench of Justice Krishna Murari, Justice Hima Kohli
and one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud). The matter was not taken
up. By an order dated 31 August 2023, Justice D Y Chandrachud
allowed the application for listing the review petition in open court
and issued notice, returnable in six weeks. Justice Hima Kohli did
not agree and was of the view that the review petition be dismissed.
Justice Narasimha who was the third member of the Bench recused
from the matter for personal reasons. Subsequently, Justice Manoj
Misra was nominated as the third member of the Bench. By an order
dated 26 September 2024, notice was issued in the review petition.
45. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 states that during the
pendency in any court of any suit in which any right to immovable
property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot
be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or
proceedings. The explanation to the provision states that for the
purposes of the Section, the pendency of a suit or proceedings
shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation
of the plaint or institution of the proceeding in a Court, and shall
continue until the suit or proceeding is disposed by a “final decree
or order” and complete satisfaction of the order is obtained, unless
it has become unobtainable by reason of the expiry of any period
of limitation. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as
follows:
“52. During the pendency in any Court having authority
within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu
and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the
Central Government of any suit or proceeding which
is not collusive and in which any right to immovable
property is directly and specifically in question, the
property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with
696 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect
the rights of any other party thereto under any decree
or order which may be made therein, except under the
authority of the Court and on such terms as it may
impose.
Explanation.– For the purposes of this section, the
pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to
commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint
or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent
jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding
has been disposed of by a final decree or order and
complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or
order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable
by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation
prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the
time being in force.”
(emphasis supplied)

46. The following conditions ought to be fulfilled for the doctrine of lis
pendens to apply:
a. There must be a pending suit or proceeding;
b. The suit or proceeding must be pending in a competent court;
c. The suit or proceeding must not be collusive9;
d. The right to immovable property must be directly and specifically
in question in the suit or proceeding;
e. The property must be transferred by a party to the litigation; and
f. The alienation must affect the rights of any other party to the
dispute.10
47. In short, the doctrine of lis pendens that Section 52 of the Transfer
of Property Act encapsulates, bars the transfer of a suit property
during the pendency of litigation. The only exception to the principle

9 A collusive suit is not a real suit but a sham where the claim that is put forward if fictitious. See Nagubai
Ammal v. B Shama Rao, 1956 SCC 321
10 See Amit Kumar Shaw v. Farida Khatoon, (2005) 11 SCC 403
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 697

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

is when it is transferred under the authority of the court and on terms
imposed by it. Where one of the parties to the suit transfers the suit
property (or a part of it) to a third-party, the latter is bound by the
result of the proceedings even if he did not have notice of the suit or
proceeding. The principle on which this doctrine rests was explained
by Lord Turner in Bellamy v. Sabine11 as follows:
“It is, as I think, a doctrine common to the courts both
of Law and Equity and rests, as I apprehend, upon this
foundation that it would plainly be impossible that any
action or suit could be brought to a successful termination,
if alienations pendente lite were permitted to prevail. The
plaintiff would be liable in every case to be defeated by
the defendants alienating before the judgment or decree,
and would be driven to commence his proceedings de
novo, subject again to be defeated by the same course
of proceedings.”
48. Justice M H Beg in Jayaram Mudaliar v. Ayyaswami12 set out the
content of the doctrine of lis pendens as follows:
“14. The background of the provision set out above was
indicated by one of us (Beg, J.,) in Jayaram Mudaliar v.
Ayyaswami [(1972) 2 SCC 200, 217 : AIR 1973 SC 569].
There, the following definition of the lis pendens from
Corpus Juris Secundum (Vol. LIV, p. 570) was cited:
“Lis pendens literally means a pending suit, and the doctrine
of lis pendens has been defined as the jurisdiction, power,
or control which a court acquires over property involved
in a suit pending the continuance of the action, and until
final judgment therein.”
It was observed there:
“Expositions of the doctrine indicate that the need for it
arises from the very nature of the jurisdiction of Courts
and their control over the subject-matter of litigation so
that parties litigating before it may not remove any part

11 (1857) 1 De G&J 566
12 [1973] 1 SCR 139 : AIR 1973 SC 569
698 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

of the subject-matter outside the power of the Court to
deal with it and thus make the proceedings infructuous.”
49. The purpose of lis pendens is to ensure that the process of the
court is not subverted and rendered infructuous. In the absence of
the doctrine of lis pendens, a defendant could defeat the purpose of
the suit by alienating the suit property. This purpose of the provision
is clearly elucidated in the explanation clause to Section 52 which
defines “pendency”. Amending Act 20 of 1929 substituted the word
“pendency” in place of “active prosecution”. The Amending Act also
included the Explanation defining the expression “pendency of suit
or proceeding”. “Pendency” is defined to commence from the “date
of institution” until the “disposal”. The argument of the respondents
that the doctrine of lis pendens does not apply because the petition
for review was lying in the registry in a defective state cannot be
accepted. The review proceedings were “instituted” within the period
of limitation of thirty days. The doctrine of lis pendens kicks in at the
stage of “institution” and not at the stage when notice is issued by this
Court. Thus, Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act would apply to
the third-party purchaser once the sale was executed after the review
petition was instituted before this Court. Any transfer that is made
during the pendency is subject to the final result of the litigation.13

H. Relief
50. The High Court relied on Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act to decree
specific performance only to the extent of the consideration paid by
the petitioner. The directions of the High Court are extracted below:
“89. […], this court is of the considered opinion that by
exercising power under Section 12, in order to meet the
ends of justice, suit can be decreed for specific performance
only to the extent of 90% of the amount paid by the plaintiff
to the defendants 6 & 8 towards sale consideration.
90. In the result, Appeal Suit is allowed in part directing
the defendants 6 & 8 to register the suit schedule property
in favour of the plaintiff proportionate to the extent of
amount paid by the plaintiff i.e., 90% of the total sale
consideration[…].

13 See GT Girish v. Y Subba Raju [2022] 8 SCR 991
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 699

M/s Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. v. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Ors.

91. It is needless to state that the Suit Schedule Land is
required to be divided by metes and bounds in the execution
proceedings by the Execution Court, as indicating above
i.e., 90% and 10% with the assistance of an advocate
commissioner and the 90% of the part of the Suit Schedule
Land, so determined, shall be registered in favour of the
Appellant in accordance with the law.”
51. On appeal, this Court held that it was not a fit case to exercise
discretion to grant relief in terms of Section 12 because the purchaser
breached an essential condition of the agreements to sell and the
suit was filed beyond limitation:
“77. […] In this case, the petitioner breached the essential
condition of the contract, which altogether disentitles him
to claim specific performance. There is no doubt that the
claim of purchaser is hit by delay and laches on their
part as they did not take appropriate measures within
the stipulated time and filing of the suit was delayed by
almost five years […]
78. Therefore, we do not think that it is an appropriate case
for granting relief to the purchaser in terms of Section 12 of
the Specific Relief Act 1963 as the claim of the purchaser
is barred by delay, laches and limitation.”
52. Having concluded that the errors apparent on the face of the record
identified above go to the root of the reasoning on both the issues
of limitation and specific performance, we recall the judgment of this
Court dated 25 August 2022. The judgment of the High Court dated
23 April 2021 is restored.
53. The review petitions are allowed in the above terms.
54. Pending application(s), if any, is disposed of.

Result of the case: Review Petitions allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain