Holding

The service tax for the period in question was not payable because the charging provision (Section 66A, Finance Act, 1994) became effective only on 18 April 2006; consequently, penalty and interest cannot be levied, and the demand for such is set aside, though no refund is granted due to the appellant’s delay.

Summary

Mis. Shoeline was served a show‑cause notice for non‑payment of service tax on commissions paid to overseas agents for the period July 9, 2004 to March 31, 2006. The Joint Commissioner confirmed the demand in February 2008, but the appellant neither filed a statutory appeal nor challenged the order, instead paying the tax amount while contesting penalty and interest. After other cases held that service tax was not payable before the insertion of Section 66A of the Finance Act, 1994 (effective 18 April 2006), Shoeline filed a writ petition in 2012, which was dismissed for a four‑year delay. The Supreme Court examined the principles of laches, acquiescence and equity, held that the tax liability for the said period did not arise until Section 66A came into force, and therefore penalty and interest could not be levied. The Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the demand for interest and penalty, but declined to order a refund of the tax already paid due to the appellant’s delay.

Issues considered

The validity of the service tax demand for the period July 9, 2004 – March 31, 2006 in view of the later insertion of Section 66A, 1994.
Whether the appellant’s four‑year delay in filing the writ petition bars relief under the doctrines of laches and acquiescence.
Whether penalty and interest can be imposed on a tax that was not payable under law.
Whether the appellant is entitled to a refund of the service tax already paid.

Legislation cited

Finance Act, 1994s. 66A

Subjects

service taxSection 66AdelaylachesacquiescencepenaltyinterestrefundArticle 226judgment in remequity

Judgment

[2017] 8 S.C.R. 582

A MIS. SHOELINE
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX AND ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. I0214of2017)
B AUGUST 10,2017
[A.K. SIKRI AND ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.)
Equity - Legality of service tax was to be determined for
period July 9, 2004 to March 31, 2006 - The validity of demand
C was confirmed by the Joint Commissioner of service tax - No
statutory appeal filed by the appellant against the order - Further.
appellant made payments of service tax - However. appellant was
_aware that there were numerous other litigations pending against
service tax - Jn those other litigations, it was held that service tax
was not payable in absence of appropriate provision at the relevant
D time and it became payable only w.ef April 18, 2006, when section
66A was inserted - Pursuant thereto, writ Petition was filed by the
appellant and same was dismissed as barred by delay and /aches -
Held: The legal position which is settled is that this service tax was
not payable for the period in question inasmuch as such a liability
E arose w.ej: April 18, 2006 - This legal position is not confined to
only those who approached the Court but is a declaration of law -
It can be treated as judgment in rem - Jn instant case, equities would
be balanced by not insisting on payment of penalty and interest -
Appellant approached belatedly, thus may not be entitled to refund
of service tax already paid but at the same time, the appellant should
F not be called upon to pay any interest and penalty levied on a tax
which was not payable in law - Finance Act, 1994 - s.66A.
Delay/Laches - Validity of dPTnand of service tax challenged
after four years - Appellant received a show cause notice for non-
payment of service tax - Appellant contested the said show cause
G notice and challenged the legality of service tax - Validity of demand
was confirmed by the Joint Commissioner of service tax - No
statutory appeal filed by the appellant against the order - Appellant
was aware that there were numerous other litigations pending - In
those other litigations, it was held that service tax was not payable
~ Pursuant thereto writ Petition filed by the appellant, but was
H
582
MIS. SHOELINE v. COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX · 583
AND ORS .
.,
dismissed as barred by delay and /aches of four years -::- l)ivision. A
Bench also concurred, thereby affirming the order - Held: After.
Joint Commissioner had passed the order. no statutory appeal was
preferred by the appellant challenging the order - When appellant
had not challenged the demand and was merely watching the ·
proceedings in other similar cases, the decision in those cases cannot B
famish any cause of action to the appellant to file the writ petition
- Ther.efore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or
whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the
·writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in
granting the relief to the incumbent- Constitution ofIndia -Art.226.
• Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
c

HELD: 1. The Joint Commissioner of service tax had
confirmed the validity of demand of service tax vide order dated
February, 2008. No statutory appeal was preferred by the appellant
challenging that order. The writ petition was filed only in March, D
2012. During tltis period, the appellant was also making payment .
towards service tax demanded by t.he respondents without
challenging the order. The appellant now wants to take advantage
of other litigation pending in respect of same subject matter. When.
the appellant had not challenged the demand and was merely E
sitting on the fence, watching the proceedings in other similar
cases, the dei:ision in those cases cannot furnish any cause of
· action to the appellant to file the writ petition. Law on this behalf
·is crystal clear. [Paras l and 9) [585-C; 587-G-H; 588-A-BJ

2. In the instant case, though the service tax levied for the · p
period in question was to the tune of Rs.11,62,728/- which stands
paid by the appellant, liability on account of penalty and interest
is also fastened upon the appellant. The legal position which is
settled is that this service tax was not payable for the period in
question i.e. July 9, 2004 to March 31, 2006 inasmuch as such a
liability arises only w.e.f. April 18; 2006 after·the insertion of the G
relevant charging Section 66A ·in the Fina.nee Act, 1994. This ·
legal position is not confined to only those who approached. the
Co.urt but is a declaration ofla.w. It can .be treated as judgment in
·rem. [Para 2011?92-D~E) ·
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A 3. In a case like this, equities would be balanced by not
insisting on payment of penalty and interest. Thus, when the
appellant approached belatedly, it may not be entitled to refund
of service tax already paid but at the same time, the appellant
should not be called upon to pay any interest and penalty levied
B on a tax which was not payable at all in law. [Para 211 [593-G-H;
594-AJ
State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava & Ors. (2015) 1 SCC 347 : [2014) 12 SCR
193; Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.
(1989) 2 SCC 356 : [19891 1 SCR 13; Harwindra
c Kumar v. ChiefEngineer. Karmik & Ors. [200515 Suppl.
SCR 317 - relied on.
Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corporation
Ltd. & Anr. v. Jain School Society (2003) 12 SCC
538; U.P Jal Nigam & Anr. v. Jaswant Singh & Anr.
D (2006) 11 sec 464: [20061 8 Suppl. SCR 916;
Mis. D. Cawasji & Co. & Ors. v. State of Mysore & Anr.
(1975) 1 SCC 636 : [19751 2 SCR 511 - referred to.
Hals bury s Laws of England - referred to.

E Case Law Reference
[20141 12 SCR 193 relied on Para 10
[19891 1 SCR 13 relied on Para 11
(2003) 12 sec 538 referred to Para 12
F (2006) 8 Suppl. SCR 916 referred to Para 14
(20051 5 Suppl. SCR 317 relied on Para 15
[19751 2 SCR 511 r~ferred to Para 18
CIVlLAPPELLATEJURlSDICTION: CivilAppealNo.10214
G of2017.
From the final Order dated 22.06.2016 passed by the High Court
ofJudicature at Madras in W.A. No.790 of2013.
G. V. Rao, A.K. Upadhyay, Devendra Singh, Advs. for the
Appellant.
H
MIS. SHOELINE v. COMMISSIONER, OF SERVICE TAX 585
AND ORS.

Yashyank.Andhyaru, Sr. Adv., Tara Chandra Sharma, Ms. Sunita A
Rani Singh, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A.K. SIKRI, J. I. By way of this appeal, correctness of the
order dated June 22, 2016 passed by the Division Bench of the High.
Court is questioned. Vide the said order, Division Bench affirmed the B
order of the learned single Judge passed in the writ petition filed by the
appellant herein and, thus, dismissed the writ appeal. Writ petition was
filed in the High Court by the appellant challenging the validity of demand
which was confirmed by the Joint Commissioner of service tax vide
order dated February 27, 2008. Writ petition was, in fact, not considered c
·on merits and was dismissed as barred by delay and !aches of four
years. The Division Bench has also concurred with the single bench
thereby affirming its order.
2. Show cause notice dated August 23, 2007 was received by the
appellant for non-payment of service tax on 'commission paid to overseas D
agents' under 'Business Auxiliary Service'. The appellant contested
the said show cause notice by filing his reply. However, rejecting the
objections raised by the appellant, the Joint Commissioner confirmed the
demand vide order dated August 27, 2008. Writ petition was filed in the
•,,i: High Court in March, 2012. As it was filed four years after the demand
' was confirmed, for this reason, writ petition and writ appeal of the appellant E
have been dismissed.
., 3. lf one goes by the aforesaid facts alone, it may not be wrong to
form an opinion that the challenge laid to the demand was belated.
However, the question is as to whether the appellant had duly and
satisfactorily explained the delay in approaching the Court after a period F
·of four years. Entire focus of the arguments of the learned counsel for
the appellant was on this aspect with the submission that the High Court
totally overlooked and ignored the explanations given which furnished
sufficient cause for approaching the Court in March, 2012.
4. In this behalf, the learned counsel referred to the following G
facts about which there is no dispute. As aforesaid, the show cause
notice was issued to the appellant for non-payment of service tax on
'commission paid to overseas agent'. It was for the period from July 9,
2004 to March 31, 2006 during which period the appellant was paying
H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A conunission to the overseas agent. The Commission was being paid for
the outsourcing of business ofexport of shoe- uppers for soliciting orders
by the overseas agents on behalf of the appellant in foreign exchange.
Simply put, the overseas agent was appointed by the appellant for securing
export orders of shoe-uppers. On the orders which were so procured
B by the overseas agent and were given to the appellant, the appellant
could make exports of shoe uppers. It is on these orders the appellant
had paid commission to the foreign party. As per the respondent
department, service tax was payable on the said conunission as the said
activity would come within the sweep of' Business Auxiliary Service'.
That was a reason for issuing show cause notice and demand service
C tax from the appellant who was supposed to deduct the same on the
payments made to a foreign agent.
. 5. The appellant had resisted the show cause notice by submitting
its reply dated January 2, 2008 and stating that the liability of payment of
service tax, on amounts being remitted to overseas agent, would not fall
D on the payment prior to June 16, 2005 in view of the inapplicability of
The Finance Act, 1994, However, after the passing of the order by the
Joint Commissioner on February 27, 2008 rejecting the aforesaid
contention and confirming the demand of service tax, the said demand
was not challenged immediately by filing statutory appeal which was
available. Not only this, when the amount as confirmed vide order dated
E February i7, 2008 was not paid and the appellant was threatened with
coercive action stating that his bank accounts would be attached, the
appellant started making payments and paid the entire service tax in five
instalments. Some of these instalments were paid in the year 2011 and
one instalment was paid late i.e. on September 17, 2016 (which it appears
F was made after the appeal was dismissed by the High Court vide
impugned judgment dated June 22, 2016). In this manner, though the
appellant has paid the amount of service tax in the sum of Rs. 11,62,728/
- as demanded. However, no amount is paid towards penalty and interest
though that was also adjudicated upon.
G 6. Coming to the explanation given for delayed approach to the
Court, it is stated by the appellant that it was aware that there were
numerous other litigations pending from2007 onwards by various parties
who were under genuine and the bonafide belief that they were not
liable to pay the service tax. However, the appellant themselves were

H
MIS. SHOELINE v. COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX 587
AND ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

unable to file a statutory appeal before the Departmental Appellate A
Authorities, since the file had been misplaced due. to a change of
managerial set-up in the organisation as the partnership firm was in the
process of dissolution and the concern was being converted into a sole
proprietorship which took place on January 24, 2009. In other litigations,
it was held that service tax was not payable in the absence of appropriate B
provision at the relevant time and it became payable only w.e.f. April 18,
2006 when Section 66A was inserted in the Finance Act, as a charging
section. On that basis, on September 26, 2011, the Ministry of Finance
issued a circular bearing No. F. No. 276/8/2009-CX8A which stated
that the service tax liability on any taxable service provided a non-resident
or a person located outside India to a recipient in India stating that the C
service tax liability on any taxable service provided by a non resident or
a person located outside India, to a recipient in India, would arise w.e.f.
April 18, 2006 i.e. the date of insertion of the relevant charging section
66A of the Finance Act, 1994. This circular was issued by the Ministry
of Finance, Department of Revenue after this Court had dismissed the D
Special Leave Petitions filed by the Department, challenging the orders
of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT)
on applicability of service tax prior to April 18, 2006.
7. It is thereafter that the appellant filed the writ petition in March,
2012. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the aforesaid
reasons were genuine and provided due explanation for approaching the E
Court in March, 2012. It was also submitted that in the counter affidavit
filed by the respondents in the High Court, respondents have admitted
that service tax was not applicable to pending disputes .
. 8. The respondents, however, had contended that the case of the
appellant would not be covered as it would not constitute a pending F
dispute because of the reason that the case of the appellant stood resolved
on February 27, 2008 when the Joint Commissioner had passed the orders
which had attained finality, in the absence of any statutory appeal preferred
by the appellant.
9. From the aforesaid narration of facts, one thing is clear. The G
Joint Commissioner had passed the orders on February 27, 2008. No
statutory appeal was preferred by the appellant challenging that order.
The writ petition was filed only in March, 2012. During this period, the
appellant was also making payment towards service tax demanded by
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A. the respondents without challenging the order. The appellant now wants
to· take advantage of other litigation pending in respect of same subject
matter. When the appellant had not challenged the demand and was
merely sitting on the fence, watching the proceedings in other similar
cases, the decision in those cases cannot furnish any cause of action to
B the appellant to file the writ petition. Law on this behalf is crystal clear.
10. In State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. v. Arvind Kumar
Srivastava & Ors. 1, the moot question which requires determination is
as to whether in the given case, approach of the Tribunal and the High
Court was correct in extending the benefit of earlier judgment of the
Tribunal, which had attained finality as it was affirmed till the Supreme
C Court. This Court held that:
"23. ... The respondents before us did not challenge these
cancellation orders till the year 1996 i.e. for a period of9 years. It
means that they had accepted the cancellation of their
appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding
D that some other persons whose appointment orders were also
cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The
earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the
Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents
have not joined service nor working like the employees who
E succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27
years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders.
'Therefore, not only was there unexplained delay and !aches in
filing the claim petition after a period of9 years, it would be totally
unjust to direct the appellants to give them appointment as of today
i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents
F would be almost 50 years of age or above.
11. In Rup Diamonds & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. 1 , the
petitioner, a recognized Export House for the purposes of EXIM Policy,
1982-83 was not granted facility of import of certain items even though
it had discharged export obligation. The petitioners, however, did nothing
G and claimed the above facility more than four years after discharge of
the export obligation and after five years of the expiry of the license.
Since in similar cases, such facility was granted pursuant to the orders
passed by the High Court of Bombay that the petitioners made an
1
(2015) 1sec347
H '(1989) 2 sec 356
MIS. SHOELINE v. COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX . 589
AND ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

application in the year 1986, which was rejected by the department. A ,''
The petitioners thereafter approached the Supreme Court under Article
"32 of.the Constitution after one year of rejection. Dismissing the petition,
this Court observed:
"8. . .. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not
pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were B
content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fencetill somebody
else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered
on the analogy of one where a law had been declared
unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to
recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared
void." c
12. In Haryana State Handloom & Handicrafts Corporation
Ltd. & Anr. v. Jain School Society1, land acquisition proceedings were
challenged after about two decades. The delay was sought to be
explained on the grounds that some other party had challenged the
acquisition and had obtained stay order from th.e court and hence the D
.Petition could be filed only after disposal of those proceedings. This
Court dismissed the petition observing that pendency of other proceedings
would not be good ground or challenging the acquisition. ·
13. Halsbury's Laws of England. states as follows:
E
"In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount
to !aches, the chief points to be considered are:
(i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and
(ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's F
part.
Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the
violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has
been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is
unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he G
has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a
· waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not
waiving the remedy, he.has put the other party in a position in

'c2003) 12 sec s3s
H
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 8 S.C.R.

A which it would not be reasonable to place him ifthe remedy were
afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay
are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine
of !aches."
14. In U.P. Jal Nigam & Am: v. Jaswant Singh & Anr. 4 , the
B issue pertained to entitlement of the employees of U.P. Jal Nigam to
continue in service up to the age of 60 years.
15. In Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer, Karmik &
Ors.(2005) Suppl. 5 SCR 317, this Court had earlier held that these
employees were in fact entitled to continue in service up to the age of 60
C years. After the aforesaid decision, a spat of writ petitions came to be
filed in the High Court by those who had retired long back. The question
that arose for consideration was as to whether the employees who did
not wake up to challenge their retirement orders, and accepted the same,
and had collected their post retirement benefits as well, could be given
relief in the light of the decision delivered in Harwindra Kumar (supra).
0 The Court refused to extend benefit applying the principle of delay and
!aches. It was held that an important factor in exercise of discretionary
relief under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia is !aches and delay.
When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces into the
situation, his writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the
E ground that the same relief should be granted to him as was granted to
the persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and
challenged their retirement. The Court held that: ·
"In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the
respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in
F accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time.
If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed
writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it
appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not
rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such
cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the
G incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration
the question ofacquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent
whether other parties are going to be prejudicated if the relief is.
granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have

H • (2006) 11 sec 464
MIS. SHOELINE · v. COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX 591
AND ORS. [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

challenged theirretirement being violative of the provisions of the A
Act; perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to
raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their
rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse
of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit
for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise B
funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on
the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court
come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are
guilty of waiver and acquiescence?"
'
16. Of course, the Ministry of Finance had issued a circular dated C.
September 26, 2011 after the legality of such a demand of service tax
was determined. However, in such a scenario, the appellant can succeed
only if its case gets covered by the four corners of such circular. A
reading of this circular reveals that after the judgment of Bombay High
Court holding that service tax would not apply to such cases, which was
upheld by' tl,iis Coillt on dismissal of special leave petitions, the Central D
{3oard of Excise and Customs in the Department of Revenue, Ministry·
of Finance, CJ9vernment of India has issued this circular dated September
26, 201lstatirig that such a liability would arise w.e.f. April 18, 2006.
Relevant portion of the said order reads as under:
· "2. In view of the aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble E
Supreme Court, the service tax liability on any taxable service
provided by a non resident or a person located outside India, to a
recipient in India, would arise w.e.f. 18.4.2006, i.e., the date of
enactment of section 66A of tbe Finance Act, 1994. The Board
has accepted this position. Accordingly, the instruction F No.
275111201 O~CX8A, dated 30.6.2010 stands rescinded. F
3. Appropriate action may please be taken accordingly in the
pending disputes.,;
17. It is clear from the aforesaid circular that in 'pending disputes',
the Government decided not to press for payment of service tax in such G
cases. Intention was clear, namely, this circular would not apply to those
cases which were already over and were not pending on that date.
Otherwise, all those persons who had already paid the demand earlier
without protesting the same would start claiming refund of those

H
592 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 8 S.C.R.

A payments. Therefore, this circular would not come to the aid of the
appellant.
18. Learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon the judgment
of this Court in Mis. D. Cawasji & Co. & Ors. v. State of Mysore &
Anr. 5• We have gone through the said judgment minutely. There is no
B need to discuss the facts of that case in detail. Suffice is to mention that
in that case, claim for refund of the tax paid was made which tax was
paid by mistake under legislation and was subsequently held to be void.
The writ petitions were dismissed on the ground of delay and the Supreme
Court upheld the decision of the High Court. We, therefore, fail to
understand how this judgment helps the appellant. If at all, ratio of that
C judgment goes against the appellant.
19. As pointed out above, insofar as present case is concerned,
the appellant never challenged adjudicating orders dated February 27,
2008 and woke up only after the issue was settled in other cases.
D 20. Having said so, we find one peculiar thing in the instant case.
Though the service tax levied for the period in question was to the tune
ofRs.11,62,728/- which stands paid by the appellant, liability on account
of penalty and interest is also fastened upon the appellant. The legal
position which is settled is that this service tax was not payable for the
period in question i.e. July 9, 2004 to March 31, 2006 inasmuch as such
E a liability arises only w.e.f April 18, 2006 after the insertion of the relevant
cnarging Section 66A in the Finance Act, 1994. This legal position is not
confined to only those who approached the Court but is a declaration of
law. It can be treated as judgment in rem. We may reproduce following
observations from the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastava & Ors.:
F "22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the
aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the
respondents, can be sununed up as under.
"22. l. The The normal rule is that when a particular set of
employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated
G persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not
doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of
Article 14 of the Constitution oflndia. This principle needs to be
applied in service matters more emphatically as the service

H '(1975) 1 sec 636
MIS. SHOELINE v. COMMISSIONER OF SERVICE TAX 593
AND ORS. [A.K SIKRI, J.]

jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates A
that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly.
Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other
similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they
are not to be treated differently.
22.2. However, this principle is subject to well-recognised B
exceptions in the form of !aches and delays as well as
acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful
. action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up
after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts
who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their
efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the C
judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be
extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and
!aches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground
to dismiss their claim.
22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where D
the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with
intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether
they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the
obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit
thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur E
when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy
matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C.
. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Vnion of India,
( 1997) 6. SCC 721 .: 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand,
ifthe judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit
of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court F
and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can
be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the
judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment
extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not
suffer from either !aches and delays or acquiescence. G
21. In a case like this, equities would be balanced by not insisting
on payment of penalty and interest. Thus, when tlie appellant approached
belatedly, it may not be entitled to refund of service tax already paid but
at the same time, the appellant sho~ld n_ot be called upon to pay any
H
594 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 8 S.C.R.

A interest and penalty levied on a tax which was not payable at all in law.
The High Court, to this extent, committed an error by not dealing with
this aspect of the matter and dismissing the writ petition in its entirety.
22. As a result, this appeal is partly allowed by setting aside the
demand qua interest and penalty.
B No costs.

AnlcitGyan Appeal partly all<>wed.