Supreme Court of India
M.S. SANDHU & ANR. ETC.versusSTATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC.
- Citation
- 2014 INSC 371
- Decided
- 7 May 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- S S NIJJAR
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Paramjit Singh judgment remains binding and must be followed, as it was not overruled by B.S. Yadav, and therefore the seniority list must be prepared in accordance with its ratio.
Summary
The case concerned seniority disputes in the Punjab Police Service DSP cadre between promotees and direct recruits. The Supreme Court examined whether the earlier judgment in Paramjit Singh, which held that the quota rule must apply both at recruitment and at confirmation, should be followed or displaced by the later Constitution Bench decision in B.S. Yadav, which limited the quota rule to recruitment only. The Court held that Paramjit Singh was not overruled, was specifically noted by the Constitution Bench, and therefore remained binding under Article 141. Consequently, the High Court’s decision to quash the seniority list and direct the State to prepare a new list in accordance with Paramjit Singh was affirmed. The appeals were dismissed, leaving the seniority list to be prepared as per the earlier ratio.
Issues considered
- The applicability of the quota rule at the stage of confirmation versus only at recruitment.
- Whether the judgment in B.S. Yadav overrules or modifies the ratio in Paramjit Singh.
- The correct method for fixing seniority of promotees and direct recruits under the Punjab Police Service Rules.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Art.14, s. Art.141, s. Art.16, s. Art.233, s. Art.235, s. Art.309
Subjects
seniorityquota rulepromotionDSP cadrePunjab Police Service Rulesconfirmationdoctrine of stare decisisservice law
Judgment
[2014] 13 S.C.R. 460
A M.S.SANDHU &ANR. ETC.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. ETC.
B (Civil Appeal Nos. 5397-5406 of 2014)
MAY0?,2014
[SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR AND A. K.SIKRI, JJ.]
c Service Law - Seniority - Cadre of Deputy
Superintendent of Police (DSP) -Dispute between
promotees and direct recruits- High Court quashed seniority
list prepared by the State Government and directed it to
prepare fresh seniority list in accordance with the judgment
D in the case of Paramjit Singh where the Supreme Court had
held that rule of quota should apply not only at the time of
appointment but at the time of confirmation also and
confirmation is to be done on the basis of vacancies - Plea
of appellants that the principle laid down in Paramjit Singh
E case was totally discarded by the subsequent Constitution
Bench judgment in the case of S.S. Yadav wherein it was held
that the rule of quota applicable at the stage of appointment/
recruitment will have no applicability at the time of
confirmation; and that the High Court ought to have followed
F the judgment in S.S. Yadav case since that judgment was
already before it when this case was decided by the High
Court- Whereas in Paramjit Singh case, rules pertaining to
officers of DSP cadre itself (i.e. the 1959 Rules) were in issue
in B.S.Yadav case, some other Rules (i.e. 1963 Rules) came
G up for interpretation -Approach of the High Court in following
the dicta laid down in Paramjit Singh - Justification - Held:
Justified, as it pertained to the same Service and same Rules
- That is the mandate of Art. 141 of the Constitution - Since ·
H 8. S. Yadav case did n6J overrule Paramjit Singh case and
460
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 461
rather explained and approved that judgment, the High Court A
had no option but to follow Paramjit Singh case- Constitution
of India, 1950-Art.141- Doctrines I Principles- Doctrine of
stare decisis - Punjab Police Service Rules, 1959- rr. 3, 4, 6, 8
and 10 - Punjab Judicial Servi9e Rules, 1963.
B
Dismissing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1. In a matter like this, the approach of the
High Court to follow the dicta in Paramjit Singh is most
appropriate which pertains to the same Service and same C
Rules. That is the mandate of Article 141 of the
Constitution. The High. Court could depart only in a
situation where it finds that the said judgment has been
subsequently overruled, specifically or impliedly or it is
per· incurium. Significantly, Paramjit Singh's case has
0
been specifically taken note of and commented upon by
the Constitution bench. It is clear that the judgment in
Paramjit Singh is not overruled by B.S.Yadav either
impliedly or specifically. It also cannot be said that
Paramjit Sing h's case is per in curium nor was it argued. E
[Paras 30, 31 and 34][486-C-E; 488-G-H]
1.2. The appellants are the promotees. It was at the
instance of this very class viz. promotee officers in the
same service who had questioned the validity of the Rule F
10 of the 1959 Rules, this Court was provoked to decide
that the quota rule had to be applied not only at the stage
of initial recruitment, but also at the stage of confirmation.
It is strange that when another set of promotees now
feel that the aforesaid interpretation rendered in favour G
of their own class, is not conducive to them and the
outcome is to their prejudice, they want the Court to take
a 'U' turn. Such a situation cannot be countenanced as
it would be anathema to the principle of doctrine of stare
H
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13S.C.R.
A decisis. Moreover, once it is found that the B.S.Yadav
does not overrule Paramjit Singh and rather explains
and approves that judgment, the High Court had no
option but to follow Paramjit Singh, as well as the
coordinate Bench of this Court. The operation of the
B Rules may result in harsh consequences as far as
appellants are concerned. But on the vagaries of such
outcomes, the Court cannot keep on interpreting a rule
differently. It is more especially when the promotees
being in excess of their quota have enjoyed the fortuitous
C appointment beyond their quota of vacancies.
[Paras :35, 37][489-B-E; 490-E-F]
Paramjit Singh & Ors. v. Ram Rakha 1979 (3) SCC
478 - explained.
D
B.S. Yadav v. U.0.1. 1980 Suppl. SCC 524: 1981
SCR 1024; R.K.Sabharwal v. U.0.1. (1995) 2 SCC
745: 1995 (2) SCR 35; Sura} Parkash Gupta v.
State of J & K. 2000 (7) SCC 561 : 2000 (3) SCR
E 807; G.S.Lamba & Ors. v. U.0.1. & Ors. 1985 (2)
SCC 604: 1985 (3) SCR 431 and Maharashtra
Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of
Maharashtra (2000) 2 SCC 552 - referred to.
Case Law Reference:
F
1979 (3)"SCC 478 explained Para 3
1981 SCR 1024 referred to Para 6
1995 (2) SCR 35 referred to Para 23
G
2000 (3) SCR 807 referred to Para 23
1985 (3) SCR 431 referred to Para 23
(2000) 2 sec 552 referred to Para 36
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 463
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal A
Nos. 5397 - 5406 of 2014.
From the judgment and order dated 10.04.2008 in CWP
No. 17397/1999, CWP
' .
No. 13224/2001, CWP No. 14332/ B
2001, CWP No. 15145/2001, CWP No. 12206/2005, CWP
No. 12208/2005, CWP No. 12321/2005, CWP No. 9087/2006
dated 23/01/2009 in CM No. 20061/2008 in CWP No. 12206/
2005, dated 24/04/2009 in RA No. 80/2009 in .CWP No. C
12206/2005 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at
Chandigarh.
WITH
C.A. Nos. 5407-5409, 5410-5412, 5413- 5422, 5423- . D
5425, 5426-5428, 5429-5438, 5439-5441 of 2014.
Mr. Rakesh Khanna, Sr. AAG., P. S. Patwalia, Nidhesh
Gupta, Dr. Rajiv Dhawan, Gurminder Singh, Sr. Advs., Ajay
Bansal, AAG., Ashok K. Mahajan, Tarun Gupta, Naresh
Sharma, S. Janani, Vineet Bhagat, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, E
Sudhir Walia (for Mr. AbhishekAtrey), Nikhil ~ain, Gagan Deep
Sharma, Ms. Preeti Singh (forMr. D. Mahesh Babu), Jagjit
Singh Chhabra, Gaurav Yadav, Ms. Binu Tamta and Dhruv
Tamta, Advs. for the appearing parties.
F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. K.SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The perennial dispute of seniority between the direct
recruits and promotees, that keeps showing its fang time and G
again in one form or the other, has surfaced in these batch of
appeals as well.
H
464 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A Having regard to the nature of the dispute, we deem it
proper to narrate the facts sequentially and while doing so, we
will also be stating the respective positions which the parties
to this lis have taken. In this manner by the time statement of
facts is over, we shall have crystallized the issues as well, which
B need to be answered.
3. Genesis of the dispute lies in the Punjab Police Service
Rules 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "1959 Rules") and the
origin can be traced to the judgment of this Court in the case
C of Paramjit Singh & Ors. vs. Ram Rakha 1979 (3) SCC
478. The dispute before us relates to seniority in the cadre of
Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) between the direct
recruits and promotees in these proceedings, which was the
subject matter of the aforesaid decision as well. However,
D before discussing the nature of disf)ute we would like to take
stock of the relevant provisions of 1959 Rules.
4. 1959 Rules are framed by the Governor of Punjab in
exercise of powers vested by the proviso to Article 309 of the
E Constitution. Rule 2 which is definition clause defines "Service
to mean the Punjab Police Service Rule 2 (f)". As per Rule 3
the Service shall comprise of the posts specified in Appendix
'A' to these Rules which shows 62 posts in the cadre of DSP.
Method of recruitment is stipulated in Rule 6 as per which 80%
F posts are to be filled by promotion from the rank of Inspectors
and 20% by direct recruitment. Rule 8 provides that both
promotees and direct recruits would be on probation for a
period of two years and in case of promotees, the Government
may by special order in each case permit period of officiating
G appointment to the Service to count towards the period of
probation. This rule also empowers the Government to extend
the period of probation by not more than one year, if it deems
fit. Rule 10, which is the most crucial provision and would
remain fulcrum of the discussion hereinafter, provides for
H fixation of seniority and reads as under:
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 465
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
"SENIORITY OF MEMBERS OF SERVICE:- A
10. The Seniority of members of the Service shall be
determined by the date of confirmation in the servic_e.
Provided that if two or more members are confirmed on
the same date; B
(i) a member who is appointed to the Service by
promotion shall be senior to the members appointed
otherwise;
c
(ii) in the case of members who were appointed by direct
appointment, the seniority shall be determined in
accordance with their position in the competitive
examination;
(iii) in the case of members who were appointed to the D
service by promotion, the seniority shall be determined
in accordance with the date of their entry in position list
'G'."
As is clear from the above, date of confirmation in E
Service is the relevant date and determinative factor for
assigning seniority.
5. This very rule of seniority in a dispute between direct
recruits and promotees, came up for consideration before this F
Court in Paramjit Singh's case. Respondents 1 and 2 in the
said case, who were promotees to the cadre of DSPs of
February 1961 and January 1961 respectively, had filed the
Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at
Chandigarh praying for a direction to confirm them in the G
Service. Apart from impleading State functionaries, six other
persons who were direct recruits were also impleaded as
respondents. These direct recruits were appointed as DSPs
between May 1961 and May 1965. The grievance of the said
H
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A two promotees was that quota rule of 80% by promotion and
20% by direct recruitment was not adhered to at the time of
confirmation in the Service, and therefore, even though they
were members of the Service since a period earlier to the
said direct recruits, they were not confirmed though the latter
B were confirmed and, as a consequence, were made senior to
these promotess, by virtue of Rule 10. On these premise, failure
to confirm them in the post available to them was challenged
as breach of the 1959 Rules and also in violation of Art.16 of
the Constitution. The contention of the Government as well as
C the direct recruits was that quota applies at the stage of initial
recruitment and not at the time of confirmation and there was
no allegation that the quota rule was violated at the time of
initial recruitment. It was also argued that no one can claim to
be confirmed as a matter of right. Further, the said promotees
0
were on officiating basis against temporary posts and therefore
for want of permanent posts, they could not be confirmed till
substantive vacancies in the permanent strength of the cadre
were available. The argument of the promotees was that if
E seniority is to be reckoned from the date of confirmation in the
service, confirmation must be made available to the recruits
from both the sources, namely promotees and direct recruits.
It was argued that if the direct recruits are confirmed or deemed
confirmed on satisfactory completion of probation and at the
F same time the cases of promotees for confirmation are not
considered, it would put them in a serious disadvantage in so
far as further promotions is concerned, viz. nomination to Indian
Police Service. Seniority-cum-merit being the criteria and the
basic cadre being the cadre of DSPs from nomination is to
G be made, their cases would not come up for consideration in
the absence of confirmation. On consideration of the entire
matter, the Court held that as the determinative date for fixing
the seniority is the date of confirmation, quota rule will have to
be observed not only at the stage of recruitment but at the stage
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 467
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
of confirmation as well. Else, it would result in discrimination A
to the promotees and would impinge upon their seniority in
the Service. The Court chose to give this interpretation as
according to it, this was the only way out to save Rule 10 from
the vice of arbitrariness. It is clear from the following discussion:
B
"Now, if the other view if taken that the quota rule would
apply both at the time of recruitment and at the time of
confirmation, Rule 10 which provides for seniority
according to the date of confirmation would certainly be
saved from the vice of unreasonableness. Is such a c
construction possible? One need not stretch the
language to bring about the desired result but in this case
upon a harmonious reading of Rules 3,6,8 and 10, the
conclusion is inescapable that quota rule is operating
both at the time of initial recruitment and at the time of D
confirmation. If the rule of seniority were one otherwise
than according to date of confirmation it would not have
become necessary to ~pply the quota rule at the stage
of confirmation but in this case the quota rule is linked up
with the seniority rule and unless the quota rule is strictly E
observed in practice it will be difficult to hold that the
seniority rule is not unreasonable and does not offend
Art.16(see S.G.Jaisinghani's case at pp. 717 and 718).
Quota rule is linked up with seniority rule because, not
the date of entry in service determines the seniority but F
the date of confirmation determines seniority and,
therefore, quota rule is inextricably intertwined with the
seniority rule and any delinking would render the seniority
rule wholly unreasonable. And other view would lead to G
the most undesirable result wholly unintended by the
framers of the rule. It must be remembered that after
recruitment, members of the service, though drawn from
two different sources - direct recruits and promotees -
constitute a single integrated cadre. They discharge H
468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A identical functions, bear similar responsibilities and
acquire an equal amount of experience in the respective
assignments. In this background in S.B.Patwardhan's
case this Court held that if the promotees are treated
with an evil eye and an unequal hand in the matter of
B seniority as was done under Rule 8(iii), the rule would
suffer from the vice of unreasonableness and would
· offend Art.16 and it was actually rule is applied at the
stage of initial recruitment and wholly ignored at the time
of confirmation because in that event while direct recruits
c will get confirmation automatically, the promotees would
hang out for years as has happened in the case of
mspondents 1 and 2 and if they are not confirmed they
would never get seniority and their chances of being
considered for promotion to the higher post would be
D
wholly jeopardized. To avoid this utterly unconscionable
outcome the construction we have put on Rule 8 would
be in consonance with justice and reason."
6. After solving the dispute in the aforesaid manner, the
E Court also made certain other observations in para 14. We
would refer to that para at the relevant stage inasmuch as it is
the contention of the appellants before us that observations
made in the said para are legally erroneous which position is
now acknowledged by this Court in the Constitution Bench
F judgment in the case of B.S.Yadavvs. U.0.1. 1980 Suppl. SCC
524.
7. To put it succinctly, in Paramjit Singh's case, this Court
held that rule of quota shall apply at the time of confirriation
G also and confirmation was to be done on the basis : I ':1cancies.
It would mean that even at the time oi cor1firmat:on quota of
4: 1 between the promo tees and direct recruits would be
applicable.
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 469
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
8. Implementing this judgment, the State Government A
prepared seniority list dated 4.6.1981 thereby granting dates
of confirmation from 1961 to 1981. This led to filing of an
application for clarification in Paramjit Singh's case by the
appellants in the said case. Dismissing the application the
Court made the following categorical remarks: B
"There was no ambiguity in the Court's earlier judgment.
What the Court meant was that quota should be co-
related to the vacancies which are to be filled in. Who
retired and from what source he was recruited may not c
be very relevant because retirement from service may
not follow the quota rule. A roster had to be introduced
which was to continue while giving confirmation.
Introduction of roster only postulates ascertainment of·
available number of vacancies and proceeding to make D
recruitment keeping in view of the quota. If recruitment is
strictly made according to quota there will be no difficulty
in applying the very rule of quota even while giving
confirmation. It was, thus, maintained that since the quota
in the present case is 4: 1 that, four promotes to one E
direct recruit, therefore, whenever vacancies occur, the
appointing authority has first to recruit four promotes
irrespective of the factors or circumstances causing the
vacancies and as soon as four promotes are recruited
to bring in a direct recruit." F
9. Having noticed the ratio of the case of Paramjit Singh
(supra), we now proceed to.take stock of the factual details of
the dispute in these appeals. A number of posts of the DSPs
were created in the year 1989 and the State Government was G
not finding suitable persons for appointment to the said posts.
The State Government accepted the proposal of the Director
General of Police, Punjab and relaxed the condition of
experience from 6 years to 4 years as Inspector for promotion
H
470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A to the post of DSP. Thereafter, between November, 1989 to
December 1989, 85 Inspectors who had more than 4 years of
service but less than 6 years, were promoted to the rank of
DSP. The Punjab Public Service Commission, ultimately in
the year 1998, granted approval to the aforesaid appointments
B and the promotes, DSPs of 1989 batch were brought on list
'G' from the date of their promotion.
10. A Writ Petition being CWP No.17397 of 1999 was
filed by direct recruits of 1990 and 1991 thereby challenging
c the action of the State Government in bringing the promoted
DSPs of 1989 batch on list 'G' from the date of their promotion
as DSPs in the High Court. It was the grievance of the writ
petitioners/direct recruits in the said writ petition that the
promotees who were appointed as DSPs from the year 1987
D to 1989 were promoted in excess of their quota of 80%.
11. Thereafter, the State Government vide order dated
10.10.2000 confirmed the promotees DSPs of 1989 batch.
The aforesaid action of confirmation of 1989 batch DSPs was
E challenged by one Tulsi Ram byway of filing CWP No.16419
of 2000 in the High Court. The question which arose in the
said writ petition for the determination by the High Court was
whether the promotion of the promotees officers of 1989 batch
to the post of DSP was de hors the Rules and whether they
F could be given the benefit of that service for the purpose of
their seniority.
12. The Division Bench of the High Court vide judgment
dated 26. 4.2001 dismissed the writ petition filed by Tulsi Ram
G holding that the promotee officers are entitled to the benefit of
their temporary service which they rendered as DSPs and that
service has to count towards their seniority. The said judgment
is reported in 2002 (5) SLR 409. The Special Leave Petition
against the said judgment was dismissed by this Court and in
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 471
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
view of the dismissal of the Special Leave Petition the A
aforesaid judgment became final so far as the promotees .
DSPs of 1989 batch are concerned.
13. Thereafter, the State Government finalized the
seniority list of the members of the Punjab Police Service vide B
order dated 7.7.2005. One of the writ petitioners in
W.P.No.17397 of 1999 namely Gurpreet Singh Bhuller filed
the Civil Writ Petition No.12206 of 2005 challenging the
aforesaid seniority list and also prayed that the seniority list of
the members of the Punjab Police Service may be prepared C
in accordance with the judgment of this Court in Paramjit
Singh's case.
14. The High Court, vide impugned judgment dated
10.4.2008, has allowed the Civil Writ Petition No.12206 of
0
2005 and quashed the seniority list dated 7.7.2005 thereby
directing the State Government to prepare the seniority list in
accordance with the judgment of this Court in Paramjit Singh's
case. It is this judgment which is assailed before us.
15. Some more factual details need a mention at this E
. stage. When W.P. No.16419/2000 filed by direct recruits was
dismissed by the High Court on 26.4.2001 and SLP there
against was also dismissed, the State Government initially took
the position based on the aforesaid judgment, viz. that the F
requirement of 6 years service for promotion to the post of
DSP which was relaxed to 4 years was approved and
confirmed held valid therefore seniority would be given from
1988. However, the Government, thereafter, chose to constitute
a Committee to go into the entire gamut of these issues. The G
Committee went into the length & breadth of all the relevant
issues, including the earlier judgment of this Court in the case
of Paramjit Singh and recommended that judgment in Paramjit
Singh's case should be followed. On the basis of the said
H
472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A recommendation, the State Government passed the orders
dated 7.7.2005 accepting the same. Interestingly, in the
meantime, many promotees DSPs who were brought on list
'G', had been inducted into IPS Service. However, the
Government decided not to interfere with the said career
B progression of those DSPs and they are left untouched.
16. These developments and issues were debated
before the High Court which has, vide impugned judgment
dated 10.4.2008, held that the decision of the Government
C following the dicta in Paramjit Singh's case is apt &justified. It
has been directed that this judgment be implemented and
consequential change in IPS be also made. However, those
promotees DSPs who had already been inducted as IPS and
were not impleaded in the parties in the said case filed an
D application stating that they were adversely affected. On that
application the High Court passed the order deleting the
direction of making consequential changes in the IPS. The
promotees also filed Review Petition seeking review of the
said judgment. This petition has been dismissed by the High
E Court vide order dated 24.4.2009. Before us, in all these
appeals, promotees DSPs have come forward challenging the
decision of the High Court in the Writ Petition as well as in the
Review Petition.
F 17.. Two more developments which need to be mentioned
at this stage are:
(1) The State Government has already circulated seniority
list on "15.12.2009 on the basis of direction given in the
G judgment of the High Court i.e. after the filing of the SLPs.
(2) The earlier 1959 Rules have been repealed with the
promulgation of the Punjab Civil Services General Conditions
of Service Rules, 1994. Indubitably, Rule 20 of these Rules
categorically mentions that only common permanent post
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 473
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
would constitute the cadre and not the temporary ones. Vital A
change is made in the rule fixing seniority. Now, from the date
of framing of these Rules dated 4.9.1994, length of service is
adopted as the criteria for fixing the seniority and thereby giving
go bye to the earlier criteria based on the date of confirmation.
B
18. Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Mr. Nidesh Gupta, Sen.ior
Advocates appeared for the appellants in these cases and
advanced detail arguments in support of promotees' case.
Opening the front, Mr. Patwalia, at the outset drew the attention
of this Court to the subsequent case of B.S.Yadav vs. U.0.1. C
· (supra) and submitted that the Constitution Bench in that case
has laid down principle of law in unequivocal terms that rule of
rotation cannot be read into the rule of seniority. He, thus,
submitted that observations of the Division Bench in Paramjit
Singh's case in para 14 that rule of quota shall apply at the D
time of confirm·ation also did not remain valid any longer. In
this endeavour, Mr. Patwalia specifically referred to para 35 of
B.S.Yadav judgment, wherein the Constitution Berich framed
two issues that needed to be resolved. We reproduce issue
No.2 as framed as first issue does not concern us: E
"(2) whether the High Court, basing itself on the rule of
at
quota, is justified in applying the rule of rotation the
time of confirmation of promotees and direct recruits as
District and Sessions Judges." F
19. He emphasized that question No.2 framed in the said
case arose directly for consideration in the present set of
appeals also which was answered by the Constitution Bench
in para 53 onwards. In para 53, the Court noticed that the main G
thrust of the argument of the promotees was that method of
rotation cannot apply at the time of confirmation as it wquld be
violative of their fundamental rights under Art.14 and 16 of the
Constitution. This is answered in subsequent paras. Our
H
474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13S.C.R.
A purpose would be served in reproducing discussion contained
in paras 65 to 68 which are as follows:
"65. In the light of these contentions, the question for
determination is whether the method of confirmation
B adopted by the High Court by the rotation of promotees
and direct recruits in the ratio of 2 : 1 is justified on a
proper interpretation of the relevant rules. Is the operation
of Rule 8 confined to the stage of initial recruitment to
the Service by promotion and by direct appointment?
c Or, can that rule be superimposed on Rules 10 and 12
so as to justify its application at the stage of confirmation
also? These are the questions which are posed for our
consideration.
66. Rule 8, as its very heading shows, provides for a
D
distinct condition of service with reference to a specific
point of time, namely: "Recruitment to Service". The words
"to be filled up by direct recruitment" which occur in the
proviso to sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 also point in the direction
E that the operation of this sub-rule is confined to the stage
of initial recruitment to the Service either by promotion
or by direct appointment from the Bar. Rules 10, 11 and
12 provide for the regulation of probation, reversion of
promoted officers and seniority, which conditions of
F service are distinct and separate from "Recruitment to
Service" dealt with in Rule 8. In other words, Rule 8 only
fixes the respective quota of recruits from the two sources
specified in clauses (i) and (ii) of sub-rule (1 ). Such
reservation is intended to be made at the stage of initial
G appointments only, by reserving 2/3rd of the total number
of posts in the cadre for promote es and 1/3rd for direct
recruits. It seems to us evident that a post which falls
vacant in the quota of promotees cannot be filled by the
confirmation of a direct recruit therein nor indeed can a
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 475
. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
promotee be confirmed in a post which is within the quota A
of direct recruits.
67. If this be the true construction of Rule 8, the method
of confirmation by rotation of direct recruits and
promotees, regardless of whether the vacancy assigned B
to the particular officer falls within the quota of the class
to which he belongs will be in contravention of that rule. It
was held by this Court in Punjab & Haryana High Court
v. State of Haryana that "appointment" is not a continuous
process, that the process of appointment is complete c
as soon as a person is initially recruited to the service
either by. promotion or by direct recruitment and tha·t
confirmation is not a part of the process of appointment.
The necessity of treating "recruitment to the Service" and
"confirmation" as two distinct and separate matters can D
be appreciated if only it is realised that "recruitment to
the Service" is a matter which falls within the power of
the Governor under Article 233 while "confirmation" is a
matter of "control" vesting in the High Court under Article
235. The superimposition of Rule 8, which fixes the quota E
at the stage of recruitment, on the rules relating to
confirmation and seniority is therefore contrary to the
basic constitutional concepts governing judicial service.
68.This apart, the application of rota system at the stage F
of confirmation is beset with practical difficulties. For
example, if vacancies in the quota of direct recruits cannot
be filled for 2 or 3 years for the not uncommon reason
that direct recruits are not available, and during that period
several vacancies occur in the quota of promotees who G
have been officiating continuously for two or three years,
can the postporiement of the confirmation of such
promotees against vacant posts in their quota, until the
· direct recruits are appointed and become eligible for
H
476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A confirmation on completing the prescribed period of
probation, be justified on any reasonable ground? Is it
proper and fair to defer the confirmation of the promo tees
merely because direct recruits are not available at that
point of time so as to enable the High Court to make
B confirmations from both the sources by rotation? This,
precisely, is what the High Court has done by the
impugned notification dated August 25, 1976 and that is
the reason why it has not confirmed ten more promotees
in Punjab, for whom vacancies are available within the
c quota of promotees."
20. It is noteworthy that judgment in. Paramjit Singh
(supra) was specifically noticed and discussed by the
Constitution Bench in para 71 to which we shall advert later
D whrle undertaking our analysis as the outcome of these
proceedings depends on the true impact of the discussion
contained in that para.
21. The Constitution Bench, thereafter, discussed the
E judgment of the High Court which was impugned in the
B.S.Yadav, and held that the High Court was not justified in
applying the rule of rotation at the time of confirmation of the
members of the superior judicial service. For the sake of clarity,
we would like to reproduce para 72 and 73 containing such a
F ratio:
"72. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court was not
justified in applying the rule of rotation at the time of
confirmation of the members of the Superior Judicial
Service who were appointed to that Service by promotion
G
and by direct recruitment. In fact, we would like to remind
that a special Bench of five learned Judges of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana had itself held on December
13, 1977 in N.S. Rao v. State of Haryana that the rule <;:if
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 477
[A K. SIKRI, J.]
rota cannot be read into the rule of quota prescribed by A
Rule 8 of the Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules. It
was observed by the Special Bench in para 14 of its
judgment that a plain reading of Rule 8 shows that the
intention of the framers of the rules was only to provide
for quota and that no indication at all has been given that B
the rotational system also had to be followed at the time
of confirmation or for the purpose of fixing seniority. In
coming to this conclusion, the High Court placed reliance
on the decisions of this Court in A.K. Subraman and N.K.
Chauhan to which we have already referred. The High C
Court expressed its conclusion in para 22 of the judgment
by saying that Rules 8 and 12 are independent of each
other, that the rotational system cannot impliedly be read
into the quota rule prescribed by Rule 8 and that the.
0
members of the Superior Judicial Service are entitled to
claim seniority, strictly in accordance with the provisions
· of Rule 12. We are unable to understand how, in the
discharge of its administrative functions, the High Court
could have failed to follow a judgment of its own special E
Bench consisting of five learned Judges. We are of the
opinion that the aforesaid judgment has taken a correct
view of the matter on a combined reading of Rules 8 and
12.
73. We would like to say at the cost of repetition that we F
are not dealing with the abstract question as to whether
the rule of quota necessarily excludes the rule ofrotation.
We are only concerned to point out that it is not correct
to say that the rule of rota must necessarily be read into G
the rule of quota. We have to decide in these cases the
narrow question asto whether, on a true interpretation of
Rules 8 and 12 of the Superior Judicial Service Rules of
Punjab and Haryana, the quota rule prescribed by Rule
8 justifies, without more, its extension at the time of H
478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A confirmation so that, after every two promotees are
confirmed one direct recruit has to be confirmed and until
that is done, promotees cannot be confirmed even if
vacancies are available within their quota in which they
can be confirmed. We are of the opinion, on a proper
B interpretation of the rules, that promotees are entitled to
be confirmed in the vacancies which are available within
their quota of 2/3rd, whether or not 1/3rd of the vacancies
are occupied by confirmed direct recruits. And similarly,
direct recruits are entitled to be confirmed in vacancies
c which are available within their quota of 1/3rd, whether
or not 2/3rd of the vacancies are occupied by confirmed
promotees. What we find lacking in justification is the
refusal of the High Court to confirm the promotees even
if vacancies are available in their quota in which they can
D
be confirmed merely because, by doing so, more than
two promotees may have to be confirmed at one time,
without the confirmation of a proportionate number of
direct recruits. The fairness which Articles 14 and 16
postulate is that if a promotee is otherwise fit for
E
confirmation and a vacancy falling within the quota of
promotees is avaifable in which he can be confirmed,
his confirmation ought not to be postponed until a direct
recruit, whether yet appointed or not, completes his period
F of probation and thereupon becomes eligible for
confirmation. The adoption of this principle in the matter
of confirmation, will not, in practice, give any undue
advantage to the promotees. The facts and figures
supplied by the High Court in Annexure 'R-4' to its counter-
G affidavit in Writ Petition No. 266 of 1979 show that
vacancies in the quota of promotees do not generally
become available before the promotees have put in two
to five years' service as officiating District and Sessions
Judges."
H
M.S.SANDHU V; STATE OF PUNJAB 479
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
22. Based on the aforesaid dicta in B.S.Yadav, the A
learned senior counsel paraphrased his submissions as
follows:
(1) Judgment in Paramjit Singh's case was never
implemented by the Government when it was pronounced. This B
was clear from the fact that the appellants promotees who were
promoted in the November/December 1989 were promoted
in relaxation of the rule providing for length of service as .
eligibility condition and their names were also brought in the
list "G". Many persons of 1989 Batch were even further inducted c
into the IPS. This list was even approved, though belatedly in
the year 1998 and that was the reason for the confirmation
orders coming in the year2000. However, that was much before
the direct recruits were confirmed. In case, quota is applied at
the stage of confirmation also, it would seriously affect these D
promotees who are otherwise much senior to the direct
recruits.
(2) In a situation like this, the Government rightly felt that
the judgment in Paramjit's Singh case was not capable of E
implementation. This was even the stand of the Government
in the Writ Petition No.1739/1999 filed before the High Court
by the direct recruits. A specific counter affidavit was filed
stating that the promotees did not exceed their quota and their
seniority was rightly determined. However, the Government F
turned turtle thereafter and took a 'U' turn. ·
(3) In any case within one year of the judgment in Parmajit
Singh, which was rendered in the year 1979 Constitution
Bench in B.S.Yadav in the year 1980, strengthened the legal G
position which impliedly overruled Paramjit Singh's case.
(4) If at all, judgment in Paramjit Singh is to be confined
to its own facts without treating it as it precedent.
H
480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A (5) Fault is found with the impugned judgment of the High
Court which decided to follow Paramjit Singh's case on the
ground that when this case was decided by the High Court in
the year 2008, the High Court had before it Constitution Bench
in B.S.Yadav and the High Court was supposed to follow the
B law laid down therein which had binding force, rather than
choosing to follow another judgment which had lost its sheen.
(6) The judgment in Paramjit Singh, if followed now, is
going to create anomalous situation.
c 23. Mr. Nidesh Gupta while adopting the aforesaid
submissions, further pointed out that rule of 80:20 for
promotees and direct recruits was only a quota rule and not a
rota rule. In so far as quota is concerned that was kept within
bounds while making promotions of the promotees to DSP
0
Cadre. He argued that in such a scenario, the subsequent
judgment of the Supreme Court in R.K.Sabharwal vs. U.0.1.
(1995) 2 sec 745 would also be applicable which laid down
rule of promotion on post basis and not vacancy basis. He
E further submitted that the judgment in B.S.Yadav was followed
in Suraj Parkash Gupta vs. State of J & K. 2000 (7) SCC
561 wherein the Court has held as under:
"41. The direct recruits contend that rota is to be implied
or read into the "quota" rule. It is also argued that there
F has been a previous practice of applying a rota and that
this fact stands conceded in the counter-affidavit filed by
the Government in SWP No. 824-B of 1994. R~liance is
also placed on the Cabinet note of December 1997 where
the view of the Law Department that quota-rota rule is to
G
be applied, is referred to."
He also referred to the judgment of G.S.Lamba &Ors.
v. U.0.1. & Ors.1985 (2) SCC 604 and relied upon paras 17,
23 and 25 which are as under:
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 481
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
"17. It is too late in the day to dispute that it would be A
open to the Government, while constituting a service, to
provide for recruitment to it from more than one source
and also to reserve quota for each source. As a logical
corollary, it would equally be open to the Government to
provide for seniority rule related to rotation ofvacancies. B
Shortly this is called quota rul.e of recruitment and rota
rule of seniority interlinking them. So far there is no
controversy. The contention of the petitioners is that in
implementing this rule there has been such large scale
deviation that it results in denial of equality to the C
members of the service similarly circumstanced. It will
be presently demonstrably established that where rota
rule of seniority is interlinked with quota rule of
recruitment, and if the latter is unreasonably departed
0
from and breaks down under its own weight, it would be
unfair and unjust to give effect to the rota rule of seniority.
To some extent this is not res integra. Though some
advance has been made on this proposition in later
decisions.
E
23. Now turning to the impugned seniority lists, what the
Union of India appears to have done is that it has applied the
quota and rotated the vacancies but where candidates from a
particular source were not available, the vacancies were
deemed to 'be kept open (some kind of carry forward) to be F
filled in by later recruitment from the same source years after
the vacancy occurred, but in the meantime the vacancy was
filled in presumably by excess recruitment from the other
sources. That is clearly either non-implementation of the quota G
rule or malfunctioning of the quota rule and yetthe rota rule is
adhered to which is both impermissible under-the Rules as
well as unjust, unfair and inequitous being violative of Articles
14and 16.
H
482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A 25. The language of Rule 13(1) appears to be mandatory
in character. Where recruitment to a service or a cadre is from
more than one source, the controlling authority can prescribe
quota for each source. It is equally correct that where the quota
is prescribed, a rule of seniority by rotating the vacancies can
B be a valid rule for seniority. But as pointed out earlier if the rule
of seniority is inextricably intertwined with the quota rule and
there is enormous deviation from the quota rule, it would be
unjust, inequitous and unfair to give effect to the rota rule. In·
fact as held in O.P. Sing/a case giving effect to the rota rule
C after noticing the enormous departure from the quota rule
would be violative of Article 14. Therefore assuming that quota
rule was mandatory in character as pointed out earlier, its
departure must permit rejection of rota rule as a valid principle
D of seniority."
24. Mr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel
appearing for the private respondents in some of these
appeals, submitted that the central issue was as to whether
judgment in Paramjit Singh is per incuriam and had not to be
E followed at all. His submission was that it was not so as the
judgment pertains to the same 1959 Rules and same Service
Cadre i.e. DSP. Therefore, there was no reason to depart from
the ratio in Paramjit Singh which had the direct bearing. He
argued that in Paramjit this Court had emphasized that there
F were specific reasons, rationale and justification for attaching
rota to quota because the Court was dealing with exceptional
situation and found that linkage of the two as the only just
solution. At that time, this was done to give benefit to the
G promotees. Now, these promotees cannot turn round and the
ratio in Paramjit Singh, when the fact situation does not suit
the application of that rule. Mr. Dhawan also referred to certain
portion of the judgment ~nd B.S.Yadav argued that the said
judgment is based on the interpretation which was to be given
H to Rule 8 of Punjab Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963. He
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 483
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
further stressed that when Paramjit Singh is specifically taken A
note in B.S.Yadav and not overruled, it would mean that the
said judgment is in fact upheld by the Constitution Bench. It
was also argued that the promotees were not even appointed
to the substantive vacancies and therefore cannot take
advantage of their so called continuous service rendered in B
temporary post of DSPs. He, concluding his.argument with
emphatic plea that the peculiar situation which prevailed qua
this particular Service rightly led the High Court to follow the
dicta of Paramjit Singh giving sufficient justifiable reasons in
support. C
25. Mr. Gurminder Singh, Sr. Advocate, appeared for
. some other private respondents in these appeals. He also
endeavoured to bring home the different situation under which
Paramjit Singh and B.S.Yadav cases were decided. His D
submission was that even if Paramjit Singh was to be confined
to its own facts, the solution therein was valid in so far as this
very Service is concerned.As the present case also related to
same Rules and same Service, there was no illegality in
following Paramjit Singh. He further submitted that the reason E
for bunching, which had taken place in the instant case, was
direct recruits were not appointed at time and the vacancies
remained unfilled for long period. In fact between 1971 and
1985 there was no recruitment under this quota. He also
mentioned that Rules were again amended in the year 2010 F
i.e. w.e.f. 18.8.2010. With the amendment of Rule 10, now
length of service is the criteria. He referred to orders of
confirmation dated 19.12.2011 and submitted that this was
the most equitable solution which could be achieved by the G
Government. Therefore, there was no reason to interfere with
the exercise which had been accomplished on the basis of
the Expert Committee's report and to which the High Court in
given its imprimatur in the impugned judgment.
H
484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A 26. Mr. Khanna who appeared on behalf of the State
Government submitted that the stand of the Government was
very clear, namely, quota was maintained on the cadre strength.
He also submitted that the State had no other alternative
except to follow dicta in Paramjit Singh which gave
B interpretation to Rule 10 and that was binding on the State
Government.
27. From what we have noted above, including the
submissions of learned counsel for the various parties, it
c becomes clear that the entire issue hinges primarily upon an
answer to the question as to whether dicta laid down in Paramjit
Singh's case be followed or we need to deviate therefrom and
follow the principle laid down in. B.S.Yadav's case. All other
issues and arguments raised would pale into insignificance
D once answer to this core issue becomes available. In fact upon
decision on this central issue, answer to other peripheral issues
would itself surface. Therefore, we proceed to address this
issue in the first place.
E 28. We have carefully considered the submissions of the
learned counsel for the parties on this aspect. As pointed out
above, shorn off any niceties and nuances which have been
projected before us, the core issue is as to whether judgment
of this Court in Paramjit Singh's case was rightly followed by
F the High Court. The case of Paramjit Singh was concerned
with same 1959 Rules pertaining to the officers of this very
cadre, namely DSP Cadre. It was interpreting the rule in the
context which had arisen before it. The Court was of the opinion
that to save rule 10 from the vice of the arbitrariness and to
G avert the situation of striking down the same, it would be
appropriate to interpret the said Rule 10 to mean that rule of
quota shall apply not only at the time of appointment but at the
time of confirmation also and confirmation was to be done on
the basis of vacancies. This was achieved in the manner stated
H in para 14 of the said judgment which reads that:
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 485
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
"It may be pointed out that where recruitment is from two A
sources and the seniority in the cadre is determined
according to the date 9f confirmation, to accord utmost
fair treatment a rotational system has to be followed while
giving confirm.ation. The quota rule would apply to
vacancies and recruitment has to be made keeping in B
view the vacancies available to the two sources according
to the quota. If the quota rule is strictly adhered to there
will be no difficulty in giving confirmation keeping in view
the quota rule even at the time of confirmation. A roster
is introduced while giving confirmation ascertaining every C
time which post has fallen vacant and the recruit from
that source has to be confirmed in the post available to
the source. This system would break down the moment
recruitment from either source in excess of the quota is
0
made. In fact a strict adherence to the quota rule at the
·time of rec.ruitment would introduce no difficulty in
applying the Rule at the time of confirmation because
vacancies would be available for confirmation to persons
belonging to different sources of recruitment. The difficulty E
arises when recruitment in excess of the quota is made
and it is further 4s1accentuated when recruits from one
source, to wit, in this case direct recruits get automatic
confirmation on completion of the probationary period
while the promotees hang out for years together before F
being confirmed. In Mervyn Coutinho case this Court in
terms said that rotational system of fixing seniority
meaning thereby confirmation followed by seniority does
not offend equality of opportunity in Governmer]t service
and recruitment not following the fixed quota rule need G
not be a ground for doing away with rotational system."
29: The appellai:its' argument is that this principle is totally
discarded by the subsequent Constitution Bench judgment in
the case of B.S.Yadav wherein it is held that the rule of quota H
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A applicable at the stage of appointment/recruitment will have
no applicability at the time of confirmation. Thus, on the one
hand, we have the judgment in the case of Paramjit Singh which
pertains to these very Rules and the ratio of this judgment is
applied by the High Court and on the other hand, we have the
B law laid down by the Constitution Bench in B.S. Yadav wherein
the provisions of some other rules came up for interpretation.
30. According to us, in a matter like this, the approach of
the High Court to follow the dicta in Paramjit Singh is most
c appropriate which pertains to the same Service and same
Rules. That is the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution.
The High Court could depart only in a situation where it finds
that the said jud_gment has been subsequently overruled,
specifically or impliedly or it is per- incurium. Therefore, the
D moot question would be to examine as to whether B.S.Yadav
overrules the judgment in Paramjit Singh.
31. Significantly, Paramjit Singh's case has been
specifically taken note of and commented upon by the
E Constitution bench. Therefore, we are not faced with a situation
where Paramjit Singh judgment has gone unnoticed. This
judgment has been discussed by the Constitution Bench in
para 71, as under:
"71. In Paramjit Singh Sandhu v. Ram Rakha it was
F
held by this Court on a harmonious reading of Rules 3,
4, 6, 8, and 10 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1959 that the
quota rule was operative both at the time of initial
recruitment and at the time of confirmation. We would
like to clarify that this case is not an authority for the
G
proposition that whenever service rules provide for quota,
the rule of rota must be read into the rule of quota. We
are not laying down that the rules of.quota and rota cannot
coexist. Service rules may so provide or they may yield
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 487
. [A. K. SIKRI, J.]
to such an interpretation. In that event, their validity may A
have to be tested in the total setting of facts. Therefore,
whether the quota system has to be observed not only at
the stage of initial recruitment but also at the stage of
confirmation is riot a matter of abstract law but will depend
on the wording of the rules and the scheme of the rules B
under consideration. Any dogmatic assertion, one way
or the other, is wrong to make. On a review of these
authorities, all that we would like to say is that on a proper
interpretation of the rules governing the Punjab and
Haryana Superior Judicial Service, the rule of rota cannot C
be read into the rule of quota. In other words, the ratio of
2 : 1 shall have to be applied at the stage of recruitment
but cannot, on the language of the relevant rules, be
applied at the stage of confirmation."
D
32. From the reading of the aforesaid extracted portion,
it follows that the Court made it clear that it was not laying down
that rule of quota and rota cannot go exist. Service rules, in a
particular case may specifically provide the co-existence of
quota and rota. There may also be a situation where service E
rules be interpreted as such. That is a very important comment
made by the Constitution Bench after taking note of the ratio
in Paramjit Singh's case. It is specifically noted how the Court
on harmonious reading of Rules 3,4,6,8 and 10 of these 1959
Rules had come to the conclusion that quota rule was operative F
both at the time of initial appointment and at the time of
confirmation. After taking note of this ratio on the harmonious
interpretation of the Rules in question, rather than stating that
such an interpretation was impermissible or wrongly given, the G
Constitution Bench clarifies that there may be circumstances
where such an interpretation would be permissible and validity
of the rules would be tested in the total setting of facts. That
was precisely done by the Bench in Paramjit Singti's case.
Only conclusion which can be drawn from the reading of para H
488 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A 71 of the judgment is that the harmonious reading of the 1959
Rules done in that case was in fact approved, and by no stretch
of reasoning, can it be inferred that it was overruled.
33. It needs to be highlighted at this stage that having
s regard to the overall circumstances and the factual position
which prevailed while deciding Paramjit Singh's case, the
Court held that in order to save Rule 10 from the vice of
arbitrariness, the only interpretation which could be given was
to hold that the quota rule would apply both at the time of
C recruitment and at the time of confirmation. Detailed reasons
are given justifying the said line of action taken by the Court
and that portion of the judgment has already been extracted.
In the beginning, not only this, even when the Review Petition
was filed the Court made it clear that there was no ambiguity
D in the judgment. It was also made clear that what the Court
meant was that quota should be co-related to the vacancies
which are to be filled in. Who retired and from what source he
was recruited may not be very relevant because retirement
from service may not follow the quota rule. A roster had to be
E introduced which was to continue while giving confirmation.
Introduction of roster only postulates ascertainment of available
number of vacancies and proceeding to make recruitment
keeping in view of the quota.
F 34. It was argued by the learned counsel for the
respondent that the language of the rules that interpreted in
B.S.Yadav (supra) viz. the Punjab Judicial Service Rules 1963,
are different from Punjab Police Rules 1959. It is not even
necessary to go into this aspect minutely, inasmuch as from
G the above discussion it becomes clear that the judgment in
Paramjit Singh is not overruled by B.S.Yadav either impliedly
or specifically. It also cannot be said that Paramjit Sing h's case
is per in curium nor was it argued. Once, we go by the ratio of
that judgment, the seniority being dependent upon the date of
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 489
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
confirmation made it necessary to introduce the roster by giving A
four vacancies to promotees and the five vacancy to the direct
recruit and adhere to the same strictly to bring it in consonance
with justice and reason.
35. The learned senior counsel appearing for the 8
appellants have tried to argue that if the aforesaid rule is
followed it would act to the prejudice of the appellants. The
appellants are the promotees. It was at the instance of this
very class viz. promotee officers in the same service who had
questioned the validity of the Rule 10, this Court was provoked c
to decide that the quota rule had to be applied not only at the
stage of initial recruitment, but also at the stage of confirmation.
It is strange that when another set of promotees now feel that
the aforesaid interpretation rendered in favour of their own
class, is not conducive to them and the outcome is to their D
prejudice, they want the Court to take a 'U' turn. Such a situation
cannot be countenanced as it would be anathema to the
principle of doctrine of stare decisis. Moreover, once we find
that the B.S.Yadav does not overrule Paramjit Singh and rather
explains and approves that judgment, the High Court had no E
option but to follow Paramjit Singh, as well as the coordinate
Bench of this Court.
36. Notwithstanding the above, it would be appropriate
to point out that the argument of the appellants that the F
op'eration of the rotational principle in quota would lead to
inequitable results was refuted by the respondents who
submitted that by applying the principle as directed by this
Court, the State Government has drawn out a seniority, the
perusal of which shows that against the existing strength of G
the service of 450 there are 406 promotee officers as against
360 vacancies following to their share @ 80% and 44 direct
recruits as against 90 vacancies to their share@ 20%. The
further appointment to the promotion to the IPS cadre is made
H
490 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 13 S.C.R.
A solely on the basis of merit and the ratio of officers which make
it to the IPS from the State Service cannot be taken as an
indicator of any discrimination resulting by virtue of the 959
Rules. We find some substance in the aforesaid argument.
Somewhat similar argument, as taken by the appellants before
B us, was commented upon by this Court in Maharashtra
Vikrikar Karamchari Sangathan v. State of Maharashtra
(2000) 2 sec 552, at page 567:
"Lastly, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that
C some of the appellants have put in more than 17 years of
service when a few of the direct recruits were either
schooling and/or nor born in the cadre. If the appellants
were to be pushed down, it would cause great hardship
to them. We are unable to subscribe to this contention
D because if there is patent violation of the quota rule, the
result must follow and the appellants who remained in
the office for all these years cannot take the advantage
of this situation. This submission is, therefore, devoid of
any substance."
E
37. The operation of the Rules may result in harsh
consequences as far as appellants are concerned. But on the
vagaries of such outcomes, the Court cannot keep on
interpreting a rule differently. It is more especially when the
F promotees being in excess of their quota have enjoyed the
fortuitous appointment beyond their quota of vacancies. ·
38. Likewise, argument of the appellants that the quota
rule had broken down would not cut much ice. First of all, such
G an argument was not even raised/pleaded, nor any material
was placed on record which shows that the adherence to the
quota rule as possible leading to break down of the quota.
Private respondents have made fervent plea that as a matter
of record whenever State Government had endeavoured to
H
M.S.SANDHU v. STATE OF PUNJAB 491
[A. K. SIKRI, J.]
make direct recruitments, vacancies had been duly filled with A
adequate number of candidates. Therefore, for want of any
material no definite findings can be recorded on this aspect,
more so, such a case was not pleaded before the High Court.
May be, because of such situation recurring time and again
either in favour of the promotees or in favour of the direct B
recruits, the Government has remedied the situation by
amending the rules thereby bringing the rule of continuous .
length of service for determining the seniarity. It is always open
to the Government to take such steps for the benefit of all in
the service and to ensure that the result is equitable. However, C
in the instant case, we do not find fault with the judgment of the
High Court. ·
39. We, accordingly, hold that the approach of the High
Court in following the dicta laid down in Paramjit Singh was D
. perfectly justified. Finding no merit in these appeals, the same
are hereby dismissed. No costs.
Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Appeals dismissed.
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