Holding

Because the petitioners failed to produce any evidence to overturn the statutory presumption that the cheques were drawn for discharge of a legally enforceable debt, the convictions under Section 138 stand affirmed.

Summary

The petitioners, a film production company and its proprietor, borrowed Rs 41.28 lakh in five instalments from the complainant on a hand‑loan basis at 2% per month interest and issued five cheques to discharge the debt, which were returned for insufficient funds. The complainant filed five complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, leading to conviction and six‑month simple imprisonment for each cheque, with compensation orders, which were upheld by the High Court. The petitioners contended that the money was a joint investment for a film and not a loan, arguing that the statutory presumption under Section 139 should shift to the complainant. The Supreme Court held that the petitioners offered no oral or documentary evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for a legally enforceable debt, and therefore the convictions were justified. The Court also ordered that the sentences in the five cases run concurrently and refused special leave, dismissing the petition.

Issues considered

The applicability and rebuttal of the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act that a cheque is issued for discharge of a debt.
Whether the burden of proof to establish a legally enforceable debt lies on the complainant when the drawer admits receipt of money.
Whether conviction under Section 138 can stand in the absence of documentary evidence of a loan.
Whether sentences for multiple convictions arising from the same transaction should run concurrently under Section 31 CrPC.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 31, s. 427
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881s. 118, s. 138, s. 139

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose as to whether the courts below were justified in convicting the petitioners u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques and sentencing them to imprisonment and to pay the cheque amounts as compensation, in each of the complaints. Headnotes Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 139 – Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds – Petitioners borrowed certain sum in five instalments as a hand loan from the

Subjects

s.138s.139Negotiable Instruments Actcheque dishonourstatutory presumptionburden of proofconcurrent sentencescriminal appealloan vs investmentfilm production

Judgment

[2024] 10 S.C.R. 2248 : 2024 INSC 1059

M/s S.S. Production and Anr.
P1: M/s S. S. Production
P2: TR. S. Subbiah
v.
TR. Pavithran Prasanth
(Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No(s). 13981-13985 of 2024)
01 October 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia and
Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as to whether the courts below were justified in
convicting the petitioners u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 for dishonour of cheques and sentencing them to six
months of simple imprisonment and to pay the cheque amounts
as compensation, in each of the complaints.

Headnotes
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – ss.138, 139 – Dishonour
of cheque for insufficiency of funds – Petitioners borrowed
certain sum in five instalments as a hand loan from the
complainant and promised to repay the same on demand with
interest – Issuance of five cheques in order to discharge the
liability but the same got dishonoured on being presented by
the complainant, with the endorsement ‘funds insufficient’ –
Five complaints in respect of the five dishonoured cheques
against the petitioners – Case of the petitioners that money
was given to them in the course of producing a film jointly
by the complainant and the petitioners and since the film
failed, the cheques and receipts given by the petitioners
were misused by the complainant – Trial court convicted
the petitioners u/s.138 and sentenced them to six months
of simple imprisonment and to pay the cheque amounts as
compensation, in each of the complaints – Said order upheld
by the courts below – Interference:

* Author
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2249

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

Held: Not called for – Reasoning of the courts below is sound
that evidence had to be adduced by the petitioners that the said
amounts were given for producing a film and were not by way of
return of any loan taken, which was not done – Just by taking a
counter-stand to raise a probable defence would not shift the onus
on the complainant in such a case for the plea of defence has to
be buttressed by evidence, either oral or documentary – Liability
has to be discharged by the person concerned and that would be
a legally enforceable debt repayable, under the purview of s.138 –
If the amount were by way of investments in a film being jointly
produced, the need per se to issue cheques, including interest
would not have arisen at all, which has not been explained by the
petitioners at all – Onus to first prove as to how the amount that
is said to have been given by the complainant to the petitioners
could have been given, would not be fatal as receipt of the amount
has not been denied, much less disputed by the petitioners – No
error in the High Court opining that in view of the denial by the
General Power of Attorney holder of the complainant with regard
to any joint deal/venture with the petitioners in film production,
the onus would not shift on the complainant and would remain on
the petitioners to prove that such receipt of money was not with
regard to repayment of an amount legally due to the complainant –
Accused have not been able to dislodge the statutory presumption
u/s.139 – Exercising the judicial discretion, it is directed that the
sentences of imprisonment awarded in each complaints, would
run concurrently. [Paras 8-14]

Case Law Cited
Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant [2022] 4 SCR 442 : (2022) 6
SCC 735; Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh [2023] 13 SCR 788 : (2023)
10 SCC 148; Rafiq v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1981] 1 SCR 402 :
(1980) 4 SCC 262; Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Assistant Collector
of Customs (Prevention) [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 747 : (1988) 4
SCC 183; V K Bansal v. State of Haryana [2013] 7 SCR 617 :
(2013) 7 SCC 211; O M Cherian v. State of Kerala (2015) 2 SCC
501 – referred to.

List of Acts
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
2250 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords
s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Dishonour of
cheques; Pay the cheque amounts as compensation; Dishonour
of cheque for insufficiency of funds; Discharge the liability;
Endorsement ‘funds insufficient’; Capacity of complainant u/s.138
NI Act; Statutory presumption u/s.139 NI Act; Onus to prove amount
legally due; Six months of simple imprisonment; Legally enforceable
debt; Statutory presumption; Sentences to run concurrently; Judicial
discretion.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Criminal) Nos. 13981-13985 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 15.06.2023 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRLRC Nos. 394, 395, 396, 403 and
406 of 2020

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Sameer Aslam, Adv. Ms. M. Venmani.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Delay condoned.
2. The present petition assails the common Final Judgment and
Order dated 15.06.2023 in Crl. R. C. Nos.394-396, 403 & 406 of
2020 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Impugned Order’) passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Madras (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘High Court’), whereby the five Criminal Revision cases filed by
the petitioners were dismissed and the conviction and sentence,
as awarded by separate Judgments and Orders dated 31.10.2017
passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate (Fast Track Court III), Saidapet,
Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Trial Court’) in C.C. Nos.137-
141 of 2016 and confirmed by separate Judgments and Orders dated
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2251

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

31.10.2019 passed by the VII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil
Court, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Appellate Court’)
in Crl. A. Nos.380-384 of 2017, were upheld.

BRIEF FACTS:
3. The sole respondent is the complainant. The petitioner no.2 is the
proprietor of petitioner no.1 and both are arrayed as accused. It
was alleged that the petitioner no.2 was in the business of Cinema
Production and for his urgent business needs, he had approached
the complainant and borrowed a total sum of Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees
Forty-One Lakhs Twenty-Eight Thousand) in five instalments as a
hand loan on 29.08.2015 and promised to repay the same on demand
with interest at the rate of 2% per month. Separate Promissory
Notes dated 29.08.2015 were executed for each of the instalments
in favour of the complainant.
4. In order to discharge the liability of Rs.42,08,000/- (Rupees Forty-
Two Lakhs Eight Thousand), a total of five cheques were issued by
the accused, which on being presented by the complainant, were
returned with the endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. Statutory Notice
was issued by the complainant pursuant to which he lodged five
complaints in respect of the five dishonoured cheques against the
petitioners. The Trial Court convicted the accused under Section 1381
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereinafter referred to as

1 ‘138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.—Where any cheque
drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money
to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other
liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of
that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from
that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an
offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for
a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque,
or with both:
Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless—
(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is
drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;
(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the
payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within
thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as
unpaid; and
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or
as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the
said notice.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt
or other liability.’
2252 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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the ‘Act’) and sentenced them to six months of Simple Imprisonment
and to pay the cheque amounts as compensation, in each of the
complaints. This order of conviction and sentence has been upheld
by the First Appellate Court and thereafter by the High Court vide
the Impugned Order.
5. The details of the five cases are tabulated hereinunder:

Date of Loan 29.08.2015
Loan Amount Rs.41,28,000 with interest @ 2% per mensem
Cheque Date 29.09.2015
Drawn On South Indian Bank, Gandhipuram, Coimbatore Branch
Cheques No. 500834 500830 500831 500832 500833
Cheque 1.28 10.2 each x 4 cheques = 40.8
Amounts
[In Rs. (Lakhs)]
Total Cheque Rs.42,08,000
Amount (inclusive of interest)
Date Cheque 29.09.2015 15.10.2015
presented
Date Cheque 29.09.2015 16.10.2015
returned
Returned with ‘Funds Insufficient’
Endorsement
Date of Legal 07.10.2015 12.11.2015
Notice
Date Postal 19.11.2015 24.11.2015 26.11.2015
Cover returned
Postal Cover ‘Unclaimed’
returned as
Complaint 137 138 139 140 141
CC ___/2016
Crl. A. No. 380 381 382 383 384
___/2017

SUBMISSIONS BY THE PETITIONERS:
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the cheque(s)
must be proved to have been issued for a legally enforceable debt,
but in the present cases, the complainant has not produced any
statement of accounts and/or Income Tax Returns showing that the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2253

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

complainant lent money to the accused and the accused did not
repay the said money. Hence, the complainant failed to prove that
the cheques were issued for a legally enforceable debt.
7. It was contended that the complainant claims that he lent cash of
Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees Forty-One Lakhs Twenty Eight Thousand)
to the accused with rate of interest of 2% per month. However, the
matter of fact is that the said money was given to the accused in the
course of producing a film jointly by the complainant and the accused
and since the film failed, the cheques and receipts given by the
accused were misused by the complainant. Further, the complainant
failed to establish that the amount given by the complainant is a loan
and not for any other purpose by placing the statement of accounts
and/or Income Tax Returns. Hence, the complaint would not attract
Section 138 of the Act as the accused has rebutted the presumption
under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act by probable defence. This
defence has been established by cross-examining PW1/the General
Power of Attorney-holder of the complainant. Accordingly, the accused
had shifted the burden on the complainant. Hence, the statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the Act would not continue and
it was for the complainant to discharge the onus by bringing on
record evidence/material to show that the amount(s) given is/are for
a legally enforceable debt. Moreover, the complainant failed to assail
the defence of the accused. On these grounds, learned counsel for
the petitioners urged the Court to issue notice and thereafter, admit
and allow the appeals.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
8. From the order impugned, it is clear that though the contention of
the petitioners was that the said amounts were given for producing
a film and were not by way of return of any loan taken, which may
have been a probable defence for the petitioners in the case, but
rightly, the High Court has taken the view that evidence had to be
adduced on this point which has not been done by the petitioners.
Pausing here, the Court would only comment that the reasoning of
the High Court as well as the First Appellate Court and Trial Court
on this issue is sound. Just by taking a counter-stand to raise a
probable defence would not shift the onus on the complainant in such
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a case for the plea of defence has to be buttressed by evidence,
either oral or documentary, which in the present cases, has not
been done. Moreover, even if it is presumed that the complainant
had not proved the source of the money given to the petitioners
by way of loan by producing statement of accounts and/or Income
Tax Returns, the same ipso facto, would not negate such claim for
the reason that the cheques having being issued and signed by the
petitioners has not been denied, and no evidence has been led to
show that the respondent lacked capacity to provide the amount(s)
in question. In this regard, we may make profitable reference to
the decision in Tedhi Singh v Narayan Dass Mahant (2022) 6
SCC 735:
‘10. The trial court and the first appellate court have
noted that in the case under Section 138 of the NI Act
the complainant need not show in the first instance that
he had the capacity. The proceedings under Section
138 of the NI Act is not a civil suit. At the time, when
the complainant gives his evidence, unless a case is
set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent,
that the complainant did not have the wherewithal, it
cannot be expected of the complainant to initially lead
evidence to show that he had the financial capacity. To
that extent, the courts in our view were right in holding
on those lines. However, the accused has the right to
demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case
did not have the capacity and therefore, the case of the
accused is acceptable which he can do by producing
independent materials, namely, by examining his
witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to
him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the
materials produced by the complainant himself. He can
further, more importantly, achieve this result through the
cross-examination of the witnesses of the complainant.
Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the courts to consider
carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence and
then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the
accused has shown that the case of the complainant is
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2255

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

in peril for the reason that the accused has established
a probable defence.’
(emphasis supplied)

9. The High Court has also rightly noted that the petitioners have not
denied receipt of the sum of Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees Forty-One Lakhs
Twenty-Eight Thousand) but have taken the defence that it was given
in the course of jointly producing a film with the complainant. Even
then, the liability has to be discharged by the person(s) concerned
and that would be a legally enforceable debt repayable, under the
purview of Section 138 of the Act.
10. Moreover, as per the defence proffered by the petitioners themselves,
the money was given to the accused in the course of producing a
film jointly by the complainant. The accused urge that since the film
failed, the cheques and receipts given by the accused were misused
by the complainant. Thus, arguendo, if the same is correct, and the
accused and respondent-complainant were indeed jointly producing
a film, no reason/occasion to issue the cheques and receipts to the
complainant is forthcoming, inasmuch as, if the amount(s) were by
way of investments in a film being jointly produced, the need per
se to issue cheques, including interest would not have arisen at all.
This crucial aspect has not been explained by the petitioners at all.
11. Further, the High Court has also rightly observed that even assuming
the petitioners and the complainant engaged together in film
production and were in the course of jointly producing a film, the
fact that the transaction occurred as a joint investment has not been
substantiated by the petitioners before the Courts. In this background,
the onus to first prove as to how the amount that is said to have been
given by the complainant to the petitioners could have been given,
would not be fatal as receipt of the amount(s) has not been denied,
much less disputed by the petitioners. In this regard, specifically, a
suggestion given to the GPA-holder of the complainant i.e., PW1 that
the complainant and petitioners were engaged in film production has
been emphatically denied by PW1.
12. We also find no error in the High Court opining that in the backdrop
of emphatic denial by PW1 with regard to any joint deal/venture with
2256 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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the petitioners in film production and acceptance and non-rebuttal
of receipt of Rs.41,28,000/- (Rupees Forty-One Lakhs Twenty-
Eight Thousand), the onus would not shift on the complainant and
would remain on the petitioners to prove that such receipt of money
was not with regard to repayment of an amount legally due to the
complainant. In fact, the accused have not been able to dislodge the
statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Act. In this context,
in a decision of recent vintage, Rajesh Jain v Ajay Singh, (2023)
10 SCC 148, the Court stated:
‘33. The NI Act provides for two presumptions : Section
118 and Section 139. Section 118 of the Act inter alia
directs that it shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, that every negotiable instrument was made or
drawn for consideration. Section 139 of the Act stipulates
that “unless the contrary is proved, it shall be presumed,
that the holder of the cheque received the cheque, for the
discharge of, whole or part of any debt or liability”. It will
be seen that the “presumed fact” directly relates to one of
the crucial ingredients necessary to sustain a conviction
under Section 138. [The rules discussed hereinbelow are
common to both the presumptions under Section 139 and
Section 118 and are hence, not repeated—reference to
one can be taken as reference to another]
34. Section 139 of the NI Act, which takes the form of a
“shall presume” clause is illustrative of a presumption of
law. Because Section 139 requires that the Court “shall
presume” the fact stated therein, it is obligatory on the
Court to raise this presumption in every case where
the factual basis for the raising of the presumption had
been established. But this does not preclude the person
against whom the presumption is drawn from rebutting it
and proving the contrary as is clear from the use of the
phrase “unless the contrary is proved”.
35. The Court will necessarily presume that the cheque
had been issued towards discharge of a legally enforceable
debt/liability in two circumstances. Firstly, when the drawer
of the cheque admits issuance/execution of the cheque
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2257

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

and secondly, in the event where the complainant proves
that cheque was issued/executed in his favour by the
drawer. The circumstances set out above form the fact(s)
which bring about the activation of the presumptive clause.
[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal
[Bharat Barrel & Drum Mfg. Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal,
(1999) 3 SCC 35]]
36. Recently, this Court has gone to the extent of holding
that presumption takes effect even in a situation where the
accused contends that a blank cheque leaf was voluntarily
signed and handed over by him to the complainant. [Bir
Singh v. Mukesh Kumar [Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019)
4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
40]]. Therefore, mere admission of the drawer’s signature,
without admitting the execution of the entire contents in
the cheque, is now sufficient to trigger the presumption.
37. As soon as the complainant discharges the burden to
prove that the instrument, say a cheque, was issued by
the accused for discharge of debt, the presumptive device
under Section 139 of the Act helps shifting the burden
on the accused. The effect of the presumption, in that
sense, is to transfer the evidential burden on the accused
of proving that the cheque was not received by the Bank
towards the discharge of any liability. Until this evidential
burden is discharged by the accused, the presumed fact
will have to be taken to be true, without expecting the
complainant to do anything further.

xxx

39. The standard of proof to discharge this evidential
burden is not as heavy as that usually seen in situations
where the prosecution is required to prove the guilt of an
accused. The accused is not expected to prove the non-
existence of the presumed fact beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused must meet the standard of “preponderance of
probabilities”, similar to a defendant in a civil proceeding.
[Rangappa v. Sri Mohan [Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010)
2258 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri)
184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]]
40. In order to rebut the presumption and prove to the
contrary, it is open to the accused to raise a probable
defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable
debt or liability can be contested. The words “until the
contrary is proved” occurring in Section 139 do not mean
that the accused must necessarily prove the negative that
the instrument is not issued in discharge of any debt/
liability but the accused has the option to ask the Court
to consider the non-existence of debt/liability so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the
case, to act upon the supposition that debt/liability did
not exist. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa
v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
571: AIR 2019 SC 1983]; see also Kumar Exports v.
Sharma Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets,
(2009) 2 SCC 513: (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629: (2009) 1
SCC (Cri) 823] ]
41. In other words, the accused is left with two options.
The first option—of proving that the debt/liability does
not exist—is to lead defence evidence and conclusively
establish with certainty that the cheque was not issued in
discharge of a debt/liability. The second option is to prove
the non-existence of debt/liability by a preponderance of
probabilities by referring to the particular circumstances
of the case. The preponderance of probability in favour
of the accused’s case may be even fifty-one to forty-
nine and arising out of the entire circumstances of the
case, which includes: the complainant’s version in the
original complaint, the case in the legal/demand notice,
complainant’s case at the trial, as also the plea of the
accused in the reply notice, his Section 313 CrPC statement
or at the trial as to the circumstances under which the
promissory note/cheque was executed. All of them can
raise a preponderance of probabilities justifying a finding
that there was “no debt/liability”. [Kumar Exports v. Sharma
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2259

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

Carpets [Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC
513: (2009) 1 SCC (Civ) 629: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 823]]
42. The nature of evidence required to shift the evidential
burden need not necessarily be direct evidence i.e. oral
or documentary evidence or admissions made by the
opposite party; it may comprise circumstantial evidence
or presumption of law or fact.
43. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove
that the instrument was not issued in discharge of a
debt/liability and, if he adduces acceptable evidence, the
burden again shifts to the complainant. At the same time,
the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence
and, if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling,
the burden may likewise shift to the complainant. It is
open for him to also rely upon presumptions of fact,
for instance those mentioned in Section 114 and other
sections of the Evidence Act. The burden of proof may
shift by presumptions of law or fact. In Kundan Lal case
[Kundan Lal Rallaram v. Custodian (Evacuee Property),
1961 SCC OnLine SC 10: AIR 1961 SC 1316] when the
creditor had failed to produce his account books, this Court
raised a presumption of fact under Section 114, that the
evidence, if produced would have shown the non-existence
of consideration. Though, in that case, this Court was
dealing with the presumptive clause in Section 118 NI Act,
since the nature of the presumptive clauses in Sections
118 and 139 is the same, the analogy can be extended
and applied in the context of Section 139 as well.
44. Therefore, in fine, it can be said that once the accused
adduces evidence to the satisfaction of the Court that on a
preponderance of probabilities there exists no debt/liability
in the manner pleaded in the complaint or the demand
notice or the affidavit-evidence, the burden shifts to the
complainant and the presumption “disappears” and does
not haunt the accused any longer. The onus having now
shifted to the complainant, he will be obliged to prove
the existence of a debt/liability as a matter of fact and his
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failure to prove would result in dismissal of his complaint
case. Thereafter, the presumption under Section 139
does not again come to the complainant’s rescue. Once
both parties have adduced evidence, the Court has to
consider the same and the burden of proof loses all its
importance. [Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa [Basalingappa
v. Mudibasappa, (2019) 5 SCC 418: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri)
571: AIR 2019 SC 1983]; see also, Rangappa v. Sri Mohan
[Rangappa v. Sri Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441: (2010) 4 SCC
(Civ) 477: (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 184: AIR 2010 SC 1898]]’
(emphasis supplied)

13. For reasons aforesaid, we do not find any ground to interfere in the
order impugned and accordingly, the petition(s) shall stand dismissed.
We refuse special leave, being cognizant of Rafiq v State of Uttar
Pradesh (1980) 4 SCC 262:
‘3. Concurrent findings of fact ordinarily acquire a deterrent
sanctity and tentative finality when challenged in this Court
and we rarely invoke the special jurisdiction under Article
136 of the Constitution which is meant mainly to correct
manifest injustice or errors of law of great moment. …’
(emphasis supplied)

14. However, before parting, the Court would clarify that though there
are separate judgments and orders of the Trial Court, in each case,
six months’ simple imprisonment and direction to pay the cheque
amount as the compensation has been awarded; the orders being of
the same date between the same parties and in connection with the
same transaction of the same nature, albeit in different tranches, the
sentences of imprisonment awarded shall run concurrently. Further,
in case of failure of the petitioners to pay the compensation amount
within six months from today, the same shall be recovered from them
as a public debt under the relevant law, and it shall be paid to the
complainant/respondent by the competent authority post-recovery.
In directing the sentences to run concurrently, we have exercised
judicial discretion [reference to ‘judicial discretion’ herein is to be
understood as per Gudikanti Narasimhulu v Public Prosecutor,
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2261

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1 SCC 240] guided by the
principles governing the field, which are noted infra:
I. Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v Assistant Collector of Customs
(Prevention) (1988) 4 SCC 183 [2-Judge Bench]
‘10. The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the
so-called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences.
If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two
enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive
sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent
sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction
relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting
the two offences are quite different.’
(emphasis supplied)

II. V K Bansal v State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 211 [2-Judge
Bench]
‘18. Applying the principle of single transaction referred to
above to the above fact situations we are of the view that
each one of the loan transactions/financial arrangements
was a separate and distinct transaction between the
complainant on the one hand and the borrowing company/
appellant on the other. If different cheques which are
subsequently dishonoured on presentation, are issued
by the borrowing company acting through the appellant,
the same could be said to be arising out of a single loan
transaction so as to justify a direction for concurrent
running of the sentences awarded in relation to dishonour
of cheques relevant to each such transaction. That being
so, the substantive sentence awarded to the appellant in
each case relevant to the transactions with each company
referred to above ought to run concurrently. We, however,
see no reason to extend that concession to transactions
in which the borrowing company is different no matter the
appellant before us is the promoter/Director of the said
other companies also. Similarly, we see no reason to direct
running of the sentence concurrently in the case filed by
State Bank of Patiala against M/s Sabhyata Plastics and
2262 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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M/s Rahul Plastics which transaction is also independent
of any loan or financial assistance between the State
Financial Corporation and the borrowing companies.
We make it clear that the direction regarding concurrent
running of sentence shall be limited to the substantive
sentence only. The sentence which the appellant has
been directed to undergo in default of payment of fine/
compensation shall not be affected by this direction. We do
so because the provisions of Section 427 CrPC do not, in
our opinion, permit a direction for the concurrent running
of the substantive sentences with sentences awarded in
default of payment of fine/compensation.’
(emphasis supplied)

III. O M Cherian v State of Kerala (2015) 2 SCC 501 [3-Judge
Bench]
‘18. While referring the matter to a larger Bench, the
Bench observed that in Mohd. Akhtar Hussain case
[Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs, (1988) 4
SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921], Section 31 CrPC was not
noticed by this Court. It is to be pointed out that in Mohd.
Akhtar Hussain case [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector
of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and
Manoj case [(2014) 2 SCC 153: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 763],
the appellants who were convicted for different counts of
offences arose out of a single transaction, favouring the
exercise of discretion to the benefit of the accused that the
sentences shall run concurrently. Those decisions are not
cases arising out of conviction at one trial of two or more
offences and therefore, reference to Section 31 CrPC in
those cases was not necessitated.
19. As pointed out earlier, Section 31 CrPC deals with
quantum of punishment which may be legally passed when
there is (a) one trial; and (b) the accused is convicted of
two or more offences. The ambit of Section 31 is wide,
covering not only a single transaction constituting two
or more offences but also offences arising out of two or
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 2263

State (NCT) of Delhi v. Rajeev Sharma

more transactions. In the two judgments in Mohd. Akhtar
Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector of Customs,
(1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and Manoj [(2014)
2 SCC 153: (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 763], the issue that fell
for consideration was the imposition of sentence for two
or more offences arising out of the single transaction. It
is in that context, in those cases, this Court held that the
sentences shall run concurrently.
20. Under Section 31 CrPC it is left to the full discretion
of the court to order the sentences to run concurrently in
case of conviction for two or more offences. It is difficult
to lay down any straitjacket approach in the matter of
exercise of such discretion by the courts. By and large, trial
courts and appellate courts have invoked and exercised
their discretion to issue directions for concurrent running
of sentences, favouring the benefit to be given to the
accused. Whether a direction for concurrent running
of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would
depend upon the nature of the offence or offences
committed and the facts and circumstances of the case.
The discretion has to be exercised along the judicial lines
and not mechanically.
21. Accordingly, we answer the reference by holding that
Section 31 CrPC leaves full discretion with the court to
order sentences for two or more offences at one trial to
run concurrently, having regard to the nature of offences
and attendant aggravating or mitigating circumstances. We
do not find any reason to hold that normal rule is to order
the sentence to be consecutive and exception is to make
the sentences concurrent. Of course, if the court does not
order the sentence to be concurrent, one sentence may
run after the other, in such order as the court may direct.
We also do not find any conflict in the earlier judgment in
Mohd. Akhtar Hussain [Mohd. Akhtar Hussain v. Collector
of Customs, (1988) 4 SCC 183: 1988 SCC (Cri) 921] and
Section 31 CrPC.’
(emphasis supplied)
2264 [2025] 4 S.C.R.

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15. Exemption from surrendering granted earlier vide Order dated
03.05.2024 in favour of petitioner no.2 will cease to operate. The
petitioner no. 2 is hereby directed to surrender within three weeks
from the date of communication of this Judgment to serve the
remaining period of sentence. Registry shall intimate the petitioners
and their AOR forthwith.
16. Pending IA(s), if any, stand closed.

Result of the case: Petition dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain