M/S. REAL ESTATE AGENCIESversusGOVT. OF GOA & ORS.

                           [2012] 8 S.C.R. 278


 A                  M/S. REAL ESTATE AGENCIES
                                   v.
                        GOVT. OF GOA & ORS.
                    (Civil Appeal No. 6383 of 2012)
                        SEPTEMBER 10, 2012
 B
           [P. SATHASIVAM AND RANJAN GOGOi, JJ.]

         Constitution of India, 1950:

 C       Art.226 - Writ petition seeking interference of High Court
    in proposed developmental work at the instance of State
    Government and Municipal Corporation on the land claimed by
    petitioner - Dismissed by High Court on the ground of
   alternative efficacious remedy, i.e. a suit for injunction - Held:
o Writ Court exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226 is fully
   empowered to interdict the State or its instrumentalities from
   embarking upon a course of action to detriment of the rights of
   the citizens, though, in the exercise of jurisdiction in the domain
  of public law such a restraint order may not be issued against
E a private individual - In the instant case, order of High Court
  does not contain any reference to the relevant circumstances
  in which it had passed the impugned order nor does it contain
  any reasons why the petitioner was relegated to the remedy of
  initiating a civil action - The manner of reaching the decision
F and the reasons therefor are sacrosanct to the judicial
  proceedings - Judgments/Orders.

         Art. 226 - Writ petition involving title to the subject land
  - Held: There is no universal rule or principle of law which
  debars the Writ Court from entertaining adjudications
G involving disputed questions of fact - In the instant case,
  petitioner, claimed title to the land in question on the basis
  of the deed of Indenture, the orders of the High Court in a Civil
  Suit and the LPA as well as the proceedings of acquisition in
  respect of an area acquired out of the land in question - State
H                                278
    REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                   279

Government did not claim any title to the land - Claim of A
Municipal Corporation, that the land had vested in it was not
substantiated - High Court ought not to have disposed of the
writ petition at the stage and in the manner it had so done and,
instead, ought to have satisfied itself that there was actually
a serious dispute between the parties on the question of s
ownership or title - Only in that event, High Court would have
been justified to relegate the petitioner to the civil court to seek
its remedies by way of a suit - Impugned order passed by
 High Court is not tenable in law - Alternative remedy.

     Jurisprudence:                                               c
      Ownership - Petitioner - developer after developing a
residential colony, stated to have been transferred the open
land to be developed as "open space" - Developer failed to
develop the land as "open space" - Held: Land in question D
being earmarked as "open space", the normal attributes of
legal ownership of the land have ceased insofar as petitioner
is concerned who is holding the land as a trustee on behalf
 of residents and other members of public - Petitioner cannot
 transfer the land nor can it use the same in any other manner E
 except by keeping it as an open space - In the
 circumstances, taking into account the nature of the
 developmental works that were proposed and the fact that a
 part of the work may have been executed in the meantime,
 respondents are permitted to complete the remaining work on F
 the land with liberty to the petitioner to raise and establish a
 claim before the appropriate forum for such loss and
 compensation, if any, to which it may be entitled in law.

     The appellant filed a writ petition before the High
 Court challenging the Government Order dated 30.6.2010            G
 proposing to undertake the developmental works on the
 land in question admeasuring 19250 sq.m., which,
 according to the appellant was transferred to it under a
 registered deed dated 16.11.1977, after completing the
 developmental work of the residential colony developed                H
     280     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 8 S.C.R.

A by it, and was meant to be kept open as "vacant space".
   The petitioner claimed the right, title and interest in the
   subject land and asserted that it had exclusive right to
   develop the same. It was the case of the petitioner that
   the G.0. dated 30.6.2010 required that tenders in respect
B of developmental work on the land would not be issued
  unless the land itself was acquired, however, without
  initiating any acquisition proceedings tender was floated
  and respondent No.4 was awarded work order and the
  works on the land were undertaken w.e.f. 2.1.2011. The
c High Court refused the reliefs sought in the writ petition
  leaving the writ petitioner with the option of approaching
  the civil court. Aggrieved, the writ petitioner filed the
  appeal.

        Disposing of the appeal, the Court
D
       HELD: 1.1. The order of the High Court does not
   contain any reference to the relevant circumstances in
  which it had passed the impugned order nor does it
  contain any reasons why the petitioner was relegated to
E the remedy of initiating a civil action. Time and again this
  Court has emphasized that such a course of action by a
  court cannot lead to a legally acceptable conclusion
  inasmuch as the manner of reaching the decision and the
  reasons therefor are sacrosanct to the judicial process.
F [Para 7] [288-F-H]

        1.2. A reading of the order of the High Court would
   show that its refusal to interdict the developmental works
   undertaken or about to be undertaken is on the ground
   that the petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy,
G i.e. a suit for injunction. The Writ Court exercising
  jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution is fully
  empowered to interdict the State or its instrumentalities
  from embarking upon a course of action to detriment of
  the rights of the citizens, though, in the exercise of
H jurisdiction in the domain of public law such a restraint
       REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                              281


order may not be issued against a private individual. [Para                         A
8) [289-B-C]

     1.3. There is no universal rule or principle of law
which debars the Writ Court from entertaining
adjudications involving disputed questions of fact. In fact,                        8
in the realm of legal theory, no question or issue would
be beyond the adjudicatory jurisdiction under Art. 226,
even if such adjudication would require taking of oral
evidence. However, as a matter of prudence, the High
Court under Art. 226 normally would not entertain a                                 C
 dispute which would require it to adjudicate contested
 questions and conflicting claims of the parties to
 determine the correct facts for due application of the law.
 [Para 9) [289-E-G]

      ABL International Ltd. & Anr. V. Export Credit Guarantee                      D
 Corporation of India Ltd. 2004 (3) SCC 553; Smt. Gunwant
 Kaur & Ors. v. Municipal Committee, Bhatinda & Ors, 1969
 (3) SCC 769 and Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar
 Municipal Council 1970 (2) SCR 854= 1970 (1) SCC 582 -
 relied on.                                                                         E

      1.4. The petitioner, in the instant case, claimed title
 to the land in question on the basis of the deed of
 Indenture dated 16.11.1977; the orders of the Bombay
 High Court in Suit No. 11811981 and LPA No. 26 of 1983
                                                                                        F
 as well as the proceedings of acquisition in respect of an
 area of about 625 sq. m. out of the open space in
 question. The State did not claim any title to the land but
 contended that by virtue of the judgment of this Court in
 Pt. Chet Ram' the petitioner had ceased to hold the normal
 attributes of ownership of immovable property in respect                               G
  of the land in question and its position was more akin to
  that of a trustee holding the land for the benefit of the
  public at large. The Housing Society (respondent No.5),
  1.   Pt. Chet Ram Vahist vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 1994 (5) Suppl. Ser       H
       180.
           282      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 8 S.C.R.


       A on the other hand, claimed easementary right of
         enjoyment of the open space. [Para 10] [292-F-H; 293-A]

               1.5 It is only the Municipal Corporation, Panaji
          (respondent No.2), which claimed that the land had
       8  vested  in it. How and in what manner such vesting had
          occurred, however, has not been stated in support of the
          claim of the Corporation. There is complete silence in this
          regard. In such circumstances, it was incumbent on the
         High Court to undertake a deeper probe in the matter in
      C order to find out whether the claim of the Corporation had
         any substance or had been so raised merely to relegate
         the petitioner to a more "lengthy, dilatory and expensive
         process" that is inherent in a civil suit. The High Court
         ought not to have disposed of the writ petition at the
         stage and in the manner it had so done and, instead,
      D ought to have satisfied itself that there was actually a
         serious dispute between the parties on the question of
         ownership or title. Only in that event, the High Court
         would have been justified to relegate the petitioner to the
         civil court to seek its remedies by way of a suit. [Para 1O]
      E [293-B-D]

              1.6 Therefore, the impugned order dated 18.08.2011
          passed by the High Court is not tenable in law. [Para 11]
          [293-E]
      F      2. There is also no manner of doubt that the land in
        question being earmarked as open space and the said
        fact having been affirmed by the High Court in Civil Suit
        No. 1/B/1981 and LPA No. 26 of 1983, the normal
        attributes of legal ownership of the land have ceased
      G insofar as the petitioner is concerned which is holding
        the land as a trustee on behalf of the residents and other
        members of the public. The petitioner cannot transfer the
        land nor can it use the same in any other manner except
II.     by keeping it as an open space. Keeping in mind the very
      H limited rights of the petitioner that are disclosed at this
    REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                 283


stage by the materials on record and taking into account A
the nature of the developmental works that were
proposed and the fact that a part of the work may have
been executed in the meantime, the respondents should
be permitted to complete the remaining work on the land
and the petitioner should be left with the option of raising B
and establishing a claim before the appropriate forum for
such loss and compensation, if any, to which it may be
entitled in law. [Para 12-13] [293-H; 294-A-E]

    Pt. Chet Ram Vashist vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi       C
                            =
1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 180 (1995) 1 sec 47 - relied on.

                     Case Law Reference:
    1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 180 relied on               Para 5
    2004 (3) sec 553             relied on          Para 9        D
    1969 (3) sec 769             relied on          Para 9
    1970 (2) SCR 854             relied on          Para 9

     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.              E
 6383 of 2012.

       From the Judgment and Order dated 18.8.2011 of the High
 Court of Judicature of Bombay at Goa (Panaji Bench) in Writ
 Petition No. 98 of 2011.
                                                                  F
      Krishnan Venugopal, R.V. Pai, Aniruddha P. Mayee, Bina
 Pai, Charudatta for the Appellant.

     Siddharth Bhatnagar, Malvika Trivedi, Pawan Kr. Bansal,
 T. Mahipal for the Respondent.
                                                                  G
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     RANJAN GOGOi, J. 1. Leave granted.

     2. This appeal has been filed to challenge the order dated   H
     284       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A   18th August, 2011 passed by the High Court of Bombay
     (Panaji Bench) in Writ Petition No.98/11 by which the reliefs
     sought in the writ petition have been refused and the writ
     petitioner has been left with the option of approaching the civil
     court for the redressal of his grievances.
 B
           3. The facts in brief may be noted at the very outset:

         (i) The petitioner herein (writ petitioner before the High
   Court) is a registered partnership firm which had developed a
   residential colony in Miramar, Goa, known as La Campala
C residential colony. It is the case of the petitioner that after
   completion of the developmental work the residual land of the
   colony, including all open plots that were meant to be kept open
   as "vacant space", were transferred in favour of the petitioner
   under a registered deed dated 16th November, 1977. Such
D open spaces, according to the petitioner, included a piece of
  land measuring about 19250 sq.mtrs. bearing Challa No.18 of
   PT Sheet No. 120, Miramar, Panaji, Goa (hereinafter referred
  to as 'the land in question'). The petitioner claims that the right,
  title and interest in the said open land undisputedly vested in
E the petitioner and the petitioner has exclusive right to develop
  the said open land which is to the knowledge of all concerned
  including the respondents in the present appeal.

         (ii) In the writ petition filed, it was further claimed that
  sometime in the year 1981 the petitioner wanted to raise
F construction in an area of about 7,000 sq.mtrs. (consisting of
  14 plots of 500 sq.mtrs. each) out of the aforesaid open space
  of 19250 sq.mtrs. According to the petitioner, such construction
  over the 7,000 sq.mtrs. of land would still have kept more than
  12,000 sq.mtrs. as open space which area would have been
G within the prescriptions contained in the existing Municipal
  Rules and Regulations. However some of the purchasers of the
  plots who had constructed their buildings thereon and had
  formed a co-operative society i.e. Model Cooperative Housing
  Society, approached the Bombay High Court by way of a civil
H suit bearing No.1/B of 1981 claiming an easementary right in
    REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                   285
              [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]

respect of the entire vacant/open space of 19250 sq.mtrs. In A
the aforesaid suit, the Co-operative Society, as the plaintiff,
contended that in the brochures published at the time of
development of the housing colony it was represented that
 19250 sq.mtrs. of open space will be available in order to
ensure plenty of light and ventilation besides serving as a B
 recreational ground for the children of the members of the
 Society. In these circumstances a decree of injunction was
 sought against the defendants in Suit No. 1/B of 1981
 particularly the defendant No.9 i.e. the petitioner herein from
 raising any construction on the land in question. By judgment c
 and order dated 29th April, 1983 the said suit was decreed.
  L.P.A. No. 26/83 filed by the present petitioner against the said
  judgment and order dated 29th April, 1983 was dismissed and
  the decree passed by the Learned Single Judge was affirmed.
  According to the petitioner, in the course of the aforesaid
                                                                    0
   proceedings, no issue with regard to the title of the petitioner
  to the land in question was raised and it was accepted by all
   the contesting parties that the petitioner was the owner of the
   said land measuring 19250 sq.mtrs. In fact, the only issue in
   the suit was with regard to the right of the petitioner to raise E
   constructions on the said land or on any part thereof.

       (iii) It was the further case of the petitioner in the writ
 petition that an area of about 625 sq. mtrs. out of the open
 space in question was acquired under the provisions of the
 Land Acquisition Act, 1894 sometime in the year 1990 and in         F
 the said acquisition proceeding, the petitioner was treated as
 the absolute owner of the land. In fact, according to the
 petitioner, the compensation payable under the Award was
 paid to the petitioner who had also filed a Reference
 Application under Section 18 of the Act and had further carried     G
 the matter in an appeal to the High Court of Bombay.

      4. According to the petitioner the aforesaid facts show and
  establish the undisputed title of the petitioner to the land in
  question. Certain activities were, however, undertaken on the      H
     286        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A said land on 2nd January, 2011 and the inquiries made on
     behalf of the petitioner indicated that alongwith a project of
    beautification of the adjoining Miramar lake a project to develop
    the open land in question was proposed to be undertaken.
    Specifically, a jogging track, walk ways, recreational centres
 B etc. were proposed. According to the petitioner, further inquiries
    revealed that such developmental work on the land was
    proposed to be undertaken at the instance of the respondent
    No. 3 who is the local Municipal Councilor and, in fact, a
    Government Order dated 3oth June, 2010 had been passed
 C in the matter by the Principal Chief Engineer, Public Works
    Department, Government of Goa. The petitioner had also
    averred in the writ petition filed, that the very first stipulation in
   the order dated 30th June, 2010 required that tenders in respect
   of the developmental work on the land shall not be issued
   unless the land itself is acquired. However, without initiating any
0
   proceeding to acquire the land, a tender was floated sometime
   in September, 2010 and the respondent No. 4 was awarded
   the Work Order sometime in December, 2010 requiring
   completion of the developmental works on the land within 180
   days. It is pursuant thereto that the works on the land were
E undertaken w.e.f. 2nd January, 2011. As the aforesaid actions
   of the respondents were not only in violation o(the Government
   Order dated 30th June, 2010 but also had the_effect of
   depriving the petitioner of the ownership in the proper!y in
   question, the petitioner filed the writ petition in question seeking
F interference of the High Court in the proposed developmental
  work which according to the petitioner had already
  commenced.

       5. The respondents in the writ petition, including the
G Government of Goa and the Corporation of the city of Panaji
  apart from the Model Co-operative Housing Society, filed
  separate counter affidavits/written statements in the case.
  According to the State the open space in question was
  required to be kept free from any kind of construction under the
H planning laws in force and that the plot owners in the residential
       REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                   287
                 [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
colony have an easementary right on and over the open space A
which had been so declared by the High Court of Bombay in
Civil Suit No.1/B/1981 and L.P.A. No.26/1983. Furthermore in
terms of the judgments of the High Court in the aforesaid cases
the petitioner was obliged to keep the open space so available
and vacant at all times. In the affidavit filed the State had also B
contended that at no point of time the petitioner was interested
 in developing the open space and the same had become a
 dumping ground of garbage. In such a situation the Local
 Corporator of the Panaji Municipal Corporation was requested
 by the residents to intervene in the matter and develop the land C
  into a recreational area. Initially the work was entrusted to the
  Goa State Infrastructure Development Corporation. Thereafter,
  the Goa State Urban Development Agency was entrusted with
  the responsibility. However, as both the aforesaid entities faced
   the problem of shortage of funds it was decided that the work
   will be carried out by the PWD, Goa. In the affidavit filed it was D
   further stated that the open space was to be developed into (a)
   Children Playing area, (b) Joggers Track, (c) Water Harvesting
   Pond, (d) Multi-purpose court for cricket/football and (e) a Tennis
    court and an Amphitheatre. Such development which was to be
    to the benefit of all the residents, particularly the children and E
    the elders, was estimated to cost around Rs.2.92 crores. It was
    specifically stated in the affidavit of the State, that the work had
    already commenced and almost 14% thereof had been
    completed.
                                                                        F
       In para 14 of the affidavit it was stated that in terms of the
 decision of this Court in Chet Ram Vashist v. Municipal
 Corporation of De/hP, the petitioner has ceased to be the legal
 owner of the land and its position was that of a trustee holding
 the land for the benefit of the members of the Housing Society         G
 and the public at large. The petitioner had no right to use the
  land for any developmental work or to transfer or sell the same;
  it was merely a trustee of the land holding the same for a

  1.   (1995) 1 sec 47.
                                                                        H
     288       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A specific purpose i.e. beneficial utilization as an open space by
      the community at large. In a situation where the petitioner had
      done nothing to develop the open space for the public good,
     the Government had decided to step in and carry out the project
     for the benefit of the residents.
 B
          6. In the affidavit filed by the respondent No.2 -
     Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation, Panaji, a claim
     that the open space had vested in the Corporation had been
     raised whereas in the affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.
C 5 i.e. Model Cooperative Housing Society, the details of the
    judgment in Civil Suit No. 1/8 of 1981 had been mentioned
    under which the land in question is required to be maintained
    as an open space so to enable the residents to have free
    access to light and air apart from recreational facilities. In the
    affidavit filed by the respondent No. 5, the decision of this Court
D in Chet Ram Vashist 's case (supra) had also been relied upon
    to contend that the legal title of the petitioner in the said open
   space stood extinguished and petitioner is holding the land only
   as a trustee on behalf of the residents of the locality. As the
   petitioner had not discharged the duties cast upon it as a trustee
E and had utterly failed to develop the open space, the residents
   of the locality had approached the local Ward Councilor
   (respondent No.3) who had taken the initiative to develop the
   land in question.

F       7. The aforesaid detailed recital of the facts projected by
  the parties had become necessary as the order of the High
  Court assailed in the present SLP does not contain any
  reference to the relevant circumstances in which the High Court
  had passed the impugned order or the reasons why the
G petitioner was relegated to the remedy of initiating a civil action.
  Time and again this Court has emphasized that such a course
  of action by a Court cannot lead to a legally acceptable
  conclusion inasmuch as the manner of reaching the decision
  and the reasons therefor are sacrosanct to the judicial process.
  However, we do not wish to dilate the aforesaid aspect of the
H
       REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                  289
                 [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
matter any further in view of the clear and consistent insistence   A
of this Court on the aforesaid fundamental requirement.

      8. A reading of the order of the High Court would go to
show that its refusal to interdict the developmental works
undertaken or about to be undertaken is on the ground that the
                                                                    8
Petitioner has an efficacious alternative remedy, i.e. a suit for
injunction. The Writ Court exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution is fully empowered to interdict the State
or its instrumentalities from embarking upon a course of action
to detriment of the rights of the citizens, though, in the exercise
of jurisdiction in the domain of public law such a restraint order C
 may not be issued against a private individual. This, of course,
 is not due to any inherent lack of jurisdiction but on the basis
 that the public law remedy should not be readily extended to
  settlement of private disputes between individuals. Even where
  such an order is sought against a public body the Writ Court D
  may refuse to interfere, if in the process of determination
  disputed questions of fact or title would require to be
  adjudicated.

       9. However, there is no universal rule or principle of law E
 which debars the Writ Court from entertaining adjudications
 involving disputed questions of fact. In fact, in the realm of legal
 theory, no question or issue would be beyond the adjudicatory
 jurisdiction under Article 226, even if such adjudication would
 require taking of oral evidence. However, as a matter of
                                                                      F
  prudence, the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution,
  normally would not entertain a dispute which would require it
  to adjudicate contested questions and conflicting claims of the
  parties to determine the correct facts for due application of the
  law. In ABL International Ltd. & Anr. V. Export Credit
  Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. 2 , the precise position of G
  the law in this regard has been explained in paragraphs 16,
   17 and 19 of the Judgment in the course of which the earlier
   views of this Court in Smt. Gunwant Kaur & Ors. v. Municipal
  2.    12004 (3) sec 553J.                                             H
             290       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012) 8 S.C.R.


    A        Committee, Bhatinda & Ors. 3 and Century Spg. & Mfg. Co.
             Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Counci/4 has been referred to.
             The aforesaid paragraphs of the judgment in ABL International
             Ltd. & Anr. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India
             Ltd. (supra) may, therefore, be usefully extracted below:
B
                "16. A perusal of this judgment though shows that a writ
                 petition involving serious disputed questions of facts which
                requires consideration of evidence which is not on record,
                will not normally be entertained by a court in the exercise
                of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
c               India. This decision again, in our opinion, does not lay
                down an absolute rule that in all cases involving disputed
                questions of fact the parties should be relegated to a civil
                suit. In this view of ours, we are supported by a judgment
                of this Court in the case of Gunwant Kaur v. Municipal
D               Committee, Bhatinda - 1969 (3) SCC 769 where dealing
                with such a situation of disputed questions of fact in a writ
                petition this Court held: (SCC p. 774, paras 14-16)

                         "14. The High Court observed that they will not
E                        determine disputed question of fact in a writ
                         petition. But what facts were in dispute and what
                         were admitted could only be determined after an
                         affidavit-in-reply was filed by the State. The High
                        Court, however, proceeded to dismiss the petition
F                       in limine. The High Court is not deprived of its
                        jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Article 226
                        merely because in considering the petitioner's right
                       to relief questions of fact may fall to be determined.
                        In a petition under Article 226 the High Court has
                       jurisdiction to try issues both of fact and law.
G
                       Exercise of the jurisdiction is, it is true, discretionary,
                       but the discretion must be exercised on sound
                       judicial principles. When the petition raises
        3.    11969 (3) sec 769].
H       4.    [1970 (1) sec sa21.
REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                   291
          [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
      questions of fact of a complex nature, which may A
      for their determination require oral evidence to be
      taken, and on that account the High Court is of the
      view that the dispute may not appropriately be tried
      in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try
      a petition. Rejection of a: petition' ih limine will B
       normally be justified, where the High Court is of the
       view that the petition is frivolous or because of the
       nature of the claim made dispute sought to be
       agitated, or that the petition against the party
       against whom relief is claimed is not maintainable C
       or that the dispute raised thereby is such that it
       would be inappropriate to try it in the writ
       jurisdiction, or for analogous reasons.

       15. From the averments made in the petition filed
       by the appellants it is clear that in proof of a large    D
       number of allegations the appellants relied upon
       documentary evidence and the only matter in
       respect of which conflict of facts may possibly arise
       related to the due publication of the notification
       under Section 4 by the Collector.                         E

       16. In the present case, in our judgment, the High
       Court was not justified in dismissing the petition on
       the ground that it will not determine disputed
       question of fact. The High Court has jurisdiction to
                                                                 F
       determine questions of fact, even if they are in
       dispute and the present, in our judgment, is a case
       in which in the interests of both the parties the High
       Court should have entertained the petition and
       called for an affidav.it-in-reply from the respondents,   G
        and should have proceeded to try the petition
        instead of relegating the appellants to a separate
        suit."

 17. The above judgment of Gunwant Kaur (supra) finds
 support from another judgment of this Court in the case of      H
     292       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A         Century Spg. and Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. Ulhasnagar Municipal
           Council - 1970 (1) SCC 582 wherein this Court held:
           (SCC p. 587, para 13)

                  "Merely because a question of fact is raised, the
                  High Court will not be justified in requiring the party
 B
                 to seek relief by the somewhat lengthy, dilatory and
                 expensive process by a civil suit against a public
                 body. The questions of fact raised by the petition
                 in this case are elementary."

 c             xxx                xxx                               xxx
          19. Therefore, it is clear from the above enunciation of law
          that merely because one of the parties to the litigation
          raises a dispute in regard to the facts of the case, the court
 D        entertaining such petition under Article 226 of the
         Constitution is not always bound to relegate the parties to
         a suit. In the above case of Gunwant Kaur (supra) this
         Court even went to the extent of holding that in a writ
         petition, if the facts require, even oral evidence can be
         taken. This clearly shows that in an appropriate case, the
E
         writ court has the jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition
         involving disputed questions of fact and there is no
         absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition even if the same
         arises out of a contractual obligation and/or involves some
         disputed questions of fact.
F
        10. The Petitioner in the present case claimed title to the
   land in question on the basis of the deed of Indenture dated
   16.11.1977; the order of the Bombay High Court in Suit No. 1/
   B/1981 and LPA No. 26 of 1983 as well as the proceedings
G of acquisition in respect of an area of about 625 sq. m. out of
  the open space in question. The State did not claim any title
  to the land but had contended that by virtue of the judgment of
  this Court in Pt. Chet Ram (supra) the Petitioner had ceased
  to hold the normal attributes of ownership of immovable
H property in respect of the land in question and its position was
    REAL ESTATE AGENCIES v. GOVT. OF GOA                    293
              [RANJAN GOGOi, J.]
more akin to that of a trustee holding the land for the benefit of A
the public at large. The Housing Society (defendant No.5), on
the other hand, claim easementary right of enjoyment of the
open space. It is only the Municipal Corporation, Panaji
(defendant No.2), who had claimed that the land has vested in
it. How and in what manner such vesting had occurred, B
 however, had not been stated in support of the claim of the
 Corporation. There is complete silence in this regard. In such
 circumstances, it was incumbent on the High Court to undertake
 a deeper probe in the matter in order to find out whether the
 claim of the Corporation had any substance or had been so           c
 raised merely to relegate the Petitioner to a more "lengthy,
 dilatory and expensive process" that is inherent in a civil suit.
 The High Court, in our considered view, ought not to have
 disposed of the Writ Petition at the stage and in the manner it
 had so done and. instead. ought to have satisfied itself that
                                                                    0
 there was actually a serious dispute between the parties on the
 question of ownership or title. Only in that event, the High Court
 would have been justified to relegate the Petitioner to the Civil
  Court to seek his remedies by way of a suit.

      11. On the view that we have taken, we have to conclude        E
 that the impugned order dated 18.08.2011 passed by the High
 Court is not tenable in law. However, having arrived at the
 aforesaid conclusion the next question that has to engage our
 attention is what would be the appropriate order in the facts and
 circumstances of the case?                                          F

      12. In the counter affidavit filed before this Court, the
 Respondent claims that about 40% of the work has been
 completed and extension of time for completion of the remaining
 work, as per the terms of the Contract, is being processed.         G
 Though the Petitioner disputes the aforesaid position, it may
 be reasonable to assume that in absence of any interim order
 some progress in the execution of the developmental work has
 taken place during pendency of the present proceeding·. There
 is also no manner of doubt that the land in question being
                                                                     H
      294      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 8 S.C.R.


 A    earmarked as open space and the said fact having been
     affirmed by the High Court in Civil Suit No. 1/B/1981 and LPA
      No. 26 of 1983, the normal attributes of legal ownership of the
     land have ceased insofar as the Petitioner is concerned who
     is holding the land as a Trustee on behalf of the residents and
 s   other members of the Public. The Petitioner cannot transfer
     the land or use the same in any other manner except by keeping
     it as an open space. The aforesaid position flows from the
     decision of this Court in Pt. Chet Ram Vashist (supra) wherein
     such a conclusion had been reached by this Court in a largely
c    similar set of facts.

        13. Keeping in mind the very limited rights of the Petitioner
   that are disclosed at this stage by the materials on record and
   taking into account the nature of the developmental works that
   were proposed and the fact that a part of the work may have
D been executed in the meantime, we are of the view that the
   Respondents should be permitted to complete the remaining
  work on the land and the petitioner should be left with the option
  of raising a claim before the appropriate forum for such loss
  and compensation, if any, to which he may be entitled to in law.
E Naturally, if any such claim of compensation is required to be
  founded on proof of title/ownership or any other such relevant
  fact(s), the Petitioner will have to establish the same. No part
  of the present order shall be construed to be an expression of
  any opinion of this Court with regard to the ownership or any
F other right or entitlement of the Petitioner which has to be
  proved in accordance with law.

         14. Consequently, we dispose of the Civil Appeal in the
     above terms.

G R.P.                                        Appeal disposed of.