Supreme Court of India
M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANYversusKHATOONBEE AND ANR.
- Citation
- 2017 INSC 122
- Decided
- 9 February 2017
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- S KHEHAR
Holding
A claim petition filed after a 28‑year delay is not a surviving claim; the requirement of filing within a reasonable time persists despite the deletion of Section 166(3).
Summary
The respondents' daughter died in a motor accident on 02‑02‑1977. A claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on 23‑02‑2005, more than 28 years after the accident. The Tribunal entertained the claim, and the High Court upheld it, holding that the deletion of Section 166(3) removed any limitation period. M/s Purohit & Co. appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court examined whether the omission of the limitation clause allowed a claim to be filed at any time and whether a claim filed after such a long delay could be considered a "live and surviving" claim. It held that, despite the statutory omission, a claim must be made within a reasonable time; a 28‑year delay is unreasonable and renders the claim stale. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, the High Court order set aside, and the claim was declared not a surviving claim. The Court also ordered the appellant to pay Rs. 25,000 litigation expenses to the respondents.
Issues considered
- Whether the deletion of Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 eliminates any limitation period for filing a claim petition before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
- Whether a claim petition filed after an inordinate delay (28 years) can be treated as a live and surviving claim and be entertained.
- Whether the principle of filing within a reasonable time applies despite the statutory omission.
- Whether Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked in the absence of a specific limitation period in the Motor Vehicles Act.
Legislation cited
- General Clauses Act, 1897s. Section 6-A
- Limitation Act, 1963s. Article 137
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1939s. Section 110-A
- Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. Section 158(6), s. Section 166(3) (originally)
Subjects
Motor Vehicles Actclaim petitionlimitation perioddelayreasonable timestale claimMotor Accident Claims Tribunaldeletion of statutory provisionLimitation Act
Judgment
f201712 S.C.R. 1
· M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY A
v.
KHATOONBEE AND ANR.
(Civil Appeal No. 2555 of2017)
FEBRUARY 09, 2017 B
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI, N. V. RAMANA
AND DR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.)
Delay I Laches:
Delay of 28 years - In filing claim petition uls. 166 of Motor c
Vehicles Act, 1988 - Entertained by courts below holding that.the
1988 Act does not provide limitation for raising claim for
compensation - On appeal, held: Even though no period of limitation
is prescribed under 1988 Act, claim can be raised and can be
considered to be genuine, so long it is a live and surviving claim -
D
Claim can be raised only within reasonable time - The question of
reasonability would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case - In the present case, delay of 28 years cannot be considered
as prima facie reasonable period - The. claim, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, was stale and ought to have been treated
as dead claim - Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - s. 166(3). E
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 A perusal of the provision of Section HOA of
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reveals that a period of limitation of
six months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was
provided for, to· raise a claim for compensation. In the successor F
legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, Section 166(3),
as originally enacted, also provided for limitation of a period of
six months for filing a claim petition. However, on this occasion,
· a bar was introduced for entertaining a claim petition, a.rising out
of a motor accident after twelve months (from the date of G
occurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of limitation
provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be
relaxed upto twelve months, by demonstrating that' there was
sufficient cause for such delay. The period of limitation provided
under Section 166(3) aforementioned was completely done away
H
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.
A with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as Section 166(3) came to be
deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. [Paras 4, 5, 6] [5-C-
E; 6-F-ll]
1.2 Eve 1 though no period of limitation remains prescribed,
after the amrndment of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
B 1988, whereb: • sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be deleted
yet it would be imperative to determine, whether at the juncture
when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, the :laim was a live and surviving claim. A claim raised
before the Mo •tor Accident Claims Tribunal, can be considered
to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim. It is not
c as if, it can be c•pen to all and sundry,'to approach a Motor Accident
Claims Tribnil d, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture,
after the accid mt had taken place. The individual concerned, must
approach the fribnnal within a reasonable time. [Paras 12 and
13] [15-D, G- HJ
D 1.3 The question of reasonability would naturally depend
on the facts a1 d circumstances of each case. A delay of 28 years,
even wi.thout .·eference to any other fact, cannot be considered
as a prima fa' ie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal. The justification expressed at the
E behest of the 1es pond en ts, for approaching the Tribunal, after a
period of 28 years, that the Petitioners are poor person and they
have no kno vi edge about the Law, cannot be accepted.
Undoubtedly, the claim in the facts and circumstances of the
instant case, w is stale, and ought to have been treated as a dead
claim, at the pc fat of time, when the respondents approached the
F Tribunal by fil1 ng a claim petition, on 23.02.2005. Thus, the claim
raised by the respondents before the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, wJien the respondents
approached the· said Tribunal. [Paras 14, 15, 16] [16-A-B, D-E)
Co-rporat1 on Bank " Navin J. Shah (2000) 2 SCC 628;
G 'Haryana State Coop. Land Development Bank v.
Nee/am (: 005) 5 SCC 91 : [2005] 2 SCR 424 - relied
on.
Dhanna/,1/ v. D.P. Vijayvargiya (1996) 4 SCC
652:[1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 417; The New India
H
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 3
Assurance Co.Ltd. v. C. Padma (2003) 7 SCC A
713: [2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 677 - distinguished.
2. The appellant was directed to deposit a sum of
Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to the
respondents. The aforesaid deposit was actually made since the
deposit was made, and was payable to the respondents, it is just B
and appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to
direct the Registry of this Court, to transmit the aforesaid amount
of Rs.25,000/- to the respondents, by way of a cheque, drawn in
the name of respondent No.I. [Para 17) [16-F-G)
Case Law Reference C
[1996) 2 Suppl. SCR 417 distinguished Para 7
[2003) 3 Suppl. SCR 677 distinguished Para 7
(2000) 2 sec 628 relied on Para 10
[2005) 2 SCR 424 relied on Para 11
D
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2555
of20I7
From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2015 of the High Court
of Bombay at Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition No. 3647 of2007.
Ankur Mittal, Adv., for the Appellant. E
Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Adv., for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJI 1. Heard learned counsel
for..the rival parties. F
2. The daughter of the respondents died in a motor accident on
02.02.1977. A claim petition was filed, under Section 166 of the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1988 Act'), seeking
compensation on account of the motor accident, wherein the respondents'
daughter had died, on 23.02.2005 i.e., after a period of more than 28 G
years. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as
'the Tribunal') entertained the above claim. A prayer made to reject the
claim petition, for the reason, that the said claim had been raised 28
years after the accident in question, was rejected. It is in these
circumstances, that M/s Purohit and Company (the petitioner herein)
approached the High Court, wherein, the matter was re-adjudicated. H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS · [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A Again, a prayer was made at the hands of the petitioner, that the claim
had been made belatedly, and was not a surviving claim. The High
Court, upheld the justiciability of the claim petition, on the short ground,
that no period of limitation had been provided for raising a claim for
compensation, under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The judgment
rendered by the High Court on 07.07.2015, has been assailed by M/s
B
Purohit & Company through the instant petition for special leave to
appeal.
3. Leave granted.
4. While raising a cl1allenge to the impugned judgment, in the first
c instance, a reference was made to Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1939 Act'.), in order to
demonstrate, that a period of limitation, at the time, was provided for,
referable to the date when the accident had taken place. Section 11 OA
aforementioned is being extracted hereunder:
D "110-A. Application for compensation.- (1) An application for
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified
in sub-section ( 1) of Section 110 may be made-
(a) by the person who has sustained· the injury; or
(aa) by th'e owner of the property; or
E •
(b) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of
the legal representatives of the deceased; or
(c} by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or
any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the
case may be:
F
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the
deceased have not joined ip any such application for
compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for
the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and
the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be imp leaded
G as respondents to the application.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be made to the
Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the
accident occurred, and shal I be in such form and shall contain
such particulars as may be prescribed.
-H
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 5
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJJ]
Provided that where any claim for compensation under Section A
92-A is made in such application, the application shall contain a
separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature
of the applicant;
(3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the B
accident:
Provided thatthe Claims Tribunal may entertain the application
after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied
thatthe applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making
the application in time."
(emphasis is ours)
c
A perusal of the provision of Section 11 OA of the 1939 Act, extracted
above, reveals, that a period oflimitation of six months (from the date of
occurrence of the accident) was provided for, to raise a claim for
compensation.
D
5. In the successor legislation, namely, the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988, Section 166(3), as originally enacted, also provided for limitation
of a period of six months for filing a claim petition. Section 166
afore"'entioned is extracted hereunder:
"166.Application for compensation.- (I) An application for E
compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified
in sub-section (I) of section 165 may be made-
(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or
(b) by the owner of the property;. or
( c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of F
the legal representatives of the deceased; or
( d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or a!I or
any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case
maybe:
Provided that where all the legal representatives of the G
deceased have not joined in any such application for
compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for
the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and
the legal representatives who have not so joined, shal I be impleaded
as respondents to the application.
H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.
A (2) Every application under sub-section (I) shal I be made, at the
option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having
jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred, or to
the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction
the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local
limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in
B
such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed:
Provided that where no c Iaim for compensation under section
140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a
separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature
of the applicant.
c (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained
unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the
accident:
Provided thatthe Claims Tribunal may ente1tain the application
after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than
D twelve months. if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented
by sufficient cause from making the application in time.
(4) The Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents
forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of section 158 as an
application for compensation under this Act.
E (emphasis is ours)
A perusal of the original provision of Section 166 of the 1988 Act,
extracted above reveals, that once again a period of limitation of six
months (from the date of occurrence of the accident) was provided for.
However, on this occasion, a bar was introduced for entertaining a claim
F petition, arising out of a motor accident after twelve months (from the
date ofoccurrence of the accident). Obviously, the period of Iimitation
provided for through Section 166(3) of the 1988 Act, could be relaxed
upto twelve months, by demonstrating that there was sufficient cause
for such delay.
G 6. It would however, be pertinent to mention, that the period of
limitation provided under Section 166(3) aforementioned was completely
done away with, with effect from 14.11.1994, as Section 166(3) came to
be deleted, from the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The question which has
arisen for consideration, in the instant appeal, is the consequence of the
omission of sub-Section (3) of Section 166 of the 1988 Act. Does the
H
M/S. PUROH!T AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 7
[JAGD!SH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]
above omission have the effect of allowing a claimant, to file a claim A
application, at any time, and whenever he chooses? Even after a decade!
7. The contention of the respondents-claimants to overcome the
period of limitation was based on two judgments. Firstly, it is based on
the judgment in Dhannalal vs. D.P.Vijayvargiya, ( 1996) 4 SCC 652,
wherein, this Court had held as under: B
"7.!n this background, now it has to be examined as to what is
the effect of omission of sub-section (3) of Section 166 of the
Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said
sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the
sametime, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that c
benefit of deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 is not to be
extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation
has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from
Section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose
an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994
when sub-section (3) was omitted from Section 166. For one D
reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim
or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be
not filed after 14.11.1994 in respect of such accident? Whether
a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994 can be rejected by the
Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of
E
twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section
(3) of Section 166 was in force having expired the right to prefer
the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived
after deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994?
According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub- •
section (3) of Section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal F
has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date
on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions
cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions
were barred by time when sub-section (3) of Section I 66 was
in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to
G
time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the
new Act in order to protect the interests of the victims of the
accidents and their heirs ifthe victims die. One such amendment
has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid Amendment Act
54 of 1994 by substituting sub-section (6) of Section 158 which
provides: H
...
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.
A "158. ( 6)As soon as any information regarding any accident
involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or
report under this section is completed by a police officer, the
officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of
the same within thirty days from the date of recording of
information or, as the case may be, on completion of such
B
report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy
thereof to the concerned insurer and where a copy is made
available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt
of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and
Insurer."
c In view of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act the officer
in-charge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy
of information/report regarding the accident to the Tribunal having
jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the insurer
concerned. it also requires that where a copy is made available
to the ownerofthe vehicle, he shall within thirty days ofreceipt
D
of such copy forward the same to the Claims Tribunal and insurer.
111 this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from Section
166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of
the said section by Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the
accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer.ciaim for
E compensation although not being preferred earlier because of
the expiry of the oeriod oflimitation prescribed, how the victim
or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the
question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is
pending either before the Tribunal. the High Court or the Supreme
Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has
F
been pursuing from the Tribunal to this Court. His right to get
compensation in connection with the accident in question is being
resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filling the
same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.I 994 in
respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, view of
G the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition,
the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition
which has been filed and is being pursued upto this Court cannot
be thrown out on the ground of limitation."
(emphasis is ours)
H
M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 9
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]
The second judgment on which reliance was placed, was The New A
India Assurance Co.Ltd. vs. C.Padma, (2003) 7 SCC 713, wherein also,
the matter was adjudicated on the same lines by observing as under:
"IO. The ratio laid down in Dhannalal's case (supra) applies with
full force to the facts of the present case. When the claim petition
was filed sub-section (3) of Section 166 had been omitted. Thus. B
the Tribunal was bound to entertain the claim petition without
taking note of the date on which the accident took place. Faced
with this situation, Mr. Kapoor submitted that Dhannalal's case
does not consider Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act and
therefore, needs to be reconsidered. We are unable to accept
the submission. Section 6-A of the General Clauses Act.
c
undoubte"dly, provides that the repeal ofa provision will not affect
the continuance of the enactment so repealed and in operation
at the time of repeal. However. this is subject to "unless a
different intention appears". In Dhannalal's case the reason for
the deletion of sub-section (3) of Section 166 has been set out. D
It is noted that Parliament realized the grave injustice and injury
caused to heirs and legal representatives of the victims of
accidents ifthe claim petition was rejected only on the ground of
limitation. Thus "the different intention" clearly appears and
Section 6A of the General Clauses Act would not apply.
E
11. Mr. Kapoor, learned counsel for the appellant, has placed
reliance on the decision rendered by this Court in Vinod Gurudas
Raikar vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1991 SC 2156.
The facts of that case were that the appellant was injured in an
accident, which took place on 22.1.1989. The claim petition of
the appellant was filed on 15.3 .1990 with a prayer for condonation F
of delay. The Tribunal held that in view of sub-section (3) of
Section 166 of the new Motor Vehicles Act, which came into
force on I. 7.1989, the delay of more than six months could not
be condoned. In the facts and circumstances of that case this
Court held that the case of the appellant was 'covered by the G
new Act and the delay for a longer period than six months could
not be condoned. In our view, the facts of the case in Vinod
Gurudas (supra) are different from the facts of the present case,
as noticed above.
H
10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 12. The learned counsel for the appellant, next contended that
since no period of! imitation has been prescribed by the legislature,
Article 137 of the Limitation Act may be invoked. otherwise,
according to him, stale claims would be encouraged leading to
multiplicitv oflitigation for non-prescribing the period oflimitation.
We are unable to countenance the contention of the appellant
B
for more than one reason. Firstly, such an Act like the Motor
Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief
to the victims or their families, if otherwise the claim is found
genuine. Secondly. it is a self contained Act which prescribes
the mode of filing the application, procedure to be followed and
c award to be made. The Parliament. in its wisdom. realised the
grave injustice and injury being caused to the heirs and legal
representatives of the victims who suffer bodily injuries/die in
accidents, by rejecting their claim petitions at the threshold on
the ground oflimitation, and purposely deleted sub-section (3) of
Section 166, which provided the period oflimitation for filing the
D
claim petitions and this being the intendment of the legislature to
give effective relief to the victims and the families of the motor
accidents untrammeled by the technicalities of the limitation,
invoking of Article 137 of the Limitation Act would defeat the
intendment of the Legislature.''
E (emphasis is ours)
Based on the aforesaid determination rendered by this Court, the High
Court, by its impugned order dated 07.07.2015, arrived at the conclusion,
that there being no period of limitation at the juncture, when the claim
petition was filed on 23.02.2005, the same could not have been rejected,
F merely for reason of delay.
8. Dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the High Court
on 07.07.2015, Mis Purohit and Company has approached this Court, by
filing the instant appeal.
9. The solitary contention advanced at the hands of the learned
G
counsel for the appellant was, that even though there may no longer be
a defined period oflimitation, for approaching the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation (under the provisions of the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988), yet a claimant must approach a Court, for
raising such a claim within a reasonable time. It was submitted, that
H
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. II
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]
after a period of time, the claim would be stale and will have to be A
treated as a dead claim. Such a claim, it was submitted, could not be
treated as a surviving claim. To demonstrate situations when an accident's
claim would no longer be considered to be a surviving claim, illustratively
it was submitted, that in a. given case when the evidence to establish the
rival claims, would not be available, for the mere reason of lapse oftime.
B
Either, the witnesses would not be available, or accessible, on account
of lapse of time, resulting in lapse of memory and a situation in which
truthful evidence can no longer be recorded. The contention was, that in
such background, it was imperative for the concerned Court, to determine
whether, in the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the claim
could be considered as a surviving claim, on the date when the claim c
petition was filed before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
I 0. In support of the contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellant, as has been noticed in the foregoing
paragraph, learned counsel invited our attention to Corporation Bank vs .
. Navin J.Shah, (2000) 2 SCC 628, wherein a claim for compensation had D
been raised under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, wherein also,
there was no period oflimitation prescribed (at the time, when the claim
wasraised). Dealing with the question in hand, this Court had recorded
the following observations:
"12. We may further notice that there is another strong reason E
as to why the claim made by the respondent should not have
been granted. The transactions in question took place in the years
1979 and 1981. The difficulties in realisation of the amounts
due from the consignee also became clear at the time when the
claim was made before the Corporation and the claim had been
made as early as on 19-12-1982. The petition before the F
Commission was filed on 25-9-1992 that is clearly a decade after
a claim had been made before the Corporation. A claim could
not have been filed by the respondent at this distance of time.
!.D_Q_ced at the relevant time there was no period of limitation
under the Consumer Protection Act to prefer a claim before G
the Commission but that does not mean that the claim could
be made even after an unreasonably long delay. The Commission
has rejected this contention by a wholly wrong approach in taking
into consideration that the foreign exchange payable to Reserve
Bank of India was still due and, therefore, the claim is alive.
H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017) 2 S.C.R.
A The claim of the respondent is from the Bank. At any rate, as
stated earlier, when the claim was made for indemnifying the
losses suffered from the Corporation, it was clear to the parties
about the fut ii ity of awaiting any longer for collecting such amounts·
from the foreign bank. In those circumstances, the claim. if at all
was to be made. ought to have been made within a reasonable
B
time thereafter. What is reasonable time to lay a claim depends
upon the facts of each case. In the legislative wisdom. three
years' period has been prescribed as the reasonable time under .
the Limitation Act to lay a claim for money. We think.that period
should be the appropriate standard adopted for computing
c reasonable time to raise a claim in a matter of this nature. For
this reason also we find that the claim made by the respondent
ought to have been rejected by the Commission."
(emphasis is ours)
It would be pertinent to mention, that the claim raised under the Consumer
D Protection Act, in the above judgment, was delayed by a period of I 0
years, and even though, no period oflimitation was prescribed, this Court
held, that the same was not maintainable.
11. Reliance was also placed on Haryana State Coop. Land
Development Bank Vs. Neelam (2005) 5 SCC 91, wherein, this Court
E held as under:
"17. In Nedungadi Bank Ltd.(2001) 6 SCC 222, a Bench of
this Court, where S.Saghir Ahmad was a member [His Lordship
was also a member in Ajaib Singh (supra), opined: (SCC pp.459-
60, para 6)
F
"6. Law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate
Government to exercise its powers under Section I 0 of the
Act. It is not that this power can be exercised at any point of
time and to revive matters which had since been settled. Power
is to be exercised reasonably and in a rational manner. There
G appears to us to be no rational basis on which the Central
Government has exercised powers in this· case after a lapse of
about seven years of the order dismissing the respondent
from service. At the time reference was made no industrial
dispute existed or could be even said to have been
apprehended. A dispute which is stale could not be the subject-
H
MIS. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 13
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, CJ!]
matter of reference under Section 10 of the Act. As to when A
a dispute can be said to be stale would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case. When the matter has become
final, it appears to us to be rather incongruous that ihe reference
be made under Section 10 of the Act in the circumstances like
the present one. In fact it could be said that there was no
B
dispute pending at the time when the reference in question
was made."
18. It is trite that the courts and tribunals having plenary jurisdiction
have discretionary power to grant an appropriate relief to the
parties. The aim and object of the Industrial Disputes Act may
be to impart social justice to the workman but the same by itself c
would not mean that irrespective ofhis conduct a workman would
automatically be entitled to relief. The procedural laws like
estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are equally applicable to the
industrial proceedings. A person in certain situation may even be
held to be bound by the doctrine of acceptance sub silentio. The D
respondent herein did not raise any industrial dispute questioning
the termination of her services within a reasonable time. She
even accepted an alternative employment and has been continuing
therein from 10.8.1988. In her replication filed before the
Presiding Officer of the Labour Court while traversing the plea
raised by the appellant herein that she is gainfully employed in E
HUDA with effect from 10.8.1988 and her services had been
regularized therein, it was averred :
"6. The applicant workman had already given replication to
the A.L.C.-cum- Conciliation Officer, stating therein that she
was engaged by HUDA from 10.8.1988 as clerk-cum-typist F
on daily wage basis. The applicant workman has the right to
come to the service of the management and she is interested
to join them."
19. She, therefore, did not deny or dispute that she had been
regularly employed or her services had been regularized. She G
merely exercised her right to join the service of the appellant.
20. lt is true that the respondent had filed a writ petition within a
period of three years but indisputably the same was filed only
after the other workmen obtained the same relief from the Labour
Court in a reference made in that behalf by the State. Evidently H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.
A in the writ petition she was not in a position to establish her legal
right so as to obtain a writ of or in the nature of mandamus
directing the appellant herein to reinstate her in service. She
was advised to withdraw the writ petition presumably because
• she would not have obtained any relief in the said proceeding .
Even the High Court could have dismissed the writ petition on
B
the ground of delay or could have otherwise refused to exercise
its discretionary jurisdiction. The conduct of the respondent in
approaching the Labour Court after more than seven years had,
therefore, been considered to be a relevant factor by the Labour
Court for refusing to grant any relief to her. Such a consideration
c on the part of the Labour Court cannot be said to be an irrelevant
one. The Labour Court in the aforementioned situation cannot
be said to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction injudiciously,
arbitrarily and capriciously warranting interference at the hands
of the High Court in exercise ofits discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226 of the Constitution.
D
21. The matter might have be.en different had the respondent
been appointed by the appellant in a permanent vacancy.
22. Both HUDA and the appellant are statutory organizations.
The service of the respondent with the Appellant was an ad hoc
one. She served the appellant only for a period of one year
E three months; whereas she had been serving HUDA for more
than sixteen years. Even if she is directed to be reinstated in the
services of the appellant without back wages as was directed by
the High Court, the same would remain an ad hoc one and, thus,
her services can be terminated upon compliance of the provisions
F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It is also relevant to note that
there may or may not now be any regular vacancy with the
appellant-Bank. We have noticed herein before that in the year
1996, the vacancies had been filled up and a third party right had
been created. It has not been pointed out to us that there exists
a vacancy. Having considered the equities between the parties,
G we are of the opinion that it was not a fit case where the High
Court should have interfered with the discretionary jurisdiction
exercised by the Labour Court.
23. For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment
cannot be sustained which is set aside accordingly. This appeal
H
M/S. PUROHIT AND COMPANY v. KHATOONBEE AND ANR. 15
[JAGDISH SINGA KHEHAR, CJ!]
is allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, A
then: shall be no order as to costs."
(emphasis is ours)
It would be relevant to mention, that the above judgment was rendered
in a matter, where the challenge was raised under the provisions of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, wherein also no period of limitation is B
prescribed to approach the Industrial Tribunal. Despite the above, this
Court arrived at the conclusion, that a claim raised after a period of 7
years, was not a surviving ctaim. And therefore, the claim petition was
held to be not maintainable.
12. Drawing an analogy to the judgments rendered under the c
Consumer Protection Act, 1986, ·as also, under the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947, it was the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant,
that even though no period of limitation remains prescribed, after the
amendment of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, whereby
sub-Section (3) of Section 166 came to be deleted (with effect from
D
14.11.1994), yet it would be imperative to determine, whether at the
juncture when the claimant approached the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, the claim was a live and surviving claim.
13. We are satisfied, that the submission advanced at the hands of;
the learned counsel for the appellant merits acceptance. The judgments on
·which the High Court had relied, and on which the respondents have E
emphasised, in our considered view, are not an impediment, to the acceptance
of the submission canvassed on behalfofthe appellant. We say so, because
in Dhannalal's case (supra) the question of inordinate delay in approaching
the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, was not considered. In the second •
judgment in C.Padma's case (supra), it was considered. And in the F
C.Padma 's case, the first conclusion drawn in paragraph 12 was " ... if
otherwise the claim is found genuine ... ". We are of the considered view,
that a claim raised before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, can be
considered to be genuine, so long as it is a live and surviving claim. We are
satisfied in accepting the declared position of law, expressed in the
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. It is not as G
if, it can be open ~o all and sundry, to approach a Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal, to raise a claim for compensation, at any juncture, after the
accident had taken place. The individual concerned, must approach the
Tribunal within a reasonable time.
H
16 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2017] 2 S.C.R.
A 14. The question of reasonability would naturally depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case. We are however, satisfied, that a
delay of 28 years, even without reference to any other fact, cannot be
considered as a primafacie reasonable period, for approaching the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal. The only justification indicated by the
respondents, for initiating proceedings after a lapse of28 years, emerges
B
from paragraph 4, contained in the application for condonation of delay,
filed by the claimants, before the Tribunal. Paragraph 4 aforementioned
is extracted hereunder:
"4. That the Petitioners are poor person and they have no
knowledge about the Law. Also the Respondent has not pay the
c single pie towards any compensation."
15. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the justification
expressed at the behest of the respondents, for approaching the Tribunal,
after a period of 28 years, we are of the view, that the explanation
tendered, cannot be accepted. Undoubtedly, the claim (pertaining to an
D accident which had occurred on 02.02.1977), in the facts and
circumstances of the instant case, was stale, and ought to have been
treated as a dead claim, at the point of time, when the respondents
approached the Tribunal by filing a claim petition, on 23.02.2005.
16. In view of the reasons recorded hereinabove, we hereby set
E aside the impugned order dated 07 .07.2015, and allow the instant appeal,
by holding, that the claim raised by the respondents before the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal, was not a surviving claim, when the
respondents approached the said Tribunal.
17. Before concluding this order, it is relevant to notice, that by a
F motion bench order dated 14.09.2015, the appellant herein was directed
to deposit a sum of Rs.25,000/- towards litigation expenses, payable to
the respondents. The aforesaid deposit was actually made (as has been
noticed, in the motion bench order, dated 12.07.2016). Since the deposit
was made, and was payable to the respondents, we consider it just and
appropriate, in the facts and circumstances of this case, to direct the
G Registry of this Court, to transmit the aforesaid amount ofRs.25,000/-
to the respondents, by way ofa cheque, drawn in the name ofrespondent
No.l.
Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.
H
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