Holding

If the main and dominant purpose of a tenancy is residential, incidental or authorized non‑residential use does not remove the premises from the definition of 'premises let for residential purposes' under Section 14(1)(e).

Summary

The tenant, Mis. Precision Steel and Engg. Works, occupied a ground‑floor flat in Greater Kailash, Delhi, under a licence deed dated 13 September 1971 that required residential use but permitted incidental office use subject to local authority approval. The landlord, Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, sought eviction under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, claiming a bona‑fide residential requirement. The Rent Controller held the premises were not residential and dismissed the petition, but the Delhi High Court reversed, holding the premises were let for residential purposes. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether a mixed‑use tenancy could be treated as "premises let for residential purposes" and interpreted the explanation to Section 14(1)(e) as ex abundanti cautela. It held that the expression must be construed liberally; if the main and dominant purpose of letting is residential, incidental or authorized non‑residential use does not remove the residential character. Consequently, Section 14(1)(e) applied and the eviction order was upheld. The appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The meaning of 'premises let for residential purposes' under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act when the tenancy is for mixed residential and non‑residential use.
Whether the explanation appended to Section 14(1)(e) alters the determination of the main purpose of letting.
Whether incidental or authorized office use under the licence deed defeats the landlord's claim of bona‑fide residential requirement.

Legislation cited

Delhi Development Authority Act, 1957s. 14, s. 29
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 347, s. 430
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958s. 14(1)(e)

Subjects

rent controlevictionresidential purposemixed use tenancyDelhi Rent Control Actbona fide requirementinterpretation of statutesDelhi Development Authority Actmunicipal law

Judgment

MIS. PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS A
v.
PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAYAL

DECEMBER 9. 2002

[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.J. B

~ ·, Rent Control and Eviction:

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958; Section 14(/)(e):
c
Eviction Petition-On ground of bonafide requirements-Rejected by
Rent Controller on the ground that premises let out was not for residential
purpose-Reversed by High Court- On appeal, held: Where premises is Jet
oui for comj:Josite or .mixed purposes, it is necessary to ascertain from the
written agreement/deed the main and dominant purpose of letting if purpose
of letting is residential, any incidential or unauthorised user would be of no
D
effect-Jn the facts and circumstances ofthe case, provision ofSection 14(/)(e)
'> attracted-Delhi Development Authority Act; Sections 14 and 29-Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act; Sections 347 and 430.

Words and Phrases:
E
'n1ixed user·- 'abundant cautela '-Meaning of in the context of Section
14(/)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Appellant-tenant was in occupation of tenancy premises as per terms
of the Licence Deed. Respondent-Landlord filed eviction petition on F

- ground of bonafide requirements under Section 14(l)(e) of the Delhi Rent
Control Act. Rent Controller rejected it since purpose for which premises
have been let out was not residential and Section 14(l)(e) not attracted.
On appeal, High Court reversed the order of Rent Controller. Hence this
appeal by the tenant.
G
It was contended for the appellant that premises was let out for
residedtial as well as non-residential purpose as per agreement/Licence
Deed; and that as per explanation appended to Section 14(l)(e) of the Act,
Legislature intends that even incidental user of premises for non-
residential purpose with the consent of Landlord would change the purpose
~.
637
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of letting from residential to non-residential, Section 14(1)(e) not attracted.
On behalf of Respondent-Landlord, it was submitted that pre-
dominant purpose of letting was residential only besides incidental user
for purpose other than residential was not in conformity with local laws.

B Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act protects tenants
from eviction. An order for recovery of possession of the tenancy premises
can be made by the Rent Controller on one or more of the specified
' ,.
grounds. It is not permissible under the Scheme of the Act to file an
C application seeking an order for recovery of the premises let for non-
residential purposes on the ground of bona fide requirement. Letting out
for composite or mixed purposes and whether the premises let for such
composite or mixed purposes can be got vacated on the ground of bona
fide requirement is not specifically provided by the Act. (634-B-EJ
D 1.2. The expression 'the premises let for residential purposes' should
be construed liberally and not technically or narrowly; meaning thereby,
where the premises are solely let for residential purposes they are
undoubtedly covered by Section 14(1)(e) but even when the premises are
let out for composite or mixed purposes if the predominant or main
E purpose of letting is for residential purposes, the same would be included
within the expression 'the premises let for residential purposes'. An
incidental, secondary or unauthorized user of the premises for purposes
other than residential would not take the premises out of the meaning of
the expression 'the premises let for residential purposes'. In such cases, it
would be necessary to find out what is the "main and dominant purpose"
F of letting as distingui~hed from "subsidiary, ancillary or incidental
purpose". [643-F, G; 644-B)

Allenbury E11gineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri R.:m Krishna Dalmia and Ors.,
(1973] 1 sec 7, followed.
G Dr. Sewa Singh v. Smt. Revinder Kaur and Anr., (1970) RCJ 615 SC;
Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal and Ors., (1979) 2 SCC 274; Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lal
Ramnarayan and Ors., (1978( 1 SCC 58 and Hirata! Kapur v. Prabha
Choudhury, (1988) 2 SCC 172, relied on.

Lakshman Santu Sintre v. Balkrishna Keshav Shetye, AIR (1925)
H
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS r. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TA YAL 639
• I Bombay 398; Watter & Son ltd. v. Thomas, (1921) I KB 541; T. A
Dakshinamoorthy v , Thulja Bai and Anr. AIR (1952) Madras 413 and
Feyereisel v. Parry and Ors., (1952) I All E.R. 728, referred to.

1.3. Once the terms of tenancy have been reduced into writing the
purpose of tenancy has to be determined by reading the relevant clauses
of th.e deed and extrinsic evidence making a departure from the terms of B
deed may not be admissible. In case of doubt or vagueness resort can be
had to other factors such as constructional features of the premises, their
location, the amenities available, the conveniences provided, the number
of rooms and the actual user to which the premises have been subjected.
The opening and governing part of Clause 6 of licence deed is couched in C
a mandatory form-'the licensee shall use the premises for the residence
of the directors, partners and officers". In the succeeding sentence the use
of word 'however' is suggestive of the fact that incidental user of the
tenancy premises for the office purpose also was permitted by the landlord.
Such incidental user is permissive and not purposive. And that too has
been made dependent on the permissibility determinable by reference to D
the laws governing the local authority. (646-F-H; 647-A(

1.4. In the instant case, the primary and dominant purpose of letting
the suit premises is residential. Commercial activity therein is not
permitted. Incidental user for office purpose is permitted subject to the
condition of such user being permissible under the municipal laws \Vhich E
it is not. In any case such user being incidental or ancillary, the same would
not detract from the primary or dominant purpose of letting. The suit
premises have been rightly held by the High Court to be 'the premises let
for residential purposes' within the meaning of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.
(648-A-B] F
Kam/a Marwah v. Mis. Kapur Fabrics, 48 (1992) DLT 636,
distinguished.

2. The enactment of explanation appended to Section 14(l)(e) is ex
abundanti cautela. All that the explanation say is that the tenant cannot G
by his unilateral act of impermissible user, alter the purpose of letting.
This explanation has nothing to do with determining the main, principal
or dominant purpose of letting-the theory applies to interpreting the
expression "the premises let for residential purposes" in Section 14(l)(e)
of the Act. (649-A-B]
H
640 S_UPREME COURT REPORTS (2002] SUPP. 4 S.CR.

A
2000.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2227 of ' •. :
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.1999 of the Delhi High Court
in C.R. No. 408 of l 994.

B B. Datta and S.K. Taneja, Ujjwal Banerjee, S.K. Puri, Ms Anindita
Gupta and H.K. Puri, for the Appellants.

M.L. Verma,. Prashant Pakkhide, Abhay Kumar and Subramonium
Prasad, for the Respondent.

C The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R.C. LAHOTI, J. Proceedings for eviction of the appellants-tenants,
were initiated by the respondent landlord on the ground available under
clause (e) of sub section (I) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
D l 958 (hereinafter 'the Act,' for short). The High Court has, in exercise of its
revisional jurisdiction, passed an order for .recovery of pos5ession. of the ·
tenancy premises~ The tenants are in appeal by special leave.

The tenancy premises are situated at B-44, Greater Kailash, Part I, New
-
Delhi. Out of the building standing over I 000 sq. yards plot the appellants
E are in occupation of the front portion of the ground-floor since 1971. Premises
comprise of four bed rooms, 3 barthrooms 1 barsati, I garage and the servant
quarters along with one bathroom for servants. At this stage, it is no m,ore in
controversy that the respondent is owner-cum-landlord of the premises and .,
the appellants are the tenants. The terms of tenancy are incorporated in a
document dated 13th September, l 97 l called Licence Deed. The Rent
F Controller and the High Court have both recorded findings of fact that the
suit premises are required bona fide by the respondent-landlord for occupation
as. a residence for himself and the members 'of his family and for satisfying
such requirements the respondent does not possess any other suitable
accommodation. The controversy centres around determination of the purpose
G for which che premises have been let, and, depending on the answer, whether
the applicability of Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act is attracted. In the opinion of
the Rent Controller-it is not; in th~ opinion of the High Court-it is.

Clauses 6, 7, 12 and 16 of the Licer.ce Deed, which were referred to
by the learned counsel for the parties during the course of hearing, are extracted
H and reproduced hereunder:- , /
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 1·. PREM DEVA NIRAN.IAN DEVA TA YAL [LAHOTI, J.J 641

"6. The Licensees shall use the said premises for the residence of A
their Directors, partners and officers. The Licensees will, however,
be free to use the said premises in part or in full also for office
purpose provided the rules of the local authorities so permit and
in such an event the Licensees shall pay to the owners any increase
in local taxes, etc. occasioned by such change of use of the said
premises from residential to office.
B

7. The Licensees shall not permit the said premises or any part
thereof being used by any other person for any purpose
whatsoever without the previous consent in writing of the owners
and in default thereof the Licence shall be liable for cancellation.
The Licensees shall not transfer possession of the premises or c
part thereof or otherwise carry on the business in the premises
with any other person or assign, transfer, change or otherwise
alienate their interest in the premises.
12. The Licensees shall comply at all times with all the rules and
regulations of the local authorities whatsoever in relation to the D
said premises.
16. The Licensees agree and understand that the said premises shall
not be used for any illegal or immoral purpose, for gambling or
for sale of alcoholic beverages and the owners shall have full
right to cancel the Licence by giving one month's notice in case E
the said premises are used for any of these purposes and to claim
in full the balance of the Licence fees for the unexpired part of
the Licence period and in addition to claim damages/for less of
good reputation of the premises and the owners and also expenses
sustained in the removal of the Licensees' establishment from
F
the said premises."

A few other relevant undisputed facts may also be noticed. The master
plan and the zonal plan of the locality where the suit premises are situated
have earmarked the area as residential. No activity other than residential is
permissible threat. This is so by virtue of the provisions contained in Delhi G
Development Act, · 1957 and Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, the
relevant provisions whereof will be referred to where needed. It appears that
on 18.3.1982, a junior engineer of Delhi Development Authority ('ODA', for
short) inspected the premises occupied by the appellants and found that a
front rnom on the ground floor was being used for running an office of the
appellant-company. The company, which is tile tenant, and its director and H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A constituted attorney, the appellant no:2 were prosecuted for having committed
an offence punishable under Section 14 read with Section 29(2) of DDA Act
for the residential building falling in development zone F-11 which can be
used only for residential purposes according to master plan, was being used
for running an office therein. The Metropolitan Magistrate found such misuser
B having been proved. The defence taken by the appellants was that only one
room of the tenancy premises was used for his office by appellant no.2 as he
being a director of many companies the personnel thereof were coming to
him for consultancy work which was transacted in the one room office. The
appellants were convicted and directed to pay a fine of Rs. 3000 each.

C On behalf of the appellants one Rajbir Pal,· Lower Division Clerk of
Municipal Corporation of Delhi was examined as RW2, who stated that Greater
Kailash-I was a freehold area where .it was permissible, so far as MCD is
concerned, to use the property for resi<IPntial as well as commercial purposes.
He further' deposed that so far as the premises in occupation of the appellants
are concerited, misuser charges were levied and recovered from the appellants
D for the period 1.4.1989 to 31.3 .1991. Such misuser charges are recovered
when residential premises are subjected to commercial use. In the records
relating to this property, made available by the witness in the court, there was
no letter from the landlord allowing commercial user of the suit premises by
the tenants though a letter dated 1.3 .1990 from the appellants requesting for
E permitting commercial user of the suit premises was available in the records.

Mr. B. Dutta, the learned senior counsel for the appellants placed forceful
reliance on clause 6 of the Licence Deed and submitted that the premises
have been let out not only for the residence of directors, partners and officers
of the tenant-company but the tenants have been permitted freely to use the
F tenancy premises in part or in full also for office purposes which shows that
~o far as the parties to the tenancy agreement are concerned the purpose of
letting is mixed, i.e., residential and non-residential·both. The submission of
Mr. M.L. Verma, the learned senior coun~el for the landlord-respon.dent, has
been that the principal purpose of letting is residential only though incide11tally
user for office purposes has been allowed, eclips~d by the condition that such
G user does not invite the wrath of the rules of the local authorities. Inasmuch
as the laws governing the local authorities and as applicable to the suit
premises do not permit user of the premises for any purpose other than
residential, the purpose of letting, on a fair construction of clause 6 of the
Licence Deed would remain residential only and this inference stands
H reinforced by a reading of Clauses 7, 12 and 16 of the Licence Deed. Having
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 1·. PREM DEV A NIRANJAN DEVA TAY AL (LAHOTI, J.J 64 J

heard the learned counsel for the parties at length we are satisfied that the A
predo1ninant and main purpose, for which the suit premises have been let is
residential and therefore proceedings for eviction under Section 14(1 )(e) of
the Act have been rightly held by the High Court to be maintainable.

Section 14 of the Act protects tenants from eviction. An order for the
recovery of possession of the tenancy premises can be made by the Rent B
Controller on one or more of the specified grounds. One of the grounds
provided by clause (e), relevant for our purpose, is under:

"(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona
fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or
for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the C
owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises
are held and that the landlord or such person has no other
reasonably suitable residential accommodation;
Exp/anation.-For the purpose of this clause, "premises let for
residential purposes" include any premises which having been D
let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the· landlord,
used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;"

It is not permissible under the scheme of the Act to file an application
seeking an order for the recovery of the premises let for non-residential
purposes on the ground of bona fide requirement. Letting out for composite E
or mixed purposes and whether the premises let for such composite or mix~d
purposes can be got vacated on the ground of bona fide requirement is not
specifically provided by the Act.

In our opinion the expression 'the premises let for residential purposes'
should be construed liberally and not technically or narrowly; meaning thereby,
F
where the premises are solely let for residential purpose they are undoubtedly
covered by Section 14(1 )(e) but even when the premises are let out for
composite or mixed purpose ifthe predominant or main purpose of letting is
for residential purpose, the same would be included within the expression
'the premises let for residential purposes'. An incidental, a secondary or G
unauthorized user of the premises for purposes other than residence would
not take the premises out of the meaning of the expression 'the premises let
for residemial purposes.'

Premises are capable of being classified into residential and non-
I
residential depending on the purpose of letting. This is broad classification. H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Question of construction and .determining the purpose of letting may pose
difficulty when the premises are let for mixed, composite or dual purpose,
i.e., where the entire premises are allowed to be used for an overlapping
purpose or the premises forming subject matter of one tenancy are allowed
to be used for purposes more than one. In such a case it cannot be said that
the premises would cease to be of either category, i.e., they would be neither
B residential nor non residential. Rather it would be necessary to find out what
is the "main and dominant purpose" of letting as distinguished from
"subsidiary, ancillary or incidental purpose". The theory of determining the
purpose of letting by reference to finding out the main and dominant purpose
of letting has ample judicial authority to derive support from. In Dr. Sewa
C Singh v. Smt. Revinder Kaur and Anr., (1970) RCJ 615 SC it was held that
residential building will remain so even if it is used by a person engaged in
one or more of the professions partly for his business or partly for his-residence.
The building in the occupation of the t"'nant was undoubtedly residential and
on the evidence it was found that part of it was being used by the tenant, a
medical practitioner for examining patients and prescribing medicines. In
D Allenbury Engineers Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia and Ors., [1973]
1 sec 7' to determine whether the tenancy was for manufacturing purpose
within the meaning of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 the
Constitution Bench applied the test of 'main and dominant purpose' as
distinguished from 'incidental purpose'. The dominant purpose of lease was
E for storage and resale of the vehicles. Some spare parts were manufactured
and used in the vehicles as incidental to the main purpose of disposal of the
vehicles as without repairing or reconditioning the vehicles the disposal could
hardly have been possible. It was held that the dominant purpose of the lease
as manufacturing purpose was not established. In Sant Ram v. Rajinder Lal
and Ors., [1979] 2 SCC 274, a cobbler carried on cobbler's business in the
F shop. Incidentally he slept in the back portion of the shop at night while he
worked during the days. On the off days he would go home at night. It was
held that the purpose of letting remained exclusively commercial as.the user
of back portion for sleeping in the night was not incompatible with day's
user.
G .In Smt. Nai Bahu v. Lala Ramnarayan and Ors., [1978] 1 SCC 58, this
Court has held that a non-residential accommodation ~an be allowed to be
vacated by an order for eviction if the same was genuinely required not only
for non-residential use but also a portion of it bona fide for personal residence.
It clearly follows that user of a portion for personal residence would not alter
H the essential and basic or dominant user for non residential purpose: Hirata/ •
'
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 1·. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TAY AL {LAHOTI, J.J 645

Kapur v. Prabha ChoudhUY)'. [1988] 2 sec 172, is a reverse case on facts A
but deals with Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. The premises
were residential in nature and let out for residential purposes. The landlord,
a lawyer, applied for recovery of possession of his residential premises pleading
bona fide requirement for his residential purposes. It was held that merely
because the lawyer landlord intended to use a portion of the premises for
purposes of his office, library or study, the same would not detract from his B
requirement being for residential purposes. It would be different when the
entire premises sought to be got vacated are needed solely for use as office
and library in which case the requirement would cease to be residential
merely. This decision clearly spells out that incidental, secondary or partial
user of the premises for office purpose along with use as residence of the C
premises does not alter the main or predominant purpose of user of the
premises and the same continues to be residential.

In lakshman Santu Sintre v. Ba/krishna Keshav Shetye, AIR (1925)
Bombay 398, Chief Justice Macleod, speaking for the Division Bench opined
that the fact that a man carries on business or works in the same premises, D
which he uses for dwelling in, cannot thereby prevent those premises coming
within the category of premises used as a dwelling house.

In Walter and Son. Ltd v. Thomas, (1921) I KB 541, the question
arose-what is a dwelling house? The Bench applied the test-What is the
dominant purpose and principal user of the premises? The Bench opined that E
answer would determine the purpose of tenancy and user of premises. The
dominant purpose and object may be to carry the business of a licensee and
the provision of accommodation for the occupants may be a mere adjunct of
the business. Then the premises do not cease to be 'business premises' because
dwelling accommodation necessary for the purpose of the business is attached. F
On the other hand a dwelling house would not cease to be so by reason only
that part of the premises is used as a shop or office or for business, trade or
professional purposes.

In Feyereisel v. Parry and Ors., (1952) I All E.R. 728, the premises
let by a landlord to a tenant were a camping site and a bungalow thereon. The G
tenant occupied the bungalow and carried on the business of a camping site
proprietor. It was held that the camping site was the main object of the letting
and the bungalow was a mere adjunct to the business carried on by the tenant
and therefore it was held that the dwelling house went along with the camping
site. The test of principal and dominant object of letting and user of the H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A premises was reiterated. The question formulated was-"ls one thing the
adjunct of the other, or the other of the one?"

Incidentally, we may refer to a Full Bench decision of Madras High
Court in T Dakshinamoorthy v. Thul/a Bai and Anr., AIR (1952) Madras
413. The Full Bench held the English test being applicable in India too, as
B sound and reasonable, and approved the test of dominant purpose and principal
user being applied for determining the purpose of letting though the.Bench
observed that such tes~ was not always of easy application and the difficulty
in the actual application of the test was capable of being taken care of by a
margin of judicial discretion in the matter of the determination of the question
C . of the· character of the building as a question of fact has necessarily to be
allowed for. To quote, the Full Bench held, "Instances of transactions inspired
by mixed motives and intents in which the question of the main, real and
dominant motive and intent has to be canvassed for validating or invalidating
them are not uncommon in other branches of law. There can in our judgment
be no reason or principle why a canvass of the main, real and dominant
D purpose should be regarded as not legitimate in this branch of law in cases
where the letting is actuated by mixed purposes."

In our opinion, for the purpose of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act, so long
as the principle and dominant purpose of letting is residential merely because
a mixed user of the premises or user of a part or incidental or· ancillary user
E of the premises is permitted for activities other than residential, the purpose
of letting the premises would not cease to be residential and the premises
would continue to be governed by Section 14(1)(e) of the Act.

It is not the case of the appellants that any business activity is being
F carried out in the suit premises or was permitted to be carried on or was
included within the purposes of letting. Once the terms tenancy have been
reduced into writing the purpose of tenancy has to be determined by reading
the relevant clauses of the deed and extrinsic evidence making a departure
from the terms of deed may not be admissible. In case of doubt or vagueness
resort can be had to other factors such as constructional features of the
G premises, their location, the amenities available, the conveniences provided,
the number of rooms and the actual user to which the premises have been
subjected. The opening and governing part of Clause 6 is couched in a
mandatory form-'the licensee shall use the premises for the residence of the
directors, partners and officers. In the succeeding sentence the use of word
H 'however,' is suggestive of the fact that incidental user of the tenancy premises
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 1·. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TA VAL [LA HOT!, J.] 64 7

for the office purpose also was permitted by the landlord. Such incidental A
user is pennissive and not purposive. And that too has been 1nade dependent
on the permissibility detenninable by reference to the la\vS governing the
local authority. It is not disputed that the provisions of Delhi Development
Act, 1957 and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 do apply to the
locality where the tenancy premises are situated.
B
Section 14 of DOA Act provides that after the coming into operation
of any of the plans in a zone, no person shall use or permit to be used any
land or building in that zone otherwise than in conformity of such plan. The
inhibition contained in Section 14 applies in full force inasmuch as the master
plan and the zonal plan provide for Greater Kailash Part I being residential C
locality only. That is why the user of one room as an office was held liable
to be penalized under Section 29 of the Act. Section 347 of the DMC Act
imposes restrictions on uses of buildings with in Delhi Municipal Corporation
area. No person shall, without the written permission of the Commissioner or
otherwise than in conformity with the conditions, if any, of such permission,
change or allow the change of use of any land or building. Section 430 D
provides for the manner in which a written permission may be granted. It has
to be in writing and sig.r.ed by the Commissioner or by the officer empowered
in this behalf. It should satisfy other requirements of Section 430. A perusal
of the statement of Rajtir Pal RW2 does not spell out any written permission

-
by the Commissioner or an empowered officer having been allowed in E
accordance with Section 347 read with Section 430 of the DMC Act so far
as the suit premises are concerned. Construing the statement of Rajbir Pal as
much in favour of the appellants as possible, all that can be said is that the
premises were found to have been misused and the misuser was condoned for
the period 1.4.1989 to 1.3.1991 by levying misuse charges. The appellants
did send a letter dated l.3.1990 to the Corporation authorities requesting for F
permitting commercial user of the suit premises. However the exact nature of
prayer is not known as the contents of the letter were not brought on record.
Certainly, Rajbir Pal does not depose to any such permission having been
granted by the Commissioner to the appellants.

Clause 7 of the Deed prohibits user of the premises for business purposes. G
Clause 12 obliges the occupants to comply with the laws governing the
locality and as applicable to the local authorities. Clause 16 restrains use for
any illegal purpose, i.e. a purpose not permitted by law. These clauses
obviously attract applicability of Sections 14 and 29 of the DOA Act as also
Section 347 of the DMC Act. H
--I
648' SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A The upshot of the above discussion is that the primary and domina,nt
purpose of letting the suit premises i.s residential. Commercial activity therein
is not permitted. Incidental user for office purpose is permitted subject to the
condition of such user being permissible under the municipal laws which it
is not. In any case such user being incidental or ancillary, the same would not
B detract from the primary or dominant purpose of letting. The suit premises
have been rightly held by the High Court to be 'the premises let for residential
purposes' within the meaning of Section 14(l)(e) of the Act.

The decision in Kanda Marwah v. Mis. Kapur Fabrics, 48 (1992) DLT
636, was forcefully relied on by learned senior counsel for the appellants. It
C is a single Bench decision of the High Court of Delhi. Having: gone through
the decision, we find it a case of a peculiar nature proceeding on its own facts
and clearly distinguishable so far 11s the present case is concerned. Section
14(1 )(e) of the Act did not come up for the consideration of the Court. The
eviction was sought for under Section 14(l)(k) of the Act. The lessee was
obliged by clause (9) of the lease deed to use the premises for his residence
D only. However, it was found that in brazen disregard of the relevant clause
of the lease deed the tenant indulged into misuser of the premises deviating
from the permitted user of the residence only and in spite of the protest by
the landlord. As the lease deed by clause (18) incorporated permission from
the landlord to the tenant to utilize the premises, in case he so wanted, wholly
E or partially, for office purposes but subject to getting permission from the
Government, it was held that so long as the tenant secured condonation of
misuser from the Land and Development Office on payment of charges or
penalty, the eviction order could be held in abeyance. However, still if the
misuser was not condoned by the L and DO office the tenant must stop the
misuser finally and suffer an eviction order in the event of defiance. Clearly,
F the High Court was not determining whether the purpose of letting was
residential within the meaning of Section 14(1 )(e) of the Act; all that the
High Court considered was whether the user or dealing with the premises by
the tenant was contrary to any condition imposed on the landlord by the
Government or local authority within the meaning of Section 14(1 )(k) of the
G Act.
The learned senior counsel for the appellants referred to the explanation
appended to Section 14(\)(e) and submitted that the Legislature in its wisdom
thought fit to enact that premises let for residential purpose if used incidentally
for commercial or other purposes by the tenant but without the consent of the
H landlord would not alter the purpose and the enactment of the explanation is
PRECISION STEEL AND ENGG. WORKS 1•. PREM DEVA NIRANJAN DEVA TA YAL (LAHOTl.J.] 649

suggestive of legislative intent that even incidental user for commercial or A
other purposes if accompanied by the consent of the landlord would take the
premises out of the expression 'premises let for residential purpose'. We
cannot agree. The enactment of explanation is ex abundanti cautela. All that
the explanation say is that the tenant cannot by his unilateral act of
impermissible user, alter the purpose of letting. This explanation has nothing B
to do with determining the main, principal or dominant purpose of letting -
the theory which in our opinion applies to interpreting the expression "the
premises let for residential purposes" in Section 14( I)( e) of the Act.

The appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellants are allowed four
months' time from today for vacating the suit premises subject to filing the C
usual undertaking within a period of three weeks from today.

S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

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