M/S P.R. DEB AND ASSOCIATESversusSUNANDA ROY
- Citation
- 1996 INSC 347
- Decided
- 1 March 1996
- Disposal
- Disposed off
- Bench
- FAIZAN UDDIN
Holding
Specific performance of a contract for sale of immovable property cannot be granted where the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part, i.e., pay the stipulated sum within a reasonable time, and where no contractual condition makes the vendor’s execution of a co‑operative society agreement a prerequisite for that payment.
Summary
The appellant, owner of a plot in South Calcutta, entered into a sale agreement with the respondent for Rs 9 lakhs, requiring an initial payment of Rs 25,000 and a further Rs 4 lakhs within five months, the latter being essential for the appellant to obtain alternative accommodation. The respondent failed to pay the Rs 4 lakhs on time and later claimed that the appellant was obliged to first execute a separate agreement with a proposed co‑operative housing society before the payment could be made. The trial court dismissed the suit for specific performance on the ground that the respondent was not ready and willing to perform his part; the Calcutta High Court reversed this decision and granted specific performance, directing payment within three months. The respondent failed to make the payment and sought an extension, which the High Court refused. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the payment of Rs 4 lakhs was an essential term, the respondent was unable and unwilling to pay, and there was no contractual condition requiring the appellant to enter into the co‑operative society agreement; consequently, specific performance could not be granted. The Court allowed the appeal challenging the High Court decree, restored the trial court’s dismissal, and dismissed the parallel appeal against the refusal to extend time.
Issues considered
- Can specific performance be granted when the plaintiff is not ready and willing to perform his part, i.e., pay the stipulated sum within a reasonable time?
- Does clause 11 of the sale agreement make the appellant’s execution of an agreement with a co‑operative housing society a condition precedent to the respondent’s payment?
- Is the time for payment of Rs 4 lakhs of the essence of the contract?
- Can the High Court extend time for payment under a conditional decree after it has become functus officio?
Legislation cited
Subjects
Judgment
J
i
MIS P.R. DEB AND ASSOCIATES A
v.
SUNANDA ROY
MARCH 1, 1996
[FAIZAN UDDIN AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.] B
Specific Relief Act, 1963-Section J(}-Specific Perfonnance-Suit
fo,-P/aintiff must be ready and willing to carry out his part of the agreement
at all material times-Otherwise suit cannot be decreed for specific perfor-
mance.
c
The appellant, owner of certain immovable property, agreed to sell
to the respondent that property for a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs. Under the terms
of this agreement a sum of Rs. 25,000 was to be paid at the time of
execution of the agreement and a further sum of Rs. 4 lakhs within five
months from the date of the agreement and the balance amount at the time D
of conclusion of the purchase, time-being of the essence of the contract;
that the appellant was required to hand over vacant possession of the
property on completion of sale except for possession of four shop rooms
in the front portion as the payment of Rs. 4 lakhs was required under the
terms of the agreement to enahl.e the appellant to acquire a suitable E
residence by utilising this sum. As the respondent failed and neglected to
pay this amount within the prescribed period, the appellant called upon
the respondent to pay the amount within seven days but despite this notice,
the respondent failed and neglected to pay the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs.
The respondent filed a suit for specific performance against the F
ap;:>ellant which was dismissed by the trial court holding that the respon-
dent-plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract.
In appeal, the High Court granted specific performance of the contract
and directed the appellant to execute the deed of conveyance, on the
respondent paying the amounts set out therein within a period of three G
months from the date of the judgment. The respondent did not make
payment within specified period. He made an application for extension of
time for making payment under the decree but the High Court declined to
grant any extension of time holding that in the facts and circumstances of
the case it would cause hardship, serious prejudice and injury to the
opposite party. It resulted in the respondent's suit for specific perfor- H
163
164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [19%] 3 S.C.R.
A mance being dismissed. Two appeals were filed, one by the appellant-defen-
dant and another by the respondent-plaintiff against the decision of the
High Court.
The respondent contended that under the agreement, the appellant
was required to enter into a further agreement with the promoter of a
B proposed housing society being formed by the respondent but the appel-
lant did not enter into any agreement with the proposed society, so the
respondent could not raise the Sum of Rs. 4 lakhs.
Disposing of the matter, this Court
c HELD : Payment of Rs. 4 Iakhs within a reasonable time was an
essential term of the contract becaus• late payment of this amount may
affect the appellant's right to obtain suitable alternative residential ac-
comodation. The respondent-plaintiff was not in a position to pay the sum
of Rs. 4 lakhs either within the time specified in the agreement of sale or
D within a reasonable time. He has insisted on the appellant first entering
into an agreement with a proposed housing society which never came into
existence. There was nothing in the agreement of sale which required the
appellant to enter into an agreement with a proposed co-operative housing
society as a condition precedent to receiving part payment of the sum of Rs.
E 4 lakhs. The proposed co-operative housing society was never registered
and there was nothing to show that there were any members of his proposed
society. The respondent plaintiff was not in a position to carry out the terms
of agreement of sale. The plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance, must
be ready and willing to carry out his part of the agreement at all material
times. Such was not the case here. In fact, even after the decree of specific
F performance the respondent was not able to deposit the amounts specified
by the High Court within the time prescribed. As the respondent did not
comply and was unwilling and/or unable to comply with the term of the
agreement, he could not be considered as ready and willing to perform his
part of the contract. [169-D-G; 170-B, D, E; 171-F)
G Chand Rani (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. v. Kamal Rani (Smt.) (Dead) by
Lrs., [1993) 1 SCC 519 and Parakunnan Veeti// Joseph's Son Mathew v.
Nedumbara Kuruvi/a's Son & Ors., [1987) Supp SCC 340, relied on.
1.2. In the present case, the right of the appellant to purchase
H suitable residental accomodation was seriously affected by non-payment of
J
I
P.R DEBANDASSOCIATEv. SUNANDAROY[MRS. SUJATA V.MANOHARJ.] 165
Rs. 4 lakhs within a reasonable time. The respondent had failed to comply A
with the term of the agreement relating to payment of this amount. In these
circumstances, in any case, a decree for specific performance cannot be
granted as it would be nnfair and unreasonable to do so. [171-H; 172-A]
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4631 of
1993 Etc. B
From the Judgment and order dated 26.5.93 of the Calcutta High
Court in F.A.No. 127 of 1989.
C.S. Vaidyanathan for L.P. Agrawala & Co. for the Appellants.
c
Asim Mehrotra for Khaitan & Co. for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J. Civil Appeal No. 4631A of 1993 D
is by original defendant to the suit challenging the decree of specific
performance which has been passed in appeal by the High Court of
Calcutta against the appellant. The judgment and decree of the High Court
in appeal is dated 28th of August, 1991. By this judgment and decree, the
judgment and order of the trial court dismissing the respondent's suit for
specific performance was set aside. The High Court granted to the respon- E
dent a decree for specific performance of the· contract in question and
directed the appellant to execute the deed of conveyance as set out therein
on the respondent paying to the appellant the amounts set out therein. The
decree provided that the respondent shall make these payments with
interest as specified therein within a period of three months from the date F
of the judgment; and the appellant was directed to execute the documents
. within three months thereafter. The respondent, however, did not make
payment within specified period which expired on 27th of November, 1991.
The respondent, however, ultimately made an application dated 3rd of
February, 1992 before the High Court for extension of time for making
payment under the decree by a further period of three months. The G
appellant opposed this application. The High Court by its order dated 26th
of May, 1993 has declined to grant any extension of time for payment of
the said amounts holding, inter alia, that in the facts and circumstances of
the case it would cause hardship, serious prejudice and injury to the
opposite party if any further extension of time is given thereby reopening H
166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R ..
A the decree. The application of the respondent for extension of time has
been dismissed by the High Court thus resulting in the respondent's suit
for specific performance standing dismissed.
Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1993 is filed by the respondent from the
judgment and order of the High Court dated 26th of May, 1993. For the
B sake of convenience the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 4631A of 1993, that
is to say the original defendant, is referred to as the appellant while the
respondent in Civil Appeal No. 4631A of 1993, that is to say the original
plaintiff, is referred to as the respondent.
C The appellant is the owner of certain immovable property bearing
No. 30, Gariahata Road, South Calcutta. By the agreement dated 24th of
October, 1977 the appellant agreed to sell to the respondent the said
property for a sum of Rs. 9 lakhs on the terms and conditions set out in
the agreement of sale dated 24th of October, 1977. Under the terms of this
D agreement a sum of Rs. 25,000 was to be paid at the time of execution of
the agreement. A further sum of Rs. 4 lakhs was to be paid within five
months from the date of the agreement and the balance amount was to be
paid at the time of conclusion of the purchase, time-being of the essence
of the contract. Under clause 4 of the agreement, after the title of the
appellant was accepted by the respondent, the respondent was required to
E send to the appellant's advocate a draft of the proposed conveyance in
order to enable the appellant to apply for and obtain the income tax
clearance certificate under Section 230A of the Income Tax Act and for
permission of the compentent authority under the Urban Land (Ceiling
and Regulation) Act, 1976. Under clause 6 of the agreement the appellant
F was required to hand over vacant possession of the said property on
completion of sale except for possession of four shop rooms in the front
portion. Clauses 11, 13 and 14 of the agreement are as follows :
"11. And it is further agreed that if ultimately the Conveyance is
to be executed in favour of a Co-operative Housing Society to be
G initiated by the said P.R. Deb & Associates as nominee of the said
Purchaser herein and a further Agreement may be entered into
between the Promoter of that Housing Society and the Vendor
and the said Agreement be registered at the Office of the District
Registrar at Alipore, 24-Parganas and the Vendor shall have to
H give necessary consent letter to the Co-operative Housing Society
P.R DEB AND ASSOCIATE'. SUNANDA ROY[MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.] 167
lo the effect that she has agreed to sell the land and the buildings A
thereon to the co-operative Housing Society.
13. On the Vendor's making out a marketable title to the said
property free from all encumbrances whatsoever and on her com-
plying with the obligations under this Agreement, if the Purchaser B
fails to complete the purchase within the time and in the manner
hereinbefore mentioned, the Vendor thereupon shall have the full
power of rescinding this Agreement by giving notice in writing to
the Purchaser or its said Advocate and the said earnest money of
Rs. 25,000 shall in that even stand absolutely forfeited by the
Vendor as and by way of liquidated damages and the Vendor shall C
have further rights to sue the purchaser for specific performance
of this Agreement and for other reliefs.
14. It is clearly understood and agreed that further payment of Rs.
4,00,000 will not be treated as earnest money for the operation of D
this clause. In case the transaction falls through 1he said sum of
Rs. 4,00,000 has to be refunded forthwith."
Under the terms of the said agreement the respondent was required
to pay Rs. 4 lakhs within five months, that is to say, on or before 23rd of
March, 1978. As the respondent failed and neglected to pay this amount E
within the prescribed period, the appellant addressed to the respondent
her solicitor's letter dated 12.4.1978. In this letter, the appellant pointed
out that the part payment of Rs. 4 lakhs had not been made by the
respondent to the appellant within the prescribed period under the agree-
ment. It was further pointed out that the respondent was aware that the F
appellant was residing in the said property. The appellant had agreed to
give vacant possession of this property on completion of sale. The payment
of Rs. 4 lakhs was required under the terms of the agreement to enable
the appellant to acquire a suitable residence by utilising this sum. The letter
also records that in fact the appellant had inspected a number of properties
and approved two of them for purchase: but owing to the default on the G
part of the respondent in paying the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs the appellant was
not able to proceed any further. On account of the default committed by
the respondent, the appellant had the option to terminate the agreement.
However, without prejudice to her rights she called upon the respondent
to pay the said sum of Rs. 4 lakhs within the seven days failing which the H
168 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996) 3 S.C.R.
A appellant would be compelled to take further steps against the respondent
as she may be advised. Despite this notice, the respondent failed and
neglected to pay the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs.
The respondent contends that under clause 11 of the said agreement,
B the appellant was required to enter into a further agreement with the
promoter of a proposed housing society being formed by the respondent
and was required to give a consent letter to the co-operative housing
society as set out in clause 11. The respondent contends that although
meetings were held between the solicitors of the appellant and the respon-
dent, the appellant did not give such consent or enter into an agreement ,
C with the proposed co-operative housing society which was then being set
up by the respondent. It is the respondent's case that he could not raise
the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs since the appellant did not consent to and/or execute
an agreement in favour of the proposed housing society in supersession of
the agreement of 24th of October, 1977. In this connection, the
D respondent's solicitors have addressed two letters to the appellant's
solicitors. One is a letter dated 5th of June, 1978, written long after the
expiry of the date for payment of Rs. 4 lakhs, in which the respondent has
called upon the appellant to approve the draft agreement for sale between
one M/s. Anirban Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. which was not then
registered and the appellant in supersession of the existing agreement
E along with a cheque for Rs. 25,000 drawn in favour of the appellant by the
said proposed society. This cheque has not been encashed. The second
letter from the respondent to the appellant's solicitors is dated 25th Sep-
tember, 1980 in which it is, inter alia, recorded that unless the agreement
was executed between the proposed co-operative society and the appellant,
F it would not be possible for the respondent to raise money and make
payment of Rs. 4 lakhs. The letter also records that the appellant had,
during the negotiations, taken the stand that unless the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs
was paid the appellant would not execute the fresh agreement for sale. This
letter also records that after the agreement between the proposed co-
operative society and the appellant is completed, the respondent will,
G within a month thereafter, make payment of Rs. 4 lakhs. But unless the
agreement is completed it is impossible to collect the money from the
members of the proposed co-operative society.
On 10.11.1980, the respondent filed a suit for specific performance
H against the appellant· praying for specific performance of the agreement of
P.R DEB AND ASSOCIATE,. SUNANDA ROY [MRS. SUJATA V. MANO HAR, J.J 169
24th of October, 1977. The trial court by its judgmen~and order dated A
24.12.1985 dismissed the suit holding that the respondent was not ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract. In appeal, however, the
High Court has granted specific performance as prayed for on terms and
conditions which are set out in its judgment and decree dated 28.8.1991.
Hence the present appeal has been filed by the appellant.
B
Under the agreement of sale dated 24.10.1977, the respondent was
required to make part payment of Rs. 4 lakhs within five months of the
agreement of sale. The agreement has clearly provided that this payment
is not by way of earnest but it is part payment of the purchase price. The
purpose of this payment is clearly set out in the appellant's solicitor's letter C
dated 12.4.1978 addressed to the respondent's solicitors. Early payment of
the amount of Rs. 4 lakhs was required as the appellant had to purchase
alternative residential accomodation for herself in order to carry out her
obligation under the agreement of sale to deliver vacant possession of the
property to the respondent except for the four shops set out in the said D
agreement. By her solicitor's letter of 12th April, 1978, the appellant had
also make it clear that she requires payment of Rs. 4 lakhs for this purpose
and gave notice to the respondent to pay this amount within a week of the
said letter since the time for payment had already expired. Clearly, pay-
ment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a reasonable time was an essential term of the
contract. Because a late payment of this amount may affect the appellant's E
right to obtain suitable alternative residential accomcidation; property
prices may increase, thus affecting the appellant's right to purchase a
suitable residential accommodation. From the reply which has been sent
by the respondent's solicitors, especially the reply dated 25.9.1980, it is
quite clear that the respondent was not in a position to pay the sum of Rs. F
4 lakhs either within the time specified in the agreement of sale or within
a reasonable time. In fact, he has clearly set out in the said letter that unless
he is able to enter into a suitable arrangement with a co-operative housing
society, he will not be able to pay Rs. 4 lakhs to the appellant. He has
insisted, therefore, on the appellant first entering into an agreement with
a proposed housing society which admittedly, never came into existence. G
There is nothing in clause 11 of the agreement of sale which requires the
appellant to enter into an agreement with a propsed co-operative housing
society as a condition precedent to receiving part payment of the sum of
Rs. 4 lakhs. Clause 11 is independent of the right of the appellant to receive
a sum of Rs. 4 lakhs. The agreement specifies the time within whieh the H
170 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.
A sum of Rs. 4 lakh& was to be paid and the correspondence makes it quite
clear that the respondent was not in position to pay this amount within the
agreed period or within any reasonable time thereafter because he had, in
turn, to collect this amount from the expected members of the proposed
co-operative housing society. There is no evidence in this case to show
B whether there were any members of this proposed co-operative housing
society and whether the respondent was in a position to collect this amount
of Rs. 4 lakhs. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary. The proposed
co-operative housing society was never registered and there is nothing to
show that there were any members of this proposed co-operative housing
society. Although the respondent and his solicitor have given evidence in
C the case, they have not stated that the respondent had the sum of Rs. 4
lakhs at the material time or that the respondent was in a position to pay
this amount within a reasonable time. There is nothing in the agreement
requiring the appellant to enter into an agreement with the proposed co'
operative housing society before the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs is released to her.
D The trial court, therefore, had rightly come to the conclusion that the
respondent-plaintiff was not in a position to carry out the terms of agree-
ment of sale. The plaintiff, in a suit for specific performance, must be ready
and willing to carry out his part of the agreement at all material times. Such
is not the case here. In fact, even after the decree of specific performance,
the respondent was not able to deposit the amounts specified by the High
E Court within the time prescribed. Ultimately he applied for extension of
time for deposit of amount which application was rejected.
In the case of Chand Rani (Smt.) (Dead) by Lrs. v. Kamal Rani (Smt.)
(Dead) by Lrs., [1993] 1 SCC 519, a Bench of Five Judges of this Court
F considered a similar situation, where the contract stipulated that a sum of
Rs. 98,000 would be paid by the purchaser to the vendor within a period
of ten days only. Despite notices of the vendor, the vendce was not willing
to pay the said amount unless vacant possession of a part of the property
was given by the vendor to the vendee. The Court said that in view of the
express terms of the contract coupled with the conduct of the vendee, it
G was clear that the time was of the essence of the contract and the vendee
was not ready and willing to perform the contract. In these circumstances,
this Court upheld the refusal of the High Court to grant specific perfor-
mance. This Court has observed that although in the case of a sale of
immovable property time is not of the essence of the contract, it has to be
H ascertained whether under the terms of the contract, when the parties
P.R. DEBANDASSOCIATEv. SUNANDAROY[MRS.SUJATA V. MANOHAR,J.] 171
'+· . named a specific time within with completion was to take place, really and A
in su.bstance it was intended that it should be completed within a
reasonable time. It observed that the specific performance of a contract
will ordinarily be granted, notwithstanding default in carrying out the
contract within the specified period, if having regard to the express stipula-
tions of the parties, nature of the property and the surrounding circumstan-
ces, it is not inequitable to grant the relief. If the contract relates to sale
B
of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that the time was
not of the essensce of the contract. But even if it is not of the essence of
,. the contract, the Court may infer that it is to be performed in a reasonable
time if the conditions of the contract so warrant. These can be inferred,
(1) from the express terms of the contract; (2) from the nature of the c
property and; (3) from the surrounding circumstnaces. For example, the
object of making the contract may make it clear that the agreement
requires to be performed within a reasonable time. The Court said that the
stipulation in the contract regarding payment of Rs. 98,000 within a period
of ten days only showed that the failure to pay the amount within the
D
stipulated period would constitute a breach of contract.
"
The present case is similar. The clause relating to payment of various
amounts under the contract including the sum of Rs. 4 lakhs states that the
time is of the essence. Moreover, by his letter of 12th April, 1978, also the
appellant has made payment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a period of seven days E
from the date of notice, of the essence of the contract pointing out the
- circumstances which require payment of Rs. 4 lakhs within a reasonable
time. As the respondent drd not comply and was unwilling and/or unable
.,. to comply with this terms of the agreement, he cannot be considered as
ready and. willing t'f perform his part of the contract. ·
F
In the case of Parakunnan Veetil/ Joseph's Son Mathew v. Nedumbara
Kurnvila's Son & Ors., [1987] (Supp) SCC 340, this Court has observed that
the court should meticulously consider all facts and circumstances before
granting specific performance. The court should take care to see that it is
,... not used as an instrument of oppression to have an unfair advantage. G
In the present case, the right of the appellant to purchase suitable
residential accommodation is seriously affected by non-payment of Rs. 4
lakhs within a reasonable time. The respondent had failed to comply with
the term of the agreement relating to payment of this amount. In these H
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996) 3 S.C.R.
A circumstances, in any case, a decree for specific performance cannot be
granted as it would be unfair and unreasonable to do so. The High Court,
therefore, was not right in setting aside the judgment and order of the trial
court.
We, therefore, allow Civil Appeal No. 4631A of 1993 and restore the
B judgment and order of the trial court while setting aside the judgment and
decree of the High Court.
In view of Civil Appeal No. 4631A of 1993 being allowed, as above,
nothing now survives in Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1993 which is against the
refusal of the High Court to extend time for making payment of the
C amounts under the decree of the High Court which has now been set aside.
The High Court passed a conditional decree whereby the High Court has
ordered, inter a/ia, that in the event of the respondent herein committing
default in making the payment to the appellant within the time as specified
in the decree, the suit for specific performance of the contract 'shall and
D do stand dismissed'. The respondent contends that the High Court has the
power to extend time for making payment despite this provision in the
decree. While the appellant contends that the court having become functus
officio on passing of the above conditional decree, it cannot further extend
time. The High Court has declined to extend time in the facts and cir-
E cumstances of the case. We need not, however, examine the detailed
contentions raised by both the parties in this connection since this dispute
has now become redundant, the decree for specific performance having
been set aside. Civil Appeal No. 4631 of 1993 is, therefore, dismissed. The
respondent shall pay to the appellant costs of the appeals.
F The respondent will be at liberty to withdraw the amount deposited
pursuant to the orders of the Court with accrued intere9st, if any.
R.A. Matter disposed of.
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