Supreme Court of India
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD.versusM/S SAMTEX DESINZ PVT. LTD.
- Citation
- 2021 INSC 359
- Decided
- 26 July 2021
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- INDIRA BANERJEE
Holding
An interest‑free term loan disbursed for working‑capital purposes is a financial debt under Section 5(8) of the IBC, rendering the lender a financial creditor who may file a petition under Section 7.
Summary
M/s Orator Marketing Pvt. Ltd., the assignee of a Rs 1.60 crore interest‑free term loan given to M/s Samtex Desinz Pvt. Ltd. for working‑capital, filed a petition under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) to initiate a corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP). The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) rejected the petition, holding that the loan did not constitute a ‘financial debt’ and therefore the applicant was not a ‘financial creditor’. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the IBC, the meaning of ‘includes’, and the scheme of the Code. It held that a debt disbursed against the consideration of time value of money includes interest‑free loans, as the phrase ‘if any’ allows for the absence of interest. Consequently, the loan qualified as a financial debt, making the appellant a financial creditor eligible to file under Section 7. The Court set aside the NCLT and NCLAT orders, revived the petition, and allowed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether an interest‑free term loan advanced to a corporate debtor qualifies as ‘financial debt’ under Section 5(8) of the IBC.
- Whether the lender (or its assignee) can be deemed a ‘financial creditor’ eligible to initiate a CIRP under Section 7 of the IBC.
- How the word ‘includes’ in Section 5(8) should be interpreted – expansively or restrictively.
Legislation cited
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016s. Rule 4
- Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016s. 3(10), s. 3(11), s. 3(12), s. 3(6), s. 3(8), s. 5(7), s. 5(8), s. 6, s. 62, s. 7
- Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016
Subjects
InsolvencyBankruptcyFinancial debtInterest‑free loanCorporate Insolvency Resolution ProcessSection 5(8) IBCFinancial creditorDefaultStatutory interpretation
Judgment
742 [2021]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 6 S.C.R. 742 [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD.
v.
M/S SAMTEX DESINZ PVT. LTD.
(Civil Appeal No. 2231 of 2021)
B JULY 26, 2021
[INDIRA BANERJEE AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016:
ss. 5(8), 7, 62 – Financial debt – Construction of – Person
C giving a term loan to a Corporate Person, free of interest, on account
of its working capital requirements– Non-payment of the same by
Corporate Debtor – Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process-CIRP u/s. 7 by the appellant-lender – Rejection of the
application by NCLT as also NCLAT holding that the claim cannot
be termed to be a ‘financial debt’ – On appeal, held: Initiation of
D
CIRP by a Financial Creditor u/s. 7 is the occurrence of a default
by the Corporate Debtor – ‘Default’ means non-payment of debt in
whole or part when the debt has become due and payable, and
includes financial debt and operational debt – ‘Financial debt’ u/s.
5(8) means outstanding principal due in respect of a loan and would
E also include interest thereon, if any interest were payable thereon –
If there is no interest payable on the loan, only the outstanding
principal would qualify as a financial debt – Definition of ‘financial
debt’ in s. 5(8) does not expressly exclude an interest free loan –
‘Financial Debt’ would be construed to include interest free loans
advanced to finance the business operations of a corporate body –
F
On facts, both NCLAT and NCLT misconstrued the definition of
‘financial debt’ in s. 5(8), by reading the same in isolation and out
of context, thus, the order passed by the NCLAT and NCLT, set aside
– Application u/s. 7 of the IBC stands revived.
s. 5(8) – Financial debt – Expression ‘includes’ – Construction
G of – Held: Legislature has the power to define a word in a statute –
Where the word is defined to include something, the definition is
prima facie extensive – Depending on the context in which the word
‘includes’ may have been used, and the objects and the scheme of
the enactment as a whole, the expression ‘includes’ may have to be
H construed as restrictive and exhaustive – Words and phrases.
742
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 743
PVT. LTD.
Interpretation of statutes: Construction/interpretation of A
statutory provision – Held: Legislative intent of the statute is to be
seen in the words used by the legislature itself – In case of doubt,
the object and purpose of the statute or the reason and spirit behind
it, is to be seen – When a question arises as to the meaning of a
certain provision in a statute, the provision has to be read in its
B
context – The Statute has to be read as a whole.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Both the NCLAT and NCLT have misconstrued
the definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the Insolvency
and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, by reading the same in isolation C
and out of context. The judgment and order of the NCLAT,
affirming the judgment and order of the Adjudicating Authority
(NCLT) and dismissing the appeal is patently flawed, and are set
aside. [Para 8, 32][753-G; 766-A]
1.2 In construing and/or interpreting any statutory D
provision, one must look into the legislative intent of the statute.
The intention of the statute has to be found in the words used by
the legislature itself. In case of doubt, it is always safe to look
into the object and purpose of the statute or the reason and spirit
behind it. Each word, phrase or sentence has to be construed in
the light of the general purpose of the Act itself. The interpretative E
effort “must be illumined by the goal, though guided by the
words”. When a question arises as to the meaning of a certain
provision in a statute, the provision has to be read in its context.
The statute has to be read as a whole. The previous state of the
law, the general scope and ambit of the statute and the mischief F
that it was intended to remedy are relevant factors. [Para 9,
10][753-H; 754-A-C]
1.3 The definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the
IBC cannot be read in isolation, without considering some other
relevant definitions, particularly, the definition of ‘claim’ in Section G
3(6), ‘corporate debtor’ in Section 3(8), ‘creditor’ in Section 3(10),
‘debt’ in section 3(11), ‘default’ in Section 3(12), ‘financial
creditor’ in Section 5(7) as also the provisions, inter alia, of
Sections 6 and 7 of the IBC. The eligibility of a person, to initiate
the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, if questioned, has
H
744 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A to be adjudicated upon consideration of the key words and
expressions in the aforesaid Section and other related provisions.
[Para 15, 18][759-B, E]
1.4 Corporate Resolution Process gets triggered when a
Corporate Debtor commits a default. A Financial Creditor may
B file an application for initiating a Corporate Insolvency Resolution
Process against the Corporate Debtor, when a default has
occurred. A ‘corporate debtor’ means a corporate person who
owes a debt to any person, as per the definition of this expression
in Section 3(8) of the IBC. Under Section 5(7) of the IBC ‘financial
creditor’ means any person to whom a financial debt is owed and
C includes a person to whom such debt has legally been assigned.
Section 5(8) defines ‘financial debt’ to mean “a debt along with
interest if any which is disbursed against the consideration of the
time value of money and includes money borrowed against the
payment of interest, as per Section 5(8)(a) of the IBC.
D The definition of ‘financial debt’ Section 5(8) includes
the components of sub-clauses (a) to (i) of the said Section.
[Paras 19-21][759-F-G; 760-A-C]
1.5 The NCLT and NCLAT have overlooked the words “if
any” which could not have been intended to be otiose. ‘Financial
E debt’ means outstanding principal due in respect of a loan and
would also include interest thereon, if any interest were payable
thereon. If there is no interest payable on the loan, only the
outstanding principal would qualify as a financial debt. Both
NCLAT and NCLT have failed to notice clause(f) of Section 5(8),
in terms whereof ‘financial debt’ includes any amount raised under
F any other transaction, having the commercial effect of borrowing.
Furthermore, sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Sub-section 8 of Section 5
of the IBC are apparently illustrative and not exhaustive.
Legislature has the power to define a word in a statute. Such
definition may either be restrictive or be extensive. Where the
G word is defined to include something, the definition is prima facie
extensive. [Paras 22, 23][760-C-E]
1.6 Of course, depending on the context in which the word
‘includes’ may have been used, and the objects and the scheme
of the enactment as a whole, the expression ‘includes’ may have
H to be construed as restrictive and exhaustive. [Para 27][761-F]
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 745
PVT. LTD.
1.7 The trigger for initiation of the Corporate Insolvency A
Resolution Process by a Financial Creditor under Section 7 of
the IBC is the occurrence of a default by the Corporate Debtor.
‘Default’ means non-payment of debt in whole or part when the
debt has become due and payable and debt means a liability or
obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and
B
includes financial debt and operational debt. The definition of ‘debt’
is also expansive and the same includes inter alia financial debt.
The definition of ‘Financial Debt’ in Section 5(8) of IBC does not
expressly exclude an interest free loan. ‘Financial Debt’ would
have to be construed to include interest free loans advanced to
finance the business operations of a corporate body. [Para C
31][765-E-G]
Poppatlal Shah Vs. State of Madras AIR 1953 SC 274
: [1953] SCR 677; Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs. ICICI
Bank Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8 SCR 33; Swiss
Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Union of India and D
Others (2019) 4 SCC 17 : [2019] 3 SCR 535; Pioneer
Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union of India
(2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR 381; Dilworth v.
Commissioner of Stamps (1899) AC 99; State of Bombay
v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha and Ors. AIR 1960 SC 610
: [1960] 2 SCR 866; CIT Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal E
Hotel Secunderabad (1971) 3 SCC 550:[1972] 1 SCR
168; Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for
Jaypee Infratech Ltd. V. Axis Bank Ltd. (2020) 8 SCC
401 – referred to.
Case Law Reference F
[1953] SCR 677 referred to Para 9
[2017] 8 SCR 33 referred to Para 11
[2019] 3 SCR 535 referred to Para 12
G
[2019] 10 SCR 381 referred to Para 14
(1899) AC 99 referred to Para 24
[1960] 2 SCR 866 referred to Para 25
H
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A [1972] 1 SCR 168 referred to Para 26
(2020) 8 SCC 401 referred to Para 28
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2231
of 2021.
B From the Judgment and Order dated 08.03.2021 of the National
Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi Bench in Comp. App.
(AT) (INS) No.1064 of 2020.
Nikhil Goel, Lzafeer Ahmad B. F., Advs. for the Appellant.
Aniruddha Deshmukh, Adv. for the Respondent.
C
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
This appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy
Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the IBC) is against the final
D judgment and order of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
(NCLAT), New Delhi in Company Application (AT)(Insolvency) No.
1064 of 2020 dated 08-03-2021, whereby the NCLAT has been pleased
to dismiss the appeal of the Appellant and confirmed the order dated
23.10.2020 of the Adjudicating Authority, i.e., the National Company
Law Tribunal (NCLT), New Delhi, dismissing the petition being CP(IB)
E No. 908/ND/2020, filed by the Appellant under Section 7 of the IBC
with the finding that the Appellant is not a financial creditor of the
Respondent. The Appellant is an assignee of the debt in question.
2. The short question involved in this Appeal is, whether a person
who gives a term loan to a Corporate Person, free of interest, on account
F of its working capital requirements is not a Financial Creditor, and
therefore, incompetent to initiate the Corporate Resolution Process under
Section 7 of the IBC.
3. M/s Sameer Sales Private Limited, hereinafter referred to as
to “Original Lender”, advanced a term loan of Rs.1.60 crores to the
G Corporate Debtor for a period of two years, to enable the Corporate
Debtor to meet its working capital requirement. The Original Lender
has assigned the outstanding loan to the Appellant.
4. According to the Appellant the loan was due to be repaid by the
Corporate Debtor in full within 01.02.2020. The Appellant claims that
H
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 747
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
the Corporate Debtor made some payments, but Rs.1.56 crores still A
remain outstanding.
5. The Appellant filed a Petition under Section 7 of the IBC in the
NCLT for initiation of the Corporate Resolution Process. The petition
was, however, rejected by a judgment and order dated 23.10.2020. The
Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) held : B
“11. Heard the parties and perused the case records.
12. There is no dispute that the applicant initially had
disbursed the amount interest free to the respondent company.
A perusal of the application it is clear that the loan was given
interest free. C
****
15. Mere grant of loan and admission of taking loan will
ipso fact not treat the applicant as ‘Financial Creditor’ within
the meaning of Section 5(8) of the Code. D
*******
17. In the application the applicant himself has submitted that
the loan was interest free. ….
****
E
20. It is well settled that the onus lies on the applicant to
establish that the loan was given against the consideration
for time value of money. Onus to prove also lies on the
applicant to establish that the debt claimed in the application
comes within the purview of ‘financial debt’ and that the
applicant is a financial creditor’ in respect of the present claim F
in question. Applicant has miserably failed to substantiate
with supporting documentary evidence that interest, as
claimed at Part-V of the application, is payable as per the
agreed loan covenants.
21. Hon’ble NCLT in the matter of Dr. B.V.S. Lakshmi vs. G
Geometrix Laser Solutions Private Limited has observed that
“fc/- coming within the definition of ‘Financial Debt’ as
defined under sub-section (8) of Section 5 the Claimant is
required to show that (I) there is a debt along with interest, if
any, which has been disbursed and (ii) such disbursement H
748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A has been made against the ‘consideration for the time value
of money”
22. It is reiterated that in the present case neither the loan
agreement has any provision regarding the payment of interest
not there is any supporting evidence/document to establish
B applicable rate of interest to be paid on the said loan. The
applicant has failed to prove that the loan was disbursed
against consideration for time value of money, particularly
when respondent company has affirmed that no interest has
been paid not payable at any point of time.
C 23. Similarly, in the matter of Shreyans Realtors Private Limited
& Anr. vs. Saroj Realtors & Developers Private Limited
Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No.311 of 2018, vide its
order dated 04.07.2018 Hon’ble NCLAT has observed that
when corporate debtor never accepted the component of
interest and has given no undertaking to repay the loan with
D interest; the Appellants cannot claim to ow ‘financial debt’
from the ‘Corporate Debtor’ and thereby cannot be claimed
to be a ‘Financial Creditor’ as defined under Section 5(7) &
(8) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
24. Therefore, neither the present claim can be termed to be a
E ‘financial debt’ nor does the applicant come within the
meaning of ‘financial creditor’. Once the applicant does not
come within the meaning of ‘financial creditor’ he becomes
ineligible to file the application under Section 7 of the
Insolvency Code 2016.
F 25. for the reasons stated above this petition fails and the
same stands dismissed as not maintainable.”
6. Being aggrieved, the Appellant filed an appeal under Section
61 of the IBC. The appeal has been dismissed by the NCLAT, by the
judgment and order impugned before this Court.
G
7. The relevant part of the impugned judgment and order is
extracted hereinbelow for convenience:
“5. We have heard Counsel for both sides and perused the
Appeal and the Reply filed by the Respondent. The fact that
loan was advanced to the Respondent, is not in dispute. The
H
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 749
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
narrow question involved is whether the transaction A
concerned can be treated as a transaction of Financial Debt
as defined in Section 5(8) of IBC. The definition of “Financial
Debt” under IBC Section 5(8) reads as under:-
“(8) “financial debt” means a debt alongwith interest, if
any, which is disbursed against theconsideration for the B
time value of money and includes—
(a) money borrowed against the payment ofinterest;
(b) any amount raised by acceptance under any acceptance
credit facility or its de-materialised equivalent;
C
(c) any amount raised pursuant to any note purchase
facility or the issue of bonds, notes,debentures, loan stock
or any similar instrument;Company Appeal (AT) (Ins)
No.1064 of 2020;
(d) the amount of any liability in respect of any lease or D
hire purchase contract which is deemed as a finance or
capital lease under the Indian Accounting Standards or
such other accounting standards as may be prescribed;
(e) receivables sold or discounted other than any
receivables sold on non-recourse basis;
E
(f) any amount raised under any other transaction,
including any forward sale or purchase agreement, having
the commercial effect of a borrowing;
Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-clause,—
(i) any amount raised from an allottee under a real estate F
project shall be deemed to be an amount having the
commercial effect of a borrowing;and
(ii) the expressions, “allottee” and “realestate project”
shall have the meanings respectively assigned to them in
clauses (d) and (zn) of section 2of the Real Estate G
(Regulation and Development) Act,2016 (16 of 2016);]
(g) any derivative transaction entered into in connection
with protection against or benefit from fluctuation in any
rate or price and for calculating the value of any derivative
H
750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A transaction, only the market value of such transaction shall
be taken into account;
(h) any counter-indemnity obligation inrespect of a
guarantee, indemnity, bond, documentary letter of credit
or any other instrument issued by a bank or financial
B institution;
(i) the amount of any liability in respect of any of the
guarantee or indemnity for any of the items referred to in
sub-clauses (a) to (h) of this clause;”Company Appeal (AT)
(Ins) No.1064 of 20206IBC separately defines debt under
C Section 3(11) as under:-
“(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a
claim which is due from any person and includes a financial
debt and operational debt;”
It is apparent that there can be debts which do not necessarily
D fall in the definition of financial debt or operational. Money
borrowed against payment of interest comes within the
definition financial debt. However, if the money borrowed is
not against payment of interest, under the definition of
financial debt, the core requirement is to find whether there is
E “consideration for the time value of money”. The facts of the
matter disclose and the Appeal also records that when the
Corporate Debtor was unable to get any further loan from
the market after having taken loan from M/s. Tata Capital
Financial Services Ltd., M/s. Sameer Sales which was related
party to the Corporate Debtor, extended interest free unsecured
F loan to the Corporate Debtor payable on or after 1st February,
2020 and that too upon demand by the lenders. It would be
appropriate to reproduce the Loan Agreement itself to
understand the same. The Loan Agreement (Annexure A-2)
reads as under:-
G LOAN AGREEMENT
THE PRESENT LOAN AGREEMENT IS BEING EXECUTED
BETWEEN M/S SAMEER SALES PVT. LTD. AND M/S
SAMTEX DESINZ PVT. LTD. AT NEW DELHI ON THIS
20th DAY JANUARY Two thousand Eighteen.
H
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 751
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
BETWEEN A
(1) M/S SAMEER SALES PRIVATE LIMITED, a company
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 bearing CIN
No. U51900DL1992PTC047363, having registered office
at 122, Tribunal Complex, Ishwar Nagar, Mathura Road,
New Delhi-110065, represented by its director, Kamlesh B
Rani Bhardwaj hereinafter referred to the “Lender” which
expression shall mean and include is nominees, assigns or
successors, from time to time.
AND
(2) M/S Samtex Desinz Private Limited, a company C
registered under the Companies Act, 1956 bearing CIN
No. U18209DL2017PTC320315, having registered office
at A-36, Hoisery Complex Phase 2 NOIDA U.P. represented
by its director Mr. Sumeer Duggal, hereinafter referred to
the “Borrower” which expression shall mean and include D
its nominees assigns or successors from time to time.
BACKGROUND
1. That whereas consequent to the purchase of the business
( except liabilities) of M/s. Samtex Desinz (Proprietorship
Firm) the Borrower had availed of a term loan of Rs. E
14,00,00,000.00 (Fourteen Crore Only) form M/S Tata
Capital Financial Services Ltd., vide which all the assets
of the Borrower have been mortgaged/assigned in favour
of the aforesaid institutional lender. That the aforesaid
terms facility is insufficient to cover certain working capital F
requirement of the Borrower and is insufficient to meet
other requirement relating to payments stamps duty etc. of
SAMTEX DESINZ PRIVATE LIMITED
Director
Director/Autho. Sign G
the Borrower and that therefore there is a shortfall of
2,00,00,000.00 (Two Crore Only)
2. That because of the aforesaid loan from the M/s Tata
Capital no other institutions. Willing to extend unsecured H
752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A loan to the Borrower, and therefore it is agreed that the
lender is agreeable to extend a loan of Rs. 1,60,00,000.00
(One Crore Sixty Lakh Only) in favour of the Borrower.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1. The Lender agrees to extend to the Borrower a term
B loan Rs. 1,60,00,000.00 (One Crore Sixty Lakh Only) for
a period of two years commencing form the date of signing
of this agreement.
2. The aforesaid amount shall become due and payable
01-02-2020 or upon demand by the lender.
C
3. That having regard to the status of the parties, the present
loan is being extended without any charge on any of the
assets at present or in the future.
4. Commencing of the date of this Agreement, the Loan
D shall bear NIL interest.
5. Notwithstanding anything contained in this agreement,
the loan amount shall become immediately due and payable
at any time on or after the expiry of a period of two years
i.e. on or after 01/02/2020 upon demand by the Lender.
E 6. The Borrower agrees that so long as the loan as in
outstanding the Borrower will inform the Lender in any
change in the constitution of the Borrower.
7. The Borrower shall repay the entire loan on or before
04/02/2020 and that till such a time the entire amount is
F not repaid the terms of the present agreement shall remain
in force. The Borrower is entitled to pre-pay the loan
amount at any time, without any penalty, after giving the
lender notice in writing of its intention of the same.
8. The agreement shall remain in force of the term indicated
G in Clause 7 above unless terminated earlier in accordance
with Clause 7.
9. All notices under this agreement shall be in writing and
shall be either delivered via special messenger and hand
and upon the addresses as may be advised from time to
H time by either party.
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 753
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
10. The agreement shall be governed by Indian Law and A
the Courts of Delhi shall have jurisdiction to settle any
dispute arising out of or in connection with this agreement.
For the Borrower
SamtexDesinzPvt Ltd For the Lender
B
Director Director
Witness :
When we read the background as recorded in paragraphs
– 1 and 2 of the above Loan Agreement, it is clear that the
sister concern which extending the loan did not record C
anything other than the problem of the Corporate Debtor,
for granting the loan. It is merely recorded that because of
taking loan from M/s. Tata Capital Financial Services Ltd.,
no other institution is willing to extend unsecured loan to
the Corporate Debtor “and therefore”, the lender had D
agreed to extend the loan of Rs. 1,60,00,000/- to the
borrower (i.e. Corporate Debtor). Then the above
Agreement refers terms and conditions.
Appeal para-7(d) as under :-
“d. In these circumstances to ensure continued development E
of the business of the Corporate Debtor, Mr. Sameer
Bharadwaj, the then Director and the Current Authorized
Signatory of the Respondent, through the sister concern
advanced a sun of Rs. 1.60 Crore. It is submitted that in
compliance with the law, the aforesaid sum was extended F
under a loan agreement, however the sum was advanced
interest free, since the development of the business was
enough consideration for time value of money.”
8. The judgment and order of the NCLAT, affirming the judgment
and order of the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and dismissing the appeal G
is patently flawed. Both the NCLAT and NCLT have misconstrued the
definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the IBC, by reading the
same in isolation and out of context.
9. In construing and/or interpreting any statutory provision, one
must look into the legislative intent of the statute. The intention of the
H
754 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A statute has to be found in the words used by the legislature itself. In case
of doubt, it is always safe to look into the object and purpose of the
statute or the reason and spirit behind it. Each word, phrase or sentence
has to be construed in the light of the general purpose of the Act itself,
as observed by Mukherjea, J. in Poppatlal Shah Vs. State of Madras1,
and a plethora of other judgments of this Court. To quote Krishna Iyer, J,
B
the interpretative effort “must be illumined by the goal, though guided by
the words”.
10. When a question arises as to the meaning of a certain provision
in a statute, the provision has to be read in its context. The statute has to
be read as a whole. The previous state of the law, the general scope and
C ambit of the statute and the mischief that it was intended to remedy are
relevant factors.
11. In Innoventive Industries Ltd. Vs. ICICI Bank Ltd. 2 ,
authored by Nariman, J., this Court analysed the scheme of the IBC and
held:
D “27. The scheme of the Code is to ensure that when a default
takes place, in the sense that a debt becomes due and is not
paid, the insolvency resolution process begins. Default is
defined in Section 3(12) in very wide terms as meaning non-
payment of a debt once it becomes due and payable, which
E includes non-payment of even part thereof or an instalment
amount. For the meaning of “debt”, we have to go to Section
3(11), which in turn tells us that a debt means a liability of
obligation in respect of a “claim” and for the meaning of
“claim”, we have to go back to Section 3(6) which defines
“claim” to mean a right to payment even if it is disputed. The
F Code gets triggered the moment default is of rupees one lakh
or more (Section 4). The corporate insolvency resolution
process may be triggered by the corporate debtor itself or a
financial creditor or operational creditor. A distinction is made
by the Code between debts owed to financial creditors and
operational creditors. A financial creditor has been defined
G
under Section 5(7) as a person to whom a financial debt is
owed and a financial debt is defined in Section 5(8) to mean
a debt which is disbursed against consideration for the time
value of money. As opposed to this, an operational creditor
1
AIR 1953 SC 274
H 2
(2018) 1 SCC 407
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 755
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
means a person to whom an operational debt is owed and an A
operational debt under Section 5(21) means a claim in respect
of provision of goods or services.
28. When it comes to a financial creditor triggering the
process, Section 7 becomes relevant. Under the Explanation
to Section 7(1), a default is in respect of a financial debt B
owed to any financial creditor of the corporate debtor — it
need not be a debt owed to the applicant financial creditor.
Under Section 7(2), an application is to be made under sub-
section (1) in such form and manner as is prescribed, which
takes us to the Insolvency and Bankruptcy (Application to
Adjudicating Authority) Rules, 2016. Under Rule 4, the C
application is made by a financial creditor in Form 1
accompanied by documents and records required therein. Form
1 is a detailed form in 5 parts, which requires particulars of
the applicant in Part I, particulars of the corporate debtor in
Part II, particulars of the proposed interim resolution D
professional in Part III, particulars of the financial debt in
Part IV and documents, records and evidence of default in
Part V. Under Rule 4(3), the applicant is to dispatch a copy
of the application filed with the adjudicating authority by
registered post or speed post to the registered office of the
corporate debtor. The speed, within which the adjudicating E
authority is to ascertain the existence of a default from the
records of the information utility or on the basis of evidence
furnished by the financial creditor, is important. This it must
do within 14 days of the receipt of the application. It is at the
stage of Section 7(5), where the adjudicating authority is to F
be satisfied that a default has occurred, that the corporate
debtor is entitled to point out that a default has not occurred
in the sense that the “debt”, which may also include a disputed
claim, is not due. A debt may not be due if it is not payable in
law or in fact. The moment the adjudicating authority is
satisfied that a default has occurred, the application must be G
admitted unless it is incomplete, in which case it may give
notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within 7 days of
receipt of a notice from the adjudicating authority. Under
sub-section (7), the adjudicating authority shall then
communicate the order passed to the financial creditor and H
756 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A corporate debtor within 7 days of admission or rejection of
such application, as the case may be.
29. The scheme of Section 7 stands in contrast with the scheme
under Section 8 where an operational creditor is, on the
occurrence of a default, to first deliver a demand notice of
B the unpaid debt to the operational debtor in the manner
provided in Section 8(1) of the
Code.……………………..........................................
The moment there is existence of such a dispute, the
operational creditor gets out of the clutches of the Code.
C 30. On the other hand, as we have seen, in the case of a
corporate debtor who commits a default of a financial debt,
the adjudicating authority has merely to see the records of
the information utility or other evidence produced by the
financial creditor to satisfy itself that a default has occurred.
D It is of no matter that the debt is disputed so long as the debt
is “due” i.e. payable unless interdicted by some law or has
not yet become due in the sense that it is payable at some
future date. It is only when this is proved to the satisfaction of
the adjudicating authority that the adjudicating authority may
reject an application and not otherwise.”
E
12. In Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. And Anr. Vs. Union of India and
Others3, this Court speaking through Nariman, J. held:
“27. As is discernible, the Preamble gives an insight into what
is sought to be achieved by the Code. The Code is first and
F foremost, a Code for reorganisation and insolvency resolution
of corporate debtors. Unless such reorganisation is effected
in a time-bound manner, the value of the assets of such persons
will deplete. Therefore, maximisation of value of the assets of
such persons so that they are efficiently run as going concerns
is another very important objective of the Code. This, in turn,
G will promote entrepreneurship as the persons in management
of the corporate debtor are removed and replaced by
entrepreneurs. When, therefore, a resolution plan takes off
and the corporate debtor is brought back into the economic
mainstream, it is able to repay its debts, which, in turn,
3
H (2019) 4 SCC 17
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 757
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
enhances the viability of credit in the hands of banks and A
financial institutions. Above all, ultimately, the interests of all
stakeholders are looked after as the corporate debtor itself
becomes a beneficiary of the resolution scheme—workers are
paid, the creditors in the long run will be repaid in full, and
shareholders/investors are able to maximise their investment.
B
Timely resolution of a corporate debtor who is in the red, by
an effective legal framework, would go a long way to support
the development of credit markets. Since more investment can
be made with funds that have come back into the economy,
business then eases up, which leads, overall, to higher
economic growth and development of the Indian economy. C
What is interesting to note is that the Preamble does not, in
any manner, refer to liquidation, which is only availed of as a
last resort if there is either no resolution plan or the resolution
plans submitted are not up to the mark. Even in liquidation,
the liquidator can sell the business of the corporate debtor
as a going concern. (See ArcelorMittal [ArcelorMittal (India) D
(P) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2019) 2 SCC 1] at para 83,
fn 3).
28. It can thus be seen that the primary focus of the legislation
is to ensure revival and continuation of the corporate debtor
by protecting the corporate debtor from its own management E
and from a corporate death by liquidation. The Code is thus
a beneficial legislation which puts the corporate debtor back
on its feet, not being a mere recovery legislation for creditors.
The interests of the corporate debtor have, therefore, been
bifurcated and separated from that of its promoters/those who
F
are in management. Thus, the resolution process is not
adversarial to the corporate debtor but, in fact, protective of
its interests. The moratorium imposed by Section 14 is in the
interest of the corporate debtor itself, thereby preserving the
assets of the corporate debtor during the resolution process.
The timelines within which the resolution process is to take G
place again protects the corporate debtor’s assets from further
dilution, and also protects all its creditors and workers by
seeing that the resolution process goes through as fast as
possible so that another management can, through its
entrepreneurial skills, resuscitate the corporate debtor to
achieve all these ends.” H
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A 13. This Court further held:
“42. A perusal of the definition of “financial creditor” and
“financial debt” makes it clear that a financial debt is a debt
together with interest, if any, which is disbursed against the
consideration for time value of money. It may further be money
B that is borrowed or raised in any of the manners prescribed
in Section 5(8) or otherwise, as Section 5(8) is an inclusive
definition. On the other hand, an “operational debt” would
include a claim in respect of the provision of goods or services,
including employment, or a debt in respect of payment of dues
arising under any law and payable to the Government or any
C local authority.
43. A financial creditor may trigger the Code either by itself
or jointly with other financial creditors or such persons as
may be notified by the Central Government when a “default”
occurs. The Explanation to Section 7(1) also makes it clear
D that the Code may be triggered by such persons in respect of
a default made to any other financial creditor of the corporate
debtor, making it clear that once triggered, the resolution
process under the Code is a collective proceeding in rem
which seeks, in the first instance, to rehabilitate the corporate
debtor. Under Section 7(4), the adjudicating authority shall,
E within the prescribed period, ascertain the existence of a
default on the basis of evidence furnished by the financial
creditor; and under Section 7(5), the adjudicating authority
has to be satisfied that a default has occurred, when it may,
by order, admit the application, or dismiss the application if
such default has not occurred. On the other hand, under
F
Sections 8 and 9, an operational creditor may, on the
occurrence of a default, deliver a demand notice which must
then be replied to within the specified period. What is
important is that at this stage, if an application is filed before
the adjudicating authority for initiating the corporate
G insolvency resolution process, the corporate debtor can prove
that the debt is disputed. When the debt is so disputed, such
application would be rejected.”
14. In Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Union
of India4, this Court speaking through Nariman, J. referred to several
H 4
(2019) 8 SCC 416
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 759
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
earlier judgments including Innoventive Industries Ltd. (supra) and A
Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. (supra) and held that even individuals who
were debenture holders and fixed deposit holders could also be financial
creditors who could initiate the Corporate Resolution Process.
15. The definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the IBC
cannot be read in isolation, without considering some other relevant B
definitions, particularly, the definition of ‘claim’ in Section 3(6), ‘corporate
debtor’ in Section 3(8), ‘creditor’ in Section 3(10), ‘debt’ in section 3(11),
‘default’ in Section 3(12), ‘financial creditor’ in Section 5(7) as also the
provisions, inter alia, of Sections 6 and 7 of the IBC.
16. Under Section 6 of the IBC, a right accrues to a Financial C
Creditor, an Operational Creditor and the Corporate Debtor itself to initiate
the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in respect of such Corporate
Debtor, in the manner provided in Chapter II of the IBC.
17. Section 7 of the IBC enables a Financial Creditor to file an
application for initiating Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against D
a Corporate Debtor either by itself, or jointly with other Financial Creditors
or any other person on behalf of the Financial Creditor, as may be notified
by the Central Government, when a default has occurred.
18. The eligibility of a person, to initiate the Corporate Insolvency
Resolution Process, if questioned, has to be adjudicated upon consideration E
of the key words and expressions in the aforesaid Section and other
related provisions.
19. Corporate Resolution Process gets triggered when a Corporate
Debtor commits a default. A Financial Creditor may file an application
for initiating a Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process against the F
Corporate Debtor, when a default has occurred.
20. A ‘corporate debtor’ means a corporate person who owes a
debt to any person, as per the definition of this expression in Section 3(8)
of the IBC. Section 3(11) defines ‘debt’ to mean “a liability or obligation
in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a
G
financial debt and operational debt.” The word ‘claim’ has been
defined in Section 3(6) to mean inter alia “a right to payment, whether
or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed, undisputed,
legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.” ‘Default’ is defined in section
3(12) to mean “non-payment of a debt when the whole or any part
or instalment of the amount of debt has become due and payable H
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A and is not paid by the debtor or the Corporate Debtor, as the case
may be.” Under Section 5(7) of the IBC ‘financial creditor’ means any
person to whom a financial debt is owed and includes a person to whom
such debt has legally been assigned.
21. The definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) of the IBC
B has been quoted above. Section 5(8) defines ‘financial debt’ to mean “a
debt along with interest if any which is disbursed against the
consideration of the time value of money and includes money
borrowed against the payment of interest, as per Section 5(8) (a) of
the IBC. The definition of ‘financial debt’ in Section 5(8) includes the
components of sub-clauses (a) to (i) of the said Section.
C
22. The NCLT and NCLAT have overlooked the words “if any”
which could not have been intended to be otiose. ‘Financial debt’ means
outstanding principal due in respect of a loan and would also include
interest thereon, if any interest were payable thereon. If there is no
interest payable on the loan, only the outstanding principal would qualify
D as a financial debt. Both NCLAT and NCLT have failed to notice
clause(f) of Section 5(8), in terms whereof ‘financial debt’ includes any
amount raised under any other transaction, having the commercial effect
of borrowing.
23. Furthermore, sub-clauses (a) to (i) of Sub-section 8 of Section
E 5 of the IBC are apparently illustrative and not exhaustive. Legislature
has the power to define a word in a statute. Such definition may either
be restrictive or be extensive. Where the word is defined to include
something, the definition is prima facie extensive.
24. In Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps5 the Privy Council,
F dealing with a definition which incorporated the word “include”, said,
“The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in
order to enlarge the meaning; and when it is so used these words or
phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as
they signify according to their natural import, but also those as things
G which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the
word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become
imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not
merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of
the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and
5
H (1899) AC 99
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 761
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the A
meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached
to these words or expressions.”
25. In dealing with the definition of ‘industry’ in the Industrial
Disputes Act 1947 in the State of Bombay v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha
and Ors 6, a three-judge Bench of this Court speaking through B
Gajendragadkar, J. said “It is obvious that the words used in an
inclusive definition denote extension and cannot be treated as
restricted. Where we are dealing with an inclusive interpretation, it
would be inappropriate to put a restrictive interpretation upon words
of wider denotation.”
C
26. In CIT Andhra Pradesh v. Taj Mahal Hotel Secunderabad 7,
this Court, speaking through A.N. Grover, J. construed the definition of
plant in Section 10(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1922, which read “plant”
includes vehicles, books, scientific apparatus and surgical equipment,
purchased for the purpose of the business, profession or vocation and
observed:- D
“The very fact that even books have been included shows
that the meaning intended to be given to ‘plant’ is wide. The
word ‘includes’ is often used in interpretation clauses in order
to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in
the body of the statute. When it is so used these words and E
phrases must be construed as comprehending not only such
things as they signify according to their nature and import
but also those things which the interpretation clause declares
that they shall include.”
27. Of course, depending on the context in which the word F
‘includes’ may have been used, and the objects and the scheme of the
enactment as a whole, the expression ‘includes’ may have to be construed
as restrictive and exhaustive.
28. In a recent judgment of this Court in Anuj Jain, Interim
Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Ltd. V. Axis Bank Ltd.8,
G
this court, speaking through Maheswari, J. referred to various precedents
on restrictive and expansive interpretation of words and phrases used in
a statute, particularly, the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ and held:-
6
AIR 1960 SC 610
7
(1971) 3 SCC 550
8
(2020) 8 SCC 401 H
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A “46. Applying the aforementioned fundamental principles to
the definition occurring in Section 5(8) of the Code, we have
not an iota of doubt that for a debt to become “financial
debt” for the purpose of Part II of the Code, the basic elements
are that it ought to be a disbursal against the consideration
for time value of money. It may include any of the methods
B
for raising money or incurring liability by the modes
prescribed in clauses (a) to (f) of Section 5(8); it may also
include any derivative transaction or counter-indemnity
obligation as per clauses (g) and (h) of Section 5(8); and it
may also be the amount of any liability in respect of any of
C the guarantee or indemnity for any of the items referred to in
clauses (a) to (h). The requirement of existence of a debt,
which is disbursed against the consideration for the time value
of money, in our view, remains an essential part even in respect
of any of the transactions/dealings stated in clauses (a) to (i)
of Section 5(8), even if it is not necessarily stated therein. In
D
any case, the definition, by its very frame, cannot be read so
expansive, rather infinitely wide, that the root requirements
of “disbursement” against “the consideration for the time
value of money” could be forsaken in the manner that any
transaction could stand alone to become a financial debt. In
E other words, any of the transactions stated in the said clauses
(a) to (i) of Section 5(8) would be falling within the ambit of
“financial debt” only if it carries the essential elements stated
in the principal clause or at least has the features which could
be traced to such essential elements in the principal clause.
In yet other words, the essential element of disbursal, and
F
that too against the consideration for time value of money,
needs to be found in the genesis of any debt before it may be
treated as “financial debt” within the meaning of Section 5(8)
of the Code. This debt may be of any nature but a part of it is
always required to be carrying, or corresponding to, or at
G least having some traces of disbursal against consideration
for the time value of money.
47. As noticed, the root requirement for a creditor to become
financial creditor for the purpose of Part II of the Code, there
must be a financial debt which is owed to that person. He
H may be the principal creditor to whom the financial debt is
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 763
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
owed or he may be an assignee in terms of extended meaning A
of this definition but, and nevertheless, the requirement of
existence of a debt being owed is not forsaken.
48. It is also evident that what is being dealt with and
described in Section 5(7) and in Section 5(8) is the transaction
vis-à-vis the corporate debtor. Therefore, for a person to be B
designated as a financial creditor of the corporate debtor, it
has to be shown that the corporate debtor owes a financial
debt to such person. Understood this way, it becomes clear
that a third party to whom the corporate debtor does not owe
a financial debt cannot become its financial creditor for the
purpose of Part II of the Code. C
49. Expounding yet further, in our view, the peculiar elements
of these expressions “financial creditor” and “financial debt”,
as occurring in Sections 5(7) and 5(8), when visualised and
compared with the generic expressions “creditor” and “debt”
respectively, as occurring in Sections 3(10) and 3(11) of the D
Code, the scheme of things envisaged by the Code becomes
clearer. The generic term “creditor” is defined to mean any
person to whom the debt is owed and then, it has also been
made clear that it includes a “financial creditor”, a “secured
creditor”, an “unsecured creditor”, an “operational creditor”, E
and a “decree-holder”. Similarly, a “debt” means a liability
or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any
person and this expression has also been given an extended
meaning to include a “financial debt” and an “operational
debt”.
F
49.1. The use of the expression “means and includes” in these
clauses, on the very same principles of interpretation as
indicated above, makes it clear that for a person to become a
creditor, there has to be a debt, i.e., a liability or obligation in
respect of a claim which may be due from any person. A
“secured creditor” in terms of Section 3(30) means a creditor G
in whose favour a security interest is created; and “security
interest”, in terms of Section 3(31), means a right, title or
interest or claim of property created in favour of or provided
for a secured creditor by a transaction which secures payment
for the purpose of an obligation and it includes, amongst H
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A others, a mortgage. Thus, any mortgage created in favour of
a creditor leads to a security interest being created and
thereby, the creditor becomes a secured creditor. However,
when all the defining clauses are read together and
harmoniously, it is clear that the legislature has maintained a
distinction amongst the expressions “financial creditor”,
B
“operational creditor”, “secured creditor” and “unsecured
creditor”. Every secured creditor would be a creditor; and
every financial creditor would also be a creditor but every
secured creditor may not be a financial creditor. As noticed,
the expressions “financial debt” and “financial creditor”,
C having their specific and distinct connotations and roles in
insolvency and liquidation process of corporate persons, have
only been defined in Part II whereas the expressions “secured
creditor” and “security interest” are defined in Part I.
50. A conjoint reading of the statutory provisions with the
D enunciation of this Court in Swiss Ribbons [Swiss Ribbons
(P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17] , leaves nothing
to doubt that in the scheme of the IBC, what is intended by
the expression “financial creditor” is a person who has direct
engagement in the functioning of the corporate debtor; who
is involved right from the beginning while assessing the
E viability of the corporate debtor; who would engage in
restructuring of the loan as well as in reorganisation of the
corporate debtor’s business when there is financial stress. In
other words, the financial creditor, by its own direct
involvement in a functional existence of corporate debtor,
F acquires unique position, who could be entrusted with the
task of ensuring the sustenance and growth of the corporate
debtor, akin to that of a guardian. In the context of insolvency
resolution process, this class of stakeholders, namely, financial
creditors, is entrusted by the legislature with such a role that
it would look forward to ensure that the corporate debtor is
G rejuvenated and gets back to its wheels with reasonable
capacity of repaying its debts and to attend on its other
obligations. Protection of the rights of all other stakeholders,
including other creditors, would obviously be concomitant of
such resurgence of the corporate debtor.”
H
M/S ORATOR MARKETING PVT. LTD. v. M/S SAMTEX DESINZ 765
PVT. LTD. [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]
29. In Jaypee Infratech Ltd. (supra), the debts in question were A
in the form of third-party security, given by the Corporate Debtor to
secure loans and advances obtained a third party from the Respondent
Lender and, therefore, held not to be a financial debt within the meaning
of Section 5(8) of the IBC. There was no occasion for this Court to
consider the status of a term loan advanced to meet the working capital
B
requirements of the Corporate Debtor, which did not carry interest.
Having regard to the Aims, Objects and Scheme of the IBC, there is no
discernible reason, why a term loan to meet the financial requirements
of a Corporate Debtor for its operation, which obviously has the
commercial effect of borrowing, should be excluded from the purview
of a financial debt. C
30. In Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha Vs. Manhabala Jeram
Damodar9, this Court interpreting Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small
Cause Courts Act, 1882, as amended by the Maharashtra Act XIX of
1976, observed that ‘the golden rule is that the words of a statute must
prima facie be given their ordinary meaning when the language or D
phraseology employed by the legislature is precise and plain’. Since
Section 41(1) does not specifically exclude a gratuitous licensee or make
a distinction between a licensee with material consideration or without
material consideration, the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) was
held to also include a ‘gratuitous licensee’. E
31. At the cost of repetition, it is reiterated that the trigger for
initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process by a Financial
Creditor under Section 7 of the IBC is the occurrence of a default by the
Corporate Debtor. ‘Default’ means non-payment of debt in whole or
part when the debt has become due and payable and debt means a F
liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person
and includes financial debt and operational debt. The definition of ‘debt’
is also expansive and the same includes inter alia financial debt. The
definition of ‘Financial Debt’ in Section 5(8) of IBC does not expressly
exclude an interest free loan. ‘Financial Debt’ would have to be construed
to include interest free loans advanced to finance the business operations G
of a corporate body.
32. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and order
impugned is, accordingly, set aside. The order of the Adjudicating
9
(2013) 15 SCC 358 H
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 6 S.C.R.
A Authority, dismissing the petition of the Appellant under Section 7 of the
IBC is also set aside. The petition under Section 7 stands revived and
may be decided afresh, in accordance with law and in the light of the
findings above.
33. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of accordingly.
B
Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.
C
D
E
F
G
H
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "Insolvency"Sign in to search