M/S. MUSTAN TAHERBHAIversusCOMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS

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_ _.
                             [2011] 3 S.C.R. 353


                          M/S. MUSTAN TAHERBHAI                          A
                                      v.
               COMMNR. OF CENTRAL EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
                      (Civil Appeal No. 3788 of 2003)
                             FEBRUARY 28, 2011                               ,
       '   '                                                             B
                 [D.K. JAIN; ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND
                              H.l. DATIU, JJ.]

          Customs Act, 1962: Notification nos. 113183-Cus and
     133187-Cus - Indian built ship brought in India for breaking        C
    purpose - Leviability of customs duty .:. Vessel manufactured
    in a Customs Bor.ded Warehouse using certain imported
    items - When vessel ceased to ply and was grounded, it was
    auctioned and purchased by the appellant for breaking
    purpose - Demand of customs duty - Tribunal held that                D
    Notification no.133187-Cus was applicable, and, therefore, the
    appellant was liable to pay customs duty on the vessel at the
    time of breaking of ship - Appeal. before Supreme Court ;....
    Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal directing
    it to first appreciate the facts of the case and then determine      E
    the question of leviability of import duty on an Indian built ship
    sold for breaking - It directed the Tribunal to take note of a
    particular judgment of Bombay High Court, special leave
    petitions whereagainst were summarily dismissed - Tribunal
    reconsidered the matter and by impugned order dismissed the          F
    appeal holding that on the date of clearance,· notification in
    force was 113183-Cus and the duty would be payable in terms
    of the said notification and, therefore, question of applicability
    of judgment of Bombay High Court did not arise - On appeal,
    held: While deciding the case, the Tribunal ignored the              G.
    specific directions issued by the Supreme Court - Therefore,
    the decision of the Tribunal was not sustainable - Matter
    remitted to Tribunal for consideration afresh.

               Judicial discipline: While remanding the matter to the
                                       353                            H
     354    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 3 S.C.R.
                                                                     -
A Tribunal, Supreme Court gave specific directions to Tribunal
  to examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the
  foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the matter
  - The Tribunal, while deciding the case, ignored the specific
  directions issued by the Supreme Court - Held: Tribunal
8 erred in ignoring the specific directions of the Supreme Court
  - Judicial discipline obligated the Tribunal to appreciate the
  factual matrix as directed.
          A vessel was manufactured in a Customs Bonded
     Warehouse using certain imported items. When the
C    vessel ceased to ply and was grounded, it was auctioned.
     The appellant, the highest bidder purchased the vessel.
     The Department levied customs duty on the same. T_he
     Commissioner (appeal) confirmed the demand. The
     appellant filed appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal
D    held that Notification no.133/87-Cus was applicable in the
     Instant case, and, therefore, the appellant was liable to
     pay customs duty on the vessel at the time of breaking
     of ship. The appellant filed appeal before the Supreme
     Court. By order dated 30th August, 2001, the Supreme
E    Court remanded the matter to the Tribunal, observing that
     the Tribunal did not consider the fact that the vessel was
     built in India and excise duty was paid thereon at the time
     of its clearance and, thereby directed it to first appreciate
     the facts of the case and then determine the question of
·F   leviability of import duty on an Indian built ship sold for
     breaking. The Court also directed the Tribunal to take
     note of the judgment of Bombay High Court, special
     leave petitions whereagainst were summarily dismissed.
     The Tribunal reconsidered the matter and dismissed the
G    appeal holding that on the date of clearance, the
     notification in force was 113/83-Cus, the provisions
     thereof would apply and the duty would be payable In
     terms of the conditions in the said notification and in the
     light of this finding, the question of applicability of
H    judgment of Bombay High Court did not arise and the
--
     : MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL                  355
                EXCISE AND CUSTOM$
       plea that the ship was manufactured in India and it A
       attracted excise duty did not require consideration at all.
     · The instant appeal was filed challenging the order of the
       Tribunal. ·

         Disposing of the appeal and remitting the matter to
                                                             8
     Tribunal for consid~ration afresh, the Court·

         · HELD: 1. '.'Vhile deciding the case, the Tribunal
     ignored the specific directions issued by this Court by
     order dated 30th August 2001. It is evident from the
     impugned order that the· Tribunal did not appreciate the          C
     facts in their correct perspective, which resulted in
     vitiating its decision on the question of leviability of import
     duty. Although, from the impugned order, it is evident that
     the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court
     by order dated 30th August 2001 that it was required to           D.
     first record the correct facts and then in the factual
     perspective locate and apply the relevant law, yet it
     proceeded to hold that when it is accepted that
     Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of
     clearance of the vessel from the ship yard, the persistent        E
     plea that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse
     located in India and therefore, it attracted excise duty
     alone need not be considered at all. In light of the
     decision and directions of this Court passed on 30th
     August, 2001, judicial discipline obligated the Tribunal to       F
     examine the entire legal issue after ascertaining the
     foundational facts, regardless of its earlier view in the
     matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot be
     sustained. [Para 17] [364-F-G; 365-A-D]
          Union of India & Ors. v. Mis. Jalyan Udyog & Anr. (1994) G
     1SCC318; Union of India v. Baijnath Melaram 1998 (97) ELT
     27 (SC); The State of Tamil Nadu v. M.K. Kandaswami & Ors.
     (1975) 4 SCC 745; In Re. Sea Customs Act, 1878 S. 20
     (1964) 3 SCR 787; Mis. Baijnath Melaram v. Union of India
                                                                   H
                                                                 --
    356     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A & Ors. (W.P. 1478of1983); Hyderabad Industries Ltd. & Anr.
  v. Union of India & Ors. (1999) 5 SCC 15; D.C.M. & Anr. v.
  Union of India & Anr. 1995 Supp (3) SCC 223; Hansraj
  Gordhandas v. H.H. Dave, Assistant Collector of Central
  Excise & Customs, Surat & Ors. (1969) 2 SCR 253; Novopan
B India Ltd., Hyderabad v. Collector of Central Excise And
  Customs, Hyderabad 1994 Supp (3) SCC 606;
  Commissioner of Central Excise and Customs, Indore v.
  Parenteral Drugs India Ltd. (2009) 14 SCC 342 - referred
  to.
C         Case Law Reference
      (1994) 1 sec 318         referred to     Para 6, 7,9,
                                               10,16,
      1998 (97) ELT 27 (SC)     referred to    Para 8
D
      (1975) 4 sec 745          referred to    Para 14
      (1964) 3 SCR 787          referred to    Para 14
      (W.P. 1478 of 1983)       referred to    Para 14
E             .
      (1999) 5 sec 15           referred to    Para 14
      1995 Supp (3) SCC 223 referred to        Para 16
      (1969) 2 SCR 253          referred to    Para 16
F     1994 Supp (3) SCC 606      referred to   Para 16
      (2009) 14 SCC 342         referred to    Para 16
        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    3788 of 2003.
G
        From the Judgment & Order dated 18.2.2003 of the
    Customs, Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, West
    Regional Bench at Mumbai in Appeal No. C/1783/9418-2.

H       Joseph Vellapally, Raghvesh Singh, Ajay Sharma for the
    Appellant.
--            . ··.   ,        .
       MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL                       357
                EXCISE AND CUSTOMS
         Harish Chander, B, Sunita Rao, Priya Bhatnagar, B.K.               A
     Prasad for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          D.K. JAIN, J. 1. This appeal, under Section 130E of the
     Customs Act, 1962 (for short "the Act"), is directed against           B
     order dated 18th February, 2003, passed by the Customs,
     Excise & Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, as it existed at the
     relevant time, (for short "the Tribunal"). By the impugned order
     the Tribunal has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant
     herein and confirmed the levy of customs duty on the ocean             C
     going vessel, registered as M.V. Jagat Priya, purchased by
     them in a Court auction, for breaking/ scrapping purpose in
     terms of Notification No. 133/87-Cus.
          2. M.V. Jagat Priya was manufactured by Mis. Hindustan            o
     Shipyard Ltd. in the -year 1975 in a Customs Bonded
     Warehouse at Vishakapatanam, using certain imported items.
     The said vessel was cleared on 30th November, 1975, and was
     delivered to Mis. Dempo Steamship Ltd. for a consideration
     of Rs. 7,61, 12,400/- and Central Excise duty at the rate of 1%        E
     was paid thereon. The vessel was registered as Indian vessel
     tonnage and flying an Indian flag. However, it ceased to ply and
     was grounded at Bedi Sunder, Jamnagar, in June 1986. On
     16th October, 1992, an order was passed by the High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay in Admiralty suit at the instance of           F
     Union of India and lhe Shipping Credit and Investment Co. of
     India Ltd. for auction of the vessel on "as is where is" basis "free
     from all encumbrances and existing liens".
          3.0n 12th February, 1993, the vessel was auctioned and
     being the highest bidder, the appellant viz. Mis. Mustan               G
     Taherbhai purchased the vessel. The sale in favour of the
     appellant was confirmed by the High Court and in furtherance
     thereof, the possession of the ship was delivered on 4th March,
     1993. Thereafter, on 10th May, 1993, on the direction of the
     Superintendent of Central Excise & Customs, the appellant              H
                                                                           -
    358      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 3 S.C.R.

A filed a bill of entry claiming that the ship was an Indian built ship,
  and therefore, no customs duty was payable. On 12th May,
  1993, the Superintendent of Central Excise, Jamnagar passed
  a provisional assessment order demanding customs duty @
  5%, and an additional duty of Rs. 1000/- per LDT.
B
        4. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred Special Civil
  Application No. 4924 of 1993 before the High Court of Gujarat.
  The High Court, vide interim orde~ dated 25th May, 1993,
  permitted the appellant to clear the materials obtained by
C breaking the ship in question without payment of provisional
  duty on the condition that the appellant will file a bond with
  security deposit. Vide order dated 23rd July, 1993, the High
  Court disposed of the said application, and directed the
  appellant to file an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).
  Accordingly, the appellant preferred an appeal before the
D Commissioner (Appeals).
         5. The Commissioner (Appeals), vide order dated 29th
    April, 1994, dismissed the appeal and confirmed the order of
    provisional assessment dated 12th May, 1993.
E
       6. Being aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal
  before the Tribunal. Vide order dated 10th July, 1998 the
  Tribunal dismissed the appeal. Relying on the decision of this
  Court in Union of India & Ors. Vs. Mis. Jalyan Udyog & Anr.1,
  the Tribunal observed that Notification No. 133/87-Cus was
F applicable in the instant case, and therefore, the appellant was
  liable to pay customs duty on the vessel at the rate prevalent
  at the time of breaking of ship.
        7. Being dissatisfied, the appe/lant preferred an
G application under Section 129(8)(2) of the Act praying for
  rectification of mistakes in the order, dated 10th July, 1998, on
  the ground that the Tribunal had erroneously concluded that: (i)
  the goods manufactured in a customs bonded warehouse were
  similar to goods imported under the Act; (ii) the issue for
H 1. (1994) 1 sec 318.
--        MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL                   359
              EXCISE AND CUSTOMS [D.K. JAIN, J.]
     determination before it was whether Notification No. 133/87-          A
     Cus was applicable or not, whereas the real issue for
     determination was whether the vessel was imported or
     indigenously manufactured; (iii) the customs duty under
     Notification No. 133/87-Cus was payable when Notification No.
     118/59-Cus was applicable; (iv) since the vessel was                  B
     subsequently being broken up, its clearance would be governed
     by Notification No. 262/58-Cus; and (v) the decision in Jalyan
     Udyog (supra) was applicable to the facts of the present case.

        8. Vide order dated 13th April, 1999, the Tribunal
 • dismissed the said application on the ground that it is a settled       C
  . position that goods manufactured in a customs bonded
   warehouse are treated akin fo goods manufactured in a foreign
   country, and when the vessel was taken out of the country for
   plying as foreign going vessel, and subsequently, the said
   vessel is brought back to India for breaking purposes, it               D
   amounts to re-import.

          9. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred yet another·
     application under Section 129(8)(2) of the Act for rectification
     of mistakes in the order of   IfieTribunal dated 13th April, 1999 E
     on the ground that in Union of India Vs. Baijnath Me/aram 2,
     this Court had affirmed the Bombay High Court's decision
     wherein it was held that no customs duty was payable on .
     vessels which are subject to breaking, if the said vessels had
     been manufactured in India. Vide order dated 8th October, F
     1999, the Tribunal dismissed the said application as well,
     holding that it had correctly relied on the decision of this Court
     in Ja/yan Udyog (supra).

          10 Still aggrieved, the appellant preferred C.A. No. 1998
     of 2000 before this Court. Vide order dated 30th August, 2001,        G
     this Court, while remanding the matter back to the Tribunal,
     observed thus:

           "It appears from the judgment of the Tribunal that the matter
     2.   1998 (97) ELT 27 (SC).                                           H
                                                                       --
    360       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011) 3 S.C.R.


A         was argued without reference to facts which are now stated
          in the special leave petition, namely, that the vessel was
          built in India and excise duty was paid thereon at the time
          of its clearance. It was delivered to an Indian party. The
          contention on these facts is that this was not a transaction
B         of export and import which would render the appellants
          liable to the payment of customs duty.

          Reliance by the Tribunal upon the decision of this Court in
          the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Ja/yan Udyog &
          Ors. (1994 (1) S.C.C. 318) would be misplaced if these
c         are, indeed, the facts for that was not a case that related
          to a vessel that was built in India and cleared for
          home consumption. We think it appropriate, in the
          circumstances, that the order under challenge should be
          set aside and the matter be remanded to the Tribunal to
D         be considered afresh. In so doing, the Tribunal shall
          determine, first, the facts and then the law. The Tribunal
          may take note of the judgment of the Bombay High Court
          delivered on 5th February, 1992 in the case of Mis.
          Baijnath Melaram vs. Union of India & Ors. (Writ Petition
E         No.1478 of 1983), special leave petitions whereagainst
          were summarily dismissed. It may be noted that we
          express no opinion on the merits of the case on either
          side."

F It is plain from a bare reading of the said order that this Court
  had directed the Tribunal to first appreciate the facts of the case
  and then determine the question of leviability of import duty on
  an Indian built ship which was sold for breaking. It is evident
  from the afore-extracted paragraph that the Court had observed
G that reliance by the Tribunal on the decision of this Court in
  Ja/yan L'1yog (supra) would be misplaced.

         11. Accordingly, the Tribunal re-considered the matter. As
    stated above, vide the impugned order, the Tribunal has
    dismissed the appeal, observing thus:
H
--     MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL
           EXCISE AND CUSTOMS [D.K. JAIN, J.]
                                                                  361


         "The fact that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. was not in           A
         existence at the date on which the vessel was cleared by
         HSL having been superseded by Notification No. 163/65-
         Cus. came to light only on the submissions made by Shri
         Pundir. It would appear that at all times it was wrongly
         pre3umed that the earlier Notification was in existence. We      B
         do not see the revelation as bringing on record new facts.
         We see it as correction of the factual error, which had
         existed in the record at all times. We find no substance in
         the submissions of Shri Doiphode, that a new case is being
         made out by the Revenue at the present stage.                    c
         14. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court thaf
         as far as facts are concerned, the Tribunal is the final
         authority and the Court would go into only the questions of
         law at the appeal stage. Therefore, the Tribunal would first
         record the correct facts and then in the factual perspective     D
         would locate and apply the relevant law.

         15. When .the fact is accepted that Notification 118/59-
         Cus. did not exist at the time of clearance of the vessel
         from the Shipyard, the persistent plea that the ship was         E
         manufactured in the warehouse and that it was
         manufactured in India and that it attracted excise duty alone
         need not be considered at all. Since on the date of such
         clearance, the notification in force was 113/83-Cus., the
         provisions thereof would apply and the duty would be             F
         payable in terms of the conditions in the said notification.

          16. Since we have so held the question of the applicability
          of the High Court judgment in the case of Baijnath Melaram
          does not arise."
                                                                          G
          12, Hence, the present appeal.

          13. Mr. Joseph Vellapally, learned senior counsel
     appearing on behalf of the appellant, strenuously urged that in
     the in~tant case the imported goods lost tlieir identity when they   H
    362       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 3 S.C.R.
                                                                        --
A were used in the manufacture of vessel along with domestically
  procured goods, and were cleared as such, and therefore, the
  revenue cannot claim on the one breath that the ship was
  "manufactured" in India and attracted excise duty at the time of
  clearance and on the other breath cannot contend that the ship
B was manufactured abroad and was exigible to levy of customs
  duty when it is to be cleared for breaking at an Indian coast.
  Learned counsel urged that once excise duty has been levied
  and paid on goods, there is no question of levy of customs duty
  under Section 3 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 as the latter is
c meant to neutralize the non-levy of excise duty.
        14. Learned counsel contended that Section 21 of the
  erstwhile Sea Customs Act, 1878 provided that when any article
  liable to duty forms part or ingredient of a good, then such good
  would be liable to full duty as if it was entirely composed of such
D article. In the absence of such a charging provision in the Act,
  ships manufactured by Hindustan Shipyard in India cannot be
  subjected to customs duty at the time of clearance for home
  consumption. Relying on the decisions of this Court in The
  State of Tamil Nadu Vs. M.K. Kandaswami & Ors. 3 and In Re.
E Sea Customs Act, 1878 S. 20. 4, learned counsel submitted
  that no customs duty was chargeable in the instant case, in as
  much as the ship was not a "taxable good" as it was not
  imported as defined under Section 2(25) of the Act. Moreover,
  there was no "taxable event" as there was no import in the
F instant case, and the appellant being an auction-purchaser
  cannot be likened to an importer under the Act. Relying on the
  decision of this Court in Baijnath Melaram (supra), learned
  counsel urged that no customs duty can be levied on Indian built
  ships. Learned counsel asserted that the Tribunal had not
G complied with the order of this Court dated 30th August, 2001
  in as much as it has failed to consider the judgment of the
  Bombay High Court in Mis. Baijnath Melaram Vs. Union of

    3.   (1975) 4 sec 745.
H   4.   (1964) 3 SCR 787.
--
          MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL                   363
              EXCISE AND CUSTOMS [D.K. JAIN, J.]
     India & Ors. 0f'/.P. 1478 of 1983), nor has it determined the         A
     question of liability to import duty of an Indian built ship, after
     evaluating the factual background of the case as was
     specifically directed. Relying on the decision of this court in
     Hyderabad Industries Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 5,
     learned counsel urged that even if it is held that customs duty       B
     is payable in the instant case, no additional customs duty is
     leviable as excise duty had already been paid.

          15. Per contra, Mr. Hairsh Chander, learned senior counsel
     appearing on behalf of the Revenue, while supporting the
     impugned judgment, contended that at the time of clearance            C
     of the ship, Notification No. 118/59-Cus was not in force, as
     the same had been superseded by Notification No. 163/65-Cus.
     At the time the appellant presented the bill of entry, however,
     Notification No. 133/87-Cus was in force, as rightly concluded
     by the Tribunal.                                                      D
          16. Learned counsel urged that when a ship is
     manufactured in a bonded warehouse, for all purposes, it is
     deemed to be manufactured in a foreign country, and by virtue
     of Notification No. 133/87-Cus, a legal fiction is created            E
     whereby when the ship manufactured in a bonded warehouse
     is brought to India for breaking purposes, it is deemed to be
     manufactured in a foreign country and appropriate duty has to
     be paid for clearance for ship breaking. Learned co.unsel
     contended that the said Notification is clear, and admits of no       F
     ambiguity, and it is settled that when a fiction is created by law,
     the Courts must give full effect to the fiction. Learned counsel
     urged that in terms of the Notification and as was observed by
     this Court in Jalyan Udyog (supra), the date relevant for
     determining the value and rate of the customs duty chargeable         G
     is the date on which the ship is broken up, which should be
     reckoned as the date on which permission for breaking up is
     accorded by the Director General of Shipping. Learned counsel
     submitted that the fact that the appellant was an auction-
     5.    (1999) 5 sec 15.                                                H
                                                                       --
    364       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011] 3 S.C.R.


A purchaser is inconsequential in as much as Notification No.
  133/87-Cus was a conditional notification, viz. when the ship
  is broken, customs duty as prevalent on the date of breaking
  will have to be paid, and therefore, customs duty was required
  to be paid in terms of Sections 12 and 15 read with Section
B 68 of the Act. Learned counsel also argued that Section 68 of
  the Act makes it clear that when the importer of any
  warehoused goods intends to clear them for home
  consumption, then a bill of entry for home consumption has be
  to be filed, and the import duty leviable on such goods has to
c be paid by the importer, as was held in D.C.M. & Anr. Vs.
  Union of India &Anr. 6 • Learned counsel submitted that Section
  9 of the Act makes it clear that clearance from a Bonded
  warehouse is to be treated as an import into India. It was also
  stressed that clearance of vessel was in terms of the exemption
  notification, which stipulated payment of appropriate customs
0
  duty prevalent at the time of its breaking. Reliance was placed
  on the decisions of this Court in Hansraj Gordhandas Vs. H.H.
  Dave, Assistant Collector of Central Excise & Customs, Surat
  & Ors7.; Novopan India Ltd., Hyderabad Vs. Collector of
  Central Excise And Customs, Hyderabac/l and Corpmissioner
E of Central Excise and Customs, Indore Vs. Parenteral Drugs
  India LtcP. to contend that the terms of an exemption notification
  have to be construed strictly.

       17. Having bestowed our anxious consideration, we are
F constrained to hold that the impugned judgment deserves to be
  set aside on the short ground that while deciding the case, the
  Tribunal has ignored the specific directions issued by this Court,
  vide order dated 30th August, 2001. It is evident from the
  impugned order, in particular from paras 15 and 16 that the
G Tribunal has not appreciated the facts obtaining in the present

    6.   1995 supp (3) sec 223.
    7.   (1969) 2 SCR 253.
    a.   1994 Supp (3) sec 606.
H   9.   c2009) 14 sec 342.
--
       MUSTAN TAHERBHAI v. COMMNR. OF CENTRAL                     365
           EXCISE AND CUSTOMS [D.K. JAIN, J.]
     case in their correct perspective, which has resulted in vitiating A
     its decision on the question of leviability of import- duty.
     Although, from para 14 of the impugned order it is evident that
     the Tribunal was conscious of the direction of this Court that it
     was required to first record the correct facts and then in the.
     factual perspective locate.and apply the relevant law, yet in the B
     very next paragraph it proceeds to hold that when it is accepted
     that Notification No. 118/59-Cus. did not exist at the time of
     clearance of the vessel frrm the ship yard, the persistent plea
     that the ship was manufactured in a warehouse located in India
     and therefore, it attracted excise duty alone need not be            c
     considered at all. In our opinion, in light of the decision and
     directions of this Court in C.A. 1998 of 2000, judicial discipline
     obliged the Tribunal to examine the entire legal issue after
     ascertaining the foundational facts, regardless of its earlier
     view in the matter. Therefore, the decision of the Tribunal cannot 0
     be sustained.

          18. We are thus, convinced that it is a flt case which should
     be remanded back to the Tribunal for fresh adjudication and
     determination of the question of leviability of import duty on an
     Indian-built ship brought into India for breaking purpose. For       E
     the view we have taken, we deem it unnecessary to deal with
     other contentions urged by the learned counsel.

           19. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed; the impugned order
     is set aside, and the matter is remanded back to the Tribunal        F
     for fresh consideration, in accordance with law, bearing in mind
     the observations of this Court in C.A. No. 1998 of 2000. There
     will, however, be no order as to costs.

     D.G.                                      Appeal disposed of.