Holding

The doctrine of res judicata, being a public‑policy principle, applies to the present land‑grabbing suit; the identity and title of the property were finally decided in CCCA No.14 of 1972, rendering LGC No.44/2000 barred and the Special Court without jurisdiction.

Summary

The Kaushik Cooperative Building Society claimed ownership of land in Survey No.129/68 Paiki based on a 1976 decree in a specific‑performance suit (CCCA No.14 of 1972). Subsequent land‑grabbing suits (LGC Nos.46/1989, 29/1992, 15/1996) were dismissed, confirming the same title. Later, a new land‑grabbing case (LGC No.44/2000) was filed in the Special Court under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, alleging the land belonged to Survey No.129/51‑52 (renumbered 327). The High Court upheld the Special Court’s jurisdiction and refused to quash the proceeding, holding that the res‑judicata issue was a mixed question of law and fact. The Supreme Court held that the doctrine of res judicata is a wholesome principle applicable to all litigations; the identity and title of the property had been finally adjudicated, making the later suit barred and the Special Court without jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeals of the Society were allowed, the High Court and Special Court orders were set aside, and the respondents’ appeals dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars the filing of LGC No.44/2000 in view of the earlier decree determining the identity and title of the land.
Whether the Special Court had jurisdiction under Section 8(1) of the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 to entertain the suit.
Whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the proceedings on the ground of res judicata.

Legislation cited

Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982s. 2(d), s. 2(e), s. 8(1)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 1, s. 11
Urban Land Ceiling Act

Subjects

res judicataland grabbingjurisdictioncivil procedurefinality of judgmentproperty lawspecial courtpublic policy

Judgment

[2017) 4 S.C.R. 442

A MIS KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY
v.
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 5113 of 2017)
B APRILll, 2017
[PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE AND
UDAY UMESH LALIT, JJ.]
Res Judicata:
Principle of res judicata - Purpose and scope of - Held: The
c principle is public policy and preventive as to give finality to the
decision of the court of competent jurisdiction and prevent further
litigation - The application of the principle by the courts should
not be influenced.. by technical considerations ofform, but by matter
of substance within the limits followed by law - The principle is a
D wholesome one, which is applicable not merely to matters governed
by th'? provisions of CPC, but to all litigations - Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 - s. 11.
Adjudication in respect of property in question in previous
cases i.e. in a suit for specific performance and in a Land Grabbing
E case - Present Land Grabbing case filed thereafter - Maintainabili~y
of- Held: Not maintainable being barred by principle of res judicata
"- The matter in issue in the present case and previous decided suit
and Land Grabbing case is not merely identical but very same -
Once the identity of the property and the title thereof is finally
F adjudicated, it operates as res judicata.
.,
Allowing the appeals filed by a.ppellant-Society and
dismissing the appeals filed by respondents, the Court
HELD: 1. The doctrine of res judicata is a wholesome one,
which is applicable not merely to matters governed by the
G provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure but to all litigations.
The rule of res judicata while founded on ancient precedent is
dictated by a wisdom which is for all time and that the appiication
of the rule by the Courts should be influenced by no technical
considerations of form, but by matter of substance within the limits
allowed by law. The principle of res judicata is applied for the
H
442
M/S KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 443
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS.

purpose of achieving finality in litigation. [Paras 6, 7)(448-F-H; A
449-A)
Bombay. Gas Co. v. Jagannath Pandurang (1975) 4
SCC 690; Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramanandan Prasad
Narayan Singh AIR 1916 PC 78; Sri
Bhavanarayanaswamivari Temple v. Vadapalli Venkata B
Bhavanarayana Charyulu (1970) 1 SCC 673 - relied
on.
2. To constitute a matter res judicata, the follol<ing
conditions must be proved: (1) that the litigating parties must be
the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the suit also must be c
identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between the
parties; and (4) that the suit must be decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction. "One of the tests in deciding whether
the doctrine of res judicata applies to a particular case or not is
to determine whether two inconsistent decrees will come into
existence if it is not applied." [Para 8][449-E-FJ D

Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai v. Mohd. Hanifa AIR 1976
SC 1569 ; (1976) 4 sec 780 : (1976] 3 SCR 721;
N(1rayana Prabhu Venkateswara Prabhu v. Narayana
Prabhu Krishna Prabhu AIR 1977 SC 1268 : (1977) 2
SCC 181 : [1977] 2 SCR 636 - relied on. E

3. It may be true that the Court at initial stage may not
enter into the merit of the matter. Its opinion in the nature of
things would be a prima facie one. But the Court must also
consider that the analogy of res judicata or of the technical rules
of civil procedure is, in cases like the present one, appropriate F
and the Courts are expected to administer the law so as to
effectuate its underlying object. Court shall also bear in mind
that the basic character of this principle is public policy and
preventive as to give finality to the decision of the Court of
competent jurisdiction and prevent further litigation. [Para G
18][452-E-F]
4. In the present case, the matter in issue in the pending
suit before the Special Court in LGC No.44/2000 and previous
decided suits is not merely identical but very same. Other
ingredients of the principle of res judicata are also fulfilled. H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A Moreover, once identity of the property and the title thereof is
finally adjudicated in CCCA No.1411972, holding that land is
situated in Survey No.129/68 Paiki, it operates as res judicata.
[Para 19][452-G-H]
5. Therefore, both the Special Court and the High Court
. B have committed error in not appreciating the fact that orders,
judgments and decrees passed in previously decided land
grabbing cases have attained finality, wherein it was reiterated
many a times that the appellant society is the owner of the suit
property which is comprised of Survey No.129/68 and not in
Survey No.129/51 or 129/52 (which has been re-numbered as
C 327). Th.us, the approach of the High Court in the impugned order
seems to be erroneous.[Para 20][453-A-C]
Ramji Gupta & Am: v. Gopi Krishan Agrawal (dead) &
Ors. (2013) 9 SCC 438 : [2013] 5 SCR 398 - relied
on.
D
Om Parkash Singh v. M lingamaiah & Ors. (2009) 12
SCC 613 : [2009] 6 SCR 333; Manda! Revenue Officer
v. Goundla Venkaiah & Anr. (2010) 2 SCC 461; Willian1s
v. Lourdu Swamy & Anr. (2008) 5 SCC 647 : [2008] 6
i'
SCR 929; Sajjadda Nashin Sayyeed Musa Dada Bhai
.E Umar (2000) 3 SCC 350 : [2000] 1 SCR 1095; Malia
.Bajrangi dead through LRs. & Am: i: Badri Bai wife of
Jagannath & Anr. (2003) 2 SCC 464 : [2002] 5 Suppl.
SCR 557; Shama Prassanth Raji v. Ganapath Rao &
Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 522 : [2000) 3 Suppl. SCR 448 -
referred to.
F
Case Law Reference
(1975) 4 sec 690 relied on Para6
AIR 1916 PC 78 relied on Para7
(1970) 1 sec 673 relied on Para7
G
[1976] 3 SCR 721 relied on Paras
[1977] 2 SCR 636 relied on Para S
[2009) 6 SCR 333 relied on Para 10
(2010) 2 sec 461 relied on Para 13
H (2008) 6 SCR 929 relied on Para 15
M/S KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 445
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS.

[2000) 1 SCR 1095 referred to Para 15 A
[2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 557 referred to Para 15
(2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 448 referred to Para 16
[2013] 5 SCR 398 relied on Para 17
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5113 of B
2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2010 of the High Court
of Judicature Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition No. ']951
of2010
WITH c
C.A. Nos. 5116, 5117, 5118-5119, 5120-5126, 5128, 5130, 5131 of
2017
Contempt Petition (C) No. 118 of2013 In SLP (C) No. 26140 of
2011.
Jaideep Gupta, R. Basant, B. Adinarayana Rao, A. K. Ganguli, D
V. V. S. Rao, Kapil Sibal, Sanjiv Sen, Sr. Advs., Sadineni Ravi Kumar,
Sunil Fernandes, Sunil Ganu, Abhinav Rao,Ms. Mithu Jain, Puneeth,
M. Srinivas R. Rao, Arun Devdas, Abid Ali Beeran, P., Mrs. Sudha
Gupta, P. Venkat Reddy, Prashant Kr. Tyagi (for M/s. Venkat P&lwai
Law Associates), Dr. Kailash Chand, N. Rajaraman, Ms. Bina Madhavan, E
Krishna Kr. Singh, Prateek Dhir, Ms. Vijay Shree Patnaik,
Ms. Ramandeep Kaur, Sridhar Potaraju, Gaichangpou Gangmei, A1jun
Singh, Ms. Sindoora VNL, Y. Raja Gopala Rao, D. Mahesh Babu,
Aniruddha P. Mayee, K. Maruthi Rao, Mrs. Anjani Aiyagari,
Ms. T. Anamika, G. Ramakrishna Prasad, Ram Swamp Sharma,
Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, Anil Kumar Tandale, Advs. for the appei:ring F
parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
PINAKI CHANDRA GROSE, J. l. Leave granted.
2. Present appeals have been directed against the common G
judgment and order dated 61h August, 20 l 0 passed by the High Court of
Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ Petition Nos.11869 & 119~ l of
20 I0, whereby the writ petitions filed by the appellants were dismissed.
The High Court was of the view that "whether filing ofLGC is barred
by res-judicata or constructive res-judicata is a mixed question of law
H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 J 7] 4 S.C.R.

A and fact, which can be decided only on appreciation of evidence led in to
the said effect". The High Court was further of the view that the Special
Court constituted under the provisions ofA.P. Land Grabbing(Prohibition)
Act, i 982 (for short "the Act") did not commit any error in taking
cognizance of the case being Land Grabbing Case No.44/2000.
B 3. Since the present appeals, by special leave, have been tiled
assailing the same common judgment, they were heard together and are
being disposed of by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience,
Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.26925 of
20 I0 is taken as the main appeal. It is imperative to record brief facts
for the disposal of this case, which are as follows:
c
3.1 One V.R.K. Shastry had purchased the land to an extent of
12 acres 9 guntas out of 16 acres 9 guntas of land in Survey Nc.129/68
Paiki from one Md. Moulana vide agreement dated 29.12.1963. A suit
for specific performance of the said agreement having been dismissed,
V.R.K. Shastry filed an appeal before the High Court of-Andhra Pradesh
D which was numbered as CCCA No.14 of 1972. The High Court ofAndhra
Pradesh while allowing CCCA No.14of1972 vi de judgment and decree
dated 26.10.1976 decreed the suit for specific pe1formance wherein it
was held that the suit property was comprised in Survey No.129/68
Paiki and not in Survey Nos.139/51 & 129152 and is separate and distinct
E land. It is pertinent to mention here that the defendant died during
pendency of suit and his legal representatives were impleaded in the
aforesaid suit, who had earlier raised the objection of different survey
numbers. Subsequently, the decree in CCCA No.14 of 1972 came to be
amenrled by the High Court and the judgment debtors were directed to
execute the sale deed in favour of the decree holder or his nominee.
F
3 .2 After obtaining the decree V.R.K. Shastry applied for
exemotion under the ULC Act. The Government of Andhra Pradesh
vide G.O.Ms. No.523 dated 26.03.1979 granted exemption in favour of
V.R.K. Shastry. Part of said land was purchased by the appel !ant society
and Mw1icipal Corporation of Hyderabad sanctioned layout in File No.45/
G layout/8/85 in favour of the appellant society for development of 7.00
acres of land out of 12 acres 9 guntas in Survey No.129/68 Paiki. Rest
of the portion in the above said decreetal land was assigned to one V.
Narsimha Reddy and others under the Assignment Deed dated
15.01.1988. Later, 41 sale deeds were registered in favour of the
H assignees, after this Court on 12.09.1994 dismissed SLP(C)
M/S KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 447
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS. [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

No.1138 l/I 994 filed by the judgment debtors and upheld the order of the A·
executing court permitting the assignees to obtain registered sale deeds
in their favour. The High Court dismissed the appeal beingAAO No.264 7I
1998 vide its order dated 27.10.1998 and the order of the learned executing
court attained finality.
3.3 Between year 1989 and 1996, three different land grabbing B
cases under the Act were filed in the Special Court against the appellant
society by the legal representatives of deceased Md. Moulana, Sai Nagar
Housing Co-operative Society and the State of Andhra Pradesh, being
· · LGC No.46/1989, LGC No.29/ 1992 and LGC No.15/ 1996 respectively,
alleging that the property claimed by the appellant herein was not a part
of Survey No.129/68 but that of Survey No.129/51 and 129/52. All the C
land grabbing cases were dismissed and when a batch of writ petitions
were filed in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, the same ,;ere dismissed
vide a common judgment dated 0 I.OS .2007 passed by the High Court.
The High Court in said common judgment had upheld that the disputed
property is part of land in Survey No.129/68 and the same belonged to D
the appellant society. It is pertinent to mention here that LGC No.15/
1996 was dismissed as withdrawn.
3.4 One K. Bairam and few others filed another Land Grabbing
Case No.44 of2000 before the Special Court established under the Act
in respect of Land in Survey No.129/52, RS No.327, claiming that he E
and other members of the Hindu Joint Family, he as the manager, had
purchased the disputed property under the registered Sale Deed dated
25.03.1967 from one of the legal representatives of Md. Moulana, namely,
Abdul Rub. The above-noted purchaser/ assignee of the land, namely,
V. Narsimha Reddy was imp leaded in the said case and the applications
filed by the said V. Narsimha Reddy and the appellant herein, for quashing F
of LGC No.44/2000 on the ground of maintainability, were dismissed
vide order dated 30.04.20 l 0.
3.5 Being aggrieved the appellant herein and the above named V.
Narsimh~ Reddy filed Writ Petition Nos.1195 i/2010 and l l 869/20 l 0,
respectively, before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for quashing of G
LGC No.44/2000. The High Court vide impugned common judgment
dismissed both the writ petitions and upheld the order passed by the
Special Court whereby it was held that LGC No.44/2000 in the Special
Court is maintainable. Hence, the present appeals by special leave.
H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A 4. After perusing the entire material placed on record before us,
we have noticed that High Court had framed two points for consideration,
VIZ.,

a) Whether the Special Court committed any illegality in taking
cognizance of the case under Section 8(1) of the Act?
B b) Whether LGC pending before the Special Comt is liable to be
rejected by setting aside the common order dated 30.04.20 I 0
passed in I.A Nos.585/2007 and 216/20 I 0 and allowing the
said petitions?
We have further noticed that the High Court has answered both
C the above questions in the negative and observed that entire trial has
already been completed except. the cross-examination of Manda!
Revenue Officer in the said pending LGC. It was further observed that
whether filing of LGC is barred by res-judicata or constructive res-
judicata, is a mixed question oflaw and fact, which can be decided only
D on appreciation of evidence led to that effect.
5. We have carefully perused the entire record and in our
considered view, the only question of law which requires to be answered
by this Court is:
Whether the High Court is justified in not quashing the proceedings
E in LGC No.44/2000, when the Special Court ex-facie lacks
jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant case in the light
of principles of res-judicata?
6. The main point revolves around the principles of res-judicata
which is neither against public policy nor res-integra to civil procedure
F prevailing in our country. The doctrine of res judicata is a wholesome
one which is applicable not merely to matters governed by the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure but to all litigations, as was observed by
A.Alagiriswami, J. in Bombay Gas Co. Vs. Jaga1111atll Pandura11g,
( 1975) 4 SCC 690 (para 11 ).
G 7. The question of res-judicata is not res integra to our judicial
system. The rule of res judicata while founded on ancient precedent is
dictated by a wisdom which is for all time and that the application of the
rule by the Courts should be influenced by no technical consideretions of
form, but by matter of substance within the limits allowed by law:
Slteoparsan Singh Vs. Ramanandan Prasad Narayan Singh, AIR
H
M/S KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 449
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS. [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

1916 PC 78. Furthermore, it is well settled that the principle ofres judicata A
is applied for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation as laid down
by this Court in the case of Sri Bltavanaraya11aswamivari Temple
Vs. Vadapalli Venkata Bliava11araya11a Charyulu, ( 1970) 1 SCC 673,
relevant paragraph of which is quoted below:
"8. ... It was observed that the doctrine <?f res judicata is not B
co:'ifined to a decision in a suit but it applies to decisions in
other proceedings as well. But how far a decision which is
ref!dered in other proceedings will bind the parties depends
upon other considerations one of which is whether that
decision determines substantial rights of parties and the other
is whether the parties are given adequate opportunities to C
establish the rights pleaded by them. Tlte doctrine of res
judicata is not co11ji11ed to tfle limits· prescribed in Sectioll 11,
Civil Procedure Code. Tlte underlying principle of that
doctrine is tflat tit ere should be finality i11 litigation a11d tflat
a person sltould not be vexed twice over in respect of D
tfle same matter. ".
(emphasis supplied)
8. To constitute a matter res j udicata, as observed by this Court in
Syed Moh<L Salie Labbai Vs·. Mohd. Hanifa, AIR 1976 SC 1569 =
( 1976) 4 sec 780, the following conditions must be proved: ( 1) that the E
litigating parties must be the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the suit
also must be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between
the parties; and (4) that the suit must be decided by a court of competent
jurisdiction. In the case of Narayana Prablrn Ve11kates1V<tra Prab/ru
Vs. Naraya11a Prabltu Kri.slma Prab/111, AIR 1977 SC 1268 = (1977) F
2 SCC 181, it was observed by this Court: "One of the tests in deciding
whether the doctrine of res judicata applies to a particular case or not is
to determine whether two inconsistent decrees will come into existence
ifit is not applied."
9. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsels. Learned G
counsel for appellant society would argue that the main issue in the
present matter is not an inter-se title dispute as none of the other parties
are claiming title over Survey No.129/68 Paiki but are only disputing the
identity of the suit land. It was fmiher argued that identity of the suit
property has been settled to be in Survey No.129/68 Paiki in more than
H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A one legal proceeding, few of which have attained finality. It was further
subm;tted that the impugned judgment does not warrant interference on
account of the fact that the Special Court has gone elaborately into the
evidence produced before it by the respective parties.
10. It was fmiher submitted that issues as to what constitutes
B jurisdictional facts for the purpose of Sections 2(d) and 2(e) of the Act
has been elaborated upon by this Court in Om Parkaslt Singlt Vs. M.
Lingamaialt & Ors., (2009) 12 SCC 613, and taking into consideration
the extensive discussion made by this Court on scope and definition of
the terms "Land-grabbers", it could be said that the appellant society is
a land grabber.
c
I I. Per contra, the counsel for respondents has submitted that
respondent, namely, Sri Sai Nagar Co-operative Housing Society Ltd.
was recognized as the vendors· by the respondent State by way of
Government Order. He further submitted that Survey No.129152 has
been re-numbered as Smvey No.327 and appellant society and others
D come within the ambit of Section 2(d) of the Act, because as per the
Rectification Deed from its vendors and thus learned Special Court and
the High Court are erroneous in law because the Special Court under
the Act has gone beyond jurisdiction.
12. It was argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that
E the principle of res judicata cannot be applied to this particular case
because respondent society is bona fide purchaser of the scheduled
property and as such both the Special Court and the High Court were
wrong in coming to a conclusion that the respondent society was to be
non-suited on the ground ofres judicata based on the judgment passed in
F CCCANo.14of1972.
l3. Learned counsel for respondents who are legal representatives
of tht; deceased Md. Moulana, submitted that the Special Court had
requisite jurisdiction to go into the questions of title and identity. He relied
upon the judgment of this Court in the case ofManda/ Revenue Officer
G Vs. Goundla Venkaialt & Anr., (20 I0) 2 SCC 46 I, para 20, wherein it
was held that the Land Grabbing Act is a self-contained Code which
deals with various facets of Land Grabbing and providt-s for a
comprehensive machinery for determination of various issues relating to
land grabbing, including the claim of the alleged land grabber that he has
a right to occupy the land or that he has acquired title by adverse
H possession.
M/S KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 451
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS. [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

14. lt was further submitted by the learned counsel that the findings A
in OS No.29/1965, CCCANo.14/1972 and the E.A. No.14/1995 in E.P.
No.20/1995 do not have force so as to attract principles of res judicata
as against Abdul Bashisht and his legal heirs and Abdul Rub and his legal
heirs. He drew our attention to the relevant part of the order dated
17.04.1970, passed by the learned II Additional Chief Judge in O.S. B
No.2911965, which is as follows:
"6. Subsequent to the filing of the suit the fourth defendant
died and no legal representatives have been brought on record.
Hence the suit was abated against the 4'h defendant. "
15. Learned counsel relied upon the following judgments of this c
Court: Williams Vs. Lourdu Swan~v &A11r, (2008) 5 SCC 647; Sajjaddt(
Nasliin Sayyeed Vs. Musa Dada Bltai Umar, (2000) 3 SCC 350 and
Malia Bajra11gi dead tlrrougli LRs & A11r. Vs. Badri Bai wife of
Jagannatli & A11r, (2003) 2 SCC 464, wherein scope of Section ! l of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 was discussed and it was found that
when the matter in issue is substantially different from the previous D
proceedings, res judicata could not be applied.
16. Learned counsel for respondents (L.Rs. of deceased Md.
Moulana) concluded his arguments while submitting thatthe Special Court
and the High Court while appreciating the evidence are per se perverse
while relying upon the law laid down by this Court in Slu1ma Prassantli E
Raji Vs. Ga11apatlt Rao & Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 522, which is as follows:
"Undoubtedly, in a proceeding under Artii:le.'t 226 and 227
of the Constitution the High Court cannot sit in appeal over
the findings recorded by a competent Tribunal. The jurisdiction
of the High Court, therefore, is supervisory and not appellate. F
Consequently Article 226 is not intended to enable the High
Court to convert itself into a Court of Appeal and examine
for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide
what is the proper view to be taken or order to be made. But
notwithstanding the same on a mere perusal of the order of G
an inferior Tribunal if the High Court comes to a conclusion
that such Tribunal has committed manifest error by mJs-
construing certain documents, or the High Court comes to
the conclusion that on the materials it is not possible for a
H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 4 S.C.R.

A reasonable man to come to a conclusion arrived at by the
inferior Tribunal or the inferior Tribunal has ignored to take
into consideration certain relevant materials or has taken into
consideration certain materials which are not admissible, then
the High Court will be fully justified in interfering with the
findings of the inferior Tribunal. "
B
17. Before arriving at the conclusion, we would like to en~phasize
on the ratio of another judgment of this Court in the case of Ramji
Gupta & Anr. Vs. Gopi Krisflan Agrawal (dead) & Ors., (2013) 9
sec 438, para J5, which reads as follows:
c "In order to operate as res judicata, the finding must be such
that it disposes of a matter that is directly andsubstan:ial(y in
issue in the former suit, and that the said issue must have
been heard and.finally decided by the court trying such suit.
A matter which is collaterally or incidentally in issue for the
purpose of deciding a matter which is directly in issue in the
D case, cannot be made the basis for a plea of res judicata. "
18. We have perused the written notes on arguments of the learned
counsels for both the parties and after a punctilious scrutiny of complete
record, we are of the considered opinion that it may be true that the
Court at initial stage may not enter into the merit of the matter. Its opinion
E in the nature of things would be a prima facie one. But the Com1 must
also consider that the analogy ofres-judicata or of the technical rules of
civil procedure is, in cases like the present one, appropriate and the
Courts are expected to administer the law so as to effectuate its
underlying object. Court shall also bear in mind that the basic ciiaracter
p of this principle is public policy and preventive as to give finality to the
decision of the Court of competent jurisdiction and prevent further
litigation.
19. In our considered opinion, matter in issue in the pending suit
before the learned Special Court in LGCNo.44/2000 and previous decided
G suits is not merely identical but very same. Other ingredients of the
principle of res-judicata are also fulfilled. Moreover, once identity of the
property and the title thereof is finally adjudicated in CCCA No.14/ 1972,
holding that land is situated in Survey No.129/68 Paiki, it operates as res
judicata.

I-I
\

MIS KAUSHIK COOP. BUILDING SOCIETY v. 453
N. PARVATHAMMA & ORS. [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]

20. Judged~n this background and the principle set out above, the A
fnevitable conclusion is that both the Special Court and the High Court
.have conJf}litted errodn not appreciating the fact that orders, judgments
a1i\d decrees passed in previously decided land grabbing cases have
attaitied finality, wherein it was reiterated many a times that the appellant
society i.e. Mis. Kaushik Coop. Building Society is the owner of the B
suit property which is compr.ised of Survey No.129/68 and not in Survey
No.129/51or129/52 (which has been re-numbered as 327). Thus, i!l our
considered opinion, the approach of the High Court in the impugned
order seems to be erroneous. Therefore, the question before us is, chus,
· answered in negative.
21. Hence, the appeals filed by the appellant society are hereby C
allowed and the appeals filed by the respondents herein are hereby
dismissed. Consequently, the impugned judgment passed by the High
Court as also the order passed by the Special Court in I.A. No.585/2007
and I.A. No.216/20 I 0 in LGC No.44/2000, are hereby quashed and set
· aside. Contempt Petition (Civil) No.118 of 2013 in SLP(C) D
No.26140 of20ll filed by respondents, namely, Sara Abdul Gafoor &
Ors.; is also dismissed., There shall be no order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Matters disposed of.