M/S. JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD.versusM/S JASBIR SINGH CHADHA (HUF) & ANR.

                                   [2010] 6 S.C.R. 546


           A        MIS. JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD.
                                             v.
                      MIS JASBIR SINGH CHADHA (HUF) & ANR.
                             (Civil Appeal No. 4344 of 2010)
"   ....                               MAY 7, 2010
           8
                  [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

                  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. 12 r. 6 - Judgment
             on admission - Held: There should be a clear and
           C unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the
             defendant - It is essentially a question of fact and depends
             on the facts of the case - On facts, in suit for possession by
             landlord against tenant, there is no clear admission of the
             case of landlord about termination of tenancy by tenant in its
           D written statement or in its reply to the petition of landlord ul
             Or. 12 r. 6 - Thus, order of trial court and High Court, set aside
             - Matter remanded to trial court for disposal of the suit.

                  The respondent-landlord filed suit against the
           E appellant-tenant for recovery of possession and mesne
             profits on the ground that the lease deed had expired by
             efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to the
             appellant but the appellant failed to vacate the suit
             property. The appellant filed written statement. The
             respondent did not file any rejoinder. They filed an
           F application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The trial court
             decreed the suit in favour of the respondent. The High
             Court upheld the order of the trial court holding that the
             case of ejectment was made out against the appellant on
             the basis of admission of the case of the respondent in
           G the written statement filed by the appellant. Hence, the
             appeal.

                   Allowing the appeal, the Court

           H                                546
                                                                I
JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. JASBfR 5471
            SINGH CHADHA (HUF)
    HELD: 1.1. The principles of Order 12 Rule 6 CPC, ·A
can be followed only if there is a clear and unequivocal
admission of the case of the plaintiff by the appellant.
Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous admission
by one party of the case of the other party is essentially
a question of fact and the decision of this question B
depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely,
whether there is a clear admission or not cannot be
decided on the basis of a judicial precedent. [Paras 12
and 13] (552-G-H; 553-A-B]
     1.2. In the instant case, the respondent filed an              C
application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC for passing a
judgment on admission. In the said petition, the
respondents-plaintiffs averred that in view of the
admission on existence of relationship of landlord and
tenant and thereafter, service of the termination notice,           D
the only question left for adjudication for the purpose of
possession is "whether the termination of the tenancy
has been validly terminated?" To that application the
appellant gave a reply, again denying that there was any
admission by them about termination or determination of             E
tenancy. It was stated that in the suit issues are still to
be framed and the case be tried in accordance with CPC
as there is no admission by the appellant and the
respondents-plaintiffs had to prove its case with legally
admissible evidence. As such prayer was made to                     F
dismiss the application of the respondents-plaintiffs
under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. [Paras 8, 1O and 11] [551-E;
552-A-E]      \
      1.3. It cannot be said that there is a clear admission
of the case of the respondents-plaintiffs about                     G
termination of tenancy by the appellant in its written
statement or in its reply to the petition of the respondents-
p 1a in tiffs under Order 12 Rule 6. The parties have
confined their case of admission to their pleading only.
The counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs fairly stated            H
    548     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A before this Court that _he is not invoking the case of
  admission 'otherwise than on pleading'. Thus, in the
  pleadings of the appellant there is no clear admission of
  the case of respondents-plaintiffs. [Paras 14 and 15] [553-
  D-G]
B     1.4. In view of the facts of the instant case, the
  judgment of the High Court as well as of the Additional
  District Judge cannot be upheld and are set aside. The
  matter is remanded to the trial court for expeditious
  disposal of the suit as early as possible [Paras 22 and 23]
C [555-E-F]
       Karam Kapahi and Ors. vs. Mis. Lal Chand Public
    Charitable Trust and Anr. 2010 (3) SCALE 569,
    distinguished.
o      Uttam Singh Duggal and Co. Ltd. vs. United Bank of
  India and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120; Koramall Rambal/av vs.
  Mongilal Dalimchand 23 Calcutta Wee'kly Notes (1918-19)
  1017; J.C. Galstaun vs. ED. Sassoon & Co., Ltd. 27 Calcutta
  Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783; Abdul Rahman and brothers
E vs. Parbati Devi AIR 1933 Lahore 403, referred to.
      Gilbert vs. Smith 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686;
  Hughes vs. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow Assurance
  Company (Limited) Times Law Reports 1891-92 Volume
  8 pg 81; Landergan vs. Feast Law Times Reports 1886-87
F Volume 85 pg 42; Ellis vs. Allen (1914) 1 Ch. D. 904,
    referred to.
                        Case Law Reference:
     2010 (3) SCALE 569      Distinguished.     Para 13
G    (2000) 1 sec 120        Referred to.      ·Para 14
     1875-76 (2)
     Chancery Division 686 Referred to.         Para 16
     Times Law Reports
H
JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. JASBIR 549
            SINGH CHADHA (HUF)

 1891-92 Volume 8 pg 81 'Referred to.         Para 17         A

 Law Times Reports 1886-87

 Volume 85 pg 42           Referred to.       Para 18

 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes                                     B
 (1918-19) 1017            Referred to.       Para 19

 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes

 (1922-23) 783             Referred to.       Para 20
                                                              c
 (1914) 1 Ch. D. 904       Referred to.       Para 20

 AIR 1933 Lahore 403       Referred to.       Para 21

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4344 of 2010.                                                 D

    From the Judgment & Order dated 28.11.2008 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA No. 465 of 2008.

    Shiv Kumar Suri for the Appellant.
                                                              E
     K.V. Viswanathan, Arunima Dwivedi, Anil Kaushik, Gopal
Sigh Chauhan. Neha S. Verma and Shiv Prakash Pandey for
the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                              F
    GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted.
     2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 28.11.2008 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Regular
First Appeal No.465 of 2008. In the impugned judgment upon
admission the High Coµrt came to a finding that a case of G
ejectment was made out against the appellant on the basis of
admission of the case of the plaintiff-landlord in the written
statement filed by appellant. In passing the said judgment the
High Court affirmed the judgment and decree of dispossession·
                                                              H
    550      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A passed by the Additional District Judge, Delhi on 23.09.2008
  against the appellant.
          3. The material facts of the case are that the respondents-
    plaintiffs, claiming to be the landlords/owners of the premises
    bearing Flat No.205, (2nd Floor), Arunachal Building, 19,
B   Barakhambha Road, New Delhi-110001 having area of 581 sq.
    ft., (super area) (hereinafter, 'the suit premises') filed a suit
    against the appellant for recovery of possession and mesne
    profit. The case of the plaintiff-landlord in the plaint is that the
    appellant was inducted as a tenant vide lease deed dated
C   07.07.2003 at a monthly rent of Rs.23,200/- for a period of three
    years with effect from 07.07.2003. According to the
    respondents-plaintiffs the said lease dated 07.07.2003 was
    initially for a period of three years and which was to be renewed
    for a further period of three years as per the mutual consent of
D   both the parties with 20% increase in the monthly rent. The main
    case of the plaintiff-landlord is that the said lease deed had
    expired by efflux of time and notice to that effect was sent to
    appellant which was enclosed with the plaint. In paragraph 6
    of the plaint further averment is that the appellant, despite
E   determination of its tenancy of the suit property, has failed to
    vacate the suit property, and handover the possession thereof
    to the respondents-plaintiffs.
         4. The stand of the respondents-plaintiffs before the Civil
    Court and also the High Court and before this Court also was
F   that the case of termination of tenancy has been admitted by
    the appellant in its written statement.
         5. In order to appreciate this controversy it will be proper
    to set out the relevant averments in the plaint and written
    stateme11t of the parties.
G
        6. Paragraprs 5 and 6 of the plaint on which the
    respondents-plaintiffs rely are as follows:-
          "5. That the tenancy has expired by efflux of time but for
          the precautionary measure, the Plaintiffs vide notice dated
H         July 15, 2006 terminated the tenancy of the Defendant,
 JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. jASBIR 551
 SINGH CHADHA (HUF) [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.)
     which was sent via Regd. Ad. & UPC. The aforesaid notice          A
     dated July 15, 2006 was duly served upon the defendant.
     The copy of said notice is annexed herewith as Annexure
     A-3. The registration receipt, UPC and acknowledgement
     card are annexed herewith as Annexure A-4 to A-6
     respectively.                                                     B
     6. That the defendant, despite, the determination of its
     tenancy of the said suit property has failed to vacate the
     suit property and handover the possession thereof to the
     Plaintiffs".
    7. In the written statement, which was filed by the appellant,
                                                                       c
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint have been dealt with in
paragraphs 5 and 6 of the written statement respectively. Those
two paragraphs are set out below:-
     "5. That the contents of para 5 of the plaint are a matter of     D
     record. It is submitted that tenancy has neither expired by
     efflux of time nor it has been terminated.
     6. That in reply to the contents of para 6 of the plaint, it is
     submitted that defendant is in possession of the premises.
     There has been no determination of tenancy.                       E
     8. It is clear from a perusal of the aforesaid averments in
the written statement that the appellant has disputed (a) the fact
of expiry of tenar:icy by efflux of time; (b) the appellant has also
disputed that th.ere has been a determination of tenancy. So
far as receipt of notice referred to in paragraph 5 of the plaint      F
is concerned, there has been no denial by the appellant.
               '
      . 9. Learned counsel for the appellant also argued before
  us that the lease deed cannot be terminated in view of certain
  clauses contained in the lease. The said argument was                G
  opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs.
  But in the facts of this case and in view of the nature of the
 judgment we propose to pass we need not decide those
. contentions at all.
                                                                       H
    552       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A      10. It may be noted herein that to the written statement filed
  by the appellant, the respondents-plaintiffs did not file any
  rejoinder. They filed an application under Order 12 Rule 6 of
  the Code of Civil Procedure for passing a judgment on
  admission. In the said petition in paragraph 4, the respondents-
8 plaintiffs also averred as follows:-
          "4. That in view of the admission (i) On existence of
          relationship of landlord and tenant and there after (ii)
          service of the termination notice, the only question left for
          adjudication for the purpose of possession is "whether the
C         termination of the tenancy has been validly terminated?"
       11. To that application the appellant had given a reply. In
  paragraph 2 of the reply it was again denied by the appellant
  that there was any admission by them about termination or
  determination of tenancy. In the said reply it has been stated
0 that in the suit issues are still to be framed and the case be
  tried in accordance with the Civil Procedure Code as there is
  no admission by the appellant and the respondents-plaintiffs
  have to prove its case with legally admissible evidence.
  As such prayer was made to dismiss the application of the
E respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule 6.
       12. Learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs relied
  on a judgment of this Court in Karam Kapahi & Others vs. Ml
  s. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust & Another reported in
F 2010 (3) SCALE 569 and contended that in view of the
  principles laid down in that case, this Court may affirm the
  judgment of the High Court in the instant case. This Court is
  unable to accept the aforesaid contention. In Karam Kapahi
  (supra) a Bench of this Court analyzed the principles of Order
  12 Rule 6 of the Code and held that in the facts of that case
G there was clear admission on the part of the lessee about non-
  payment of lease rent. The said admission was made by the
  lessee in several proceedings apart from its pleading in the suit.
  In view of such clear admission, the Court applied the
  principles of Order 12 Rule 6 in the case of Karam Kapahi
H (supra). The principles of law laid down in Karam Kapahi
JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. JASBIR 553
SINGH CHADHA (HUF) [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

(supra) can be followed in this case only if there is a clear and     A
unequivocal admission of the case of the plaintiff by the
appellant.
      13. Whether or not there is a clear, unambiguous
admission by one party of the case of the other party is
essentially a question of fact and the decision of this question      B
depends on the facts of the case. This question, namely,
whether there is a clear admission or not cannot be decided
on the basis of a judicial precedent. Therefore, even though the
principles in Karam Kapahi (supra) may be unexceptionable
they cannot be applied in the instant case in view of totally         C
different fact situation.                             ·
     14. In Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. Vs. United Bank
of India and others reported in (2000) 7 SCC 120 the provision
of Order 12 Rule 6 came up for consideration before this Court. .
This Court on a detailed consideration of the provisions of Order 0
12 Rule 6 made it clear "wherever there is a clear admission
of facts in the face of which it is impossible for the party making
such admission to succeed" the principle will apply. In the
instant case it cannot be said that there is a clear admission
of the case of the respondents-plaintiffs about termination of E
tenancy by the appellant in its written statement or in its reply
to the petition of the respondents-plaintiffs under Order 12 Rule
6.
     15. It may be noted here that in this case parties have
                                                                      F
confined their case of admission to their pleading only. The
learned counsel for the respondents-plaintiffs fairly stated before
this Court that he is not invoking the case of admission
'otherwise than on pleading'. That being the position this Court
finds that in the pleadings of the appellant there is no clear
admission of the case of respondents-plaintiffs.                      G
    16. In this connection reference may be made to an old
decision of the Court of Appeal between Gilbert vs. Smith
reported in 1875-76 (2) Chancery Division 686. Dealing with
the principles of Order XL, Rule 11, which was a similar              H
                                          1
    554    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A provision in English Law, Lord Justice James held, "if there was
  anything clearly admitted upon which something ought to be
  done, the plaintiff might come to the Court at once to have that
  thing done, without any further delay or expense" (see page
  687). Lord Justice Mellish expressing the same opinion made
B the position further clear by saying, "it must, however, be such
  an admission of facts as would shew that the plaintiff is clearly
  entitled to the order asked for". The learned Judge made it
  further clear by holding, "the rule was not meant to apply when
  there is any serious question of law to be argued. But if there
c is an admission on the pleading which clearly entitles the
  plaintiff to an order, then the intention was that he should not
  have to wait but might at once obtain any order" (see page
  689).
       17. In another old decision of the Court of Appeal in the
D case of Hughes vs. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow
  Assurance Company (Limited) reported in The Times Law
  Reports 1891-92 Volume 8 at page 81, similar principles were
  laid down by Lord Justice Lopes, wherein His Lordship held
  "judgment ought not to be signed upon admissions in a
E pleading or an affidavit, unless the admissions were clear and
  unequivocal". Both Lord Justice Esher and Lord Justice Fry
  concurred with the opinion of Lord Justice Lopes.
       18. In yet another decision of the Court of Appeal in
  Landergan vs. Feast reported in The Law Times Reports 1886-
F 87 Volume 85 at page 42, in an appeal from Chancery
  Division, Lord Justice Lindley and Lord Justice Lopes held that
  party is not entitled to apply under the aforesaid rule unless
  there is a clear admission that the money is due and
  recoverable in the action in which the admission is made.
G      19. The decision in Landergan (supra) was followed by the
    Division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Koramall Ramballav
    vs. Mongilal Dalimchand reported in 23 Calcutta Weekly Notes
    (1918-19) 1017. Chief Justice Sanderson, speaking for the
    Bench, accepted the formulation of Lord Justice Lopes and
H
  .                              .
JEEVAN DIESELS & ELECTRICALS LTD. v. JASBIR 555
SINGH CHADHA (HUF) [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
held that admission in Order 12, Rule 6 must be a "clear             A
admission".
      20. In the case of J.C. Galstaun vs. E. D. Sassoon & Co.,
Ltd., reported in 27 Calcutta Weekly Notes (1922-23) 783, a
Bench of Calcutta High Court presided over by Hon'ble Justice
Sir Asutosh Mookerjee sitting with Justice Rankin while              B
construing the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code
followed the aforesaid decision in Hughes (supra) and also the
view of Lord Justice Lopes in Landergan (supra) and held that
these provisions are attracted "where the other party has made
a plain admission entitling the former to succeed. This rule         C
applies where there is a clear admission of the facts on the face
of which it is impossible for the party making it to succeed". In
saying so His Lordship quoted the observation of Justice
Sargent in Ellis vs. Allen [(1914) 1 Ch.· D. 904] {See page
~n.                                                                  D
    21. Similar view has been expressed by Chief Justice
Broadway in the case· of Abdul Rahman and brothers vs.
Parbati Devi reported in AIR 1933 Lahore 403. The learned
Chief Justice held that before a Court can act under order 12,
Rule 6, the admission must be clear and unambiguous.                 E
     22. For the reasons discussed above and in view of the
facts of this case this Court cannot uphold the judgment of the
High Court as well as of the Additional District Judge. Both the
judgments of the High Court and of the Additional District Judge
are set aside.                                                       F
     23. The matter is remanded to the trial Court for
expeditious disposal of the suit as early as possible, preferably
within a period of six months from the date of service of this
order on the learned trial Court. It is made clear that this Court   G
has not made any observation on the merits of the case.
     24. The appeal is allowed. There will be no order as to
costs.

N.J.                                            Appeal allowed.
                                                                     H