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Supreme Court of India

M/S. JAIPRAKASH INDUSTRIES LTD. (PRESENTLY KNOWN AS M/S. JAIPRAKASH ASSOCIATES LTD.)versusDELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Citation
2024 INSC 273
Decided
5 April 2024
Disposal
Dismissed

Holding

The amalgamation of the lessee with the transferee company constitutes a transfer of the leased plots, thereby invoking clause II(4)(a) and entitling the DDA to recover fifty percent of the unearned increase in value.

Summary

The appellant, Jaiprakash Associates Ltd., was created by the amalgamation of Jaiprakash Associates Pvt Ltd (the original lessee) and Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd, pursuant to a scheme sanctioned by the High Court in 1986, which transferred four perpetually leased plots to the amalgamated entity. The Delhi Development Authority (DDA), as the lessor, demanded payment of an unearned increase in value (UEI) of Rs.2,13,59,511.20 on the basis of clause II(4)(a) of the perpetual lease deeds, which requires the lessor's written consent and allows recovery of 50% of the UEI upon any transfer. The appellant contended that the amalgamation was not a transfer within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and thus the UEI claim was inapplicable. The Supreme Court examined the lease clause, the scheme of amalgamation, and relevant policy instructions, concluding that the amalgamation did constitute a transfer of the leased plots and triggered the lessor’s right to recover UEI. Consequently, the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the DDA’s entitlement to the UEI.

Issues considered

  • Whether the amalgamation of the lessee company with another company amounts to a transfer of the leased plots under clause II(4)(a) of the perpetual lease deed.
  • Whether such a transfer obliges the lessee to pay the unearned increase in value as stipulated in the lease deed.
  • Whether Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, bars the DDA’s claim of UEI in the context of a corporate amalgamation.
  • Whether the High Court erred in holding that the amalgamation did not constitute a transfer.

Legislation cited

Subjects

LeasePerpetual lease deedsLesseeLessorDemand for an unearned increase valuePermanent lesseeAmalgamationScheme for amalgamationParting with the possessionTransfer of plotsInvoluntary transfers

Judgment

                 [2024] 4 S.C.R. 427 : 2024 INSC 273

                M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd.
     (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd.)
                              v.
                 Delhi Development Authority
                       (Civil Appeal No. 8336 of 2009)
                                 05 April 2024
               [Abhay S. Oka* and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.]

                            Issue for Consideration
       High Court had sanctioned the scheme for amalgamation of
       M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Pvt Ltd and M/s. Jaypee Rewa
       Cement, directing that the properties in the Schedule thereto
       which included four plots perpetually leased to M/s. Jaiprakash
       Associates Pvt Ltd shall stand vested in M/s. Jaypee Rewa
       Cement-transferee (now known as the appellant). Whether
       amalgamation amounted to transferring the plots. Respondent-
       DDA’s demand for an unearned increase in the value (i.e.
       difference between the premium paid and the market value)
       from the appellant, if justified.

                                   Headnotes
       Lease – Perpetual lease deeds – Demand for unearned increase
       in the value of the plot at the time of sale, transfer, assignment,
       or parting with the possession – Perpetual lease deeds of
       four plots in favour of lessee (M/s. Jaiprakash Associates
       Pvt Ltd) – Scheme for amalgamation sanctioned by High
       Court, directing that the properties in the Schedule thereto
       which included the aforesaid plots shall stand vested in the
       transferee company (now known as the appellant ) – Demand
       by respondent-DDA for an unearned increase in the value from
       the appellant – Justification:
       Held: Perpetual leases put an embargo on the lessee selling,
       transferring, assigning or otherwise parting with the possession
       of the whole or any part of the commercial plots except with the
       previous consent of the lessor in writing – The second proviso
       makes it clear that the respondent-DDA, which has stepped into
       the shoes of the lessor, will be entitled to recover a portion of the
       unearned increase in the value – Further, there was a specific
       clause in the order of amalgamation passed by the High Court which
* Author
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       held that the plots stood transferred from the original permanent
       lessee to the transferee M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd, now
       known as M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd-appellant – Relevant
       clause II(4)(a) covers all the categories of transfers as it provided
       that the lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with
       the possession of the whole or any part of the commercial plots
       without the written consent of the lessor – The said clause does not
       exclude involuntary transfers – In the facts of the case, it cannot
       be said that there was an involuntary transfer, as the transfer was
       made based on a petition filed by the lessee and the transferee for
       seeking amalgamation – In a sense, this is an act done by them
       of their own volition – Nothing illegal in the impugned judgment
       dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant against dismissal of
       its writ petition. [Paras 6, 8 and 12]
       Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.5 – “Transfer of property”
       defined – High Court had sanctioned the scheme for
       amalgamation of M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Pvt Ltd and
       M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement, directing that the properties in
       the Schedule thereto which included four plots perpetually
       leased to M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Pvt Ltd shall stand
       vested in M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement-transferee (now known
       as the appellant) – Plea of the appellant that transfer in this
       case was not covered by the transfer defined u/s.5:
       Held: Clause II(4)(a) in the perpetual leases was very wide as it not
       only covered transfers but also parting with possession – Therefore,
       the transfer contemplated by the said clause is much wider than
       what is defined u/s.5 – s.5 clarifies that nothing contained therein
       shall affect any law for the time being in force in relation to the
       transfer of property to or by companies – Therefore, s.5 will be of
       no assistance to the appellant. [Para 11]

                                 Case Law Cited
            Delhi Development Authority v. Nalwa Sons Investment
            Ltd. & Anr. [2019] 6 SCR 783 : (2020) 17 SCC 782 –
            referred to.
            Indian Shaving Products Limited v. Delhi Development
            Authority & Anr. (2001) SCC Online Del 1123 :
            2002 1 AD (Del) 175; Vijaya C. Gursahaney v. Delhi
            Development Authority & Ors. 1994 SCC Online Del
            306 : 1994 II AD (Delhi) 770 – referred to.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        429

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

                               List of Acts
     Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

                            List of Keywords
     Lease; Perpetual lease deeds; Lessee; Lessor; Demand for an
     unearned increase value; Permanent lessee; Amalgamation;
     Scheme for amalgamation; Parting with the possession; Transfer
     of plots; Involuntary transfers.

                           Case Arising From
     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.8336 of 2009
     From the Judgment and Order dated 16.08.2007 of the High Court
     of Delhi at N. Delhi in LPA No. 252 of 2003
                        Appearances for Parties
     Kavin Gulati, Sr. Adv., Ms. Sharmila Upadhyay, Pawan R Upadhyay,
     Sarvjit Pratap Singh, Ms. Supriya R Pandey, Advs. for the Appellant.
     Sanjiv Sen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anjali Singh, Ms. Tanwangi Shukla, Ms.
     Malvika Kapila, Advs. for the Respondent.
                Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                Judgment
     Abhay S. Oka, J.
     FACTUAL ASPECTS
1.   The Hon’ble President of India executed four separate perpetual
     lease deeds on 12th August 1983 in favour of M/s. Jaiprakash
     Associates Pvt Ltd in respect of the plots more particularly described
     in Schedule-I to the lease deeds (for short, ‘the said plots’). In July
     1986, a joint application was made by M/s. Jaiprakash Associates
     Pvt Ltd and M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd before the High Court of
     Judicature at Allahabad, praying for amalgamation of M/s. Jaiprakash
     Associates Pvt Ltd with M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd. By the
     order dated 30th July 1986, the High Court sanctioned the scheme
     of amalgamation. The said plots were included in the Schedule of
     the properties to the scheme of amalgamation. While passing the
     order dated 30th July 1986 approving amalgamation, the High Court
     directed that the properties in Parts I, II and III of Schedule II to
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       the said order shall stand vested in the transferee company (M/s.
       Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd). After the amalgamation, in September
       1986, the name of M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd was changed to
       M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. Subsequently, the name was changed
       to M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd, which is the present appellant.
       Thus, in short, the appellant is a company created as a result of the
       amalgamation of the erstwhile M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Pvt Ltd
       and M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd. In short, the present appellant
       is the transferee company.
2.     An application was made by the appellant to the respondent-Delhi
       Development Authority (for short, ‘DDA’) for a grant of permission to
       mortgage the said plots in favour of the Industrial Finance Corporation
       of India. By the letter dated 14th March 1991, the respondent-DDA
       demanded an unearned increase value of Rs.2,13,59,511.20. Being
       aggrieved by the said demand, representations were made by the
       appellant which were not favourably considered by the respondent-
       DDA. Therefore, the appellant filed a writ petition before a learned
       Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. By the order dated 30th
       January 2003, the learned Single Judge dismissed the said petition
       filed by the appellant by relying upon a decision a Division Bench
       of the same High Court in the case of Indian Shaving Products
       Limited v. Delhi Development Authority & Anr.1 Being aggrieved
       by the decision of the learned Single Judge, the appellant preferred
       an appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi. By
       the impugned judgment, the said appeal had also been dismissed.
       SUBMISSIONS
3.     The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant invited our
       attention to clause II(4)(a) of the lease deed, which puts an embargo
       on the lessee not to sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with the
       possession of the whole or any part of the said plots except with
       the previous consent in writing from the lessor. The proviso to the
       said clause entitled the lessor to impose a condition while granting
       consent, of payment of a portion of the unearned increase in the
       value (i.e. the difference between the premium paid and the market
       value). He submitted that the amalgamation of the lessee with another
       company under the orders of the Company Court will not amount


1    2001 SCC Online Del 1123: 2002 1 AD (Del) 175
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                          431

    M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
              Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

       to the sale, transfer or assignment of the said plots. His submission
       is that in the case of Indian Shaving Products Limited1, the High
       Court had dealt with a completely different set of factual and legal
       nuances. In the said case, the submission of the petitioner was that
       Section 32 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,
       1985 (for short, ‘SICA’) would have an overriding effect over the terms
       and conditions of the lease deed. He submitted that the merger or
       amalgamation was taken up in the said case for rehabilitation of a sick
       company and that it was a distressed company merger. Therefore,
       the said decision will have no application to the facts of this case.
4.     The learned senior counsel for the appellant further submitted that
       the amalgamation or merger of the two companies does not involve
       any transfer within the meaning of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
       (for short, ‘TPA’). He submitted that only in view of the operation of
       Section 394 of the Companies Act, 1956, the assets and liabilities
       of the lessee had merged and devolved on the appellant. He urged
       that the order sanctioning the scheme of amalgamation is an order
       in rem, which binds everyone. He pointed out that in the scheme
       of amalgamation, there was no element of sale consideration or
       consideration for transfer. The learned senior counsel submitted that
       in the scheme subject matter of this appeal, the transferor personality
       ceased to exist and merged with the transferee. The learned senior
       counsel relied upon a decision of the High Court of Delhi in the case
       of Delhi Development Authority v. Nalwa Sons Investment Ltd.
       & Anr2. He also relied upon a decision of the Division Bench of the
       High Court of Delhi in the case of Vijaya C. Gursahaney v. Delhi
       Development Authority & Ors3.
5.     The learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-DDA invited
       our attention to the order passed by the High Court of Judicature
       at Allahabad on 30th July 1986. He submitted that clause (1) of the
       order provides that the transferor company’s properties, rights and
       powers in respect of the property described in the first, second and
       third parts of schedule II shall be transferred without any further act
       or deed to the transferee company. He would, therefore, submit that
       the demand for unearned increase was lawful.


2     [2019] 6 SCR 783 : (2020) 17 SCC 782
3     1994 SCC Online Del 306 : 1994 II AD (Delhi) 770
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       CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
6.     We have given careful consideration to the submissions. In the
       perpetual leases, clause (II)(4)(a) was incorporated, which reads thus:
            “II. The Lessee for himself, his heirs, executors,
            administrators and assigns covenants with the Lessor in
            the manner following that is to say:-
            .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
            .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
            (4) (a) The lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or
            otherwise part with the possession of the whole or any
            part of the commercial plot except with the previous
            consent in writing of the lessor which he shall be
            entitled to refuse in his absolute discretion.
            Provided that such consent shall not be given for a period
            of ten years from the commencement of this Lease unless
            in the opinion of the Lessor, exceptional circumstances
            exist for the grant of such consent.
            Provided further that in the event of the consent
            being given the Lessor may impose such terms and
            conditions as he thinks fit and the Lessor shall be
            entitled to claim and recover a portion of the unearned
            increase in the value (i.e. the difference between the
            premium paid and the market value) of the plot at the
            time of sale, transfer, assignment, or parting with the
            possession, the amount to be recovered being fifty
            percent of the unearned increased and the decision
            of the Lessor in respect of the market value shall be
            final and binding.
            Provided further that the Lessor shall have the pre-emptive
            right to purchase the property after deducting fifty per cent
            of the unearned increase as aforesaid.”
                                                                      (emphasis added)
       The same clause has been incorporated in all four perpetual leases
       with which we are concerned. Therefore, the perpetual leases put an
       embargo on the lessee selling, transferring, assigning or otherwise
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                                        433

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

     parting with the possession of the whole or any part of the commercial
     plots except with the previous consent of the lessor in writing. The
     second proviso makes it clear that the respondent-DDA, which has
     stepped into the shoes of the lessor, will be entitled to recover a
     portion of the unearned increase in the value.
7.   Now, the question is whether amalgamation will amount to transferring
     the said plots. We have carefully perused the order dated 30th July
     1986 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad sanctioning the
     scheme of amalgamation. In the said scheme, M/s. Jaiprakash
     Associates Private Ltd (the erstwhile company) was shown as the
     ‘transferor company’ and M/s. Jaypee Rewa Cement Ltd was shown
     as the ‘transferee company’. Clauses (1) and (2) of the operative
     part of the order dated 30th July 1986 read thus:
           “.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
           1.     That all the properties, rights and powers of
                  the Transferor Company specified in the first,
                  second and third parts of the Schedule II hereto
                  and all other properties, rights and powers of
                  the Transferor Company be transferred without
                  further act or deed to the transferee company and
                  accordingly the same shall pursuant to section
                  394(2) of the Companies Act, 1956 be transferred
                  to and vest in the Transferee Company for all the
                  estate and interest of the Transferor Company
                  therein but subject, nevertheless to all charges
                  now affecting the same; and
           2.     That all the liabilities and duties of the Transferor
                  Company be transferred without further act or deed
                  to the Transferee company and accordingly the same
                  shall pursuant to section 394(2) of the Companies
                  Act, 1956 be transferred to and become the liabilities
                  and duties of the transferee company, and
           .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..”
                                                                     (emphasis added)
8.   The said plots are a part of the Schedule of the properties referred
     to in clause (1). Thus, there is a specific clause in the order of
     amalgamation which holds that the said plots stand transferred from
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       the original permanent lessee to the transferee M/s. Jaypee Rewa
       Cement Ltd, which is now known as M/s. Jaiprakash Associates Ltd.
       Clause II(4)(a) covers all the categories of transfers as it provides
       that the lessee shall not sell, transfer, assign or otherwise part with
       the possession of the whole or any part of the commercial plots
       without the written consent of the lessor. The said clause does not
       exclude involuntary transfers. In the facts of the case, it cannot be
       said that there is an involuntary transfer, as the transfer is made
       based on a petition filed by the lessee and the transferee for seeking
       amalgamation. In a sense, this is an act done by them of their own
       volition.
9.     A similar issue arose for consideration before this Court in the case
       of Nalwa Sons Investment Ltd2. The Court was dealing with a
       case where the Company Court passed an order of arrangement
       and demerger. As a result, the plot given on lease to a company
       was transferred to another company. In paragraph 5 of the decision,
       this Court had set out the policy instructions regarding charging an
       unearned increase. Paragraph 5 reads thus:
            5. The instructions followed by the competent authority
            in regard to charging of UEI have been articulated in
            document Annexure P-1, which reads thus:
                                 XXX XXX XXX
            Sub. : Substitution/addition/deletion of names in lease/
            sub-lease of industrial/commercial plots unearned increase
            In supersession of previous instructions on the subject, the
            Lt. Governor, Delhi is pleased to order that henceforth in
            the matters of addition/deletion and substitution of names
            in respect of industrial/commercial lease/sub-lease to be
            executed or already executed, the following procedure
            shall be followed:
            1.   No unearned increase to be charged:
                 (a)   The auction-purchaser/allottee shall be permitted
                       free of charge, to add, delete or substitute the
                       names of family members which may, where
                       necessary, take the form of partnership firm or
                       private limited company.
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                            435

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

                (b)   In case of conversion of partnership firm into
                      private limited company comprising original
                      partners as Directors/Subscribers/Shareholders.
                (c)   In case of addition, deletion or substitution of
                      partners in a firm or Directors and conversion of
                      sole proprietorship firm or partnership concern
                      into private limited company when change in
                      constitution is limited, for approval by the DDA,
                      within one year from the date of purchase of
                      plot in auction. This will to apply in case of plot
                      obtained by the party by way of allotment.
                (d)   Change from private limited company to
                      public limited company where a private limited
                      company becomes a public limited company
                      under Section 43-A of the Companies Act, 1956.
           2.   Where unearned increase is to be charged:
                (a)   Addition of outsiders not falling within the family
                      members shall be allowed through a conveyance
                      deed on payment of 50% unearned increase on
                      his proportionate shares. The unearned increase
                      shall be calculated at the market rate prevalent
                      on the date of receipt of the application in the
                      office of the DDA.
                (b)   Substitution of the original allottee/auction-
                      purchasers shall be allowed on payment of 50%
                      unearned increase of his shares in the value of
                      the plot which will be calculated at the market
                      rate. The market rate shall be the rate prevalent
                      on the date of receipt of the application. It is
                      irrespective of the fact whether the lease deed
                      has been executed or not.
                (c)   50% unearned increase will be charged in
                      respect of proportionate shares of the plot parted
                      with by way of addition, deletion or substitution
                      of partner/partners in case of single ownership
                      or partnership firm and Director/Directors/
                      Shareholders/Subscribers in case of private
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                       limited company. This is applicable where the
                       incoming persons do not fall within the definition
                       of family. Unearned increase would be charged
                       on the basis of market rate prevalent on the
                       date of intimation for each and every change
                       in the constitution. This would be applicable
                       in all cases where the lease deed has been
                       executed or not.
                 (d)   In case where a private limited company/
                       public limited company separately floating
                       a new company although Directors may be
                       the same and the name of old company has
                       not changed and it still exists as it was,
                       50% unearned increase will be chargeable
                       in such cases.
            3.   Interest @ 18% p.a. on the unearned increase from
                 the date of receipt of the application intimating the
                 change till the payment by the company or individual
                 or firm shall be charged on the amount of the unearned
                 increase payable to the DDA.
            4.   The administrative conditions prescribed in the UO
                 No. F.1(23)/78/C(L) Part II dated 8-5-1979 will remain
                 unchanged.
                                 XXX XXX XXX”
                                                     (emphasis added)
       In paragraphs 14 to 18, this Court held thus:
            14. For answering the seminal question, we must first
            advert to the obligation of Respondent 1 springing from
            the stipulation in the perpetual lease deed. Clause 6(a),
            as extracted in para 2 above, envisages a bar to sell,
            transfer, assign or otherwise part with the possession
            of the whole or any part of the commercial plot, except
            with the previous consent in writing of the lessor
            (appellant), which the appellant would be entitled
            to refuse in its absolute discretion. While granting
            consent in terms of the proviso to Clause 6(a), it is open
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           437

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

           to the appellant to impose such terms and conditions
           as may be deemed appropriate and claim and recover
           a portion of the unearned increase in the value of the
           commercial plot, being 50% of the unearned increase.
           The decision of the appellant in this behalf is final and
           binding upon the original lessee (Respondent 1). The
           amount towards the unearned increase is computed on the
           basis of the difference between the premium paid and the
           market value of the commercial plot. In doing so, the fact
           that the transfer under consideration did not involve any
           consideration amount or the value paid by the transferee
           is below the market value, would not inhibit recovery of
           50% of the prescribed unearned increase amount on
           actual or, in a given case, notional basis. This is the plain
           meaning of the stipulation. This position is reinforced from
           the contemporaneous instructions issued by the competent
           authority of the appellant about the manner in which the
           unearned increase should be charged and from whom
           such charges should be recovered. That can be discerned
           from the instructions dated 6-9-1988.
           15. Indeed, the said instructions advert to the category
           of persons from whom no unearned increase should be
           charged, despite being a case of transfer of the property
           as mentioned in Clause 1 thereof. The Division Bench of
           the High Court has relied upon the category mentioned
           in Clause 1(b). The same reads thus:
           “1. No unearned increase to be charged:
           (a)***
           (b) In case of conversion of partnership firm into private
           limited company comprising original partners as Directors/
           Subscribers/Shareholders.”
           From the plain language of this clause, we fail to fathom
           how the said clause will be of any avail to the respondents.
           For, we are not dealing with a case of conversion of a
           partnership firm into a private limited company as such.
           The fact that the instructions extricate the category of
           transfers referred to in Clause 1 of the instructions from
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       the liability of paying an unearned increase despite being
       a case of transfer, cannot be the basis to exclude the other
       category of transfers/persons not specifically covered by
       Clause 1, such as the case of present respondents. That
       is a policy matter. The respondents were fully aware about
       the existence of such a policy. That policy has not been
       challenged in the writ petition. Concededly, the reliefs
       claimed in the writ petition were limited to quashing of the
       demand letter dated 5-8-2010 and notice dated 31-1-2011,
       demanding unearned increase; and to direct the appellant
       to convert the said property from leasehold to freehold in
       favour of Respondent 2, without charging any unearned
       increase. The reliefs are founded on the assertion that
       the transfer was not to any outsider, much less for any
       consideration.
       16. In the first place, it is not open to the respondents
       to contend that the arrangement and demerger scheme
       does not result in transfer of the subject plot from
       the original lessee (Respondent 1) to Respondent 2.
       Inasmuch as, Clause (2) of the order passed by the
       Company Judge approving the scheme of demerger,
       as reproduced above, makes it amply clear that all
       property, assets, rights and powers in respect of the
       specified properties, including the subject plot, shall
       stand transferred to and vest in Respondent 2. Once
       it is a case of transfer, it must abide by the stipulation
       in Clause 6(a) of the lease deed of taking previous
       consent in writing of the lessor (appellant) and to
       fulfil such terms and conditions as may be imposed,
       including to pay any unearned increase amount. We
       find force in the argument of the appellant that the fact
       situation of the present case would, in fact, be governed
       by Clause 2(d) of the instructions which reads thus:
       “2. Where unearned increase is to be charged:
       (a)***
       (d) In case where a private limited company/public
       limited company separately floating a new company
       although Directors may be the same and the name
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                           439

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

           of old company has not changed and it still exists as
           it was, 50% unearned increase will be chargeable in
           such cases.”
           This clause plainly applies to the present case. The
           demand of unearned increase from the respondents is
           founded on that basis. The High Court misinterpreted the
           said clause and erroneously opined that it is not applicable
           to a case of demerger of a public limited company.
           17. The principal clause is Clause 6(a) of the lease
           deed. The clause referred to in the instructions is equally
           significant. Indeed, the latter merely provides for the
           mechanism to recover the unearned increase from the
           original lessee. The fact that the same group of persons
           or Directors/promoters/ shareholders would be and are
           associated with the transferee company does not cease
           to be a case of transfer or exempted from payment of UEI,
           as envisaged in Clause 6(a) of the lease deed. Rather,
           Clause 2(d) of the policy, noted above, makes it expressly
           clear that unearned increase be charged irrespective of
           the fact that the Directors in both companies are common
           and the old (parent) company has not changed its name.
           18. The fact that it was a case of transfer is reinforced
           from the order of demerger passed by the Company
           Judge and once it is a case of transfer, coupled with
           the fact that the respondents are not covered within the
           categories specified in Clauses 1(a) to 1(d) of the policy
           of the appellant, reproduced in para 5 above, they would
           be liable to pay unearned increase (“UEI”) in the manner
           specified in Clause 6(a) of the lease deed. The obligation to
           pay UEI does not flow only from the instructions issued by
           the competent authority of the appellant but primarily from
           the stipulation in the perpetual lease deed in the form of
           Clause 6(a). Viewed thus, the Division Bench of the High
           Court committed a manifest error in allowing the appeal
           and setting aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge,
           who had rightly dismissed the writ petition and upheld the
           demand notice and the show-cause notice calling upon
           the respondents to pay the unearned increase amount in
440                                                            [2024] 4 S.C.R.

                       Digital Supreme Court Reports


            terms of Clause 6(a) of the perpetual lease deed. That
            demand was final and binding on the respondents, so
            long as the stipulation in the form of Clause 6(a) of the
            perpetual lease was in force.”
                                                      (emphasis added)
       This Court was dealing with an order of the Company Judge, which
       provided that the property of a company shall stand transferred to the
       respondent before this Court, and therefore, it was a case of transfer
       to which clause 6(a) of the lease deed will be attracted. Clause 6(a)
       in the lease subject matter of the said case was identical to clause
       II(4)(a) of the perpetual lease in the present case. This Court also
       held that clause 2(d) of the policy determining unearned income was
       attracted in the case of transfer due to demerger. In our view, the
       same principles will apply to a merger, and an unearned increase
       will be payable. In the case of Indian Shaving Products Limited1,
       the High Court of Delhi dealt with the amalgamation of companies
       under the SICA and not under the Companies Act. In any event,
       this court confirmed the said decision by summarily dismissing the
       petition. In the present case, the relevant clause II(4)(a) of the leases
       covers involuntary transfers as well.
10. An argument is also sought to be canvassed that the transfer in this
    case is not covered by the transfer defined under Section 5 of the
    TPA. Section 5 of the TPA reads thus:
            “5. “Transfer of property” defined.—
            In the following sections “transfer of property” means an
            act by which a living person conveys property, in present
            or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to
            himself, and one or more other living persons; and “to
            transfer property” is to perform such act.
            In this section “living person” includes a company or
            association or body of individuals, whether incorporated
            or not, but nothing herein contained shall affect any law
            for the time being in force relating to transfer of property
            to or by companies, associations or bodies of individuals.”
11. The relevant clause II(4)(a) in the perpetual leases subject matter
    of this appeal is very wide. It not only covers transfers but also
    parting with possession. Therefore, the transfer contemplated by
[2024] 4 S.C.R.                                                        441

 M/s. Jaiprakash Industries Ltd. (Presently known as M/s. Jaiprakash
           Associates Ltd.) v. Delhi Development Authority

     the said clause is much wider than what is defined under Section 5.
     Importantly, Section 5 clarifies that nothing contained therein shall
     affect any law for the time being in force in relation to the transfer
     of property to or by companies. Therefore, Section 5 of the TPA will
     not be of any assistance to the appellant.
12. Therefore, we find nothing illegal about the impugned judgment.
    Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.
13. By the order dated 3rd January 2008 of this Court, an interim stay
    was granted to the impugned judgment subject to a condition
    of the appellant depositing a sum of Rs.2,13,59,511.20 with this
    Court. The office report shows that the amount and the interest
    accrued thereon have been separately invested. Therefore, it will
    be open for the respondent-DDA to withdraw the principal amount
    of Rs.2,13,59,511.20 along with the interest.

     Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey                 Result of the case:
                                                          Appeal dismissed.


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M/S. JAIPRAKASH INDUSTRIES LTD. (PRESENTLY KNOWN AS M/S. JAIPRAKASH ASSOCIATES LTD.) versus DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY — 2024 INSC 273 - Legal Desk AI