Supreme Court of India
M/S INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD.versusN. SATCHIDANAND
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 425
- Decided
- 4 July 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R V RAVEENDRAN
Holding
A Permanent Lok Adalat has jurisdiction over public utility service disputes irrespective of contractual exclusive jurisdiction clauses, and an airline is not liable for compensation for delays caused by weather or ATC when it provides the statutorily mandated minimum facilitation.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined a claim by a passenger against Indigo Airlines for compensation due to a prolonged flight delay, alleged deficiency in service, and alleged illegal detention at Hyderabad airport. The Court held that the Permanent Lok Adalat in Hyderabad had jurisdiction to entertain the dispute despite the airline’s contract clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction to Delhi courts, as such a clause is invalid when it ousts all courts that would otherwise have jurisdiction. It further found that the delay was caused by dense fog, bad weather and ATC congestion—factors beyond the carrier’s control—so the airline was not liable for damages under the Carriage by Air Act or its own conditions. The airline had provided the minimum facilitation (snacks, water, toilet facilities) required by DGCA guidelines, satisfying its statutory duty. Consequently, the award of Rs.10,000 compensation by the Permanent Lok Adalat was set aside.
Issues considered
- The jurisdiction of the Permanent Lok Adalat, Hyderabad, to entertain the passenger's claim.
- The validity and effect of the exclusive jurisdiction clause in Indigo's Conditions of Carriage.
- Whether the airline is liable for damages for delay caused by weather and ATC control.
- The airline's duty to provide minimum facilitation during a delay and whether its performance amounted to deficiency in service.
- The existence of a cause of action for compensation for alleged illegal detention at Hyderabad airport.
- The propriety of the Permanent Lok Adalat's award of compensation.
Legislation cited
- Aircraft Rules, 1937s. Rule 133A, s. Rule 134
- Carriage by Air Act, 1972s. Second Schedule, Clause 19
- DGCA Circular dated 6.8.2010 (Passenger Facilitation)
- DGCA Circular No.8/2007 (Low Visibility Conditions)
- Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987s. 19, s. 22-B, s. 22C, s. 22E
Subjects
jurisdictionexclusive jurisdiction clausePermanent Lok Adalatairline liabilityflight delayfacilitationlow cost carrierCarriage by Air Actpublic utility serviceconsumer protection
Judgment
[2011] 6 S.C.R. 1116
A M/S INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD.
v.
N. SATCHIDANAND
(Civil Appeal No. 4925 of 2011)
JULY 4, 2011
B
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN AND A.K. PATNAIK, JJ.]
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987:
c s. 22-B - Permanent Lok Ada/at for public utility services
- Jurisdiction of - Air passenger - Ticket purchased at
Hyderabad - Plane boarded at Delhi for Hyderabad - Delay
in flight - After flight landed at Hyderabad, passenger
detained for inquiry - Claim for damages by passenger for
0 deficiency in service and alleged illegal detention - HELD:
Permanent Lok Ada/at, Hyderabad had jurisdiction to
entertain the application of the passenger.
Jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Ada/at - Exclusion clause
in contract - Scope and interpretation of - HELD: Parties
E cannot, by agreement, confer jurisdiction on a court which
does not have jurisdiction - Ouster of jurisdiction of some
courts is permissible so long as the court on which exclusive
jurisdiction is conferred had jurisdiction - In the instant case,
as the clause provides that irrespective of the place of cause
F of action, only courts at Delhi would have jurisdiction, the said
clause is invalid in law - Further, a clause ousting the
jurisdiction of a court has to be construed strictly - Permanent
Lok Ada/at is a Special Tribunal and not a court -
Interpretation of statutes.
G
ss. 19 and 22-B - Lok Ada/at constituted uls 19 and
Permanent Lok Ada/at constituted u/s 22-B - Distinction
between - Explained - Confusion in nomenclature clarified
- HELD: Lok Adalats constituted uls 19 on a regular or
H 1116
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1117
permanent basis, may be referred to as 'Continuous Lok A
Adalats'.
Contract:
Airlines - e-ticketing - Conditions of carriage by
reference - HELD: Placing the conditions of carriage on the B
web-site and referring to the same in the e-ticket and making
copies of conditions of carriage available at the airport
counters for inspection is sufficient notice in regard to the
terms of conditions of the carriage and will bind the parties -
The mere fact that a passenger may not read or may not C
demand a copy does not mean that he will not be bound by
the terms of contract of carriage - Notice.
Carriage by Air Act, 1972:
Second Schedule - Clause 19- Low cost carrier- Flight D
delayed after the passengers boarded the plane -
Cancellation of flight and option given to passengers to
continue the journey by the combined flight in the same
aircraft - Passenger opted to avail the option - Combined
flight also delayed - Application by passenger before E
Permanent Lok Ada/at claiming damages for deficiency in
service - HELD: Permanent Lok Ada/at recorded a finding
of fact that delay was due to dense fog/bad weather and want
of A TC clearance due to air traffic congestion, which were
beyond the control of the air carrier, and as a consequence, F
rightly held that the air carrier was not liable for payment of
any compensation for the delay as such.
Liability of carrier to provide facilitation during delay -
HELD: The issue of responsibility for delay in operating the G
flight is distinct and different from the responsibility of the
airline to offer facilitation to the passengers grounded or
struck on board due to delay - Even if no compensation is
payable for the delay on account of bad weather or other
conditions beyond the control of the air carrier, the airline will H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.
A be made liable to pay compensation if it fails to offer the
minimum facilitation in the form of refreshment/water/
beverages, as also toilet facilities to the passengers who have
boarded the plane, in the event of delay in departure, as such
failure would amount to deficiency in service - Jn the instant
B case, though the claimant had to stay in the aircraft for 11
hours, it was because of his voluntary decision to take the later
flight which was a combined flight and the delay in regard to
combined flight was 4 hours 20 minutes - However, the airline
served snacks and water two times - Further there was no
c complaint that toilet facilities were denied - Thus, the facilities
offered by the carrier were reasonable and met the minimum
facilitation as per DGCA guidelines applicable at the relevant
point of time - Thus the airline was not liable to pay any
damages - The order of the Permanent Lok Ada/at affirmed
by the High Court awarding damages and costs to the
0
respondent is set aside and the application of respondent for
compensation is rejected - Consumer fora and Permanent
Lok Adalats can not award compensation merely because
there was inconvenience or hardship or on grounds of
E sympathy, if there is no cause of action for claiming damages
- Compensation - Cause of action.
Low cost carrier - Exclusion clause stipulating that in the
event of flight delay, carrier would not provide any 'meals' -
HELD: Such exclusion clause can apply to passengers who
F have not boarded the flight and who have the freedom to
purchase food in the airport or the freedom to leave - It will
not apply to passengers who are on board and the delay in
the flight taking off. denies them access to food and water -
Suggestion given to Airports and A TC authorities to allow
G passengers, who had boarded the. aircraft, to get back to the
airport lounge when there is delay in flight for a period beyond
three hours.
The respondent, who was booked to travel on a 'low
H cost carrier', namely Indigo flight No.GE-301, from Delhi
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1119
to Hyderabad on 14.12.2007 scheduled to depart at 6.15 A
a.m., boarded the flight at around 5.45 a.m. Due to dense
fog, bad weather and poor visibility at Delhi airport the
flight was delayed. Around 11.15 a.m. an announcement
was made that flight No. SE-301 was cancelled and the
passengers were given the options: (a) refund of air fare; B
or (b) credit for future travel on lndiGo; or (c) rebooking
onto an alternative lndiGo flight at no additional cost. The
respondent took the third option to continue the journey
on the combined flight (flight no. SE-305 scheduled to
depart at 12.15 p.m.), by the same aircraft by remaining c
on board. Even the combined flight No.SE 305 could not
take off on schedule, as the ATC did not give the
clearance. Finally, the ATC clearance was given at 4.20
p.m. and the flight departed at 4.37 p.m. and reached
Hyderabad around 7 p.m. The respondent and some
0
other passengers were detained at the Hyderabad Airport
for more than an hour in connection with an enquiry by
the Security Personnel of lndiGo, in regard to a complaint
by the on-board crew that they had threatened and
misbehaved with the air hostesses when the flight was
delayed. E
The respondent filed a complaint against the
appellant-Airlines at Hyderabad before the Permanent
Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services, claiming a
compensation of Rs. 5 lakh for the delay, deficiency in F
service, failure to provide him medical facilities, as he was
diabetic and· hyper tension patient and for illegal
detention from 7.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. at Hyderabad
Airport. The airline resisted the claim contending, inter
alia, that the Permanent Lok Adalat at Hyderabad had no G
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint, as having regard
to the jurisdiction clause in the contract of carriage, only
the courts at Delhi had jurisdiction; that the delay was
because of the factors which were beyond the control of
the airlines, and was not on account of any negligence H
1120 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A or want of care or deficiency in service on its part; that
the respondent did not disclose his ailments; that the
flight being operated by a low cost carrier, the airline did
not have any provision to serve any food or beverages;
in spite of it, arrangements were made for supply of free
s snacks and water.
The Permanent Lok Adalat, by award dated 18.9.2009
held that it had territorial jurisdiction. It further held that
the delay was due to poor visibility and bad weather
conditions, reasons beyond the control of the appellant,
C but there was laxity and deficiency in service on the part
of the appellant. Consequently, it awarded Rs.10,000/- as
compensr.tion and Rs.2,500/- as costs. The Permanent
Lok Adalat did not examine the issue of wrongful
confinement. The writ petition of the airline was
· D dismissed by the High.
Allowing the appeal filed by the airline, the Court
HELD:
E Jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat:
1.1. The dispute was with reference to a contract of
carriage of a passenger from Delhi to Hyderabad. The
ticket was purchased at Hyderabad and, consequently,
F the contract was entered into at Hyderabad. A part of the
cause of action also arose at Hyderabad as the
respondent clearly alleged as one of the causes for
claiming compensation, his illegal detention at the
Hyderabad Airport by the security staff of the appellant
G when the flight landed. Therefore, the courts and tribunals
at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to entertain the claims/
disputes. Section 228 of the Legal Services Authorities
Act, 1987 (LSA Act) provides that Permanent Lok Adalats
shall be established for exercising jurisdiction in respect
H of one or more public utility services for such areas as
' INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1121
may be specified in the notification. It is not disputed that A
the Permanent Lok Adalat for public utility services,
Hyderabad was constituted for the area of Hyderabad and
transport services by way of carriage of passengers by
air is a public utility service. Therefore, the Permanent Lok
Ada/at at Hyderabad had jurisdiction to entertain the B
application against the appellant. [para 17) [1143-F-H;
1144-A-B]
1.2. The finding of the High Court that the term relating
to exclusive jurisdiction should be ignored on the ground C
that the passengers would not have read it, cannot be
endorsed. The fact that the conditions of carriage contain
the exclusive jurisdiction clause is not disputed. The e-
tickets do not contain the complete conditions of carriage
but incorporate the conditions of carriage by reference.
The interested passengers can ask the airline for a copy D
of the contract of carriage or visit the web-site and
ascertain the same. Placing the conditions of carriage on
the web-site and referring to the same in the e-ticket and
making copies of conditions of carriage available at the
airport counters for inspection is sufficient notice in E ~,..
iregard to the terms of conditions of the carriage and will
bind the parties. The mere fact that a passenger may not
read or may not demand a copy does not mean that he
will not be bound by the terms of contract of carriage.
[para 18) [1144-C-G] F
1.3. It is well settled that the parties cannot by
agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which does not
have jurisdiction; and that only where two or more courts
have the jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding, an G
agreement that the disputes shall be tried in one of such
courts is not contrary to public policy. The ouster of
jurisdiction of some courts is permissible so long as the
court on which exclusive jurisdiction is conferred, had
jurisdiction. In the instant case, the 'exclusive jurisdiction H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A clause', contained in the Indigo Conditions of Carriage,
i.e. "All disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the
courts of Delhi only." is made applicable to all contracts
of carriage with the appellant, relating to passengers,
baggage or cargo anywhere in the country, irrespective
B of whether any part of the cause of action arose at Delhi
or not. If the clause had been made to apply only where
a part of cause of action accrued in Delhi, it would have
been valid. But as the clause provides that irrespective
of the place of cause of action, only courts at Delhi would
c have jurisdiction, the said clause is invalid in law, having
regard to the principle laid down in ABC Laminart. The
fact that in the instant case, the place of embarkation
happened to be Delhi, would not validate a clause, which
is invalid. [para 14-15) (1139-G-H; 1140-A-B; 1141-B-G]
D ABC Laminart v. A.P. Agencies 1989 (2) SCR 1 = 1989
(2) sec 163 - relied on
1.4. Further, a clause ousting the jurisdiction of a
court, which otherwise would have jurisdiction will have
E to be construed strictly. In the instant case, the relevant
clause provides that all disputes shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts at Delhi only. But the respondent
did not approach a "court". The claim was filed by the
respondent before a Permanent Lok Ada/at constituted
F under Chapter VI-A of the Legal Services Authorities Act,
1987 ('LSA Act'). The Permanent Lok Ada/at is a Special
Tribunal which is not a 'court' and, as such, the provision
in the contract relating to exclusivity of jurisdiction of
courts at Delhi will not apply. [para 16) [1141-H; 1142-A-
G B; 1143-D]
1.5. The confusion caused on account of the term
Permanent Lok Ada/at being used to describe two
different types of Lok Adalats. The LSA Act refers to two
types of Lok Adalats needs to be removed. The first is a
H Lok Ada/at constituted u/s. 19 of the Act which has no
INTERGLOBEAVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1123
. adjudicatory functions or powers and which discharges A
purely conciliatory functions. The second is a Permanent
Lok Ada/at established u/s. 228(1) of LSA Act to exercise
jurisdiction in respect of public utility services, having
both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions. The word
Permanent Lok Ada/at should refer only to Permanent B
Lok Adalats establ.ished u/s. 228(1) of the LSA Act and
not to the Lok Adalats constituted u/s. 19. However in
many states, when Lok Adalats are constituted u/s. 19 of
LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted
from periodical sittings), they are also called as c
Permanent Lok Adalats even though they do not have
adjudicatory functions. To avoid confusion, the State
Legal Services Authorities and the High Courts may
ensure that Lok Adalats other than the Permanent Lok
Adalats established u/s. 228(1) of the Act in regard to
0
public utility services, are not described as Permanent
Lok Adalats. One way of avoiding the confusion is to refer
to the Lok Adalats constituted u/s. 19 of the Act on a
regular or permanent basis as 'Continuous Lok Adalats'.
[para 19] [1144-H; 1145-A-G]
E
UC of India vs. Suresh Kumar - 2011 (4) SCALE 137 -
referred to.
Low cost carrier vis-a-vis full service carrier:
2.1. The appellant is a low cost carrier. The F
1
passengers, who prefer to travel on budget fares, when
opting for low cost carriers know fully well that they
cannot expect from such carriers, the services as!iociated
with full service carriers. But the fact that an airline is ~
low cost carrier does not mean that it can dilute th~ G
requirements relating to safety, security and\
,maintenance. Nor can it refuse to comply with the·
minimum standards and requirements prescribed by the\
Director General of Civil Aviation. The fact that it offers
only 'no- frills' service does not mean that it can absolve H
1124 SUPREME COURT REt->ORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.
A itself from liability for negligence, want of care or
deficiency in service. [para 20) [1145-H; 1146-A-E]
Liability for damages for delay:
3. Clause 19 of Second Schedule to Carriage by Air
B Act, 1972 makes it clear that the carrier is not liable for
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of
passengers. Further, the lndiGo Conditions of Carriage
categorically state that the carrier will not be liable to pay
any damages for delays, rescheduling or cancellations
C due to circumstances beyond the control of lndiGo.
There is no ci1spute that in the instant case, the delay was
for reasons beyond the control 01 the carrier. The
guidelines show that the operating air carrier would not
be liable to pay compensation to a passenger, in respect
D of either cancellation or delays attributable to
meteorological conditions (weather/fog etc.,) or air traffic
control directions/instructions, which are beyond the
control of the air carrier. The Permanent Lok Adalat
recorded a finding of fact that delay was due to dense fog/
E bad weather and want of ATC clearance due to air traffic
congestion, which were beyond the control of the air
carrier and as a consequence rightly held that the air
carrier was not liable for payment of any compensation
for the delay as such. This was the position as on the
F date of the incident (14.12.2007) and even subsequently,
after the issue of the guidelines dated 6.8.2010 by the
DGCA. [para 25) [1153-F-H; 1154-A-C]
Liabilit'( to provide facilitation during delay:
G 4.1. The issue of responsibility for delay in operating
the flight is distinct and different from the responsibility
of the airline to offer facilitation to the passengers
grounded or struck on board due to delay. If the
obligation to provide facilitation to the passengers is
H legally recognized, either based on statutory
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1125
requirements or contractual obligations or recognized A
conventions, failure to provide the required minimum
facilitation may, depending upon the facts of the case,
amount to either breach of statutory/contractual
obligation, negligence, want of care or deficiency in
service on the part of the operating airline entitling the B
passengers for compensation. [para 26) [1154-D-F]
4.2. As per the DGCA's guidelines dated 5.12;2007
which were in force on 14.12.2007 (the relevant date),
there was obligation to provide facilitation to passengers
on the part of the carrier. Clause 35 provided, if the flight C
is delayed, after boarding, appropriate facilitation has to
be given by the Airlines on board. Clause 36 provides that
the Airlines, even low cost carriers, had to provide
facilitation in terms of tea/water/snacks to the passengers
of their delayed flights. [para 27] [1154-G-H] D
4.3. Facilitation of passengers who are stranded after
boarding the aircraft on account of delays is an implied
term of carriage of passengers, accepted as an
international practice, apart from being a requirement to E
be fulfilled under DGCA's directives. Such facilitation
which relates to the health, survival and safety of the
passengers, is to be provided, not only by full service
carriers, but all airlines including low cost carriers. This
obligation has nothing to do with the issue of liability or
F
non-liability to pay compensation to the passengers for
the delay. Even if no compensation is payable for the
delay on account of bad weather or other conditions
beyond the control of the air carrier, the airline will be
made liable to pay compensation if it fails to offer the
minimum .facilitation in the form of refreshment/water/ G
beverages, as also toilet facilities to the passengers who
have boarded the plane, in the event of delay in departure,
as such failure would amount to deficiency in service. At
the relevant point of time (14th December 2007), in the
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A event of delay, passengers on-board were to be provided
by the air carriers, including low cost carriers, facilitation
by way of snacks/water/tea apart from access to toilet.
[para 28] [1155-A-F]
Ravennet Singh Bagga vs. KLM Royal Duth Airlines
B 1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 320 = 2000 (1) SCC 66 - referred to.
Effect of Indigo Conditions of Carriage on the liability for
facilitation:
4.4. The exclusion clause no doubt states that in the
C event of flight delay, lndiGo would not provide any
"meals". But it can apply to passengers who have not
boarded the flight and who have the freedom to purchase
food in the airport or the freedom to leave. It will not
apply to passengers who are on board and the delay in
D the flight taking off, denies them access to food and
water. In the extra-ordinary situation where the
passengers are physically under the complete care and
control of the airline, as it hapi:-ens when they have
boarded the aircraft and have no freedom to alight from
E the aircraft, the duty of the airlines to protect and care for
them, and provide for basic facilitation including the care
for the health , welfare and safety would prevail over any
term of the contract excluding any facilitation (except
where the carrier itself cannot access food due to
F emergency situations), and the exclusion clause in
question stood superseded. (The DGCA directives in
force from 15.8.2010 clearly provide that passengers shall
be offered free of cost meals and refreshment in relation
to the waiting time). This is with reference to the
G passengers on board, in delayed flights which have not
taken off. Subject to any directives of DGCA to the
contrary, the exclusion clause will be binding in normal
conditions, that is, during the flight period, once the flight
has taken off, or where the passenger has not boarded.
H [para 31] [1157-H; 1158-A-F]
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1127
What was the period of delay: A
5. The respondent's complaint is about the
inordinate delay of eleven hours after boarding. It is true
that the respondent was confined to the aircraft for nearly
eleven hours on account of the delay. But, the delay in a
sense was not of 11 hours (from 5.35 a.m. to 4.37 p.m). 8
The respondent first took flight No.GE-301 which was
scheduled to depart at 6.15 a.m. and boarded that flight
at 5.45 a.m. When that flight was unduly delayed on
account of the bad weather around 11.15 a.m. the said
flight was cancelled and was combined with subsequent C
flight No.6E-305 due to depart at 12.15 p.m. If the
respondent continued to sit in the aircraft, it was because
of his voluntary decision to take the later flight which was
a combination of flight No.6E-301 and 6E-305 which was
. due to depart at 12.15 p.m. (subject to ATC clearance) and D
that was delayed till 4.37 p.m. Therefore, the delay in
regard to the combined flight which was due for
departure at 12.15 p.m. was four hours and twenty
minutes. The stay of eleven hours in the aircraft was a
voluntary decision of the respondent, as he could have E
left the aircraft much earlier around 11.00 a.m. by either
opting to obtain refund of the air fare or by opting for
credit for future travel or by opting for an lndiGo flight on
a subsequent day. Having opted to remain on board the
respondent could not make a grievance of the delay, or F
no'1-availability of food of his choice or medicines. [para
33] [1159-F-H; 1160-A-B]
Whether the airline failed to provide facilitation to
respondent?
G
6.1. When flight No.GE-301 was cancelled and
combined with the subsequent flight No.6E-305, the on-
board passengers including the respondent who opted
to continue in the flight were offered snacks (sandwiches)
and water free of cost, around 12 noon. As the combined H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A flight (No.6E-305) was also delayed, a second free offer
of sandwiches and water was made around 3 p.m. But
the second time, the respondent was offered a chicken
sandwich and as he was a vegetarian, he was offered
biscuits and water, instead. In the absence of prior
8 intimation about the preference in regard to food and in
emergency conditions, the non-offer of a vegetarian
sandwich in the second round of free snacks cannot be
considered to be a violation of basic facilitation. In fact,
the appellant being a low cost carrier, on the relevant
date, there was also no occasion for indicating such
C preferences. It is not the case of the respondent that toilet
facilities were denied or not made available. In the
circumstances, the appellant being a low cost carrier, the
facilitations offered by it, were reasonable and also met
the minimum facilitation as per the DGCA guidelines
D applicable at the relevant point of time. [para 34-35] [1160-
C-H; 1161-A-B]
6.2. The respondent had not notified the Airlines that
he was a patient suffering from an ailment which required
E medication or treatment. There is nothing to show that the
respondent requested for any treatment or medicines
during the period when he was on board. [para 36] [1161-
C]
7. As regards the respondent's detention at
F Hyderabad, neither the Permanent Lok Adalat, nor the
High Court has recorded any finding of wrongful or
vexatious detention or harassment. Therefore, the
question of awarding compensation under this head also
does not arise. [para 37] [1162-B-C]
G
Whether the appellant is liable to pay damages:
8.1. The Permanent Lok Adalat has rightly held that
when there was an inordinate delay after completion of
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1129
boarding, the carrier should take steps to secure the A
permission of the Airport and ATC authorities to take back
the passengers, who had already boarded, to the airport
lounge when there was an inordinate delay. But the
observation that failure to take the passengers to the
airport lounge was unexcusable and unbecoming B
behaviour on the part of the airlines was not warranted
on the facts and circumstances of the case. The admitted
position in the case is that the airlines made efforts in that
behalf, but permission was not granted to it to send back
the passengers to the airport lounge, in view of the heavy c
congestion in the airport. The airport and the ATC
authorities are not parties to the proceedings. If
permission was not granted for the passengers to be
taken to the airport lounge, the airlines cannot be found
fault with. [para 38] [1162-D-H;· 1163-A] D
8.2. Where the delay is for reasons beyond the
control of the airlines, as in the instant case, due to bad
weather and want of clearance from ATC, in the absence
of proof of negligence or deficiency in service the airlines
cannot be held responsible for the inconvenience caused E
to the passengers on account of the delay. The
justification for damages given by the High Court that as
the appellant did not operate lndiGo flight No.6E-301 as
per schedule and caused inconvenience to a passenger
who was a diabetic patient, he was entitled to nominal F
damages for deficiency in service, does not find support
either on facts or in law. The order of the Permanent Lok
Adalat affirmed by the High Court awarding damages and
costs to the respondent is set aside and the application
of respondent for compensation is rejected. [para 39 to G
42] [1163-B-G; 1164-G]
9.1. Consumer fora and Permanent Lok Adalats can
not award compensation merely because there was
inconvenience or hardship or on grounds of sympathy.
H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A What is relevant is whether there was any cause of action
for claiming damages, that is whether there was any
deficiency in service or whether there was any
negligence in providing facilitation. If the delay was due
to reasons beyond the control of the airline and if the
s airline and its crew have acted reasonably and in a bona
fide manner, the carrier cannot be made liable to pay
damages even if there has been some inconvenience or
hardship to a passenger on account of the delay. [para
40) [1163-E-G]
c 9.2. If a flight had remained on tarmac without taking
off, for eleven hours, after boarding was completed, it
was because the Airport and ATC authorities refused to
send the passengers to the Airport lounge. Normally if the
aircraft has remained on tarmac for more than two or
D three hours after boarding is closed, without the flight
taking off, the passengers should be permitted to get
back to the airport lounge to get facilitation service from
the airline. Whenever there is such delay beyond a
reasonable period (say three hours), the passengers on
E board should be permitted to get back to the airport
lounge. If for any unforeseen reason, the passengers are
required to be on board for a period beyond three hours
or more, without the flight taking off, appropriate
provision for food and water should be made, apart from
F providing access to the toilets. Congestion in the airport
on account of the delayed and cancelled flights can not
be a ground to prevent the passengers on board from
returning to the airport lounge. While the guidelines
issued by the DGCA cover the responsibilities of the
G airlines, DGCA and other concerned authorities should
also specify the responsibilities of the airport and the ATC
authorities to ensure that no aircraft remains on tarmac
for more than three hours after the boarding is closed and
that if it has to so remain, then permit the passengers to
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1131
return to the airport lounge from the aircraft, till the aircraft A
· is ready to take off. DGCA shall also ensure that the
conditions of carriage of all airlines in India are in
consonance with its Civil Aviation Directives. [para 41]
[1163-H; 1164-A-F]
Case Law Reference: B
1989 (2) SCR 1 relied on para 14
2011 (4) SCALE 137 referred to para 19
1999 (4) Suppl. SCR 320 referred to para 29 C
CIVIL APPELALTE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4925 of 2011.
From the Judgment & Order dated 31.12.2009 of the High
Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Writ D
Petition No. 27754 of 2009.
V. Giri, (A.C.) Mohd. Sadique T.A. Raj Shekhar, Liz
Mathew, Amit Kumar Srivastava, R.V. Karneshwaran for the
appearing parties.· E .·
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
.R.V.RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. Leave granted. Heard.
2. The appellant, an aviation company operating an air F
carrier under the name and style of lndiGo Airlines has filed
this appeal aggrieved by the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court dated 31.12.2009 dismissing its writ petition
challenging the decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public
Utility Services, Hyderabad, dated 18.9.2009 awarding G
Rs.10,000 as compensation and Rs.2,000 as costs to the
respondent herein.
Facts found to be not in dispute
3. The respondent and eight others were booked to travel H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A on Indigo flight No.6E-301 from Delhi to Hyderabad on
14.12.2007 scheduled to depart at 6.15 a.m. The respondent
reached the airport, obtained a boarding pass and boarded the
flight at around 5.45 a.m. Due to dense fog, bad weather and
poor visibility at Delhi airport the flight was delayed. An
8 announcement was made that the flight was unable to take off
due to dense fog and poor visibility, and that the flight will take
off as and when a clearance was given by ATC. As appellant
was a 'low cost carrier' neither snacks nor beverages were
offered. However sandwiches were offered for sale and the
C respondent purchased a sandwich by paying Rs.100. Around
· 11.15 a.m. an announcement was made that flight No. 6E-301
was cancelled and the passengers were given the following
options: (a) refund of air fare; or (b) credit for future travel on
lndiGo; or (c) rebooking onto an alternative lndiGo flight at no
additional cost. As an extension of the third option, willing
D passengers were permitted to undertake the journey on the next
flight, by combining the said flight (Flight No.6E-301) with the
next flight (Flight No. 6E-305) which was scheduled to depart
at 12.15 p.m., subject to improvement in weather conditions
and clearance by Air Traffic Control ('ATC' for short).
E
4. As the same aircraft was to be used for the combined
flight, several of the passengers including respondent took the
third option, and opted to continue the journey on the combined
flight, by the same aircraft by remaining on board. Several other
F passengers, who opted for refund of their airfare or obtaining
credit for future travel or for re-booking on subsequent flights
of their choice, left the aircraft.
5. In view of the cancellation of flight No.6E-301 and the
DGCA regulations prescribing maximum duty hours for the
G crew, the crew of 6E-301 was replaced by the fresh crew of
flight No.6E-305. Even the combined flight No.6E 305 could not
take off on schedule as the ATC did not give the clearance.
Several announcements were made about the delay on
account of inclement weather conditions and the piling up of
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1133
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
, delayed flights queuing for take off. In the mean.while on A
account of cancellation of flights and delaying of several flights,
lhe airport was getting overcrowded and congested. As a
consequence, the airport authorities advised the flights which
had completed boarding but had not taken off for want of A TC
clearance, not to send back the boarded passengers to the B
airport lounge, but retain them in the aircraft itself, as the airport
was not capable of handling the additional load. The
respondent and some other passengers, who had opted for
travel in the combined later flight by the same aircraft, protested
about the delay and demanded lunch/refreshments as they were c·
held up inside the aircraft. Each of the affected passengers,
including the respondent, was provided with a sandwich and
water, free of cost around noon time. A further offer of free
sandwiches was made around 3.00 p.m. However as
vegetarian sandwiches were exhausted, the second offer by the
0
crew was of chicken sandwiches. Respondent and others, who
declined chicken sandwiches, were offered biscuits and water
·free of cost. Finally the ATC clearance was given at 4.20 p.m.
and the flight departed at 4.37 p.m. and reached Hyderabad
around 7 p.m.
E
6. When the flight reached Hyderabad, the respondent and
some other passengers were detained at the Hyderabad
Airport for more than an hour in connection with an enquiry by
the Security Personnel of lndiGo, in regard to a complaint by
the on-board crew that they had threatened and misbehaved F
with the air hostesses when the flight was delayed.
The complaint and the response
7. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant
before the Permanent Lok Adalat for Public Utility Services, G
claiming a compensation of Rs.Five lakhs for the delay and
deficiency in service resulting in physical discomfort, mental
agony ~nd inconvenience. The respondent listed the following
reasons for the claim:
H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A (a) confinement to the aircraft seat from 5.45 a.m.
(time of boarding) to 4.37 p.m. (time of departure
of flight) for nearly 11 hours leading to cramps in
his legs;
(b) failure to provide breakfast, lunch, tea in the aircraft
B
in spite of the fact that the respondent was detained
in the aircraft for eleven hours (from 5.45 a.m. to
4.37 p.m.) before departure;
(c) failure to provide access to medical facilities to the
c respondent who was a diabetic and hyper tension
patient;
(d) illegal detention from 7 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. at
Hyderabad airport upon a false complaint by the
D crew of the aircraft;
(e) inability to celebrate his birthday on 15.12.2007, on
account of the traumatic experience on the earlier
day, apart from being prevented from attending
court on 14.12.2007 and being prevented from
E attending office till 19.12.2007.
8. The respondent contended that the airlines failed to
take necessary care of the passengers and failed to act
reasonably by not resorting to the remedial steps in regard to
F following matters:
(a) In view of the foggy conditions and inclement
weather, instead of issuing boarding passes, the
passengers should have been asked to wait in the
airport lounge itself until the weather/visibility
G improved, so that they could have had breakfast
and lunch in the airport restaurant without being
confined to the aircraft for a total period of eleven
hours;
H (b) When the flight could not take off due to bad weather
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1135
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
for a long time (nearly eleven hours), the appellant A
ought to have brought back the passengers from the
aircraft to the terminal so that they could have
avoided confinement to their narrow seats in the
aircraft and at the same time had access to
breakfast and lunch, proper toilet facilities, if B
necessary, medicines;
(c) Though the appellant was a low cost carrier with no
provision for serving food, in the extraordinary
circumstances of detention of the passengers in the
aircraft for 11 hours (before departure), it should
c
have provided breakfast and lunch of their choice
and beverages, free of cost, on board.
(d) The respondent being a diabetic and hyper-tension
patient was required to have timely meals and D
medicines, which he was denied. Though a free
sandwich was provided around 12.30 p.m., at
around 3.00 p.m. when second round of frees
snacks were offered, he was offered a chicken
sandwich which he could not accept being a E
vegetarian. Offering a few biscuits with water as an
alternative was wholly insufficient.
(e) Since the toilets were being constantly used by the
cooped up pas~engers in the aircraft for several
hours, and as there was no proper air circulation, F
the air was unbreathable apart from the foul smell
from the toilet leading to nausea and dizziness.
9. The appellant resisted the claim of the respondent on
the following grounds : G
(a) The Permanent Lok Adalat at Hyderabad had no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. Having
regard to the jurisdiction clause in the contract of
carriage, only the courts at Delhi had jurisdiction.
H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A Any complaint or case had tr. be filed only at Delhi.
(b) The delay was for reasons beyond the control of the
airlines and its employees, due to dense fog and
bad weather. As the visibility dropped to less than
around 15 meters, flights could not take off and the
B
consequential congestion at the airport led to further
delay. Even after the fog had cleared, the Air Traffic
Control clearance for take off was given only at 4.20
p.m. The delay was not on account of any
negligence or want of care or deficiency in service
c on the part of the airlines, but due to bad weather
conditions and want of ATC clearance, which were
beyond the control of the airlines and therefore it
was not liable to pay any compensation.
D (c) The respondent was given the option of either re-
booking in a different flight, or receive the refund of
the airfare, or continue the journey in the same
aircraft by taking the next combined flight to depart
as per ATC clearance. The respondent opted for
E continuing the journey in the combined flight and he
stayed in the aircraft. If he had opted for re-booking
or refund, he could have left the aircraft by 12.00
Noon.
(d) The respondent did not disclose his alleged
F physical condition (about diabetes and hyper
tension) either at the time of purchasing the ticket
or during the period he was on board. If he was
suffering from any ailment he ought to have given
advance notice or ought to have accepted the offer
G for rebooking or refund and left the aircraft as was
done by several other passengers.
(e) Being a flight operated by a low cost carrier, the
appellant did not have any provision to serve any
H food or beverages. Only sandwiches and some
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1137
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
other snacks were available on sale basis. In spite A
of it, in view of the delay, arrangements were made
for supply of free sandwiches and water, once
around 12.30 p.m. and again around 3.00 p.m. The
toilets were also functional all through the period.
Thus _there was no deficiency in "Service or want of B
care on its part.
10. In regard to the detention of respondent at Hyderabad
Airport, the appellant submitted that the respondent and some
of his fellow passengers became agitated and furious when the C
announcement regarding cancellation of flight No.6E 301 was
made and started abusing and misbehaving with the crew using
extremely vulgar and threatening language; that the respondent
also threw the biscuits offered, at one of the crew members;
and that a complaint was made against the respondent and
other members by the crew and consequently when the flight D
reached Hyderabad there was an inquiry by appellant's
Assistant Manager (Security). It was further submitted that
during enquiry, the crew decided not to press the matter in the
.interests of customer relations and to avoid unnecessary
complications; and therefore, even though CISF personnel E
advised that a written complaint may be given in regard to the
misbehaviour, a written complaint was not given and the
respondent and others were permitted to leave. The allegation
of wrongful confinement and harassment was thus denied.
F
11. The Permanent Lok Adalat, by award dated 118.9.2009
'held that it had territorial jurisdiction. It further held that the delay
was due to poor visibility and bad weather conditions, reasons
beyond the control of the appellant. It further held: (a) though
the claim of the respondent that he was confined in the aircraft G
'without providing food was not established, and though the
airlines being a low cost carrier, was not bound to provide any
food to its passengers, as the passengers were detained in
the aircraft for long, not providing fo,od of passenger's choice
caused inconvenience and suffering to the passengers; (b) H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A though there was no evidence to show that the respondent had
notified the airlines that he was a diabetic and it was not
possible to hold the airlines responsible in any manner, the fact
that he suffered on account of being a diabetic could not be
ignored; and (c) though the relevant rules might not have
s permitted the passengers who had boarded the aircraft to return
to the airport lounge, in view of the unduly long delay, the rules
should have been relaxed and the airlines was under a moral
duty to take the passengers to the lounge and keep them there
till the flight was permitted to take off and failure to do so was
c inexcusable. The Permanent Lok Adalat did not examine the
grievance regarding wrongful confinement at the Hyde_rabad
airport for an hour and half stating that criminal offences were
not within its purview. The Permanent Lok Adalat held that there
was laxity and deficiency in service on the part of the appellant
and consequently awarded Rs.10000 as compensation and
0
Rs.2500 as costs.
12. The said decision of the Permanent Lok Adalat was
challenged by the appellant by filing a writ petition. The High
Court dismissed the writ petition by the impugned judgment
E dated 31.12.2009. In regard to jurisdiction the High Court held
as follows:
"Most of the passengers, who took tickets or most of the
passengers who buy tickets in Indigo counters seldom,
F read the terms and conditions regarding jurisdiction of
Court in case of disputes. In such a situation, the
jurisdiction aspects of the contract between lndiGo and
passenger must receive liberal approach by the Courts or
else the consumerism would be at peril."
G The High Court did not interfere with the award of the
Permanent Lok Adalat on the following reasoning:
"Whatever be the reason and whatever be the justification,
for Indigo in not operating Flight 6E-301 as per schedule,
H it certainly caused inconvenience to the passenger who is
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1139
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.}
admittedly a diabetic patient. Therefore, he should at least A
receive nominal damages for the deficiency of service.
This was what was precisely done by learned Permanent
Lok Adalat in an unexceptional manner. We do not see any
strong reason to exercise our extraordinary jurisdiction to
find fault with the same." B
13. The said order is under challenge in this appeal by
special leave. On the contentions urged the following questions
arise for consideration:
(i) Whether the Permanent Lok Adalat at Hyderabad did C
not have territorial jurisdiction?
(ii) When a flight is delayed due to bad weather, after the
boarding of passengers is completed, what are the
minimum obligations of an air carrier in particular a low
0
cost carrier, to ensure passenger comfort?
(iii) When there is delay for reasons beyond the control of
the airlines, whether failure to provide periodical lunch/
dinner or failure to take back the passengers to the airport
lounge (so that they can have freedom to stretch their legs, E
move around and take food of their choice) can be termed
as deficiency in service or negligence?
(iv) Whether the award of compensation of Rs.10,000/-
with costs calls for interference? F
Re: Question (i) : Jurisdiction of Permanent Lok Adalat
14. The Indigo Conditions of Carriage, containing the
standard terms which govern the contract between the parties
, provide as follows: "All disputes shall be subject to the G
jurisdiction of the courts of Delhi only." The appellant contends
that the ticket related to the travel from Delhi to Hyderabad, the
complaint was in regard to delay at Delhi and therefore the
cause of action arose at Delhi; and that as the contract provided
H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A that courts at Delhi only will have jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of
other courts were ousted. Reliance was placed on ABC
Laminart v. AP. Agencies [1989 (2) SCC 163] where this court
held:
"So long as the parties to a contract do not oust the
B jurisdiction of all the Courts which would otherwise have
jurisdiction to decide the cause of action under the law it
cannot be said that the parties have by their contract
ousted the jurisdiction of the Court. If under the law several
Courts would have jurisdiction and the parties have agreed
c to submit to one of these jurisdictions and not to other or
others of them it cannot be said that there is total ouster
of jurisdiction. In other words, where the parties to a
contract agreed to submit the disputes arising from it to a
particular jurisdiction which would otherwise also be a
D proper jurisdiction under the law, their agreement to the
extent they agreed not to submit to other jurisdictions
cannot be said to be void as against public policy. If on
the other hand, the jurisdiction th~y agreed to submit to
would not otherwise be proper jurisdiction to decide
E disputes arising out of the contract it must be declared void
being against public policy .
... ... From the foregoing decisions it can be reasonably
deduced that where such an ouster clause occurs, it is
pertinent to see whether there is ouster of jurisdiction of
F
other Courts. When the clause is clear, unambiguous and
specific accepted notions of contract would bind the
parties and unless the absence of ad idem can be shown,
the other Courts should avoid exercising jurisdiction, As
regards construction of the ouster clause when words like
G 'alone', 'only, 'exclusive' and the like have been used there
may be no difficulty. Even without such words in
appropriate cases the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio
alterius' -expression of one is the exclusion of another may
be applied. What is an appropriate case shall depend on
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1141
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
the facts of the case. In such a case mention of one thing A
may imply exclusion of another. When certain jurisdiction
is specified in a contract an intention to exclude all others
from its operation may in such cases be inferred. It has
therefore to be properly construed."
B
15. The 'exclusive jurisdiction clause', as noticed above
is a standard clause that is made applicable to all contracts of
carriage with the appellant, relating to passengers, baggage
or cargo anywhere in the country, irrespective of whether any
part of the cause of action arose at Delhi or not. If for example C
a passenger purchases a ticket to travel from Mumbai to
,Kolkata, or Chennai to Hyderabad, which involved travel without
· touching Delhi and if such ticket was purchased outside Delhi,
obviously the Delhi courts will not have territorial jurisdiction as
no part of the cause of action arises in Delhi. As per the
principle laid down in ABC Laminart, any clause which ousts D
. the jurisdiction of all courts having jurisdiction and conferring
jurisdiction on a court not otherwise having jurisdiction would
be invalid. It is now well settled that the parties cannot by
agreement confer jurisdiction on a court which does not have
jurisdiction; and that only where two or more courts have the E
;jurisdiction to try a suit or proceeding, an agreement that the
disputes shall be tried in one of such courts is not contrary to
public policy. The ouster of jurisdiction of some courts is
permissible so long as the court on which exclusive jurisdiction
is conferred, had jurisdiction. If the clause had been made to F
apply only where a part of cause of action accrued in Delhi, it
would have been valid. But as the clause provides that
irrespective of the place of cause of action, only courts at Delhi
would have jurisdiction, the said clause is invalid in law, having
regard to the principle laid down in ABC Laminart. The fact that G
in this case, the place of embarkation happened to be Delhi,
would not validate a clause, which is invalid.
16. There is another reason for holding the said clause to
be invalid. A clause ousting jurisdiction of a court, which H
otherwise would have jurisdiction will have to be construed
1142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.
A strictly. In this case, we are concerned with a clause which
provides that all disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of
the courts at Delhi only. But in this case, the respondent did
not approach a "court". The claim was filed by the respondent
before a Permanent Lok Ada/at constituted under Chapter Vl-
B A of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 ('LSA Act' for
short). Section 22C provides that any party to a dispute may,
before the dispute is brought before any court, make an
application to the Permanent Lok Ada/at for settlement of the
dispute. When the statement, additional statements, replies
c etc., are filed in an application filed before it, the Permanent
Lok Adalat is required to conduct conciliation proceedings
between the parties, taking into account, the circumstances
of the dispute and assist the parties in their attempt to reach
an amicable settlement of the dispute. If the parties fail to
reach an agreement, the Permanent Lok Ada/at is required to
0
decide the dispute. The Permanent Lok Adalats are authorized
to deal with and decide only disputes relating to service
rendered by notified public utility services provided the value
does not exceed Rupees Ten Lakhs anC: the dispute does not
E relate to a non-compoundable offence. Section 220 provides
that the Permanent Lok Ada/at shall, while conducting the
conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under:
the LSA Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice,
objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice and
shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and
F the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Section 22E provides that every
. award of the Permanent Lok Ada/at shall be final and binding
on the parties and could be transmitted to a civil court having
local jurisdiction for execution. Each and every provision of
Chapter VIA of LSA Act emphasizes that is the Permanent Lok
G Ada/at is a Special Tribunal which is not a 'court'. As noted
above, Section 22C of the LSA Act provides for an application
to the Permanent Lok Adalat in regard to a dispute before the
dispute is brought before any court and that after an application
is made to the Permanent Lok Adalat, no party to the
H application shall invoke the jurisdiction of any court in the same
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1143
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
dispute, thereby making it clear that Permanent Lok Adalat is A
distinct and different from a court. The nature of proceedings
before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially a conciliation which
is non-adjudicatory in nature. Only if the parties fail to reach an
agreement by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat mutates
into an adjudicatory body, by deciding the dispute. In short the B
procedure adopted by Permanent Lok Adalats is what is
popularly known as 'CON-ARB' (that is "conciliation cum
arbitration") in United States, where the parties can approach
a neutral third party or authority for conciliation and if the
conciliation fails, authorize such neutral third party or authority c
to decide the dispute itself, such decision being final and
binding. The concept of 'CON-ARB' before a Permanent Lok
Adalat is completely different from the concept of judicial
adjudication by courts governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Permanent Lok Ada/at not being a 'court', the
0
provision in the contract relating to exclusivity of jurisdiction of
courts at Delhi will not apply.
17. The appellant next contended that even if the jurisdiction
clause is excluded from consideration, only courts and tribunals
at Delhi will have jurisdiction as the cause of action arose at E
Delhi and not at Hyderabad. The appellant contended that the
respondent boarded the flight at Delhi and the entire incident
relating to delay and its consequences took place at Delhi and
therefore courts at Delhi alone will have jurisdiction. This
contention is wholly untenable. The dispute was with reference F
to a contract of carriage of a passenger from Delhi to
Hyderabad. The ticket was purchased at Hyderabad and
consequently the contract was entered into at Hyderabad. A
part of the cause of action also arose at Hyderabad as the
respondent clearly alleged as one of the causes for claiming G
compensation, his illegal detention for an hour and half at the
Hyderabad Airport by the security staff of the appellant when
the flight landed. Therefore the courts and tribunals at
Hyderabad had jurisdiction to entertain the claims/disputes.
Section 228 provides that permanent Lok Adalats shall be H
1144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A established for exercising jurisdiction in respect of one or more
public utility services for such areas as may be specified in the
notification. It is not disputed that the Permanent Lok Adalat for
public utility services, Hyderabad was constituted for the area
of Hyderabad and transport services by way of carriage of
B passengers by air is a public utility service. Therefore we hold
that the Permanent Lok Ada/at at Hyderabad had jurisdiction
to entertain the application against the appellant.
18. One of the reasons assigned by the High Court to hold
that Permanent Lok Adalat at Hyderabad had jurisdiction was
C that the term in the lndiGo conditions of carriage that only courts
at Delhi will have jurisdiction should be ignored as most of the
passengers buying tickets from lndiGo may not read the terms
and conditions regarding jurisdiction of courts and therefore,
the court should adopt a liberal approach and ignore such
D clauses relating to exclusive jurisdiction. The said reasoning is
not sound. The fact that the conditions of carriage contain the
exclusive jurisdiction clause is not disputed. The e-tickets do
not contain the complete conditions of carriage but incorporate
the conditions of carriage by reference. The interested
E passengers can ask the airline for a copy of the contract of
carriage or visit the web-site and ascertain the same. Placing
the conditions of carriage on the web-site and referring to the
same in the e-ticket and making copies of conditions of
carriage available at the airport counters for inspection is
F sufficient notice in regard to the terms of conditions of the
carriage and will bind the parties. The mere fact that a
passenger may not read or may not demand a copy does not
mean that he will not be bound by the terms of contract of
carriage. We cannot therefore, accept the finding of the High
G Court that the term relating to exclusive jurisdiction should be
ignored on the ground that the passengers would not have read
it.
.19. We may also at this juncture refer to the confusion
caused on account of the term Permanent Lok Ada/at being
H
-- -
INTERGL08E AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1145
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
used to describe two different types of Lok Adalats. The LSA A
Act refers to two types of Lok Adalats. The first is a Lok Ada/at
constituted under Section 19 of the Act which has no
adjudicatory functions or powers and which discharges purely
conciliatory functions. The second is a Permanent Lok Ada/at
established under section 228(1) of LSA Act to exercise B
!jurisdiction in respect of public utility services, having both
conciliatory and adjudicatory functions. The word Permanent
Lok Ada/at should refer only to Permanent Lok Adalats
established under section 228(1) of the LSA Act and not to the
Lok Adalats constituted under section 19. However in many c
states, when Lok Adalats are constituted under section 19 of
LSA Act for regular or continuous sittings (as contrasted from
periodical sittings), they are also called as Permanent Lok
Ada/ats even though they do not have adjudicatory functions.
In UC of India vs. Suresh Kumar- 2011 (4) SCALE 137, this 0
court observed: "It is needless to state that Permanent Lok
Adalat has no jurisdiction or authority vested in it to decide any
lis, as such, between the parties even where the attempt to
arrive at an agreed settlement between the parties has failed".
The said decision refers to such a 'Permanent Lok Adalat' E
organized under section 19 of the Act and should not be
confused with Permanent Lok Adalats constituted under
section 228(1) of the Act. To avoid confusion, the State Legal
Services Authorities and the High Courts may ensure that Lok
Adalats other than the Permanent Lok Ada/ats established
under section 228(1) of the Act in regard to public utility F
services, are not described as Permanent Lok Adalats. One
way of avoiding the confusion is to refer to the Lok Adalats
constituted under section 19 of the Act on a regular or
permanent basis as 'Continuous Lok Adalats'. Be that 'as it
may. G
Re : Question (ii) to (iv)
Low cost carrier vis-a-vis full service carrier .
20. The appellant is a low cost carrier. It is necessary to H
1146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A bear in mind the diffe· Jnce between a full service carrier and
a low cost carrier, though both are passenger airlines. Low cost
carriers tend to save on overheads, operational costs and more
importantly on the services provided. Low cost carriers install
the maximum number of seats possible in their aircraft, and
B attempt to operate the aircraft to optimum levels and fill the
seats to capacity. The passengers, who prefer to travel on
budget fares, when opting for low cost carriers know fully well
that they cannot expect from them, the services associated with
full service carriers. From the passenger's view point, the
c important difference between the two classes of airlines lies in
the on-board service offered to them by the airlines. While full
service carriers offer several services including free food and
beverages on board, low cost carriers offer the minimal 'no-
frills' service which does not include any free food or beverages
0 except water. But the fact that an airline is a low cost carrier
does not mean that it can dilute the requirements relating to
safety, security and maintenance. Nor can they refuse to comply
with the minimum standards and requirements prescribed by
the Director General of Civil Aviation ('DGCA' for short). The
E fact that it offers only 'no- frills' service does not mean that it
can absolve itself from liability for negligence, want of care or
deficiency in service. Both types of carriers have clauses either
excluding or limiting liability in respect of certain contingencies.
The disclaimers by low cost carriers will be more wider and
exhaustive when compared to full service carriers. DGCA and
F other authorities concerned with licensing low cost carriers,
shall have to ensure that the terms of contract of carriage of
low cost carriers are not unreasonably one sided with reference
to their disclaimers. This becomes all the more necessary as
the terms of contract of carriage are not incorporated in the
G tickets that are issued and usually passengers, who purchase
the tickets, will not be able to know the actual terms and
conditions of contract of carriage unless they visit the website
of the airline or seeks a copy of the complete terms of contract
of carriage. All that is required to be noted in the context of this
H case is that travel by a low cost carrier does not mean that the
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 114 7
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
passengers are to be treated with any less care, attention, A
respect or courtesy when compared to full service carriers or
that there can be dilution in the minimum standards of safety,
security or efficiency.
Relevant statutory provisions and DGCA directives
B
21. The Carriage of Air Act, 1972 gives effect to the
convention for unification of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air, and amendments thereto, to non-international
carriage by air. Section 8 provides that the Central Government
may by notification in the official gazette apply the rules C
contained in the first schedule to the Act and any provision of
section 3 or section 5 or section 6 to such carriage by air, not
being international carriage by air, as may be specified in the
notification, subject, however, to such exceptions, adaptations,
modifications as may be so specified. Notification No.S0.186E D
dated 30.3.1973 issued under section 8 of the Act applies to
sections 4, 5 and 6 and the rules contained in the second
schedule to the Act to all carriages by air (not being an
international carriage) and also modified several rules in the
second schedule to the Act apart from amending sections 4 E
and 5 and omitting section 6 of the Act. Chapter Ill of the Second
Schedule to the said Act relates to "liability of the carrier'' and
clause 19 thereof (as amended by Notification No.S0.186(E)
dated 30.3.1973 issued under section 8(2) of that Act) is
extracted below:- F
"19. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the carrier
is not to be liable for damage occasioned by delay in the
carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo."
22. Rule 134 of the Aircraft Rules 1937 provides that no G
person shall operate any scheduled air transport services
except with the permission of the Central Government. Rule
133A of the said Rules provides that the special directions
issued by the Director General of Civil Aviation ('DGCA' for
short} by way of circulars/notices to aircraft owners relating to H
1148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A operation and use of aircraft shall be complied with by the
persons to whom such direction is issued. The Director General
of Civil Aviation, Govt. of India, issued a circular No.8/2007
dated 5.12.2007, containing the guidelines for Aircraft
operations during Low Visibility Conditions (Fog management)
s at IGI Airport, Delhi which were applicable on the relevant date
(14.12.2007). Clauses 31, 32, 35 and 36 thereof are extracted
below:
"(31) Airlines shall augment their ground staff and position
them at the airport with proper briefing for handling various
c passenger facilitation processes in co-ordination with the
other airport agencies.
(32) Airlines shall inform their passengers of the delay/
rescheduling/cancellation of their flights in through mobile/
D SMS/other communication mean to avoid congestion at the
airport.
(35) Airlines shall ensure progressive boarding of the
passengers out of security hold area in order to avoid
congestion in the security hold. Passenger after check-in
E
shall be made to proceed for security by the airlines after
ensuring that the flight is ready to depart/is on ground. If
delayed, after boarding, appropriate facilitation to be
given by Airlines on board.
F (36) The Airlines, particularly LCC shall provide
facilitation in terms of tea/water/snacks to the passenger
of their delayed flights. The coupon scheme extended by
DIAL may be availed by airlines for the passenger
facilitation purpose."
G
(emphasis supplied]
Other directives referred by way of comparison
23. We may, by way of comparison also refer to the
H following provisions of the subsequent circular/CAR (Civil
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1149
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.)
Aviation Requirements) dated 6.8.2010 issued by DGCA in A
regard to the facilities to be provided to passengers by airlines
due to denied boarding, cancellation or delays in flights, which
came into effect from 15.8.2010.
"Introduction B
xxx
1.4 The operating airline would not have the obligation to
pay compensation in cases where the cancellations and
delays have been caused by an event(s) of force majeure C
i.e. extraordinary circumstance(s) beyond the control of the
airline, the impact of which lead to the cancellation/delay
of flight(s), and which could not have been avoided even
if all reasonable measures had been taken by the airline.
Such extraordinary circumstances may in particular, occur D
due to political instability, natural disaster, civil war,
insurrection or riot, flood, explosion, government regulation
or order affecting the aircraft, strikes and labour disputes
causing cessation, slowdown or interruption of work or any
other factors that are beyond the control of the airline. E
1.5 Additionally, airlines would also not be liable to pay any
compensation in respect of cancellations and delays
clearly attributable to Air Traffic Control (ATC),
meteorological conditions, security risks, or any other F
causes that are beyond the control of the airline but which
affect their ability to operate flights on schedule.
Extraordinary circumstances should be deemed to exist
where the impact of an air traffic management decision in
relation to a particular aircraft or several aircraft on a G
particular day, gives rise to a long delay or delays, an
overnight delay, or the cancellation of one or more flights
by that aircraft, and which could not be avoided even
though the airline concerned had taken all reasonable
measures to avoid or overcome of the impact of the H
1150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A relevant factor and, therefore, the delays or cancellations.
xxx xxxxxx
3.4 Delay in Flight
B 3.4.1 The airlines shall provide facilities in accordance with
Para 3.6.1 (a) if the passenger has checked in on time,
and if the airline expects a delay beyond its original
announced scheduled time of departure or a revised time
of departure of:
c (a) 2 hours or more in case of flights having a block time
of up to 2 Yz hrs; or
(b) 3 hours or more in case of flights having a block time
of more than 2 Yz hrs and up to 5 hours; or
D
(c) 4 hours or more in case of flights not falling under sub-
para (1) and (b) of Para 3.4.1.
3.4.2. When the reasonably expected time of departure is
more than 24 hours, after the scheduled time of departure
E previously announced, the airline shall provide facility to the
passengers in accordance with the provisions of para
3.6.1 (b) hereunder.
3.4.3 An operating airline shall not be obliged to adhere
F to Para 3.6 if the delay is caused due to extra ordinary
circumstances as defined in Para 1.4 and Para 1.5 which
could not have been avoided even if all reasonable
measures had been taken.
xxx xxxxxx
G
3.6 Facilities to be offered to Passengers
3.6.1 Passengers shall be offered free of charge the
following:
H
lNTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1151
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
(a) Meals and refreshments in relation to waiting time. A
(b) Hotel Accommodation when necessary (including
transfers).
3.6.2 Airlines shall pay particular attention to the needs of
persons with reduced mobility and any other person (S) B
accompanying them.
3.8 General
3.8.1 The airlines shall display their policies in regard to C
compensation, refunds and the facilities that will be
provided by the airline in the event of denied boardings,
cancellations and delays on their respective websites as
part of their passenger Charter of Rights. Passengers shall
be fully informed by the airlines of their rights in the event
of denied boarding, cancellations or delays of their flights D
so that they can effectively exercise their rights provided
at the time of making bookings/ticketing, they have given
adequate contact information to the airline or their agents.
The obligation of airlines to fully inform the passenger(s)
shall be included in ticketing documents and websites of E
the airlines and concerned third parties (GDS and travel
agents) issuing such documents on airlines' behalf. "
(emphasis supplied)
I
F
24. We may also refer to Regulation (EC) No.261/2004
of the European Parliament and of the Council, establishing
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers
in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long
delay of flights, to know the European standards. Clause (17)
of the preamble thereto provides thus : G
"(17) Passengers whose flights are delayed for a
specified time should be adequately cared for and should
H
1152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 6 S.C.R.
A be able to cancel their flights with reimbursement of their
tickets or to continue them under satisfactory conditions." 1
(emphasis supplied)
Article 6 deals with delay, Article 8 deals with reimbursement
B and Regulation 9 deals with passengers' right to care. We
extract below the relevant regulations:
"Article 6 (Delay)
1. When an operating air carrier reasonably expects a
c flight to be delayed beyond its scheduled time of
departure:
(a) for two hours or more in the case of flights of 1,500
kilometres or less; or
D
(b) for three hours or more in the case of all intra-
Community flights of more than 1,500 kilometres and of
all other flights between 1,500 and 3,500 kilometres; or
(c) for four hours or more in the case of all flights not falling
E under (a) or (b),
Passengers shall be offered by the operating air carrier:
(i) the assistance specified in Article 9(1)(a) and 9(2); and
F (ii) when the reasonably expected time of departure is at
least the day after the time of departure previously
announced, the assistance specified in Article 9(1 )(b) and
9(1 )(c); and
G (iii) when the delay is at least five hours, the assistance
specified in Article 8(1 )(a).
2. In any event, the assistance shall be offered within the
time limits set out above with respect to each distance
bracket.
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1153
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
Article 8 (Right to reimbursement or re-routing) A
)()()()(
Article 9 (Right to care)
1. Where reference is made to this Article, passengers B
shall be offered free of charge:
(a) meals and refreshments in a reasonable relation to
the waiting time;
(b) hotel accommodation in cases c
- where a stay of one or more nights becomes
necessary, or
- where a stay additional to that intended -by the
0
passenger becomes necessary;
(c) transport between the airport and place of
accommodation (hotel or other).
2. In addition, passengers shall be offered free of charge E
two telephone calls, telex or fax messages, or e-mails."
(emphasis supplied)
Liability for damages for delay
F
25. Rule 19 of Second Schedule to Carriage by Air Act,
makes it clear that the carrier is not liable for damage
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers. The
position would be different if under the contract, the carrier
agrees to be liable for damages. On the other hand, the lndiGo G
Conditions of Carriage categorically state that the carrier will
not be liable 10 pay any damages for delays, rescheduling or
cancellations due to circumstances beyond the control of
lndiGo. There is no dispute that in this case, the delay was for .
reasons beyond the control of the carrier. The guidelines show H
1154 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A that the operating air carrier would not be liable to pay 1
compensation to a passenger, in respect of either cancellation
or delays attributable to meteorological conditions (weather/fog
etc.,) or air traffic control directions/instructions, which are
beyond the control of the air carrier. The Permanent Lok Adalat
B recorded a finding of fact that delay was due to dense fog/bad
weather and want of ATC clearance due to air traffic
congestion, which were beyond the control of the air carrier and
as a consequence rightly held that the air carrier was not liable
for payment of any compensation for the delay as such. We may
c note this was the position as on the date of the incident
(14.12.2007) and even subsequently, after the issue of the
guidelines dated 6.8.2010 by the DGCA.
Liability to provide facilitation during delav
D 26. The issue of responsibility for delay in operating the
flight is distinct and different from the responsibility of the airline
to offer facilitation to the passengers grounded or struck on
board due to delay. If the obligation to provide facilitation to the
passengers is legally recognized, either based on statutory
E requirements or contractual obligations or recognized
conventions, failure to provide the required minimum facilitation
may, depending upon the facts of the case, amount to either
breach of statutory/contractual obligation, negligence, want of
care or deficiency in service on the part of the operating airline
F entitling the passengers for compensation.
27. We may consider whether there was any such
obligation to provide facilitation to passengers by the appellant
on 14.12.2007. As per the DGCA's guidelines dated
5.12.2007 which were in force on 14.12.2007, there was such
G obligation on the part of the carrier. Clause 35 provided if the
flight is delayed, after boarding, appropriate facilitation has to
be given by the Airlines on board. Clause 36 provides that the
Airlines, even low cost carriers, had to provide facilitation in
terms of tea/water/snacks to the passengers of their delayed
H flights.
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1155
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
28. Under the CAR circular dated 6.8.2010 which came A
into effect on 15.8.2010, in the event of delays attributable to
air traffic control or meteorological conditions, the operating
Airlines shall have to offer to the passengers free of cost, meals
and refreshment in relation to waiting time, vide clause 3.6.1(a)
read with clause 3.4.1. Facilitation of passengers who are B
stranded after boarding the aircraft on account of delays is an
implied term of carriage of passengers, accepted as an
international practice, apart from being a requirement to be
fulfilled under DGCA's directives. Such facilitation which relates
to the health, survival and safety of the passengers, is to be c
provided, not only by full service carriers, but all airlines including
low cost carriers. This obligation has nothing to do with the issue
of liability or non-liability to pay compensation to the
• 1passengers for the delay. Even if no compensation is payable
for the delay on account of bad weather or other conditions
0
beyond the control of the air carrier, the airline will be made
liable to pay compensation if it fails to offer the minimum
facilitation in the form of refreshment/water/beverages, as also
toilet facilities to the passengers who have boarded the plane,
1
in the event of delay in departure, as such failure would amount E
to deficiency in service. At the relevant point of time (14th
December 2007), in the event of delay, passengers on-board
were to be provided by the air carriers, including low cost
carriers, facilitation by way of snacks/water/tea apart from
access to toilet. [Note: The facilitation requirement was
subsequently revised and upgraded with effect from 15.8.2010 F
' as "adequate meals and refreshments" due during the waiting
period].
29. We may at this juncture refer to the decision of this
Court in Ravneet Singh Bagga vs. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines G
- 2000 (1) sec 66, wherein the distinction between a
deficiency in service and negligence is brought out. This Court
held:
"6. The deficiency in service cannot be alleged without
attributing fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy H
1156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A in the quality, nature and manner of performance which is
required to be performed by a person in pursuance of a
contract or otherwise in relation to any service. The burden
of proving the deficiency in service is upon the person who
alleges it. The complainant has, on facts, been found to
B have not established any willful fault, imperfection,
shortcoming or inadequacy in the service of the
respondent. The deficiency in service has to be
distinguished from the tortuous acts of the respondent. In
the absence of deficiency in service the aggrieved person
c may have a remedy under the common law to file a suit
for damages but cannot insist for grant of relief under the
Act for the alleged acts of commission and omission
attributable to the respondent which otherwise do not
amount to deficiency in service ...... If on facts it is found
that the person or authority rendering service had taken all
D
precautions and considered all relevant facts and
circumstances in the course of the transaction and that their
action or the final decision was in good faith, it cannot be
said that there had been any deficiency in service. If the
action of the respondent is founJ to be in good faith, there
E is no deficiency of service entitling the aggrieved person
to claim relief under the Act. The rendering of deficient
service has to be considered and decided in each case
according to the facts of that case for which no hard and
fast rule can be laid down. Inefficiency, lack of due care,
F absence of bonafide, rashness, haste or omission and the
like may be the factors to ascertain the deficiency in
rendering the service."
Effect of lndiGo Conditions of Carriage on the liability for
G facilitation
30. The next question is whether the exclusion clause in
the lndiGo Conditions of Carriage can absolve liability to
provide facilitation to passengers affected by delay. The
H relevant clause in the Indigo conditions of carriage is extracted
below:
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1157
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
"Flight Delays, Reschedule or Cancellations A
lndiGo reserves the right to cancel, reschedule or delay the
commencement or continuance of a flight or to alter the
stopping place or to deviate from the route of the journey
or to change the type of aircraft in use without incurring any
8
liability in damages or otherwise to the Customers or any
other person whatsoever. Sometimes circumstances
beyond lndiGo's control result in flight delays, reschedule
or cancellations. In such circumstances, lndiGo reserves
the right to cancel, reschedule or delay a flight without prior C
notice. Circumstances beyond lndiGo's control can include,
without limitation, weather; air traffic control; mechanical
failures; acts of terrorism; acts of nature; force majeure;
strikes; riots; wars; hostilities; disturbanr.es; governmental
regulations, orders, demands or requirements; shortages
of critical manpower, parts or materials; labour unrest; D
etc, lndiGo does not connect to other airlines and is not
responsible for any losses incurred by Customers while
trying to connect to or from other airlines.
If an lndiGo flight is cancelled, rescheduled or E
delayed for more than two/three hours (depending
on the length of the journey), a Customer shall have
to right to choose a refund; or a credit for future travel
on lndiGo; or re-booking onto an alternative lndiGo
flight at no additional cost subject to availability. F
xxx xxx xxx
Please note that in the event of flight delay,
reschedule or cancellation, lndiGo does not provide
compensation for travel on other airlines, meals, G
lodging or ground transportation."
(emphasis supplied)
31. The said exclusion clause no doubt states that in the H
1158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.
A event of flight delay, lndiGo would not provide any "meals". But
it can apply to passengers who have not boarded the flight and
who have the freedom to purchase food in the airport or the
freedom to leave. It will not apply to passengers who are on
board and the delay in the flight taking off, denies them access
B to food and water. In the extra-ordinary situation where the
passengers are physically under the complete care and control
of the airline, as it happens when they have boarded the aircraft
and have no freedom to alight from the aircraft, the duty of the
airlines to protect and care for them, and provide for basic
C facilitation would prevail over any term of the contract excluding
any facilitation (except where the carrier itself cannot access
food due to emergency situations). No public utility service can
say that it is not bound to care for the health, welfare and safety
of the passengers because it is a low cost carrier. At all events,
D the said clause in question stood superseded, in so far as flights
taking off from IGI Airport, Delhi, having regard to the guidelines
relating to Aircraft operations during low visibility conditions at
IGI Airport, Delhi, which provide that all airlines including low
cost carriers shall provide facilitation in terms of tea/water/
snacks to the passengers of delayed flights. (The DGCA
E directives in force from 15.8.2010 clearly provide that
passengers shall be offered free of cost meals and refreshment
in relation to the waiting time). What we have stated above is
with reference to the passengers on board, in delayed flights
which have not taken off. Subject to any directives of DGCA to
F the contrary, the exclusion clause will be binding in normal
conditions, that is, during the flight period, once the flight has
taken off, or where the passenger has not boarded.
What was the period of delay?
G
32. The respondent's complaint is about the inordinate
delay of eleven hours after boarding. The question is whether
there was a delay of nearly eleven hours, as contended by the
respondent. It is true that the respondent was confined to the
aircraft for nearly eleven hours on account of the delay. But a
H
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1159
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
careful examination of the facts will show that the delay in a A
sense was not of 11 hours (from 5.35 a.m. to 4.37 p.m). The
, respondent first took flight No.6E-301 which was scheduled to
depart at 6.15 a.m. and boarded that flight at 5.45 a.m. When
that flight was unduly delayed on account of the bad weather
around 11.15 a.m. the said flight was cancelled and was B
combined with subsequ·ent flight No.6E~305 due to depart at
12.15 p.m. When flight No.6E-301 was cancelled all its
passengers were given the option of refund of the fare or credit
for future travel or re-booking on to an alternative Indigo flight.
Because the delayed flight was combined with the subsequent c
flight and the same aircraft was to be used for the subsequent
flight that was to take off at 12.15 p.m., the respondent and
some others, instead of opting for refund of the air fare or re-
booking on a subsequent flight, opted to continue to be in the
aircraft and took the combined flight which was scheduled to
0
depart at 12.15 p.m. subject to ATC clearance. In so far as flight
No.6E-301 is concerned, after a delay of about five hours it was
cancelled and the passengers could have left the aircraft as
many did. If the respondent continued to sit in the aircraft, it was
because of his voluntary decision to take the later flight which E
was a combination of flight No.6E-301 and 6E-305 which was
due to depart at 12.15 p.m. (subject to ATC clearance) and that
was delayed till 4.37 p.m. Therefore the delay in regard to the
combined flight which was due for departure at 12.15 p.m. was
four hours and twenty minutes.
F
33. The respondent was offered the choice of refund of
fare, credit for a future travel on lndiGo or rebooking in a
subsequent lndiGo flight. The third option was further extended
by giving the option to remain on board by taking the
subsequent combined flight using the same aircraft subject to G
ATC's clearance. The respondent consciously opted for the
third choice of continuing in the combined flight and remained
in the aircraft. Therefore, the stay of eleven hours in the aircraft
was a voluntary decision of the respondent, as he could have
left the aircraft much earlier around 11.00 a.m. by either opting H
1160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A to obtain refund of the air fare or by opting for credit for future
travel or by opting for an lndiGo flight on a subsequent day.
Having opted to remain on board the respondent could not
make a grievance of the delay, or non-availability of food of his
choice or medicines.
B
Whether the airline failed to provide facilitation to
respondent?
34. It is not in dispute that during the initial period of delay,
when it was not known that there would be considerable delay,
C the respondent purchased a sandwich in the normal course.
When flight No.6E-301 was cancelled and combined with the
subsequent flight No.6E-305, the on-board passengers
including respondent who opted to continue in the flight were
offered snacks (sandwiches) and water free of cost, around 12
D noon. As the combined flight (No.6E-305) was also delayed, a
second free offer of sandwiches and water was made around
3 p.m. But the second time, what was offered to respondent
was a chicken sandwich and as the respondent who was a
vegetarian refused it, he was offered biscuits and water,
E instead. It is not the case of the respondentthat toilet facilities
were denied or not made available. In the circumstances, the
appellant being a low cost carrier, the facilitations offered by
it, were reasonable and also met the minimum facilitation as
per the DGCA guidelines applicable at the relevant point of
F time.
35. In the absence of prior intimation about the preference
in regard to food and in emergency conditions, the non-offer
of a vegetarian sandwich in the second round of free snacks
cannot be considered to be a violation of oasic facilitation.
G While the dietary habits or religious sentiments of passengers
in regard to food are to be respected and an effort should be
made to the extent possible to cater to it, in emergency
situations, non-offer of the preferred diet could not be said to
be denial of facilitation, particularly when the airline had no
H notice of passengers' preference in food. In fact, the appellant
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD v. N. SATCHIDANAND 1161
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
being a low cost carrier, there was also no occasion for A
indicating such preferences. We however note that in the
subsequent DGCA guidelines which came into effect from
15.8.2010, the facilitation to be provided has been
appropriately upgraded by directing that the delayed
passengers are to be provided with meals and refreshment as B
and when due depending upon the period of delay.
36. There is nothing to show that respondent requested for
any treatment or medicines during the period when he was on
board. He had also not notified the Airlines that he was a patient C
suffering from an ailment which required medication or
treatment. Therefore, the respondent could not expect any
special facilitation, even if his condition would have added to
his physical discomfort on account of delay.
.Whether respondent is entitled to compensation for D
detention at Hyderabad?
37. The next question that arises for consideration is
whether the appellant is liable to compensate the respondent
for the detention for nearly one and half hours after E
disembarkation at Hyderabad. The appellant's version is that
respondent started abusing and misbehaving with the crew
members using vulgar and threatening language, that he threw
the biscuits offered on a crew member, that he was detained
for the purpose of enquiry by the Assistant Manager of the
appellant at Hyderabad on the complaint of the crew members, F
but to avoid unnecessary complications and good customer
relations, the crew members decided not to give written
complaint and therefore he was permitted to leave after some
time. The respondent's version is that the complaint by the crew
was false and this was proved by the fact that they did not give G
a written complaint. There is no evidence as to what transpired
and the two versions remained unsubstantiated. B'ut the
undisputed facts show he was asked to remain in view of a
complaint by the crew, that CSIF personnel stated that unless
there was written complaint, no action could be taken, that the H
1162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R. .
A crew did not give written complaint and the respondent was
permitted to leave after about an hour of disembarkation. On
the facts and circumstances this cannot be termed to be
unnecessary or deliberate harassment by the airlines. While the
airlines ought to have been sensitive to the travails of the
B passengers who were cooped 'up in the aircraft for more than
thirteen hours without adequate food or other facilities, the
airlines also could not ignore any complaint by the crew about
any unruly behaviour of any passenger. Be that as it may. In this
case neither the Permanent Lok Adalat, nor the High Court has
c recorded any finding of wrongful or vexatious detention or
harassment. Therefore the question of awarding compensation
under this head also does not arise.
Whether the appellant is liable to pay damages?
D 38. The Permanent Lok Adalat has held that when there
was an inordinate delay after completion of boarding, the
airlines had a moral duty, irrespective of rules and regulations,
to take back the passengers to the airport lounge by obtaining
necessary approvals from the airport/ATC authorities and keep
E the passengers in the lounge till the clearance for the flight to
take off was given and failure to do so was an unexcusable and
unbecoming behaviour on the part of the airline. We agree that
the carrier should take steps to secure the permission of the
Airport and ATC authorities to take back the passengers who
F had already boarded to the airport lounge when there was an
inordinate delay. But the assumption that the rules and
regulations had to be ignored or without the consent and
permission of the airport a11d ATC authorities, the airline crew '
ought to have taken back the passengers to the airport lounge,
G is not sound. The admitted position in this c.ase is that the
airlines made efforts in that behalf, but permission was not
granted to the airlines to send back the passengers to the
airport lounge, in view of the heavy congestion in the airport.
The airport and the ATC authorities are not parties to the
proceedings. If permission was not granted for the passengers
H
..
INTERGLOBE AVIATION LTD. v. N. SATCHIDANAND1163
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
to be taken to the airport lounge, the airlines cannot be found A
fault with. Therefore, the observation that failure to take the
passengers to the airport lounge was unexcusable .and
unbecoming behaviour on the part of the airlines, was not
warranted on the facts and circumstances of the case.
B
·39. The High Court has justified the award of damages on
rthe ground that as appellant did not operate lndiGo flight No.6E-
301 ·as per schedule and caused inconvenience to a passenger
who is a diabetic patient, he was entitled to nominal damages
for deficiency in service. Where the delay is for reasons beyond C
the control of the airlines as in this case due to bad weather
and want of clearance from ATC, in the absence of proof of
negligence or deficiency in service the airlines cannot be held
responsible for the inconvenience caused to the passengers
on account of the delay. The justification for damages given by
the High Court does not find support either on facts or in law. D
Conclusion
40. There can be no doubt that the respondent, like any
oth'er passenger forced to sit in a narrow seat for eleven hours, E
underwent considerable physical hardship and agony on
account of the delay. But, it was not as a consequence of any
deficiency in service, negligence or want of facilitation by the
appellant. Consumer fora and Permanent Lok Adalats can not
award compensation merely because there was inconvenience
or hardship or on grounds of sympathy. What is relevant is
F
whether there was any cause of action for claiming damages,
that is whether there was any deficiency in service or whether
there was any negligence in providing facilitation. If the delay
was due to reasons beyond the control of the airline and if the
appellant and its crew have acted reasonably and in a bona G
fide manner, the appellant cannot be made liable to pay
damages even if there has been some inconvenience or
hardship to a passenger on account of the delay.
41. If a flight had remained on tarmac without taking off, H
•
1164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.
A for eleven hours, after boarding was completed, and if
permission was refused to send the passengers to the Airport
lounge, the Airport and ATC authorities have to be blamed for
requiring the passengers to stay on board. Normally if the
aircraft has remained on tarmac for more than two or three
s hours after boarding is closed, without the flight taking off, the
passengers should be permitted to get back to the airport
lounge to get facilitation service from the airline. Whenever there
is such delay beyond a reasonable period (say three hours),
the passengers on board should be permitted to get back to
c the airport lounge. If for any unforeseen reason, the passengers
are required to be on board for a period beyond three hours
or more, without the flight taking off, appropriate provision for
food and water should be made, apart from providing access
to the toilets. Congestion in the airport on account of the
delayed and cancelled flights can not be a ground to prevent
0
the passengers on board from returning to the airport lounge
when there is a delay of more than two hours after completion
of boarding. While the guidelines issued by the DGCA cover
the responsibilities of the airlines, DGCA and other concerned
authorities should also specify the responsibilities of the airport
E and the ATC authorities to ensure that no aircraft remains on
tarmac for more than three hours after the boarding is closed
and that if it has to so remain, then permit the passengers to
return to the airport lounge from the aircraft, till the aircraft is
ready to take off. DGCA shall also ensure that the conditions
F of carriage of all airlines in India is in consonance with its Civil
Aviation Directives.
42. In view of our findings, this appeal is allowed. The order
of the Permanent Lok Adalat affirmed by the High Court
G awarding damages and costs to the respondent is set aside
and the application of respondent for compensation is rejected.
We place on record, our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by Shri V. Giri, senior counsel, as amicus curiae.
R.P. Appeal allowed.
H
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