Supreme Court of India
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LIMITEDversusM/S BHADRA PRODUCTS
- Citation
- 2018 INSC 53
- Decided
- 23 January 2018
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- R F NARIMAN
Holding
An award deciding the issue of limitation is an interim award and may be challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, without recourse to Section 16.
Summary
The appellant, Indian Farmers Fertilizer Co‑operative Ltd., issued a tender for defoamers which was won by the respondent, Bhadra Products. After the respondent supplied the goods, a payment dispute arose and the parties went to arbitration. The sole arbitrator first decided the issue of limitation, holding the claim was not time‑barred, and issued a "first partial award" on 23 July 2015. The appellant challenged this award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, arguing it was not an interim award and therefore fell within the jurisdiction‑determining provisions of Section 16. The Supreme Court held that the award on limitation is an interim award within the meaning of Section 2(1)(c) and can be independently set aside under Section 34, without invoking Section 16. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the lower court’s order, and remitted the matter for determination of the Section 34 application.
Issues considered
- Whether an award deciding the issue of limitation qualifies as an interim award under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
- Whether such an award can be challenged under Section 34 or must be dealt with under the jurisdiction‑determining regime of Section 16.
Legislation cited
- Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. 16, s. 2(c), s. 31(6), s. 32(1), s. 34, s. 37
- English Arbitration Act, 1996s. 30, s. 31, s. 47
- UNCITRAL Model Laws. Article 16
Subjects
interim awardarbitrationsection 34section 16competence‑competencepartial awardlimitationArbitration and Conciliation Actpiecemeal challenges
Judgment
848 [2018]REPORTS
SUPREME COURT 1 S.C.R. 848 [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE
LIMITED
v.
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS
B (Civil Appeal No. 824 of 2018)
JANUARY 23, 2018
[R. F. NARIMAN AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – ss. 2(c), 31(6), 32
and 34 – Interim Arbitral Award – Whether an award delivered by
C
an Arbitrator, which decides the issue of limitation, can be said to
be an interim award and whether such interim award can then be
set aside u/s.34 of the Act – Held: Insofar as first question is
concerned, yes, the language of s.31(6) is advisedly wide in nature –
A reading of the said sub-section makes it clear that the jurisdiction
D to make an interim arbitral award is left to the good sense of the
arbitral tribunal and that it extends to “any matter” with respect to
which it may make a final arbitral award – The expression “matter”
is wide in nature and subsumes issues at which the parties are in
dispute – It is clear, therefore, that any point of dispute between the
parties which has to be answered by the arbitral tribunal can be
E
the subject matter of interim arbitral award – Insofar as second
question is concerned, yes, such an “interim award” is within the
meaning of s.2(1)(c) of the Act and being subsumed within the
expression “arbitral award”, therefore, can be challenged u/s.34
of the Act – English Arbitration Act, 1996 – s. 47.
F Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – s.16 – Appellant
issued a tender enquiry for supply of Defoamers – Respondent
successfully submitted its bid, pursuant to which respondent supplied
the Defoamers – Respondent demanded payment – However,
appellant took the stand that nothing was due and payable to
G respondent – Since, dispute arose between the parties, respondent
invoked arbitration – Issue of limitation was taken first by the
Arbitrator and vide an award the said issue was decided in favour
of respondent-claimant stating that their claim had not become time
barred – Whether a decision on a point of limitation would go to
jurisdiction and, therefore, be covered by s.16 of the Act, in which
H case all other issues have to be decided first, and it is only after
848
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 849
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS
such issues are decided that such an award can be challenged u/s. A
34 of the Act – Held: In the instant case, the award passed by the
Arbitrator is an interim award, which being an arbitral award, can
be challenged separately and independently u/s.34 of the Act –
Such an award, which does not relate to the arbitral tribunal’s own
jurisdiction u/s.16, does not have to follow the drill of s.16(5) and
B
(6) of the Act – In the light of this, Parliament may consider amending
s.34 of the Act so as to consolidate all interim awards together with
the final arbitral award, so that one challenge u/s. 34 can be made
after delivery of the final arbitral award – Piecemeal challenges
like piecemeal awards lead to unnecessary delay and additional
expense. C
Words and Phrases – “Jurisdiction” – The sense of term
“jurisdiction” used in s.16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 – Discussed.
Doctrines/Principles – Kompetenz - kompetenz principle –
Discussed – English Arbitration Act, 1996 – ss. 30, 31 – UNCITRAL D
Model Law – Art. 16.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: Whether an award on the issue of limitation can
first be said to be an interim award?
E
1.1 As can be seen from Section 2(c) and Section 31(6) of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, except for stating that an
arbitral award includes an interim award, the Act is silent and
does not define what an interim award is. Section 31(6) which
delineates the scope of interim arbitral awards and states that
the arbitral tribunal may make an interim arbitral award on any F
matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award.
[Para 8] [856-F-G]
1.2 The language of Section 31(6) is advisedly wide in
nature. A reading of the said sub-section makes it clear that the
jurisdiction to make an interim arbitral award is left to the good G
sense of the arbitral tribunal, and that it extends to “any matter”
with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. The
expression “matter” is wide in nature, and subsumes issues at
which the parties are in dispute. It is clear, therefore, that any
point of dispute between the parties which has to be answered by
H
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A the arbitral tribunal can be the subject matter of an interim arbitral
award. However, in an appropriate case, the issue of more than
one award may be necessitated on the facts of that case. However,
by dealing with the matter in a piecemeal fashion, what must be
borne in mind is that the resolution of the dispute as a whole will
be delayed and parties will be put to additional expense. The
B
arbitral tribunal should, therefore, consider whether there is any
real advantage in delivering interim awards or in proceeding with
the matter as a whole and delivering one final award, bearing in
mind the avoidance of delay and additional expense. Ultimately,
a fair means for resolution of all disputes should be uppermost in
C the mind of the arbitral tribunal. [Para 9] [856-G-H; 857-A-C]
1.3 To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 32(1) is
also material. This section goes on to state that the arbitral
proceedings would be terminated only by the final arbitral award,
as opposed to an interim award, thus making it clear that there
D can be one or more interim awards, prior to a final award, which
conclusively determine some of the issues between the parties,
culminating in a final arbitral award which ultimately decides all
remaining issues between the parties. [Para 10] [857-D]
1.4 Tested in the light of the statutory provisions and the
E case laws cited, it is clear that as the Arbitrator has disposed of
one matter between the parties i.e. the issue of limitation finally,
the award in the instant case is an “interim award” within the
meaning of Section 2(1)(c) of the Act and being subsumed within
the expression “arbitral award” could, therefore, have been
challenged under Section 34 of the Act. [Para 16] [860-G-H; 861-
F A]
Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab (1999) 3 SCC
487 : [1999] 2 SCR 230; McDermott International Inc.
v. Burn Standard Co. Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181: [2006]
2 Suppl. SCR 409 – relied on.
G
Exmar BV v. National Iranian Tanker Co. [1992] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 169 – referred to.
Whether a decision on a point of limitation would go to jurisdiction
and, therefore, be covered by Section 16 of the Act?
H 2.1 Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 851
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS
lays down what, in arbitration law, is stated to be the Kompetenz- A
kompetenz principle, viz. that an arbitral tribunal may rule on its
own jurisdiction. At one time, the law was that the arbitrator, being
a creature of the contract, could not rule on the existence or
validity of the arbitration clause contained in the contract. This,
however, gave way to the Kompetenz principle which was adopted
B
by the UNCITRAL Model Law. [Para 17] [861-C]
2.2 It may be noticed that Section 16(1) to (4) of the Act
are based on Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The
Kompetenz principle deals with the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction
in the narrow sense of ruling on objections with respect to the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. What is C
important to notice in the language of Section 16(1) is the fact
that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, which
makes it clear that it refers to whether the arbitral tribunal may
embark upon an inquiry into the issues raised by parties to the
dispute. [Para 19] [862-E] D
2.3 The “jurisdiction” mentioned in Section 16 of the Act
has reference to three things: (1) as to whether there is the
existence of a valid arbitration agreement; (2) whether the arbitral
tribunal is properly constituted; and (3) matters submitted to
arbitration should be in accordance with the arbitration agreement. E
[Para 20] [863-G-H]
2.4 It is clear that the award passed in the instant case is
an interim award, which being an arbitral award, can be challenged
separately and independently under Section 34 of the Act. Such
an award, which does not relate to the arbitral tribunal’s own F
jurisdiction under Section 16, does not have to follow the drill of
Section 16(5) and (6) of the Act. The Parliament may consider
amending Section 34 of the Act so as to consolidate all interim
awards together with the final arbitral award, so that one challenge
under Section 34 can be made after delivery of the final arbitral
award. Piecemeal challenges like piecemeal awards lead to G
unnecessary delay and additional expense. [Para 29] [871-F-H]
National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Siemens
Atkeingesellschaft (2007) 4 SCC 451; Ittavira Mathai
v. Varkey Varkey [1964] 1 SCR 495 – relied on.
H
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee (1969) 3
SCR 92; Pandurang Dhoni Chougule v. Maruti Hari
Jadhav [1966] 1 SCR 102; Anisminic v. Foreign
Compensation Commission (1969) 2 AC 147; M.L. Sethi
v. R.P. Kapur (1972) 2 SCC 427: [1973] 1 SCR 697;
Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju (1974) 3
B
SCC 415 : [1974] 1 SCR 548; ITW Signode India Ltd.
v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 : [2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 751;
Foreshore Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D.
Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412 : [2015] 5 SCR 1075 –
referred to.
C Case Law Reference
[1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 169 referred to Para 13
[1999] 2 SCR 230 relied on Para 14
[2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 409 relied on Para 15
D [1969] 3 SCR 92 referred to Para 21
[1964] 1 SCR 495 relied on Para 22
(2007) 4 SCC 451 relied on Para 23
[1966] 1 SCR 102 referred to Para 24
E (1969) 2 AC 147 referred to Para 25
[1973] 1 SCR 697 referred to Para 25
[1974] 1 SCR 548 referred to Para 26
[2003] 5 Suppl. SCR 751 referred to Para 27
[2015] 5 SCR 1075 referred to Para 28
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 824 of
2018.
From the Judgment and Order dated 30.06.2017 of the High Court
of Orissa, Cuttack in ARBA No. 31 of 2015.
G K. K. Venugopal, AG, Balaji Srinivasan, Alok Kumar, Amit
Agnihotri, Ms. Somya Yadava, Ms. Aakriti Sharma, Siddhant Tripathi,
Avi Pandey, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ajit Kumar Sinha, Sr. Adv., Ashwarya Sinha, Ms. Mohini Priya,
Ms. Upasana Nath, Advs. for the Respondent.
H
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 853
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
R. F. NARIMAN, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. An interesting question arises as to whether an award delivered
by an Arbitrator, which decides the issue of limitation, can be said to be
an interim award, and whether such interim award can then be set aside
under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter B
referred to as “the Act”). The brief facts necessary to dispose of the
present appeal are as follows.
3. The appellant before us issued a tender enquiry to 19 parties,
including the respondent, for supply of Defoamers. The respondent
submitted its bid, pursuant to which a Letter of Intent dated 2nd November, C
2006 was issued to the respondent for supply of 800 Metric Tonnes of
Defoamers to be used for production of 3,08,880 Metric Tonnes of P2O5.
By 11th April, 2007, the respondent had supplied 800 Metric Tonnes of
Defoamers, however, they could not achieve the targeted production by
the end of 1st November, 2007, which was the validity of the supply D
period. After considerable delay, on 6th June, 2011, the respondent issued
a legal notice demanding payment of Rs.6,35,74,245/- on 27th September,
2012. The appellant made it clear that there was nothing due and payable
to the respondent. Since disputes arose between the parties, on 1st
October, 2014 the respondent invoked arbitration, and on 25th January,
2015, Justice Deepak Verma, a retired Judge of the Supreme Court, E
was appointed as the sole arbitrator. On 3rd March, 2015, issues were
framed. On 23rd July, 2015, the learned Arbitrator thought it fit to take
up the issue of limitation first, inasmuch as the counsel appearing for
both the parties submitted that this issue could be decided on the basis of
documentary evidence alone. This issue was then decided in favour of F
the claimant stating that their claims had not become time barred. A
petition filed under Section 34 of the Act challenged the aforesaid award,
styling it as the ‘First Partial Award’. On 8th October, 2015, the District
Judge, Jagatsinghpur, dismissed the Section 34 Petition stating that the
aforesaid award could not be said to be an interim award and that,
therefore, the Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed further under Section G
34 of the Act. The appeal to the High Court of Orissa was dismissed by
the impugned order dated 30th June, 2017, reiterating the reasoning of
the learned District Judge.
4. Appearing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. K.K. Venugopal,
learned Attorney General, has argued before us that the award made on H
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A 23rd July, 2015 is an interim award under the Act and would, therefore,
be amenable to challenge under Section 34 of the Act as such. He
referred us to various provisions of the Act and buttressed his stand with
reference to a number of judgments, including, in particular, the judgment
of National Thermal Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Siemens
Atkeingesellschaft, (2007) 4 SCC 451. He also referred us to various
B
judgments on what constitutes an interim award and argued that,
according to him, the point of limitation being one of the issues raised by
the parties, was finally decided by the aforesaid award and would,
therefore, be amenable to challenge.
5. Shri Ajit Kumar Sinha, learned senior advocate appearing on
C behalf of the respondent, also placed reliance on various sections of the
Act, in particular Sections 16 and 37 thereof. According to the learned
senior advocate, a ruling on the point of limitation is a ruling on
“jurisdiction” and any finding thereon goes to the root of the case. This
being the case, the drill of Section 16 has to be followed, and as the plea
D of limitation has been rejected by the learned Arbitrator, the arbitral
proceedings have to continue further and the challenge has to be postponed
only after all other issues have been decided. According to the learned
senior advocate, the scheme of Section 37, in particular Section 37(2)(a),
also makes it clear that appeals lie only from an order under Section 16
accepting the plea but not rejecting it. Also, according to the learned
E senior advocate, the present award cannot be said to be an interim award,
but is merely an order passed under Section 16 of the Act. He also
relied upon several judgments to buttress his point of view and relied
heavily upon judgments which held that a decision on a point of limitation
goes to jurisdiction in which case Section 16 of the Act would get
F attracted.
6. Having heard learned counsel for both parties, it is important
to first set out the relevant provisions of the Act, which are as under:
“2. Definitions.—(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise
requires,—
G (c) “arbitral award” includes an interim award;
xxx xxx xxx
16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its
jurisdiction.—
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including
H
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 855
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
ruling on any objections with respect to the existence or validity A
of the arbitration agreement, and for that purpose,—
(a) an arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be
treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the
contract; and
(b) a decision by the arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and B
void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction
shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of
defence; however, a party shall not be precluded from raising
such a plea merely because that he has appointed, or participated C
in the appointment of, an arbitrator.
(3) A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the scope of its
authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged to be beyond
the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral proceedings.
D
(4) The arbitral tribunal may, in either of the cases referred to in
sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), admit a later plea if it considers
the delay justified.
(5) The arbitral tribunal shall decide on a plea referred to in sub-
section (2) or sub-section (3) and, where the arbitral tribunal
E
takes a decision rejecting the plea, continue with the arbitral
proceedings and make an arbitral award.
(6) A party aggrieved by such an arbitral award may make an
application for setting aside such an arbitral award in accordance
with section 34.
F
xxx xxx xxx
31. Form and contents of arbitral award.—
(6) The arbitral tribunal may, at any time during the arbitral
proceedings, make an interim arbitral award on any matter with
respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. G
xxx xxx xxx
32. Termination of proceedings.—(1) The arbitral proceedings
shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of
the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2).
H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A xxx xxx xxx
37. Appealable orders.—(1) An appeal shall lie from the
following orders (and from no others) to the Court authorised by
law to hear appeals from original decrees of the Court passing
the order, namely:—
B (a) refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under section 8;
(b) granting or refusing to grant any measure under section 9;
(c) setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under
section 34.
C (2) Appeal shall also lie to a court from an order of the arbitral
tribunal—
(a) accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section
(3) of section 16; or
(b) granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under section
D
17.
(3) No second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal
under this section, but nothing in this section shall affect or take
away any right to appeal to the Supreme Court.”
E 7. The point at issue is a narrow one: whether an award on the
issue of limitation can first be said to be an interim award and, second,
as to whether a decision on a point of limitation would go to jurisdiction
and, therefore, be covered by Section 16 of the Act.
8. As can be seen from Section 2(c) and Section 31(6), except
F for stating that an arbitral award includes an interim award, the Act is
silent and does not define what an interim award is. We are, therefore,
left with Section 31(6) which delineates the scope of interim arbitral
awards and states that the arbitral tribunal may make an interim arbitral
award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral
award.
G
9. The language of Section 31(6) is advisedly wide in nature. A
reading of the said sub-section makes it clear that the jurisdiction to
make an interim arbitral award is left to the good sense of the arbitral
tribunal, and that it extends to “any matter” with respect to which it may
make a final arbitral award. The expression “matter” is wide in nature,
H and subsumes issues at which the parties are in dispute. It is clear,
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 857
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
therefore, that any point of dispute between the parties which has to be A
answered by the arbitral tribunal can be the subject matter of an interim
arbitral award. However, it is important to add a note of caution. In an
appropriate case, the issue of more than one award may be necessitated
on the facts of that case. However, by dealing with the matter in a
piecemeal fashion, what must be borne in mind is that the resolution of
B
the dispute as a whole will be delayed and parties will be put to additional
expense. The arbitral tribunal should, therefore, consider whether there
is any real advantage in delivering interim awards or in proceeding with
the matter as a whole and delivering one final award, bearing in mind the
avoidance of delay and additional expense. Ultimately, a fair means for
resolution of all disputes should be uppermost in the mind of the arbitral C
tribunal.
10. To complete the scheme of the Act, Section 32(1) is also
material. This section goes on to state that the arbitral proceedings would
be terminated only by the final arbitral award, as opposed to an interim
award, thus making it clear that there can be one or more interim awards, D
prior to a final award, which conclusively determine some of the issues
between the parties, culminating in a final arbitral award which ultimately
decides all remaining issues between the parties.
11. The English Arbitration Act, 1996, throws some light on what
is regarded as an interim award under English Law. Section 47 thereof E
states:
“47 Awards on different issues, &c.
(1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the tribunal may
make more than one award at different times on different aspects
of the matters to be determined. F
(2) The tribunal may, in particular, make an award relating—
(a) to an issue affecting the whole claim, or
(b) to a part only of the claims or cross-claims submitted to it for
decision.
(3) If the tribunal does so, it shall specify in its award the issue, G
or the claim or part of a claim, which is the subject matter of the
award.”
12. By reading this section, it becomes clear that more than one
award finally determining any particular issue before the arbitral tribunal
can be made on different aspects of the matters to be determined. A H
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A preliminary issue affecting the whole claim would expressly be the subject
matter of an interim award under the English Act. The English Act
advisedly does not use the expression “interim” or “partial”, so as to
make it clear that the award covered by Section 47 of the English Act
would be a final determination of the particular issue that the arbitral
tribunal has decided.
B
13.In Exmar BV v National Iranian Tanker Co. [1992] 1
Lloyd’s Rep. 169, an interim final award was made, which contained the
decision that it would not issue any such award in the claimant’s favour
pending determination of the respondent’s counter claims. Detailed
reasons were given for this decision. The Judge, therefore, characterized
C the aforesaid award as an award finally deciding a particular issue
between the parties, and concluded that as a result thereof, he had
jurisdiction to review the tribunal’s decision.
14.In Satwant Singh Sodhi v. State of Punjab (1999) 3 SCC
487 at 491 and 493, an interim award in respect of one particular item
D was made by the arbitrator in that case. The question before the Court
was whether such award could be made the rule of the Court separately
or could be said to have been superseded by a final award made on all
the claims later. This Court held:
“6. The question whether interim award is final to the extent it
E goes or has effect till the final award is delivered will depend
upon the form of the award. If the interim award is intended to
have effect only so long as the final award is not delivered it will
have the force of the interim award and it will cease to have
effect after the final award is made. If, on the other hand, the
F interim award is intended to finally determine the rights of the
parties it will have the force of a complete award and will have
effect even after the final award is delivered. The terms of the
award dated 26-11-1992 do not indicate that the same is of interim
nature.”
G On the facts of the case, the Court then went on to hold:
“11. This Court in Rikhabdass v. Ballabhdas [AIR 1962 SC 551
: 1962 Supp (1) SCR 475] held that once an award is made and
signed by the arbitrator, the arbitrator becomes functus officio.
In Juggilal Kamlapat v. General Fibre Dealers Ltd. [AIR 1962
SC 1123 : 1962 Supp (2) SCR 101] this Court held that an
H
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 859
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
arbitrator having signed his award becomes functus officio but A
that did not mean that in no circumstances could there be further
arbitration proceedings where an award was set aside or that
the same arbitrator could never have anything to do with the
award with respect to the same dispute. Thus in the present
case, it was not open to the arbitrator to redetermine the claim
B
and make an award. Therefore, the view taken by the trial court
that the earlier award made and written though signed was not
pronounced but nevertheless had become complete and final,
therefore, should be made the rule of the court appears to us to
be correct with regard to Item 1 inasmuch as the claim in relation
to Item 1 could not have been adjudicated by the arbitrator again C
and it has been rightly excluded from the second award made by
the arbitrator on 28-1-1994. Thus the view taken by the trial
court on this aspect also appears to us to be correct. Therefore,
the trial court has rightly ordered the award dated 28-1-1994 to
be the rule of the court except for Item 1 and in respect of which
D
the award dated 26-11-1992 was ordered to be the rule of the
court.”
It is, thus, clear that the first award that was made that finally determined
one issue between the parties, with respect to Item no.1 of the claim,
was held to be an interim award inasmuch as it finally determined claim
1 between the parties and, therefore, could not be re-adjudicated all E
over again.
15. In McDermott International Inc. v. Burn Standard Co.
Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 181 at page 211-212, under the heading ‘validity of
the partial award’, this Court held:
F
“68. The 1996 Act does not use the expression “partial award”.
It uses interim award or final award. An award has been defined
under Section 2(c) to include an interim award. Sub-section (6)
of Section 31 contemplates an interim award. An interim award
in terms of the said provision is not one in respect of which a
final award can be made, but it may be a final award on the G
matters covered thereby, but made at an interim stage.
69. The learned arbitrator evolved the aforementioned procedure
so as to enable the parties to address themselves as regards
certain disputes at the first instance. As would appear from the
partial award of the learned arbitrator, he deferred some claims. H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A He further expressed his hope and trust that in relation to some
claims, the parties would arrive at some sort of settlement having
regard to the fact that ONGC directly or indirectly was involved
therein. While in relation to some of the claims, a finality was
attached to the award, certain claims were deferred so as to
enable the learned arbitrator to advert thereto at a later stage. If
B
the partial award answers the definition of the award, as
envisaged under Section 2(c) of the 1996 Act, for all intent and
purport, it would be a final award. In fact, the validity of the said
award had also been questioned by BSCL by filing an objection
in relation thereto.
C 70. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that BSCL did not raise
any objection before the arbitrator in relation to the jurisdiction
of the arbitrator. A ground to that effect has also not been taken
in its application under Section 34 of the Act. We, however, even
otherwise do not agree with the contention of Mr Mitra that a
D partial award is akin to a preliminary decree. On the other hand,
we are of the opinion that it is final in all respects with regard to
disputes referred to the arbitrator which are subject-matters of
such award. We may add that some arbitrators instead and in
place of using the expression “interim award” use the expression
“partial award”. By reason thereof the nature and character of
E an award is not changed. As, for example, we may notice that in
arbitral proceedings conducted under the Rules of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce, the expression “partial
award” is generally used by the arbitrators in place of interim
award. In any view of the matter, BSCL is not in any way
F prejudiced. We may state that both the partial award and the
final award are subject-matter of challenge under Section 34 of
the Act.”
The aforesaid judgment makes it clear that an interim award or partial
award is a final award on matters covered therein made at an intermediate
G stage of the arbitral proceedings.
16. Tested in the light of the statutory provisions and the case law
cited above, it is clear that as the learned Arbitrator has disposed of one
matter between the parties i.e. the issue of limitation finally, the award
dated 23rd July, 2015 is an “interim award” within the meaning of Section
H 2(1)(c) of the Act and being subsumed within the expression “arbitral
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 861
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
award” could, therefore, have been challenged under Section 34 of the A
Act.
17. However, Shri Sinha has argued before us that the award
dated 23rd July, 2015 being a ruling on the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction
would fall within Section 16 of the Act, and inasmuch as the decision
taken on the point of limitation was rejected, the drill of Section 16 must B
be followed in which case all other issues have to be decided first, and it
is only after such issues are decided that such an award can be challenged
under Section 34 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act lays down what, in
arbitration law, is stated to be the Kompetenz-kompetenz principle, viz.
that an arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction. At one time, the
law was that the arbitrator, being a creature of the contract, could not C
rule on the existence or validity of the arbitration clause contained in the
contract. This, however, gave way to the Kompetenz principle which
was adopted by the UNCITRAL Model Law. Article 16 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law, on which Section 16 of the Act is based, reads
as follows: D
“Article 16. Competence of arbitral tribunal to rule on its
jurisdiction
(1) The arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including
any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the
arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an arbitration clause E
which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the
arbitral tribunal that the contract is null and void shall not entail
ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.
(2) A plea that the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction F
shall be raised not later than the submission of the statement of
defence. A party is not precluded from raising such a plea by the
fact that he has appointed, or participated in the appointment of,
an arbitrator. A plea that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding the
scope of its authority shall be raised as soon as the matter alleged G
to be beyond the scope of its authority is raised during the arbitral
proceedings. The arbitral tribunal may, in either case, admit a
later plea if it considers the delay justified.
(3) The arbitral tribunal may rule on a plea referred to in paragraph
(2) of this article either as a preliminary question or in an award
H
862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A on the merits. If the arbitral tribunal rules as a preliminary question
that it has jurisdiction, any party may request, within thirty days
after having received notice of that ruling, the court specified in
article 6 to decide the matter, which decision shall be subject to
no appeal; while such a request is pending, the arbitral tribunal
may continue the arbitral proceedings and make an award.”
B
18. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act expressly
refers to the UNCITRAL Model Law in the following terms:
“3. Though the said UNCITRAL Model Law and Rules are
intended to deal with international commercial arbitration and
C conciliation, they could, with appropriate modifications, serve as
a model for legislation on domestic arbitration and conciliation.
The present Bill seeks to consolidate and amend the law relating
to domestic arbitration, international commercial arbitration,
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and to define the law
relating to conciliation, taking into account the said UNCITRAL
D Model Law and Rules.”
19. It may be noticed that Section 16(1) to (4) are based on Article
16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law. The Kompetenz principle deals
with the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction in the narrow sense of ruling on
objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration
E agreement. What is important to notice in the language of Section 16(1)
is the fact that the arbitral tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, which
makes it clear that it refers to whether the arbitral tribunal may embark
upon an inquiry into the issues raised by parties to the dispute.
20. Here again, the English Arbitration Act of 1996 throws some
F light on the problem before us. Sections 30 and 31 of the said Act read
as under:
“30 Competence of tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction.
- (1) Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, the arbitral tribunal
may rule on its own substantive jurisdiction, that is, as to—
G
(a) whether there is a valid arbitration agreement,
(b) whether the tribunal is properly constituted, and
(c) what matters have been submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the arbitration agreement.
H
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 863
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
(2) Any such ruling may be challenged by any available arbitral A
process of appeal or review or in accordance with the provisions
of this Part.
31 Objection to substantive jurisdiction of tribunal. - (1)
An objection that the arbitral tribunal lacks substantive jurisdiction
at the outset of the proceedings must be raised by a party not B
later than the time he takes the first step in the proceedings to
contest the merits of any matter in relation to which he challenges
the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
A party is not precluded from raising such an objection by the
fact that he has appointed or participated in the appointment of C
an arbitrator.
(2) Any objection during the course of the arbitral proceedings
that the arbitral tribunal is exceeding its substantive jurisdiction
must be made as soon as possible after the matter alleged to be
beyond its jurisdiction is raised. D
(3) The arbitral tribunal may admit an objection later than the
time specified in subsection (1) or (2) if it considers the delay
justified.
(4) Where an objection is duly taken to the tribunal’s substantive
jurisdiction and the tribunal has power to rule on its own E
jurisdiction, it may— (a) rule on the matter in an award as to
jurisdiction, or (b) deal with the objection in its award on the
merits. If the parties agree which of these courses the tribunal
should take, the tribunal shall proceed accordingly.
(5) The tribunal may in any case, and shall if the parties so agree, F
stay proceedings whilst an application is made to the court under
section 32 (determination of preliminary point of jurisdiction).”
These sections make it clear that the Kompetenz principle, which
is also followed by the English Arbitration Act of 1996, is that the
“jurisdiction” mentioned in Section 16 has reference to three things: (1) G
as to whether there is the existence of a valid arbitration agreement; (2)
whether the arbitral tribunal is properly constituted; and (3) matters
submitted to arbitration should be in accordance with the arbitration
agreement.
H
864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A 21. That “jurisdiction” is a coat of many colours, and that the said
word displays a certain colour depending upon the context in which it is
mentioned, is well-settled. In the classic sense, in Official Trustee v.
Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, (1969) 3 SCR 92 at 99, “jurisdiction” is
stated to be:
B “In the order of Reference to a Full Bench in the case
of Sukhlal v. Tara Chand [(1905) ILR 33 Cal 68] it was stated
that jurisdiction may be defined to be the power of a Court to hear
and determine a cause, to adjudicate and exercise any
judicial power in relation to it: in other words, by jurisdiction
is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters
C that are litigated before it or to take cognizance of matters
presented in a formal way for its decision. An examination of
the cases in the books discloses numerous attempts to define the
term ‘jurisdiction’, which has been stated to be ‘the power to
hear and determine issues of law and fact’, the authority by
D which the judicial officer take cognizance of and ‘decide causes’;
‘the authority to hear and decide a legal controversy’, ‘the
power to hear and determine the subject-matter in controversy
between parties to a suit and to adjudicate or exercise any judicial
power over them;’ ‘the power to hear, determine and pronounce
judgment on the issues before the Court’; ‘the power or authority
E which is conferred upon a Court by the Legislature to hear and
determine causes between parties and to carry the judgments
into effect’; ‘the power to enquire into the facts, to apply the
law, to pronounce the judgment and to carry it into execution’.”
(Mukherjee, Acting CJ, speaking for Full Bench of the Calcutta
F High Court in Hirday Nath Roy v. Ramachandra Barna
Sarma ILR 68 Cal 138)
22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ittavira Mathai v.
Varkey Varkey, (1964) 1 SCR 495 at 501-503, made a distinction
between an erroneous decision on limitation being an error of law which
G is within the jurisdiction of the Court, and a decision where the Court
acts without jurisdiction in the following terms:
“The first point raised by Paikedy for the appellant is that the
decree in OS No. 59 of 1093 obtained by Anantha Iyer and his
brother in the suit on the hypothecation bond executed by
H Ittiyavira in favour of Ramalinga Iyer was a nullity because the
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 865
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
suit was barred by time. In assuming that the suit was barred by A
time, it is difficult to appreciate the contention of learned counsel
that the decree can be treated as a nullity and ignored in
subsequent litigation. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the
court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and
therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree
B
set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled
that a court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit
and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may
decide wrong; and that even though it decided wrong it would
not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had
the jurisdiction over the subject-matter and it had the jurisdiction C
over the party and, therefore, merely because it made an error
in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has
acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have
jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though
they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be
D
treated as nullities. Learned counsel, however, referred us to the
decision of the Privy Council in Maqbul Ahmad v. Onkar Pratap
Narain Singh [AIR (1935) PC 85] and contended that since
the court is bound under the provisions of Section 3 of the
Limitation Act to ascertain for itself whether the suit before it
was within time, it would act without jurisdiction if it fails to do E
so. All that the decision relied upon says is that Section 3 of the
Limitation Act is peremptory and that it is the duty of the court to
take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the
point of limitation is not referred to in the pleadings. The Privy
Council has not said that where the court fails to perform its
F
duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely
makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only
in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the
party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that
error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not
be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity.” G
23. It is in this sense of the term that “jurisdiction” has been used
in Section 16 of the Act. Indeed, in NTPC (supra) at 460-461, a Division
Bench of this Court, after setting out Sections 16 and 37 held:
“10. Now, the only question that remains to be decided in the
present case is whether against the order of partial award an H
866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A appeal is maintainable directly under Section 37 of the Act or
not. We have considered the submissions of learned counsel for
the appellant and after going through the counterclaim and the
partial award, we are of the opinion that no question of jurisdiction
arises in the matter so as to enable the appellant to file a direct
appeal under Section 37 of the Act before the High Court. As
B
already mentioned above, an appeal under sub-section (2) of
Section 37 only lies if there is an order passed under Sections
16(2) and (3) of the Act. Sections 16(2) and (3) deal with the
exercise of jurisdiction. The plea of jurisdiction was not taken by
the appellant. It was taken by the respondent in order to meet
C their counterclaim. But it was not in the context of the fact that
the Tribunal had no jurisdiction, it was in the context that this
question of counterclaim was no more open to be decided for
the simple reason that all the issues which had been raised in
Counterclaims 1 to 10 had already been settled in the minutes of
meeting dated 6-4-2000/7-4-2000 and it was recorded that no
D
other issues were to be resolved in first and third contracts.
Therefore, we fail to understand how the question of jurisdiction
was involved in the matter. In fact it was in the context of the
fact that the entire counterclaims have already been satisfied
and settled in the meeting that it was concluded that no further
E issues remained to be settled. In this context, the counterclaims
filed by the appellant were opposed. If any grievance was there,
that should have been (sic raised) by the respondent and not by
the appellant. It is only the finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
after considering the counterclaim vis-à-vis the minutes of
meeting dated 6-4-2000/7-4-2000. Therefore, there was no
F
question of jurisdiction involved in the matter so as to enable the
appellant to approach the High Court directly.”
Interestingly, in a separate concurring judgment, P.K. Balasubramanyan,
J., held:
G “17. In the larger sense, any refusal to go into the merits of a
claim may be in the realm of jurisdiction. Even the dismissal of
the claim as barred by limitation may in a sense touch on the
jurisdiction of the court or tribunal. When a claim is dismissed on
the ground of it being barred by limitation, it will be, in a sense, a
case of the court or tribunal refusing to exercise jurisdiction to
H go into the merits of the claim. In Pandurang Dhoni
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 867
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav [AIR 1996 SC 153 : (1996) A
1 SCR 102] this Court observed that: (AIR p. 155, para 10)
“It is well settled that a plea of limitation or a plea of res judicata
is a plea of law which concerns the jurisdiction of the court
which tries the proceedings. A finding on these pleas in favour
of the party raising them would oust the jurisdiction of the court, B
and so, an erroneous decision on these pleas can be said to be
concerned with questions of jurisdiction which fall within the
purview of Section 115 of the Code.”
In a particular sense, therefore, any declining to go into the merits
of a claim could be said to be a case of refusal to exercise C
jurisdiction.
18. The expression “jurisdiction” is a word of many hues. Its
colour is to be discerned from the setting in which it is used.
When we look at Section 16 of the Act, we find that the said
provision is one, which deals with the competence of the Arbitral D
Tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction. SBP & Co. v. Patel Engg.
Ltd. [(2005) 8 SCC 618] in a sense confined the operation of
Section 16 to cases where the Arbitral Tribunal was constituted
at the instance of the parties to the contract without reference to
the Chief Justice under Section 11(6) of the Act. In a case where
the parties had thus constituted the Arbitral Tribunal without E
recourse to Section 11(6) of the Act, they still have the right to
question the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal including the right
to invite a ruling on any objection with respect to the existence
or validity of the arbitration agreement. It could therefore rule
that there existed no arbitration agreement, that the arbitration F
agreement was not valid, or that the arbitration agreement did
not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to adjudicate upon the
particular claim that is put forward before it. Under sub-section
(5), it has the obligation to decide the plea and where it rejects
the plea, it could continue with the arbitral proceedings and make
the award. Under sub-section (6), a party aggrieved by such an G
arbitral award may make an application for setting aside such
arbitral award in accordance with Section 34. In other words, in
the challenge to the award, the party aggrieved could raise the
contention that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass it or that it
had exceeded its authority, in passing it. This happens when the H
868 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A Tribunal proceeds to pass an award. It is in the context of the
various sub-sections of Section 16 that one has to understand
the content of the expression “jurisdiction” and the scope of the
appeal provision. In a case where the Arbitral Tribunal proceeds
to pass an award after overruling the objection relating to
jurisdiction, it is clear from sub-section (6) of Section 16 that the
B
parties have to resort to Section 34 of the Act to get rid of that
award, if possible. But, if the Tribunal declines jurisdiction or
declines to pass an award and dismisses the arbitral proceedings,
the party aggrieved is not without a remedy. Section 37(2) deals
with such a situation. Where the plea of absence of jurisdiction
C or a claim being in excess of jurisdiction is accepted by the
Arbitral Tribunal and it refuses to go into the merits of the claim
by declining jurisdiction, a direct appeal is provided. In the context
of Section 16 and the specific wording of Section 37(2)(a) of the
Act, it would be appropriate to hold that what is made directly
appealable by Section 37(2)(a) of the Act is only an acceptance
D
of a plea of absence of jurisdiction, or of excessive exercise of
jurisdiction and the refusal to proceed further either wholly or
partly.
19. In a case where a counterclaim is referred to and dealt with
and a plea that the counterclaim does not survive in view of the
E settlement of disputes between the parties earlier arrived at is
accepted, it could not be held to be a case of refusal to exercise
jurisdiction by the Arbitral Tribunal. Same is the position when
an Arbitral Tribunal finds that a claim was dead and was not
available to be made at the relevant time or that the claim was
F not maintainable for other valid reasons or that the claim was
barred by limitation. They are all adjudications by the Tribunal
on the merits of the claim and in such a case the aggrieved party
can have recourse only to Section 34 of the Act and will have to
succeed on establishing any of the grounds available under that
provision. It would not be open to that party to take up the position
G that by refusing to go into the merits of his claim, the Arbitral
Tribunal had upheld a plea that it does not have jurisdiction to
entertain the claim and hence the award or order made by it,
comes within the purview of Section 16(2) of the Act and
consequently is appealable under Section 37(2)(a) of the Act.”
H (at pages 463-464)
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 869
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
24. This judgment is determinative of the issue at hand and has A
our respectful concurrence. However, various judgments were referred
to by learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the respondent, in
which “jurisdiction” in the wide sense was used. Thus, a jurisdictional
error under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, dealing
with revision petitions, was held to include questions which relate to res
B
judicata and limitation. [See Pandurang Dhoni Chougule v. Maruti
Hari Jadhav (1966) 1 SCR 102 at 107)].
25. This judgment was expressly referred to in the context of
Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, (1969) 2 AC 147,
delivered in England, which virtually made all “errors of law” “errors of
jurisdiction” in the Administrative Law sphere and explained in M.L. C
Sethi v. R.P. Kapur, (1972) 2 SCC 427 at 435 as under:
“...The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above
case would show the extent to which “lack” and “excess” of
jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent
to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of D
“jurisdiction”. The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce
the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within
jurisdiction almost to vanishing point. The practical effect of the
decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional.
This comes perilously close to saying that there is jurisdiction if E
the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any
misconstruction of a statute can be represented as “basing their
decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal”,
“imposing an unwarranted condition” or “addressing themselves
to a wrong question”. The majority opinion in the case leaves a
Court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether F
there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction
can be determined only by construing the empowering statute,
which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much
latitude the court is prepared to allow. In the end it can only be a
value judgment (see H.N.R. Wade, “Constitutional and G
Administrative Aspects of the Anisminic case”. Law Quarterly
Review, Vol. 85,1969, p. 198). Why is it that a wrong decision on
a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a
jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision? It
is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a
H
870 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction
of the court in the primitive sense of the term and render the
decision or a decree embodying the decision a nullity liable to
collateral attack. The reason can only be that the error of law
was considered as vital by the court. And there is no yardstick to
determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of
B
the Court…”
26. Likewise, in Hari Prasad Mulshanker Trivedi v. V.B. Raju
(1974) 3 SCC 415 at 423-424, a Constitution Bench of this Court again
referred to the blurring of lines between errors of law and errors of
jurisdiction found in Anisminic (supra) as follows:
C “Though the dividing line between lack of jurisdiction or power
and erroneous exercise of it has become thin with the decision
of the House of Lords in the Anisminic case, [(1967) 3 WLR
382] we do not think that the distinction between the two has
been completely wiped out. We are aware of the difficulty in
D formulating an exhaustive rule to tell when there is lack of power
and when there is an erroneous exercise of it. The difficulty has
arisen because the word “jurisdiction” is an expression which is
used in a variety of senses and takes its colour from its context,
(see per Diplock, J., at p. 394 in the Anisminic case). Whereas
the “pure” theory of jurisdiction would reduce jurisdictional control
E to a vanishing point, the adoption of a narrower meaning might
result in a more useful legal concept even though the formal
structure of law may lose something of its logical symmetry. “At
bottom the problem of defining the concept of jurisdiction for
purpose of judicial review has been one of public policy rather
F than one of logic”. [S. A. Smith : “Judicial Review of
Administrative Action”, 2nd Edn., p. 98] And viewed from the
aspect of public policy as reflected in the provisions of the 1950
and 1951 Acts, we do not think that a wrong decision on a question
of ordinary residence for the purpose of entering a person’s name
in the electoral roll should be treated as a jurisdictional error
G which can be judicially reviewed either in a civil court or before
an election tribunal.”
27. In ITW Signode India Ltd. v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 at 74,
a case strongly relied upon by Shri Sinha, this Court held in the context
of limitation qua recovery of duty under Section 11A of the Central Excise
H Act, 1944 as follows:
M/S. INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER CO-OPERATIVE LTD. v. 871
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS [R. F. NARIMAN, J.]
“69. The question of limitation involves a question of jurisdiction. A
The finding of fact on the question of jurisdiction would be a
jurisdictional fact. Such a jurisdictional question is to be
determined having regard to both fact and law involved therein.
The Tribunal, in our opinion, committed a manifest error in not
determining the said question, particularly, when in the absence
B
of any finding of fact that such short-levy of excise duty related
to any positive act on the part of the appellant by way of fraud,
collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts, the extended
period of limitation could not have been invoked and in that view
of the matter no show-cause notice in terms of Rule 10 could
have been issued.” C
28. Given the context of Section 11A of the Central Excise Act,
1944, obviously the expression “jurisdiction” would mean something more
than merely being able to embark on the merits of a dispute. In a recent
judgment under Section 9A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as
inserted by the State of Maharashtra), this Court in Foreshore Coop. D
Housing Society Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412, referred
to the expression “jurisdiction” occurring in Section 9A and held an earlier
judgment of this Court to be per incuriam. Though the Constitution
Bench judgment in Ittavira (supra) was mentioned by the Bench,
referring to the argument of one of the counsel for the parties, in the
concluding portion, this judgment is not referred to at all. In any case, E
the reasoning of the Court in that case was in the context of Section 9A
which, when contrasted with Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, made the Court accept the wider concept of “jurisdiction” as laid
down in Pandurang (supra).
29. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the award dated 23rd F
July, 2015 is an interim award, which being an arbitral award, can be
challenged separately and independently under Section 34 of the Act.
We are of the view that such an award, which does not relate to the
arbitral tribunal’s own jurisdiction under Section 16, does not have to
follow the drill of Section 16(5) and (6) of the Act. Having said this, we G
are of the view that Parliament may consider amending Section 34 of
the Act so as to consolidate all interim awards together with the final
arbitral award, so that one challenge under Section 34 can be made
after delivery of the final arbitral award. Piecemeal challenges like
piecemeal awards lead to unnecessary delay and additional expense.
H
872 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 1 S.C.R.
A 30.The appeal is, accordingly, allowed and the impugned judgment
is set aside. The Section 34 proceedings before the District Judge,
Jagatsinghpur may now be decided. There shall, however, be no order
as to costs.
B Ankit Gyan Appeal allowed.
C
D
E
F
G
H
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