M/S. ESCORTS LIMITEDversusRAMA MUKHERJEE

                    [2013] 10 S.C.R. 339


                  M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED                           A
                               v.
                    RAMA MUKHERJEE
             (Criminal Appeal No. 1457 of 2013)
                   SEPTEMBER 17, 2013
                                                                 B
   [P. SATHASIVAM, CJI AND JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

     Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - s.138 - Dishonour of
 cheque - Jurisdiction to try offence u/s. 138 - Vesting with which
 Court - Held: The Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the C
 dishonoured cheque was presented for encashment, would
 have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed uls. 138.
     Issue arose for consideration as to whether the Court
 within the jurisdiction whereof, the complainant had 0
 presented the dishonoured cheque '(Issued by an
 accused), had the jurisdiction to entertain a petition flied
 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act,
 1881.
      The High Court held that just because the E
 dishonoured cheques In question were presented for
 encashment by the complainant at Delhl or the demand
 notice was sent from Delhl, the Courts at Deihl would not
 have jurisdiction to try the case. The High Court accepted
 the prayer made by the drawee of the cheque (I.e. the F
 respondent) to conclude, that the Courts at Delhi did not
 have the jurisdiction to try the complaint filed by the
 appellant, under Section 138 of the Negotiable
 Instruments Act. Hence the present appeal.
                                                            G
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
       HELD: 1.1. It is apparent, that the conclusion drawn
__ by-the Hign Court, In the Impugned order-;15 notin-

                             339                                 H
    340     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A consonance with the decision rendered by this Court in
  Nishant Aggarwal's case wherein it has been concluded,
  that the Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the
  dishonoured cheque was presented for encashment,
  would have the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint
B filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  In addition to the judgment rendered by this Court in
  Nishant Aggarwal's case, another bench of this Court
  has also arrived at the conclusion drawn in Nishant
  Aggarwal's case, on the· pointed issue under
c consideration. In this behalf, reference may be made to
  the 'decision rendered in FIL Industries Limited vs. lmtiyaz
  Ahmed Bhat. [Paras 5, 6] [351-A-D]

       1.2. In view of the above, having taken into
  consideration the factual position noticed by the High
0 Court in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, this
  Court is of the view that the High Court erred in
  concluding that the courts at Delhi, did not have the
  jurisdiction to try the petition filed by the appellant under
  Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The
E impugned order passed by the High Court is accordingly
  set aside. [Para 7] [354-E-F]

         Nishant Aggarwal vs. Kai/ash Kumar Sharma [Criminal
    Appeal no. 808 of 2013 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9434
F   of 2011); decision of Supreme Court dated 1.7.2013]and
    FIL Industries Limited vs. lmtiyaz Ahmed Bhat [Criminal
    Appeal No. 1168 of 2013 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8096
    of 2012), decision of Supreme Court dated 12.8.2013] -
    relied on.
G        K. Bhaskaran vs. Shankaran Vaidhyam Ba/an & Anr.
    (1999) 7 SCC 510 : 1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271; Shri lshar
    Alloys Steels Ltd. Vs. Jayaswal NECO Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC
    609; Harman Electronics Private Ltd. Vs. National Panasonic
    India Pvt. Ltd. (2009) 1 SCC 720 : 2008 (17) SCR 487 and
H
  M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE              341


FIL Industries Limited vs. lmtiyaz Ahmed Bhat 2014 (2) SCC   A
266 - referred to.
     2. However, during the course of hearing, whilst it
was the case of the appellant (based on certain
documents available on the file of the present case) to
reiterate that the cheque in question, which was the B
subject matter of the appellant's claim under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was presented
for encashment at Delhi; it was the contention of the
respondent, that the aforesaid cheque was presented for
encashment at Faridabad. It was accordingly submitted, C
that the jurisdictional issue need.ed to be decided by
accepting, that the dishonoured cheque was presented
at Faridabad. It is not possible for this Court to entertain
and adjudicate upon a disputed question of fact. In case,
the respondent is so advised, it would be open to him to 0
raise an objection on the issue of jurisdiction, based on
a factual position now asserted before this Court. In case
the respondent raises such a plea, the same shall be
entertained and disposed of in accordance with law.
[Para 8] [354-G-H; 355-A-D]
                                                             E
                     Case Law Reference:
    1999 (3) Suppl. SCR 271     referred to     Para 4
    (2003) 3 sec 609            referred to     Para 4
    2008 (17) SCR 487           referred to     Para 4
                                                             F
    2014 (2) sec 266            referred to     Para 6
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 1457 of 2013.
    From the Judgment and Order dated 27.04.2012 of the
High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Miscellaneous G
Case No. 1715 of 2011.

    S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Bina Madhavan, Praseena E.
Joseph, Shivendra Singh (for Lawyer's Knit & Co.) for the
Appellant.                                                   H
    342       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013) 10 S.C.R.


A         A.K. De, Debasis Misra, Rajesh Dwivedi, Sanjay Chetry
    for the Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. This Court on
B 21.2.2013 directed that the instant SLP (Crl.) No.7325 of 2012
  be listed after the pronouncement of judgment in Criminal
  Appeal no. 808 of 2013 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9434 of
  2011), titled Nishant Aggarwal vs. Kai/ash Kumar Sharma.
  Nishant Aggarwal's case (supra) was disposed of by this Court
C on 1. 7.. 2013. The pointed question, which arose for
  consideration in this Court's aforesaid determination was,
  whether the Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the
  complainant had presented the dishonoured cheque.(issued by
  an accused), had the jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed
D under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. While
  disposing Criminal Appeal No.808 of 2013, this Court returned
  a finding in the affirmative by observing as under:

          "(7) We have already narrated the case of both the parties
          in the pleadings portion. In order to answer the only
E
          question, It is relevant to note that the undisputed facts in
          the context of territorial jurisdiction of the learned
          Magistrate at Bhiwani are that the drawee of the cheque
          i.e., the respondent/complainant is a resident of Bhiwani.
          The native village of the respondent, namely, village
F         Barsana is situated in District Bhiwani. The respondent
          owns ancestral agricultural land at village Barsana, District
          Bhiwani. It is also asserted that the respondent is runnina
          his bank account with Canara Bank, Bhiwani and is also
          residing at the present address for the last about two
G         decades. In view of the same. it is the claim of the
          respondent that he bonafidely presented the cheque in his
          bank at Bhiwani which was further presented to the
          drawer's Bank at Guwahati. The cheque was returned
          uncashed to the respondent's bank at Bhiwani with the
H         endorsement "payment stopped by drawer". The
M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                   343
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
 respondent received the bounced cheque back from his            A
 bank at Bhiwani. Thereafter, the respondent sent a legal
 notice under Section 138 of the N.I. Act to the appellant
 from Bhiwani. In turn, the appellant sent a reply to the said
 notice which the respondent received at Bhiwani. In view
 of non-payment of the cheque amount. the respondent filed       e
 a complaint under Sections 138 and 141 of the N.I. Act
 before the learned Magistrate at Bhiwani.

 (8) Inasmuch as the issue in question is directly considered
 by this Court in K. Bhaskaran (supra}, before going into
 the applicability of other decisions, it is useful to refer the C
 relevant portion of the judgment in paras 10 and 11 of the
 said case which reads thus:

        "10. Learned counsel for the appellant first
        contended that the trial court has no jurisdiction to D
        try this case and hence the High Court should not
        have converted the acquittal into conviction on the
        strength of the evidence collected in such a trial. Of
        course, the trial court had upheld the pleas of the
        accused that it had no jurisdiction to try the case. E

         11. We fail to comprehend as to how the trial court
        could have found so regarding the jurisdiction
        question. Under Section 177 of the Code "eve_ry
         offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried
         in a court within whose jurisdiction it was F
        committed". The locality where the Bank (which
        dishonoured the cheque} is situated cannot be
        regarded as the sole criterion to determine the
        place of offence. It must be remembered that
        offence under Section 138 would not be completed G
        with the dishonour of the cheque. It attains
        completion only with the failure of the drawer of the
        cheque to pay the cheque amount within the expiry
        of 15 days mentioned in clause (c} of the proviso
        to Section 138 of the Act. It is normally difficult to H
    344           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A                  fix up a particular locality as the place of failure to
                   pay the amount covered by the cheque. A place, for
                   that purpose, would depend upon a variety of
                   factors. It can either be at the place where the
                   drawer resides or at the place where the payee
B                  resides or at the place where either of them carries
                   on business. Hence, the difficulty to fix up any
                   particular locality as the place of occurrence for the
                   offence under Section 138 of the Act."

          It is clear that this Court also discussed the relevant
c         provisions of the Code, particularly, Sections 177, 178 and
          179 and in the light of the language used, interpreted
          Section 138 of the N.1. Act and laid down that Section 138
          has five components, namely,

D          i)      drawing of the cheque;

           ii)     presentation of the cheque to the bank;

           iii)    returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank;

E          iv)     giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque
                   demanding payment of the cheque amount; and

           v)      failure of the drawer to make payment within 15
                   days of the receipt of the notice.
F         After saying so, this Court concluded that the complainant
          can choose any one of the five places to file a complaint.
          The further discussion in the said judgment is extracted
          hereunder:

G                  "14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can
                   be completed only with the concatenation of a
                   number of acts. The following are the acts which are
                   components of the said offence:

           (1)     drawing of the cheque,
H
M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                        345
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

  (2)   presentation of the cheque to the bank,                      A

  (3)    returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank,

  (4)    giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque
         demanding payment of the cheque amount,
                                                                     B
  (5)   failure of the drawer to make payment within 15
        days of the receipt of the notice.

 15, It is not necessary that all the above five acts should
 have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible          c
 that each of those five acts could be done at five different
 localities. But a concatenation of all the above five is a sine
 qua non for the completion of the offence under Section
 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section
 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:
                                                                     D
         11
              178. (a)-(c) * * *

         (d) where the offence consists of several acts done
         in different local areas, it may be enquired into or
         tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such       E
         local areas. 11

  16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in
  five different localities any one of the courts exercising
 jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the
 place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act.        F
  In other words, the complainant can choose any one of
 those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local
 areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those
 five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened
 and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise                    G
 jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section
 138 of the Act. 11

 (9) Para 11 of K. Bhaskaran (supra), as quoted above,
 clarified the place in the context of territorial jurisdiction as   H
    346       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2013] 10 S.C.R.


A       per the fifth component, namely, "failure of the drawer to
        make payment within 15 days of the receipt." As rightly
        pointed out by learned senior counsel for the respondent,
        the place of failure to pay the amount has been clearly
        qualified by this Court as the place where the drawer
B       resides or the place where the payee resides. In view of
        the same and in the light of the law laid down by this Court
        in K.Bhaskaran (supra), we are of the view that the learned
        Magistrate at Bhiwani has territorial jurisdiction to try the
        complaint filed by the respondent as the respondent is
c       undisputedly a resident of Bhiwani. Further, in K.
        Bhaskaran (supra), while considering the territorial
      · jurisdiction at great length, this Court has concluded that
        the amplitude of territorial jurisdiction pertaining to a
        complaint under the N.I. Act is very wide and expansive
D       and we are in entire agreement with the same.

                ***                                           ***

          (12) Mr. Ahmadi, learned senior counsel for the appellant
          has also relied on a decision of this Court in Harman
E         Electronics Private Limited and Another vs. National
          Panasonic India Private Limited, (2009) 1 SCC 720. In
          Harman Electronics (supra), the complainant and the
          accused entered into a business transaction. The accused
          was a resident of Chandigarh. He carried on the business
F         in Chandigarh and issued a cheque in question at
          Chandigarh. The complainant had a Branch Office at
          Chandigarh although his Head Office was at Delhi. He
          presented the cheque given by the accused at Chandigarh.
          The cheque was dishonoured at Chandigarh. The
G         complainant issued a notice upon the accused asking him
          to pay the amount from New Delhi. The said notice was
          served on the accused at Chandigarh. On failure on the
          part of the accused to pay the amount within 15 days from
          the date of the communication of the said letter, the
H         complainant filed a complaint at Delhi. In the complaint, it
M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                      347
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
 was stated that the Delhi Court has jurisdiction to try the        A
  case because the complainant was carrying on business
  at Delhi, the demand notice was issued from Delhi, the
  amount of cheque was payable at Delhi and the accused
  failed to make the payment of the said cheque within the
  statutory period of 15 days from the date of receipt of           s
  notice. It is further seen that the cognizance of the offence
  was taken by the learned Magistrate at Delhi. The accused
  questioned the jurisdiction of the Magistrate at Delhi before
  the Addi. Sessions Judge, New Delhi. The Sessions Judge
  held that the Magistrate at Delhi had jurisdiction to entertain   c
  the complaint as, admittedly, the notice was sent by the
  complainant to the accused from Delhi and the
  complainant was having its Registered Office at Delhi and
 was carrying on business at Delhi. The learned Judge has
  also observed that the accused failed to make payment             D
  at Delhi as the demand was made from Delhi and the
  payment was to be made to the complainant at Delhi. The
  Delhi High Court dismissed the petition filed by the
  accused. Thereafter, the accused approached this Court.
  This Court considered Section 138 of the N.I. Act and also
  referred to K.Bhaskaran's case (supra) and quoted the five        E
  components of offence under Section 138 which have
  been noted in paragraph supra. This Court reiterated that
  the five different acts which are the components of offence
  under Section 138 of the N .I. Act were done in five different
  localities, any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in      F
  one of the five local areas can become the place of trial
  for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and the
  complainant would be at liberty to file a complaint at any
. of those places. Ultimately, this Court held that the
  Chandigarh Court had jurisdiction to entertain the                G
  complaint because the parties were carrying on business
  at Chandigarh, Branch Office of the complainant was also
  in Chandigarh, the transactions were carried on only from
  Chandigarh and the cheque was issued and presented at
 Chandigarh. This Court pointed out that the complaint did          H
    348        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A          not show that the cheque was presented at Delhi, because
           it was absolutely silent in that regard and, therefore, there
          was no option but to presume that the cheque was
          presented at Chandigarh. It is not in dispute that the
          dishonour of the cheque also took place at Chandigarh
B         and, therefore, the only question which arose before this
          Court for consideration was whether the sending of notice
          from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in
          taking cognizance under the N.I. Act. In such
          circumstances, we are of the view that Harman Electronics
c         (supra} is only an authority on the question where a court
          will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from
          the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not
          deviate from the other principles laid down in K.
          Bhaskaran (supra}. This Court has accepted that the place
          where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has
D
          jurisdiction to try the complaint. In this way, this Court
          concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give
          rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice
          would. In other words, the court clarified only on the service
          in such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay
E         the demanded, amount within a period of 15 days,
          thereafter, the commission of an offence completes. We
          are of the view that this Court in Harman Electronics
          (supra) affirmed what it had said in K. Bhaskaran (supra)
          that court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented
F         and in whose jurisdiction there is failure to make payment ·
          within 15 days of the receipt of notice can have jurisdiction
          to trv the offence under Section 138 of the N. I. Act. It is also
          relevant to point out that while holding that the Chandigarh
          Court has jurisdiction. this Court in Harman Electronics
G         (supra) observed that in the case before it. the complaint
          was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented
          at Delhi. In the case on hand. it is categorically stated that
          the cheque was presented at Bhiwani whereas in Harman
          Electronics (supra) the dishonour had taken place at
H         Chandigarh and this fact was taken into account while
  M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                      349
          [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

    holding that Chandigarh court has jurisdiction. In the A
    complaint in question. it is specifically stated that the
    dishonour took place at Bhiwani. We are also satisfied that
    nothing said in Harman Electronics (supra) had adverse
    impact on the complainant's case in the present case.
                                                                     8
    (13) As observed earlier, we must note that in K.
    Bhaskaran (supra), this Court has held that Section 178
    of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a
    criminal court and Section 179 of the Code has stretched
    it to still a wider horizon. Further, for the sake of repetition, C
    we reiterate that the judgment in lshar Alloy (supra) does
    not affect the ratio in K. Bhaskaran (supra) which provides
    jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the
    payee. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances
    and even on merits, the High Court rightly refused ta
    exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of D
    the Code and dismissed the petition filed by the appellant-
    accused.

    (14) In the light of the above discussion. we hold that the
    ratio laid down in K.Bhaskaran (supra) squarely applies          E
    to the case on hand. The said principle was correctly
    applied by the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High
    Court. Consequently. the appeal fails and the same is
    dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal. the
    interim order granted by this Court on 09.12.2011 shall          F
    stand vacated."

                                              {emphasis is ours)

    2. Leave granted.
                                                                    G
     3. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties. The
reason for posting the instant matter for hearing after the
disposal of Nishant Aggarwal's case (supra) was, that the
controversy arising herein, was exactly the same as was sought
to be determined by this court in Nishant Aggarwal's case            H
    350       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A   (supra). The factual position necessary for the disposal of the
    instant Civil Appeal, was noticed in paragraph 13 of the
    impugned order, passed by the Delhi High Court. The same is
    being extracted hereunder:

          "13. Thus Mis Re/igare Finvest (supra) relied on by the
B
          Petitioner was a case where even the drawer bank's
          clearing branch which dishonoured the cheque was also
          situated at New Delhi. In the said case, the jurisdiction was
          vested in the Courts at Delhi because of the drawer's
          bank's clearing branch being at Delhi and not because the
c         cheque was presented in the payee bank or that the legal
          notice of demand was issued from a place at Delhi.
          Applying the decisions aforementioned to the facts of the
          present case, I do not consider it fit to state that just
          because the cheques were presentea at Delhi or the
D         demand notice was sent from Delhi. Courts at Delhi would
          have jurisdiction to try the present case."

                                                   (emphasis is ours)

E        4. Having taken into consideration the fact th;at the cheque
    was presented for encashment by the complain!_nt at Delhi, and
    having referred to the judgments rendered by this Court in K.
    Bhaskaran vs. Shankaran Vaidhyam Ba/an & Anr., (1999) 7
    SCC 510, Shri /shar Alloys Steels Ltd. Vs. Jayaswal NECO
    Ltd., (2003) 3 SCC 609, and Harman Electronics Private Ltd.
F   Vs. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., (2009) 1 SCC 720, the
    High Court accepted the prayer made by the drawee of the
    cheque (i.e. the respondent herein) to conclude, that the Courts
    at Delhi did not have the jurisdiction to try the complaint filed
    by the appellant, under Section 138 of the Negotiable
G   Instruments Act. Having so concluded, the Metropolitan
    Magistrate before whom the matter was pending, was directed
    to return the complaint to the respondent. Liberty was granted
    to the appellant, to file the returned petition before the
    jurisdictional Court at Kolkata.
H
  MIS. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                 351
          [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
     5. It is apparent, that the conclusion drawn by the High A
Court, in the impugned order dated 27.4.2012, is not in
eonsonance with the decision rendered by this Court in Nishant
Aggarwal's case (supra). Therein it has been concluded, that
the Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the dishonoured
cheque was presented for encashment, would have the B
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

     6. In addition to the judgment rendered by this Court in
Nishant Aggarwal's case, another bench of this Court has also
arrived at the conclusion drawn in Nishant Aggarwal's case, on C
the pointed issue under consideration. In this behalf, reference
may be made to the decision rendered in FIL Industries Limited
vs. lmtiyaz Ahmed Bhat, Criminal Appeal No. 1168 of 2013
(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8096 of 2012), decided on
12.8.2013. This Court in the above matter held as under:         D

    "3. The facts very briefly are that the respondent delivered
    a cheque dated 23rd December. 2010 for an amount of
    '29,69.746/-(Rupees Twenty Nine lakhs sixty nine thousand
    seven hundred forty six only) on Jammu and Kashmir Bank E
    Limited. Branch Imam Saheb. Shopian. to the appellant
    towards some business dealings and the appellant
    deposited the same in UCO Bank. Sopore. When· the
    cheque amount was not encashed and collected in the
    account of the appellant in UCO Bank Sopore, the F
    appellant filed a complaint under Section 138 of the
    Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 before the Chief Judicial
    Magistrate, Sqpore. The respondent sought dismissal of
    the complaint on the ground that the Chief Judicial
    Magistrate had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the G
    complaint. By order dated 29th November, 2011, the
    learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sopore, however, held
    that he had the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.
    Aggrieved, the appellant filed Criminal Miscellaneous
    Petition No. 431 of 2011 under Section 561A of the
                                                                H
    352       SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 10 S.C.R.


A         Jammu and Kashmir Criminal Procedure Code and by the
          impugned order dated 2nd June, 2012, the High Court
          quashed the complaint saying that the Court at Sopore had
          no jurisdiction to receive and entertain the complaint.

          4. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and we
B
          find that in K.Bhaskwan v. Sankaran Vidyabalan and
          Another, (1999) 7 SCC 510, this Court had the occasion
          to consider as to which Court would have the jurisdiction
          to entertain the complaint under Section 1-38 of the
          Negotiable Instruments Act and in paras 14, 15 and 16 of
c         the judgment in the aforesaid case held as under:-

                "14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can ·
                be completed only with the concatenation of a
                number of acts. Following are the acts which are
D               components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the
                cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank,
                (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee
                bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of
                the cheque demanding payment of the cheque
E               amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment
                within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.

                 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts
                 should have been perpetrated at the same locality.
                 It is possible that each of those five acts could be
F                done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of
                 all the above five is a sine qua non for the
                 completion of the offence under Section 138 of the
                 Code. In this context a reference to Section 178(d)
                 of the Code is useful. It is extracted below:
G                           I

                       'Wh$'e the offence consists of several acts
                       done; in different local areas, it may be
                       inquired into or tried by a Court having
                       jurisdiction over any of such local areas."
H
M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                     353
        [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]

        16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done A
        in five different localities any one of the courts
        exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas
        can become the place of trial for the offence under
        Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the
        complainant can choose any one of those courts B
        having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas
        within the territorial limits of which any one of those
        five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so
        widened and· so expansive it is an idle exercise to
        raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence       c
        under Section 138 of the Act."

 5. It will be clear from the aforesaid paragraphs of the
 judgment in K. Bhaskaran's case (Supra) that five different
 acts compose the offence under Section 138 of the
 Negotiable Instruments Act and if any one of these five D
 different acts was done in a particular locality the Court
 having territorial jurisdiction on that locality can become the
 place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the
 Negotiable Instruments Act and, therefore, the complainant
 can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over E
 any one of the local area within the territorial limits of which
 any one of the five acts was done. In the facts of the present
 case. it is not disputed that the cheque was presented to
 the UCO Bank at Sopore in which the appellant had an
 account and. therefore the Court at Sopore had territorial F
  jurisdiction to entertain and try the complaint.

 6. Learned counsel for the respondent. however. relied on
 the decision of this Court in Harman Electronics Private
 Limited and Another v. National Panasonic India Private G
 Limited to submit that the Court at Shopian would have the
 territorial jurisdiction. We have perused the aforesaid
 decision of this Court in Harman Electronics Private
 Limited (Supra) and we find on a reading of paragraphs
 11 and 12 of the judgment in the aforesaid case that in that H
    354       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 10 S.C.R.

A         case the issue was as to whether sending of a notice from
          Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking
          cognizance of a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable
          Instruments Act when the parties had been carrying on
          business at Chandigarh. the Head Office of the
B         respondent-complainant was at Delhi but it had a branch
          at Chandigarh and all the transactions were carried out only
          from Chandigarh. On these facts. this Court held that Delhi
          from where the notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable
          Instruments Act was issued by the respondent would not
          have had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under
c         Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This
          question does not arise in the facts of the present case.

          7. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set
          aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and
D         remand the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sopore
          for decision in accordance with law."

                                                    (emphasis is ours)

          7. In view of the above, having taken into consideration the
E   factual position noticed by the High Court in paragraph 13 of
    the impugned judgment, we are of the view, that the High Court
    erred in concluding that the courts at Delhi, did not have the
    jurisdiction to try the petition filed by the appellant under Section
    138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The impugned order
F   dated 27.4.2012 passed by the High Court is accordingly liable
    to be set aside. The same is, therefore, hereby set aside.

       8. Despite the conclusion drawn by us hereinabove, it
  would be relevant to mention, that our instant determination is
G based on the factual position expressed by the High Court in
  paragraph 13 of the impugned order. During the course of
  hearing, whilst it was the case of the learned counsel for the
  appellant (based on certain documents available on the file of
  the present case) to reiterate that the cheque in question, which
H was the subject matter of the appellant's claim under Section
  M/S. ESCORTS LIMITED v. RAMA MUKHERJEE                 355
          [JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, was presented for A
encashment at Delhi; it was the contention of the learned
counsel for the respondent, that the aforesaid cheque was
presented for encashment at Faridabad. It was accordingly
submitted, that the jurisdictional issue needed to be decided
by accepting, that the dishonoured cheque was presented at B
Faridabad. It is not possible for us to entertain and adjudicate
upon a disputed question of fact. We have rendered the instant
decision, on the factual position taken into consideration by the
High Court. In case, the respondent herein is so advised, it
would be open to him to raise an objection on the issue of c
jurisdiction, based on a factual position now asserted before
us. The determination rendered by us must be deemed to be
on the factual position taken into consideration by the High Court
(in paragraph 13, extracted above), while disposing of the issue
of jurisdiction. In case the respondent raises such a plea, the D
same shall be entertained and disposed of in accordance with
law.

    9. Allowed in the aforesaid terms.

B.B.B.                                       Appeal allowed.    E