M/S. EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS.versusHARIHAR SINGH AND ANR.

                           [2008] 16 S.C.R. 7


              MIS. EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS.                        A
                                   v.
                      HARIHAR SINGH AND ANR.
                  (Criminal Appeal No. 1755 of 2008)
                         NOVEMBER 7, 2008
                                                                       B
"'·       [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

            Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.482 - Quashing
      of proceedings - /Qherent powers of High Court- Scope of-
      Discussed - On facts, proceedings were initiated by              c
      Respondent No.1 as·a counterb/ast to the proceedings
      initiated by Appellants - Continuance of proceedings initiated
      by Respondent No.1 will be nothing but an abuse of the
      process of law - Hence quashed.
                                                                       D
          A complaint was filed by Respondent No.1 under
      ss.420, 468 and 471 IPC. The Magistrate issued summons.
      The accused-Appellants filed petition under s.482 CrPC
      praying for quashing of the proceedings. The petition
      was dismissed by the High Court.
                                                                       E
           In appeal before this Court, its was contended that
      proceedings were initiated by Respondent No.1 as a
      counter-blast to the earlier proceedings initiated by
      Appellants against Respondent ·No.1 in form of a
      complaint under ss.138/442 r/w s.141 of the Negotiable           F
      Instruments Act, 1881 and hence continuance of the
      proceedings initiated by Respondent No.1 will amount to
      an abuse of the process of law.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court                               G
~        HELD: 1.1. s.482 CrPC does not confer any new
      powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent
      power which the Court possessed before the enactment

                                    7                                  H
    8         SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2008] 16 S.C.R.


A of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under
    which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,
     (i) to give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent
     abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure
     the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to
B lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the
     exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment
     dealing with procedure can provide for all cases th~t may.
    possibly arise. Courts, ·therefore, have inherent powers
    apart from express provisions of law which are
C necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties
    imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which
    finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
    and preserves inherent powers of the High Cour;ts. All
    courts, whether civil or criminal, possess, in the a~sence
    of any express provision, as inherent in their const~ution,
0
    all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to
    undo a wrong in the course of administration of justice
    on the principle quando lex aliquid a/icui concedit,
    concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when
  ' the law gives a person anything it gives him that without
E which it cannot exist). ,[Para 10] [14-E, F, G, H; 15-A-B]
       1.2. While exercising powers under s.482 CrPC, the
  Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision.
  Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has
F to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and
  only when such exercise is justified by the tests·
  specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be
  exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial
  justice for the administration of which alone courts exist.
G Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice
  and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as
  to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such
  abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to
  allow any action which would result in injustice and
  prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers,
H
   EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS. v. HARi HAR           9
               SINGH AND ANR.

court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it A
finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of
the process of court or quashing of these proceedings
would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no
offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may
examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought B
to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials
to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto. [Para 1O] [19-0]
     1.3. When exercising jurisdiction under s.482 CrPC, C
the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an
enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or
not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it
accusation would not be sustained. That is the function
of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt, should not D
be an instrument of oppression or needless harassment.
Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising
discretion and should take all relevant facts and
circumstances into consideration before issuing process,
lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private E
complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an
instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a
prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The power
should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest F
of the rare cases. Where a criminal proceeding is
manifestly attended with ma/a tides and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with
a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge." . G
[Para 7] [16-C-F]

    1.4. The powers possessed by the High Court under
s.482 CrPC are very wide and the very plenitude of the
power requires great caution in its exercise. The High
Court being the highest court of a State should normally 'H
    10        SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2008] 16 S.C.R.


A refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where
   the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so, when
   the evidence has not been collected and produced before
   the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or
   legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true
B perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no
   hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in        ..;.__
  which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary
  jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. It
  would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the
C case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in
  order to determine whether a conviction would be
  sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
  that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be
  erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude
  that the complaint 1cannot be proceeded with. In
D proceedings instituted on complaint, exercise of the
  inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for
  only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any
  offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. [Para 8]
E [18-B-F]
       1.5. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not
  constitute the offence of which cognizance has been
  taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to
  quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under
F s.482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there
  should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial
  to find out whether the case would end in conviction or
  acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it
  appears that on consideration of the allegations in the
G light of the stateme.nt made on oath of the complainant
  that the ingredients of the offence or offences are
  disclosed and there is no material to show that the              ·1
  complaint is ma/a fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event
  there would be no1 justification for interference by the
H High Court. When an information is lodged at the police
        EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS. v. HARi HAR              11
                    SINGH AND ANR.

     station and an offence is registered, then the mala tides A
     of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is
     the material collected during the investigation and
     evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the
     accused person. The allegations of mala tides againstthe
     informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be· B
.•   the basis for quashing the proceedings. [Para 8] [18"F-
     H; 19-A-B]
         1.6. The factual scenario clearly shows that the
     proceedings were initiated as a counterblast to the
     proceedings initiated by the appellants. Continuance of        C
     such proceedings will be nothing but an abuse of the
     process of law. Proceedings are accordingly quashed.
     [Para 1O] [19-D]

         R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR (1960) SC 866; State     D
     of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 and State
     of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa (2002) 3 SCC 89, relied on.
                       Case Law Reference :
         AIR (1960) SC 866          relied on           Para 6      E
         (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 relied on                Para 7
         (2002) 3 sec 89            relied on           Para 9
         CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal           F
     No. 1755 of 2008.

         From the final Judgment and Order dated 25.1.2007 of the
     High Court of Allahabad, Lucknow Bench at Lucknow in
     Criminal Misc. No. 131 of 2007.
                                                                    G
         R.S. Suri, Rachna Gupta, Vijay Krishna, Savitri Pandey,
     Fuzail Khan and Anil Kumar Jha for the appearing parties.

         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

         DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted.                   H
     12        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2008) 16 S.C.R.


A         2. Challenge in this appeal is to the order of a learned
      Single Judge of Allahabad High Court dismissing the petition
      under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
     (in short the 'Code'): By the said petition appellants had prayed
     for quashing the proceedings initiated on the basis of complaint
B filed by respondent No.1 and the order of learned Civil Judge,
     Junior Division/Judicial Magistrate, R. S. Ghat, Barabanki,
     dated 8th February, 2005 taking cognizance of offences
     punishable under Sections 420, 468 and 471 of the Indian
     Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC') and issuance of
c summons to the appellants. The learned magistrate recorded
     statements of the complainant under Section 200 of Code as
    well as of the witness uni:ler Section 202 of the Code and
    thereafter issued summons to the f!ppellants to start
     proceedings. The appellants took the stand that the
     proceedings were nothing but an abuse ot'the process of Court.
0
     It was pointed
              .   .
                     out that the summons
                                  I     .
                                             issued
                                                  •
                                                    were never served
    and bailable warrant of arrest and subsequently non-bailable
    warrant has been issued and even proceedings under Section
    82 of the Code have beeri initiated. The High Court accepted
    that without service of summons the issuance of bailable as well
E · as non-bailable warrant w'as uncalled for. It was also directed
    that the proceedings initiated under Section 82. of the Code was
    to be stayed and on the appellants appearing before the
    concerned court the proceedings shall continue. The application
  ·was accordingly disposed of.
F
        3. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
  background facts clearly show that the proceedings were
  initiated with a view to harass the appellants and as· a
  counterblast to the proceedings initiated by the appellants. The
G order is supported by learned counsel for the respondent No.1.

          4, In order to appreciate the stand taken by the appellant     ~
    it is necessary to take note of the factual position, the same is
    as follows:

H
        EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS. v. HARIHAR                      13
           SINGH AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

         On 1.4.1994 the Respondent no.1 approached the                    A ·
     Petitioner no.1 for dealership, and a Letter of Intent
     appointment of dealer was issued to the Respondent

          On March 2000 the tenure of dealership of the Respondent
     no.1 was ended as the same was not doing business, incurring
                                                                           8
     heavy debts to the appellant no.1.

          On January, 2001 the Respondent no.1 issued cheque
     bearing no 628701 dated 30.12.2000 for Rs.50,00,000/- (Fifty
     Lacs) discharging his liability towards the debt incurred against
     the appellant No.1.                                                   C

         On January, 2001 the Respondent presented the cheque
     bearing No. 628701 to his bank for withdrawal.

         On 23.01.2001 the bank returned the cheque with an
     endorsement on the return memo i.e. refer to the drawer.              D

           On 05.02.2001 the appellant issued a Legal Notice under
     Section 138 Negotiable Instrument Act, 1882 (in short the 'NI
     Act')
                                                                           E
          On January 2001, the appellant filed a complaint u/s 138/
     442 read with Section 141 of the NI Act before the Court of
     judicial Magistrate-I, Faridabad.

          On 12.04.2001, the Trial Court after considering the
     Complaint and the pre-summoning evidence took cognizance              F
     and issued summons against the Respondent. The Respondent
     no. 1 appeared and subsequently was released on bail.

          On 04.10.2002 the Respondent No.1 filed a private
     complaint under section 200 Cr.P.C. before the Civil Judge,           G
)·   (J.D.)/District Barabanki alleging that the officials of Petitioner
     no.1 herein had stolen the cheques bearing No. 0628701 'to
     0628704, It was further mentioned by him that in the complaint
     that in the year 1998 he had informed the Bank of Baroda,
     Barabanki that he has lost the aforesaid cheques and also             H
    14        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2008] 16 S.C.R.

                                                                        -r
A reported to the same to the SHO, Barabanki. He further alleged·
  that the appellants herein forged the cheques bearing No.
  0628701 and presented the same in the bank at Faridabad,
  and thereby alleged that they had committed an offence under
  Sections 468 & 471 IPC.'
B
         On 08.02.2005 the complaint bearing No.· 1343 of 2004
    filed by the Respondent No.1 herein came up for hearing
    before the Civil Judge, (J.D.)/Judicial Magistrate, RS. Ghat,
    Uttar Pradesh, and the Learned Magistrate vide its order dated
    08.02.2005 took cognizance' of the matter and issued summons
c   to the Appellants.

      · In January 2007, to their utter shock and surprise, the
  appellants came to know that the Learned Civil Judge, (J.D.)/
  Judicial Magistrate, RS. ~hat, Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh had
D issued non-bailable warrant and had also initiated proceedings
  under Section 82 Cr.P.C. against them in the complaint case
  No. 1343 of 2004 filed by the Respondent herein.
          5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a
    case of this nature is an exception and not the rule. The section
E does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves
    the inherent power which the Court possessed before the
  . enactment of the Code. It 'envisages three circumstances under
    which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to
    give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of
F the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of
    justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any
    inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent
   jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure
    can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts,
G   therefore,  have inherent powers apart from express provisions
    of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions        -I
    and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine
   which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes
    and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts,
H
   EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS. v. HARIHAR                       15
      SINGH AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

whether civil or criminal, possess, in the absence of any express A
provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as
are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in the course
of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid
alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo res ipsa esse
non palest (when the law gives a person anything it gives him B
that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers
under the section, the Court does not function as a court of
appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though
wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution
and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically c
laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito
justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration
of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for
advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse
that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power
                                                                    0
to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court
would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that
initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of
court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise seive E
the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the
complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a
complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into
the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and
whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are F
accepted in toto.
    6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [AIR 1960 sc 866] this
Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent
power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:
                                                                       G
           (1) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal
     bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
     sanction;
          (ii) where the allegations in the first information report
     or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their      H
    16        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2008] 16 S.C.R.


         entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
                                                                        --r
A

               (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
         there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
         adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
         (AIR para 6)
B
         7. In dealing with the last case, it is important to bear in
    mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal
   evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly
   inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where
c there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not
   support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under
    Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily
   embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is
   reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of ii
D accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the
   trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt, should not be an
   instrument of oppression or needless harassment. Court should
   be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and
   should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
E consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an
   instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash
   vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the
  section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-
  circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The
F
  scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and          +
  the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its               •
  power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse
  of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of
  justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
  Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]. A note of
G caution was, however, added that the power should be
  exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare cases.
  The illustrative categories indicated by this Court are as follows:
  (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
              "( 1) Where the allegations made in the first
H
               EICHER TRACTOR LTD. AND ORS. v. HARi HAR                17
                  SINGH AND ANR. [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
     r         information report or the complaint, even if they are taken   A
"
''             at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
               prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
               against the accused.
                     (2) Where the allegations in the first information
               report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR      B
     -\        do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
               investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of
               the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
               purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
                     (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
                                                                             c
               FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
               the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
               and make out a case against the accused.
                     (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute D
               a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
               offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
               without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
               Section 155(2) of the Code.
                      (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or           E
                complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
                basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
                conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding
                against the accused.
          -~

                      (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in   F
               any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
               (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
               institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
               where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
               concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance    G
               of the aggrieved party.
                     (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
               attended with mala fides and/or where the proceeding is
               maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
               vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him         H
    18         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2008) 16 S.C.R.


A        due to private and personal grudge." ·

          8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High
     Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and. the
     very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its
8    exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
     exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The
     inherent power should. not be exercised to stifle a legitimate
     prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State
     should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a
C    case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so,
     when the evidence has not been collected and produced before
     the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are
     of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective
     without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can
     be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will
D    exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the
     proceedings at any stage. It would not be proper for the High
     Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all
     probabilities in order fo determine whether a conviction would
     be su.stainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion
E   that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous
    to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint
    cannot be proceeded with. In proceedings instituted on
    complaint, exercise ofthe inherent powers to quash the
    proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint
F   does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or
    oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint d,o not
    constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by
    the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same
    in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the
G   Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be
    meticulous analysis. of the case before the trial to find out
    whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. The
    complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on
    consideration of the allegations in the light of the statement
H   made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the