M/S BHARAT COKING COAL LTD AND ORS.versusCHHOTA BIRSA URANW
- Citation
- [2014] 4 S.C.R. 887
- Decided
- 25 March 2014
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- GYAN SUDHA MISRA
Holding
The Supreme Court affirmed that the employer must follow Implementation Instruction No. 76 and that the employee’s 1987 claim for date of birth correction is valid, upholding the High Court’s order.
Summary
The employee, Chhota Birsa Uranw, joined Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. in 1973 with a date of birth recorded as 15‑Feb‑1947. He later discovered that his school leaving certificate and Mining Sardarship certificate recorded his birth as 6‑Feb‑1950 and sought correction under Implementation Instruction No. 76 in 1987. The employer refused, leading to a superannuation order based on the 1947 date. The employee filed a writ petition; the High Court allowed the correction and quashed the superannuation order. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the employee had raised the dispute at the earliest opportunity, that the employer must follow the procedure in Implementation Instruction No. 76, and that the school leaving and Mining Sardarship certificates are valid evidence of birth date. The Court affirmed the High Court’s order and dismissed the appeal.
Issues considered
- Whether the employee's claim for correction of date of birth filed in 1987 is barred by limitation or considered as raised at the fag end of service.
- Whether school leaving certificates and Mining Sardarship certificates, issued after the date of employment, can be treated as authentic for date of birth correction under Implementation Instruction No. 76.
- Whether the statutory Form ‘B’ register prevails over non‑statutory certificates in determining date of birth.
- Whether the High Court had jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution versus the industrial dispute forum.
- Interpretation of the phrase ‘issued prior to the date of employment’ in Implementation Instruction No. 76.
Legislation cited
- Companies Act, 1956s. 617
- Constitution of Indias. Article 136, s. Article 226
- Industrial Disputes Act
- Mines Ruless. 1955
Subjects
Judgment
[2014] 4 S.C.R. 887
A
MIS BHARAT COKING COAL LTD AND ORS.
v.
CHHOTA BIRSA URANW
(Civil Appeal No. 4890 of 2014)
MARCH 25, 2014 B
[GYAN SUOHA MISRA AND
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, JJ.]
SERVICE LAW: c
Date of birth - Correction of - Claim of employee to
correct his date of birlh and rectify discrepancies in his service
record - Declined by employer - Allowed by High Courl - Held:
With an aim to prevent cascading inconveniences caused by
change of date of birlh, a wronged employee should not be D
denied of his rights especiaJ/y when he has adhered to the
procedure laid down and attempted to avoid litigation by
resorting to in-house mechanisms - Public Corporations!
Departments, should not benefit from their own omission of
duty - In the instant case, appellant-company failed to follow E
the procedure as laid down in Implementation Instruction - It
was due to discrepancies which subsisted that appellants
gave all its employees a chance to rectify the same -
Respondent duly followed the procedure available --
Appellants are bound by their actions and their attempt to F
deny claim of ,respondent on the basis of technicality is
incorrect - It has been correctly determined by single Judge
of High Courl that dispute was not raised at fag end of service
nor on the eve of superannuation but it was raised al the
earliest possible· opportunity in 1987 when respondent G
became aware of the discrepancy - Order of High Court does
not call for any interference.
887
H
888 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A EVIDENCE:
Date of birth - School leaving certificate - Evidentiary
value of - Relevant date with regard to issuance of school
leaving certificate - Held: Implementation Instruction No. 76
8 clause (i)(a) permits rectification of the date of birth by treating
the date of birth mentioned in school leaving certificate to be
correct provided such certificates were issued by educational
institution prior to date of employment - Date of issue of
certificate actually intends to refer to the date with relevant
record in school on the basis of which the certificate has been
C issued - A school leaving certificate is usually issued at the
time of leaving school by student, subsequently a copy
thereof also can be obtained where a student misplaces his
said school leaving certificate and applies for a fresh' copy
thereof - Issuance of fresh copy cannot change the relevant
D record which is prevailing in records of the school from date
of admission and date of birth of student, duly entered in
records of the school.
The respondent joined appellant no. 1 company on
E 31.3.1973. At that time, his date of b.irth was recorded as
15.2.1947. He obtained a secondary school leaving
certificate in 1979 in which his date of birth was recorded
as 6.2.1950. In 1986 the respondent passed the Mining
Sardarship and in the certificate acknowledging the same
F his date of birth was recorded as 6.2.1950. In 1987 in the
process of identifying the discrepancies and correcting
the service records in terms of Implementation Instruction
no. 76, the respondent specifically sought that the
incorrect date of birth be corrected as mentioned in the
G Mining Sardar Certificate and the School Leaving
Certificate. However the same was not given effect to. The
respondent subsequently made a representation on
16.. 7.2006 for correction of his date of birth but the same
was rejected on 19.7.2006. By order dated 2.8.2006, the
H respondent was intimated that he was to superannuate
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 889
URA NW
from 28.2.2007. The respondent filed a writ petition A
seeking to quash the said order on the ground that his
date of superannuation was incorrectly calculated by
relying on the erroneous date of birth which should have
been rectified as provided in the Mining Sardar Certificate
and the School Leaving Certificate. The single Judge of B
the High Court allowed the writ petition. The Letters
Patent appeal filed by the company was dismissed.
Dismissing the appeal, the court
HELD: 1.1 With an aim to prevent the cascading C
inconveniences caused by a change of date of birth, a
wronged employee should not be denied of his rights
especially when he has adhered to the procedure laid
down and attempted to avoid litigation by resorting to in-
house mechanisms. Public Corporations/Departments, D
should not benefit from their own omission of duty. In the
- instant case, the appellant-company failed to follow the
procedure as laid down in the Implementation
Instruction. It is the appellant's omission and not the
inaction of the respondent which led to the dispute being E
raised in the courts at suctl a delayed stage. The attitude
of such Corporations, wherein to avoid the rectification
of a date of birth, litigation is unnecessarily prolonged
just because they have number of resources at their
command, goes against the grain of equ.ity and duty F
towards society at large. [para 13] [905-D-F]
1.2 In 1973 when the respondent joined the service
and Form 'B' register was filled and when it was filled
once again in 1983, there were certain discrepancies
regarding permanent address, father's name and date of G
joining. In 1987, when the appellant in terms of
Implementation Instruction No. 76 contained in the
National Coal Wage Agreement Ill, made available the
details of all employees for verification of service records
and gave them chance to identify and rectify the H
890 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A discrepancies in their service records, the respondent
raised the dispute as to incorrect particulars regarding his
date of joining, father's name, permanent address and
date of birth. The respondent duly followed the procedure
available. In such circumstances, the appellant was
B bound by its actions, and its attempt to deny the claim
of the respondent on the basis of technicality was
incorrect. The appellants should have followed the
procedure as laid down by Implementation Instruction
No. 76 to determine the date of birth of an existing
c employee. Thus, it is evident and correctly determined by
the single Judge of the High Court that the dispute was
not raised at the fag end of service nor on the eve of
superannuation but it was raised at the earliest possible
opportunity in 1987 when the respondent became aware
of the discrepancy. [para 8, 11-12] [899-C-F, 902-E-F; 903-
0
A-B, D-E]
1.3 The High Court duly verified the genuineness of
the school leaving certificate on the basis of a
supplementary affidavit filed by legal inspector of the
E appellant company admitting that the school leaving
certificate was verified and found to ba genuine. Further,
Implementation Instruction No.76 ciause (i)(a) permits
rectification of the date of birth by treating the date of birth
mentioned in the school leaving certificate to be correct
F provided such certificates were issued by the educational
institution prior to the date of employment. The date of
issue of certificate actually intends to refer to the date with
the relevant record in the school on the basis of which
the certificate has been issued. A school leaving
G certificate is usually issued at the time of leaving the
school by the student, subsequently a copy thereof also
can be obtained where a student misplaces his said
school leaving certificate and applies for a fresh copy
thereof. The issuance of fresh copy cannot change the
H relevant record which is prevailing in the records of the
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 891
URANW
school from the date of the admission and birth date of A
the student, duly entered in the records of the school.
Therefore, the order of the High Court does not call for
any interference. [para14-15] (905-H; 906-A-C, D-G]
G. M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal vs. Shib
8
Kumar Dushad and Ors. 2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 336 = (2000)
8 SCC 696; Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer and
Anr. (1995) Suppl. 2 SCC 598; State of Punjab vs. S. C.
Chadha 2004 (2) SCR 216 = (2004) 3 SCC 394; State of UP.
& Anr. v. Shiv Narain Upadhyay 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 847 =
(2005) 6 SCC 49; State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Goraknath C
Sitaram Kamble & Ors. 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 685 = (2010)
14 SCC 423; Registrar General, High Court of Madras vs. M.
Manickam & Ors. (2011) 9 SCC 425; High Court of Andhra
Pradesh vs. N. Sanyasi Rao 2011 (13) SCR 403 = (2012) 1
SCC 674; and Mohd. Yunus Khan v. UP. Power Corporation D
Ltd. 2008 (14) scR 1114 = (2009) 1 sec 80 - cited.
Case Law Reference:
2000 (4) Suppl. SCR 336 cited para 4
E
(1995) Suppl. 2 sec 598 cited para 4
2004 (2) SCR 216 cited para 9
2005 (1) Suppl. SCR 847 cited para 9
2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 685 cited para 9 F
(2011) 9 sec 425 cited para 9
2011 (13) SCR 403 cited para 10
2008 (14) SCR 1114 cited para 10
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. G
4890 of 2014.
From the Judgment and Order dated 20.09.2010 of the
High Court of Jharkhand Judicature at Ranchi in LPA No. 90
of 2010. H
892 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A Anupam Lal Das, Anirudh Singh, Didesh Sinha for the
Appellants.
Gopal Prasad for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal arises against the order of the High
Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Letters Patent Appeal No.90
of 2010 dated September 20, 2010, which was filed against
c the order dated December 11, 2009 passed by the learned
Single Judge in a writ being W.P. (S) No. 496 of 2007 filed by
the respondent in the present matter, wherein the court quashed
the order dated August 2, 2006 passed by the Project Officer,
Jamunia Open Cast Project (hereinafter referred to as 'Project
D
Officer') Area of the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (being appellant
No. 1 in the present matter), which stated that the respondent
will superannuate on February 28, 2007.
3. The brief facts leading to the same are as under :
·- E
3.1. The respondent joined appellant No. 1, Bharat Coking
Coal Ltd. ('BCCL'), a 'Government Company' as under Section
617 of the Companies Act, 1956, his date of joining as per the
impugned order is stated to be March 31, 1973. At the time of
F joining, his date of birth was recorded as February 15, 1947,
in Form 'B', a statutory form stipulated under the Mines Rules,
1955, the basis of recording the same is not clear. The
respondent obtained a Secondary School Leaving Certificate
issued on October 12, 1979, which indicated that he attended
Rajya Samposhit Uchcha Vidyalaya, Baghmara, a Government
G
school in Dhanbad from January, 1964 to August. 1964. In the
said certificate, the date of birth of the respondent is recorded
as February 6, 1950, which is in conflict with his date of birth
as entered by him in the service records being the
aforemention~d Form 'B'.
H
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 893
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
3.2. Subsequently, in 1983, he was transferred to the A
Jamunia Open Cast Project and as stated, he once again
signed the Form 'B' wherein his date of birth was recorded as
February 15, 1947 and he allegedly did not raise any objections
then.
B
3.3. In 1986, the respondent passed the Mining Sardarship
and in the certificate acknowledging the same his date of birth
was recorded as February 6, 1950, corresponding to the date
recorded in the aforementioned School Leaving Certificate.
Therefore, there existed two sets of records of the respondent's C
details; first being the Form 'B' register on one hand in which
the date of birth was recorded to be February 15, 1947 and
second being the Mining Sardar Certificate and the School
Leaving Certificate wherein the date of birth was recorded as
February 6, 1950.
D
3.4. In 1987, the National Coal VVage Agreement Ill
(hereinafter referred as 'NCWA Ill') being Implementation
Instructions were put into operation for stabilizing service
records of employees. Pursuant to Implementation Instruction
No. 76, appellant No. 1 provided its employees with Nominee E
Forms as prescribed by the Implementation Instructions which
contained relevant extracts from the service records in the Form
'B' register, thereby enabling the employees to identify any
discrepancy or error in the records and get the same rectified
as per the prescribed procedure. In wake of the same the F
respondent became aware of inconsistencies in the records
regarding his date of birth, date of appointment, father's name
and permanent address; therein the respondent made
representations to the Project Officer. Jamunia Open Cast
Project for rectification of the abovementioned errors and he G
specifically sought the incorrect date of birth to be corrected
as per the date mentioned in the Mining Sardar Certificate and
the School Leaving Certificate. It appears that the concerned
authorities rectified the discrepancies regarding the name of
the father and the permanent address; however the date of birth H
894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A and date of appointment remained unchanged. Thereafter, as
stated by the respondent, he made a subsequent representation
to the concerned Project Officer on July 16, 2006 for correction
of the date of birth in the Form 'B' register in accordance with
the Mining Sardar Certificate and the same was rejected by
B the appellant company vide letter dated July 19, 2006.
3.5. The Project Officer vide order dated August 2, 2006
intimated the respondent that he is to superannuate from
February 28, 2007. Aggrieved by the same, the respondent filed
a writ bearing W.P. (S) No. 496 of 2007 for quashing of the
C order of superannuation by the Project Officer on the grounds
that the date of superannuation has been incorrectly calculated
by relying on the erroneous date of birth which should have
been rectified in terms of the NCWA Ill, which provided that the .
Mining Sardar Certificate and the School Leaving Certificate
D must be treated as authentic documents by the employer as
proof of the date of birth of the employee. The appellant
company without challenging the genuineness of the same
countered the respondent on the grounds that the Form 'B'
register was a conclusive proof of date of birth as it was verified
E by the signature of the employee being the. respondent; and
having accepted the entry then, the respondent is not entitled
to raise any dispute after twenty years and at the fag end of
his service. The High Court while allowing the writ determined
that the respondent did not raise such a claim at the fag end
F of his career, rather such a claim was made in 1987 itself and
the appellant ·company had failed to respond suitably to th!'l
dispute raised by the respondent. Thereby, the Court directed
the appellant company to conduct an enquiry on the basis of
the certificates produced by the respondent and to effectively
G communicate to the respondent the decision taken together with
the reasons assigned within three months of the passing of the
order.
3.6. Aggrieved, the appellant company preferred a Letters
Patent Appeal, the order in which is impugned herein. The High
H
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 895
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
Court dismissed the appeal having found no merit in the same A
in light of the clauses in Implementation Instruction No. 76.
3.7. Thereafter, the matter lies before us.
4. The appellant in the present appeal has come before
us seeking that the impugned judgment be set aside. The case B
of the appellant is, firstly, when a school leaving certificate is
not a document mentioned in Implementation Instruction No. 76,
the High Court was incorrect in substituting the same with the
documents given in the said Instruction, thereby creating a
situation which supersedes all other statutory documents like C
Form 'B' register. Secondly, the High Court should have
considered that the date of birth recorded in Form 'B' register
being a statutory document under Mines Act is binding and
cannot be preceded by a non-statutory document and therefore,
the inter alia holding of the High Court that School Leaving D
Certificate and Mining Sardar Certificate would take
precedence over company records and other statutory
documents is contrary to the judgment of this Court in G.M.
Bharat Coking Coal Ltd., West Bengal vs. Shib Kumar
Dushad and Ors. 1• Thirdly, the appellant has challenged the E
exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court under Article 226
considering that the respondent as workman could avail
efficacious remedy from the forum under the Industrial Disputes
Act and the respondent could raise such a dispute at the fag
end of his career de hors the judgment in Bharat Coking Coal F
Ltd. vs. Presiding Officer and Anfl. Fourthly, that the documents
on which' the respondent has relied being School Leaving
Certificate and Mining Sardar Certificate are not those
mentioned in Implementation Instruction No. 76 for review of
determination of date of birth with respect to existing employees G
and that the implementation of the impugned order would give
way to many unscrupulous employees to procure such
documents and take advantage of the same. Fifthly, the
1. (2000) a sec 696.
2. (1995) Suppl 2 sec 598. H
896 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A respondent while signing the Form 'B' register at the time of
appointment had verified his date of birth as February 15, 194 7
on his joining on January 1, 1973 and later on his transfer in
1983; since he is a supervisory staff capable of reading and
writing and understanding English his verification amounts to
B acceptance and his raising of dispute in 1987, fourteen years
after is incorrect. Sixthly, the appellant has challenged the
reliance placed on the School Leaving Certificate by the
respondent on the grounds that the same was issued on
October 12, 1979 six years after his appointment and as the
c Mining Sardar Certificate was based on the same reliance on
it is also doubtful; furthermore, since both the documents were
issued after the date of employment they cannot form basis of
correction of date of birth; furthermore, the appellant has
challenged the correctness of the School Leaving Certificate
on the grounds that the alleged Certificate was not verified by
0
the District Education Commissioner; that the attendance
register for relevant period when the respondent allegedly
attended school was not available and the verification was with
respect to one Sri Birsa Prasad Uranw; it is further submitted
E that these discrepancies which were covered by legal inspector
of company (who was duly charge-sheeted) in collusion with the
respondent make the school leaving certificate dubious. Finally,
it was submitted that the respondent has raised the issue at
the fag end by means of a belated writ i.e. thirty years after
appointment and after twenty years (as claimed by him) of his
F knowledge.
5. Per contra, the respondent has denied the averments
of the appellant and has submitted that he has not disputed his
date of birth at the fag end of his service as found by the learned
G Single Judge. It has been submitted that the respondent joined
service on March 31, 1973, when his date of birth was recorded
as February 15, 1947 basis of which is not clear; that
subsequently in 1986 he cleared his Mining Sardarship and
was given a Mining Sardar Certificate where his date of birth .
H was recorded as February 6, 1950 same as in his School
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 897
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
Leaving Certificate; that subsequently in 1987, on noticing the A
incorrect date of birth and other details in his service records,
the respondent immediately submitted an application for the
correction of his date of birth as February 6, 1950 and other
minor corrections in his service records. On receiving no
information regarding the same on inquiry from his superiors, B
he was given the impression that the necessary corrections
were made i[l the service records and the respondent was
surprised to receive his superannuation order in 2006 on the
basis of the incorrect date of birth being February 15, 194 7.
6. In these circumstances, the respondent has contended,
c
firstly, that it is not the case that the respondent disputed date
of birth at the end of service, instead he had disputed the same
way back in the year 1987, it is the employer who disputed the
same at the fag end by creating the impression that claim of
respondent for correction of date of birth was accepted when, D
in reality, it was not and even the learned Single Judge has
concurred that the rectification was not sought at the fag end.
Secondly, it was· contended that the respondent has relied on
two documents for correction of his date of birth as February
6, 1950, namely the statutory Mining Sardar Certificate and the E
School Leaving Certificate. Thirdly, it has been contended that
in light of the policy contained in part (B) of Implementation
Instruction No. 76, the appellant as per clause (i)(a) accepted
the School Leaving Certificate but it was contended before the
High Court that as the same was issued in 1979 and as the F
workman joined service in 1979, the c~rtificate was thus, 'not
issued' prior to the date of employment and therefore cannot
form the basis of correction of date of birth. However, this
contention was rejected by the High Court, which held that the
school records were created prior to joining and a copy issued G
on a subsequent date does not create a difference as the date
of issue of certificate refers to the date when the relevant record
was created on the basis of which the certificate has been
issued. In addition to the same, it has also been submitted that
the appellate court had granted time to the appellant to verify H
898 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A the genuineness of the School Leaving Certificate and in
response through a supplementary affidavit, the appellants have
admitted the school leaving certificate to be genuine, thus
contended by the respondent that as the School Leaving
Certificate was found to be genuine, it warrants no interference.
B Fourthly, it has been contended by the respondent that his claim
for correction was not considered on the basis of the Mining
Sardar Certificate which as claimed has been given by the
Central Government and was submitted by him, which is also
mentioned as a basis for correction of date of birth in Clause
c (i)(b) in Part B of Implementation Instruction No. 76. It is further
submitted that the appellant did not give any reason as to why
the Minirig Sardar Certificate was rejected by them. Finally, the
respondent has submitted that he was made to retire
prematurely and not allowed to work inspite of favourable
D orders from the High Court; furthermore, the respondent filed
a contempt petition but was not allowed to work by the
petitioners on the pretext of pendency of matter before higher
courts. It is also the case of the respondent that he was not
gainfully employed anywhere else during that period.
E 7. It is pertinent to note at this point that during the oral.
proceedings, this Court vide order dated July 4, 2013 directed
the appellants as under:
"List after four weeks to enable the counsel for the
F petitioners to produce the original and also photocopy of
the Form 'B' register where it is alleged that the
respondent had affixed his signature on the date of birth
which was recorded as 15.02.1947."
However, as found by us and pointed out by the respondent
G instead of filing the original Form 'B' prepared in 1973, at the
time of joining of the respondent with designation as Explosive
Carrier (which as claimed admittedly did not bear the signature
of the respondent), filed a photocopy of the alleged Form 'B'
dated January 27. 1987 which showed the designation of the
H respondent to be that of Mining Sardar. It has been submitted
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 899
. URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
by the respondent that his signature was taken on the alleged A
form on January 27, 1987 while handing over the photocopy of
the same for necessary correction of the record.
8. On the basis of the above, we find that within the given
set of facts the dispute is regarding the manner in which the
date of birth should be determined; whether the reliance should 8
be placed on the set of records being the Mining Sardar
Certificate and the School Leaving Certificate which state the
date of birth to be February 6, 1950 or reliance should be placed
on the extracts of the Form 'B' register which state the date of
birth to be February 15, 1947. The position which emerges on C
the basis of the above is that after having joined service in 1973
when the Form 'B' register was filled and when it was filled once
again in 1983 when the respondent was transferred, there were
certain discrepancies regarding permanent address, father's
name and date of joining. In 1987, when the appellant made D
available the details of all employees for verification of service
records, the respondent raised the dispute regarding his
incorrect particulars being the date of joining, father's name,
permanent address and date of birth. Apparently, the
abovementioned corrections other than date of birth were E
made. Thus, it is evident and correctly determined by the
learned Single Judge that the dispute was not raised at the fag
end of service or on the eve of superannuation but it was raised
at the earliest possible opportunity in 1987 when the respondent
became aware of the discrepancy. As the factum of when the F
dispute was raised is settled what remains to be determined
is the issue of date of birth'.
9. In the corpus of service law over a period of time, a
certain approach towards date of birth disputes has emerged
in wake of the decisions of this Court as an impact created by G
the change in date of birth of an employee is akin to the far
reaching ripples created when a single piece of stone is
dropped into the water. This Court has succinctly laid down the
same in Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department vs.
R. Kirubakaran (supra), which is as under:- H
900 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A "7. An application for correction of the date of birth should
not be dealt with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping
in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be
pointed out that any such direction for correction of the
date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain
B reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him .
for their respective promotions are affected in this
process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury,
inasmuch as, because of the correction of the date of
birth, the officer concerned, continues in office, in some
cases for years, within which time many officers who are
c below him in seniority waiting for their promotion, may
lose their promotions for ever. Cases are not unknown
when a person accepts appointment keeping in view the
date of retirement of his immediate senior. According to
us, this is an important aspect, which cannot be lost sight
D of by the court or the tribunal while examining the
grievance of a public servant in respect of correction of
his date of birth. As such, unless a clear case, on the
basis of materials which can be held to be conclusive in
nature, is made out by the respondent, the court or the
E tribunal should not issue a direction, on the basis of
materials which make such claim only plausible. Before
any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must
be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the
person concerned and his claim for correction of date of
F birth has been made in accordance with the procedure
prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order.
If no rule or order has been framed or made, prescribing
the period within which such application has to be filed,
then such application must be filed within the time, which
G can be held to be reasonable. The applicant has to
produce the evidence in support of such claim, which
may amount to irrefutable proof relating to his date of
birth. Whenever any such question arises, the onus is on
the applicant, to prove the wrong recording of his date of
H birth, in his service book. In many cases it is a part of
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 901
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
the strategy on the part of such public servants to A
approach the court or the tribunal on the eve of their
retirement, questioning the correctness of the entries in
respect of their dates of birth in the service books. By this
process, it has come to the notice of this Court that in
many cases, even if ultimately their applications are B
dismissed, by virtue of interim orders, they continue for
months, after the date of superannuation. The court or the
tribunal must, therefore, be slow in granting an interim
relief for continuation in service, unless prima facie
evidence of unimpeachable character is produced c
because if the public servant succeeds, he can always
be compensated, but if he fails, he would have enjoyed
undeserved benefit of extended service and merely
caused injustice to his immediate junior."
The same approach had been followed by this Court while D
. deciding on date of birth disputes irrespective of the relief being
in favour of the workman or the employer. (See: State of
Punjab vs. S.C. Chadha 3, State of UP. & Anr. v. Shiv Narain
Upadhyay4, State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Vali Mohd. Dosabhai
Sindhi5, State of Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Goraknath Sitaram E
Kamble 6 )
10. Another practice followed by the courts regarding such
disputes is that date of birth of an employee is determined as
per the prescribed applicable rules or framework existing in the
organization. Even this Court inspite of the extraordinary powers F
conferred under Article 136 has decided date of birth disputes
in accordance with the applicable rules and seldom has the
Court determined the date of birth as it is a question of fact fit
to be determined by the appropriate forum. (See: State of
Maharashtra & Anr. vs. Goraknath Sitaram Kamble & Ors. 7 G
3. (2004J 3 sec 394.
4. (2005J 6 sec 49.
5. (2006J 6 sec 537.
6. (201 OJ 14 sec 423.
7. (201 OJ 14 sec 423. H
902 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A Registrar General, High Court of Madras vs. M. Manickam &
Ors. 8 High Court of Andhra Pradesh vs. N. Sanyasi Rao 9)
11. As stated earlier, this Court needs to decide the
manner in which date of birth has to be determined. It is the
case of the appellant that as the respondent raised the dispute
B
at the fag end of his career and as there exists a set of records
being the Form 'B' register which is a statutory document in
which the date of birth has been verified by the respondent
himself twice, other non statutory documents should not be
given precedence and the orders of the High Court must be
c set aside. This claim of the appellant does not stand in the
present matter. As determined, the dispute was not raised at
the fag end of the career; on the contrary, it was raised in 1987
almost two decades prior to his superannuation when he first
came to know of the discrepancy. It has been held in Mohd.
D Yunus Khan v. U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. 10 , that, "an
employee may take action as is permissible in law only after
coming to know that a mistake has been committed by the
employer." Thus, the case of the respondent should not be
barred on account of unreasonable delay. Admittedly, the
E appellant as the employer in view of its own regulations being
Implementation Instruction No. 76 contained in the National Coal
Wage Agreement Ill, gave all its employees a chance to identify
and rectify the discrepancies in the service records by providing
them a nominee form containing details of their service records.
F This initiative of the appellants clearly indicated the existence
of errors in service records of which the appellants were aware
and were taking steps to rectify the same. Again.st this
backdrop, the stance of the appellant that the records in the
Form 'B' register must be relied upon does not hold good as it
G is admitted by the appellant that errors existed in the same.
Even a perusal of the nominee form exhibits the ambiguity
regarding the date of birth and date of joining. It was due to
8. (2011 > g sec 425.
9. (2012) 1 sec 674.
H 1o. (2009) 1 sec 80.
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 903
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
the discrepancies which subsisted that the appellants gave all A
its employees a chance to rectify the same. In such
circumstances, the appellants are bound by their actions and
their attempt to deny the claims of the respondent is incorrect.
The respondent in this case duly followed the procedure
available and the attempt of the appellant to deny the claim of B
the respondent on the basis of technicality is incorrect. We,
therefore, feel that the learned Single Judge has correctly held
that:
"11. Having given the petitioner, like all employees, the C
benefit of seeking correction of the entries contained in
their service records including their date of birth, the
petitioner's claim cannot be denied, merely because he
had signed upon the Form 'B' Register at the time of its
opening and containing the entry of date of birth a
recorded the1ein. " D
12. The appellant in the present case should have followed
the procedure as laid down by Implementation Instruction No.
76 to determine the date of birth of an existing employee. The
provisions of which read as follows: E
"(B) Review determination of date of birth in respect
of existing employees.
(i)(a) In the case of the existing employees
Matriculation Certificate of (sic: or) Higher Secondary F
Certificate issued by the recognized Unive:rsities of Board
or Middle Pass Certificate issued by the Board of
Education and/or Department of Public Instruction and
admit cards issued by the aforesaid Bodies should be
treated as correct provided they were issued by the said G
Universities/Boards Institutions prior to the date of
employment.
(i)(b) Similarly, Mining Sardarship, winding engine or
similar other statutory certificate where the Manager had
H
904 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R.
A to certify the date of birth will be treated as authentic.
Provided that where both documents mentioned in
(i)(a) and (i)(b) above are available, the date of birth
recorded in (i)(a) will be treated as authentic
B (ii) Wherever there is no variation in records, such
cases will not be reopened unless there is a very glaring
and apparent wrong entry brought to the notice of the
Management. The Management after being satisfied on
the merits of the case will take appropriate action for
c correction through determination committee/medical
board.
(C) Age Determination Committee/medical Board
for the above will be constituted by the Management. In the
D case of employees whose date of birth cannot be
determined in accordance with the procedure mentioned
in (B) (i) (a) or (B) (i) (b) above, the date of birth recorded
in the records of the company, namely, Form 'B' register,
CMP Records and Identity Cards (untampered) will be
treated as final. Provided that where there is a variation,
E
in the age recorded in the records mentioned above, the
matter will be referred to the Age Determination
Committee/Medical Board constituted by the Management
for the determination of age.
F (D) Age determination: by the Age Determination
Committee/Medical Board referred to ab.ove may consider
their evidence available with the colliery management; and/
or
G (E) Medical Board constituted for determination of
age will be required to manage (sic assess) the age in
accordance with the requirement of medical jurisprudence
and the Medical Board will as far as possible indicate the
accurate age assessed and not approximately."
H
BHARAT COKING COAL LTD. v. CHHOTA BIRSA 905
URANW [PINAKI CHANDRA GHOSE, J.]
In another case, being G.M. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. A
Shib Kumar Dushad (supra) where the date of birth of an
employee of the Bharat Coking Coal was in dispute and
the same set of instructions were applicable, this court
referring to the Implementation Instruction held that:
B
"20. From the provisions in the instructions referred to
above, it is clear that in case of dispute over the date of
birth of an existing employee who has neither a
Matriculation Certificate/Secondary School Certificate nor
a statutory certificate in which the Manager has certified C
the entry regarding the date of birth to be authentic the
employer is to refer the matter to the Medical Board. "
13. We give due regard to the sensitive nature of date of
birth disputes and fully agree with the approach laid down in
R. Kirubakaran Case (supra). However, with an aim to prevent D
the cascading inconveniences caused by a change of date of
birth, a wronged employee should not be denied of his rights
especially when he has adhered to the procedure laid down
and attempted to avoid litigation by resorting to in-house
mechanisms. Public Corporations/Departments, should not E
benefit from their own omission of duty. In the present case, the
appellant-company failed to follow the procedure as laid down
in the Implementation Instruction. It is the appellant's omission
and not the inaction of the respondent which led to the dispute
being raised in the courts at such a delayed stage. The attitude F
of such corporations wherein to avoid the rectification of a date
of birth, litigation is unnecessarily prolonged just because they
have number of resources at their command, goes against the
grain of equity and duty towards society at large.
14. As noted by us. the respondent in 1987 on coming to G
know of the wrong recording of his date of birth in his service
records from the nomination form sought rectification.
Therefore, such rectification was not sought at the fag end of
his service. We have further noticed that the High Court duly
verified the genuineness of the school leaving certificate on the H
906 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014) 4 S.C.R.
A basis of a supplementary affidavit filed by Shri Dilip Kumar
Mishra, legal inspector of the appellant company on September
6, 2010 before the High Court. It has been admitted in the said
supplementary affidavit that the school leaving certificate has
been verified and has been found to be genuine. We have
B further noticed that Implementation Instruction No.76 clause
(i)(a) permits rectification of the date of birth by treating the date
of birth mentioned in the school leaving certificate to be correct
provided such certificates were issued by the educational
institution prior to the date of employment. The question of
c interpreting the words 'were issued' was correctly interpreted,
in our opinion, by the High Court which interpreted the said
words for the purpose of safeguarding against misuse of the
certificates for the purpose of increasing the period of
employment. The High Court correctly interpreted and meant
that these words will not apply where the school records
0
containing the date of birth were available long before the
starting of the employment. The date of issue of certificate
actually intends to refer to the date with the relevant record in
the school on the basis of which the certificate has been issued.
E A school leaving certificate is usually issued at the time of
leaving the school by the student, subsequently a copy thereof
also can be obtained where a student misplaces his said school
leaving certificate and applies for a fresh copy thereof. The
issuance of fresh copy cannot change the relevant record which
is prevailing in the records of the school from the date of the
F admission and birth date of the student, duly entered in the
records of the school.
15. Therefore, the ord~r of the High Court does not call for
any interference. We endorse the reasoning given by the High
G Court and affirm the same.
16. In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in the
appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed.
Rajendra Prasad Appeal dismissed.
H
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