Holding

A driver holding an LMV licence may lawfully drive a Transport Vehicle whose gross weight does not exceed 7,500 kg without a separate endorsement, and the Mukund Dewangan (2017) decision is not per incuriam.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined whether a holder of a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) licence, defined under Section 2(21) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, may drive a Transport Vehicle whose gross weight does not exceed 7,500 kg without a separate endorsement under Section 10(2)(e). After analysing the definitions, the 1994 amendment that created a single Transport Vehicle class, and numerous provisions of the Act and Rules that impose stricter requirements on medium and heavy vehicles, the Court held that LMV licence holders are competent to operate such light Transport Vehicles and that the additional eligibility criteria apply only to vehicles above the 7,500 kg threshold. The Court affirmed the ratio in Mukund Dewangan (2017), finding no fatal omission, and rejected the claim that the earlier decision was per incuriam. Consequently, the reference was answered, confirming that no separate endorsement is required for LMV licence holders to drive Transport Vehicles within the weight limit.

Issues considered

Whether a driver holding an LMV licence (Section 10(2)(d)) can operate a Transport Vehicle without a specific endorsement under Section 10(2)(e).
Whether the second part of Section 3(1) overrides the definition of LMV in Section 2(21).
Whether the additional eligibility criteria for Transport Vehicles apply to drivers of LMV‑class vehicles weighing below 7,500 kg.
The effect of the 1994 amendment (Act 54 of 1994) that substituted four classes with a single Transport Vehicle class.
Whether the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is per incuriam for not considering certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules.

Legislation cited

Act 54 of 1994 (Amendment to Motor Vehicles Act)
Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989s. Rule 10, s. Rule 14, s. Rule 31, s. Rule 5, s. Rule 75
English Road Traffic Act, 1930
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988s. 10, s. 14, s. 15, s. 18, s. 180, s. 181, s. 2(21), s. 2(47), s. 3, s. 4, s. 41, s. 66, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) licenseVehicles with gross vehicle weight of less than/below 7,500 kgsTransport VehicleDriving licenseLearner’s licensesLicensing1994 amendmentSeparate endorsementSpecific authorizationAdditional authorizationDriverReferencePer incuriamMedium goods vehicleMedium passenger vehicleHeavy goods vehicleHeavy passenger vehicleCommercial vehiclesHarmonious constructionStare decisisRoad safetyPublic welfareMotor vehiclesSocial welfare legislationCompensationRoad accidentsInsured vehiclesInsurance companiesPolicy domainTransportation policyTransportation sector

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 541 : 2024 INSC 840

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd.
v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.
(Civil Appeal No. 841 of 2018)
06 November 2024
[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy,*
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, Pankaj Mithal and
Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
(i) Whether a driver holding a Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) license
(for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of less than 7,500 kgs)
as per Section 10(2)(d), which specifies ‘Light Motor Vehicle’, can
operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without obtaining specific authorization
under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act, specifically for the ‘Transport
Vehicle’ class; (ii) whether the second part of Section 3(1) which
emphasizes the necessity of a driving license for a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ overrides the definition of LMV in Section 2(21) of MV
Act? Is the definition of LMV contained in Section 2(21) of MV Act
unrelated to the licensing framework under the MV Act and the MV
Rules; (iii) whether the additional eligibility criteria prescribed in the
MV Act and MV Rules for ‘transport vehicles’ would apply to those
who are desirous of driving vehicles weighing below 7,500 kgs
and have obtained a license for LMV class under Section 10(2)(d)
of the MV Act; (iv) what is the effect of the amendment made by
virtue of Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 which substituted four
classes under clauses (e) to (h) in Section 10 with a single class of
‘Transport Vehicle’ in Section 10(2)(e); (v) whether the decision in
Mukund Dewangan (2017) is per incuriam for not noticing certain
provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules.

Headnotes†
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – ss.10(2)(d), 10(2)(e), 2(21), 2(47) – On
reference, 3-Judge Bench in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. [2017] 7 SCR 765 [Mukund Dewangan (2017)]
held that the holder of a license for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’
(LMV) class need not have a separate endorsement to drive
a ‘transport vehicle’ if it falls under the ‘Light Motor Vehicle’

* Author
542 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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class i.e. below 7,500 kgs – However, two-judge Bench in M/s
Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi &
Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 816 observed that Mukund Dewangan (2017)
did not consider certain important provisions of the MV Act
and MV Rules, referred the matter to a larger bench of three
judges for reconsideration of the ratio in Mukund Dewangan
(2017) – Said three judge Bench further referred the matter to
a larger bench of five judges – A driver holding a Light Motor
Vehicle (LMV) license for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight
of less than 7,500 kgs, if can operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’
without obtaining specific authorization therefor:
Held: Yes – For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles
are not entirely separate classes and both overlap – Thus, a driver
holding a license for LMV class u/s.10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross
vehicle weight under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ without needing additional authorization u/s.10(2)(e)
specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class – In the absence of
any obtrusive omission, the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017)
is not per incuriam even if did not consider certain provisions of
the MV Act and MV Rules and is upheld. [Paras 131(I), (II)]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – ss.2(10), 3, 10(e) to (h), Chapter II-
s.10(2)(e) – Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – r.14 –
Form 4 – ‘Transport Vehicle’ in s.3 – Purpose – 1994 amendment
substituted four classes of ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium
passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’, and ‘heavy
passenger vehicle’ under clauses (e) to (h) in s.10 with a
single class of ‘Transport Vehicle’ in s.10(2)(e) – Effect – Plea
of insurance companies that in view of the ‘transport vehicle’
having been specifically mentioned after the amendment, a
separate endorsement would be necessary to drive a ‘transport
vehicle’ and that even before the 1994 amendment, the second
part of s.3 always provided that a separate endorsement would
be necessary:
Held: The specific authorization does not mean that a person
holding an LMV license which covers ‘Transport vehicle’, would
be disentitled to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’ – The emphasis in the
second part of Section 3 is in relation to Medium and Heavy Vehicles
in the statutory scheme even prior to the 1994 amendment –
Second part of Section 3 pertains to a driving license for those
driving ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’,
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 543

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

‘heavy goods vehicle’, and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’ – Such an
interpretation is logical because medium and heavy vehicles would
require greater maneuverability and skill as compared to drivers
of the LMV class – The subsequent amendment in Section 10
makes this position even clearer – ‘Transport Vehicle’ primarily
targets vehicles exceeding 7,500 kgs, for the purpose of license
regime – The intention of the legislature was to simplify the licensing
framework for larger commercial vehicles and at the same time not
interdict a LMV license holder to also drive a transport vehicle –
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria [2008] 1
SCR 1061 holding that the 1994 amendment had a prospective
operation, partially overruled – ‘Transport Vehicle’, does not
exclude transport vehicles already classified as ‘LMV’, under
Section 10 – Thus, ‘Transport vehicles’ mentioned in Section 10
would cover only those vehicles whose gross vehicle weight is
above 7,500 kgs – Such an interpretation aligns with the broader
purpose of the amendments and ensures that the licensing regime
remains efficient and practical for vehicle owners and drivers –
Section 10 is to be read with Section 2(21) which defines a ‘Light
Motor Vehicle’. [Paras 41, 42, 44.3, 45]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 –
Whether the additional eligibility criteria prescribed in the MV
Act and MV Rules for ‘transport vehicles’ would apply to those
who are desirous of driving vehicles weighing below 7,500 kgs:
Held: No – The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV
Act and MV Rules will apply only to such vehicle (‘medium goods
vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’
and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’), whose gross weight exceeds
7,500 Kg – This interpretation on how the licensing regime is to
operate for drivers under the statutory scheme will not compromise
the road safety concerns and will also effectively address the
livelihood issues for drivers operating Transport Vehicles in legally
operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg), with their LMV
driving license. [Paras 131(III), 130]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – ss.3(1), 2(21), 10 – Harmonious
construction – Various provisions were cited to contend that
the legislature had placed LMVs and Transport Vehicles under
separate classes and that the holder of a LMV license cannot
drive a Transport Vehicle without a separate endorsement –
Whether the second part of s.3(1) which emphasizes the
544 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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necessity of specific requirement of a driving license for a
‘Transport Vehicle’ overrides the definition of LMV in s.2(21) :
Held: No – Section 3 is not a special provision overriding the strict
and emphatic definition of LMV, given in Section 2(21) and the
separate class of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ provided in Section 10 –
Section 2(21) uses the term ‘means’ and there is an affirmation of
certainty in the wordings of the definition and it is to be recognized
sensu stricto in a technical sense and must not be understood
loosely – Section 3 does not disentitle the LMV license holders
to drive transport vehicles of the permissible weight category –
To say otherwise would be incompatible and would render the
strict definition clause, sterile and a ‘dead letter’ – In view of a
harmonious construction of both sections, for LMV licence holders,
a separate endorsement under ‘Transport Vehicle’ class would
be unnecessary for driving LMV class of vehicles – Additional
licensing requirements will have no application for the LMV class
of vehicles but will be needed only for such ‘Transport Vehicles’,
which by virtue of their gross weight fall in the Medium and Heavy
category – This construction also fulfills the legislative purpose to
ensure road safety – Age restrictions outlined in Section 4, the
requirement of a medical certificate, and the criteria under Section 7
should reasonably apply only for the medium and heavy transport
vehicles whose gross weight will be above 7500 Kg – A person
holding a LMV license is equally competent to drive a Transport
Vehicle whose gross weight does not exceed 7,500 kgs – The
reference to ‘transport vehicle’ in Section 3(1) and other sections
of the Act and Rules apply to only those vehicles which fall beyond
the scope of the sensu stricto definition under Section 2(21) – This
interpretation would ensure that no provision or word is rendered
otiose and the licensing regime remains coherent with the legislative
intent. [Paras 74, 85]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – The ratio in Mukund Dewangan
v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2017] 7 SCR 765 [Mukund
Dewangan (2017)], if per incuriam for not noticing inter alia
ss.4(1), 7, 14, second proviso to s.15, ss.180, 181 of the Motor
Vehicle Act, 1988 and Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989:
Held: No – Answering the reference, 3 Judge Bench in Mukund
Dewangan (2017) analysed key provisions of the Act and Rules
and rightly concluded inter alia that the holder of a license for a
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 545

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class need not have a separate endorsement
to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle weight
of which does not exceed 7500 kg or a motor car or tractor
or road-roller, the unladen weight of which does not exceed
7500 kg – Though, the judgment did not analyse the provisions
that distinguish transport and non-transport vehicles however, the
statutory scheme of Motor Vehicle Act is more nuanced than the
simple weight-based distinction made in the said judgment – The
Court also failed to notice ss.31(2) and (3) which specify ‘Transport’
and ‘Non-Transport’ vehicles however, the judgment gave due
consideration to the important statutory provisions – The overlooked
provisions would not alter the eventual pronouncement – There
are no glaring error or omission that would alter the outcome of
the case. [Paras 113-115]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – s.2(21) – Light Motor Vehicle (LMV)
‘means’ a ‘Transport Vehicle’ – ‘means’ – Meaning:
Held: As per the definition clause of LMV, it inter-alia ‘means’
a ‘Transport Vehicle’ – The use of the word ‘means’ suggests
specifics – When the statute says that a word or a phrase shall
“mean” (instead of say “include”), it is quite certainly a ‘hard and
fast’, strict and exhaustive definition – There is no distinction
between the two classes of vehicles – Such a definition is an
explicit statement of the full connotation of a term and there is
no ambiguity. [Para 32]
Interpretation of Statutes – Importance of definition sections –
Discussed.
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Purpose and objective – Discussed.
Interpretation of Statutes – Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Social
welfare legislation – Interpretation:
Held: 1988 Act is fundamentally a social welfare legislation providing
a mechanism for victims and their families to seek compensation
for loss or injury resulting from road accidents – Also, its provisions
regarding licensing and penalties for traffic violations serve the
broader purpose of promoting road safety – Thus, any interpretation
of its provisions must ensure a mechanism for timely compensation
and relief for victims of road accidents and also promote overall
road safety. [Para 15]
546 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – s.2(21) – Strict interpretation of:
Held: A light motor vehicle would mean a transport vehicle, omnibus,
road roller, tractor, or motor car, provided the weight does not
exceed 7,500 kgs. [Para 35]
Interpretation of Statutes – Principles of statutory interpretation –
Discussed.
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Compensation – Accidents involving
‘transport vehicles’ operated by individuals holding licenses
to drive ‘light motor vehicles’ – Payment of claims disputed
by insurance companies:
Held: Compensation must not be denied for minor technical
breaches of the licensing conditions – The emphasis on ‘Transport
Vehicle’ in the licensing scheme has to be understood only in the
context of the ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ vehicles – This harmonious
construction also aligns with the objective of the 1994 amendment
in Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure – This would
prevent insurance companies from taking a technical plea to defeat
a legitimate claim for compensation involving an insured vehicle
weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a person holding a driving
license of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class. [Paras 76, 126, 127]
Judgments – Per incuriam – When:
Held: A decision is per incuriam only when the overlooked
statutory provision or legal precedent is central to the legal issue
in question and might have led to a different outcome if those
overlooked provisions were considered – It must be an inconsistent
provision and a glaring case of obtrusive omission – The doctrine
of per incuriam applies strictly to the ratio decidendi and not to
obiter dicta – If a court doubts the correctness of a precedent, the
appropriate step is to either follow the decision or refer it to a larger
Bench for reconsideration – It has to be shown that some part of
the decision was based on a reasoning which was demonstrably
wrong, for applying the principle of per incuriam – In exceptional
cases, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight, a judgment
fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority
running counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle
of per incuriam may apply. [Para 111]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Impact of Mukund Dewangan (2017)
that allowed Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) license holders to drive
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 547

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

Transport Vehicles below 7500 Kg, on road safety, if any – Plea
of Insurance Companies that if Mukund Dewangan (2017) is
not interfered with, unfit drivers will start plying Transport
Vehicles putting at risk the lives of thousands of people:
Held: Rejected – No empirical data was produced to show that road
accidents in India have increased as a direct result of drivers with
LMV license, plying a transport vehicle of LMV class of vehicles
whose gross weight is within 7500 Kg – Road safety is indeed
an important objective of the MV Act but Court’s reasoning must
not be founded on unverified assumptions without any empirical
data – While the Court is mindful of issues of road safety, the task
of crafting policy lies within the domain of the legislature – Court
cannot dictate policy decisions or rewrite laws. [Para 117]
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 – Whether a driver holding a license
for a ‘Light motor vehicle’ can operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’
without obtaining a specific endorsement – Various conflicting
judgments for over 25 years:
Held: Judgments in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha, Nagashetty, S.
Iyyapan and Kulwant Singh holding that a separate endorsement
for a ‘transport vehicle’ are not necessary are upheld however,
judgments in Prabhu Lal, Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir and
Angad Kol which held otherwise are overruled. [Para 96.3]
Words and Phrases – “per incuriam” – Discussed.

Case Law Cited
New India Assurance Company v. Prabhu Lal [2007] 12 SCR 724 :
(2008) 1 SCC 696; New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Roshanben
Rahemansha Fakir [2008] 8 SCR 328 : (2008) 8 SCC 253; Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Angad Kol [2009] 2 SCR 695 : (2009) 11
SCC 356 – overruled.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria [2008] 1
SCR 1061 : (2008) 3 SCC 464 – partially overruled.
Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2017] 7 SCR
765 : (2017) 14 SCC 663; Ashok Gangadhar Maratha v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd. [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 202 : (1999) 6 SCC 620;
Nagashetty v. United India Insurance Co [2001] Supp. 1 SCR
656 : (2001) 8 SCC 56; S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co.
Ltd [2013] 7 SCR 45 : (2013) 7 SCC 62; Kulwant Singh v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd (2015) 2 SCC 186 – affirmed.
548 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [2016] 3 SCR
1075 : (2016) 4 SCC 298; M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi & Ors. (2019) 12 SCC 816; Bajaj
Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi [2023] 12
SCR 241 : (2023) 4 SCC 723; Bajaj Alliance General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi (2024) 1 SCC 818; Nathi Devi v.
Radha Devi Gupta [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1141 : (2005) 2 SCC
271; Aphali Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [1989]
Supp. 1 SCR 129 : (1989) 4 SCC 378; Skandia Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan [1987] 2 SCR 752 : AIR 1987
SC 1184; Sohan Lal Passi v. Sesh Reddy [1996] Supp. 3 SCR
647 : AIR 1996 SC 2627; Gurmej Singh S v. Sardar Pratap Singh
Kairon AIR 1960 SC 122; R S Raghunath v. State of Karnataka
[1991] Supp. 1 SCR 387 : AIR 1992 SC 81; Union of India v.
Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. [2001] 1 SCR 221 : (2001) 4
SCC 139; Rajasthan SRTC v. Santosh [2013] 3 SCR 720 : (2013)
7 SCC 107; P. Kasilingam v. PSG College of Technology [1995] 2
SCR 1061 : AIR 1995 SC 1395; Punjab Land Development and
Reclamation Corpn Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court [1990]
3 SCR 111 : (1990) 3 SCC 682; Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand
Jain [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 707 : 1997 (1) SCC 373; Lord Herschell
LC in Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph Lockwood 1894
A.C. 347 at 360; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh
[2004] 1 SCR 180 : (2004) 3 SCC 297; Madan and Co. v. Wazir
Jaivir Chand [1988] Supp. 3 SCR 983 : (1989) 1 SCC 264; Life
Insurance Corporation v. Escorts [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 909 :
1986 (2) SCC 264; Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar
AIR 1955 SC 661; Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [1975]
3 SCR 834 : (1975) 2 SCC 232; A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602; MCD v. Gurnam
Kaur [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 929 : (1989) 1 SCC 101; Punjab Land
Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court [1990]
3 SCR 111 : (1990) 3 SCC 682; N.Bhargavan Pillai v. State of
Kerala [2004] Suppl. 1 SCR 444 : (2004) 13 SCC 217; State of
M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [2011] 11 SCR 678 : (2011) 7
SCC 639; Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. [2001]
3 SCR 479 : (2001) 6 SCC 356; State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer
[2003] 3 SCR 919 : (2003) 5 SCC 448; Sundeep Kumar Bafna
v. State of Maharashtra [2014] 4 SCR 486 : (2014) 16 SCC 623;
Shah Faesal v. Union of India [2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4
SCC 1 – referred to.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 549

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

Powdrill v. Watson (1995) 2 AC 394; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co.
Ltd. 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300; Lancaster
Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941)
2 All ER; Bryers v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. (1957) 1 QB
134 : (1956) 3 All ER 560 (CA) Per Singleton; Canadian Pacific
Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers 1958 AC 485 : (1957) 3 All ER 572; A.
and J. Mucklow Ltd. v. IRC, 1954 Ch 615 : (1954) 2 All ER 508
(CA); Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All
ER 708 (CA); Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union 1954 Ch 479 : (1954)
1 All ER 822 (CA); Morelle LD v. Wakeling, (1955) 2 QB 379;
Gough v. Gough [(1891) 2 QB 665 : 65 LT 110] – referred to.

Books and periodicals cited
George Carlin, ‘Carlin on Campus’ (HBO, 1984); Law Commission
of India; Law Commission of India, Access of Exclusive Forum for
Victims of Motor Accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (119th
Report, February, 1987); Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory
Interpretation (Lexis Nexis, 2016); Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th
Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities
(pp. 297-98, para 578); Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court
of India (Oxford University Press 2000); Anuj Bhuwania, ‘Courting
the People—Public Interest Litigation in Post Emergency India’
(Cambridge University Press 2017); P.J. Fitzgerald(Ed), ‘Salmond on
Jurisprudence’ (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1966); Motor Vehicle
Aggregator Guidelines, 2020 – referred to.

List of Acts
Motor Vehicles Act, 1939; Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989;
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; English Road Traffic Act, 1930.

List of Keywords
Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) license; Vehicles with gross vehicle
weight of less than/below 7,500 kgs; Transport Vehicle; Driving
license; Learner’s licenses; Licensing; 1994 amendment; Separate
endorsement; Specific authorization; Additional authorization;
Driver; Reference; Per incuriam; ‘medium goods vehicle’; ‘medium
passenger vehicle’; ‘heavy goods vehicle’; ‘heavy passenger
vehicle’; Commercial vehicles; Harmonious construction; Stare
decisis; Road safety; Public welfare; Motor vehicles; Social welfare
legislation; Compensation; Road accidents; Insured vehicles;
Insurance companies; Policy domain; Transportation policy;
Transportation sector.
550 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 841 of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.08.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in SBCMA No. 5127 of 2011
With
SLP(C) Nos. 10918, 9604 and 9613 of 2018, Diary Nos. 24834 and
25256 of 2018, SLP(C) No. 24671 of 2018, Diary Nos. 32753, 32756,
37055 and 39059 of 2018, SLP(C) No. 426 of 2019, SLP(C) Nos.
505-506 of 2019, SLP(C) No. 17506 of 2018, Diary Nos. 23638,
24137, 24530 and 24534 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 5958, 8918-8919
and 11503-11504 of 2019, SLP(C) No. 8277 of 2020, SLP(C) Nos.
8123-8124 of 2022, SLP(C) Nos. 14645-14646 and 35472-35473 of
2017, SLP(C) No. 6055 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 18849, 20449, 21547
and 23017-23018 of 2019, Civil Appeal Nos. 8001-8002 of 2024,
SLP(C) No. 766 of 2020, SLP(C) Nos. 24545 and 30601 of 2019,
SLP(C) No. 696 of 2021, Civil Appeal Nos. 1477, 842, 1479, 483,
1506 and 1478 of 2018, Diary No. 40406 of 2017, Civil Appeal No.
1476 of 2018, Diary No. 41949 of 2017, SLP(C) Nos. 2684-2685,
597 and 524 of 2018, Diary No. 2524 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 19242-
19244 of 2018, Diary No. 23636 of 2018, SLP(C) No. 28906 of 2018,
13315, 14523-14524 of 2019, Diary No. 37270 of 2017, Civil Appeal
No.1475 of 2018, SLP(C) No. 5065, 10459, 9908 and 6668 of 2018,
Diary No. 4869, 6119 and 6264 of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 8816, 9607,
9610, 9612, 9606 and 9609 of 2018, Diary Nos. 9963, 9970 and 990
of 2018, SLP(C) Nos. 5193, 5188, 9611, 9608 and 9605 of 2018,
SLP(C) Nos. 20221, 19921 and 28961 of 2023
Appearances for Parties
Tushar Mehta, SG, Jayant Bhushan, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Anand
Sanjay M. Nuli, Ms. Anita Shenoy, Sr. Advs., Ashutosh Ghade, Nimit
Bhimjiyani, Ms. Sneha Balapure, Ms. Sakshi Mittal, Navneet Kumar,
Harsh Sharan, Saurabh Tiwari, Parijat Kishore, Amit Kumar Singh, Ms.
K Enatoli Sema, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Abhishek
Gola, Viresh B. Saharya, Rishabh Mathur, Akshat Agarwal, P.K. Seth,
Ms. Manjeet Chawla, Mrs. Usha Pant Kukreti, Ms. Meenakshi Midha,
Ms. Garv Singh, Aditya Parashar, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Ms. Hetu
Arora Sethi, Rahul Jain, Anirudh Bhat, Rajeev Maheshwaranand Roy,
Dr. Meera Agarwal, Ramesh Chandra Mishra, Anil Kumar, Sandeep Jha,
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 551

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

Ram Ekbal Roy, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Neha Das, Aman Nihal, Ravi
Shankar Ravi, Vikas Bharti, Binay Kumar Das, Raj Kishor Choudhary,
Shakeel Ahmed, Paras Nath Singh, Ms. Pratibha Singh, Abhishek
Kumar Gola, Ramneek Singh, Roop Chaudhary, Arun Kumar Nagar,
Ms. Savita, Ms. Supriya, Sudhir Naagar, Ms. Amrreeta Swaarup, Gaurav
Malhotra, Rajesh Kumar Gupta, Ms. Jyoti Kaushik, Manjunath Meled,
Sandeep Sharma, Mrs. Vijayalaxmi Udapudi, Ganesh Kumar R., Sukant
Vikram, Yojit Mehra, Amartya Bhushan, Tushar Bhushan, Ketan Paul,
Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Shuchi Singh, Rakesh Kumar Tewari, Krishna
Kant Dubey, Ujjwal Kumar Dubey, Vivek Kumar Pandey, Aman Kumar,
Jainendra Kumar, Nirmit Bhalla, Devendra Kumar Mishra, Yasharth
Kant, Ms. Sonal Kushwah, Suryaansh Kishan Razdan, Jagdish
Chandra, Niteen Kumar Sinha, Vishal Meghwal, Ms. Aishwarya Sinha,
Ms. Kirti Sinha, Ms. Ankita Chaudhary, Parmod Kumar Vishnoi, Kumar
Prashant, Avnish Dave, Vaibhav Dwivedi, Raghav Sharma, Shreyas
Balaji, Ram Lal Roy, Shiv Singh Yadav, Salil Paul, Sahil Paul, Sandeep
Dayal, Ms. Kanupriya Mehta, Niranjan Sahu, Uma Kanta Mishra, Ms.
Apoorva Sharma, Debabrata Dash, Anilendra Pandey, Manoj Kumar,
Rajeev Kumar Ranjan, Ms. Priya Kashyap, Brijesh Pandey, Mallikarjun
S. Mylar, Ashok Bannidinni, Ms. Betsara Mylliemngap, Tripurari Ray,
Balwant Singh Billowria, Nithyananda Murthy P, Ms. Bhanu Prabha,
Vivekanand Singh, Anirudh Ray, Rajinder Singh, Ms. Shilpa Singh,
Ms. Shalini Kaul, Pushpinder Singh, Kumar Kartikay, Sukhmandeep
Singh, Harsh Wadhwani, Nishanth Patil, Ayush P Shah, Vignesh
Adithiya S, Sushil Kumar Sharma, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Virendra
Kumar, Vikas Kakkar, Ms. Ankhi Sarkar, Ms. Akhila Wali, Suraj Kaushik,
Nanda Kumar K. B., Dharm Singh, Shiva Swaroop, M/s. Nuli & Nuli,
Devvrat, Ms. Harshita Sharma, Ms. Swati Setia, Ms. Charu Sangwan,
Anup Kumar, Abhijit Banerjee, Devesh Kumar Agnihotri, Nitin Jain, Ms.
Tanya Swarup, Shivam Singh, Manish Kumar, Ms. Bahuli Sharma,
Ishwar Singh, Ms. Shaswati Parhi, Suyash Vyas, Divyansh Mishra,
Gopal Singh, Subhro Sanyal, Kaustubh Shukla, C.B. Gururaj, Prakash
Ranjan Nayak, Animesh Dubey, Debasis Jena, Apoorv Nautiyal,
Anuj Bhandari, Rajat Gupta, Gaurav Jain, Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Mrs.
Anjali Doshi, Sharanagouda Patil, Mrs. Supreeta Patil, M/s. S-legal
Associates, K.R. Karthik, Pradeep Gaur, Amit Gaur, Ms. Sweta Sinha,
Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Ms. Fauzia Shakil, Vivek Mathur, Siddharth
Agarwal, Ms. Mohini Priya, Ms. Namrata Sarah Caleb, Ms. Parita,
Ms. Ayushma Awasthi, C. George Thomas, P.B. Suresh, Advs. for
the appearing parties.
552 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Hrishikesh Roy, J.

Title* Page No.
A. Background …6
B. Submissions on behalf of Insurance Companies … 15
C. Submissions on behalf of Claimants … 22
D. Issues … 26
E. Discussion … 27
(i) The Purpose of MV Act
(ii) Brief Overview of MV Act & MV Rules
(iii) Construing Section 2(21), 3 & 10 of MV Act
(iv) Whether the interpretation in Mukund
Dewangan (2017) renders most provisions
of the MV Act & MV Rules otiose?
(a) Harmonious Construction
(b) Interpretation must not lead to impractical
outcomes
(v) Discussion on the 8 Conflicting judgments
(vi) Is Mukund Dewangan (2017) per incuriam?
F. Impact on Road Safety … 114
G. Conclusion … 121

1. On the perception of the capability of drivers on the road, the comedian
George Carlin made the humorous observation to the effect that:
‘Have you ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an
idiot, and anyone going faster than you is a maniac?’.1 Concerns
about road safety are often shaped by individual biases without the
opinion being founded on any empirical data. It is easy to overlook the
full spectrum of factors that contribute to road safety. In this context,

* Ed. Note: Pagination as per the original Judgment.
1 George Carlin, ‘Carlin on Campus’ (HBO, 1984) <https://www.primevideo.com/detail/George-Carlin-
Carlin-On-Campus/0ND548YT8ZBNFE9A56MJWHZ8PK> accessed 2 November 2024
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 553

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

the pivotal legal issue that this Constitution bench of five judges has
to decide is whether under the existing legal framework of the Motor
Vehicle Act, 1988 (for short “MV Act”) and the Central Motor Vehicles
Rules, 1989 (for short, “MV Rules”), a person holding a license for
a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class, can drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without
a specific endorsement, provided the ‘Gross Vehicle Weight’ of
the vehicle does not exceed 7,500 kgs?. Besides road safety, the
livelihood concern of a large number of drivers of transport vehicles
in India also requires an answer from the bench. In this judgment,
let us name our driver Sri, who is a ‘Transport Vehicle’ driver. As
can be appreciated, Sri spends maximum hours behind the driving
wheels and is arguably the most experienced one amongst Indian
drivers, carrying goods and people, from destination A to B and so on.
A. BACKGROUND
2. Before we set out the relevant provisions, a brief overview of the legal
journey that has led us to the above quest would be appropriate.
The vexed question was first noticed by a 2-judge Bench of Justice
Kurian Joseph and Justice Arun Mishra in Mukund Dewangan v.
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.2 (for short “Mukund Dewangan(2016)”.
It took note of the conflicting views in 8 different judgments of this
Court and framed the following questions for determination by a
3-judge bench:
“59.1. What is the meaning to be given to the definition
of “light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of the
MV Act? Whether transport vehicles are excluded from it?
59.2. Whether “transport vehicle” and “omnibus” the “gross
vehicle weight” of either of which does not exceed 7500
kg would be a “light motor vehicle” and also motor car or
tractor or a roadroller, “unladen weight” of which does not
exceed 7500 kg and holder of licence to drive class of
“light motor vehicle” as provided in Section 10(2)(d) would
be competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the
“gross vehicle weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg
or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen weight”
of which does not exceed 7500 kg?

2 (2016) 4 SCC 298
554 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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59.3. What is the effect of the amendment made by virtue
of Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 while substituting
clauses (e) to (h) of Section 10(2) which contained “medium
goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor vehicle”, “heavy
goods vehicle” and “heavy passenger motor vehicle” by
“transport vehicle”? Whether insertion of the expression
“transport vehicle” under Section 10(2)(e) is related to the
said substituted classes only or it also excluded transport
vehicle of light motor vehicle class from the purview of
Sections 10(2)(d) and 2(41) of the Act?
59.4. What is the effect of amendment of Form 4 as to
operation of the provisions contained in Section 10 as
amended in the year 1994 and whether procedure to obtain
driving licence for transport vehicle of class of “light motor
vehicle” has been changed?”
3. Speaking through Justice Arun Mishra, the reference was answered
by a 3-Judge Bench of Justice Arun Mishra, Justice Amitava Roy,
and Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul in Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental
Insurance Co. Ltd.3 (for short “Mukund Dewangan (2017)”). The Bench
concluded that the holder of a license for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class
need not have a separate endorsement to drive a ‘transport vehicle’
if it falls under the ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class i.e. below 7,500 kgs.
The reference was answered as under:
“60.1 ‘Light motor vehicle’ as defined in section 2(21)
of the Act would include a transport vehicle as per the
weight prescribed in section 2(21) read with section 2(15)
and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded
from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue of
Amendment Act No.54/1994.
60.2. A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle
weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg. would
be a light motor vehicle and also motor car or tractor or
a road roller, ‘unladen weight’ of which does not exceed
7500 kg. and holder of a driving licence to drive class
of “light motor vehicle” as provided in section 10(2)(d) is

3 [2017] 7 SCR 765 : (2017) 14 SCC 663
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 555

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

competent to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the
gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or
a motor car or tractor or road-roller, the “unladen weight”
of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is to say, no
separate endorsement on the licence is required to
drive a transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class as
enumerated above. A licence issued under section 10(2)
(d) continues to be valid after Amendment Act 54/1994
and 28.3.2001 in the form.
60.3. The effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act
No.54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting clauses
(e) to (h) of section 10(2) which contained “medium goods
vehicle” in section 10(2)(e), medium passenger motor
vehicle in section 10(2)(f), heavy goods vehicle in section
10(2)(g) and “heavy passenger motor vehicle” in section
10(2)(h) with expression ‘transport vehicle’ as substituted
in section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid substituted
classes only. It does not exclude transport vehicle, from
the purview of section 10(2)(d) and section 2(41) of the
Act i.e. light motor vehicle.
60.4. The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of
“transport vehicle” is related only to the categories which
were substituted in the year 1994 and the procedure to
obtain driving licence for transport vehicle of class of “light
motor vehicle” continues to be the same as it was and has
not been changed and there is no requirement to obtain
separate endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a
driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle,
he can drive transport vehicle of such class without
any endorsement to that effect.”
[emphasis supplied]
4. However, the above pronouncement did not put the matter to rest.
On 3.5.2018, a two-judge Bench comprising Justice Kurian Joseph
& Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar in M/s. Bajaj Alliance General
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi & Ors.4 noted that while deciding

4 (2019) 12 SCC 816
556 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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the vexed question in Mukund Dewangan (2017), the 3 Judge-bench
had not considered important provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules.
The bench noted that the following significant provisions were not
placed before the Court in Mukund Dewangan (2017):
“3. It is the submission of Shri Jayant Bhushan and Shri
Joy Basu, learned Senior Counsel that certain distinct
provisions pertaining specifically to transport vehicles have
unfortunately not been brought to the notice of the Court:
1. Section 4(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter
referred to as “the Act”) provides that the minimum age of
holding a driving licence for a motor vehicle is 18 years.
Section 4(2) provides that no person under the age of
20 years shall drive a transport vehicle in a public place.
2. Section 7 provides that no person can be granted a
learner’s licence to drive a transport vehicle unless he
has held a driving licence to drive a light motor vehicle
for at least one year.
3. Section 14 deals with the currency of licence to drive
motor vehicles. A driving licence issued or renewed under
this Act, in case a licence to drive a transport vehicle
will be effective for a period of three years. The proviso
to Section 14(2)(a) provides that in case of a licence to
drive a transport vehicle carrying goods of dangerous or
hazardous nature, it shall be effective for a period of one
year. However, in case of any other licence, it would be
effective for a period of 20 years.
4. Rule 5 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989
(hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”) makes a medical
certificate issued by a registered medical practitioner
mandatory in case of a transport vehicle, whereas for a
non-transport vehicle, only a self-declaration is sufficient.
5. Rule 31, specifically sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) provide
for a difference in the syllabus and duration of training
between transport and non-transport vehicles.
It is also submitted that in these provisions, there does
not appear to be any exception carved out for transport
vehicles which come in the light motor vehicle category.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 557

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

5. Being a two-judge bench, the Court deemed it appropriate to refer
the prayer itself for reconsideration of the ratio in Mukund Dewangan
(2017) to a larger bench of three judges. Subsequently, a three-
Judge bench of Justice U.U. Lalit, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, and
Justice P.S. Narasimha on 8.3.20225 noted that the referral order
rightly observed that certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules
were not noticed in Mukund Dewangan (2017). The 3-judge bench
flagged certain additional provisions that were not noticed in Mukund
Dewangan (2017). Since such a view was expressed by a Bench of
equal strength, it was considered appropriate to refer the matter to
a larger bench of five judges. The reference order reads as under:
“5. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Mr. Gopal Sankaranaryanan,
Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Advocates as
well as Mr. Amit Singh, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave,
Mr. Kaustubh Shukla, Ms. Meenakshi Midha and Mr.
Rajesh Kumar Gupta, learned Advocates, appearing for
Insurance Companies have invited our attention to few
other provisions, namely, the second proviso to Section
15 and Sections 180 and 181 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 apart from those mentioned in the referral order.
It is submitted that though Section 3 was quoted in the
decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra), the latter part of
Section 3 and the effect thereof was not noticed by the
Court. The latter part of said Section 3 stipulates that “no
person shall so drive a transport vehicle other than the
motor cab or motor cycle hired for his own use or rented
under any scheme made under any scheme made under
sub-section (2) of Section 75 unless his driving licence
specifically entitles him so to do.”
6. It is thus submitted that the provisions contemplate
different regimes for those having licence to drive Light
Motor Vehicles as against those licensed to drive Transport
Vehicles.
7. Having bestowed our attention to the contentions
raised by the learned counsel and the issues which fall
for consideration, in our view, the referral order was right

5 Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi (2023) 4 SCC 723
558 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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in stating that certain provisions were not noticed by this
Court in its decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra). We are
prima facie of the view that in terms of the referral order,
the controversy in question needs to be re visited. Sitting
in a combination of Three Judges, we deem it appropriate
to refer the matters to a larger bench of more than Three
Judges as the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India may deem
appropriate to constitute”
6. For the benefit of the claimants, the reference order also pertinently
notes that:
“9. Before we part, we must note that all the learned
counsel appearing for the Insurance companies have fairly
submitted that the compensation in terms of the directions
issued by the Courts below, that is to say, in following the
principles laid down in Mukund Dewangan (supra) has
either been paid in full or shall be paid in terms of such
directions. Their statements are recorded.”
7. Thus, the correctness of Mukund Dewangan (2017) is to be evaluated
during this reference. At this juncture, we may note that during the
final stage of hearing before this Court on 20.7.2023, it was brought
to our notice that the Union Government had accepted the decision in
Mukund Dewangan (2017), by issuing notifications dated 16.4.2018
and 31.3.2021. The Rules were also amended to bring them in
conformity with the said judgment. Considering such compliance,
we sought the assistance of the learned Attorney General, Mr. R.
Venkataramani and desired to elicit the specific stand of the Union
Government on the issue. When the matter was next heard on
13.9.2023,6 the following order was passed by this 5-judge bench:
“8. Mr. R Venkataramani, Attorney General for India,
has appeared in response to the request of the Court
and submitted a written note. The note submitted by the
Attorney General indicates that:
(i) Application of the ratio in Mukund Dewangan (supra)
enables a person holding a licence for a light motor
vehicle to drive a transport vehicle on the strength

6 Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rambha Devi (2024) 1 SCC 818
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 559

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

of that licence without a separate transport vehicle
licence; and
(ii) This interpretation of the provisions of the statute
and the Rules in Mukund Dewangan (supra) does
not appear to be in accord with the legislative intent.
9. The note also indicates that the letter dated 16 April
2018 was issued by the Union government taking note
of the judgment in Mukund Dewangan (supra) as the law
declared by this Court. Resultantly, the notification dated
31 March 2021 was issued to further amend the Rules
to bring them in conformity with the judgment. However,
the Attorney General has submitted that this may not be
treated as a policy declaration by the Union Government
and, as such, the letter and the notification may not have
any bearing or conclusiveness on the state of law to be
clarified.
10. At the same time, it has been submitted that the Union
of India is open to the need, if any, to issue guidelines/
regulations to address the perceived gaps in law as
understood in the judgment of this Court in Mukund
Dewangan (supra).
11. Apart from the specific submission of the Union
Government during the course of hearing, that it is open
to re-evaluate the position in law, we are of the considered
view that it would be necessary for the Union Government
to have a fresh look at the matter. We are inclined to take
this view for the following reasons:
(i) Since the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988,
there has been a rapid evolution of the transport sector,
particularly in the last few years with the emergence of
new infrastructure and new arrangements for putting
into place private transport arrangements;
(ii) Any interpretation or formulation of the law must
duly take into account valid concerns of road safety
bearing on the safety of users of public transport
facilities;
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(iii) Any change in the position of law as expressed in
Mukund Dewangan (supra) would undoubtedly have
an impact on persons who have obtained insurance
relying on the law declared by this Court and who may
be driving commercial vehicles with LMV licences.
A large number of persons would be dependent on
the sector for earning their livelihood; and
(iv) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra) has held
the field for nearly six years and the impact of the
reversal of the decision, at this stage, particularly on
the social sector, is a facet which would have to be
placed in balance by the policy arm of the Government.
12. The considerations which have been flagged above
do not necessarily weigh in the same direction. However,
all of them do raise important issues of policy which must
be assessed and evaluated by the Union Government.
Whether a change in the law is warranted is a matter
which has to be determined by the Union Government after
taking a considered decision bearing in mind the diverse
considerations which fall within its remit in making policy
choices and decisions.
13. Having regard to these features, we are of the view
that the issue of interpretation which has been referred
to the Constitution Bench by the referral order dated
8 March 2022 should await a careful evaluation of the policy
considerations which may weigh with the Government in
deciding as to whether the reversal of the decision as it
obtains in Mukund Dewangan (supra) is warranted and, if
so, the way forward that must be adopted bearing in mind
the diverging interests, some of which have been noted
in the earlier part of the order.
14. Hence, in view of the consequences which may arise by
the reversal of the judgment in Mukund Dewangan (supra),
it would be appropriate if the entire matter is evaluated
by the Government before this Court embarks upon the
interpretative exercise. Once the Court is apprised of the
considered view of the Union Government, the proceedings
before the Constitution Bench can be taken up.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 561

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

15. We request the Union Government to carry out this
exercise within a period of two months.
16. We clarify that we have not expressed any opinion
on the merits of the referral order dated 8 March 2022 or
on the correctness of the decision in Mukund Dewangan
(supra) which would await further arguments once the
considered view of the Union Government is placed before
this Court.”
8. In view of the consultative exercise being carried out by the
government, the matter was deferred multiple times. On 16.4.2024,
a note on the proposed set of amendments to the MV Act was
submitted before this Court. On 21.8.2024, the learned Attorney
General, R. Venkataramani had suggested that the matter be either
deferred till the amendments are tabled before Parliament or the
Court may conclude the pending hearing. We then proceeded to
hear the part-heard matter on 21.8.2024.
B. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF INSURANCE COMPANIES
9. We have heard Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General;
learned Senior Counsel Mr. Siddhartha Dave, Mr. Jayant Bhushan;
Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior
Counsel; Mr. Amit Kumar Singh and Mr. Shivam Singh, Learned
Counsel on behalf of the Insurance Companies. Mr. PB Suresh
appeared as a supporting Intervenor for the ‘The Society against
Drunk Driving’.
9.1. Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned Senior Counsel took us through
those provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules that create
a distinction between ‘Light Motor Vehicles’ and ‘Transport
Vehicles’.
9.2. The Counsel drew the Court’s attention to Section 3 of the
MV Act which stipulates the ‘necessity for a driving license’ to
drive a motor vehicle. He referred to the second part of the
provision which states that ‘no person shall so drive a transport
vehicle…unless his driving license specifically entitles him so to
do.’ It was contended that Mukund Dewangan (2017) overlooked
that there was a specific mention of ‘transport vehicle’ in Section
3 which would indicate that a license for a ‘light motor vehicle’
cannot be used for driving a ‘transport vehicle’.
562 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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9.3. Mr. Dave further argued that the eligibility for obtaining a
license for transport vehicles is more stringent than for Light
Motor Vehicles. Since transport vehicles are primarily utilized
for carrying passengers and goods, the additional requirements
are essential for ensuring road safety. Adverting to Section 4
of the MV Act, which sets out the age limit, the Counsel
highlighted that the minimum age for securing a driving
license for ‘motor vehicles’ is 18 years but for driving ‘transport
vehicles’, Section 4(2) provides that the minimum age would
be 20. Moreover, to qualify even for a learner’s license to drive
a ‘transport vehicle’, Section 7(1) stipulates that a candidate
must have held a driving license for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’,
for at least one year.
9.4. Section 8(3) mandates that an individual applying for a learner’s
license for a transport vehicle, must submit a medical certificate
from a registered medical practitioner, attesting to the applicant’s
physical fitness to operate a transport vehicle. However, such
a requirement is absent in the case of a Light Motor Vehicle
for which only a self-declaration is sufficient. Additionally,
the second proviso to Section 15 of MV Act stipulates that
a medical certificate is also necessary for the renewal of a
driving license for ‘transport vehicles’. Section 9(4) requires
that the applicant for a ‘transport vehicle’ license must possess
a driving certificate from a driving school or establishment. It
was further submitted that the 1994 amendment to Section
10 merged four classes of (i) ‘medium goods vehicle’,
(ii) ‘medium passenger vehicle’, (iii) ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and
(iv) ‘heavy passenger vehicle’, into a single class of ‘transport
vehicle’ under Section10(2)(e) of MV Act. Section 10(2)(d) on
the other hand provides for a separate class of ‘Light Motor
Vehicle’. Therefore, the retention of the separate classes of
‘transport vehicle’ and ‘light motor vehicle’ under Section 10(2)
by the 1994 Amendment, implies that the two classes are not
co-equals, and the license holder of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ is
not eligible to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. A separate license
would be mandatory is the argument of the counsel.
9.5. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel argued that
Mukund Dewangan (2017) erred in two significant respects. The
judgment overlooked Section 3, which mandates a separate
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 563

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

endorsement for driving a ‘transport vehicle’. Reliance was
placed on the decision in Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta,7
where it was held that ‘effort should be made to give effect to
each and every word used by the Legislature.’ Therefore, it
was projected that the Court should not disregard any part of
Section 3 in its interpretation.
9.6. The other reason why Mukund Dewangan (2017) was incorrect
according to Mr. Bhushan, was because it focused on the
general law, rather than the special provisions within the MV Act.
It was therefore argued that it is a well-known principle that the
general will not override the special (Generalia Specialibus Non
Derogant) and the special will override the general (Specialia
Generalibus Derogant). It was pointed out that Section 10(2)
explicitly distinguishes between ‘Transport Vehicles’ and LMV,
treating them as separate categories. Mukund Dewangan
(2017) erroneously subsumed ‘transport vehicles’ under the
broader category of ‘Light Motor Vehicles’. It was also contended
that the requirements for obtaining a transport vehicle license
are distinct and more rigorous because the drivers of transport
vehicles are entrusted with the safety of passengers including
school children and strangers, who repose their trust in the
driver of the transport vehicle.
9.7. In his turn, Mr. Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel
emphasized that the classification of transport vehicles
under 7500 kg within the definition of Light Motor Vehicles
under Section 2(21) is a broad definition, based on weight.
He contended that this classification does not imply that the
licensing regime under the MV Act is also determined by
weight. According to the Counsel, licensing under the MV
Act is linked to the intended ‘use’ of the vehicle. Specific
attention was drawn to the definition of a Transport Vehicle
in Section 2(47), which refers to a ‘public service vehicle’, a
‘goods carriage’, an ‘educational institution bus’ or a ‘private
service vehicle’. Mr. Kaul argued that in the separate definition
for each of these categories, one common factor is discernible
as each provision uses words like ‘use’, ‘used or adapted to

7 [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1141 : (2005) 2 SCC 271
564 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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be used’, ‘constructed or adapted for use’. This shows that
the licensing scheme is based on usage and not the weight
of the vehicle.
9.8. Mr. Tushar Mehta, Learned Solicitor General submitted that
the definition under Section 2(21) which includes transport
vehicles is for a different regime, set under Section 113 and 115
of MV Act. These sections are contained in Chapter VII which
is titled ‘Control of Traffic’ and pertain to ‘limits of weight and
limitations on use’ and ‘power to restrict the use of vehicles’.
In this context, vehicles of specific weight may be prohibited
from certain roads or areas thereby, making weight a relevant
factor. Under the said definition of LMV, ‘weight’ has been kept
as a factor for demarcation between ‘LMV’ and ‘Transport’
vehicles only for the purposes of determining the ‘road tax’.
Rule 31(2) and Rule 31(3) of the Rules prescribe the syllabus
for training drivers for ‘Non-Transport’ and ‘Transport’ vehicles
respectively. It was submitted that the said syllabuses are not
the same. Also, the MV Act provides that the minimum period
of training shall not be less than 21 days for ‘Non-Transport’
vehicles, as opposed to ‘Transport’ vehicles, for which the
minimum period of training shall not be less than 30 days.
9.9. In her turn, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, learned Senior Counsel
presented to the Bench a photograph of a bus weighing
7450 kg, just below the limit of 7500 kg. She argued that if
a school bus is operated by someone holding a Light Motor
Vehicle license, it could be very risky. It was asserted that
weight should not be a determining factor for licensing, rather it
may be relevant in contexts such as taxes, permits, and other
regulatory considerations. Ms. Dave pointed out that Mukund
Dewangan (2017) failed to acknowledge the necessity of a
Form 7 endorsement for LMV license holders to drive transport
vehicles. This endorsement is crucial, as LMV license holders
cannot legally drive transport vehicles without it. Furthermore,
Section 9(6) requires competence testing, specific to the type of
vehicle, necessitating separate licenses for LMV and Transport
Vehicles to maintain the MV Act’s regulatory coherence.
9.10. Mr. P.B. Suresh, learned Counsel representing the Intervenor-
The Society Against Drunken Driving, an NGO argued that road
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safety is considered a fundamental right. He argued that the
decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) has led to unsafe roads
by permitting untrained drivers to operate transport vehicles.
It was submitted that Section 7 of the MV Act requires an
individual to hold a driver’s license for at least one year to
obtain a learner’s license for a transport vehicle, which is a
critical safety measure.
9.11. Mr. Shivam Singh, learned Counsel argued that motor vehicle
insurance policies had ensured adequate risk coverage only
when accidents were caused by vehicles for which, drivers
had valid licenses. However, in Mukund Dewangan (2017),
this court referred to the weight of the vehicle, rather than
vehicle usage, as a relevant marker for statutory purposes.
Consequently, insurance coverage through judicial decisions
had to be extended to cases where drivers with LMV licenses
were driving vehicles outside their licensing permits.
C. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF CLAIMANTS
10. On behalf of the Claimants, we have heard learned Senior Counsel,
Ms. Anitha Shenoy, and the respective submissions of Mr. Devvrat,
Mr. Kaustubh Shukla and Mr. Anuj Bhandari learned Counsel. While
supporting the interpretation in Mukund Dewangan (2017) the Counsel
would contend that the vehicles under the MV Act are differentiated
according to their weight. They argue that the definition of ‘light motor
vehicle’ in Section 2(21) is an inclusive definition which encompasses
multiple variety of vehicles including transport vehicles, the weight
of which does not exceed 7500 kg.
10.1. The learned Counsel, Mr. Devvrat contended that the licensing
system under the MV Act, categorises motor vehicles into two
primary groups i.e. Light and Heavy categories—LMV and
HMV respectively. It was argued that if a motorcycle used
for hire, weighing less than 200kg falls under the class of
transport vehicles, countless drivers operating on platforms
like Rapido, a bike-or-hire service, would be required to obtain
fresh licenses if Mukund Dewangan (2017) is overruled.
10.2. Mr. Anuj Bhandari, learned Counsel arguing for the Claimants,
took us through the history of the inclusion of “transport vehicles”
as a class, under the MV Act. It was submitted that for the last
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34 years, licenses have been granted in the country on the
basis of weight of the vehicle. Even today, Form 2 specifies
the grant of licenses based on weight, with exceptions being
made for vehicles like road rollers, e-rickshaws, or a motorcycle.
He pointed out that the original legislation identified four
types of vehicles: (i) medium goods vehicles, (ii) medium
passenger vehicles, (iii) heavy goods vehicles and (iv) heavy
passenger vehicles. With the 1994 amendments to the MV Act,
these categories were clubbed into a single classification of
“transport vehicles.” Building on this, Mr. Bhandari contended
that “transport vehicles” under the MV Act meant medium and
heavy vehicles. Therefore, individuals with an LMV license
were entitled to drive a light transport vehicle weighing less
than 7500 kilograms. Whereas, additional requirements of a
medical certificate and experience would apply only to those
medium and heavy transport vehicles which exceed the weight
limit of 7,500 kgs. It was argued that the Parliament changed
the nomenclature by merging the four categories into a single
class of ‘Transport Vehicles’, to ‘simplify’ the licensing scheme.
10.3. Mr. Kaustubh Shukla, Learned Counsel projected that careful
reading of all the definitions in Section 2 would make it clear
that the definitions were primarily bifurcated as follows:
“a. ‘Class of vehicle,’ which mandatorily referred
to weight: LMV [Sec. 2(21)] up to 7500 KG,
HMV (Passenger/Goods) [Sec. 2(16) & Sec.
2(17)] exceeding 12000 KG, MMV (Passenger/
Goods) [Sec. 2(23) & Sec. 2(24)] between 7500
to 12000 KG.
b. ‘Kind or Name’ (Description) of vehicle, which
had no reference to weight: [Sec. 2(7), 2(11),
2(14), 2(22), 2(25), 2(27), 2(28), 2(29), 2(33),
2(39), 2(40), 2(43), 2(44), 2(46), 2(47)].”
The legislature, according to the counsel, intended to demarcate
vehicles depending upon the weight of the vehicle and not their
description. Thus, according to him, the entire licensing scheme
must take into account the weight classification, to ensure clarity.
The earlier unamended act set the weight limit at 6000 kg which was
further raised to 7500 kg by way of the 1994 amendment. Therefore,
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 567

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the legislature intended to demarcate vehicles depending on the
weight and not the description of vehicle. It was further argued that
in the event of a conflict between the Act and the Rules, Schedules,
or Forms, the provisions of the Act will take precedence. Reliance
was placed on the decision of this Court in Aphali Pharmaceuticals
Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra.8
10.4. Ms. Anitha Shenoy, Learned Senior Counsel additionally
argued that on the strength of Mukund Dewangan (2017), the
auto drivers were permitted to operate taxis and motorcabs
while holding a driving licence for LMV for the past 6 years.
Reconsideration of the same is not merely an issue of insurance
coverage, rather it would directly impact the livelihood of those
driving transport vehicles with an LMV license. Their rights
under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India should also
be factored in for the interpretative exercise.
D. ISSUES
11. From the above submissions, the following specific issues fall for
our consideration:
(i) Whether a driver holding an LMV license (for vehicles
with a gross vehicle weight of less than 7,500 kgs) as per
Section 10(2)(d), which specifies ‘Light Motor Vehicle’, can
operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’ without obtaining specific
authorization under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act, specifically
for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class;
(ii) Whether the second part of Section 3(1) which emphasizes
the necessity of a driving license for a ‘Transport Vehicle’
overrides the definition of LMV in Section 2(21) of MV Act?
Is the definition of LMV contained in Section 2(21) of MV Act
unrelated to the licensing framework under the MV Act and
the MV Rules;
(iii) Whether the additional eligibility criteria prescribed in the
MV Act and MV Rules for ‘transport vehicles’ would apply to
those who are desirous of driving vehicles weighing below
7,500 kgs and have obtained a license for LMV class under
Section 10(2)(d) of the MV Act ;

8 [1989] Supp. 1 SCR 129 : (1989) 4 SCC 378
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(iv) What is the effect of the amendment made by virtue of Act 54
of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 which substituted four classes under
clauses (e) to (h) in Section 10 with a single class of ‘Transport
Vehicle’ in Section 10(2)(e)?
(v) Whether the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is per incuriam
for not noticing certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules?
E. DISCUSSION
(I) The Purpose of the MV Act, 1988
12. Prior to the enactment of the MV Act 1988, the legal framework
governing motor vehicles was based on the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939
which was incorporated from the English Road Traffic Act, 1930. In
January 1984, a working group was constituted to review all provisions
of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1939 and to propose necessary amendments.
This culminated in the enactment of the MV Act, 1988 which has
since undergone several amendments. The Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the MV Act, 1988 is extracted below for ready reference:
“2. Various Committees, like, National Transport Policy
Committee, National Police Commission, Road Safety
Committee, Low Powered Two - Wheelers Committee, as
also the Law Commission have gone into different aspects
of road transport. They have recommended updating,
simplification and rationalization of this law. Several
Members of Parliament have also urged for comprehensive
review of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, to make it relevant
to the modern - day requirements.
3. A Working Group was, therefore, constituted in January,
1984 to review all the provisions of the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939 and to submit draft proposals for a comprehensive
legislation to replace the existing Act. This Working Group
took into account the suggestions and recommendations
earlier made by various bodies and institutions like
Central Institute of Road Transport (CIRT), Automotive
Research Association of India (ARAI), and other transport
organisations including, the manufacturers and the general
public, Besides, obtaining comments of State Governments
on the recommendations of the Working Group, these were
discussed in a specially convened meeting of Transport
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Ministers of all States and Union territories. Some of the
more important modifications so suggested related for
taking care of –
(a) the fast increasing number of both commercial
vehicles and personal vehicles in the country ;
(b) the need for encouraging adoption of higher
technology in automotive sector;
(c) the greater flow of passenger and freight with the
least impediments so that islands of isolation are
not created leading to regional or local imbalances;
(d) concern for road safety standards, and pollution-
control measures, standards for transportation of
hazardous and explosive materials;
(e) simplification of procedure and policy liberalization
for private sector operations in the road transport
field ; and
(f) need for effective ways of tracking down traffic
offenders.”
13. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the important
provisions addressed the following:
"(a) rationalization of certain definitions with additions
of certain new definitions of new types of vehicles;
(b) stricter procedures relating to grant of driving licences
and the period of validity thereof;
(c) laying down of standards for the components and
parts of motor vehicles;
(d) standards for anti-pollution control devices;
(e) provision for issuing fitness certificates of vehicles
also by the authorised testing stations;
(f) enabling provision for updating the system of
registration marks;
(g) liberalised schemes for grant of stage carriage permits
on non nationalised routes, all-India Tourist permits
and also national permits for goods carriages;
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(h) administration of the Solatium Scheme by the General
Insurance Corporation;
(i) provision for enhanced compensation in cases of
“no fault liability” and in hit and run motor accidents;
(j) provision for payment of compensation by the insurer
to the extent of actual liability to the victims of motor
accidents irrespective of the class of vehicles;
(k) maintenance of State registers for driving licences
and vehicle registration;
(l) constitution of Road Safety Councils.
6. The Bill also seeks to provide for more deterrent
punishment in the cases of certain offences.”
14. The above would suggest that the enactment of the MV Act, 1988 was
driven, inter alia, by the rapidly increasing number of vehicles in the
country, the development of the road sector and the need to promote
the adoption of advanced technology in the automotive sector. It
is also essential to note that the Law Commission, in particular,
had made various recommendations concerning provisions of the
MV Act, 1939 and MV Act, 1988 in its Report Nos. 85,9 106,10 11911
and 149.12 To further understand the objective of the MV Act, 1988,
we may refer to the 149th Report of the Law Commission titled
‘Removing Certain Deficiencies in the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988’ which
noted the challenges faced by victims and their families in seeking
compensation under the MV Act, 1988 and the rising frequency of
road accidents in the following words:-
“ The frequency of accidents caused by motor vehicles
and the pitiable plight of the victims of such accidents and
dependants have been the subject matter of comment by

9 Law Commission of India, ‘Claims for compensation under Chapter 8 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939’(85th
Report, 1980)
10 Law Commission of India, ‘Section 103A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939: effect of Transfer of a Motor Vehicle
on Insurance’ (106th Report, November, 1984)
11 Law Commission of India, Access of Exclusive Forum for Victims of Motor Accidents under the Motor
Vehicles Act, 1939 (119th Report, February, 1987)
12 Law Commission of India, Removing Certain Deficiencies in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(149th Report,
1994)
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the Supreme Court in a number of cases. During recent
years, the number of road accidents in the country have
increased more alarmingly. Almost every day one finds in
the newspapers, sad tales of road accidents. …. There is
therefore an urgent need for streamlining the mechanism
through which the victims or their legal representatives are
compensated for their loss in such accidents so that they
may be able to receive expeditiously an appropriate amount
as compensation for the damages sustained by them. It
is felt all round that victims of motor accidents and their
legal representatives, where the accident is fatal, besides
having grievously suffered as a result of the unfortunate
event, are subjected to the agonies and uncertainties
of a legal battle for a number of years for receiving the
damages due to them through the process of Court. Of
late, Lok Adalats have been settling the cases of such
nature but it has been found that the victims or their legal
representatives are compelled to be satisfied with a paltry
sum out of the damages claimed by them. Such persons
have no other option but to settle the dispute because
they do not know for how many more years they will have
to litigate for receiving the damages. In the backdrop of
these and other related matters, the law commission has
suo moto taken up the exercise of finding a solution to
some of the problems relating to the Motor Vehicle Act
and giving their appropriate recommendations thereon.”
15. The MV Act, 1988 is fundamentally a social welfare legislation13
enacted with the objective of providing a mechanism for victims and
their families to seek compensation for loss or injury resulting from road
accidents. Additionally, its provisions regarding licensing and penalties
for traffic violations serve the broader purpose of promoting road
safety. Being a welfare legislation, it must be interpreted in a manner
so as not to deprive the claimants of the benefit of the legislation. Any
interpretation of its provisions must reflect the dual purpose, of not
only as a mechanism for ensuring timely compensation and relief for
victims of road accidents but also in promoting overall road safety.

13 Skandia Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kokilaben Chandravadan, AIR 1987 SC 1184; Sohan Lal Passi v. Sesh
Reddy, AIR 1996 SC 2627
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16. The issue in this reference is whether an individual holding an
LMV license can legally drive a transport vehicle if it falls within
the stipulated weight limit of 7,500 kgs. The genesis of the issue
stems from disputes regarding the payment of claims by insurance
companies for accidents involving ‘transport vehicles’ operated
by individuals holding licenses to drive ‘light motor vehicles’. The
question before this Court is not one of statutory interpretation but also
involves concerns of road safety and public welfare. In interpreting
any statute, it is always prudent to keep an eye on the object and
purpose of the statute, as well as the underlying reason and the spirit
behind it. However, we are conscious of not overstepping into the
policy domain which is essentially the prerogative of the legislature.
The legislature is uniquely positioned to examine the broader social,
economic and safety considerations that underlie transportation policy
and any changes to the law must be rooted in comprehensive public
discourse and analysis. Having noted the broader objective of the
MV Act, let us now discuss the statutory scheme.
(II) Brief Overview of the MV Act and MV Rules
17. It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that ‘construction
is to be made of all the parts together and not of one part only by
itself’.14 When attempting to discern the meaning of a certain provision
in a statute, it is essential to consider that provision within the broader
context of the entire legislative framework. The context encompasses
several other critical dimensions. First, it involves reading the statute
as a whole. Second, it is also crucial to take into account any previous
statutes that are in pari materia. Third, a comprehensive understanding
of the general scope and purpose of the statute is essential. Finally,
a critical aspect of interpreting any statutory provision also involves
identifying the mischief that the legislation intended to address.15
Therefore, a nuanced and thorough interpretation would lend clarity
and consistency in the application of legal principles.
18. In this regard, Justice GP Singh in his seminal treatise on Interpretation
of Statutes16 had this to say:

14 Subba Rao J in Gurmej Singh S v. Sardar Pratap Singh Kairon, AIR 1960 SC 122
15 R S Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 81; Union of India v. Elphinstone Spg. and Wvg. Co.
Ltd. (2001) 4 SCC 139; Powdrill v. Watson (1995) 2 AC 394
16 Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis, 2016)
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“It is a rule now firmly established- that the intention of the
Legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole.
The rule is referred to as an “elementary rule” by Viscount
Simonds; a “compelling rule” by Lord Somervell of Harrow;
. and a “settled rule” by BK Mukherjee. “I agree”, said Lord
Halsbury, “that you must look at the whole instrument
inasmuch as there may be inaccuracy and inconsistency;
you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the
instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be
possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it”.”
19. Let us now start by noting and understanding the statutory framework
of the MV Act and the MV Rules. A snapshot of all the chapters of
MV Act is listed below:
Chapter I-Definitions
Chapter II-Licensing of drivers of motor vehicles
Chapter III-Licensing of Conductors of Stage Carriages.
Chapter IV-Registration of motor vehicles.
Chapter V-Control of Transport Vehicles
Chapter VI-Special provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings
Chapter VII-Construction, Equipment and Maintenance of motor
vehicles.
Chapter VIII-Control of Traffic
Chapter IX-Motor Vehicles temporarily leaving or visiting India
Chapter XI- Insurance of Motor Vehicles against third party risks
Chapter XII-Claims Tribunals
Chapter XIII-Offences, Penalties and Procedure
Chapter XIV-Miscellaneous
20. The MV Rules contain the following chapters:
Chapter I-Preliminary
Chapter II-Licensing of Drivers of Motor Vehicles
Chapter III-Registration of Motor Vehicles
Chapter IV-Control of Transport Vehicles
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Chapter V-Construction, Equipment and Maintenance of Motor
Vehicles
Chapter VI-Control of Traffic
Chapter VII-Insurance of Motor Vehicles Against Third Party Risks
Chapter VIII-Offences, Penalties and Procedure
Chapter IX-Examination of Good Samaritan and Enquiry
21. This court, to effectively address the issue, is primarily concerned with
Chapter II of the MV Act and the MV Rules which relates to licensing
of drivers of motor vehicles. The Forms concerning driving license
appended to the MV Rules, may also bear a reference. Chapter II of
the MV Act contains the provisions dealing with the necessity for a
driving license, age limit, responsibility of owners of motor vehicles,
restrictions on the holding of driving licenses and the restrictions on
the grant of learner’s licenses for certain vehicles. Section 8 and
Section 9 contain provisions concerning the application for grant of a
learner’s license and driving license respectively. Section 10 which is
important for our purpose deals with ‘forms and contents of licenses to
drive’. Chapter II also contains provisions for additions to the driving
license, the licensing and regulation of schools or establishments for
imparting instruction in driving of motor vehicles, the validity period of
license, renewal, and revocation. Additionally, it also contains provisions
concerning orders refusing or revoking driving licenses, driving licenses
to drive motor vehicles belonging to Central Government, power of
licensing authority to disqualify from holding a driving license or revoke
such license, the power of Court to disqualify, suspend driving license
in certain cases, the effect of the disqualification order, endorsement,
and the maintenance of National and State Registers of Driving
licenses. Finally, it also contains provisions relating to the power of
Central and State Government to make Rules.
22. The MV Rules contain the procedure concerning driving licenses in
Chapter II. It covers, inter alia, general provisions, evidence as to
the correctness of address and age, medical certificate, educational
qualifications, preliminary test, application for a driving license,
driving test, form of driving license, renewal, driving schools and
establishments, duration of license, duplicate license as well as the
training syllabus.
23. The MV Act and MV Rules work in tandem, like two wheels in the
same axle, to form a comprehensive legal framework governing
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motor vehicles in India. While the Act provides the backbone, the
Rules provide specific provisions for implementation.
(III) Construing Section 2(21), Section 3 and Section 10
24. To understand the divergent interpretations on the core issue of
whether a holder of a LMV license can operate a ‘transport vehicle’
weighing less than 7,500 kgs, it will be necessary to first consider
the relevant definition(s) contained in Section 2 of the MV Act. The
definitions deserving scrutiny are noted below for ready reference.
The definition of Section 2 interestingly begins with the clarificatory
preface, ‘unless the context otherwise requires’:

2(10) “driving licence” means the licence issued by a competent
authority under Chapter II authorising the person specified
therein to drive, otherwise than as a learner, a motor vehicle
or a motor vehicle of any specified class or description.”
2(15) “gross vehicle weight” means in respect of any vehicle the
total weight of the vehicle and load certified and registered
by the registering authority as permissible for that vehicle;”
2(16) “heavy goods vehicle” means any goods carriage the
gross vehicle weight of which, or a tractor or a road-roller
the unladen weight of either of which, exceeds 12,000
kilograms;”
2(17) “heavy passenger motor vehicle” means any public service
vehicle or private service vehicle or educational institution
bus or omnibus the gross vehicle weight of any of which; or
a motor-car the unladen weight of which, exceeds 12,000
kilograms;”
2(21) “light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or omnibus
the gross vehicle weight of either of which or a motorcar or
tractor or road-roller the unladen weight of any of which,
does not exceed 7,500 kilograms;”
2(22) “maxicab” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted
to carry more than six passengers, but not more than
twelve passengers, excluding the driver, for hire or reward;
2(23) “medium goods vehicle” means any goods carriage other
than a light motor vehicle or a heavy goods vehicle;”
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2(24) “medium passenger motor vehicle” means any public
service vehicle or private service vehicle, or educational
institution bus other than a motor-cycle, invalid carriage,
light motor vehicle or heavy passenger motor vehicle;”
2(25) “motorcab” means any motor vehicle constructed or
adapted to carry not more than six passengers excluding
the driver for hire or reward.
2(26) “motor-car” means any motor vehicle other than a transport
vehicle, omnibus, road-roller, tractor, motor-cycle or invalid
carriage.
2(27) “motor cycle” means a two-wheeled motor vehicle, inclusive
of any detachable side-car having an extra wheel, attached
to the motor vehicle.
2(28) “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” means any mechanically
propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads whether the
power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or
internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has
not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle
running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted
for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises
or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine
capacity of not exceeding1 [twenty-five cubic centimetres];
2(29) “omnibus” means any motor vehicle constructed or adapted
to carry more than six persons excluding the driver.”
2(44) “tractor” means a motor vehicle which is not itself
constructed to carry any load (other than equipment used
for the purpose of propulsion); but excludes a road-roller;”
2(48) “unladen weight” means the weight of a vehicle or trailer
including all equipments ordinarily used with the vehicle or
trailer when working, but excluding the weight of a driver or
attendant; and where alternative parts or bodies are used
the unladen weight of the vehicle means the weight of the
vehicle with the heaviest such alternative part or body;”

25. The term ‘Transport Vehicle’ is defined in Section 2(47) of the MV Act
and each of the terms contained in the definition is separately defined
in Sections 2(35),2(14), 2(11), 2(33) of the MV Act:
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2(47) “transport vehicle” means a public service vehicle, a
goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a
private service vehicle;”
[emphasis supplied]
2(35) “public service vehicle” means any motor vehicle used or
adapted to be used for the carriage of passengers for hire
or reward, and includes a maxi-cab, a motor-cab, contract
carriage, and stage carriage;”
2(14) “goods carriage” means any motor vehicle constructed
or adapted for use solely for the carriage of goods, or any
motor vehicle not so constructed or adapted when used for
the carriage of goods;”
2(11) “educational institution bus” means an omnibus, which is
owned by a college, school or other educational institution
and used solely for the purpose of transporting students
or staff of the educational institution in connection with any
of its activities;”
2(33) “private service vehicle” means a motor vehicle constructed
or adapted to carry more than six persons excluding the
driver and ordinarily used by or on behalf of the owner of
such vehicle for the purpose of carrying persons for, or in
connection with, his trade or business otherwise than for
hire or reward but does not include a motor vehicle used
for public purposes
26. Rule 2 of the MV Rules provides certain additional definitions. For
instance, Rule 2(c) defines an ‘agricultural tractor’ as under:
“agricultural tractor” means any mechanically propelled
4-wheel vehicle designed to work with suitable implements
for various field operations and/or trailers to transport
agricultural materials. Agricultural tractor is a non-transport
vehicle’
[emphasis supplied]
27. Significantly, a non-transport vehicle is defined in Rule 2(h):
““non-transport vehicle” means a motor vehicle which is
not a transport vehicle”
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28. The definition of ‘e-cart’,17 ‘e-rickshaw’,18 ‘Battery operated vehicle’,19
‘road ambulance’,20 ‘school bus’,21 ‘special purpose vehicle’,22 ‘motor
caravan’,23 ‘puller tractor’24 and different categories of vehicles such as
‘Category L’25 and ‘Category M’26 are also provided in the MV Rules.
29. The above definition(s) in the MV Act and MV Rules would indicate that
they focus on various aspects including reference by (i) weight such
as light motor vehicle and heavy goods vehicle; (ii) the intended use
such as educational institution bus, public service or private service
and also (iii) the vehicle types such as omnibuses and motor cars.
Therefore, the scheme of the Act is not exactly either user-based or
weight-based but is a combination of both. It also takes into account
the evolving transportation sector which is reflected in the introduction
of new categories of vehicles through various amendments such as
adapted vehicles, e-carts, and e-rickshaws. Notably, the Supreme
Court has also recognized27 that hybrid rickshaws, commonly referred
to as ‘jugaad’ in India, fall under the definition of Motor Vehicle
u/s 2(28) of the MV Act.
30. For our discussion, much turns on the definition of LMV contained
in Section 2(21) of the MV Act:
“light motor vehicle” means a transport vehicle or
omnibus the gross vehicle weight of either of which or
a motorcar or tractor or road-roller the unladen weight
of any of which, does not exceed 7,500 kilograms.”
[emphasis supplied]
31. The term ‘transport vehicle’, ‘gross vehicle weight’, ‘motor car’,
‘tractor’, ‘road roller’, ‘unladen weight’ and ‘gross vehicle weight’
are also separately defined in the MV Act as noted earlier. In the

17 Rule 2(cc)
18 Rule 2(cb)
19 Rule 2(u)
20 Rule 2(zb)
21 Rule 2(zc)
22 Rule 2(zd)
23 Rule 2(za)
24 Rule 2(y)
25 Rule 2(i)
26 Rule 2(k)
27 Rajasthan SRTC v. Santosh (2013) 7 SCC 107
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context, Mr. Dave, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for one of the
insurance companies presented to us a visual 1 page representation
of the definition of LMV which being useful, is reproduced below:
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32. A plain reading of the definition clause of LMV as is also clear from
the diagram above shows that LMV, inter-alia, ‘means’ a ‘Transport
Vehicle’. The use of the word ‘means’ is crucial here which suggests
specifics. When the statute says that a word or a phrase shall
“mean” (instead of say “include”), it is quite certainly a ‘hard and
fast’, strict and exhaustive definition. Such a definition is an explicit
statement of the full connotation of a term.28 It is a clear signal that
the legislature did not wish to maintain a distinction between the two
classes of vehicles. Such an explicit and specific definition leaves
no room for ambiguity.
33. On the importance of definition sections, G.P. Singh in Interpretation
of Statutes29 has the following to say:-
“In spite of severe criticism as to utility of definitions
section or interpretation clauses, it is common to find in
a statute “Definitions” of certain words and expressions
used elsewhere in the body of the statute. The object
of such a definition is to avoid the necessity of frequent
repetitions in describing all the subject matter to which
the word or expression so defined is intended to apply.
For instance, the Supreme Court held that when the
word “securities” has been defined under the Securities
Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956, its meaning would not
vary when the same word is used at more than one place
in the same statute, as otherwise it will defeat the very
object of the definitive section.”
[emphasis supplied]
34. As noticed earlier, Section 2 also begins with the phrase ‘unless
the context otherwise requires’. However, any contention based
on a contrary context must avoid the risk of making the explicit
definition, redundant or useless. Here we may usefully extract
the following :-

28 Gough v. Gough [(1891) 2 QB 665 : 65 LT 110] referred in P. Kasilingam v. PSG College of Technology,
AIR 1995 SC 1395; See also Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn Ltd. v. Presiding Officer,
Labour Court (1990) 3 SCC 682
29 Justice G.P. Singh: Principles of Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis,2016)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 581

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

“..However, it is incumbent on those who contend that the
definition given in the interpretation clause does not apply
to a particular section to show that the context in fact so
requires. An argument based on contrary context which
will make the inclusive definition inapplicable to any
provision in the Act cannot be accepted as it would
make the definition entirely useless. Repugnancy of a
definition arises only when the definition does not agree
with the subject or context; any action not in conformity
with the definition will not obviously make it repugnant
to subject or context of the provision containing the term
defined under which such action is purported to have been
taken. When the application of the definition to a term in
a provision containing that term makes it unworkable and
otiose, it can be said that the definition is not applicable
to that provision because of contrary context.”30
[emphasis supplied]
35. Considering the emphatic nature of the definition given in Section
2(21) which would suggest a strict interpretation, it would be logical
to conclude that a light motor vehicle would mean a transport vehicle,
omnibus, road roller, tractor, or motor car, provided the weight does
not exceed 7,500 kgs. The definition as understood, has an important
bearing on the issuance of licenses and permits.
36. The term “driving license”, which is relevant for the present discussion,
is defined under Section 2(10) of the MV Act as a license authorizing
a person to operate a motor vehicle of “any specified class or
description”. Let us now read Section 10(2) titled, ‘form and Contents
of Licenses to drive’ which lists the different classes of motor vehicles.
It is contained in Chapter II which deals with ‘Licensing of Drivers
of Motor Vehicles’. A key amendment was carried out in the Section
by deleting clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) and all these were clubbed
under a single head of “transport vehicle”.

30 Justice G.P. Singh, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (LexisNexis,2016)
582 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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MV Act (pre amendment of MV Act (post amendment of
14.11.1994) 14.11.1994)
10. Form and contents of 10. Form and contents of licences
licences to drive.—(1) Every to drive.—(1) Every learner’s
learner’s licence and driving licence and driving licence, except
licence, except a driving licence a driving licence issued under
issued under section 18, shall section 18, shall be in such
be in such form and shall form and shall contain such
contain such information as may information as may be prescribed
be prescribed by the Central by the Central Government. (2) A
Government. learner’s licence or, as the case
may be, driving licence shall also
(2) A learner’s licence or, as the
be expressed as entitling the
case may be, driving licence
holder to drive a motor vehicle
shall also be expressed as
of one or more of the following
entitling the holder to drive a
classes, namely:—
motor vehicle of one or more
of the following classes, (a) motor cycle without gear;
namely:— (a) motor cycle
(b) motor cycle with gear;
without gear; (b) motor cycle
with gear; (c) invalid carriage1 ;
(c) invalid carriage; (d) light motor vehicle;
(d) light motor vehicle; (e) transport vehicle;
(e) medium goods vehicle (e) deleted
(f)medium passenger vehicle; (f) deleted
(g)heavy goods vehicle; (g) deleted
(h) heavy passenger vehicle. (h) deleted
(i) road-roller;
(j)motor vehicle of a specified
description

37. In the context of the deletion of the classes of ‘medium goods
vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’, and
‘heavy passenger vehicle’ and the introduction of a separate class
of ‘transport vehicle’ through the 1994 amendment, the counsel
for the insurance companies contended that a specific mention of
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 583

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

‘transport vehicle’ after the amendment would suggest that a separate
endorsement would be necessary to drive a ‘transport vehicle’. It was
further submitted that even before the 1994 amendment, the second
part of Section 3 always provided that a separate endorsement
would be necessary.
38. Section 3 is titled ‘Necessity for driving license’ and reads as under:
“3. Necessity for driving licence.– (1) No person shall
drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds
an effective driving licence issued to him authorising him
to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a
transport vehicle [other than a motor cab or motor cycle
hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made
under sub-section (2) of section 75] unless his driving
licence specifically entitles him so to do.
(2) The conditions subject to which sub-section (1) shall
not apply to a person receiving instructions in driving a
motor vehicle shall be such as may be prescribed by the
Central Government.”
[emphasis supplied]
39. To deal with the above submission, let us take the hypothetical
example of Sri - who let us say is desirous of driving an auto in the
year 1990. The following option(s) of classes of vehicles would be
available to Sri, as per unamended Section 10:
(a) motor cycle without gear;
(b) motor cycle with gear;
(c) invalid carriage;
(d) light motor vehicle;
(e) medium goods vehicle
(f) medium passenger vehicle;
(g) heavy goods vehicle;
(h) heavy passenger vehicle.
40. The applicant Sri would be required to fill the Form 4, prescribed
under Rule 14 of MV Rules which was prevalent before 28.3.2001.
The Form 4 is extracted below:-
584 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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“FORM 4
[See Rule 14]
Form of application for licence to drive a motor vehicle
To,
The licensing authority,
…………………………………. [Passport
size photograph]

I apply for a licence to enable me to drive vehicles of the following
description—
(a) Motorcycle without gear
(b) Motorcycle with gear
(c) Invalid carriage
(d) Light motor vehicle
(e) Medium goods vehicle
(f) Medium passenger motor vehicle
(g) Heavy goods vehicle
(h) Heavy passenger motor vehicle
(i) Roadroller
(j) Motor vehicle of the following description:
***
Certificate of test of competence to drive
The applicant has passed the test prescribed under Rule 15 of the Central
Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. The test was conducted on (here enter the
registration mark and description of the vehicle) ……………………… on
(date)……….
The applicant has failed in the test.
(The details of deficiency to be listed out)
Date:…………
Signature of Testing Authority
……………….
Full name and designation

Two specimen signatures of applicant:
Strike out whichever is inapplicable.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 585

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

41. Form 4 above indicates that there is no mention of ‘Transport Vehicle’
for the purpose of obtaining a driving license. Moreover, there is
no mention of a ‘light goods vehicle’ or a ‘light passenger vehicle’.
Therefore, if Sri applies for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ license, which
already means a ‘Transport Vehicle’ as per the definition of LMV
contained in 2(21), can it be said that Sri cannot drive a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ because ‘his driving license specifically’ does not ‘entitle him
so to do’ as provided in the second part of Section 3? We think not.
The specific authorization should not be understood to mean that
Sri holding an LMV license which covers ‘Transport vehicle’, would
be disentitled to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. A question would then
arise about the purpose of explicitly mentioning ‘Transport Vehicle’
in Section 3 (and other provisions as we will discuss later)? We may
notice that there is no mention of the term ‘light goods vehicle’ or a
‘light passenger vehicle’ in Section 10 or in the definition section.
On the other hand, a separate mention of ‘medium goods vehicle’,
‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy
passenger vehicle’ as incorporated in the Section 10 would suggest
that it is primarily targeted towards ‘Transport Vehicles’ as opposed
to a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’, which as earlier noticed could also be a
‘Non-Transport Vehicle’. The emphasis in the second part of Section 3
should therefore be understood in relation to Medium and Heavy
Vehicles in the statutory scheme even prior to the 1994 amendment.
The reasonable interpretation of the second part of Section 3 should
therefore pertain to a driving license for those driving ‘medium goods
vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’, and
‘heavy passenger vehicle’. Such an interpretation and understanding
would be logical because medium and heavy vehicles would require
greater maneuverability and skill as compared to drivers of the LMV
class. The subsequent amendment in Section 10 makes this position
even clearer. The relevant portion of the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the Amendment Act 54 of 1994 may also guide us here
and is reproduced below:
"(a) The introduction of newer type of vehicles and fast
increasing number of both commercial and personal
vehicles in the country.
(b) Providing adequate compensation to victims of road
accidents without going into longdrawn procedure;
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(c) Protecting consumers’ interest in Transport Sector;
(d) Concern for road safe ty standards, transport of
hazardous chemicals and pollution control;
(e) Delegation of greater powers to State Transport
Authorities and rationalising the role of public
authorities in certain matters;
(f) The simplification of procedures and policy
liberalisation in the field of Road Transport;
(g) Enhancing penalties for traffic offenders.

The Bill inter alia provides for –
(a) modification and amplification of certain definitions
of new type of vehicles ;
(b) simplification of procedure for grant of driving
licences;
(c) putting restrictions on the alteration of vehicles;
(d) certain exemptions for vehicles running on non-
polluting fuels;
(e) ceilings on individuals or company holdings removed
to curb “benami” holdings;
(f) states authorised to appoint one or more State
Transport Appellate Tribunals;
(g) punitive checks on the use of such components
that do not conform to the prescribed standards by
manufactures, and also stocking / sale by the traders;
(h) increase in the amount of compensation of the victims
of hit and run cases;
(i) removal of time limit for filling of application by road
accident victims for compensation;
(j) punishment in case of certain offences is made
stringent;
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 587

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

(k) a new pre-determined formula for payment of
compensation to road accident victims on the basis
of age/income, which is more liberal and rational.”
[emphasis supplied]
42. The classes of ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger vehicle’,
‘heavy goods vehicles’, and ‘heavy passenger vehicles’ as earlier
noted in the table, were subsumed under the class of ‘Transport
vehicle’. It can logically be inferred that the term ‘Transport Vehicle’
primarily targets vehicles exceeding 7,500 kgs, for the purpose of
license regime. The intention of the legislature was to simplify the
licensing framework for larger commercial vehicles and at the same
time not interdict a LMV license holder to also drive a transport
vehicle. The additional requirements for medium and heavy vehicles
are also evident from unamended sub-section 1 of Section 7 which
reads as under:
“Restrictions on the granting of learner’s license for certain
vehicles-
(1) No person shall be granted a learner’s license-
(a) to drive a heavy goods vehicle unless he has held
a driving license for atleast 2 years to drive a light
motor vehicle or for at least one year to drive a
medium goods vehicle.
(b) to drive a medium goods vehicle or a medium
passenger vehicle unless he has held a driving
license for atleast one year to drive a light motor
vehicle.”
[emphasis supplied]
43. The amended Section 7(1) however, states that:
‘7. Restrictions on the granting of learner’s licences for
certain vehicles:-
[(1) No person shall be granted a learner’s licence to drive
a transport vehicle unless he has held a driving licence
to drive a light motor vehicle for at least one year:]
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Therefore, the classes of medium and heavy vehicles stood
subsumed under ‘transport vehicles’. Our view on the LMV licence
holder’s capability to drive a transport vehicle is also fortified by the
unamended and amended Rule 10 of the MV Rules:
Rule 10 (pre-amendment) Rule 10 (post-amendment)
“10. Application for learner’s 10. Application for learner ’s
licence.— licence.—
An application for the grant of a An application for the grant of a
learner’s licence shall be made in learner’s licence shall be made in
Form 2 and shall be accompanied Form 2 and shall be accompanied
by,— by,—
(a) save as otherwise provided (a) save as otherwise provided in
in rule 6, a medical certificate rule 6, a medical certificate in
in [Form 1-A]. [Form 1-A].
(b) three copies of the applicant’s (b) three copies of the applicant’s
recent 28 [passport size recent 28 [passport size
photograph] photograph],
(c) appropriate fee as specified (c) appropriate fee as specified
in rule 32, in rule 32,
(d) in the case of an application (d) in the case of an application for
for medium goods vehicle, transport vehicle excluding
a medium passenger E-rickshaw or E-Cart, the
motor vehicle, a heavy driving licence held by the
goods vehicle or a heavy applicant]
passenger vehicle, the
[(e) proof of residence
driving license held by the
applicant.” (f) proof of age

44. The insertion of a separate class of ‘Transport Vehicle’ has led to
some confusion in legal interpretation. In National Insurance Co. Ltd.
v. Annappa Irappa Nesaria31 (for short “Annappa Irappa Nesaria”),
the issue before this Court was whether the driver of a Matador van
weighing 3,500 kgs which had a ‘goods carriage’ permit could drive
a ‘transport vehicle’, if he had a LMV license. The van, which was
insured by the appellant, met with an accident on 9.12.1999, causing

31 [2008] 1 SCR 1061 : (2008) 3 SCC 464
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 589

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

the death of respondent’s wife. It was brought to the notice of the
Court that the 1994 amendment to the MV Act, replaced “medium
goods vehicle” and “heavy goods vehicle”, with “transport vehicle.”
The 2-judge bench observed as under:
“19. “Light motor vehicle” is defined in Section 2(21) and,
therefore, in view of the provision, as then existed, it
included a light transport vehicle. xx
20. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is evident
that “transport vehicle” has now been substituted for
“medium goods vehicle” and “heavy goods vehicle”. The
light motor vehicle continued, at the relevant point of time
to cover both “light passenger carriage vehicle” and “light
goods carriage vehicle”. A driver who had a valid licence
to drive a light motor vehicle, therefore, was authorised
to drive a light goods vehicle as well.”
[emphasis supplied]
44.1. In the pertinent judgment, this Court held that the amendments
carried out in 1994 had a prospective operation and at the
time of the accident (pre-amendment), a driver holding a valid
license to drive a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ was also authorised
to drive a ‘light goods vehicle’. However, post-amendment, a
separate endorsement would be necessary. Thus, the insurance
company was held liable to remit the compensation since the
accident occurred before the change in law.
44.2. The above interpretation on prospective application in the
context of the 1994 amendment, however does not seem to
be correct since the mention of the term ‘Transport Vehicle’,
does not exclude transport vehicles that are already classified
as ‘LMV’, under Section 10. If this interpretation were accepted,
it would imply that medium or heavy vehicles would no longer
require ‘specific’ endorsements, as those classes were removed
by the amendment. This would lead to impractical outcomes.
44.3. The contention that since Light Motor Vehicles and Transport
Vehicles are mentioned separately, those Transport Vehicles
which (weighing less than 7,500 kg) fall within the class of LMV
would require the driver to have a separate driving license or
590 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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an endorsement does not appeal well to our understanding.
This would be contrary to the legislative intent. The classes
mentioned therein do not appear like watertight compartments
and some degree of overlap is discernible. An LMV license
which typically covers two-wheelers may also be used for
commercial activities like small-scale deliveries and the
driver may not be required to obtain a separate endorsement
for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class. It is difficult to accept the
argument that a driving license issued for a particular class is
limited and the intention of the legislature was to exclude the
Transport Vehicles falling within the LMV class. According to
our understanding, the correct way to view the legal implication
would be that ‘transport vehicles’ mentioned in Section 10
would cover only those vehicles whose gross vehicle weight is
above 7,500 kgs. Such an interpretation aligns with the broader
purpose of the amendments and ensures that the licensing
regime remains efficient and practical for vehicle owners and
drivers. We therefore partially overrule the decision in Annappa
Irappa Nesaria (supra) for the view taken w.r.t the post-1994
amendment position.
45. Significantly, Section 10(2) states that a driving license ‘shall also
be expressed as entitling the holder to drive a motor vehicle of one
or more of the following classes’. Therefore, the driver of a ‘Light
Motor Vehicle’ is not per se disentitled to acquire a license for a
‘Transport Vehicle’ class, for driving vehicles above the weight of
7,500 kgs or those classes which do not fall in the definition of
Light Motor Vehicle under Section 2(21). As rightly noted in Mukund
Dewangan (supra), Section 10 has to be read with Section 2(21)
which defines a Light Motor Vehicle.
III. Whether the interpretation in Mukund Devangan(2017) would
render most provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules otiose?
46. For the Insurance Companies, it was argued with much emphasis
that sole reliance on Section 2(21) r/w Section 10 as held in Mukund
Dewangan (2017) would render otiose, many provisions of the
MV Act and this can have far-reaching implications. To appreciate
this contention, a careful examination of the identified provisions
is necessary. Is it correct to say that in order to drive a transport
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 591

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

vehicle, an LMV license holder will require by law, an additional
endorsement because the scheme of the Act provides a clear
distinction between ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ and ‘Transport Vehicle’?
The following table marking the distinction was placed before the
Court for consideration:

Sr. Differentiating Provision Light Motor Transport Vehicle
No. Factor Under M.V. Vehicle License License
Act / Rules
Age / Time Requirement
(i) Age limit For Sec. 4 18 years and 20 years and above
Driving above [S.4(1)] [S.4(2)]
(ii) Restriction Sec. 7(1) No minimum Must hold a Driving
on grant of requirement to License for a Light
Learner’s obtain License Motor Vehicle for at
License for Light Motor least 1 year, to obtain
Vehicle. Learner’s License for
Transport Vehicle.
[S. 7(1)]
(iii) Training Rule 31 Not less than 21 Not less than 30 days
Period for days [Rule 31(2)] [Rule 31(3)]
Obtaining (+) (+)
License
Actual Hours of Actual Hours of
Driving shall not be Driving shall not be
less than 10 hours. less than 15 hours.
[Rule 31(4)] [Rule 31(4)]
Medical Certificates
(iv) Requirement Sec. 8(3) No requirement of Application for Grant
of Medical Medical Certificate of Learner’s License
for Certificate must be accompanied
Learner’s by a Medical
License Certificate [S.8(3)]
(v.) Requirement Sec. 15 No requirement of Application Shall be
Of Medical Medical Certificate accompanied by a
Certificate For prior to attaining Medical Certificate
Renewal Of the age of 40 [Second Proviso to
Licenses years. [Second S.15(1)]
Proviso to
S.15(1)]
592 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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(vi) Self- Rule 5 Requirement of Requirement Of
Declaration Self Declaration as Medical Certificate by
Of Fitness to Physical Fitness. a Registered Medical
Or Medical [Rule 5(1)] Practitioner. [Rule
Certificate For 5(1)]
License

Driving Certificates

(vii) Requirement Sec. 9(4) No requirement of Application for grant
Of Obtaining obtaining Driving of License Must be
Driving Certificate from a accompanied by a
Certificate Driving School. Driving Certificate
from a Driving Issued By a School or
School for Establishment referred
Obtaining to in S.12 of M.V. Act.
Driving [S.9(4)]
License

(viii) Addition Rule 17(1) No such Application for
to Driving (b) requirement Addition of Transport
License to Vehicle shall be
be supported accompanied by a
by Driving Driving Certificate in
Certificate Form 5 of the Rules.
[Rule 17(1)(b)]

Separate Vehicle / Separate License

(ix) Necessity for Sec. 66 No requirement of Permit from the
Permits a Permit. Regional, or State
Transport Authority
is required to use a
vehicle as Transport
Vehicle.

(x) Necessity Sec. 3 Effective License Driving License must
for Driving holder may drive. specifically entitle the
License Driver to drive the
Transport Vehicle.

(xi) Separate Sec.10(2) Section 10(2) Section 10(2)(e) –
Class of (d) – Light Motor Transport Vehicle.
Vehicles Vehicle.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 593

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

Validity of Driving License
(xii) Validity Sec. 14 Valid for – [S.14(2) Valid for 5 years
of Driving (b)]
[S.14(2)(a)]
License.
(i) Who has not
attained 30 years
of age on the date
of issue / renewal
– Valid till such
person attains
40 years of age;
(ii) Who has
attained 30 years,
but not attained 50
yrs. of age – Valid
for 10 years;
(iii) Who has
attained 50 years,
but not attained
55 yrs. of age
– Valid till such
person attains 60
years of age;
(iv)Who has
attained 55 years –
Valid for 5 years.
Other Differentiating Factors
(xiii) Requirement Sec. 28 No such State Govt. may make
of Uniform and requirement Rules prescribing
Badges Badges and Uniform
to be worn by Drivers
of Transport Vehicles.
[S.28(2)(d)]
(xiv) Duties, Sec. 28 No such State Govt. may make
Functions and requirement Rules prescribing
Conduct Duties and Conduct of
such persons to whom
license is issued
to drive Transport
Vehicles. [S.28(2)(h)]
(xv) Syllabus for Rule 31 Syllabus Part A, Syllabus Part E, F, G,
obtaining B, C, F, G and K H, I, J and K [Rule
License [Rule 31(2)] 31(3)]
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47. Analysis of the above provisions is now apposite. Chapter II addresses
‘Licensing of Drivers of Motor Vehicles’. We have already noticed
Section 3 earlier that covers the ‘Necessity for Driving License’ and
specifically mentions ‘Transport Vehicle’. Section 4, in sequence, is
titled ‘Age limit in connection with driving of motor vehicles’. Section 18
referred to in Section 4(2) concerns ‘Driving Licenses to drive motor
vehicles, belonging to the Central Government’. Section 4(2) in its
current form reads as under:
“(1) No person under the age of eighteen years shall drive
a motor vehicle in any public place:
Provided that [a motor cycle with engine capacity not
exceeding 50cc] may be driven in a public place by a
person after attaining the age of sixteen years.
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 18, no person under
the age of twenty years shall drive a transport vehicle
in any public place.
(3) No learners licence or driving licence shall be issued
to any person to drive a vehicle of the class to which he
has made an application unless he is eligible to drive that
class of vehicle under this section.”
[emphasis supplied]
48. Section 5 deals with the ‘Responsibility of owners of motor vehicles
for contravention of Section 3 and 4’ and declares that:
“No owner or person in charge of a motor vehicle shall
cause or permit any person who does not satisfy the
provisions of section 3 or section 4 to drive the vehicle.”
49. At this stage, we must also note the penal provisions i.e. Section 180
and Section 181 of Chapter XIII which deals with ‘Offences, Penalties
and Procedure’:
“180. Allowing unauthorised persons to drive vehicles.—
Whenever, being the owner or person in charge of a
motor vehicle, causes, or permits, any other person who
does not satisfy the provisions of section 3 or section 4
to drive the vehicle shall be punishable with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 595

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

“181. Driving vehicles in contravention of section 3
or section 4.—Whoever, drives a motor vehicle in
contravention of section 3 or section 4 shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three
months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred
rupees, or with both.”
50. Section 6 deals with ‘Restrictions on the holding of driving licenses’
and imposes, inter alia, general restrictions to prevent individuals
from allowing others to use their driving license. Section 7(1) is
important and provides that a Learner’s license for a transport
vehicle can only be issued to a person who has held a driving
license for a Light Motor Vehicle for atleast one year. The amended
section reads as under:
“7. Restrictions on the granting of learner’s licences for
certain vehicles.—
[(1) No person shall be granted a learner’s licence to drive
a transport vehicle unless he has held a driving licence
to drive a light motor vehicle for at least one year:]
[Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall
apply to an e-cart or e-rickshaw.]
(2) No person under the age of eighteen years shall be
granted a learner’s licence to drive a motor cycle without
gear except with the consent in writing of the person having
the care of the person desiring the learner’s licence.”
[emphasis supplied]
51. Section 8 deals with the ‘Grant of Learner’s license’. The requirement
of medical certificate is contained in Section 8(3), Section 15 and
Rule 5 of the MV Rules. Sub-section (3) of Section 8 as amended
mandates that an application for a Learner’s License for a Transport
Vehicle must be accompanied by a Medical Certificate by a registered
medical practitioner. However, the unamended Section 8 did not
mention ‘Transport Vehicle’:
“—8(1) Any person who is not disqualified under section 4
for driving a motor vehicle and who is not for the time being
disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence may,
subject to the provisions of section 7, apply to the licensing
authority having jurisdiction in the area—
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(i) in which he ordinarily resides or carries on business,
or (ii) in which the school or establishment referred to in
section 12 from where he intends to receive instruction
in driving a motor vehicle is situate, for the issue to him
of a learner’s licence.
(2) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be in such
form and shall be accompanied by such documents and with
such fee as may be prescribed by the Central Government.
(3) Every application under sub-section (1) shall be
accompanied by a medical certificate in such form as
may be prescribed by the Central Government and signed
by such registered medical practitioner, as the State
Government or any person authorised in this behalf by
the State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, appoint for this purpose:
XX]”
52. The amended 8(3) reads as under:
(3) Every application [to drive a transport vehicle
made] under sub-section (1) shall be accompanied by a
medical certificate in such form as may be prescribed by
the Central Government and signed by such registered
medical practitioner, as the State Government or any
person authorised in this behalf by the State Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint for this
purpose:”
[emphasis supplied]
53. Rule 5(1) of the amended MV Rules titled ‘Medical Certificate’
reiterates such a requirement. While for other vehicles, there is a
requirement of a self-declaration of fitness, a Medical certificate by
a registered Medical practitioner is necessary for driving a ‘Transport
Vehicle’. The unamended Rule 5 which does not mention ‘Transport
Vehicle’ reads as under:
“5. “Medical Certificate- Every application for the issue of a
learner’s licence or a driving licence or for making addition
of another class or description of motor vehicle to a driving
licence or for renewal of learner license or a driving license,
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 597

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

shall be accompanied by a medical certificate in Form 1
issued by a registered medical practitioner referred to in
sub-section (3) of section 8””
54. The amended Rule 5 is also extracted below:
“5. Medical Certificate- Every application for the issue of a
learner’s licence or a driving licence or for making addition
of another class or description of a motor vehicle to a driving
licence or for renewal of a driving licence to drive a vehicle
other than a transport vehicle shall be accompanied by a
self-declaration as to the physical fitness as in Form 1 and
every such application for a licence to drive a transport
vehicle shall be accompanied by a medical certificate
in Form 1-A issued by a registered medical practitioner
referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8”
[emphasis supplied]
55. Section 15 titled ‘Renewal of driving licenses’, outlines the
requirements for renewal within the time period provided therein.
The second proviso to Section 15(1), mandates the requirement
of a medical certificate for ‘Transport Vehicle’ and for those who
are above the age of 40 years. The second proviso therein reads
as under:
“Provided further that where the application is for the
renewal of a licence to drive a transport vehicle or where
in any other case the applicant has attained the age of
forty years, the same shall be accompanied by a medical
certificate in the same form and in the same manner
as is referred to in sub-section (3) of section 8, and the
provisions of sub-section (4) of section 8 shall, so far as
may be, apply in relation to every such case as they apply
in relation to a learner’s licence.”
[emphasis supplied]
56. Section 9 titled ‘Grant of driving license’ provides a comprehensive
procedure for granting driving licenses. Section 9(1) addresses the
jurisdiction involved in the licensing process. Under Section 9(2),
anyone not disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving license
may apply, using a form prescribed by the Central Government.
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The applicant must also pass a test as specified in Section 9(3).
Additionally, for those seeking a Transport Vehicle license,
Section 9(4) mandates a minimum educational qualification set by
the Central Government. Section 9(5) pertains to the requirement for
re-taking the test after 7 days. Meanwhile, 9(6) states that the test of
competence to drive must be carried out in a vehicle of the type to
which the application refers. Section 9(7) deals with disqualification
and Section 9(8) provides, inter alia, that the licensing authority may
refuse to issue a licence to a habitual criminal or a habitual drunkard
or who is habitually addicted to any narcotic drug or psychotropic
substance or whose license had been revoked earlier. Section 9(4)
which is relevant for our purpose is extracted below:
“(4) Where the application is for a licence to drive a
transport vehicle, no such authorisation shall be granted
to any applicant unless he possesses such minimum
educational qualification as may be prescribed by the
Central Government and a driving certificate issued by a
school or establishment referred to in section 12.”
[emphasis supplied]
57. Rule 17(1)(b) of the MV Rules stipulates that any application for
adding a class of “Transport Vehicle” to a Driving License must be
accompanied by a Driving Certificate:
“17. Addition to driving licence.—(1) An application
for the addition of another class or description of motor
vehicle to the driving licence shall be made in [Form
2] to the licensing authority and shall be accompanied
by— (a) an effective learner’s licence and driving licence
held by the applicant;
(b) the driving certificate in Form 5, in the case of an
application for addition of a transport vehicle, excluding
E-rickshaw or E-cart.”
[emphasis supplied]
58. Section 14 of the Motor Vehicles Act outlines the validity period of
driving licenses, distinguishing between those for ‘transport vehicles’
and ‘transport vehicles carrying goods,’ while also considering the age
of the license holder. According to the amended section, individuals
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 599

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

under 30 years of age will have their license valid until they reach
40 years, while those aged 30 to 49 will enjoy a 10-year validity
period. For individuals aged 50 to 54, the license remains valid until
they turn 60, and for those aged 55 and older, the validity is set
at 5 years. This framework reflects the understanding that driving
capabilities and experience may vary with age. The relevant part of
Section 14 is extracted below:
“14. Currency of licences to drive motor vehicles.—
(1) A learner’s licence issued under this Act shall, subject
to the other provisions of this Act, be effective for a period
of six months from the date of issue of the licence.
(2) A driving licence issued or renewed under this Act
shall,— (a) in the case of a licence to drive a transport
vehicle, be effective for a period of three years: 1 *** 2
[Provided that in the case of licence to drive a transport
vehicle carrying goods of dangerous or hazardous
nature be effective for a period of one year and renewal
thereof shall be subject to the condition that the driver
undergoes one day refresher course of the prescribed
syllabus; and;]
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”
[emphasis supplied]
59. Rule 10 is titled ‘Application for Learner’s license’. The unamended
Rule 10 stated as under:
“10. Application for learner’s licence.—
An application for the grant of a learner’s licence shall be
made in Form 2 and shall be accompanied by,—
(a) save as otherwise provided in rule 6, a medical
certificate in [Form 1-A].
(b) three copies of the applicant’s recent 28 [passport
size photograph],
(c) appropriate fee as specified in rule 32,
[(d) in the case of an application for medium goods
vehicle, a medium passenger motor vehicle, a heavy
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goods vehicle or a heavy passenger vehicle, the driving
license held by the applicant.”
[emphasis supplied]
60. The amended Rule 10 replaces these highlighted terms with the
single term ‘Transport Vehicle’:
10. Application for learner’s licence.—
An application for the grant of a learner’s licence shall be
made in Form 2 and shall be accompanied by,—
(a) save as otherwise provided in rule 6, a medical
certificate in [Form 1-A].
(b) three copies of the applicant’s recent 28 [passport
size photograph],
(c) appropriate fee as specified in rule 32,
[(d) in the case of an application for transport vehicle
excluding E-rickshaw or E-Cart, the driving licence held
by the applicant]
[(e) proof of residence
(f) proof of age”
[emphasis supplied]
61. Section 27 concerns the power of Central Government to make Rules.
Section 28 which deals with the power of the State Government
to make rules provides specifically w.r.t. transport vehicles in
sub-section 2(d) and 2(h) the following :-
“(d) the badges and uniform to be worn by drivers of
transport vehicles and the fees to be paid in respect of
badges”
(h) the duties, functions and conduct of such persons to
whom licences to drive transport vehicles are issued
[emphasis supplied]
62. Rule 31(2) and (3) which deal with the syllabus provides as under:
31. Syllabus for imparting instructions, in driving of motor
vehicles.—
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 601

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

(1) The syllabus for imparting instructions in driving of
motor vehicles of the schools or establishments shall be
as follows (see tables below):
[(2) The lessons for training drivers of non-transport
vehicles shall cover Parts A, B, C, F, G and K of the
syllabus referred to in sub-rule (1) and the training period
shall not be less than twenty-one days: Provided that in
case of motorcycles, it shall be sufficient compliance of
the provisions, if portion of Part C of syllabus as applicable
to such vehicles are covered.
(3) The lessons for training drivers of transport vehicles
shall cover Parts E, F, G, H, I, J and K of the syllabus
referred to in sub-rule (1) and the training period shall not
be less than thirty days”
[emphasis supplied]
63. Chapter V of the MV Act specifically deals with ‘Control of Transport
Vehicles’. Section 66 deals with ‘Necessity for Permits’ and prohibits
an owner of a motor vehicle to use or to permit the use of the motor
vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place save in accordance
with the conditions of permit, granted by an appropriate authority:
“66. Necessity for permits.—(1) No owner of a motor
vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a
transport vehicle in any public place whether or not such
vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save
in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or
countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority
or any prescribed authority authorising him the use of the
vehicle in that place in the manner in which the vehicle
is being used:…”
[emphasis supplied]
64. The necessity for a permit and the need for driving license are two
different requirements and the distinctions thereof must be borne
in mind.
65. The aforenoted provisions are pressed into service to contend that the
legislature has placed LMVs and Transport Vehicles under separate
classes. For each class of vehicle, varying degrees of scrutiny are
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provided and the argument on behalf of Insurance Companies is
that the holder of a LMV license is disentitled to drive a Transport
Vehicle and a separate endorsement would be necessary for driving
a vehicle of the other class.
66. Reading the various provisions as noticed above appears to pull
the reader into two distinct spheres and this might make the legal
implications unworkable. The principle of harmonious constructions
of statutes should guide us to unravel this vexed question.
(a) Harmonious Construction
67. In Sultana Begum v. Prem Chand Jain,32 this Court examined the
relevant precedents of this Court and articulated the following
principles on harmonious construction of statutes:
"a. It is the duty of the courts to avoid a head-on clash
between two sections of the Act and to construe the
provisions which appear to be in conflict with each
other in such a manner as to harmonise them;
b. The provisions of one section of a statute cannot be
used to defeat the other provisions unless the court,
in spite of its efforts, finds it impossible to effect
reconciliation between them;
c. When there are two conflicting provisions in an Act,
which cannot be reconciled with each other, they
should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect should
be given to both. This is the essence of the rule of
harmonious construction;
d. The courts have also to keep in mind that an
interpretation which reduces one of the provisions to
a “dead letter” or “useless lumber” is not harmonious
construction; and
e. To harmonize is not to destroy any statutory provision
or to render it otiose.”
[emphasis supplied]

32 [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 707 : (1997) 1 SCC 373
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 603

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

68. Keeping the above principles in mind, let us proceed further. The
relevant provisions of the MV Act and the MV Rules would show
that the term ‘Transport Vehicle’ is frequently referenced in various
Sections and Rules. Most of these provisions were not noticed in
Mukund Dewangan (2017). It is true that the legislature has imposed
additional requirements for ‘Transport Vehicles’. But should it be
enough to say that a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ license holder is legally
incapable of driving a transport vehicle although its gross vehicle
weight is below 7500 kg, as is suggested by the counsel for the
insurance companies? In our view, such a manner of interpretation
would render superfluous and otiose the precise and compact
definition of LMV given in Section 2(21) which so significantly
uses the expression ‘means’. When questions on the relevance of
Section 2(21) was raised, the following points were made:-
(a) Section 2(21) which includes Transport Vehicles is for a different
regime, set under Section 113 which places limitation both on
weight and usage of the vehicle. Section 115 empowers the
authority to restrict the driving of any vehicle of a specified class
or description. These sections are contained in Chapter VII which
is titled ‘Control of Traffic’ and pertain to ‘limits of weight and
limitations on use’ and ‘power to restrict the use of vehicles’.
Vehicles of specific weight may be prohibited from certain
roads or areas making weight a relevant factor. Under the
said definition of LMV, ‘weight’ has been kept as a factor for
demarcation between ‘LMV’ and ‘Transport’ vehicles primarily
for the purposes of determining the ‘road tax’.
(b) Section 41(4) outlines the necessity of specifying the exact
type of vehicle—including its design, construction, and intended
use—during the registration process. It was contended that this
is where weight becomes a critical factor.
(c) Weight is considered in Section 44(ae) of the Income Tax
Act 1961, which concerns incomes derived from transport
vehicles.
69. The above submissions which mention the weight of the vehicle
are in different context and can’t be used to render section 2(21)
i.e. the definition, a dead letter. If the definition clause was worded
differently, one might possibly argue that a distinction could be made
between Transport Vehicles and LMVs. But the use of the word
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‘means’, points towards the categorical intent of the legislature. When
a Court is faced with two interpretations, one of which would have
the effect of rendering a provision a ‘dead letter’, the interpretation
that allows for such violence to the key words in the statute must
be avoided. An attempt at harmonization would therefore be in
order. Let us analyse the issue further by considering the following
overlapping diagram:

70. The above illustration indicates that all Transport Vehicles are not
Light Motor Vehicles but some may fall within the class of LMVs
which is represented by the overlapping section. The inference
therefore is that if the transport vehicle falls under the definition of
Light Motor Vehicle in Section 2(21), the additional requirements as
outlined in the provisions noticed above, need not be satisfied by
a person holding a driving licence for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class.
Consequently, a separate endorsement of a Transport Vehicle is
not necessary as the LMV license would suffice for vehicles below
7500 kg weight. Such an interpretation would harmonize the statutory
provisions by requiring the additional factors only for those Transport
vehicles whose gross weight exceeds 7500 kg.
71. It was additionally argued that the principle of generalia specialibus
non derogant would apply in this case. Section 2(21) is a
general provision defining a Light Motor Vehicle which includes a
‘Transport Vehicle,’ whereas Section 3 is a specific provision that
prohibits driving a ‘transport vehicle’ without a separate license
endorsement. According to Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Section 3 should
take precedence, requiring a separate endorsement under the
‘Transport Vehicle’ class.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 605

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

72. To address the argument, let us consider the following passage by
Lord Herschell LC in Institute of Patent Agents & Ors. v. Joseph
Lockwood33 :
“Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections
to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile
them as best you may. If you cannot, you have to determine
which is the leading provision and which the subordinate
provision, and which must give way to the other.”
73. The important thing to note is that one provision must give way to
the other only when reconciliation is not possible. However, when
it is possible to harmonize the two, the Court need not determine
which is the leading provision. As regards the argument of rendering
second part of Section 3(1) otiose, let us again notice Section 3:
“3. Necessity for driving licence.—(1) No person shall
drive a motor vehicle in any public place unless he holds
an effective driving licence issued to him authorising
him to drive the vehicle; and no person shall so drive a
transport vehicle (other than a motor cab or motorcycle
hired for his own use or rented under any scheme made
under sub-section (2) of Section 75) unless his driving
licence specifically entitles him so to do.”
[emphasis supplied]
74. Section 3 refers to ‘Transport Vehicles’, like many other provisions
in the MV Act and the MV Rules. Section 3 cannot however be
construed as a special provision that would override the strict and
emphatic definition of LMV, given in Section 2(21) and the separate
class of ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ provided in Section 10. Section 2(21)
uses the term ‘means’ as earlier emphasized and there is an
affirmation of certainty in the wordings of the definition and it is to
be recognized sensu stricto in a technical sense and must not be
understood loosely. To say that Section 3 would disentitle the LMV
license holders to drive transport vehicles of the permissible weight
category, would be incompatible and would render the strict definition
clause, sterile and a ‘dead letter’. A harmonious construction of

33 1894 A.C. 347 at 360
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both sections can however reach us to a conclusion that for LMV
licence holders, a separate endorsement under ‘Transport Vehicle’
class would be unnecessary for driving LMV class of vehicles. In
our interpretation and understanding, it would be logical to hold
that the additional licensing requirements will have no application
for the LMV class of vehicles but will be needed only for such
‘Transport Vehicles’, which by virtue of their gross weight fall in the
Medium and Heavy category. Such a construction would also fulfill
the legislative purpose which is to ensure road safety by requiring
only those individuals who intend to operate medium and heavy
vehicles, to satisfy the additional licensing criteria. In our view, the
age restrictions outlined in Section 4, the requirement of a medical
certificate, and the criteria under Section 7 should reasonably apply
only for the medium and heavy transport vehicles whose gross
weight will be above 7500 Kg. Such an interpretation would fulfill
the objective of the MV Act to provide compensation to victims of
road accidents while maintaining a commensurate licensing regime
for drivers.
75. At this stage, it needs to be borne in mind that the genesis of the
present reference arises from compensation claims. A reference to
the judgment in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh34 may
therefore be apposite. A 3-judge bench of this Court noted that the
liability of the insurance company in relation to the owner depends
on several factors. The issue of lack of valid driving license was
discussed as under:
“7. If a person has been given a licence for a particular
type of vehicle as specified therein, he cannot be said to
have no licence for driving another type of vehicle which is
of the same category but of different type. As for example,
when a person is granted a licence for driving a light motor
vehicle, he can drive either a car or a jeep and it is not
necessary that he must have driving licence both for car
and jeep separately.
89. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver
to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle

34 [2004] 1 SCR 180 : (2004) 3 SCC 297
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 607

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables
the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving
licences for various categories of vehicles mentioned in
sub-section (2) of the said section. The various types
of vehicles described for which a driver may obtain a
licence for one or more of them are: (a) motorcycle
without gear, (b) motorcycle with gear, (c) invalid carriage,
(d) light motor vehicle, (e) transport vehicle, (f) road roller,
and (g) motor vehicle of other specified description. The
definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various
categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types
mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10. They are
“goods carriage”, “heavy goods vehicle”, “heavy passenger
motor vehicle”, “invalid carriage”, “light motor vehicle”,
“maxi-cab”, “medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger
motor vehicle”, “motor-cab”, “motorcycle”, “omnibus”,
“private service vehicle”, “semi-trailer”, “tourist vehicle”,
“tractor”, “trailer” and “transport vehicle”. In claims for
compensation for accidents, various kinds of breaches
with regard to the conditions of driving licences arise for
consideration before the Tribunal as a person possessing
a driving licence for “motorcycle without gear”, [sic may be
driving a vehicle] for which he has no licence. Cases may
also arise where a holder of driving licence for “light motor
vehicle” is found to be driving a “maxi-cab”, “motor-cab”
or “omnibus” for which he has no licence. In each case,
on evidence led before the Tribunal, a decision has to be
taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence
for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of
vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident.
If on facts, it is found that the accident was caused solely
because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes
like mechanical failures and similar other causes having
no nexus with the driver not possessing requisite type
of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid
its liability merely for technical breach of conditions
concerning driving licence.
90. We have construed and determined the scope of
sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act.
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Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want
of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age
of the driver and the like not found to have been the
direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor
breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter
of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential
deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not
constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage
of insurance to the third parties.”
[emphasis supplied]
76. The upshot of the above is that compensation must not be denied for
minor technical breaches of the licensing conditions. It was submitted
before this Court that the decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is
per incuriam for not considering Para 89 of the judgment. It is true
that the Court pertinently notes therein that “Cases may also arise
where a holder of driving licence for “light motor vehicle” is found to
be driving a “maxi-cab”, “motor-cab” or “omnibus” for which he has
no licence.” However, such an observation cannot be considered a
conclusive determination by the Court to hold that a separate license
for each of these vehicles would be necessary. Therefore, we are
disinclined to accept such an argument.
b) Interpretation must not result in impractical outcomes
77. It is well-settled that a statute should be interpreted in a manner that
avoids leading to unworkable or impractical outcomes.35 If a statutory
interpretation results in confusion, impracticability or creates burden
that the legislature could not have intended, such an interpretation
should be avoided. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Learned Senior Counsel,
placed reliance on Section 9(6) of MV Act and Rule 15(2) of MV
Rules to argue that if one wants an endorsement of a ‘transport
vehicle’ class, the person has to be tested on a ‘transport vehicle’
and not a ‘Maruti-800 car’. Let us test this argument by again taking
the hypothetical example of Sri who holds an LMV license and is
desirous of operating an auto for commercial purposes and as
such applies separately for a license of a ‘Transport Vehicle’ class.

35 Madan and Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1989) 1 SCC 264
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 609

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

Crucially, Section 9 dealing with ‘Grant of driving license’ provides
in sub-section (6) as under:
“(6) The test of competence to drive shall be carried out
in a vehicle of the type to which the application refers:”
78. Sub-section (2) of Rule 15 of MV Rules titled ‘Driving Test’ read thus:
“(2) The test of competence to drive referred to in sub-
section (3) of section 9 shall be conducted by the licensing
authority or such other person as may be authorised in
this behalf by the State Government in a vehicle of the
type to which the application relates.”
79. The type of the vehicle referred above, under the ‘Transport Vehicle’
class could therefore either be a three-wheeler weighing less than
7,500 kgs or a heavy passenger vehicle of more than 12,000 kgs,
if the class for which Sri applied is broadly taken as a ‘transport
Vehicle’, with no distinction between heavy, medium or light category.
Then our hypothetical driver Sri, although will be tested to drive an
‘auto’, could end up driving a heavy passenger vehicle using the
‘Transport Vehicle’ license. Such a conclusion on valid authority
would be incompatible in the context.
80. Let us also look at the syllabus that would be prescribed for Sri for
his application to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. As noted earlier, for
‘Transport Vehicles’, the syllabus as per Rule 31 is contained in Part
E, F, G, H, I, J and K:
Part A: Driving Theory-I
Part B: Traffic Education-I
Part C: Light Vehicles Driving Practice
Part D: Vehicle Mechanism and Repairs
Part E: Medium and Heavy Vehicle Driving: Driving Theory-II
Part F: Traffic Education—II
Part G. Public Relations For Drivers
Part H. Heavy Vehicle Driving Practice
Part I. Fire Hazards
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Part J. Vehicle Maintenance
Part K. First Aid
the syllabus is contained in Part E, F, G, H, I, J and K:
81. Our hypothetical Sri, who wants to drive an auto would then be
imparted training for the syllabus outlined in Parts E, F, G, H, I,
J & K. These parts primarily pertain to ‘Medium and Heavy Vehicle
Driving’. The extensive syllabus covers topics such as fire hazards,
heavy vehicle maintenance, cross-country practice and hill driving
but those would hardly be germane for Sri who is desirous of driving
only an auto rickshaw falling within the Light Motor Vehicle class.
The legislature in its wisdom had stipulated such a wide-ranging
syllabus to augment the safety measures as considered apposite for
operating medium and heavy motor vehicles. To apply this extensive
level of learning for the auto driver Sri, would defy logic although
auto is a ‘transport vehicle’ but of a light weight class. To avoid
such an illogical outcome, the argument of Mr. Bhushan has to be
rejected. It would therefore be appropriate to interpret the provision
to declare that the additional requirements outlined in the MV Act
for ‘Transport Vehicle’, would not cover the LMV class but would
be applicable only for the heavy and medium class vehicles. Such
an interpretation would align with our harmonious interpretation, as
explained earlier. If the alternate interpretation as suggested by the
counsel for the insurance companies is accepted, it would mean that
Sri’s driving skills may be tested on an autorickshaw but he would
also be legally entitled to drive a heavy multi axle truck because of
the broad class of ‘Transport Vehicle’. Such an absurd result should
not be permitted.
82. The requirement of uniforms and badges for ‘transport vehicle’ and
the duties and conduct of such persons under Section 28(2)(d)
and 28(2)(h) are not directly related to the licensing regime. Similarly
misplaced here is the reliance on necessity for Permit under
Section 66 as also Rule 62 dealing with the ‘Certificate of Fitness’
of the vehicle. Rule 62 is extracted:-
“62. Validity of certificate of fitness.—(1) A certificate of
fitness in respect of a transport vehicle granted under
section 56 shall be in Form 38 and such certificate
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 611

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

when granted or renewed shall be valid for the period
as indicated below:—

(a) new transport vehicle Two years
(b) renewal of certificate of One year
fitness in respect of vehicles
mentioned in {a) above
[(ba) renewal of certificate of Three years
fitness in respect of E-rickshaw
and E-cart
renewal of certificate of fitness One year
in respect of vehicles covered
under rule 82 of these rules
d ) f r e s h r e g i s t r a t i o n o f same period as in the case
important vehicles of vehicles manufactured in
India having regard to the
date of manufacture:
[emphasis supplied]

83. The apprehension about a person with a license of a light motor
vehicle class being able to drive an e-rickshaw, e-cart, a vehicle
carrying hazardous goods or even a road roller is also misplaced.
This is for the reason that legislature has carved out exceptions for
these special kinds of vehicles in the MV Act and the MV Rules
which is discernible from the following:.
(i) Section 28 deals with the power of State Government to make
Rules. Clause (h) provides for “the exemption of drivers of road
rollers from all or any of the provisions of this Chapter or of
the rules made thereunder”
(ii) An exception is carved out in Section 7, 9 and 27 of MV Act
for e-cart or e-rickshaw. For instance, the proviso to Section 7
states that “Provided that nothing contained in this section shall
apply to an e-cart or e-rickshaw”.
(iii) Similarly, Rule 8A provides for minimum training for driving
E-rickshaw or E-cart. Rule 9 provides for educational qualifications
for drivers of goods carriage carrying dangerous or hazardous
goods.
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Therefore, the present interpretation will not have any impact for
such vehicles.
84. It was also argued that the form of the driving license provides for
the validity period for ‘Transport’ and ‘Non Transport Vehicle’. On
this contention, we can benefit by the following words of Justice O.
Chinnappa Reddy in Life Insurance Corporation v. Escorts,36 where
for a similar insistence on form, the Judge opined as under:-
“Surely, the Form cannot control the Act, the Rules or the
directions. As one learned Judge of the Madras High Court
was fond of saying it is the dog that wags the tail and not
the tail that wags the dog. We may add what this Court
had occasion to say in Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v.
Pranlal Jayanand Thakar [(1975) 1 S.C.R. 534 : AIR 1974
SC 1728 : 1974 (2) SCC 323 : 1975 (45) Com. Cas. 43.] :
“The subservience of substance of a transaction to
some rigidly prescribed form required to be meticulously
observed, sevours of archaic and outmoded jurisprudence.”
85. A harmonious interpretation of various sections would lead us to
conclude that a person holding a LMV license is equally competent
to drive a Transport Vehicle, provided of course the vehicle’s gross
weight does not exceed 7,500 kgs. The reference to ‘transport
vehicle’ in Section 3(1) and other sections of the Act and Rules
should therefore be understood as applying to only those vehicles
which fall beyond the scope of the sensu stricto definition, under
Section 2(21). This interpretation would ensure that no provision or
word is rendered otiose and the licensing regime remains coherent
with the legislative intent. Such an interpretation would also avoid
illogical outcomes as discussed above.
V. Discussion on the 8 Conflicting decisions
86. The legal landscape surrounding the issue of whether a driver
holding a license for a ‘Light motor vehicle’ can operate a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ without obtaining a specific endorsement has been marked
by a myriad of conflicting judgments. The genesis of the present
reference stems from eight conflicting decisions which were thereafter

36 [1985] Supp. 3 SCR 909 : (1986) 2 SCC 264
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 613

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

referred to a 3-judge bench in Mukund Dewangan (2017). On the
issue of Transport Vehicles of the LMV class being driven by a
driver with a LMV License, in the event of an accident involving an
insured vehicle, some opinions have held the insurance company
liable to pay compensation while few others have noted that the
driver did not have a valid license for a ‘transport vehicle’ although
he was possessing a LMV license. On a few occasions, this Court
had exercised its power under Article 142 to grant compensation
despite noting that the driver did not possess a valid ‘transport
vehicle’ license. Before proceeding any further, a short discussion
of these decisions in chronological order would be appropriate for
aiding clarity to the discussion.
87. The earliest decision on the issue was in 1999, in Ashok Gangadhar
Maratha v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd.37 (for short “Ashok Gangadhar
Maratha”). The definition of LMV at that time stipulated a weight
limit of 6000 kgs. The facts in that case was that the appellant
who was the holder of a LMV license, owned a Swaraj Mazda
truck weighing 5,920 kgs, which got damaged in an accident on
26.11.1991. When the insurer refuted the claim, questioning the
validity of the LMV driving license, the appellant filed a complaint
before the Consumer Forum. The case traveled to the Supreme
Court where a two-judge bench of this Court pertinently observed
that a holder of a LMV license can drive a ‘transport vehicle’, without
a specific endorsement and accordingly, compensation was granted
to the claimants. The Supreme Court, inter alia, gave an important
interpretation to Section 2(21) of the MV Act as well as Rule 2(e) of
the MV Rules which defines a “non-transport vehicle”. In Para 10,
the Court pertinently observed as under:
“10. The definition of “light motor vehicle” as given in
clause (21) of Section 2 of the Act can apply only to a
“light goods vehicle” or a “light transport vehicle”. A “light
motor vehicle” otherwise has to be covered by the definition
of “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” as given in clause (28) of
Section 2 of the Act. A light motor vehicle cannot always
mean a light goods carriage. Light motor vehicle can be
a non-transport vehicle as well.”

37 [1999] Supp. 2 SCR 202 : (1999) 6 SCC 620
614 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

88. The Court supplemented its reasoning in Para 11 as under:
“11. To reiterate, since a vehicle cannot be used as a
transport vehicle on a public road unless there is a permit
issued by the Regional Transport Authority for that purpose
and since in the instant case there is neither a pleading to
that effect by any party nor is there any permit on record,
the vehicle in question would remain a light motor vehicle.
The respondent also does not say that any permit was
granted to the appellant for plying the vehicle as a transport
vehicle under Section 66 of the Act. Moreover, on the date
of the accident, the vehicle was not carrying any goods
and though it could be said to have been designed to be
used as a transport vehicle or a goods carrier, it cannot be
so held on account of the statutory prohibition contained
in Section 66 of the Act.”
89. The Court additionally noted that if one accepts the contention of
the insurer, “there can never be any light motor vehicle and there
can never be any driving licence for driving a light motor vehicle. We
cannot put such a construction on clause (21) of Section 2 of the
Act so as to exclude a light motor vehicle from the Act altogether.”
89.1. Looking at the scheme of the MV Act, the above conclusion
was the correct one declaring that an LMV would include a
‘light good vehicle’ or a ‘light transport vehicle’. While the Court
supplemented its reasoning by stating that a vehicle cannot
be used as a transport vehicle on a public road unless there
is a permit, we must understand that a ‘license’ is different
from a ‘permit’. The observations of the Court on the legal
issue of a driving license, aligns with our own interpretation.
90. In Nagashetty v. United India Insurance Co,38 the vehicle involved
was a tractor with a trailer attached, filled with stones. The case
revolved around an accident that occurred on 4.12.1995, when
a tractor driven by the driver lost control and hit two pedestrians,
resulting in the death of one person. The LRs of the deceased filed
a compensation claim before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal
(MACT), which ruled in their favor and awarded compensation
of ₹2,07,000 making the Insurance company liable for the insured

38 [2001] Supp. 1 SCR 656 : (2001) 8 SCC 56
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 615

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

tractor. The Insurance Company appealed before the High Court,
contending that the driver only had a licence to operate a tractor and
not a ‘goods vehicle’, as a trailer filled with stones was attached to
the tractor, classifying it as a ‘transport vehicle’. Deciding in favour
of the Insurance Company, the High Court held that the licence was
invalid for driving a ‘transport vehicle’, and therefore, the Insurance
Company was not liable to pay the compensation to the claimants.
90.1. Setting aside the decision of the High Court, the Supreme
Court held that a person having a valid driving license to drive
a particular category of vehicle, does not become unauthorised
to drive that category of vehicle, merely because a trailer is
attached to it. Interpreting the terms of the Insurance Policy,
it was held that if the submission of the Insurance Co. is
accepted, then every time, an owner of a private car, who
has a license to drive an LMV, attaches a roof carrier to his
car, and carries goods thereon, the LMV would become a
Transport Vehicle, and the owner would then be deemed to
have no valid license, to drive that vehicle.
90.2. It was rightly held in the above decision and as noted in Mukund
Dewangan (2017), that a vehicle cannot be readily classified
as a ‘transport vehicle’ requiring a separate endorsement in
the driving license. Although the Court supported its reasoning
by referencing the insurance policy terms, the legal position
remains that the term ‘transport vehicle’ overlaps with other
vehicle classes.
91. Before this Court, reliance was placed on the judgment in New India
Assurance Company v. Prabhu Lal39(for short “Prabhu Lal”). The
decision would now require our careful consideration. In this case,
the accident which occurred on 17.4.1998 involved a Roadways
bus (weighing 4,100 kgs) which was being driven by one M. This
was however disputed by the insurance company who claimed that
the vehicle was driven by the complainant’s own brother, who held
a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ license but not a ‘transport vehicle’ license.
The District Forum held that a “goods carrier” weighing 4,100 kgs
defined under Section 2(14) of the MV Act was driven by an individual
with a LMV license and hence this was a Transport Vehicle under

39 [2007] 12 SCR 724 : (2008) 1 SCC 696
616 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Section 2(47) of the MV Act for which, a separate endorsement was
necessary. The State Commission however held that the principle
laid down in the 1999 decision in Ashok Gangadhar (supra) would
apply and since the gross weight of the vehicle was only 6,800 kgs,
it did not exceed the permissible limits for LMV category vehicles.
Accordingly, the Insurance company was held liable. The National
Commission upheld the said decision of the State Commission,
favouring the claimants.
91.1. Reversing the concurrent decisions of the State and National
Commissions, the Supreme Court however restored the
decision of the District Forum which held that at the time of
the accident, complainant’s brother was driving the insured
vehicle. On the validity of the LMV driving license holder driving
the bus weighing 4100 kg, this Court held that a separate
endorsement was necessary to drive the Transport Vehicle.
It was observed as under:
“33. In our considered view, the State Commission
was wrong in reversing the finding recorded by the
District Forum. So far as Ashok Gangadhar [(1999)
6 SCC 620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] is concerned, we
will deal with the said decision little later but from the
documentary evidence on record and particularly,
from the permit issued by the Transport Authority, it
is amply clear that the vehicle was a “goods carrier”
[Section 2(14)]. If it is so, obviously, it was a “transport
vehicle” falling under Clause (47) of Section 2 of
the Act. The District Forum was, therefore, right in
considering the question of liability of the Insurance
Company on the basis that Tata 709 which met with
an accident was “transport vehicle”.
91.2. The Court in Para 40 and Para 41 also distinguished the
1999 judgement in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) with
the following discussion:
“40. It is no doubt true that in Ashok Gangadhar
[(1999) 6 SCC 620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] in spite
of the fact that the driver was holding valid driving
licence to ply light motor vehicle (LMV), this Court
upheld the claim and ordered the Insurance Company
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 617

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

to pay compensation. But, in our considered opinion,
the learned counsel for the Insurance Company is
right in submitting that it was because of the fact that
there was neither pleading nor proof as regards the
permit issued by the Transport Authority. In absence
of pleading and proof, this Court held that, it could
not be said that the driver had no valid licence to ply
the vehicle which met with an accident and he could
not be deprived of the compensation. This is clear
if one reads para 11 of the judgment, which reads
thus: (SCC p. 626)
“11. To reiterate, since a vehicle cannot
be used as a transport vehicle on a public
road unless there is a permit issued by
the Regional Transport Authority for that
purpose and since in the instant case there
is neither a pleading to that effect by any
party nor is there any permit on record,
the vehicle in question would remain a
light motor vehicle. The respondent also
does not say that any permit was granted
to the appellant for plying the vehicle as a
transport vehicle under Section 66 of the
Act. Moreover, on the date of the accident,
the vehicle was not carrying any goods
and though it could be said to have been
designed to be used as a transport vehicle
or a goods carrier, it cannot be so held
on account of the statutory prohibition
contained in Section 66 of the Act.”
41. In our judgment, Ashok Gangadhar [(1999) 6 SCC
620 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1170] did not lay down that the
driver holding licence to drive a light motor vehicle
need not have an endorsement to drive transport
vehicle and yet he can drive such vehicle. It was
on the peculiar facts of the case, as the Insurance
Company neither pleaded nor proved that the vehicle
was transport vehicle by placing on record the permit
issued by the Transport Authority that the Insurance
Company was held liable.”
618 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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91.3. In Prabhu Lal (supra), this Court correctly noted that the
vehicle was a ‘goods carrier’ under Section 2(14) and fell
within the definition of ‘transport vehicle’. But then it strikingly
overlooked that a ‘transport vehicle’ below 7500 kg unladen
weight, would also be covered within the definition of LMV,
under Section 2(21). This vital aspect was not discussed and
the definition of Section 2(21) was also not adverted to in the
judgment. The relevant portion of Ashok Gangadhar Maratha
(supra) where it was held that the definition of ‘light motor
vehicle’ can apply to ‘light goods vehicle’ as well as a ‘light
transport vehicle’, was also overlooked. Instead the Court
distinguished the judgment in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha
(supra) on the basis of evidence and pleadings in that case.
We have already noted earlier that the reasoning in Ashok
Gangadhar Maratha (supra) w.r.t evidence and pleadings was
only an additional observation. We must not confuse ‘permit’
with a ‘driving license’ to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle’. The
Supreme Court in Prabhu Lal (supra) should have followed
the decision in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) which
clearly stated the legal position that a ‘light motor vehicle’
would include a ‘light goods vehicle’.
92. The issue in Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra), as we have already
discussed in Part III of the judgment, was whether a driver of a
Matador van weighing 3,500 kgs, with a “goods carriage” permit,
could drive a “transport vehicle” with just a LMV license. The van met
with an accident before the 1994 amendments to the MV Act, when
there was no separate class for “transport vehicle.” The Court ruled
that since the accident occurred before the amendment, the driver’s
LMV license was valid for the transport vehicle, and the insurance
company was liable to pay compensation. However, the Court held
that post-amendment, a separate endorsement for driving transport
vehicles is required. We are disinclined to accept such a view as
we have already discussed in our judgment earlier that both before
and after the 1994 amendment, the enhanced requirements for
‘Transport Vehicles’ applied primarily for medium and heavy vehicles,
particularly following the 1994 amendment. We have also discussed
the unworkability of the broad class of ‘Transport Vehicles’ and the
inconsistency this creates with the other provisions of the MV Act
and MV Rules, if such an interpretation is adopted.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 619

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

93. In New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir40
(for short “Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir), the case involved an
autorickshaw, classified as a three-wheeled transport vehicle, used for
goods delivery. In this case, insurance company resisted the accident
claim and argued that the driver did not have a valid driving licence
for a ‘transport vehicle’. The Supreme Court however reversed the
decision of the Gujarat High Court and the MACT and noted that
under Section 14(2)(a) of the MV Act, the renewal period for Transport
Vehicle licences is three years, compared to twenty years for other
vehicle categories. Based on this reasoning, the Court held that the
driver was not authorised to drive the autorickshaw as he lacked the
appropriate endorsement on his LMV License.
93.1. The above faulty conclusion was reached primarily because the
Court failed to take into account Section 2(21), which defines a
Light Motor Vehicle (LMV). Since an autorickshaw falls within
the weight limit of an LMV, the driver’s LMV licence should have
been deemed sufficient. The presumption on account of the
validity of license for 20 years could be relevant only for such
vehicles which are covered within Medium or Heavy categories.
94. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Angad Kol41(for short “Angad Kol”),
the legal heirs of the deceased victim filed claim before the MACT,
alleging that the deceased was fatally injured by a mini door auto (a
goods carriage vehicle) on 31.10.2004 while she was standing at a
location known as ‘Hardi Turning’. The Insurance Company resisted
the claim by contending that the driver did not possess a valid and
effective licence to operate the vehicle. The Tribunal allowed the
claim and directed the payment of Rs. 1,83,000/- holding that the
driver’s Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) licence was sufficient. This view
was upheld by the High Court.
94.1. Setting aside the above decisions favouring the claim, a
two-judge bench of this Court held that the holder of a LMV
license must also obtain a separate endorsement for a transport
vehicle. It noted that the definition of LMV under Section 2(21)
of MV Act would bring within its umbrage a Transport Vehicle
but a distinction exists between the two as per Section 3 which

40 [2008] 8 SCR 328 : (2008) 8 SCC 253
41 [2009] 2 SCR 695 : (2009) 11 SCC 356
620 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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deals with the necessity of a driving license. It was thus noted
in Para 15 and 16 of the judgment:
“15. Section 9 provides for “grant of driving licence”.
Section 10 prescribes the form and contents of
licences to drive which is to the following effect:
“10. Form and contents of licences to drive.—
(1) Every learner’s licence and driving licence,
except a driving licence issued under Section
18, shall be in such form and shall contain such
information as may be prescribed by the Central
Government.
(2) A learner’s licence or, as the case may
be, driving licence shall also be expressed as
entitling the holder to drive a motor vehicle of
one or more of the following classes, namely:
(a)-(c)***
(d) light motor vehicle;
(e) transport vehicle; [ Substituted for clauses
(e) to (h) by Act 54 of 1994, Section 8 (w.e.f.
14-11-1994).]
(i) road roller;
(j) motor vehicle of a specified description.”
The distinction between a “light motor vehicle” and a
“transport vehicle” is, therefore, evident. A transport
vehicle may be a light motor vehicle but for the
purpose of driving the same, a distinct licence is
required to be obtained.
16. The distinction between a “transport vehicle”
and a “passenger vehicle” can also be noticed from
Section 14 of the Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 14
provides for duration of a period of three years in case
of an effective licence to drive a “transport vehicle”
whereas in case of any other licence, it may remain
effective for a period of 20 years.”
[emphasis supplied]
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 621

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

94.2. Relying on the judgment in Prabhu Lal (supra) which
distinguished Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra), the Court in
Angad KoI held that a driver of the mini goods carriage auto
holding a LMV license, need not have a license for a Transport
Vehicle. The Court also referred to Annappa Irappa Nesaria
(supra) to note that the amendment (applicable prospectively)
specifically introduced the term ‘Transport Vehicle’ in
Section 10. Following this amendment, a specific endorsement
for driving a Transport Vehicle would be necessary. It was
also noted that since the license was granted for 20 years,
a presumption arose that it was for a vehicle other than a
transport vehicle. It was ultimately held that the driver did
not have a valid driving license, for driving a ‘goods vehicle’
and breach of conditions of the insurance policy was found
apparent on the face of record. However, exercising its power
under Article 142, this Court directed the Insurance Company
to deposit the compensation amount before the Tribunal with
liberty to the claimants to withdraw the same providing the
right of recovery to the Insurance Company to recover the
deposited sum from the owner and the driver of the vehicle.
94.3. Before this Court, the Counsel for the Insurance Companies
placed reliance on the above decision in Angad Kol (supra)
to argue that there is a clear distinction between ‘transport
vehicle’ and ‘light motor vehicle’. Let us examine if such
argument deserves our endorsement.
94.4. The decision in Angad Kol (supra) was rendered when
Prabhu Lal (supra) and Annapa Irappa Nesaria (supra) held
the field. However, as we have noticed earlier, Prabhu Lal
(supra) conspicuously failed to notice the definition of LMV
in Section 2(21) even though it considered the definition
of Transport Vehicle. It also wrongly distinguished Ashok
Gangadhar Maratha (supra), where the legal position was
clearly stated as under:
“10. The definition of “light motor vehicle” as given in
clause (21) of Section 2 of the Act can apply only to
a “light goods vehicle” or a “light transport vehicle”.
A “light motor vehicle” otherwise has to be covered
by the definition of “motor vehicle” or “vehicle” as
622 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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given in clause (28) of Section 2 of the Act. A light
motor vehicle cannot always mean a light goods
carriage. Light motor vehicle can be a non-transport
vehicle as well.”
94.5. The Court in Angad Kol (supra) overlooked the crucial legal
analysis in Para 9 and 10 and instead distinguished Ashok
Gangadhar Maratha (supra) by relying on Para 11 where the
Court only provided additional reasoning on the requirement
of a ‘permit’. A ‘driving license’ is different from a ‘permit’. The
conflation of the two terms led to the confusion. While a driving
license relates to a driver’s qualification, a ‘permit’ relates to
the vehicle’s operational classification.
94.6. The Court in Angad Kol (supra) also relied on Annapa
Irappa Nesaria (supra), which held that the introduction of
Transport Vehicles post-amendment would imply that a specific
endorsement would be needed for Transport Vehicles. At the
cost of repetition, even otherwise, a comprehensive reading
of the MV Act and Rules shows that the specific mention of
the term Transport Vehicle in different places of the Act and
Rules for the purpose of driving license would reasonably be
applicable only for those Transport Vehicles, that fall above
the weight limit prescribed in Section 2(21) for LMVs.
95. In S. Iyyapan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd.,42 the 2-judge bench
relied on inter alia, Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra) and Annappa
Irappa Nesaria (supra). The case stemmed from an accident involving
a Mahindra Maxi Cab (a light motor vehicle) that led to the death
of one person. The deceased’s wife filed a claim before the Motor
Accidents Claims Tribunal. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,42,000/- in
compensation and held that a person holding a LMV License was
entitled to drive a Mahindra Maxi Cab. The High Court, however
reversed this decision noting that the vehicle was used as a taxi and
hence it was a commercial vehicle. It held that a separate license
is necessary for driving a commercial vehicle. The Supreme court
however restored the decision of MACT stating that the driver with a
LMV license was legally competent to drive the Max Cab, used as a
taxi. The Court additionally considered Sections 146, 147, and 149 of

42 [2013] 7 SCR 45 : (2013) 7 SCC 62
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 623

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

the MV Act and noted that under certain circumstances, insurers could
limit their liability, but they were still bound to pay compensation to third
parties. The right of third parties to compensation was protected by
law, and the insurer could later recover the amount from the insured
if any policy violation occurred. The Supreme Court categorically held
that since the driver had a valid LMV licence, and the Mahindra Maxi
Cab was classified as an LMV, the insurance company was liable to
pay the compensation. The following was the relevant discussion for
what appears to be the correct conclusion in S Iyyappan (supra):-
“18. In the instant case, admittedly the driver was holding
a valid driving licence to drive light motor vehicle. There
is no dispute that the motor vehicle in question, by which
accident took place, was Mahindra Maxi Cab. Merely
because the driver did not get any endorsement in the
driving licence to drive Mahindra Maxi Cab, which is a
light motor vehicle, the High Court has committed grave
error of law in holding that the insurer is not liable to pay
compensation because the driver was not holding the
licence to drive the commercial vehicle. The impugned
judgment [ Civil Misc. Appeal No. 1016 of 2002, order dated
31-10-2008 (Mad)] is, therefore, liable to be set aside.”
96. Similarly, in Kulwant Singh v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd,43 the question
for consideration was whether the Insurance Company had recovery
rights for breach of conditions of insurance policy when the driver
possesses a valid driving licence for driving light vehicle but fails
to obtain endorsement for driving goods vehicle? In that case, the
L/Rs of the deceased had filed a claim before the MACT following
a road accident death on 8.10.2005. The deceased was driving a
tempo which was hit by a Tata-407 Tempo. The tribunal held that the
claimants were entitled to compensation. The High Court, however,
held that there was a breach of policy conditions and the insurance
company was entitled to recover the compensation amount from the
owner of the vehicle.
96.1. The 2-judge bench of the Supreme Court opined that the
issue stands covered by the judgment in S. Iyyapan (supra).
It therefore held that the insurance company could not

43 (2015) 2 SCC 186
624 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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avoid liability merely because, the driver did not have an
endorsmement to drive a commercial vehicle.
96.2. In view of the reasons assigned by us and as rightly noted in
Mukund Dewangan (2017), the decisions in S. Iyyapan (supra)
and Kulwant Singh (supra) were decided correctly. However,
as regards the reliance on Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra),
post-amendment in Section 10 also, the law continues to be
the same for vehicles falling within the LMV category.
96.3. Therefore, the judgments where the Court has held that
a separate endorsement for a ‘transport vehicle’ may not
be necessary i.e. in Ashok Gangadhar Maratha (supra),
Nagashetty (supra), S. Iyyapan (supra) and Kulwant Singh
(supra) are found to align with our reasoning and interpretation
and they are therefore upheld. In consequence, the three
judgments which concluded otherwise i.e. Prabhu Lal (supra),
Roshanben Rahemansha Fakir (supra) and Angad Kol (supra)
are overruled based on the reasoning provided by us in this
judgment. The decision in Annappa Irappa Nesaria (supra)
is partially overruled to the extent that the position even
post-amendment would remain the same.
VI. Is Mukund Dewangan (2017) per incuriam?
97. Shifting gears, we may recall that the decision in Mukund Dewangan
(2017) was doubted for not noticing certain provisions of the MV
Act and MV Rules. These include, inter alia, Section 4(1), 7, 14,
the second proviso to Section 15 and Section 180 and 181 of the
MV Act. It was therefore argued before this Court that the said
decision is per incuriam. To begin with, it is useful to refer to some
decisions that have expounded on the principle of per incuriam.
98. The term per incuriam is a Latin term which means ‘by inadvertence’
or ‘lack of care’. English Courts have developed this principle in
relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In Halsbury’s Laws of England,44
the concept of per incuriam was explained as under:

44 Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) Vol. 26: Judgment and Orders: Judicial Decisions as Authorities
(pp. 297-98, para 578)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 625

M/s Bajaj Alliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Rambha Devi & Ors.

“A decision is given per incuriam when the court has acted
in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court
of coordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it,
in which case it must decide which case to follow;45 or when
it has acted in ignorance of a House of Lords decision, in
which case it must follow that decision; or when the decision
is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or rule having
statutory force.46 A decision should not be treated as given
per incuriam, however, simply because of a deficiency of
parties,47 or because the court had not the benefit of the
best argument,48 and, as a general rule, the only cases in
which decisions should be held to be given per incuriam
are those given in ignorance of some inconsistent
statute or binding authority.49 Even if a decision of the
Court of Appeal has misinterpreted a previous decision of
the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its
previous decision and leave the House of Lords to rectify
the mistake.”
[emphasis supplied]
99. Lord Evershed in Morelle Ld. V. Wakeling50 (for short “Morelle”)
explained the concept as under:
“As a general rule the only cases in which decisions
should be held to have been given per incuriam are those
of decisions given in ignorance or forgetfulness of some
inconsistent statutory provision or of some authority
binding on the court concerned; so that in such cases
some part of the decision or some step in the reasoning
on which it is based is found, on that account, to be
demonstrably wrong”
[emphasis supplied]

45 Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 at 729 : (1944) 2 All ER 293 at 300
46 Lancaster Motor Co. (London) Ltd. v. Bremith Ltd. (1941) 1 KB 675 : (1941) 2 All ER
47 Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA)
48 Bryers v. Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. (1957) 1 QB 134 : (1956) 3 All ER 560 (CA) Per Singleton,
L.J., affirmed in Canadian Pacific Steamships Ltd. v. Bryers1958 AC 485 : (1957) 3 All ER 572.]
49 A. and J. Mucklow Ltd. v. IRC, 1954 Ch 615 : (1954) 2 All ER 508 (CA), Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2
QB 379 : (1955) 1 All ER 708 (CA), see also Bonsor v. Musicians’ Union, 1954 Ch 479 : (1954) 1 All ER
822 (CA)
50 Morelle LD v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 (Court of Appeal).
626 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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100. A few months after the decision in Morelle (supra), the Constitution
Bench of this Court in Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar51
adopted the per incuriam principle. It held that while Article 141
states that the Supreme Court’s decisions are “binding on all courts
within the territory of India,” this does not extend to binding the
Supreme Court itself, which remains free to reconsider its judgments
in appropriate cases.
101. In Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal,52 reflecting on the principle of
per incuriam, this Court speaking through Krishna Iyer J. held thus:
“7. Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of
courts — all flowering from the same principle — converge
to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must
later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from
the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious
inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain
statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter
to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the
sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case,
an obtrusive omission. No such situation presents itself
here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment
per incuriam.”
[emphasis supplied]
102. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak,53 the Constitution Bench of this Court
made the following observations:
“42. It appears that when this Court gave the aforesaid
directions on 16-2-1984, for the disposal of the case
against the appellant by the High Court, the directions
were given oblivious of the relevant provisions or law
and the decision in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [State of W.B.
v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1 : AIR 1952 SC 75 :
1952 Cri LJ 510] . See Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th
Edn., Vol. 26, p. 297, para 578 and p. 300, the relevant
Notes 8, 11 and 15; Dias on Jurisprudence, 5th Edn., pp.

51 AIR 1955 SC 661
52 [1975] 3 SCR 834 : (1975) 2 SCC 232
53 [1988] Supp. 1 SCR 1 : (1988) 2 SCC 602
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128 and 130; Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [Young
v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., 1944 KB 718 (CA)] Also
see the observations of Lord Goddard in Moore v. Hewitt
[Moore v. Hewitt, 1947 KB 831] and Nicholas v. Penny
[Nicholas v. Penny (1950) 2 KB 466] .
“Per incuriam” are those decisions given in ignorance or
forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or of
some authority binding on the court concerned, so that in
such cases some part of the decision or some step in the
reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account
to be demonstrably wrong. See Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling
[Morelle Ltd. v. Wakeling (1955) 2 QB 379 : (1955) 2 WLR
672 (CA)] . Also see State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper
Mills Co. Ltd. [State of Orissa v. Titaghur Paper Mills Co.
Ltd., 1985 Supp SCC 280 : 1985 SCC (Tax) 538] We
are of the opinion that in view of the clear provisions of
Section 7(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952
and Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution, these directions
were legally wrong.”
103. In MCD v. Gurnam Kaur,54 A 3-Judge bench of this Court held that:
“11. ... A decision should be treated as given per incuriam
when it is given in ignorance of the terms of a statute or
of a rule having the force of a statute.”
104. In Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour
Court, 55 a five-judge bench of this Court said the following in
the context of the principle of per incuriam for ignoring statutory
provisions :-
“43. As regards the judgments of the Supreme Court
allegedly rendered in ignorance of a relevant constitutional
provision or other statutory provisions on the subjects
covered by them, it is true that the Supreme Court may
not be said to “declare the law” on those subjects if the
relevant provisions were not really present to its mind.
But in this case Sections 25-G and 25-H were not directly

54 [1988] Supp. 2 SCR 929 : (1989) 1 SCC 101
55 [1990] 3 SCR 111 : (1990) 3 SCC 682
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attracted and even if they could be said to have been
attracted in laying down the major premise, they were to
be interpreted consistently with the subject or context. The
problem of judgment per incuriam when actually arises,
should present no difficulty as this Court can lay down the
law afresh, if two or more of its earlier judgments cannot
stand together.”
[emphasis supplied]
105. In N.Bhargavan Pillai v. State of Kerala,56 a two-judge bench speaking
through Arijit Pasayat J. noted that a judgment cannot be treated
as a binding precedent, if it fails to notice a specific statutory bar:
“14. Coming to the plea relating to benefits under the
Probation Act, it is to be noted that Section 18 of the said
Act clearly rules out application of the Probation Act to a
case covered under Section 5(2) of the Act. Therefore,
there is no substance in the accused-appellant’s plea
relating to grant of benefit under the Probation Act. The
decision in Bore Gowda case [(2000) 10 SCC 260 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 1244] does not even indicate that Section 18 of
the Probation Act was taken note of. In view of the specific
statutory bar the view, if any, expressed without analysing
the statutory provision cannot in our view be treated as a
binding precedent and at the most is to be considered as
having been rendered per incuriam. Looked at from any
angle, the appeal is sans merit and deserves dismissal
which we direct.”
106. In State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan,57 this Court reiterated:
“67. Thus, “per incuriam” are those decisions given in
ignorance or forgetfulness of some statutory provision or
authority binding on the W.P.(C)Nos.7785, 7851, court
concerned, or a statement of law caused by inadvertence
or conclusion that has been arrived at without application
of mind or proceeded without any reason so that in such
a case some part of the decision or some step in the

56 [2004] Suppl. 1 SCR 444 : (2004) 13 SCC 217
57 [2011] 11 SCR 678 : (2011) 7 SCC 639
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reasoning on which it is based, is found, on that account
to be demonstrably wrong.”
107. Subsequently, in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.58
this Court observed:
“A prior decision of the Supreme Court on identical facts
and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a
later case. In exceptional instances, where by obvious
inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain
statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter
to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of
per incuriam may apply. Unless it is a glaring case of
obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the
principle of judgment ‘per incuriam’. It has to be shown
that some part of the decision was based on a reasoning
which was demonstrably wrong, for applying the principle
of per incuriam.”
[emphasis supplied]
108. In State of Bihar v. Kalika Kuer,59 the legal dilemma was noted as
under:
“10. … Easy course of saying that earlier decision was
rendered per incuriam is not permissible and the matter
will have to be resolved only in two ways — either to follow
the earlier decision or refer the matter to a larger Bench
to examine the issue, in case it is felt that earlier decision
is not correct on merits.”
109. In Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra,60 the Court
expanded the definition of per incuriam in the Indian context and
noted that:
“A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is
not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously
pronounced judgment of a Co-equal or Larger Bench; or if
the decision of a High Court is not in consonance with the

58 [2001] 3 SCR 479 : (2001) 6 SCC 356
59 (2003) 5 SCC 448
60 [2014] 4 SCR 486 : (2014) 16 SCC 623
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views of this Court. It must immediately be clarified that
the per incuriam rule is strictly and correctly applicable to
the ratio decidendi and not to obiter dicta.”
110. In a recent decision in Shah Faesal v. Union of India,61 a five judge
bench of this Court reiterated that the principle of per incuriam only
applies on the ratio of the case.
111. After having examined the above decisions, when dealing with the
ignorance of a statutory provision, we may bear in mind the following
principles. These may not however be exhaustive:
(i) A decision is per incuriam only when the overlooked statutory
provision or legal precedent is central to the legal issue
in question and might have led to a different outcome if
those overlooked provisions were considered. It must be an
inconsistent provision and a glaring case of obtrusive omission.
(ii) The doctrine of per incuriam applies strictly to the ratio decidendi
and does not apply to obiter dicta.
(iii) If a court doubts the correctness of a precedent, the appropriate
step is to either follow the decision or refer it to a larger Bench
for reconsideration.
(iv) It has to be shown that some part of the decision was based
on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, for applying
the principle of per incuriam. In exceptional instances, where
by obvious inadvertence or oversight, a judgment fails to
notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running
counter to the reasoning and result reached, the principle of
per incuriam may apply.
112. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, let us now apply
our mind to the reference made in the context of the decision in
Mukund Dewangan (2017). The following questions were referred:
"1. What is the meaning to be given to the definition of
“light motor vehicle” as defined in Section 2(21) of
the MV Act? Whether transport vehicles are excluded
from it?

61 [2020] 3 SCR 1115 : (2020) 4 SCC 1
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2. Whether “transport vehicle” and “omnibus” the “gross
vehicle weight” of either of which does not exceed
7500 kg would be a “light motor vehicle” and also
motor car or tractor or a roadroller, “unladen weight”
of which does not exceed 7500 kg and holder of a
licence to drive the class of “light motor vehicle” as
provided in Section 10(2)(d) would be competent
to drive a transport vehicle or omnibus, the “gross
vehicle weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg
or a motor car or tractor or roadroller, the “unladen
weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg?
3. What is the effect of the amendment made by virtue
of Act 54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14-11-1994 while substituting
clauses (e) to (h) of Section 10(2) which contained
“medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor
vehicle”, “heavy goods vehicle” and “heavy passenger
motor vehicle” by “transport vehicle”? Whether
insertion of expression “transport vehicle” under
Section 10(2)(e) is related to said substituted classes
only or it also excluded transport vehicle of light motor
vehicle class from the purview of Sections 10(2)(d)
and 2(41) of the Act?
4. What is the effect of amendment of Form 4 as to
the operation of the provisions contained in Section
10 as amended in the year 1994 and whether the
procedure to obtain the driving licence for transport
vehicle of the class of “light motor vehicle” has been
changed?”
113. The judgment in Mukund Dewangan (2017), shows that the 3 Judge
Bench considered Section 2(21), 2(47) read with Section 10 of
MV Act. The Court also examined the legislative intent behind the
1994 amendment to Section 10, noting that while the amendment
introduced the term “transport vehicle” under Section 10(2)(e), it
did not amend the definition of LMVs under Section 2(21). It was
further observed that the newly inserted provision of Section 10(2)(e)
would only subsume those classes of vehicles that were contained
in Sections 10(2)(e) to 10(2)(h) of the un-amended Act i.e. medium
goods vehicle, medium passenger vehicle, heavy goods vehicle and
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heavy passenger vehicle, and which now stand deleted by virtue of
the amendment of 1994. Since no amendment was carried out in
Section 10(2)(d) of the Act which contains the class for ‘Light Motor
Vehicles’, the scope of Section 10(2)(d) would remain intact as is
contained in Section 2(21) of the Act, which is to say that LMV would
include ‘Transport Vehicles’ in cases where the gross weight of such
vehicle is less than 7500 Kgs. It further noted that the syllabus does
not provide separate training for transport vehicles but includes them
under the relevant vehicle class based on the vehicle’s weight. It
considered Rule 75 which deals with ‘State Register of motor vehicles’
as provided in Form 41. Form 41 categorizes vehicles on the basis
of, inter alia, gross vehicle weight, unladen weight etc. Likewise, the
Court observed that Section 41, pertaining to registration, mandates
the inclusion of relevant information as specified in Form 20, which
outlines details such as the class of vehicle, gross vehicle weight,
and unladen weight, among other factors.
114. The court analysed those key provisions of the Act and Rules and
reached a conclusion which is aligned with the discussion and opinion
in this judgment. It rightly concluded as under:
"(i) ‘Light motor vehicle’ as defined in section 2(21) of the
Act would include a transport vehicle as per the weight
prescribed in section 2(21) read with section 2(15)
and 2(48). Such transport vehicles are not excluded
from the definition of the light motor vehicle by virtue
of Amendment Act No.54/1994.
(ii) A transport vehicle and omnibus, the gross vehicle
weight of either of which does not exceed 7500 kg.
would be a light motor vehicle and also motor car
or tractor or a road roller, ‘unladen weight’ of which
does not exceed 7500 kg. and holder of a driving
licence to drive class of “light motor vehicle” as
provided in section 10(2)(d) is competent to drive
a transport vehicle or omnibus, the gross vehicle
weight of which does not exceed 7500 kg. or a
motor car or tractor or road-roller, the “unladen
weight” of which does not exceed 7500 kg. That is
to say, no separate endorsement on the licence is
required to drive a transport vehicle of light motor
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 633

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vehicle class as enumerated above. A licence issued
under section 10(2)(d) continues to be valid after
Amendment Act 54/1994 and 28.3.2001 in the form.
(iii) The effect of the amendment made by virtue of
Act No.54/1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while substituting
clauses (e) to (h) of section 10(2) which contained
“medium goods vehicle” in section 10(2)(e), medium
passenger motor vehicle in section 10(2)(f), heavy
goods vehicle in section 10(2)(g) and “heavy
passenger motor vehicle” in section 10(2)(h)
with expression ‘transport vehicle’ as substituted
in section 10(2)(e) related only to the aforesaid
substituted classes only. It does not exclude transport
vehicle, from the purview of section 10(2)(d) and
section 2(41) of the Act i.e. light motor vehicle.
(iv) The effect of amendment of Form 4 by insertion of
“transport vehicle” is related only to the categories
which were substituted in the year 1994 and the
procedure to obtain driving licence for transport
vehicle of class of “light motor vehicle” continues to
be the same as it was and has not been changed
and there is no requirement to obtain separate
endorsement to drive transport vehicle, and if a
driver is holding licence to drive light motor vehicle,
he can drive transport vehicle of such class without
any endorsement to that effect.”
115. It is true that Mukund Dewangan (2017) did not analyse the
provisions that distinguish transport and non-transport vehicles, as
noted in the reference orders. The statutory scheme of MV is more
nuanced than the simple weight-based distinction made in the said
judgment. Moreover, the Court failed to notice Section 31(2) and 31(3)
which specify ‘Transport’ and ‘Non-Transport’ vehicles. However,
the judgment gave due consideration to the important statutory
provisions. We have carefully looked at the relevant and the wide
ranging provisions in our analysis in this decision. A harmonious
interpretation, as we have explained earlier, would lead us to the
same conclusion but fortified with some additional reasoning based
on the consideration of all the relevant provisions. The overlooked
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provisions would not, in our considered opinion, alter the eventual
pronouncement. Importantly, we do not notice any glaring error or
omission that would alter the outcome of the case. Therefore, the
ratio in Mukund Dewangan (2017) should not be disturbed by applying
the principles of per incuriam.
F. IMPACT ON ROAD SAFETY
116. The counsel for the insurance Companies raised concerns regarding
road safety, arguing that if the present law in Mukund Dewangan
(2017) is not interfered with, unfit drivers will start plying Transport
Vehicles putting at risk the lives of thousands of people. One of the
supporting Intervenors placed reliance on Para 57 of the decision
of this Court in Savelife Foundation v. Union of India62 where this
Court while exercising its public interest litigation jurisdiction under
Article 32 of the Constitution of India held that the Right to life under
Article 21 also includes the right to safety of persons travelling on the
road. Per contra, in the intervention application filed on behalf of auto
drivers, it was argued that the members of the Applicant Intervenor
have been permitted to operate taxis and motorcabs while holding
an LMV licence for the past almost 6 years. Reconsideration of the
same is not merely an issue of insurance coverage, rather it directly
pertains to the livelihood of those operating transport vehicles of the
LMV class, thereby giving rise to a fair consideration of their rights
under Article 19(1)(g). It was submitted that if this Court upsets
Mukund Dewangan (2017), which it should not, a transition period
of 12-24 months be provided.
117. The above submissions will now require our consideration. It is
true that in its PIL jurisdiction, this Court has passed orders in a
myriad of cases including elevating the right of road safety to a
fundamental right. It has also taken over policy areas63 by appointing
Commissioners to gather facts or to take expert advice in the form of
reports. However, this Court should be conscious that this is neither
a Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction nor is the Court testing the
constitutional validity of any of the provisions. Moreover, no empirical

62 (2016) 7 SCC 194
63 See Ashok H Desai and S Muralidhar, ‘Public Interest Litigation: Potential and Problems’ in B.N Kirpal
and others (eds), Supreme but not Infallible – Essays in Honour of the Supreme Court of India (Oxford
University Press 2000)
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data has been produced before us to show that road accidents in
India have increased as a direct result of drivers with LMV license,
plying a transport vehicle of LMV class of vehicles whose gross weight
is within 7500 Kg. Road safety is indeed an important objective of
the MV Act but our reasoning must not be founded on unverified
assumptions without any empirical data. The dangers of reasoning
without empirical data64 and beyond the statutory scheme of the
Act must be avoided. While we are mindful of issues of road safety,
the task of crafting policy lies within the domain of the legislature.
As a constitutional court, it is not our role to dictate policy decisions
or rewrite laws. We must be mindful of the institutional limitation to
address such concerns.
118. The complexities surrounding the question of whether the Court
should examine not only the existing laws and definitions, but also
the broader underlying issues of policy have been vividly captured
in the following words from Salmond on Jurisprudence65:
“Rules, which are originally designed to fit social needs,
develop into concepts, which then proceed to take on a
life of their own to the detriment of legal development.
The resulting “jurisprudence of concepts” produces a
slot-machine approach to law whereby new points posing
questions of social policy are decided, not by reference
to the underlying social situation, but by reference to the
meaning and definition of the legal concepts involved.
This formalistic a priori approach confines the law in a
strait-jacket instead of permitting it to expand to meet the
new needs and requirements of changing society. ……In
such cases Courts should examine not only the existing
laws and legal concepts, but also the broader underlying
issues of policy. In fact presently, judges are seen to be
paying increasing attention to the possible effects of their
decision one way or the other…… Such an approach
is to be welcomed, but it also warrants two comments.
First, judicial inquiry into the general effects of a proposed
decision tends itself to be of a fairly speculative nature.

64 Anuj Bhuwania, ‘Courting the People— Public Interest Litigation in Post-Emergency India’ (Cambridge
University Press 2017).
65 P.J. Fitzgerald(Ed), ‘Salmond on Jurisprudence’ (12th edn, Sweet and Maxwell 1966)
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Secondly, Too much regard for policy and too little for
legal consistency may result in a confusing and illogical
complex of contrary decisions; and while it is true that ‘the
life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience’
and that we should not wish it otherwise, nevertheless we
should remember that ‘no system of law can be workable
if it has not got logic at the root of it”
[emphasis supplied]
119. What follows from the above is that wherever possible, the Court must
attempt to be consistent in its approach. The principle of stare decisis,
which mandates that courts adhere to established precedents, plays a
crucial role in maintaining legal stability and predictability. The finding in
Mukund Dewangan (2017) need not be disturbed owing to speculative
concerns of road safety that intersect with broader policy issues.
120. We may recall that during the course of the present proceeding, the
Central Government was arrayed and the learned Attorney General
was requested to obtain instructions on whether the legislative wing
would wish to examine and undertake an appropriate amendment on
the legal question of whether a person holding a driving license for
a light motor vehicle is entitled to legally drive a ‘transport vehicle’
of a specified weight. An order to this effect was passed in light
of the possible social impact of the reference, particularly on road
safety and the livelihood issue. Pursuant to this, the learned Attorney
General submitted a note, inter alia, suggesting multiple amendments
including a further classification of LMVs into LMV Class 1 and LMV
Class 2, each with different weight thresholds.
121. Had the Parliament acted sooner to amend the MV Act and clearly
differentiated between classes, categories and types, much of the
uncertainty surrounding driving licenses could have been addressed,
reducing the need for frequent litigation and an unclear legal terrain.
The confusion and inconsistency in judicial decisions continued
to persist for 25 years starting from the 1999 decision in Ashok
Gangadhar Maratha (supra).
122. Road safety is a serious public health issue globally. It is crucial to
mention that in India, over 1.7 lakh persons66 were killed in road

66 Dipak K Dash, Accidents killed 474 on daily average in 2023 (October 20, 2024) <https://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/india/accidents-killed-474-daily-on-average-in-2023/articleshow/114384171.cms>
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accidents in 2023. The causes of such accidents are diverse, and
assumptions that they stem from drivers operating light transport
vehicles with an LMV license are unsubstantiated. Factors 67
contributing to road accidents include careless driving, speeding, poor
road design, and failure to adhere to traffic laws. Other significant
contributors are mobile phone usage, fatigue, and non-compliance
with seat belt or helmet regulations.
123. Driving a motor vehicle is a complex task requiring both practical skills
and theoretical knowledge. Safe driving involves not only technical
vehicle control68 but also proficiency in various road conditions,
including managing speed,69 turns, and spatial awareness relative to
other vehicles. Additionally, handling road gradients demands skill,
particularly with brakes70 and maneuvering. Effective driving requires
awareness of road signs, adherence to traffic rules,71 and a focus
on the road free from distractions. The core skills expected of all
drivers apply universally, regardless of whether the vehicle falls into
transport or non-transport categories.
124. At this juncture, it is also essential to note the scheme72 devised in
accordance with Section 75 of MV Act whereby the pre-requisites in
the form of ‘General Conditions’ to be maintained by the ‘holder of
license’ ensure safety and compliance. Certain guidelines73 have also
been enacted in so far as aggregators are concerned whereby chapters
outlining ‘Conditions for grant of licence for Aggregator’, ‘Compliance
with regard to Drivers’, ‘Compliance with regard to Vehicles’ as also
‘Compliances to ensure safety’ further address the speculative concerns
raised on behalf of the counsel for insurance companies.
G. CONCLUSION
125. The licensing regime under the MV Act and the MV Rules, when
read as a whole, does not provide for a separate endorsement for

67 WHO(2023) Global Status Report on Road Safety India 2023 Country profile https://www.who.int/
publications/m/item/road-safety-ind-2023-country-profile
68 See MV Rules, Rule 31, Part D Vehicle Mechanism and Repairs
69 See MV Act, Section 112 Limits of Speed
70 See MV rules, Rule 31, Part A-Driving Theory-I,
71 See MV Rules, Rule 31, Part B-Traffic Education-I and Part F-Traffic Education-II
72 Rent a Cab Scheme, 1989; Vide S.O. 437 (E), dated 12th June, 1989, published in the Gazette of India,
Extra. Pt. II, Sec. 3(ii), dated 12th June, 1989
73 Motor Vehicle Aggregator Guidelines, 2020
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operating a ‘Transport Vehicle’, if a driver already holds a LMV
license. We must however clarify that the exceptions carved out by
the legislature for special vehicles like e-carts and e-rickshaws,74 or
vehicles carrying hazardous goods,75 will remain unaffected by the
decision of this Court.
126. As discussed earlier in this judgment, the definition of LMV under
Section 2(21) of the MV Act explicitly provides what a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ ‘means’. This Court must ensure that neither provision i.e.
the definition under Section 2(21) or the second part of Section 3(1)
which concerns the necessity for a driving license for a ‘Transport
Vehicle’ is reduced to a dead letter of law. Therefore, the emphasis on
‘Transport Vehicle’ in the licensing scheme has to be understood only
in the context of the ‘medium’ and ‘heavy’ vehicles. This harmonious
reading also aligns with the objective of the 1994 amendment in
Section 10(2) to simplify the licensing procedure.76
127. The above interpretation also does not defeat the broader twin
objectives of the MV Act i.e. road safety and ensuring timely
compensation and relief for victims of road accidents. The aspect
of road safety is earlier discussed at length. An authoritative
pronouncement by this Court would prevent insurance companies from
taking a technical plea to defeat a legitimate claim for compensation
involving an insured vehicle weighing below 7,500 kgs driven by a
person holding a driving license of a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ class.
128. In an era where autonomous or driver-less vehicles are no longer tales
of science fiction and app-based passenger platforms are a modern
reality, the licensing regime cannot remain static. The amendments
that have been carried out by the Indian legislature may not have
dealt with all possible concerns. As we were informed by the Learned
Attorney General that a legislative exercise is underway, we hope
that a comprehensive amendment to address the statutory lacunae
will be made with necessary corrective measures.

74 See Rule 8A of MV Rules,’Minimum training required for driving E-rickshaw or E-cart’
75 See Rule 9 of MV Rules, ’Educational Qualification for drivers of goods carriages carrying dangerous or
hazardous goods’
76 The classes medium goods vehicle[(10(2)(e)], medium passenger vehicle[10(2)(f)], heavy goods
vehicle[10(2)(g)] and heavy passenger vehicle [10(2)(h)] were deleted and a new class ‘Transport
Vehicle’ was introduced in Section 10(2)(e).
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129. Just to flag one concern, the legislature through the 1994 amendment
in Section 10(2)(e) in order to introduce ‘transport vehicle’ as a
separate class could not have intended to merge light motor vehicle
(which continued as a distinct class) along with medium, and heavy
vehicles into a single class. Else, it would give rise to a situation in
which Sri (our hypothetical character), wanting to participate in the
cycling sport, is put through the rigorous training relevant only for
a multisport like Triathlon, which requires a much higher degree of
endurance and athleticism. The effort therefore should be to ensure
that the statute remains practical and workable.
130. Now harking back to the primary issue and noticing that the core
driving skills (as enunciated in the earlier paragraphs), expected to
be mastered by all drivers are universal – regardless of whether the
vehicle falls into “Transport” or “Non-Transport” category, it is the
considered opinion of this Court that if the gross vehicle weight is
within 7,500 kg - the quintessential common man’s driver Sri, with
LMV license, can also drive a “Transport Vehicle”. We are able to
reach such a conclusion as none of the parties in this case has
produced any empirical data to demonstrate that the LMV driving
licence holder, driving a ‘Transport Vehicle’, is a significant cause for
road accidents in India. The additional eligibility criteria as specified
in MV Act and MV Rules as discussed in this judgment will apply
only to such vehicle (‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium passenger
vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger vehicle’), whose
gross weight exceeds 7,500 Kg. Our present interpretation on how
the licensing regime is to operate for drivers under the statutory
scheme is unlikely to compromise the road safety concerns. This
will also effectively address the livelihood issues for drivers operating
Transport Vehicles (who clock maximum hours behind the wheels),
in legally operating “Transport vehicles” (below 7,500 Kg), with
their LMV driving license. Perforce Sri must drive responsibly and
should have no occasion to be called either a maniac or an idiot
(as mentioned in the first paragraph), while he is behind the wheels.
Such harmonious interpretation will substantially address the vexed
question of law before this Court.
131. Our conclusions following the above discussion are as under:-
(I) A driver holding a license for Light Motor Vehicle (LMV) class,
under Section 10(2)(d) for vehicles with a gross vehicle weight
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under 7,500 kg, is permitted to operate a ‘Transport Vehicle’
without needing additional authorization under Section 10(2)
(e) of the MV Act specifically for the ‘Transport Vehicle’ class.
For licensing purposes, LMVs and Transport Vehicles are not
entirely separate classes. An overlap exists between the two.
The special eligibility requirements will however continue to
apply for, inter alia, e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles carrying
hazardous goods.
(II) The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasizes the necessity
of a specific requirement to drive a ‘Transport Vehicle,’ does
not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21)
of the MV Act.
(III) The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and
MV Rules generally for driving ‘transport vehicles’ would apply
only to those intending to operate vehicles with gross vehicle
weight exceeding 7,500 kg i.e. ‘medium goods vehicle’, ‘medium
passenger vehicle’, ‘heavy goods vehicle’ and ‘heavy passenger
vehicle’.
(IV) The decision in Mukund Dewangan (2017) is upheld but for
reasons as explained by us in this judgment. In the absence
of any obtrusive omission, the decision is not per incuriam,
even if certain provisions of the MV Act and MV Rules were
not considered in the said judgment.
132. The reference is answered in the above terms. The Registry is
directed to list the matters before the appropriate Bench after obtaining
directions from Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India.

Result of the case: Reference answered.

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Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey