Holding

An order of an executive magistrate under Section 145 CrPC does not bind a civil court, which may grant an interim injunction and the parties must maintain status quo until the civil suit is decided.

Summary

The appellant, M.P. Peter, claimed ownership of 13.25 cents of land in Kizhakkambalam and was ordered by a Sub‑Divisional Magistrate under Section 145 of the CrPC to hand the property over to the respondent. The Sessions Court reversed that order, but the High Court restored it, and the Supreme Court dismissed the appellant's SLP. Meanwhile, the appellant filed a civil declaratory suit seeking a declaration of ownership and an injunction against dispossession. The Supreme Court examined whether an executive magistrate’s order under Section 145 binds a civil court and whether an interim injunction could be granted while the criminal proceeding was pending. It held that the magistrate’s order is not binding on the civil court, which may grant an injunction, and directed the parties to maintain the status quo pending the civil suit, subject to specific conditions. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether an interim injunction can be granted against a party when a proceeding under Section 145 CrPC is pending.
Whether the order of an executive magistrate under Section 145 binds a civil court.
Whether the threat of breach of peace must continue for the execution of a Section 145 order.
Whether the parties must maintain status quo pending determination of the civil suit.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 145, s. 146

Subjects

Section 145 CrPCinjunctioncivil suitpossessionproperty disputeexecutive magistratestatus quointerplay of criminal and civil courts

Judgment

[2009] 8 S.C.R. 576

A M.P. PETER
v.
STATE OF KERALA & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 980 of 2009)
MAY 11, 2009
8
[S.B. SINHA AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

c Section 145 - Property - Dispute over title - SOM
ordering restoration of possession - Sessions Court allowing
the Revision Petition - On appeal, High Court restored the
order of SDM - SLP thereagainst dismissed - Fresh
Declaratory suit filed - Interim application filed seeking
prohibitory injunction against dispossession - SDM directing
D
appellant to hand over the property to the respondent - High
Court granting ad-interim stay, but dfr;_missed the Criminal
Misc. case - On appeal, direction issued to parties to continue
to maintain status quo till the decision of the Civil Court,
subject to certain conditions - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
E
- Suits - Declaratory suit.

Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi (2004) 1 SCC I-
438; Sh. Vishnu Dutt Sharma v. Smt. Daya Sapra, Civil
Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 10997 of 2008, decided
F by S.C. on 5.05.2009 and Seth Ramdaya/ Jal v. Laxmi
Prasad, 2009 (5) SCALE 527, referred to.

Case Law Reference:

(2Q04) 1 sec 438 referred to Para 28
G
2009 (5) SCALE 527 referred to Para 31 •
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 980 of 2009.

H 576
M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 577

' From the Judgment & Order dated 19.06.2008 of the High A
Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. Misc. No. 1709 of 2008.

Roy Abraham (Himinder Lal) for the Appellant. ·

U.U. Lalit, N.M. Varghese (R. Sathish) Harish Beoran,
B
Benny Antony and Radha Shyam Jena for the Respondents.

,, The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

5.8. SINHA, J : 1. Leave granted.
c
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
dated 19.06.2008 passed by a learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Kerala in Criminal M.C.,No. 1709 of 2008
whereby and whereunder an order dated 3.04.2008 passed by
.. the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was affirmed.
D
3. Appellant is said to be the owner and in possession of
13 < cents of land in Survey No. 412/1 of ,Kizhakambalam
Village. On or about 09.01.1996, a complaint was filed by the
respondent No. 3 alleging that the property in question belonged
to him. A report was submitted by the Sub-Inspector of Police E
on 12.04.1996 before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under
Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stating that
there existed a dispute over title of the said property by and
-· between the appellant and the respondent No. 3. Before the
Sub~Divisional Magistrate the appellant herein was arrayed as F
'the B party' and the respondent No. 3 herein was 'the A party'.
By an order dated 9.10.1997, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate
held:

"As B party is stated to be residing in the building G
constructed in the disputed property, he is directed to
1
. handover the property to A party within two weeks from
today failing which A party is entitled for restoration of
possession of the property with police assistance."
H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A 4. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed a criminal revision
petition, marked as Criminal; Revision No. 41 of 1997 before
the Sessions Court, Ernakulam which by reason of an order
dated 6.03.1999 was allowed. Respondent No. 3 filed Criminal
Revision Petition No. 308 of 1999 before the High Court of
8 Kerala challenging the said order dated 6.03.1999. By reason
of an order dated 25.09.2007, the revision petition was allowed
by the High Court, holding:

"... In the circumstances, I find that the decision of the
Sessions Judge reversing the finding of the Sub Divisional
c Magistrate is liable to be set aside; and I do so. The
decision of the Sub Divisional Magistrate is restored. All
the same, considering the fact that the respondents/ 8
party has constructed house and is residing therein,
execution of the order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate is
D only to be initiated after six months from today onwards .. ."

5. A Special Leave Petition filed thereagainst by the
appellant was dismissed by this Court by an order dated
11.02.2008.
E
6. In the meantime, however, a suit, which was marked as
O.S. No. 383 of 2007, was filed by the appellant in the Court
of Munsif, Perumbavoor on 1.12.2007 for a declaration that the
appellant was the owner and in possession of 13.25 cents of
land in Old Survey No. 412/1 of Kizhakkambalam Village. An
F interim application was filed therein seeking a prohibitory
· injunction against dispossession which was dismissed by the
Munsiff Court by an order dated 24.03.2008.

7. Appellant preferred an appeal thereagainst which was
G marked as C.M.A. No. 12 of 2008 challenging the said order
dated 24.03.2008 and by an order dated 7.04.2008 an order
of injunction was passed prohibiting eviction of the appellant
from the plaint scheduled property until further orders. However,
an application for clarification of the said order was filed by the
H
M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 579
[S.B. SINHA, J.]

" respondent No. 3 and by an order dated 11.04.2008, it was A
allowed in the following terms:

"The respondent seeks a clarification that the order is not
against the R.D.O. The order of the court is clear. The
respondent alone is restrained:"
B
8. By an orde.r dated 26.08.2008, while dismissing the said
C.M.A. No. 12 of 2008, the matter was remitted to the lower
...
court with a direction to the parties to maintain the status quo.

9. On or about 3.04.2008, the Sub Divisional Magistrate c
directed the appellant to hand over possession of the suit
property to the respondent No. 3 within three days of the receipt
of the said notice.

10. Aggrieved thereby and dissatisfied therewith, the
D
appellant filed a Criminal Miscellaneous case bearing No. Crl.
M.C. No. 1709 of 2008. Though an interim stay was granted,
the High Court dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Case by
reason of the impugned judgment dated 19.06.2008.

11. Mr. Roy Abraham, learned counsel appearing on behalf E
of the appellant, would contend that the learned Trial Judge as
also the High Court 5 committed a serious error insofar as they
· failed to take into consideration that the appellant being in
possession of the property in question, an order of injunction
should have been passed in his favour. F

12. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent No. 3, on the other hand, urged :-

(i) A finding of fact having been arrived at by the
G
learned Executive Magistrate that the respondent
' i No. 3 was dispossessed by the appellant within a
~
~ period of two months from the date of initiation of
the proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code')
H
580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 8 S.C.R,

A and, thus, entitled to restoration of possession, the '
impugned judgment should not be interfered with.

(ii) Appellant having raised a contention that he was a
co-sharer in respect of the plot in question, which
having not been found favour with by the courts
B
below, he cannot be said to have any prima faole
case and, thus, the impugned order is unassailable.

13. The proceeding under Section 145 of the Code
indisputably remained pending for a long time. It was initiated
c on or about 9.01.1996 when a complaint was filed by the
respondent No. 3. As noticed hereinbefore, the 6 Sub
Divisional Magistrate directed the appellant to handover the
property to the respondent No. 3. However, the order of the Sub
Divisional Magistrate was reversed by the learned Sessions
D Judge, which in turn was set aside by the High Court by an
order dated 25.09.2007.

14. The correctness or otherwise of the said order of the
learned Sub Divisional Magistrate attained finality as the
E Special Leave Petition filed against the order of the High Court
dated 25.09.2007 was dismissed by this Court by an order
dated 11.02.2008. Indisputably, the suit was filed thereafter.

15. An order passed by an Executive Magistrate in
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 145 of the Code of
F Criminal Procedure is subject to the ultimate decision of the
suit filed in the civil court.

16. Even a decision of the learned Magistrate on
possession of the parties may have some evidentiary value but
G the same is not binding on a civil court. In a proceeding under
Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the learned r
Magistrate would not be entitled to go into a disputed and in •......
particular complicated question of title. Despite an order
passed under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
H the Civil Court-may in a suit pass an order of injunction. In this
M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 581
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
'!
case, however, admittedly during pendency of the said A
proceedings under Section 145 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the appellant had constructed a hou!\e. Prima facie,
the respondent No. 3 stood thereby. In the proceedings before
the learned Magistrate, he could have filed an application for
attachment. He could have also filed an application for B
appointment of a receiver. The question as to whether the
constructions were raised only during pendency of the said
proceeding would be considered in the suit by the Civil Court.

17. The High Court in its judgment dated 25.09.2007 while
reversing the order of the learned Sessions Judge noticed that
c
the appellant had constructed a house and been residing
,. therein. It was in that view of the matter, he interfered with the
order of the Sub Divisional Magistrate directing that the ·
restoration of possession may be effected after six months from
• the said date. D

18. It is, therefore, not denied or disputed that the appellant
is in possession of a house and has been residing therein. It
also stands admitted that the respondent No. 3 is not entitled
to the superstructure on the land in suit. Neither the High Court E
while passing the said order dated 25.09.2007 nor the courts
below took this factor into consideration. If, as conceded by Mr.
Lalit that the respondent No. 3 would not be entitled to the
superstructure standing on the said land, with a view to give full
effect to the order passed by the learned Sub Divisional F
Magistrate which provides for handing over of possession only
on the land in question, the superstructure would be required
to be demolished.

19. Should the Civil Court have granted· an order of
injunction in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case G

-•
- is the question.

20. We have noticed hereinbefore that whereas the learned
Munsiff in his order dated 24.03.2008 proceeded on the basis
that the appellant could not claim a right over the suit land H
\
582 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {2009] 8 S.C.R.

I
A belonging to a third party unless a case of adverse possession
is made out, the learned first appellate court, in its order dated
7.04.2008, op!ned:

"This is a petition filed by the Petitioner/ Appellant U/o 39
8 r 1 C.P.C. Heard the counsel for the petitioner. Perused
the appeal records. The respondents are restrained by an
order of temporary injunction from forcibly evicting the
petitioner from the plaint schedule property until further
orders."
c 21 :-As noticed hereinbefore, a clarification was sought for
and by an order dated 11.04.2008, it was stated that "order is
not against the RDO" and "the respondent alone is restrained".

22. Before, however, we advert to the correctness and/ or
D justifiability of the said order, we may notice that the learned •
Subordinate Judge, Perumbavoor in his order dated
26.08.2008 held as under:

"7. When the matter came up for hearing, the counsel for
the appellants stated that the property obtained by the
E
appellant is in old Sy. No: 411/2 B 3 and he has filed a
petition for amending his petition and the plaint. He also
pointed out that the petition to amend the plaint is filed
before trial Court. The right claimed in the plaint is filed
before trial Court. The right claimed in the plaint and the
F petition is in Sy. No: 412/1. But now the appellant had
sought the petition to amend the petition and claimed right
in Sy. No: 411/2 B 3. So, it can be seen that the case now
pleaded by the plaintiff is different from what has between
the case set up on the general plaint and the new case
G pleased. Hence, the appellant should be given an
opportunity to file a petition before the trial court to set up .. .
his claim separately.

8. As such there is no reason shown to interfere with the
H finding of the court below. Hence, this C.M.A. is dismissed.
I
M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 583
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
The matter is sent back to the lower court for considering A
the amendment petition and to decide the matter on merit.
In the meanwhile the parties will maintain status quo. There
shall no order as to costs."

23. In the suit, the Sub Divisional Magistrate was not a 8
party. No order of injunction could have been passed against
him but then that would not mean that the Civil Court could not
pass an order of injunction against the defendant - respondent.
If an order of injunction was passed against the defendant -
respondent from obtaining possession, the question of RDO's C
executing his own order dated 9.10.1997 would not arise. Even
where a court or a statutory authority may not be subjected to
an order of injunction, a party can be injuncted from proceeding
in the matter as is evident from the decision of this Court in
Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hirata/
[AIR 1962 SC 527]. D

24. Furthermore, there is no doubt or dispute that an
application for amendment of the plaint has been filed and the
same has been allowed. In the meanwhile; this Court by an
order dated 28.07.2008 passed an order of status quo as E
regards possession. Relying on or on the basis of the said
order, the learned Subordinate Judge by an order dated
12.11.2008 directed as under:

"5. The order in the C.M.A. is specifically stated that the F
matter is sent back to the lower court for considering the
amendment petition and to decide the matter on merit. In
the meanwhile the parties will maintain the status quo. It
is evident from the order that the parties will maintain
status quo till the matter is adjudicated by the Munsiffs G
Court and a decision is given on merit. The counter filed
by the respondent also show that the matter is stayed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Hence, it is evident
that the parties have to maintain the status quo till the case
is finally disposed of after the amendment of the plaint.
H
584 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 8 S.C.R.

A This petition is closed as per the basis of the order."

It was the correctness of the orders dated 7.04.2008 and
11.04.2008 which was questioned before the High Court. The
High Court opined:
B
"21. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a
civil suit having been filed and the civil Court having
passed orders like the one passed on 7.04.2008 and
11.04.2008 it must now be held that there is no threat or
breach of the peace and therefore the order under Sec.
c 145 of the Cr. P.C. does not deserve to be executed. I am
unable to accept this contention also. Threat to breach of
peace must certainly be there to invoke the jurisdiction
under Sec. 145 of the Cr.P.C. But it would be myopic to
come to the conclusion that such threat must continue
D every day during the continuation of the proceedings, after
the orders are passed, after the challenge of the orders
come to an end and till the execution of the order. I am
unable to accept the said contention that the threat of
breach of peace must exist until the order is executed. The
E parties need not be aiming the swords at each other
during this entire period to justify execution of the order
under Sec. 145 of the Cr.P.C."
l

25. Except at the first instance, the matter had not been
F considered on merit. The effect of the order refusing to grant
injunction had not been considered by the courts below.
Whether an exceptional case has been made out or not did not
fall for the consideration of the learned courts.

26. The very fact that a triable issue has been raised by
G the appellant for the purpose of grant of injunction was not
noticed. Furthermore, the fact that the appellant is residing with "
his family on the structure raised by him also escaped the
attention of the learned courts. Respondent No. 3 had been kept
out of possession for a long time. In a case of this nature,
H
M.P; PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 585
[S.B. SINHA, J.]
interest of justice would have been sub-served if an order of A
injunction would have been passed in favour of the appellant,
subject to such terms as the court might have thought fit and
proper to impose.

27. Mr. Lalit would contend that there exists a distinction 8
between forcible eviction and legal eviction. It is so. But, when
an order of injunction was sought for by the plaintiff - appellant,
his prayer was to obtain an order of injunction so that his
possession is maintained.

2R The legality or validity of the order dated 9.10.1997 C
was in question in the suit. Even the identity of the suit land,
viz., as to whether it falls within the Survey No. 412/1 is required
to be determined.

Our attention has been drawn to a decision of this Court D
in Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi [(2004) 1 SCC
438] wherein it was held:

"10. Possession is nine points in law. One purpose
of the enforcement of the law is to maintain peace and E
order in society. The disputes relating to property should
be settled in a civilized manner by having recourse to law
and not by taking the law in own hands by members of
society. A dispute relating to any land etc. as defined in
sub-section (2) of Section 145 having arisen, causing a F
likelihood of a breach of the peace, Section 145 of the
Code authorizes the Executive Magistrate to take
cognizance of the dispute and settle the same by holding
an enquiry into possession as distinguished from right to
possession or title. The proceedings under Sections 145/
146 of the Code have been held to be quasi-civil, quasi- G
criminal in nature or an executive or police action. The
purpose of the provisions is to provide a speedy and
summary remedy so as to prevent a breach of the peace
by submitting the dispute to the Executive Magistrate for
resolution as between the parties disputing the question H
586 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 8 S.C.R.

A of possession over the property. The Magistrate having
.-.....
taken cognizance of the dispute would confine himself to
ascertaining which of the disputing parties was in
possession by reference to the date of the preliminary
order or within two months next before the said date, as
B referred to in the proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 145
and maintain the status quo as to possession until the
entitlement to possession was determined by a court,
having competence to enter into adjudication of civil rights,
which an Executive Magistrate cannot. The Executive .
c Magistrate would not take cognizance .o(the dispute ·ifit
is referable only_to owriership.or rigtitto possessio~·and: ·
is not over ·possession. ~iinpliciter; sq also· the Executive
Magistrate would .refuse to '.iritertere· ifthere. is. rio likelihood
of breach of the peace .or if the iikelihood of breach of
D
a
peace though existed at previous point of time, had ...
ceased to exist by the time he was called upon to
pronounce the final order so far as he was concerned."

A distinction therein was noticed between a case where
the sabject matter of dispute is not attached by the Executive
E Magistrate and where it is so ordered. It was observed:

"12. What is an eviction "in due course of /aw"within the
meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 145 of the Code?
Does it mean a suit or proceedings directing restoration
F of possession between the parties respectively
unsuccessful and successful in proceedings under Section
145 or any order of a competent court which though not
expressly directing eviction of the successful party, has the
effect of upholding the possession or entitlement to
G possession of the unsuccessful party as against the said
successful party. In our opinion, which we would buttress
by reasons stated shortly hereinafter, ordinarily a party
unsuccessful in proceedings under Section 145 ought to
sue for recovery of possession seeking a decree or order
for restoration of possession. However, a party though
H
'M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS. 587
[S.S. SINHA, J.]
'' ~1
unsuccessful in proceedings under Section 145 may still A
be able to successfully establish before the competent
.. court that it was actually in possession of the property and
is entitled to retain the same by making out a strong case
demonstrating the finding of the Magistrate to be
apparently incorrect." B
This Court further observed:
\

--,l'

__j.
"15. It is well settled that a decision by a criminal court does
not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court
binds the criminal court. (See Sarkar on Evidence, 15th
Edn., p. 845.) A decision given under Section 145 of the
c

Code has relevance and is admissible in evidence to
show: (i) that there was a dispute relating to a particular
property; (ii) that the dispute was between the particular
r ·~ parties; (iii) that such dispute led to the passing of a D
preliminary order under Section 145(1) or an attachment
under Section 146(1), on the given date; and (iv) that the

..
Magistrate found one of the parties to be in possession
or fictional possession of the disputed property on the date
of the preliminary order. The reasoning recorded by the E
' .. Magistrate or other findings arrived at by him have no
relevance and are not admissible in evidence before the
j
.,, competent court and the competent court is not bound
'
l . by the findings arrived at by the Magistrate even on the
question of possession though, as between the parties, F
the order of the Magistrate would be evidence of
-( '. possession. The finding recorded by the Magistrate does
not bind the court. The competent court has jurisdiction and
would be justified in arriving at a finding inconsistent with
---r. the one arrived at by the Executive Magistrate even on the G
~ ... question of possession. Sections 145 and 146 only
... provide for the order of the Executive Magistrate made
under any of the two provisions being superseded by and
'( giving way to the order or decree of a competent court.
The effect of the Magistrate's order is that burden is thrown
H
588 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20091 8 s.p.R.

on the unsuccessful party to prove its possession or ~ ...,
A
entitlement to possession before the competent court."

29. Correctness of some of the observations made therein
although may be open to question, we need not enter into the
B said controversy at present.
30. We may, however, notice that this Court in Shanti
Kumar Panda (supra) held: ''I
"(3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the
c civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the '
criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate
in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an
order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary
enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and wait before
D the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage
of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the
evidence adduced before the court, the order of the
Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence.
(4) The court will be loath to issue an order of interim
E injunction or to order an interim arrangement inconsistent
with the one made by the Executive Magistrate. However,
to say so is merely stating a rule of caution or restraint, on
exercise of discretion by court, dictated by prudence and
regard for the urgenUemergent executive orders made :..
F within jurisdiction by their makers; and certainly not a tab
on the power of court. The court does have jurisdiction to
make an interim order including an order of ad interim
injunction inconsistent with the order of the Executive
Magistrate. The jurisdiction is there but the same shall be
exercised not as a rule but as an exception. Even at the
G
stage of passing an ad interim order the party unsuccessful ·.
before the Executive Magistrate may on material placed ...
before the court succeed in making out a strong prima
facie case demonstrating the findings of the Executive
Magistrate to be without jurisdiction, palpably wrong or self-
H
' M.P. PETER v. STATE OF KERALA & ORS.
[S.B. SINHA, J.)
589

inconsistent in which or the like cases the court may, after A
recording its reasons and satisfaction, make an drder
inconsistent with, 17 or in departure from, the one made
by the Executive Magistrate. The order of the court-final or
interlocutory, would have the effect of declaring one of the
parties entitled to possession and evicting therefrom the B
party successful before the Executive Magistrate within the
. j
meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 145."

31. In Sh. Vishnu Dutt Shanna v. Smt. Daya Sapra [Civil
..!'I Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 10997 of 2008, decided on
! 5.05.2009] and Seth Ramdayal Jat v. Laxmi Prasad, [2009
c
i (5) SCALE 527 ] this Court held that ordinarily the judgment of
)
a criminal court would not be binding on the Civil Court.
However, the matter will stand on a different footing in a suit
\
~
where the correctness of an order passed by an Executive
. .,..._)..
Magistrate under Section 145 of the Code in question . D

32. Apart from the fact that the civil court will have a primacy
over the decision of a criminal court even for the purpose of
grant of injunction, it is a case where an exceptional case has
been made out. As admittedly the appellant has been residing E
..J in the suit premises and as furthermore it would not be
practicable to dispossess the appellant upon demolishing the

-·
___.

......, "·
l
structure, both balance of convenience as also irreparable injury
lie in favour of the plaintiff- appellant.
F
33. We, therefore, direct that the parties shall continue to
maintain status quo till the decision of the civil court subject to
the followinQ conditions:

(i) Appellant shall not transfer, alienate or create any
third party interest in the property. G

(ii) The hearing of the suit shall be expedited and all
attempts should be made to dispose of the suit
within a period of six months from the date of receipt
of a copy of this order. H
r
590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 8 S.C.R

A (iii) The court, save and except for cogent reasons,
shall not grant any adjournment.

(iv) This order would be subject to the final decision of
the suit.
8 (v) In the event, the suit is dismissed, the court would
direct payment of such amount as it may be
determined by way of compensation to the
defendant for being kept out of possession from the
suit premises from the date of commencement of """
c the suit till the date of restoration of possession.

34. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned
observations. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there
shall, however, be no order as to costs.
L--
D
G.N. Appeal allowed.

.....