Holding

A legal presumption under Section 20 can be founded on factual presumptions or circumstantial inferences, and direct evidence of acceptance is not a prerequisite.

Summary

M. Narsinga Rao, a manager of a milk chilling centre, was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 for accepting a Rs.500 bribe from a contractor. He was caught in a trap set up by the Anti‑Corruption Bureau, but the key witnesses turned hostile after a four‑year delay, claiming the trap was fabricated. The trial court and the Andhra Pradesh High Court convicted him, relying on a presumption that he had voluntarily accepted the money, and ordered the hostile witnesses to be prosecuted for perjury. On appeal, Rao argued that Section 20 of the Act requires direct evidence of acceptance and that mere possession of the notes does not prove gratification. The Supreme Court held that a legal presumption under Section 20 may be based on factual presumptions or inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence; direct evidence is not mandatory, and the prosecution had sufficiently proved acceptance, so the presumption stands. Consequently, the conviction was upheld and the appeal dismissed.

Issues considered

The legal presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, may be drawn on the basis of a factual presumption or inference.
Whether direct evidence of acceptance of gratification is required to invoke the presumption under Section 20.
Whether the mere possession of currency notes, without explicit proof of demand, constitutes proof of gratification.
Whether the prosecution discharged its burden of proof in the absence of reliable witness testimony.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedures. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 114, s. 4
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 13(1)(d), s. 13(2), s. 20(1), s. 7

Subjects

legal presumptionfactual presumptionSection 20Prevention of Corruption Actbriberycircumstantial evidenceburden of proofcorruption

Judgment

A M. NARSINGA RAO
v.
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

DECEMBER 12, 2000

B [K.T. THOMAS, U.C. BANERJEE AND R.P. SETHI. JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Section JU legal presumption
Held. can be drawn if it is proved that the accused has accepted or agreed
C to accept any gratification, the same need not be proved through direct
evidence- -Inferences drawn from facts produced or proved are akin to
presumptions in law Evidence Act, 1872 Section 114.

Words and Phrases - 'Shall be presumed' and 'proof' Meaning of--ln
the context of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 -Section 20(/).
D
Appellant was charged for offences under Section 7 and 13 (2) read with
Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, being caught red handed
in a trap arranged by the officials of the Anti Corruption Bureau.

Evidence of prosecution started after four years. PWI, from whom the
E bribe was demanded and PW2, who was witness for the trap turned hostile
and PWI for the first time stated that he had acted at the behest of K. Appellant
in his written statement submitted that K bore grudge against him and
therefore had organised false trap against him employing PWI and PW2.

F Trial Court held that PWI and PW2 were won over by the appellant and
hence convicted the appellant for the offence and ordered the two witnesses to
be prosecuted for perjury. High Court concurred with the judgment of the
Trial Court holding that from the rest of the evidence it was established that
the appellant had accepted the amount and that gave rise to a presumption
u/s 20 of Prevention of Corruption Act that he accepted the same as illegal
G gratification.

In appeal to this court, the appellant contented that the presumption
under Section 20 of the Act could be drawn only when the prosecution
succeeded in establishing with direct evidence that the delinquent public
servant accepted or obtained gratification and that premise cannot depend on
H 584
M.!'J. RAO v. STATE OF AN'.lHRA PRADESH 585

an inference for affording foundation for the legal presumption envisaged in A
Section 20 of Act; and that handling over of some currency notes to a public
servant is not enough to make it acceftance of gratification. It is the duty of
the prosecution to prove that what was paid amounted to gratification.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court
B
HELD : 1.1. For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the Court can
rely on a factual presumption. Unless the presumption is di~proved or dispelled
or rebutted, the Court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof. It
may be unsafe to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary
presumption unless there is a statutory compulsion. 1592-EI
c
Suresh Budhurmul Ku/univ. S1a1e ofMuhurushlru. 11998) 7 SCC 337,
relied on.

1.2. From the proved facts, the court can legitimately draw a presumption
that appellant received or accepted the said currency notes on his own volition.
Of course, the said presumption is not an inviolable one, as the appellant could D
rebut it either through cross-examination of the witnesses cited against him
· or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the appellant fails to disprove the
presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by the Court that
the prosecution has proved that appellant received the said amount. [593-D]

Raghubir Singh v. Slale ofHaryana, )1994] 4 sec 560 and Hazrilal v. E
Delhi (Delhi Adminis1ra1ion), ) 1980] 2 SCC 390, relied on.

1.3. When Section 20(1) deals with legal presumption, it is to be
understood as in terrorum i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed
that the accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or F
forbearing to do any official act etc., if the condition envisaged in the former
part of the section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal
presumption under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the
accused has accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The section does
not say that the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its
only requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or G
agreed to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through
which a fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the
Evidence Act. !591-C, DJ

Sila Ram v. Stale ufRajusthun, )1975) 2 SCC 227 and Sura} Mui v. State
tflelhi AJminislraliun). 11979) 2 sec 725, distinguished. H
\
586 SLPRE'.v!I· ('()[RT REPORTS 120001SUPP.5 S.C.R.

A l.4. The expressions "may presume" and "shall presume" are defined
in Section 4 of the Evidence Act. The presumptions falling under the former
category are compendiously known as "factual presumptions" or
"discretionary presumptions" and those falling under the latter as "legal
Presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". When the expression "shall
B be presumed" is employed in Section 20(1) of the Act it must have the same
import of compulsion. 1591-A. Bl

1.5. The word "proof' need be understood in the sense in which it is
defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon admissibility of
evidence. A fact is said to be proved n hen, after considering the matters before
C it, the court either believes it to exist, or consider its existence so probable
that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to
act upon the supposition that it exists. What is required is production of such
materials on which the Court can reasonably act to reach the supposition that
a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability of its
having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is that of
D a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. 1591-E, Fl

Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Sieam Cua/ Campany ltd.. (1911) I K.B.
988, relied on.

1.6. In reaching the conclusion the Court can use the process of
E inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved. Such inferences are
akin to presumptions in law. Law gives absolute discretion to the Court to
presume the existence of any fact, which it thinks likely to have happened. In
that process the Court may have regard to common course of natural events,
human conduct, public or private business vis-a-vis the facts of the particular
F case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Section 114 of the Evidence Act.
1591-H; 592-A, Bl

I. 7. Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other
proved facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from another, the Court
is only applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent
G man would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final
conclusion to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it
remains undisturbed later. Presumption in Law of Evidence is a rule indicating
the stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the Court
can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either
disproved and dispelled. 1592-CI
H
M.'<. RAO v STAI'E OF AMJHRA PRADESH [THO'v!AS. J.J 587
2. Prosecution has proved that appellant has received gratification from A
PWl. In such a situation the Court is under a legal compulsion to draw the
legal presumption that such gratification was accepted as a reward for doing
the public duty. 1595-DI

/vfadhu/lwr Bhaskar Rao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, JT (2000)
Suppl. 2 SC 458, relied on. H

CRIMl'iAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal :-Jo. 719
of 1995.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.3.95 of the Andhra Pradesh High C
Court in Crl. A. No. 224 of 1993.

K. Madhava Reddy, Sr. Adv., L. Nageswara Rao, Jayanth Muthraj. Ms.
Madhurima Tatia, S. Uday Kumar Sagar. G. Prabhakar, :'vts. T. Anamika and G.
Ramakrishna Prasad for the appearing parties.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THOMAS, J. Can a legal presumption be based on a factual presumption 9
The !atter is discretionary whereas the former is compulsory. Such a question
arose in this appeal and in view of the importance of the issue a two-Judge
Bench has referred this case to be heard by a larger bench. The legat E
presumption envisaged in Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
1988 (for short "the Act'") is that on proof of certain fact the court '"shall
presume" certain other fact. When there is no direct evidence for establishing
the primary fact the court has to depend upon the process of inference drawn
from other facts to reach the said primary fact. The crux of the question
involved, therefore, is whether an inference thus made could be used as a
F
premise for the compulsory presumption envisaged in Section 20 of the Act.

The aforesaid question arose from the following assortment of facts.
Appellant was manager ofa Milk Chilling Centre attached to Andhra Pradesh
Dairy Devdopment Co-operative Federation. He is alleged to have received G
bribe money of Rs.500 from a milk-transporting contractor (PWl-Satya Prasad).
He was caught red handed on 20.4.1989 in a trap arranged by the officials of
the Anti Corruption Bureau (ACH). They charge-sheeted him before a Special
Court for offences under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13( l)(d) of
the Act. After trial the Special ~udge convicted him and sentenced him to
rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of Rs.2000 under each of the H

\
588 SlJPREME COl:RT REPORTS [2UOOJ SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A above counts. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh confirmed the conviction
but reduced the sentence of imprisonment to a period of one year. This appeal
is in challenge of the said conviction and sentence.

A summary of the allegations made against the appellant are these:
PW 1-Satya Prasad was to get some amount from Andhra Pradesh Dairy
B Development Corporation for transporting milk to or from the Milk Chilling
Centre at Luxettipet (Adilabad district). He approached the appellant for
taking prompt steps so as to enable him to get the money disbursed. But
appellant demanded Rs.500 for sending the recommendation in favour of
payment of the amount due to PW I. As the appellant persisted with his
C demand PW I yielded to the same, but before handing over the money to the
appellant PWI lodged a complaint (Ex.P2) with the DSP of Anti Corruption
Bureau. On the basis of the said complaint PW7 (DSP) registered Ex.Pl 8 FIR
and then made all arrangements for a trap to catch the corrupt public servant
red handed. ·

D On 20.4.1989 PWI brought the currency notes to the office of the ACB
for making up the demanded bribe amount. The said currency notes were
treated with phenolphthalein powder by or at the direction of PW7 as
preparation for the trap. PWI and the already arranged witness PW2 together
went to the house of the appellant by about noon. When appellant asked
whether the amount was brought PW I handed over the phenolphthalein
E smeared currency notes to the appellant. He accepted the amount and put the
currency notes in his pocket. Thereupon, a pre-scheduled signal was
transmitted to the members of the ACB team who were waiting outside. They
suddenly rushed to the place where the appellant was then standing, caught
the appellant red-handed and the tainted currency notes were recovered from
F his pocket. All the usual follow up steps were thereafter adopted by the ACB
team and on completion of the investigation the case was charge- sheeted
against the appellant.

It took four years thereafter for the Special Judge to commence evidence
taking for the prosecution. The said long interval, perhaps, helped the appellant
G as is reflected from the fact that PW I and PW2 made a volte-face in the trial
court and they denied having paid any bribery to the appellant and also
denied that appellant demanded the bribe amount. PW I said, for the first time,
that he acted at the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao and went to the office of
the appellant and did everything as directed by the said Krishna Rao. Both
the witnesses were declared hostile by the Public Prosecutor and both
H were cross-examined in detail. After examining the remaining witnesses for
M.'.'<. RAO v. STAfE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [THOMAS. J. j 589

prosecution the appellant was called upon to answer questions put to him A
under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Cude').
He then submitted a written statement in which he said that Dr. Krishna Rao
bore grudge against him and that person orchestrated this false trap against
him by employing PW I and PW2. According to the appellant, the tainted
currency notes were forcibly stuffed into his pocket. He examined two
witnesses on the defence side and both of them said that on the dates when B
the alleged demand was made by the appellant he was on tour at a different
place.

Both the trial court and the High Court disbelieved the defence evidence
in toto and found that PW I and PW2 were won over by the appellant and C
that is why they turned against their own version recorded by the investigating
officer and subsequently by a magistrate under Section 164 of the Code. The
Special Judge ordered those two witnesses to be prosecuted for perjury and
the said course suggested by the trial judge found approval from the High
Court also.
D
In the appeal the High Court dealt with the contention that it is not
possible to draw any presumption against the delinquent public servant in the
absence of direct evidence to show that the public servant demanded bribery
and that the same was paid to him. Learned single judge of the High Court
observed thus on that aspect: "It is true that there is no direct evidence in E
this case that the accused demanded and accepted the money. But the rest
of the evidence and the circumstances are sufficient to establish that the
accused had accepted the amount and that gives rise to a presumption under
section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act that he accepted the same as
illegal gratification, particularly so when the defence theory put forth is not
accepted." F

Mr. L. Nageswara Rao, learned counsel for the appellant, adopted a twin
contention. First is that the presumption under Section 20 of the Act could
be drawn only when the prosecution succeeded in establishing with direct
evidence that the delinquent public servant accepted or obtained gratification. G
That premise cannot depend on an inference for affording foundation for the
legal presumption envisaged in Section 20 of the Act, according to the learned
counsel. '!'he second limb of his contention is that it is not enough that some
currency notes were handed over to the public servant to make it acceptance
of gratification. Prosecution has a further duty to prove th'lt what was paid
amounted to gratification, contended the counseL H
590 SUPREME COURT REPOR-:S 12000] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A In support of the first contention, learned counsel relied on the decision
of a two ;udge bench of this court in Sita Rum v. State of Rajasthan, [l 975]
2 SCC 227. It was held by the bench that '·on mere recovery of certain money
from the person of an accused without the proof of its payment by or on
behalf of some person to whom official favour was to be shown the
presumption cannot arise."
B
The said observation was made in the background of a finding made
by the High Court in that case that the evidence of the witnesses was not
reliable and particularly because "so many jerks and jolts seem to have been
given to the prosecution case by contradictory and hostile statements of the
C witnesses that a good part of it had to be rejected by the High Court." That
decision and the observation could thus confine to the facts of that case, and
no legal principle for future application could be discerned therefrom_

Learned counsel then relied on another decision of a two judge bench
of this court in Sura) Mal v _State (Delhi Administration) ( l 979] 2 SCC 725
D wherein the bench observed that "in our opinion, mere recovery of money
divorced from the circumstances under which it is paid is not sufficient to
convict the accused when the substantive evidence in the case is not reliable."
In that case also the said finding depended upon the ve:acity of the testimony
of the witnesses. But the contention raised by the learned counsel in this case
.I
on the point convassed by him cannot find any support from the said
E decision either.

While a~verting to the first contention of the learned counsel we may
reproduce Seeton 20( I) of the Act. [That sub- section is virtually the same
as Section 4( I) of the predecessor Act of 1947 J.

F "20(1) Presumption where public servant accepts gratification other
than legul remuneration. -(I) Where, in any trial of an offence
punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b)
of sub-section (I) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person
has accepted or obrained or has agreed to accept or attempted to
obtain for him;-elf, or for any other person, any grat:fication (other
G than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person, it
shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or
obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification
or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such
as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without
H consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate."
(

!
:vi.I". RAO v. SlAlE OF A:\DHRA PRADESH !'alOMAS . .I.! 591
Before proceeding further, we may point out that the expressions "may A
presume" and "shall presume" are defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act.
The presumptions falling under the former category are compendiously known
as "factual presumptions" or "discretionary presumptions" and those falling
under the latter as "legal presumptions" or "compulsory presumptions". When
the expression "shall be presumed" is employed in Section 20( I) of the Act
it must have the same import of compulsion. B

When the sub-section deals with legal presumption it is to be understood
as in terrorum i.e. in tone of a command that it has to be presumed that the
accused accepted the gratification as a motive or reward for doing or forbear;ng
to do any ofiicial act etc .. ifthe condition envisaged in the former part of the C
section is satisfied. The only condition for drawing such a legal presumption
under Section 20 is that during trial it should be proved that the accused has
accepted or agreed to accept any gratification. The section does not say that
the said condition should be satisfied through direct evidence. Its only
requirement is that it must be proved that the accused has accepted or agreed
to accept gratification. Direct evidence is one of the modes through which a D
fact can be proved. But that is not the only mode envisaged in the Evidence
Act.

The word "proof" need be understood in the sense in which it is
defined in the Evidence Act because proof depends upon the admissibility
of evidence. A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters E
before it, the court eitner believes it to exist, or consider its existence so
probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. This is the definition given
for the word "proved" in the Evidence Act What is required is production
of such materials on which the court can reasonably act to reach the supposition F
that a fact exists. Proof of the fact depends upon the degree of probability
of its having existed. The standard required for reaching the supposition is
that of a prudent man acting in any important matter concerning him. Fletcher
1'vfou1ton l.J. in Hawkins v. Powells Tillery Steam Caul Company, Ltd.. [ 1911 J
K.B. 988 observed like this:
0
"Proof does not mean proof to rigid mathematical demonstration,
because that is impossible; !t must mean such evidence as would
induce a reasonable man to come to a particular conclusion".

The said observation has stood the test of time and can now be
followed as the standard of proof. In reaching the conclusion the court can H
~

\
(
\
\
I
592 SLPREME COLRT REPORTS j2000] SLPP. 5 S.C.R.

A use the process of inferences to be drawn from facts produced or proved.
Such inferences arc akin to presumptions in :aw. Law gives absolute discretion
to the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened. In that process the court may have regard to common course of
natural events, human conduct, public or private business vis-a-vis the facts
of the particular case. The discretion is clearly envisaged in Section 114 of
B tre Evidt:nce Act.

Presumption is an inference of a certain fact drawn from other proved
facts. While inferring the existence of a fact from anothlr, the court is only
applying a process of intelligent reasoning which the mind of a prudent man
C would do under similar circumstances. Presumption is not the final conclusion
to be drawn from other facts. But it could as well be final if it remains
undisturbed later. Presumption in Law of Evidence is a rule indicating the
stage of shifting the burden of proof. From a certain fact or facts the court
can draw an inference and that would remain until such inference is either
disproved or dispelled.
D
For the purpose of reaching one conclusion the court can rely on a
factual presumption. Unless the presumption is disproved or dispelled or
rebutted, the court can treat the presumption as tantamounting to proof.
However. as a caution of prudence we have to observe that it may be unsafe
E to use that presumption to draw yet another discretionary presumption unless
there is a statutory compulsion. This Court has indicated so in Suresh
Budharma/ Kalani v. State ofMaharashtrn, [ 1998] 7 SCC 3 37. "A presumption
can be drawn only from facts - and not from other presumptions - by a
process of probable and logical reasoning."

F Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act says that the court
may presume that "a man who is in the possession of stolen goods soon after
the theft is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be
stolen, unless he can account for his possession." That illustration can
profitably be used in the present context as wdl when prosecution brought
G reliable materials that appellant's pocket contained phenolphthalein smeared
currency notes for Rs.500 when he was searched by PW-7 DSP of the Anti
Corruption Bureau. That by itself may not or ne~d not necessarily lead to a
presumption that he accepted that amount from somebody else because there
is a possibility of somebody else either stuffing those currency notes into his
pocket or stealthily inserting the same therein. But the other circumstances
H which have been proved in this case and those preceding and succeeding the

r
M.N. RAO v. STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH [THOMAS, J.) 593

searching out of the tainted currency notes, are relevant and useful to help A
the court to draw a factual presumption that appellant had willingly received
the currency notes.

PW-7 DSP said that PW-1 approached him on the previous day and
lodged Ext.P-2 complaint stating that appellant was persistently demanding
Rs. 500 from him. The currency notes were actually prepared by PW-7 by B
smearing them with phenolphthalein powder. When appellant was caught red
handed with those currency notes he never demurred to PW-7 that those
notes were not received by him. In fact, the story that such currency notes
were stuffed into his pocket was concocted by the appellant only after lapse
of a period of 4 years and that too when appellant faced the trial in the court. C

From those proved facts the court can legitimately draw a presumption
that appellant received or accepted the said currency notes on his own
volition. Of course, the said presumption is not an inviolable one, as the
appellant could rebut it either through cross-examination of the witnesses
cited against him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the appellant fails D
to disprove the presumption the same would stick and then it can be held by
the court that the prosecution has proved that appellant received the said
amount.

In Raghubir Singh v. State of Haryana, [ 1974] 4 SCC 560 V.R. Krishna E
Iyer, J, speaking for a three Judge Bench, observed that the very fact of an
Assistant Station Master being in possession of the marked currency notes
against an allegation that he demanded and received that amount is "res ipsa
loquitur". In this context the decision of a two Judge Bench of this Court (R.S.
Sarkaria and 0. Chinnappa Reddy, JJ) in Hazari Lal v. Delhi (Delhi
Administration), [I 980] 2 SCC 390 can usefully be referred to. A police F
constable was convicted under Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947, on the allegation that he demanded and received Rs.60 from one
Sriram who was examined as PW-3 in that case. In the trial court PW-3 resiled
from his previous statement and was declared hostile by the prosecution. The
official witnesses including PW-8 have spoken to the prosecution version. G
The court found that phenolphthalein smeared currency notes were recovered
from the pocket of the police constable. A contention was raised in the said
case that in the absence of direct evidence to show that the police constable
demanded or accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the Act of
1947 could be drawn merely on the strength of recovery of the marked
currency notes from the said police constable. Dealing with the said contention H
594 SUPREME COCRT REPORTS [2000) SUPP. 5 S.CR.

A Chinnappa Reddy, J. (who spoke for the two Judge Bench) observed as
follows:

"It is not necessary that the passing of morey should be proved by
direct evidence. It may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. The
events which followed in quick succession in the present case lead
B to the only inference that the money was obtained by the accused
from PW3. Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act the court may
presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have
happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events,
human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to
facts of the particular case. One of the illustrations to Section 114 of
c the Evidence A.ct is that the court may presume that a person who
is in possession of the stolen goods soon after the theft, is either the
chief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he
can account for his possession. So too, in the facts and circumstances

D
of the present case the court may presume that the accused who took
out the currency notes from his pocket and flung them across the wall
had obtained them from PW3, who a few minutes earlier was shown
-
to have been in possession of the notes. Once we arrive at the finding
that the accused had obtained the money from PW3, the presumption
under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately
attracted. The presumption is of course rebuttable but in the present
E case there is no material to rebut the presumption. The accused was,
therefore, rightly convicted by the courts below."

The aforesaid observation is in consonance with the line of approach
which we have adopted now. We may say with great respect to the learned
F Judges of the two Judge Bench that the legal principle on this aspect has
been correctly propounded therein.

Regarding the second limb of the contention advanced by Shri
Nageshwar Rao, learned counsel for the appellant (that it was not gratification
which the appellant has received) we think it is not necessary to deal with
G the matter in detail because in a recent decision rendered by us the said
aspect has been dealt with at length. fVide Madhukar Bhaskarrao Joshi v.
State of Maharashtra, JT 2000 (supple. 2) SC 458. The following statement
made by us in the said decision would be the answer to the aforesaid
contention raised by the learned counsel:

H "The premise to be established on the facts for drawing the presumption
M !\.RAO v. STATE OF ANI>HRA PRADESH [THOMAS . .I.] 595
is that there was payment or acceptance of gratification. Once the said A
premise is established the inference to be drawn is that the said
gratification was accepted "'as motive or reward" for doing or forbearing
to do any official act. So the word 'gratification' need not be stretched
to mean reward because reward is the outcome of the presumption
which the court has to draw on the factual premise that there was
payment of gratification. This will again be fortified by looking at the B
collocation of two expressions adjacent to each other like 'gratification
or any valuable thing.' lf acceptance of any valuable thing can help
to draw the presumption that it was accepted as motive or reward for
the official act. the word •gratification' must be treated in the context
to mean any payment for giving satisfaction to the public servant who C
received it."

We, therefore, agree with t:1e finding of the trial court as well as the
High Court that prosecution has proved that appellant has received gratification
from PW I. In such a situation the court is under a legal compulsion to draw
the legal presumption that such gratification was accepted as a reward for D
doing the public duty. Of course, the appellant made a serious endeavour to
rebut the said presumption through two modes. One is to make PW I and PW2
speak to the version of the appellant and the other is by examining two
witnesses on the defence side. True PW I and PW2 obliged the appellant. The
two defence witnesses gave evidence to the effect that the appellant was not
present at the station on the date when the alleged demand was made by E
PWI. But the trial court and the High Court have held their evidence unreliable
and such a finding is supported by sound and formidable reasoning. The
concurrent finding made by the two courts does not require any interference
by this Court.
F
In the result we dismiss this appeal.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.