M. NAGABHUSHANAversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA & OTHERS

                      [2011] 2 S.C.R. 435

                     M. NAGABHUSHANA                                  A
                                v.
             STATE OF .KARNATAKA & OTHERS
               (Civil Appeal No. 1215 of 2011)

                     ,FEBRUARY 02, 2011
                                                                      B
    [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]

     . Kamataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 - s.
 28(4) .and (5)- Acquisition of land belonging to the appellant
 - Challenge to - Acquisition proceedings approved by the             C
 High Court as also Supreme Court - Appellant on the
 identical issues filing a new writ petition - Rejection of, by the
 Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court - On
 appeal, held: Attempt by the appellant to re-agitate the same
 issues which were considered by this Court and were rejected         D
 expressly in the previous judgment is a cleat instance of an
 abuse of process of this Supreme Court - Such issues are
·barred by principles of Res Judicata or Constructive Res
 Judicata and principles analogous thereto - On facts, it cannot
 be said that the Notification uls.28(4) stands vitiated in view      E
 of the provisions of s. 11 A of the 1894 Act since no award was
 passed within two years from the date of the Notification - s.
 11A of the 1894 Act does not apply to the acquisition under
 the KIAD Act - Main purpose of filing the instant appeal was
 to hold up the land acquisition proceeding which was initiated
 to achieve a larger public purpose - Thus, the State
 Government to complete the project as early as possible -
 Appellant directed to pay Rs 10 lacs as costs to State High
 Court Legal Services Authority - Code of Civil Procedure,
 1908 - s. 11 - Pnnciples of res judicata and constructive res
judicata - Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s 11A - Costs.

     ss. 28(4) and (5) and ss. 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition
Act- Comparison between - Held: There1s a substantial
difference - Land which is subject to acquisition proceeding
                               435 '
   436      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A under the 1894 Act gets vested with the Government only
  when the Collector makes an award uls. 11 of the 1854 Act,
  and the Government takes possession- Under ss. 28(4) and
  28(5) of the KIAD Act, vesting takes place by operation of law
  and it has nothing to do with the making of any award - Land
B Acquisition Act, 1894.

        Doctdnes!Principles - Principles of res judicata -
  Application of- Held: Principle of res judicata is of universal
  application since it is based on principle of 'interest
c reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in the
  interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
  and the principle 'nemo debet his ve ari, si constet curiae
  quod sit pro un aet eademn cause' which means that no one
  ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court
0 that it is for one and the same cause - Plea of Res Judicata
  is not a technical doctrine but is a fundamental principle which
  sustains the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation - Its
  application should not be hampered by any technical rules
  of interpretation - Thus, any proceeding which has been
E initiated in breach of the principle of Res Judicata is prima-
  facie a proceeding which has been initiated in abuse of the
  process of the court.

       The appellants-owner of two plots of land filed a writ
  petition challenging the acquisition proceedings with
F regard to the said lands. It was alleged that the said lands
  were outside the area of the Framework agreement {FWA)
  being acquired and the Notification issued under
  Sections 28(1) and 28(4) of Karnataka Industrial Areas
  Development Act, 1966 {KIAD). The Single Judge of the
G High Court quashed the acquisition proceedings. On
  appeal, the Division Bench of the High Court set aside
  the judgment of the Single Judge of the High Court and
  approved the acquisition proceedings. Thereafter, this
  Court upheld the order passed by the Division Bench of
H the High Court.
  M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 437
                   ORS.
    The appellant once again filed a writ petition before      A
the High Court challenging the said acquisition
proceedings. The Single Judge of the High Court
dismissed the writ petition. The appellant then filed an
appeal. It was alleged that the acquisition stood vitiated
since no award was published. The Division Bench of the        B
High Court held that the second round of litigation was
misconceived since the acquisition proceedings were
upheld right upto the Supreme Court: Therefore, the
appellant filed the instant appeal.
                                                               c
     Dismissing the appeal, the Court,

      HELD: 1.1 The principles of res judicata are of
 universal application as it is based on the principles,
 namely, 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which
                                                              0
 means that it is in the interest of the State that there
·should be an end to litigation and the other principle is
 'nemo debet his ve ari, si constet curiae quod sit pro un
 aet eademn cause' meaning thereby that no one ought
 to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to the court
 that it is for one and the same cause. The doctrine of Res E 1
 Judicata is common to all civili.zed system of
.jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper
 trial by a court of competent jurisdiction should be
 regarded as final and t!O~clusive determination of the F
 questions litigated and should for ever set the
 controversy at rest.[Para 14] [449-D-F]

     1.2 The principle of finality of litigation is based on
high principle of public policy. In the absence of such a
principle great oppression might result under the colour       G
and pretence of law in as much as there would be no end
of litigation and a rich and malicious litigar.t would
succeed in infinitely vexing his opponent by repetitive
suits and actions. This might compel the weaker party to
relinquish his right. The doctrine of Res Judicata has         H
    438     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. Thus, it is
  perceived that the plea of Res Judicata is not a technical
  doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the
  Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle
  seeks to promote honesty and a fair administratio'} of
B justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing
  court for agitating on issues which have become final
  between the parties. [Para 15) [449-G-H; 450-A-B]

         1.3. While applying the principles of Res Judicata, the
c   court should not be hampered by any technical rules of
    interpretation. Therefore, any proceeding which has been
    initiated in breach of the principle of Res Judicata is
    prima-facie a proceeding which has been initiated in
    abuse of the process of the court. [Paras 20 and 21) [452-
D E-G]
      1.4. The principles of Constructive Res Judicata, as
  explained in explanation IV to Section 11 CPC, are also
  applicable to writ petitions. Thus, the attempt to re-argue
E the case which has been finally decided by the court of
  last resort is a clear abuse ~f process of the court,
  regardless of the principles of Res Judicata. (Paras 27
  and 28) [454-E-F]

     Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. vs. State of
F Maharashtra (1990) 2 SCC 715 - followed.
        State of Kamataka and Anr. vs. All India Manufactureres
    Organisation and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 683; K.K. Modi vs. K.N.
    Modi and Ors. (1998) 3 SCC 573 - relied on.
G
          Sheoparsan Singh vs. Rammanandan Prasad Singh
    (1916) 1 I.LR. 43 Cal. 694 - approved.
       Mussammat Lachhmi Vs. Mussamamat Bhulli ILR
  Lahore Vol. VIII 384; Devi/al Modi vs. Sales Tax Officer,
H Rat/am and Ors. AIR 1965 SC 1150; State of U.P. Vs. Nawab
 M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 439
                  ORS.
Hussain (1977) 2 SCC 806 - referred to.                            A
          Greenhalgh vs.Mallard (1947) 2 All ER 255(A)- referred
to.
     Supreme Court Practice 1995 Sweet and Maxwell -
referred to.    -·                           ·                     8

     2.1 It is nobody's case that the appellant did not know
the contents of Framework agreement (FWA). It was open
to the appellant to question, in the previous proceeding
filed by it, that his land which was acquired was not C
included in the FWA. No reasonable explanation was
offered by the appellant to indicate why he had not raised
this issue. Therefore, such an issue could not be raised
in this proceeding in view of the doctrine of Constructive
Res Judicata. [Para 19] [452-C-D]                            D

     2.2 It is clear that the attempt by the appellant to re-
agitate the same issues which were considered by this
Court and· were rejected expressly in the previous
judgment in *All India Manufacturers Organisation case, E
is a clear instance of an abuse of process of this Court
apart from the fact that such issues are barred by
principles of Res Judicata or Constructive Res Judicata
and principles analogous thereto. [Para 30] [455-E-F]

    *State of Kamataka and Anr. vs. All India Manufactureres       F
Organisation and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 683 - relied on.
     3.1 It cannot be said that the Notjfication dated
30.3.2004 issued under Section 28(4) of Karnataka
Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 stands vitiated in G
view of the provisions of Section 11A of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 inasmuch as no award was passed
within two years from the date of the Notification. More
so, the said question was not urged by the appellant in
its writ petition before the Single Judge of the High Court. H
      '
     440     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A    This was urged before the Division Bench of the High
     Court unsuccessfully. [Paras 31, 32 and 33] [455-G-H; 456-
     A-B]

        3.2 The appellant did not challenge the validity of
8 Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act. Therefore, on a
  combined reading of the provisions of Sections 28 (4) and
  28 (5) of the KIAD Act, it is clear that on the publication
  of the Notification under Section 28 (4) of the KIAD Act
  i.e. from 30.3.2004, the land in question vested in the State
C free from all encumbrances by operation of Section 28(5)
  of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under the said
  Act vests only under Section 16 thereof. On a comparison
  of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section
  16 of the 1894 Act, it is clear that the land which is subject
0 to  acquisition proceeding under the 1894 Act gets vested
  with the Government only when the Collector makes an
  award under Section 11, and the Government takes
  possession. Under Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of t~e KIAD
  Act, such vesting takes place by operation of law and it
E has nothing to do with the making of any award. This is
  where Sections 28(4) and 28 (5) of the KIAD Act are vitally
  different from Sections 4 and 6 of the said Act. It cannot
  be said that acquisition under KIAD Act lapsed for
  alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section
F 11A of the 1894 Act. [Paras 36, 37, 45] [456-G-H; 457-A,
  C-D; 459-E-F]

          Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Bangalore Development
    · Authority and Ors. 2011 (1) SCALE 533 - followed.

G        Pratap and Anr. vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (1996).
     3 SCC 1; Munithimmaiah vs. State of Kamataka and Ors.
     (2002) 4 sec 326 - referred to.

     3.3 On a comparison between the provisions of Land
H Acquisition Act and KIAD Act, it is found that those two
   M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 441
                    ORS.
  Acts were enacted to achieve substantially different           A
  purposes. KIAD Act is a self contained Code and the
  Central Act is not supplemental to it. The said Act is
  primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public
· purpose and for payment of compensation. The
  acquisition of land under the 1894 Act is not concerned        B.
  solely with the purpose of planned development of any
  city. It has to cater to different situations which come
  within the expanded horizon of public purpose. [Paras 42
  and 43] [458-C-G]
                                                                 c
      Gimar Traders vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors. 2011
 (1) SCALE 223 - referred to.

      Mariyappa and Ors. vs. State of Kamataka and Ors.
 (1998) 3 sec 276 - held inapplicable.
                                                                 D
      4. The filing of the instant appeal before this Court is
  an instance of an abuse of tile process of Court. The
  main purpose was to hold up, on one or other pretext,
  the land acquisition proceeding which was initiated to
  achieve a larger public purpose. Thus, the State               E
  Government should complete the project as early as
  possible and should not do anything, including releasing
  any land acquired under the said project, as that may
  impede the completion of the project and would not be
  compatible with the larger public interest which the           F
  project is intended to serve.[Paras 47 and 48] [459-G-H;
~ 460-A-B]

      State of Kamataka and Anr. vs. All India Manufactureres
  Organisation and Ors. (2006) 4 SCC 683 - relied on.            G

     5. The appellant is directed to pay Rs. 10 lacs as
 costs in favour of Karnataka High Court Legal Services
 Authority within the stipulated period. [Para 49] [460-C]
                                                                 H
    442      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                             [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A                                        Case Law Reference:
     ILR Lahore Vol. VIII 384                    Referred to    Para 16
     (1916) 1 I.LR. 43 Cal. 694 Referred to                     Para 20
     AIR 1965 SC 1150                            Referred to    Para 22
B
     (2006) 4 sec 683                            Relied on      Para 23,30,47
     (1977) 2 sec 006                            Referred to    Para 25
     (1990) 2 sec 115                            Followed       Para 27
c
     (1947) 2 All ER 255(A)                      Referred to    Para 24
     (1998) 3 sec 573                            Relied on      Para 28
     (1996) 3 sec 1                              Referred to    Para 38
D    (2002) 4 sec 326                            Referred to    Para 40
     2011 (1) SCALE 533                          Followed       Para 41
     2011 (1) SCALE 223                          Referred to    Para 43

E    (1998) 3 sec 21s                            Held inapplicable Para 44
              '     '.' --.i:...:'.~'\-)"i···

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    1215 of 2011 ..

      From the Judgment & Order dated 23.07.2010 of the High
F Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.A. No. 1192 of 2007.

         Anoop Choudhary, June Choudhary, Raghavendra S.
    Srivatsa, Venkat Subramanium for the Appellant.

      Dushyant Dave, Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi, Anant Raman,
G R.V.S. Nair, Shanth Kr. V. Mahale, Anitha Shenoy for the
  Respondents.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

H
   M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 443 ·
                             ORS.

       GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted.                                   A

       2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order
  dated 23rd July 2010 passed by Di.vision Bench of the High
  Court of Karnataka whereby the learned Judges dismissed the
  W.A. No.1192 of 2007 which. was filed impugning an                   B
  acquisition proceeding to the State of Kamataka. It may also
  be noted that while ~ismissing the appeal, the Division Bench
  affirmed the judgmenfof the learned Single Judge dated 28th
  May 2007.

       3. From the perusal of the judgment of learned Single           C
  Judge it appears that the appellant claims to be the owner of
  the land bearing Sy. No.76/1 and Sy. No.76/2 of
  Thotadaguddadahalli Village, Bangalore North Jaluk. The
  appellant alleged that these two plots of land were outside the
  purview of the Framework Agreement (FWA} and notificatiof1           D
  issued under Sections 28(1) anci 28(4) of Kamataka Industrial
  Areas Development Act (KIAD Act}. While dismissing the writ
  petition, the learned Single Judge held that the acquisition
  proceedings in question were challenged by the writ petitioner,
  the appellant herein, in a previous writ petition No.46078/03        E
  which was initially accepted and the acquisition proceedings
  were quashed. Then on appeal, the Division Berich (in writ
  a~peal Nos. 713/04 and 2210/04) reversed the judgment of the
  learned Single Judge. !hereafter, the Division Bench order was
  upheld before this Court and this Court approved the acquisition     F
  proceedings.

       4. Therefore, the writ petition, out of which this present
~ · appeal arises, purports to be an attempt to litigate once again,
  inter alia, on the ground that the aforesaid blocks of land were
  outside the purview of FWA dated 3.4.1997. The learned               G
  Judges ofthe Division· Bench held the second round of litigation
  is misconceived inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings were
  upheld right upto this Court. The Division Bench in the
  impugned judgment noted the aforesaid facts which were also
                                                                       H
    444       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A noted by the learned Single Judge. Apart from that the Division
  Bench also noted that another batch of public interest litigation
  in W.P. No.45334/04 and connected matters were also
  disposed of by this Court directing the State of Karnataka and
  all its instrumentalities including the Housing Board to forthwith
B execute the project as conceived originally and upheld by this
  Court and it was also directed that FWA be imptemented. The
  Division Bench, however, noted that on behalf of the appellant
  an additional ground has been raised that the acquisition stood
  vitiated since no award was passed as contemplated under
c Section 11A of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter "the said
  AcC):.

        5. One of the contentions raised before the Division Bench
  on behalf of the appellant was that the question of principle of
  Constructive Res Judicata is not applicable to a writ petition.
D This contention was raised in the context of alleged non-
  publication of award and the consequential invalidation of the
  acquisition proceeding. Even though that contention was raised
  for the first time before the Division Bench. The Division Bench,
  after referring to several judgments of this Court, held that the
E said contention is not tenable in law. The Division Bench also -
  noted that in the earlier round of litigation the contentions
  relating to the land falling outside the area of FWA being
  acquired, were raised and were repelled. In fact the contentions,
  raised in the previous round of litigation, have been noted
F expressly in para 17 of the impugned judgment, which are as
  under:
          "Most of the lands in question fall outside the area required
          for peripheral road etc. and they are fully developed. The
          acquisition for the benefit of private company like the NICE
G         Ltd. could not be termed as public purpose."
          "The acquisition for peripheral road etc. would be illegal
          notwithstanding the definition of infrastructural facilities as
          incorporated under Section 2 (Sa) of the Act. The proposed
H         acquisition is in respect of the alleged contract between
M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 445
      ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
  the State and M/s. NICE Ltd. which is stated to be based        A
  on agreement dated 3.4.1997."

  "It amounts to colorable exercise of power and fraud on
  power and in such an event, the entire acquisition
  proceedings are to have been quashed by the learned             8
  Single Judge."

  "On reading of para 23(2) of the impugned order, it is clear
  that the proposed acquisition of land as notified under
  Section 28(1) of the Act is different from the alleged
  purpose, which are quite different and from the same, it is     C
  clear that the acquisition initiated is not bonafide, but the
  sar:ne is as a result of colorable exercise of power coupled
  with exercise of fraud on power and on this count also, the
  notification issued under Section 28(1) also ought to have
  been quashed."                                                  D

  "The Government did not apply its mind to the acquisition
  proceedings and there is total non application of mind by
  the government to the relevant facts in initiating the
  acquisition proceedings under the KIADB Act."
                                                                  E
  "There was a total change in the stand of the opponents
  with regard to the 'public purpose' which was stated in the
  preliminary notification vis-a-vis their statement of objection
  filed before the Court and moreover the conduct of Mis.
  NICE Company in allotting certain extent of lands to the F
  Association of India Machine Tool Manufacturers (AIMTM)
  to put up a big conventional centre, even before the ·
  acquisition proceedings are complete, disentitles them
  from supporting the acquisition of lands."
                                                                  G
  "Since admittedly no industrial area was being framed in
  the lands proposed to be acquired, the KIADB could never
  be permitted to acquire lands for the formation of
  infrastructural facility without there being any industries."

  6. In the impugned judgment at para 18, the findings of the     H
    446      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A preivious Division Bench, on the contentions extracted above,
  were also noted. Relevant parts of it are extracted:

          "In so far as the appeals filed by the appellant - Indian
          Machine Tools Manufacturers Association in Writ Appeal -
          Nos.3326-27/2004 are concerned, we find that there is
B
          considerable fore~ in the submission made by the learned
          counsel for the appellant that the writ petition filed by the
          respondents 1 and 2 itself was not maintainable. In fact the
          learned Senior Counsel for the contesting respondent fairly
          conceded the same. The writ petition filed by the 2nd
c         responderit M. Nagabhushan in WP. No.3955912003
          came  to  be dismissed by this court holding that he had
          purchased the land in question from its previous owner
          D.R. Raghavendra subsequent to final notification issued
          under Sec.28(4) of the Act and that further the previous
D         owner D.R. Raghavendra had already handed over
          possession of the land in question to the Land
          Acquisition Officer by accepting the award."

          "Therefore apart from the fact that there is no merit in any
E         of the contentions urged on behalf of the land owners, we
          find that the appeals filed by the appellant- Indian Machine
          Tool Manufacturers Association has to succeed on the
          ground that the writ petition filed by the respondents 1 and
          2 itself was not maintainable. Since the appellant - IMTMA
F         was not a party before the learned Single Judge, the leave
          so~ght for is granted."

      7. Challenging the aforesaid judgment, the present
  appellant filed a special leave petition before this Court, which,
  on grant of leave, was numbered as Civil Appeal No.3878/
G 2005. The grounds which were substantially raised by the
  present appellant in the previous appeal (No.3878/2005) have
  been raised again in this appeal. The alleged grounds in the
  present appeal about acquisition of land beyond the
  requirement of FWA were raised by the present appellant in
H the previous appeal No.3878/2005 also.
 M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 447
       ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
     8. On those contentions, a three-judge Bench of this Court,    A
while dealing with several appeals including the one filed by the
present appellant,· rendered a judgment in State of Karnataka
and another Vs. All India Manufacturers Organisation and
others - (2006) 4 sec 683, wherein the said three-judge
Bench held:                                                         B
     "The next contention urged on behalf of the landowners is
     thatthe lands were not being acquired for a public purpose.
     The counsel who have argued for the landowners have
     expatiated in their contention by urging that land in excess
     of what was required under the FWA had been acquired;          C
     land far away from the actual alignment of the road and
     periphery had been acquired; consequently, it is urged that
     E;!Ven if the implementation of the highway project is
     assumed to be for a public purpose, acquisition of land
     far away therefrom would not amount to a public purpose        D
     nor would it be covered by the provisions of the KIAD Act."
           (Par,agraph 76, page 711 of the report)
     9. In paragraph 77 of the said report, it was further held:
                                                                    E
     "In our view, this was an entirely misconceived argument.
     As we have pointed out in the earlier part of our judgment,
     the Project is an integrated infrastructure development
     project and not merely a highway project. The Project as
     it has been styled, conceived and implemented was the          F
     Bangalore-Mysore Infrastructure Corridor Project, which
     conceived of the development of roads between
     Bangalore and Mysore, for which there were several
     interchanges in and around the periphery of the city of
     Bangalore, together with numerous developmental                G
     infrastructure activities along with the highway at several
     points. As an integrated project, it may require the
     acquisition and transfer of lands even away from the main
     alignment of the road."
                                                                    H
    448       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A         10. In paragraph 79 at page 712·of the report, this Court
    affirmed the previous judgment of the Division Bench of the
    High Court in the following words:

          "The learned Single Judge erred in assuming that the lands
          acquired from places away from the main alignment of the
B         road were not a part of the· Project and that is the reason ·
          he was persuaded to hold that only 60% of the land
          acquisition was justified because it pertained to the land
          acquired for the main alignment of the highway. This, in the
          view of the Division Bench, and in our view, was entirely
c         erroneous. The Division Bench was right in taking the view
          that the Project was an integrated project intended for
          public purpose and, irrespective of where the land was
          situated, so long as it arose from the terms of the FWA,
          there was no question of characterising it as unconnected
D         with a public purpose. We are, therefore, in agreement with
          the finding of the High Court on this issue."

       11. The Division Bench judgment of the High Court was
  further affirmed by this Court in clear and express words in
E paragraph 81 of the report:

          "In summary, having perused the well-considered judgment
          of the Division Bench which is under appeal in the light of
          the contentions advanced at the Bar, we are not satisfied
          that the acquisitions were, in any way, liable to be
F         interfered with by the High Court, even to the extent as held
          by the learned Single Judge. We agree with the decision
          of the Division Bench that the acquisition of the entire land
          .for the Project was carried out in consonance with the
           provisions of the KIAD Act for a public project of great
G          importance for the development of the State of Karnataka.
          We do not think that a project of this magnitude and
           urgency can be held up by individuals raising frivolous and
           untenable objections thereto. The powers under the KIAD
          Act represent the powers of eminent domain vested in the
H          State, which may need to be exercised even to the
  M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA &                      449
        ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
       detriment of individuals' property rights so long as it· A
       achieves a larger public purpose. Looking at the case as
       a whole, we are satisfied that the Project is intended to
       represent the larger public interest of the State and that is
       why it was entered into and implemented all along."
                                                                     B
       12. We find that disregarding the aforesaid clear finding
  of this Court, the appellant, on identical issues, further filed a
  new writ petition out of which the present appeal arises. That
· writ petition, as noted above, was rejected both by the learned
  Single Judge and by the Division Bench in clear terms.
                                                                        c
    . 13. It is obvious that such a litigative adventure by the
 present appellant is clearly against the principles of Res
 Judicata as well as principles of Constructive Res Judicata and
 principles analogous thereto.
                                                                        D
       14. The principles of Res Judicata are of universal
 application as it is based on two age old principles, namely,
 'interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium' which means that it is in
 the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation
 and the other principle is 'nemo debet his ve ari, si constet          E
 curiae quod sit pro un aet eademn cause' meaning thereby that
 no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if it appears to
 the Court that it is for one and the same cause. This doctrine
 of Res Judicata is common to all civilized system of
 jurisprudence to the extent that a judgment after a proper trial
                                                                        F
 by a Court of competent jurisdiction should be regarded as final
 and conclusive determination of the questions litigated and
 should for ever set the controversy at rest.

      15. That principle of finality of litigation is based on high ·
 principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle G
 great oppression might result under the colour and pretence of
 law in as much as there will be no end of litigation and a rich
 and malicious litigant will succeed in infinitely vexing his
 opponent by repetitive suits and actions. This may compel the
 weaker party to relinquish his right. The doctrine of Res H- -
    450       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 2 S.C.R.

A Judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. That is
  why it is perceived that the plea of Res Judicata is not a
  technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains
  the Rule of Law in ensuring finality in litigation. This principle
  seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice
B and to .prevent abuse in the matter of accessing Court for
 _agitating on issues which have become final between the
  parties.

        16. Justice Tek Chand delivering the unanimous Full Bench
  decision in the case of Mussammat Lachhmi Vs. Mussammat
C Bhulli (ILR Lahore Vol.VIII 384) traced the history of this
  doctrine both in Hindu and Mohammedan jurisprudence as
  follows:-

                "In the Mitakshra (Book II, Chap. I, Section V, verse
D         5) one of the four kinds of effective answers to a suit is "a
          plea by former judgment" and in verse 10,. Katyayana is
          quoted as laying down that "one against whom a judgment
          had formerly been given, if he bring forward the matter
          again, must be answered by a· plea of Purva Nyaya or
E         former judgment" (Macnaughten and Colebrooke's
          translation, page 22). The doctrine, however, seems to
          have been recognized much earlier in Hindu
          Jurisprudence, judging from the fact that both the Smriti
          Chandrika (Mysore Edition, pages 97-98) and the
F         Virmitrodaya (Vidya-Sagar Edition, page 77) base the
          defence of Prang Nyaya (=former decision) on the
          following text of the ancient law-giver Harita, who is
          believed by some Orientalists to have flourished in the 9th
          Century B.C. and whose Smriti is now extant only in
          fragments:-
G
                 "The plaintiff should be non-suited if the defendant
          avers: 'in this very affair, there was litigation between him
          and myself previously,' and it is found that the plaintiff had
          lost his case•.                     '
                                                                    ........
H
 M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA &                    451
       ORS; [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
           There are texts of Prasara (Bengal Asiatic Society      A
     Edition, page 56) and of the Mayukha (Kane's Edition,
     page 15) to the same effect.

          Among Muhammadan law-givers similar effect was
    given to the plea of "Niza-i-munfasla" or "Amar Mania taqrir
                                                                   8
  , mukhalif." Under Roman Law, as administered by the
    Proetors' Courts, a defendant could repel the plaintiffs
    claim by means of 'exceptio rei judicatoe" or plea of former
    judgment. The subject received considerable attention at
    the hands of Ruman jurists and as stated in Roby's Roman
    Private Law (Vol.II, page 338) the general principle           C
    recognised was that "one suit and one decision was
    enough for any single dispute" and that "a matter once
    brought to trial should not be tried except, of course, by
    way of appeal".

           (Page 391-392 of the report)

      17. The learned Judge also noted that in British India t,he
·rule of Res Judicata was first introduced by Section 16 of the
 Bengal Regulation, Ill of 1973 which prohibited the Zilla and City E
 Courts from entertaining any cause which, from the production
 of a former decree or the record of the Court, appears to have
 been heard and determined by any Judge or any
 Superintendent of a Court having competent jurisdiction. The
 learned Judge found that the earliest legislative attempt at
 codification of the law on the subject was made in 1859, when F
 the first Civil Procedure Code was enacted, whereunder.
 Section 2 of the Code barred every Court from taking
 cognizance of suits which, on the same cause of action, have
 been heard and determined by a Court of competent
 jurisdiction. The learned Judge opined, and in our view rightly, G
 that this was partial recognition of the English rule in so far as
 it embodied the principles relating to Estoppel by judgment or
  Estopel by record.

     18. Thereafter, when the Code was again revised in 1877,      H
          452      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2011] 2 S.C.R.


"A· the operation of the rule was extended in Section 13 and the
         bar was no longer confined to the retrial of a dispute relating
         to the same cause of action but the prohibition was extended
         against reagitating an issue, which had been heard and finally -
         decided between the same parties in a former suit by a
    8    competent court. The learned Judge also noted that before the
         principle assumed its present form in Section 11 of the Code
         of 1908, the Seaion wa$:expanded twice. However, the learned
         Judge noted that Sectiqlf 11 is not exhaustive of the law on the
         subject.

    C   'l\\tl. .'19. It is nobody's case that the appellant did not know the
         ~bntents of FWA. From this it follows that it was open to the
· appellant to question, in the previous proceeding filed by it, that
  his land which was acquired was not included in the FWA. No
  reasonable explanation was offered by the appellant to indicate
D why he had not raised this issue. Therefore, in our judgment,
  such an issue cannot be raised in this proceeding in view of
  the doctrine of Constructive Res Judicata.

       20. It may be noted in this context that while applying the
E principles of Res Judicata the Court should not be hampered
  by any technical rules of interpretation. It has been very
  categorically opined by Sir Lawrence Jenkins that "the
  application of the rule by Courts in India should be influenced
  by no technical considerations of form but by matter of
F substance within the limits allowed by law". [See Sheoparsan
         Singh Vs. Rammanandan Prasad Singh, (1916) 1 I.LR. 43
         Cal. 694 at page 706 (P.C.)].

      21. Therefore, any proceeding which has been initiated in
  breach of the principle of Res Judicata is prima-facie a
G proceeding which has been initiated in abuse of the process
  of Court.

             22. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Devi/al Modi Vs.
         Sa/es Tax Officer, Rat/am & Ors. - AIR 1965 SC 1150, has ·
         explained this principle in very clear terms:
  M.. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 453
         ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
     "But the question as to whether a citizen should be allowed        A
     to challenge the validity of the same order by successive
     petitions under Art. 226, cannot be answered merely in the
     light of the significance and importance of the citizens'
     fundamental rights. The general principle underlying the
     doctrine of res judicata is ultimately based on                    B
     considerations of public policy. One important
     consideration of public policy is that the decisions
     pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction should be
     final, unless tb~~1 are modified or reversed by appellate
     authorities;:,~ng:the other principle is that no one should        c
     be made t;g:faoe the same kind of litigation twice over,
      because such" a process would be contrary to
     considerations.of fair play and justice, vide : Daryao Vs.
      State of U.'P., 1962-1 SCR 575; (AIR 1961 SC 1457)."

      23. This Court in A// India Manufacturers Organisation            D
 (supra) explained in clear terms that principle behind the
 doctrine of Res Judicata is to prevent an abuse of the process
-of Court.
     24. In explaining the said principle the Bench in All India        E
 Manufacturers Organisation (supr'il) relied on the following
 formulation of Lord Justice Somervell in Greenhalgh Vs.
 Mallard - (1947) 2 All ER 255 (CA):                        .

      "I think that on the authorities to which I will refer it would   F
      be accurate to say that res judicata for this purpose is not
      confined to the issu~s which the court is actually asked to
      decide, but that it covers issues or facts which are so
      clearly part of the subject-matter of the 'litigation and so
      clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse
      of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to          G
      be started in respect of them."
      25. The Bench also noted that the judgment of the Court
 of Appeal in "Greenhalgh"was approved by. this Court in State
       ..                                                               H

                   .,.
              ...... -t    .

                          ..
                          .
                               ~
    454       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A of U.P. Vs. Nawab Hussain - (1977) 2 SCC 806 at page 809,
  para 4.

         26. Following all these principles a Constitution Bench of
    this Court in Direct Recruit Class II Engg. Officers' Assn. Vs.
B State of Maharashtra - (1990) 2 SCC 715 laid down the
  · following principle:

          "...... an adjudication is conclusive and final not only as to
          the actual matter determined but as to every other matter
          which the parties might and ought to have litigated and
C         have had decided as incidental to or essentially connected
          with subject matter of the litigation and every matter
          coming into the legitimate purxiew of the original action
          both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. Thus,
          the principle of constructive res judicata underlying
D         Explanation IV of Section 11 of the Code of Civil
          Procedure was applied to writ case. We, accordingly hold
          that the writ case is fit to be dismissed on the ground of
          res judicata"

E        27. In view of such authoritative. pronouncement of the
    Constitution Bench of this Court, there can be no doubt that the
    principles of Constructive Res Judicata, as explained in
    explanation IV to Section 1.1 of the CPC, are also appHcable
    to writ petitions.

F       28. Thus, the attempt to re-argue the case which has been
  finally decided by the Court of last resort is a clear abuse of
  process of the Court, regardless of the principles of Res
  Judicata, as has been held by this Court in K.K. Modi Vs. K.N.
  Modi and Ors. - (1998) 3 SCC 573. In paragraph 44 of the
G report, this principle has been very lucidly discussed by this
  Court and, the relevant portions whereof are extracted below:

          "One of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of
          the court is relitigation, It is an abuse of the process of the
          court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party
H
  M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 455
        ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

     to relitigate the same issue which has already been tried       A
     and decided earlier against him. ·The reagitation may or
     may not be barred as res judicata .. ,"

     · 29. In coming to the aforementioned finding, this Court
relied on the Supreme Court Practice 1995 published by sweet         B
& Maxwell. The relevant principles laid down in the aforesaid
practice and which have been accepted by this Court are as
follows:

     "This term connotes that the process of the court must be
     used bona fide and properly and must not be abused. The         C
     court will prevent improper use of its machinery and will in
     a proper case, summarily prevent its machinery from being
     used as a mea'ns of vexation and oppression in the
     process of litigation .... The categories of conduct
     rendering a claim frivolous, vexatious or' an ~buse of          D
     process are not closed but depend on all the relevant
     circumstances. And for this purpose considerations of
     public policy and the interests of justice may be very
     material."
                                                                     E
     30. In the premises aforesaid, it is clear that the attempt
by the appellant to re-agitate the same issues which were
considered by this Court and were rejected expressly in the
previous judgment in A// India Manufacturers Organisation
(supra), is a clear instance of an abuse of process of this Court
apart from the fact that such issues are barred by principles of     F
Res Judicata. or Constructive Res Judicata and principles
analogous thereto.

       31. The other point which has been argued by the appellant
  is that notification dated 30.3.2004 issued under Section 28(4)    G
. of KIAD Act stands vitiated in view of the provisions of Section
  11A of the said Act inasmuch as no award was passed within
 two years from the date of the notification.

                                                                     H
    456         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2011) 2 S.C.R.


A         32. This Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention
    for the following reasons.

         33. It may be noted that the said question was not urged
    by the appellant in its writ petition before the learned Single
    Judge. Of course, this was urged before the Division Bench of
8
    the High Court unsuccessfully. Apart from that we also find no
    substance in the aforesaid contentions.

        34. If we compare the provisions of Sections 28(4) and
  28(5) of KIAD Act with the provisions of Sections 4 and 6 of
C the said Act, we discern a substantial difference between the
  tw<>.

      35. In order to appreciate the purport of both Sections
  28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, they are to be read together
D and are set out below:

          "28. Acquisition of land-

                 )()()(   )()()(


E         (4)    After orders are passed under sub-Section (3),
                 where the State Government is satisfied that any
                 land shoold be acquired for the purpose specified
                 in the notification issued under sub-section(1), a
                 declaration shall, by notification in the official
                 Gazette, be made to that effect.
F
          (5)    On the publication in the official Gazette of the
                 declaration under sub-section (4), the land shall vest
                 absolutely in the State Government free from all
                 encumbrances."
G
       36. The appellant has not challenged the validity of the
  aforesaid provisions. Therefore, on a combined reading of the
  provisions of Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, it is
  clear that_ on the publication of the notification under Section
H 28(4) of the KIAD Act i.e. from 30.3.2004, the land in question
   M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 451'
         ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
 vested in the State free from all encumbrances by operation of      A
 Section 28(5) of the KIAD Act, whereas the land acquired under
 the said Act vests only under Section 16 thereof, which runs
 as under:

      "16. Power to take possession:- When the Collector has         8
      made an award under section 11, he may take possession
      of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the
      Government free from all encumbrances"

      37. On a comparison of the aforesaid provisions, namely,
 Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act with Section 16 of         C
 the said Act, it is clear that the land which is subject to
 acquisition proceeding under the said Act gets vested with the
 Government only when the Collector makes an award under
 Section 11, and the Government takes possession. Under
 Sections 28(4) and 28(5) of the KIAD Act, such vesting takes        D
 place by operation of law and it has nothing to do with the
 making of any award. This is where Sections 28(4) and 28(5)
 of the KIAD Act are vitally different from Sections 4 and 6 of
 the said Act.
                                                                     E
        38. A somewhat similar question came up for
  consideration before a three-judge Bench of this Court in Pratap
  and Another Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. - (1996) 3 SCC
  1. In that case the acquisition proceedings commenced under
  Section 52(2) of Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 and
  the same contentions wereraised, namely, that the acquisition      F
  notification gets invalidated for not making an award within a
~ period of two years from the date of notification.

      '39. Repelling the said contention, the learned Judges held
 that once the land is vested in the Government, the provisions      G
 of Section 11 A are not attracted and the acquisition
 proceedings will not lapse. (para 12 at page 8 of the report)

     40. In Munithimmaiah Vs. State of Kamataka and others
 reported in (2002) 4 SCC 326 this Court held that the provisions    H
    458      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A of Sections 6 and 11A of the said Act do not apply to the
   provisions of Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 (BOA
   Act). In paragraph 15 at page 335 of the report this Court made
    a distinction between the purposes of the two enactments and
    held that all the provisions of said Act do not apply to BOA Act.
B
         41. Subsequently, the Constitution Bench of this Court in
  . Offshore Holdings Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Bangalore Development
    Authority and Ors., reported in 2011 (1) SCALE 533 - 574,
    held that Section 11A of the said Act does not apply to
C acquisition under BOA Act.

        42. The same principle is attracted to the present case
  also. Here also on a comparison between the provisions of said
  Act and KIAD Act, we find that those two Acts were enacted
  to achieve substantially different purposes. In so far as KIAD
D Act is concerned, from its Statement of Objects and Reasons,
  it is clear that the same was enacted to achieve the following
  purposes:

          "It is considered necessary to make provision for the
          orderly establishment and development of Industries in
E
          suitable areas in the State. To achieve this object, it is .
          proposed to specify suitable areas for Industrial
          Development and establish a Board to develop such areas
          and make available lands therein for establishment of
          Industries."
F
       43. KIAD Act is of course a self contained code. The said
  Act is primarily a law regulating acquisition of land for public
  purpose and for payment of compensation. Acquisition of land
  under the said Act is not concerned solely with the purpose of
G planned development of any city. It has to cater to different
  situations which come within the expanded horizon of public
  purpose. Recently the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gimar
  Traders Vs. State of Maharashtra & Others, reported in 2011
  (1) SCALE 223 held that Section 11A of the said Act does not
H
   M. NAGABHUSHANA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA & 459
         ORS. [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]
 apply to acquisition under the provisions of Maharashtra            A
 Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966.

      44. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied on the
 judgment of this Court in the case of Mariyappa and others Vs.
 State of Karnataka and others reported in (1998) 3 SCC 276.         B
 The said decision was cited for the purpose of contending that
 Section 11A is applicable to an acquisition under KIAD Act. In
 Mariyappa (supra) before coming to hold that provision of
 Section 11A of the Central Act applies to Karnataka Acquisition
 of Land for Grant of House Sites Act, 1972 (hereinafter "1972
 Act"), this Court held that the 1972 Act is not a self-contained    C
 code. The Court also held that the 1972 Act and the Central
 Acts are supplemental to each other to the extent that unless
 the Central Act supplements the Karnataka Act, the latter
 cannot function. The Court further held that both the Acts,
  namely, 1972 Act and the Central Act deals with the same           D
 subject. But in the instant case the K!AD Act is a self-contained
 code and the Central Act is not supplemental to it. Therefore,
 the ratio in Mariyappa (supra) is not attracted to the facts of
 the present case.
                                                                     E
      45. Following the aforesaid well settled principles, this
 Court is of the opinion that there is no substance in the
 contention of appellant that acquisition under KIAD Act lapsed
 for alleged non-compliance with the provisions of Section 11 A
 of the said Act.                                                    F
      46. For the reasons aforesaid all the contentions of the
_ appellant, being without any substance, fail and the appeal is
  dismissed.

      47. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, this Court          G
 holds that the filing of this appeal .before this Court is an
 instance of an abuse of the process of Court. The main purpose
 was to hold up, on one or other pretext, the land acquisition
 proceeding which, as held by this Court in All India
                                                                     H
   460      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2011] 2 S.C.R.


A Manufacturers Organisation (supra), was initiated to 'achieve
  a larger public purpose'.
       48. In that view of the matter, this court makes it clear that
  the State Government should complete the project as early as
  possible and should not do anything, including releasing any
8
  land acquired under this project, as that may impede the
  completion of the project and would not be compatible with the
  larger public interest which the project is intended to serve.

        49. This Court, therefore, dismisses this appeal with costs
C assessed at Rs.10 Lacs, to be paid by the appellant in favour
  of Karnataka High Court Legal Services Authority within a
  period of six weeks from date. In default, a proceeding will be
  initiated against the appellant on a complaint by the Karnataka
  High Court Legal Services Authority by the appropriate authority
D under the relevant Public Demand Recovery Act for recovery
  of this cost amount as arrears of land revenue.
        50. The appeal is, thus, dismissed with costs as aforesaid.
   Interim orders, if any, are vacated.
   N.J.                                         Appeal dismissed.