Holding

The employer was entitled to dismiss the employee under Rule 22 as his conduct was detrimental to the corporation’s interests and not protected by Article 19.

Summary

The appellant, an Assistant Manager of Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation and President of its Employees' Welfare Association, wrote a letter to the Governor alleging mismanagement and issued a press statement criticizing a senior official. The corporation charged him under Rule 22 of its service rules for misconduct, unauthorized leave, and actions detrimental to its prestige, and dismissed him after an ex‑parte enquiry. The appellant contended that his actions were protected by the fundamental right to freedom of speech and to form associations under Article 19 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court held that Rule 22 is a reasonable restriction aimed at maintaining discipline and efficiency, and that the appellant’s conduct was not protected speech but a breach of service discipline. Consequently, the employer was entitled to dismiss him, and the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The appellant's letter to the Governor and press statement constitute protected freedom of speech and association under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c).
Whether Rule 22 of the corporation's service rules, which permits dismissal for conduct detrimental to the employer, is a valid restriction on those fundamental rights.
Whether the dismissal was a lawful exercise of disciplinary power under the service rules.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 19(1)(a), s. Article 19(1)(c), s. Article 19(1)(g), s. Article 19(2), s. Article 19(4), s. Article 19(6)

Subjects

service lawdisciplinary actionfreedom of speechArticle 19government employeeRule 22misconductpublic orderdismissal

Judgment

,

"
M.H. DEVENDRAPPA A

THE KARNATAKA STATE SMALL INDUSTRIES
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

FEBRUARY 17, 1998
B
[MRS. ~UJATA V. MANOHAR AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Service Law :

Service Rules of the Karnataka State Small Industries Development C
Corportation-Rule 22-Assistants lvfanager-Letter to Governor levelling
allegations against the Corporation-Press statement issued attributing
motives to the Chairman-Proceeded on unauthorised leave-Show cause
notice issued-Charges framed-Ex-parte enquiry--Dismissal from service--
On appeal, Held, employee who disobeys the rules or displays negligence, D
inefficiency or does any-thing detrimental to the interest or prestige of the
Corporation is guilty of misconduct-Employer entitled to take disciplinary
action under Rule 22-Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 19(l)(a) :
19(l)(c) & 19(l)(g).

Constitution of India, 1950--Articles 19(/){a), 19(J)(c) & 19(l)(g)- E
Service Rules of the Karnataka State Small Industries Development
Corporation-Rule 22-Held : Rule is not violative of Constitution.

The appellant was working as Asstt. Manager of the Respondent
Corporation and was also the President of its Employees' Welfare Association.
He wrote a letter to the Governor levelling allegation of mismanagement in F
the Corporation. A JJress statement was also issued by him attributing
motives to the Chairman and welcoming his dismissal from the Presidentship
of the District Congress Committee. When an exJJlanation was called for
from the a)lpellant, he went on unauthorised leave. A notice was )lublished
in the news)la)ler calling u11on the a)lpellant tu report back to duty. Then a
show cause notice was issued for taking action under Rule 22 of the Service G
.
1- Rules of the Corporation. Thereafter charges were framed against the
a1111ellant and were served upon him. The a)l)lellant filed a civil suit for
injunction hut no injunction was granted. The ap)lellant refused to )lartici)late
in the enquiry, the exparte enquiry held him guilty of the charges levelled
again~1 him, and he was dismissed from service. The appellant umucces~fully H
919
920 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) 1 S.C.R.

A challenged the said dismissal order before the Single Judge and in appeal
before the Division Bench of the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

The contention of the appellant was that by writing ihe letter to the
GoVemor and releasing the press statement he had exercised his fundamental
right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) as also he
B had exercised his right to form associations or Unions under ,Article 19(1)(c)
of the Constitution and therefore he could not be dismissed friim·service..

Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. The Employer was entitled to take disciplinary action
~ I

c under Rule 22 of the Service)lules of the Kamataka State Small Industries
Development Corporation, since the appellant employee had made a direct
public attack on the head of his organisation. He had also, in the letter to
the Governor, made allegations against various officers of the Corporation
with whom he had to work and his conduct was clearly detrimental to the
pro11er functioning of the organisation or its internal discipline. Making
D
public statements against the head of the organisation on a political issue
also amounted to lowering the prestige of the organisation in which he
worked. On proper balancing, of individaul freedom of the appellant and
proper functioning of the Government Organisation which had employed
him, this was a fit case where the employer was entitled to take disciplinary
E action under Rule 22. (931-C-D)
2.1. The right to freedom of speech and expression is subject to
reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the Constitution of India,
1950. Similarly, Article 19(1)(c) is also subjected to reasonable restrictions
under Article 19(4). Such reasonable restrictions can be made, inter alia,
F in the interest of public order or morality. Any action which is detrimental
to the interests or prestige of the employer clearly undermines discipline
within the organisation and also the efficient functioning of that organisation.
l
Such a rule could be construed as falling under "Public Order" clause.
[925-C)

G O.K. Ghosh & Anr. v. E.X Joseph, [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 789. Referred
to.

2.2. A rule which is not llrimarily designed to restrict any of the
fundamental rights cannot be called in question as violating Article 19(1)(a)
-
;,

or 19(1)(c). Rule 22 of the Service Rules is not meant to curtail freedom of
H speech of expression or the freedom to form associations or unions. It is
·'
M.H. DEVENDRAPPA v. KARNATAKA STATE S.l.D. CORP. 921
clearly meant to maintain discipline within the sen-ice, to ensure efficient A
performance of duty by the employees of the Corporation, and to protect the
interests and prestige of the Corporation. Therefore, under Rule 22 an
employee who disobeys the sen-ice Rules or displays negligence, inefficiency
or insubordination or does anything detrimental to the interests or prestige
of the Cor1>oration or acts in conflict with official instructions or is guilty B
of misconduct, is liable to disciplinary action. (925-F-G]

P. Balakotaiah v. The Union of India & Ors., (1958) SCR 1052 &
Kameshwar Prasad & Ors., v. The State ofBihar & Anr., [1962) Supp. 3 SCR
369 referred to.

Seervai 's Constitutional Law ofIndian, Vol. I. Page 816 Para 10.238, C
referred to.

2.3. A proper balancing of interests of an individual as a citizen and
the right of the State to frame a code of conduct for its employees in the
...._ interest of proper functioning of the State is required. Therefore, what is to D
-< be considered is the reasonableness of sen-ice Rules which curtail certain
kinds of activities amongst Government sen-ants in the interests of efficiency
and discipline in order that they may discharge their public duties as
Government sen-ants in a proper manner without undermining the pre~1ige
or efficiency of the organisation. H the Rules are directly and primarily
meant for this purpose, they being in furtherance of Article 19(1)(g) can be E
upheld although they may indirectly impinge upon some other limbs of
Article 19 qua an individual employet;. (929-G-H; 930-A)

Marvin L. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School,
(391 US 563) & Permanent Secretary and Ministry of Agriculture & Ors.
r v. De Freitas, (1996) 1 CHRB 1, referred to. F

3. Joining Government sen-ice has, implicit in it, if not explicitly so
laid down, the obsen-ance of a certain code of conduct necessary for the
proper discharge of functions as a Government sen-ant. That code cannot be
flouted in the name of other freedoms. Of course, the courts will be vigilant G
to see that the code is not so widely framed as to unreasonably restrict
fundamental freedom. But a reasonable code designed to promote discipline
and efficiency can be enforced by the Government organisation in the sense
that those who flout it can be subjected to disciplinary action. (929-C-D)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3867 of H
922 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] I S.C.R.

A 1988.

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.4.88 of the Karnataka High Court
in W.P.A. No. 602of1988.

S.R. Bhat for tl1e Appellant.
B
S.S. Javali and P.R. Ramasesh with him for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J. At the material time the appellant was
c Development
the Assistant Manager of the respondent-Karnataka State Small Industries
Corporation (KSSIDC), Bangalore. He was also the President of
,
the Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation Employees'
W clfare Association, Bangalore.

On 3rd of June, 1977 the appellant addressed a letter to the Governor
D of Karnataka on behalf of the Kamataka State Small Industries Development >.
Corporation Employees' Welfare Association in which he stated that the
KSSIDC Corporation was likely to be wound up on account of bad
administration, corruption and nepotism. He said that till 1977 the Corporation
was running at a profit. However, since then it was sustaining continuous
losses. In tl1e letter it was alleged tl1at several persons were being appointed
E
in the Corporation who were not properly qualified at tl1e instance of political
leaders and ministers. The letter set out some instances of these kinds of
appointments. There were also allegations in the letter about tl1e nexus between
contractors for nrious projects and the management of the Corporation.
There were also some allegations about cement purchased forn1 the Corporation
F being diverted and various such alleged malpractices in general tenns. The
letter requested the Governor to arrange to investigate the working conditions 1.
of the said Corporation. The letter had no connection with the service
conditions of the employees or the objects of the Employees' Welfare
Association.

G On 3 lst of December 1977, tl1e appellant issued a press statement which
was published in a Kannada Daily called Samyuktha Kamataka of the same
date. The appellant isucd a statement welcoming the dismissal of Mr. S.C. ~
Venkatesh, who was then tl1e Chainnan of the appellant-Corporation from the
Presidcntship of the Bangalore City District Congress Committee. The appellant
H also expressed the hope that political leaders would prevail upon tl1e
{

M.H DEVENDRAPPA v. KARNATAKA STATE S.l.D. CORP. [MRS. SUJATA V. MANDHAR, J.] 923
Government and remove Mr. S.C. Venkatesh from the Presidentship of the A
---'-- respondent-Corporation thereby saving lakhs of rupees as Mr. S. C. Venkatesh
was doing illegal activities.

In January, 1978 the respondent wrote to the appellant seeking
confinnation about the authorship of the letter which had been sent to the
Governor and asking for his explanation as to why disciplinary action should B
not be taken against him. Thereupon the appellant went on leave from 9th of
January 1978 till 3 lst of January, 1978. The appellant absented himself from
duty from 9th of January, 1978 and on 12th of January, 1978 he sent a telegram
to the respondent seeking comnmted leave from 9.1.1978 to 31.1.1978. On 1st
of February, 1978 the respondent published a notice in the newspaper calling c
upon the appellant to report back for duty within seven dnys. By letter of 9th
of February, 1978, the appellant was asked to show cause in writing as to why
disciplinary action should not be taken as per Rule 22 of the Service Rules
of the Corporation. The appellant sent a reply dated 17 .2.1978.

~
Thereafter on 11.4.1978 three articles of charge were served on the D
appellant. The charges were to the following effect:

Charge No. I was to the effect that he had written a letter dated 3 .6.1977
to the Governor of Karnataka pointing out mismanagement in the respondent-
Corporation. Being an employee of the Corporation he could not address the E
letter to the Governor without permission of the management. This amounted
to violation of Rule 22 of th\: Service Rules of the Corporation, since it was
misconduct and kno\vingly doing something detrimental to the interests and
the prestige of the Corporation.

Charge No.2 was to the effect that the appellant had issued a statement F
,.,., in Samyukta Karnataka Kannada Daily dated 31.12.1997 attributing motives to
the then Chainnan of the respondent-Corporation and welcoming his dismissal
from tl1e Presidentship of the Bangalore District Congress Committee. Being
an employee of the Corporation he could not issue a press statement of a
political nature of indulge in political activities which amounted to gross
misconduct and knowingly committing an action detrimental to the interests
G
or prestige of the Corporation.
1-
The third charge was to the effect that his act of leaving the office
unautl1orisedly with effect from 9.1.1978 and staying away from his legitimate
work amounted to misconduct. H
)

924 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) l S.C.R.

A The appellant submitted a written statement dated 27.4.1978 in which he
stated that he had already filed a suit before the District Court, Bangalore for
a declaration and injunction. He stated that all his actions were in his capacity
as the President of the respondent-Employees' Welfare Association and that
the enquiry against him was illegal and without jurisdiction and was in mala
B fide exercise of power. He also sought to justify what he stated in the letter
to the Governor.

In the Civil suit no injunction was granted. The enquiry proceeded. On
31.5.1978 the appellant stated before the Enquiry Officer that he would not
participate in the enquiry. Thereafter the enquiry against him was held ex parte
C and he was held guilty. On receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer, the
disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice to the appellant dated
19.6.1978 in which it was pointed out that the first two charges had been held
proved against him while the third charge had been held as partly proved. In
view thereof the appellant was asked to show cause why action should not
be taken against him dismissing him from service. The appellant sent a reply
D dated 24.6.1978. "'.

On 14.7.1978 an order was passed dismissing tl1e appellant from service.
The appellant filed a writ petition before tl1e High Court of Karnataka
challenging the order of dismissal. A learned Single Judge of the High Court
dismissed the writ petition. The appeal of the appellant before a Division
E Bench of the High Court has also been dismissed. Hence the present appeal
has been filed.

Rule 22 of the Service Rules of the respondent-Corporation as set out
by the appellant in his special leave petition before this Court, is as follows:-

F "An employee, who commits a breach of these rules or displays
negligence, inefficiency or in-subordination, who knowing does
anything detrimental to the interests or prestige of the Corporation or
in conflict with official instructions or is guilty of any activity of
misconduct or misbehavior shall be liable to one or more of the
G following penalties."

The other relevant Rule is Rule 19 which is as follows:

"19. Participation in Politics:

No employee shall be a member of or otherwise associate with any
H political party in politics nor shall he take part in, subscribe in aid of,
M.H DEVENDRAPPA '· KARNATAKA STATE S.l.D. CORP. (MRS SUJATA V MANOHAR, J.] 925
or assist in any political movement or activity." A
It is the contention of the appellant that in writing the letter of 3rd June, 1977
to the Governor of Karnataka and releasing the press statement of 31.12.1977
he had exercised his fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression
under Article 19(1) (a) as also he had exercised his right to fom1 associations
or unions under Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution and that he could not be B
dismissed from service when he had exercised his fundamental rights under
Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c). This is the issue that needs to be examined.

The right to freedom of speech and expression is subject to reasonable
restrictions under Article 19(2). Such restrictions can be in the interest of
sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with C
foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of
court, defamation or incitement to an offence. Similarly, Article 19(l)(c) is also
subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(4). Such reasonable
restrictions can be made, inter a/ia, in the interest of public order or morality.
Article 19(2) or 19(4) may not be directly relevant in the present case in view D
of tl1e provisions contained in Rule 22 of the Service Rules. Rule 22 of the
Service Rules is not meant to curtail freedom of speech or expression or the
freedom to form associations or unions. It is clearly meant to maintain discipline
within the service, to ensure efficient perfom1ance of duty by the employees
of the Cmporation, and to protect the interests and prestige of tl1e Corporation.
Therefore, under Rule 22 an employee who disobeys tile service Rules or E
displays negligence, inefficiency or in-subordination or does anything
detrimental to tl1e interests or prestige of tile Corporation or acts in. conflict
with official instructions or is guilty of misconduct, is liable to disciplinary
action. Rule 22 is not primarily or even essentially designed to restrict, in any
way, freedom of speech or expression or the right to form associations or F
unions. A Rule which is not primarily designed to restrict any of the
fundamental rights cannot be called in question as violating Article I 9(1)(a)
or I 9(I)(c). In fact, in tl1e present proceedings the constitutional validity of
Rule 22 is not under challenge. What is under challenge is the order of
dismissal passed for violating Rule 22 when tile impugned conduc;t which
violates Rule 22 is held out as an exercise of a right under Article 19(1 )(a) or G
19(1)(c).

In tl1e case of P. Balakotaiah v. The Union ofIndia & Ors., [1958] SCR
1052 certain railway employees who belonged to a Workers' Union sponsored
by tile Communists carried on agitation for a general strike in order to
paralyse communications and movement of essential supplies. They were H
926 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] I S.C.R.

A charge-sheeted and their services were terminated. The charges showed that
the action was taken against the employees not because they were Communists
or trade-unionists but because they were engaged in subversive activities.
This Court said that there is no contravention of Article 19(l)(c) by the
impugned order. The impugned order did not prevent the workers from
B continuing to be Communists or trade-unionists. Their right in that behalf
remained as before. The real complaint of the workers was that their services
had been terminated and this did not involve infringement of any of their
constitutional rights apart from Article 311. This court said, "The appellants
have no doubt a fundamental right to form associations under Article 19(l)(c)
but they have no fundamental right to be continued in employment by the
C State and when. their services are terminated by the State they cannot complain
of the infringement of any of their constitutional rights when no question of
violation of Article 311 arises" (page 1064).

However, in the case of Kameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. The State of
Bihar & Anr., [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 369, Balakothaiah 's case (supra) was
D distinguished on the ground that the Service Rules had not been challenged
as ultra vires in that case. In Kameshwar Prasad's case (supra) there was a
challenge to Rule 4A of the Bihar Government Servants Conduct Rules in so
far as it prohibited any form cif demonstrations by Government servants. This
court said that a Government servant, by accepting Government service, did
E not lose his fundamental rights under Article 19 and that, Ruic 4A in so far
as it prohibited all kinds of.demonstrations, whether orderly or disorderly,
would be violative of Article 19(l)(b) which secured the right to assemble
peaceably and without amis. The Court felt that the Rule was so worded that
it was not possible to make a distinction under the Rule between
demonstrations which could be peaceful and demonstrations which could be
F violent. So that it was not possible to say that to the extent that the Rule
prohibited violent demonstrations, which may result in breach of public order,
the Rule was valid. The entire Rule, therefore, in so far as it prohibited
demonstrations, was struck down. However, while doing so, the Court said
the following (page 384):

G "We have rejected the broad contention that persons in the service
of Government forn1 a class apart to whom the rights guaranteed by
Part III do not, in general, apply. By accepting the contention that the
freedoms guaranteed by Part III and in particular those in Article
l 9(l)(a) apply to the servants of Government, we should not be taken
H to imply that in relation to this class of citizens the responsibility
M H DEVENDRAPPA v. KAR NAT AKA STATE SJ D. CORP. [MRS. SUJATA V MANO HAR, J.] 927
arising fi·om official position 11'ou/d not by ilse!f impose some A
limitations on the exercise of their rights as citizens."

[underlining ours]

mustrations would be, the duty to maintain the secrecy of voting by an officer
or clerk engaged in election duty, the duty to maintain confidentiality of B
defence strategies, and so on. Therefore, in Kameshwar Prasad's case (supra)
this Court made it clear that it was not in any manner affecting by the said
Judgment, the Rules of Government service designed for proper discharge of
duties and obligations by Government servants, although they may curtail or
impose limitations on their rights under Part III of the Constitution. C

In the case of O.K. Ghosh & Anr. v. E.X Joseph [1963] Supp. 1 SCR
789 at 794, the respondent, a Central Government servant, who was the
Secretary of the Civil Accounts Association was departmentally proceeded
against under Rules 4(A) and 4(B) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct)
Rules, 1955, for participating in demonstrations in preparation of a general D
strike and for refusing to dissociate from the Association after the Government
had withdrawn its recognition of it. This Court set aside Rule 4(B) as invalid
and violative of Article 19(l)(c). The Rule provided that no Government
servant shall join or continue to be a member of any services association
which the Government did not recognise or in respect of which recognition E
had been refused or withdrawn by it. This Court said that Rule 4(B) imposed
a restriction on the undoubted right of a Government servant under Article
19(l)(c) which was neither reasonable nor in the interest of "public order"
under Article 19(4). Because, in granting or withdrawing the recognition, the
Government might be actuated by considerations other than those of efficiency
or discipline amongst the services or consideration of public order. However, F
r Government servants can be subjected to Rules which are intended to maintain
discipline within their ranks and which lead to an efficient discharge of their
duties. The Court observed, (page 794): "There can be no doubt that
Government servants can be subjected to Rules which are intended to maintain
discipline amongst their ranks and to lead to an efficient discharge of their G
duties. Discipline amongst Government employees and their efficiency may,
in a sense, be said to be related to public order. But in considering the scope
of clause (4), it has to be borne in mind that the Rule must be in the interests
of public order· and must amount to a reasonable restriction ............ A restriction
can be said to be in the interests of public order only if the connection
between the restriction and the public order is proximate and direct." H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] I S.C.R.

A In all these cases, this Court has been at pains to point out that Service
.I...._
Rules can be framed to maintain efficiency and discipline within the ranks of
Government servants. Jn the case of 0. K. Ghosh (supra), this Court considered
such Rules as being saved by the "public order" clause under Article 19(4).
In the present case, the restrnint is against doing anything which is detrimental
to the interests or prestige of the employer. The detrimental action may
B consist of writing a letter or making a speech. It may consist of holding a
violent demonstration or it may consist of joining a political organisation
contrary to the Service Rules. Any action which is detrimental to the interests
or prestige of the employer clearly undennines discipline within the organisation
and also the efficient functioning of that organisation. Such a Rule could be
C construed as falling under ·'public order" clause as envisaged by O.K. Ghosh
(supra).

The same requirements of Rule 22 can be better looked at from the point
of view of Article 19( 1)(g) as requirements in furtherance of the proper
discharge of the public duties of Government service. Rules which are directly
D linked to and are essential for proper discharge of duties of a public office
would be protected under Article 19(l)(g) as in public interc.st. lftl1ese Rules
are alleged to violate other freedoms under Article 19, such as, freedom of
speech or expression or the freedom to form associations or unions or the
freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms, the freedoms have to be
E read ham1oniously so that Rules which are reasonably required in furtherance
of one freedo~ are not struck down as violating other freedoms. Seervai in
"Constitutional Law of India", Vol. 1page816, para 10.238 states " .........a civil
servant is following a profession or occupation within tl1e meaning of Article
l 9(l)(g). Whereas his right to freedom of speech and expression, or the right
to form an association can be subject only to reasonable restrictions in the
F interest of public order or morality, his right to carry on his profession or ''(
I
calling can be made subject to reasonable restrictions in the public interest.
If the true scope and object of an impugned rule is not to deal with freedom
or speech or freedom of association but to secure standards of conduct
necessary for the efficient and proper discharge of a profession or calling, in
G the public interest, then such restrictions can be justified under Article 19(6),
although they cannot be justified under Article 19(2) and (3) ........... "

The fundamental freedoms enumerated under Article 19 are not
A.
..
necessarily and in all circumstances mutually supportive, although taken
together they weave a fabric of a free and equal democratic society e.g. the
H right to reside and settle in any part of the country can be put in jeopardy
M.H. DEVENDRAPPA '· KARNATAKA STATE S.l.D CORP. (MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.j 929

by a vociferous local group freely elqiressing its view against persons from A
another part of the country. Freedom of speech of one affects the freedom
movement of another. Exercising the right to form an association may curtail
the freedom to express views against its activities. For example, a person
joining an association to promote adoptions cannot express anti-adoption
views. He may lose his membership. Some restriction on one's rights may be
necessary to protect another's rights in a given situation. Proper exercise of
B
rights may have, implicit in them, certain restrictions. The rights must be
harmoniously construed so that they are properly promoted with the minimum
of such implied and necessary restrictions. In the present case, joining
Government service has, implicit in it, if not explicitly so laid down, the
observance of a certain code of conduct necessary for the proper discharge c
of functions as a Government servant. That code cannot be flouted in tl1e
name of other freedoms. Of course, the courts will be vigilant to see that the
code is not so widely framed as to unreasonably restrict fundamental freedoms.
But a reasonable code designed to promote discipline and efficiency can be
enforced by the Government organisation in the sense that those who flout
it can be subjected to disciplinary action. D
,/...,

...
That is why is in Balakothaiah 's case (supra) this Court said that a
person who wanted to exercise his other freedoms under Article l9(l)(a) or
(c) may do so, but then he could not insist that he be retained in Government
service if the Service Rules for the proper functioning of the organisation
were breached in tl1e process, except to the extent he was protected by Article
E
31 l. If freedom of speech of an individual Government employee is
circumscribed by the need for efficiency or discipline or confidentiality in
public interest, the individual exercises his freedom of speech in a manner
conflicting witl1 these requirements at the risk of facing disciplinary action.
This does not mean that legitimate action discreetly and properly taken by F
~-
;.
a Government servant witl1 a sense of responsibility and at the proper level
to remedy any malfunction in the organisation would also be barred. However,
such is not the case here. Also, a person who legitimately seeks to exercise
his rights under Article 19 cannot be told that you are free to exercise the
rights, but the consequences will be so serious and so damaging, that you
will not, in effect, be able to exercise your freedoms. For example, a person
G
may be told that you are free to express your opinion against the State, but
.. - )..
~ if you do so, you will be put behind bars. This is clearly deprivation of
freedom of speech. Therefore, what we have to consider is the reasonableness
of Service Rules which curtail certain kinds of activities amongst Government
servants in the interests of efficiency and discipline in order that they may H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998) l S.C.R.

A discharge their public duties as Government servants in a proper manner
without undermining the prestige or efficiency of the organisation. If the
Rules are directly and primarily meant for this purpose, they being in
furtherance of Article 19(l)(g). can be upheld although they may indirectly
impinge upon some other limbs of Article 19 qua an individual employee. As
the above cases show, courts have made sure that such impingement is
B minimal, and Rules are made in public interest and for proper discharge of
public duties. A proper balancing of interests of an individual as a citizen and
the right of the State to frame a code of conduct for its employees in the ·
interest of proper functioning of the State, is required.

A some\vhat similar view seems to have been taken in other
C commonwealth jurisdictions as well. The appellant drew our attention to the
case of Marvin L.Pickering v. Board of Eduction ofTo.,vnship lligh School
(391) US 563. In that case a public school teacher wrote a letter to the editor
of a local newspaper criticising the way in which the Board of Education and
the superintendent of schools had handled past proposals to raise new
D revenue for the schools. After the letter was published, the board of education
determined that its publication was detrimental to the efficient operation and ,
administration of the schools of the district An action was taken against the
teacher dismissing him from service. The teacher contended that his remarks
and comments in tl1e letter were protected by the constitutional right of free
speech. The United Sates Supreme Court said: "A state has interests as an
E employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly
from those that it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of
the citizenry in general. Where a public school teac;her contends that his
dismissal is violative of his constitutional right to free speech, it is necessary
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern, and the interest of tl1e state, as
F an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services that it performs
through its employees." The Court after examining the contents. of the letter
held that the letter had 1nade no allegations against any individual official, nor
had it made any personal allegations against any member of the board of
education. The letter was confined to criticising only the policy. Jn the view
G of the Court, this would not, in any way, affect the efficient functioning of
the teacher within the organisation. 111e United States Supreme Court,
.. therefore, set aside the order of dismissal. Another commonwealth country
has recently considered a somewhat similar case. The Court of Appeal of
Antigua and Barbuda in the case Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Agriculture & Ors. v.DeFreitas, (1996) I CHRB I consideredthecaseofa
H civil servant employed by the Ministry of Agriculture who took part in
M.H. DEVENDRAPPA' KARNATAKA STATES l.D CORP [MRS. SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J] 93 J

demonstrations organised by an opposition political party against political A
-A corruption. He carried a placard against his own minister. Refuting t11e
contention tliat his right to freedom of expression and assembly under tlie
Constitution had been violated, the court said tliat there-must be an implied
presumption that imposes restriction upon public officers that are reasonably
required for t11e proper perforn1ance of tlieir functions and which are reasonably
justifiable in a democratic society. A presumption of constitutionality of such B
\ provisions has to be implied in the constitutional rights and their
constitutionality has to be upheld.

In the present case, the appellant had made direct public attack on t11e
head of his organisation. He had also. in t11e letter to the Governor, made C
allegations against various officers of the corporation witli whom he had to
work and his conduct was clearly detrimental to t11e proper functioning of t11e
organisation or its internal discipline. Making public statements against t11e
head of the organisation on a political issue also amounted to lowering t11e
prestige of tlie organisation in which he worked. On a proper balancing,
tlierefore, of individual freedom of t11e appellant and proper functioning of tlie D
Government organisation which had employed him, tliis was a fit case where
tlie employer was entitled to take disciplinary action under Rule 22.

We, t11erefore, agree witli the findings oft11e High Court and dismiss t11e
appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
E
S.V.K.l. Appeals dismissed.

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