M.A. MURTHYversusSTATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

                        M.A. MURTHY                                            A
                              v.
                STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

                          SEPTEMBER 2, 2003

        [DORAISWAMY RAJU AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]                              B
       Service Law : Qualification acquired after prescribed date-Effect
of-Advertisement ofposts-Appellant and respondents 4 & 5 applying for
the same-Respondents 4 & 5 permitted to appear for written test despite
not being qualified on the last date of submission of application-
Respondents 4 & 5 being eligible on the date of interview-Selection of C
respondent 4 and respondent 5 put in waiting list-Petition before High
Court challenging the same-Dismissal of-High Court placing reliance
 on a previous Supreme Court judgment holding that the saidjudgment held
 the field on the date of selection and not applying the subsequent review
judgment overruling the previous one-Held, High Court was in error in D
 holding that the judgment which operated on the date of selection was
 operative and not the subsequent review judgment-Candidates who
 acquired qualification subsequently were ineligible for appointment being
 not qualified on the last date of submission of application-However their
 appointments not set aside on the facts of the case, but the person eligible E
 on the prescribed date though appointed subsequently shall rank senior to
 them.

     Doctrine of Prospective overruling-Explained-There shall be no
prospective overruling unless it is so indicated in the particular decision.
                                                                               F
     Applications were invited by way of advertisement for recruitment
to two posts prescribing the age and the requisite qualifications therein.
Appellant and respondents 4 and 5 applied in response thereto. Though
respondents 4 and 5 were not qualified on the last date of submission
of application, they were permitted to appear for written test. However,       G
on the date of interview they were eligible. While respondent no. 4 was
selected, respondent no. 5 was placed in the waiting list. Against the
same, appellant preferred a writ petition before High Court which was
dismissed. High Court relied upon judgment of Supreme Court wherein
it was held that if the applicant had acquired qualification by the time
of interview, that is sufficient.                                              H
                                   327
    328                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A         An appeal was preferred before Division Bench of High Court,
    which was again dismissed. A review application was filed before High
    Court inter alia on the ground that the Supreme Court judgment relied
    upon by High Court was overruled subsequently. However, the review
    application was dismissed on the ground that on the date of selection
B   of respondent no. 4, the first judgment of Supreme Court held the field
    and therefore the selection of the respondent no. 4 could not be
    questioned. Hence the present appeals.

          Allowing the appeals, the Court

C         HELD : 1.1. The High Court was in error in holding that the
    judgment which operated on the date of selection was operative and not
    the review judgment overruling the said judgment. All the more so when
    the subsequent judgment is by way of review of the first judgment in
    which case there are no judgments at all and the subsequent judgment
D   rendered on review petitions is the one and only judgment rendered,
    effectively and for all purposes, the earlier decision having been erased
    by countenancing the review applications. (332-B-D]"

        Ashok Kumar Sharma and Anr. v. Chander Shekhar and Anr., (19931
    Supp. 2 SCC 611 and Ashok Kumar Sharma and Ors. v. Chander Shekhar
E   and Anr., (1997) 4 sec 18, explained and relied upon.

          1.2. Normally, the decision of this Court enunciating a principle
    of law is applicable to all cases irrespective of its stage of pendency
    because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court
F   is, in fact, the law from inception. The doctrine of prospective over-
    ruling which is a feature of American jurisprudence is an exception to
    the normal principle of law. Prospective over-ruling is a part of the
    principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be resorted
    to by this Court while superseding Jaw declared by it earlier. It is a
    device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to prevent
G   multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and avoidable
    litigation. In other words, actions taken contrary to the law declared
    prior to the date of declaration are validated in larger public interest.
    The law as declared applies to future cases. (331-E-H)

H         J.C. Golak Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR (1967)
              M.A. MURTHYv. STATE [PASAYAT, J.]                       329

SC 1643; Managing Director, ECJL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar         A
and Ors., [1993) 4 SCC 727; Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P., (1997)
5 SCC 201 and Baburam v. C.C. Jacob, (1999) 3 SCC 362, referred to.

      1.3. It is for this Court to indicate as to whether the decision in
qu~stion will operate prospectively. In other words, there shall be no       B
prospective over-ruling, unless it is so indicated in the particular
decision. It is not open to be held that the decision in a particular case
will be prospective in its application by application of the doctrine of
prospective over-ruling. [331-H, 332-A)

      2. The appellant shall rank senior to respondent No. 4 by treating     C
his appointment to be with effect from the date of selection of
respondent no. 4. This shall be only for the purpose of fixing the
seniority and continuity of service and not for entitlement to any salary
or other financial benefits. As respondent No. 5 was only in the waiting
list, and it is stated that he has been subsequently appointed, he will      D
also rank below the appellant and respondent no. 4. [332-E, F)

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 6913-
6914 of 2003.

     From the Judgment and Order dated 16.1.2002 and 28.1.2002 of the        E
Kamataka High Court in W.A. No. 479/78 and R.P. No. 53/2002 in W.A.
No. 479 of 1998.

    R. Mohan, Kashi Vishweshar and G. Ramakrishna Prasad for the
Appellant.
                                                                             F
    Mrs. Lalita Kaushik, Naresh Kaushik, Ms. Shilpa Chohan, Sanjay R.
Hegde, E.C. Vidya Sagar and Dr. Sushi! Balwanda for the Respondents.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. : Leave granted.
                                                                             G

     Both these appeals have common factual matrix, and legal panorama
and, therefore, are dealt with by this common judgment.

     Factual backdrop in a nutshell is as follows:                           H
    330                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A        Karnataka State Financial Corporation (hereinafter referred to as the
    'Corporation') invited applications for recruitment to two posts of Manager




B
    (Finance and Accounts) by advertisement dated 18. 7.1995. The
    advertisement inviting applications for the two posts of Manager (Finance
    and Accounts), one post for general and one post of scheduled caste,
    prescribed the requisite <!ducational qualification. It was stipulated in the
                                                                                     -
    advertisement that the age and other qualifications were to be reckoned as
    of 31.7.1995. It was also indicated that the applications in the prescribed
    format with complete information should reach the prescribed authority
    before 29th July, 1995 and incomplete applications and applications
C   without necessary enclosures were to be rejected.

          Appellant and respondents 4 and 5 were applicants in response to the
    advertisement. Though respondent No.4 was not qualified on the last date
    of submission of application, he was permitted to attend and appear for the
    written test. However, on the date of interview he was eligible. The written
D   test was conducted on 1.10.1995 and the viva vice was conducted on
    25.11.1995. Similar was stated to be the position vis-a-vis respondent No.5.
    When respondent No.4 was selected, appellant challenged his selection to
    be not in accordance with law. It is to be noted that waiting list is prepared
    and respondent No.5 was placed in the waiting list.

E        A writ application was filed before the Karnataka High Court at
    Bangalore challenging the selection of respondent N o.4 and placing
    respondent No.5 in the waiting list. Though, learned Single Judge of the
    High Court held that respondent No.4 was ineligible as on the date of
    employment, he held that in public interest the selection was to be
F   maintained.

          A reference was made to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar
    Sharma and Anr. V. Chander Shekher and Anr., [1993] Supp. 2 sec 611
    (described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma - case No.I) where it was
G   held that ifthe applicant had acquired qualification by the time of interview
    that is sufficient.

         A writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench. The view of the
    learned Single Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench. A review
    application was filed inter a/ia taking the stand that the view in Ashok
H   Kumar Sharma 's case No.I has been later on over-ruled in Ashok Kumar
               M.A. MURTHYv. STATE [PASAYAT, J.]                        331

Sharma and Ors. v Chander Shekhar and Anr., [1997] 4 sec 18, A
(described hereinafter as Ashok Kumar Sharma - case No.II). Therefore,
a review of the judgment of the Division Bench was necessary. The High
Court by the impugned judgment held that though admittedly on 18.7 .1995
i.e. on the date of advertisement the respondent No.4 was not qualified to
make an application, yet few dates and facts are relevant. He had appeared B
for the M.B.A. examination in April 1995 and the results were declared
on 4.9.1995. The written examination was held on I.I 0.1995 and viva voce
was conducted on 25.11.1995. At least by the time the written examination
and the viva voce tests were held, he had acquired the requisite qualification.
Judgment in Ashok Kumar Sharma 's case No. I was delivered on 18.12.1992
and decision in the· review petition in the said case was rendered on C
10.3.1997. The appointment of respondent No.4 was made when the
earlier decision of Ashok Kumar Sharma 's case No.I held the field. It was,
therefore, held that on the date of selection, the first judgment held the
field; and, therefore, by applying logic of that decision the selection of
respondent No.4 cannot be questioned.                                           D
       Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the approach of the
High Court is erroneous as the law declared by this Court is presumed to
be the law at all times. Normally, the decision of this Court enunciating
a principle oflaw is applicable to all cases irrespective its stage ofpendency E
because it is assumed that what is enunciated by the Supreme Court is, in
fact, the law from inception. The doctrine of prospective over-ruling which
is a feature of American jurisprudence is an exception to the normal
principle of law, was imported and applied for the first time in L.C. Golak
Nath and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Anr., AIR (1967) SC 1643. In
Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors.,·· F
[1993] 4 SCC 727, the view was adopted. Prospective over-ruling is a part
of the principles of constitutional canon of interpretation and can be
resorted to by this Court while superseding law declared by it earlier. It
is a device innovated to avoid reopening of settled issues, to prevent
multiplicity of proceedings, and to avoid uncertainty and avoidable G
litigation. In other words, actions taken contrary to the law declared prior
to the date of declaration are validated in larger public interest. The law
as declared applies to future cases. (See Ashok Kumar Gupta v. State of
UP., [1997] 5 SCC 201, Baburam v. CC Jacob, [1999] 3 SCC 362. It
is for this Court to indicate as to whether the decision in question will H
    332                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A operate prospectively. In other words, there shall be no prospective over-
  ruling, unless it is so indicated in the particular decision . .It is not open to
  be held that the decision in a particular case will be prospective in its
  application by application of the doctrine of prospective over-ruling. The
  doctrine of binding precedent helps in promoting certainty and consistency
B in judicial decisions and enables an organic development of the law besides
  providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of transactions
  forming part of the daily affairs. That being the position, the High Court
  was in error by holding that the judgment which operated on the date of
  selection was operative and not the review judgment in Ashok Kumar
  Sharma 's case No.II. All the more so when the subsequent judgment is by
C way of Review of the first judgment in which case there are no judgments
  at all and the subsequent judgment rendered on review petitions is the one
  and only judgment rendered, effectively and for all purposes, the earlier
  decision having been erased by countenancing the review applications. The
  impugned judgments of the High Court are, therefore, set aside.
D
          That brings us to the ticklish question as to how the reliefs can be
    moulded. It is not in dispute that subsequently the appellant has also been·
    appointed on 9.11.2002. Though it was permissible for this case to set aside
    the appointments of respondent no.4 and respondent no.5, on the peculiar
E   facts of this case, we consider it to be not called for and the rights of parties
    instead could be adjusted by working out equities, in the interests of
    substantial justice by adopting a different course. The appellant shall rank
    senior to respondent No.4 by treating his appointment to be with effect
    from the date of selection of respondent No.4. This shall be only for the
F   purpose of fixing the seniority and continuity of service only not for
    entitlement to any salary or other financial benefits. As respondent No.5
    was only in the waiting list, and it is stated that he has been subsequently
    appointed, he will also rank below the appellant and respondent No.4. The
    appeals are accordingly allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

    M.P.                                                         Appeals allowed.