LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P. GRAMIN BANK) & ANR.versusRAJENDRA SINGH

                   [2013] 17 S.C.R. 309


 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P.                  A
              GRAMIN BANK) & ANR.
                         v.
                 RAJENDRA SINGH
          (Civil Appeal No.6142 of 2013)
                                                              B
                      JULY 29, 2013
          [ANIL R. DAVE AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

      Service Law - Departmental enquiry - Penalty I
punishment - Judicial review - Scope - Held: The Courts C
cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental
authorities - Limited judicial review is available to interfere
with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority,
only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to
the conscience of the Court - Even in such a case, the D
appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the
disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction
to pass appropriate order of penalty - The Court by itself
cannot mandate as to w/Jat should be the penalty in such a
case - The only exception to the said principle, would be in E
those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser
punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the
charges of misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent was
foisted with more serious charges - This would be on the
 Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the concerned F
 employee and the co-delinquent are equally placed -
However, there has to be a complete parity between the tvvo,
 not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct
 as well after the service of charge sheet in the two cases - If
co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with G
 unqualified apology lesser punishment to him would be
justifiable - However, such a comparison is permissible only
 when the other employee(s) who is given lighter punishment
 was co-delinquent - Such a comparison is not permissible
                            309                               H
    310       SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A   by citing the cases of other employees, as precedents, in
    altogether different departmental enquiries.

        The appellant-Bank issued separate charge-sheets to
    six employees including the three respondents leveling
8   identical charges of misconduct. All the six employees
    denied the charges. The appellant-Bank initially chose to
    proceed and conduct the enquiry only against the
    respondents. The enquiry officer returned the findings
    that charges leveled against the respondents stood
C   proved. Consequently, the Disciplinary Authority
    dismissed all the three respondents from service. The
    departmental appeals filed by the respondents were
    dismissed.

      Aggrieved, the respondents filed writ petitions before
D the High Court. Meanwhile, the other three employees
  had admitted the charges and tendered unconditional
  apology and also had given undertaking that they would
  not commit any such misconduct in future. Keeping in
  view the same, they were inflicted the penalty of reduction
E of basic pay by one stage for one year with cumulative
  effect.

        Referring to the orders of punishment passed by the
    Disciplinary Authority in the case of other three
F   employees, the respondents stated before the High Court
    that they too were willing to tender unconditional
    apologies for their misconduct with assurance that they
    would not repeat the same in future.

      The High Court set aside the order of the punishment
G passed by the Appellate Authority with directions to re-
  consider the case of the respondents. However, the High
  Court also specifically directed the Appellate Authority to
  take a decision and award "minor punishment" as given
  in case of the other three employees.
H
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P.             311
       GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH

    This specific direction to the Appellate Authority was      A
challenged before this Court.

     The question that arose for consideration was
whether the High Court was justified in giving such a
mandamus or it should have referred the matter back to          B
the appellant-Bank with direction to take a fresh decision
in the matter.

    Allowing the appeals, the Court

    HELD:1.1. It is the Disciplinary Authority, or the          C
Appellate Authority in appeal, which is to decide the
nature of punishment to be given to a delinquent
employee keeping in view the seriousness of the
misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts
cannot assume and usurp the function of the Disciplinary        D
Authority. [Para 12] [320-G-H]

    1.2. The Judicial Review of the quantum of
punishment is available with a very limited scope. It is only
when the penalty imposed appears to be shocking
disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the           £
Courts would frown upon. Even in such a case, after
setting aside the penalty order, it is to be left to the
disciplinary/Appellate Authority to take a decision afresh
and it is not for the court to substitute its decision by
prescribing the quantum of punishment. In the present           F
case, however, the High Court has, on the one hand
directed the appellate authority to take a decision and in
the same breath, snatched the discretion by directing the
Appellate Authority to pass a particular order of
punishment. In normal course, such an order would               G
clearly be unsustainable. [Para 13] [322-G-H; 323-A-B]

   1.3. The principles can be summed up and
summarized as follows: (a) When charge(s) of
misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of               H
    312        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A    punishment to be imposed in a particular case is
    essentially the domain of the departmental authorities; (b)
    The Courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/
    departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of
     punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this
s   function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
    competent authority; (c) Limited judicial review is
    available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the
    disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty
    is found to be shocking to the conscience of the Court;
c   (d) Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside
    as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges
    framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate
    course of action is to remit the matter back tC' the
    disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with
    direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The Court
0
    by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the
    penalty in such a case. (e) The only exception to the
    principle stated in para (d) above, would be in those
    cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser
    punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the
E   charges of misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent
    was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on
    the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the
    concerned employee and the co-delinquent are equally
    placed. However, there has to be a complete parity
F   between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge
    but subsequent conduct as well after the service of
    charge sheet in the two cases. If co-delinquent accepts
    the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology
    lesser punishment to him would be justifiable. It is made
G   clear that such a comparison is permissible only when
    the other employee(s) who is given lighter punishment
    was co-delinquent. Such a comparison is not permissible
    by citing the cases of other employees, as precedents,
    in all together different departmental enquiries. [Paras 16,
H   17] (324-8-H; 325-A-D]
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P.             313
  '    GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH

     1.4. In the present case, the charges in respect of two   A
sets of employees were identical. Though the other set
of employee accepted the charges on the first day of
enquiry, a factor which is to be kept in mind, that even
those employees had denied the charges in the first
instance and accepted these charges only in the                B
departmental enquiry, that too after realizing that similar
charges had been proved against the respondents in the
departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case where
those employees had expressed the unconditional
apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating        C
circumstance for the appellants, at the same time, all
these aspects are to be considered by the appellate
authority. The High Court did not look into all these
aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass
orders imposing a specific penalty only. This direction of
the High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter       0
is remitted back to the appellate authority to take a
decision imposing appropriate penalty on the
respondents, after giving due consideration to the
mitigating circumstances pointed out by the
 respondents. [Para 18]- (325-E-H; 326-A]                      E

     Apparel Export Promotion Council vs. A. K. Chopra 1999
(1) SCC 759: 1999 (1) SCR 117; State of Meghalaya & Ors.
vs. Mecken Singh N.Marak 2008 (7) SCC 580: 2008 (8) SCR
89; Obettee (P) Ltd. vs. Mohd. Shafiq Khan (2005) 8 SCC 46:    F
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 449 and Rajendra Yadav vs. State of
M.P. & Ors. 2013 (2) SCALE 416 - referred to.

                     Case Law Reference :
   2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 449      referred to     Para 9         G
   2013 (2) SCALE 416           referred to     Para 10
   1999 (1) SCR 117             referred to     Para 12
   2008 (8) SCR 89              referred to     Para 12
                                                               H
    314          SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
    6142 of 2013 etc.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 19.12.2011 of the
    High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in Writ
B   Petition No. 1886 of 2008.

                                   WITH

    C.A. Nos. 6143 & 6144 of 2013.

C       Dhruv Mehta, Yashraj Singh Deora, Rajesh Kumar,
    Anupama Dhurve, Sarv Mitter (for Mitter & Mitter Co.) for the
    Appellants.

       K. V. Vishwanathan, Rajesh Srivastava, Raghuvendra
  Pratap, Suresh Kumari, R. S. Hegde, Chandra Prakash, Rajeev
D Singh for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

          A.K.SIKRI, J. 1. Leave granted.

E        2. These appeals arise out of the decision dated 19th
    December 2011 rendered by High Court of Judicature at
    Ailahabad, whereby three Writ Petitions filed by the respondents
    in these appeals have been disposed of with certain directions.

F        3. Before we point out the directions of the High Court in
    the impugned judgment and the grievance of the appellant
    thereto, it would be proper to traverse the seminal facts which
    are largely undisputed.

        4. The appellant-Bank had issued separate charge-sheets
G to six employees leveling identical charges. Three respondents
  before us in these appeals were the three employees out of
  those six employees to whom these charge-sheets were
  issued. All the six employees, including the respondents herein,
  filed their replies to the charge-sheets denying the charges.
H
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P                  315
  GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

     5. For certain unknown reasons, the appellant-Bank initially    A
chose to proceed and conduct the enquiry only against the
respondents herein and appointed an enquiry officer. After
conducting the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his enquiry
report, returning the findings that charges leveled against the
respondents stood proved. After giving the opportunity to the        B
respondents to file their response and objections to the enquiry
report, the Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of
dismissal from service vide order dated 15th February 2008
in respect of all the three respondents, though orders were
passed separately in each case. These respondents filed              c
departmental appeals which were also dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide orders dated 28th April, 2008.

     6. Aggrieved by the orders of the Disciplinary Authority as
well as the Appellate Authority, the respondents approached
the High Court by way of Writ Petitions.        •                    D

     7. It so happened that though the other three employees
had denied the charges and the enquiry officer was also
appointed in their cases (of course after the finding of guilt was
recorded by the enquiry officer in the case of the respondents)      E
before the enquiry officer, the said three employees admitted
the charges and tendered unconditional apology. They also
gave undertaking that they would not commit any such
misconduct in future. The enquiry officer recording this,
forwarded his report to the Disciplinary Authority anl"l keeping     F
in view that those employees had tendered unconditional
apologies with the assurance, as aforesaid, all three of them
were inflicted the penalty of reduction of his basic pay by one
stage for one year with cumulative effect" under Regulation
38(1 )(b)(ii) by separate orders dated 25th June 2008, 26th          G
June 2008 and 30th June 2008. This is a major penalty as per.
the aforesaid Regulations though in the impugned order, High
Court has termed it as "minor punishment"

     8. Be that as it may, when the three Writ Petitions filed by
the respondents herein came up for hearing before the High           H
    316          SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013) 17 S.C.R.

A    Court, the counsel who appeared on behalf of the respondents
    ·pointed out the orders of punishment passed by the Disciplinary
     Authority in the case of aforesaid three employees and made
     a statement that the respondents were also willing to tender
     unconditional apologies for their misconduct with assurance that
B    they would not repeat the same and would not give any cause
     of grievance to the Bank in future. The High Court directed the
     counsel for the Bank to seek instructions as to whether the
     Appellate Authority (which is the Board of Directors in these
     cases) was willing to reconsider the unconditional apology of
c    the respondents and award the same punishment which had
     been awarded to other persons charged for the same
     misconduct. Counsel for the Bank took the instructions and on
     the next date of hearing informed the High Court that he had
     received a letter from the Bank to the effect that since the
D   Appellate Authority was the Board of Directors which had also
     decided their appeals and confirmed the order of punishment,
     it could reconsider the matter only if the Court issues such a
     direction. Taking note of the aforesaid instructions which the
     appellant-Bank had given to its counsel, the High Court
E    disposed of the Writ Petitions by setting aside the order of the
     punishment passed by the Appellate Authority with the
     directions that these appeals of the respondents be
     reconsidered. However, while giving the directions for
     reconsideration the High Court also specifically ordered that the
     Appellate Authority shall take a decision and award "minor
F    punishment" as had been done in the case of other three
     employees. Exact nature of this direction given by the High
     Court in the impugned order reads as under:

          'The petitioners shall file before the appellate authority the
G         notarized affidavits, tendering unconditional apology in the
          same terms as has been filed before this Court and the
          appellate authority shall take a decision and pass
          appropriate orders accordingly awarding minor
          punishments, as has been done in the case of other office-
H         bearers of the Bank's Union. This shall be done in the first
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P. 317
  GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
    meeting of the Boards of Directors, which is to take place A
    hereinafter or in any case within next two months, whichever
    is earlier."

     It is this specific direction to the Appellate Authority, which
is the bone of contention.
                                                                       B
    ~
       9. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for the Bank,.
submitted that once the matter was referred back to the
Appellate Authority for reconsideration, it was to be left to the
discretion of the Appellate Authority to take an appropriate view
in the matter and it was not open to the Court to spell out and C
suggest the exact nature of penalty which the Appellate
Authority is supposed to pass. His submission was that by
issuing such a direction, the Court itself assumed the role of
the Appellate Authority which was impermissible. He further
submitted that even when the charges leveled against six D
employees were identical, the circumstances under which the
penalty was imposed on the other three employees were totally
different than the circumstances of the three respondents herein.
In this behalf, he pointed out that whereas the said three
employees who were given lesser punishment, had accepted E
the charges on the very first day before the enquiry officer and
tendered unconditional apology as well. On the other hand, in
 so far as these respondents are concerned, they denied the
 charges even in the enquiry proceedings which led to conduct
 full-fledged departmental enquiry. Not only this, even after the F
 findings of the enquiry officer the respondents adopted the same
 posture of denial and took the matter further before the
 Appellate Authority. Pointing out this distinction Mr. Mehta's
 submission was that case of the respondents cpuld not be
 trea~ed at par with other three officials and it was permissible G
 for the Appellate Authority to consider these circumstances and
 take a decision to impose penalty at variance with the
 punishment imposed upon those employees who had accepted
 the charges at the outset. Mr. Mehta referred to the judgment
 ofihis Court in the case of Obettee (P) Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Shafiq
                                                                  H
    318           SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A   Khan (2005) 8 SCC 46 wherein identical features, as prevailing
    in this case, were held as distinctive features and different and
    higher punishment was held to be justified in the following
    manner:

          "On consideration of the rival stands one thing becomes
B
          clear that Chunnu and Vakil stood on a different footing so
          far as the respondent workman is concerned. He had,
          unlike the other two, continued to justify his action. That was
          clearly a distinctive feature which the High Court
          unfortunately failed to properly appreciate. The employer
c         accepted to choose the unqualified apology given and
          regrets expressed by Chunnu and Vakil. It cannot be said
          that the employer had discriminated so far as the
          respondent workman is concerned because as noted
          above he had tried to justify his action for which
D         departmental proceedings were initiated. It is not that
          Chunnu and Vakil were totally exonerated. On the contrary,
          a letter of warning dated 11.4.1984 was issued to them.

          In Union of India vs. Parma Nanda the Administrative
E         Tribunal had modified the punishment on the ground that
          two other persons were let off with minor punishment. This
          Court held that when all the persons did not stand on the
          same footing, the same yardstick cannot be applied.
          Similar is the position in the present case. Therefore, the
F         High Court's order is clearly unsustainable and is set
          aside."

         10. Per contra Mr. Vishwanathan learned Sr. Counsel and
    Mr. Rajeev Singh, the learned Counsel appearing for the
    respondent in these appeals argued that the circumstances of
G   the two sets of cases were almost identical and therefore in the
    facts of this case, the directions of the High Court were perfectly
    in order. He pointed out that the other three employees had also
    denied the charges in the first instance, in their replies to the
    charge sheets served upon them. For some curious reasons
H   the appellant-Bank did not hold any common enquiry even when
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P.                 319
  GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J1
the charges leveled in all six charge-sheets were identical. ,A
Instead the Bank first picked up only the respondents herein,
and held the enquiry against them. It is only after in the enquiry
the charges were established against ttie respondents and the
punishment of dismissal was imposed on them, that the enquiry
against the other three employees was commenced. At this s
stage, knowing the fate of their cases, those three employees
accepted the charges and tendered unconditional apologies.
The learned counsel argued that the Bank had given definite
advantage to those three employees by deferring their enquirie"61
enabling them to-make up their mind after knowing the ·result c
in the case of the respondents. He, thus, argued that it cannot
be said that those three employees had accepted the charges
at the outset. His submission was in suet) circumstances
imposition of different and higher penalty to the respondents
                                                       .~.


herein would clearly amount to invidious discrimination;rhs held
                                                                   0
by this Court in Rajendra Yadav vs. State of M.P. & Ors. 2013
(2) SCALE 416. In that J;ase two employees were served with
charge sheets who were involved in the-same incident. A person
who had more serious role was inflicted comparatively a lighter
punishment than the appellant in the said case. This was held
to be violative of doctrine of Equality Principles enshrined under E
Article 14 of the Constitution of. India. The discussion which
ensued, while taking this view, reads as under:

     "We have gone through the inquiry report placed before
     us in respect of the appellant as well as Constable Arjun F
     Pathak. The inquiry clearly reveals the role of Arjun Pathak.
     It was Arjun Path~k who had demanded and received the
     money, though the facit approval of the appellant was
     proved in the inquiry. The charge leveled against Arjun
     Pathak was more serious than the one charged against G
     the appellant. Both appellants and other two persons as
     well as Arjun Pathak were involved in the same incident.
     After having found that Arjun Pathak had a more serious
     role and, in fact, I was he who had (jemanded and received
     the money, he was inflicted comparatively a lighter H
    320          SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 17 S.C.R.

A         punishment. At the same time, appellant who had played
          a passive role was inflicted with a more serious punishment
          of dismissal from service which, in our view, cannot be
          sustained."

                We are of the view the principle laid down in the
B
          above mentioned judgments also would apply to the facts
          of the present case. We have already indicated that the
          action of the Disciplinary Authority imposing a
          comparatively lighter punishment to the co-delinquent Arjun
          Pathak and at the same time, harsher punishment to the
c         appellant cannot be permitted in law, since they were all
          involved in the same incident. Consequently, we are
          inclined to allow the appeal by setting aside the
          punishment of dismissal from service imposed on the
          appellant and order that he be reinstated in service
D         forthwith. Appellant is, therefore, to be re-instated from the
          date on which Arjun Pathak was re-instated and be given
          all consequent benefits as was given to Arjun Pathak.
          Ordered accordingly. However, there will be no order as
          to costs."
E
         Learned counsel for the respondents made a fervent plea
    that the respondents herein were also entitled to the same
    treatment.

          11. The question that falls for determination is as to
F   wt .ether the High Court is justified in giving such a mandamus
    or it should have referred the matter back to the Bank with the
    direction to take a fresh decision in the matter?

         12. Indubitably, the well ingrained principle of law is that it
G   is the Disciplinary Authority, or the Appellate Authority in
    appeal, which is to decide the nature of punishment to be given
    to a delinquent employee keeping in view the seriousness of
    the misconduct committed by such an employee. Courts cannot
    assume and usurp the function of the Disciplinary Authority. In
H   the matter of Apparel Export Promotion Council vs.
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, tJ.P. 321
  GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J.]
AK.Chopra reported in 1999 (1) SCC 759 this principle was A
explained in the following manner:

     "22   ....... The High Court in our opinion fell in error in
           interfering with the punishment, which could be
           lawfully imposed by the departmental authorities on . B
           the respondent for his proven· misconduct. ..... The
           High Co,urt should not have substituted its own
           discr-etio~ for that the authority. What punishment
           was required to be irnposed, in the facts and
           circumstances of the case, was a matter which fell
           exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent C
           authority and did Aot warrant any interference by the
           High Court. The entire approach of the High Court
           has been faulty. The impugned order of the High
           Court cannot be sustained on this ground alone.
              "                                                 D

    Yet again, ih the case of State of Meghalaya & Ors. Vs.
Mecken Singh N.Marak reported in 2008 (7) SCC 580, this
Court reiterated the law by stating:
                                                                E
     "14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope
          of interference. is very limited and restricted to
          exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of ihe High
          Court, to interfere with the quantum of pµnishinent
          is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient
          reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction F
          in appropriate case, to consider the question in
          regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a
          limited role to play.· It is now well settled that the
           High Courts, in e>sercise of powers under Article
          226, do not interfere with the quantum of G
          punishm~nt unless there exist sufficient reasons
          therefor. The punishment imposed by the
          disciplinary authority or ~he appellate authority
           unless shocking to the conscience of the court,
           cannot be subjected to judibal review·. In the H
    322         SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A               impugned order of the High Court no reasons
                whatsoever have been indicated to why the
                punishment was considered disproportionate.
                Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice.
                The mere statement that it is disproportionate would
B               not suffice.

          15&16 lOOOOOOOOOOOOOC

          17.   Even in cases where the punishment imposed by
                the disciplinary authority is found to be shocking to
C               the conscience of the court, normally the disciplinary
                authority or the appellate authority should be
                directed to reconsider the question of imposition of
                penalty. The High Court in this case has not only
                interfered with the punishment imposed by the
D               disciplinary authority in a routine manner but
                overstepped its jurisdiction by directing the
                appellate authority to impose any other punishment
                short of removal. By fettering the discretion of the
                appellate authority to impose appropriate
E               punishment for serious misconducts committed by
                the respondent, the High Court totally misdirected
                itself while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226.
                Judged in this background the conclusion of the
                Division Bench of the High Court cannot be
F               regarded as proper at all. The High Court has
                interfered with the punishment imposed by the
                competent authority in a casual manner and,
                therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted."

          13. As is clear from the above that the Judicial Review of
G   the quantum of punishment is available with a very limited scope.
    It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shosking
    disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts
    would frown upon. Even in such a case, after setting aside the
    penalty order, it is to be left to the disciplinary/Appellate
H   Authority to take a decision afresh and it is not for the court to
          LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P. 323
           GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

     substitute its decision by prescribing the quantum of A
     punishment. In the present case, however, we find that the High
     Court has, on the one hand directed the appellate authority to
     take a decision and in the same breath, snatched the discretion
     by directing the Appellate Authority to pass a particular order
     of punishment. In normal course, such an order would c_learly B
     be unsustainable, having regard to the legal· position outlined
     above.

              14. The peculiar feature, however, is that the High Court
         has done so proceeding on the presumption that these three              c''"
                                                                                 ·~f .:


         respondents are equally and identical placed as the other three
         employees who had admitted the charges, though this parity
         is not spelled out in the impugned order. Whether this approach
         of the High Court is tenable, looking into thf:!_ facts of this case,
         is the moot question.                           ·
                                                                                 D
              fl). If there is a complete parity in the two sets of cases
       impo~i.ng different penalties would not be appropriate as
       inflicting of any/higher penalty in one case would be
       discriminatory and would amount to infraction of the doctrine
       of Equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. E
       That is the ratio of Rajendra Yadav's case, already taken note
       above. On the other hand, if there is some difference, different
       penalty can be meted out and what should be the quantum is
       to be !$!fl to the appellate authority. However, such a penalty
       should''consumerate with the gravity of misconduct and cannot F
       be shockingly disproportionate. 11.s per the ratio of Obettee (P)
        Ltd. Case even if the nature of misconduct committed by the
       two sets of employees is same, the conduct of one set of
        employee accepting the guilt and pleading for lenient view would
       justify lesser punishment to them ttian the other employees who G
        remained adopted· the mode of denial, 'with the' result that
        charges stood proved ultimately i'n         a
                                                   full-f,ledged enquiry
        conducted against them. In that event, higher penalty carl be
     . )f11posed upon such delinquent employees. It would follciw that
       C:trnosing to take a chance to contest the charges such
:1   I
                                                                                  H
      324         SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


" A   employees thereafter cannot fall back and say that the penalty
      in their cases cannot be more than the penalty which is
      imposed upon those employees who accepted the charges at
      the outset by tendering unconditional apology.

           16. This, according to us, would be the harmonious
 B
      reading of Obettee (P) Ltd. and Rajendra Yadav cases.

         The principles discussed above can be summed up and
      summarized as follows:

 c          (a)   When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an
                  enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed
                  in a particular case is essentially the domain of the
                  departmental authorities;

            (b)   The Courts cannot assume the function of
 D                disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide
                  the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to
                  be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the
                  jurisdiction of the competent authority;

 E          (c)   Limited judicial review is available to interfere with
                  the punishment imposed by the disciplinary
                  authority, only in cases where such penalty is found
                  to be shocking to the conscience of the Court;

            (d)   Even in such a case when the punishment is s'et
 F
                  aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature
                  of charges framed against the delinquent
                  employee, the appropriate course of action is to
                  remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority
                  or the appellate authority with direction to pass
 G                appropriate order of penalty. The Court by itself
                  cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty
                  in such a case.

            (e)   The only exception to the principle stated in para
 H                (d) above, would be in those cases where the co-
 LUCKNOW K. GRAMIN BANK (NOW ALLAHABAD, U.P.                 325
  GRAMIN BANK) v. RAJENDRA SINGH [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

           delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the            A
           disciplinary authority even when the charges of
           misconduct was identical or the co-delinquent was
           foisted with more serious charges. Th.is would be
           on the Doctrine of Equality when it is found that the
           concerned employee and the co-delinquent are              B
           equally placed. However, there has to be a
           complete parity between the two, not only in respect
           of nature of charge but subsequent :::onduct as well
           after the service of charge sheet in the two cases.
           If co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating          c
           remorse with unqualified apology lesser
            punishment to him would be justifiable.

     17. It is made clear that such a comparison is permissible
only when the other employee(s) who is given lighter punishment
was co-delinquent. Such a comparison is not permissible by           D
citing the cases of other employees, as precedents, in all
together different departmental enquiries.
            \
      18. Applying these principles to the facts of the present
case, we may observe that, no doubt the charges in respect of        E
two sets of employees were identical. Though the other set of
employee accepted the charges on the first day of enquiry, a
factor which is to be kept in mind, that even those employees
had denied the charges in the first instance and accepted these
charges only in the departmental enquiry, that too after realizing   F
that similar charges had been proved against the respondents
 herein in the departmental enquiry. Therefore, it was not a case
where those employees had expressed the unconditional
 apology in the first instance. This may be a mitigating
 circumstance for the appellants herein. At the same time, we        G
 are of the opinion that all these aspects are to be considered
 by the appellate authority. The High Court did not look into all
these aspects and mandated the appellate authority to pass
orders imposing a specific penalty pnly. This direction of the
 High Court is, accordingly, set aside and the matter is remitted
                                                                     H
    326          SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2013] 17 S.C.R.


A back to the appellate authority to take a decision imposing
  appropriate penalty on the respondents herein. We are
  confident that the mitigating circumstances pointed out by the
  respondents herein would be given due consideration by the
  appellate authority, keeping in view the ratio of Rajendra Yadav's
B case as well. It would be open to the respondents herein to
  make representation in this behalf to the appellate authority on
  the basis of which the respondents want to contend that they
  should be given same treatment as meted out to other three
  employees. Such a representation will be given 15 days from
c today. Appellate Authority shall pass appropriate orders
  deciding the. appeals afresh within 2 months from today.

          19. Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs.
   Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                              Appeals allowed.