Holding

An externment order under Section 47 is valid if the authority’s satisfaction is based on objective material and the notice discloses only the general nature of the allegations, not specific witness identities.

Summary

The Lt. Governor of the NCT and other officials initiated externment proceedings against Ved Prakash @ Vedu under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, alleging that his movements caused alarm and danger and that witnesses were unwilling to testify due to fear. An order directing his removal from Delhi for two years was passed, which the respondent challenged by a writ petition. The Delhi High Court set aside the order, holding that the show‑cause notice violated natural justice by not disclosing the names of reluctant witnesses. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statutory notice need only disclose the general nature of the allegations and that the authority’s satisfaction must be based on objective material, not on detailed witness identities. The Court found that the procedural safeguards of the Act were complied with and that the externment order was valid, thus restoring it. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the High Court’s order was set aside.

Issues considered

Whether the show‑cause notice under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act must disclose the names of witnesses reluctant to depose.
Whether the procedural safeguards prescribed in Sections 47, 48 and 50 of the Delhi Police Act were complied with.
Whether the satisfaction of the Commissioner of Police must be based on objective criteria and can be interfered with by the court.
Whether an externment proceeding is to be treated as preventive detention for the purposes of constitutional scrutiny.

Legislation cited

Bombay Police Acts. 56
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 119, s. 120, s. 121, s. 122, s. 123, s. 124, s. 445, s. 446, s. 447, s. 448, s. 70, s. 71, s. 72, s. 73, s. 74, s. 75, s. 76, s. 77, s. 78, s. 79, s. 80, s. 81, s. 82, s. 83, s. 84, s. 85, s. 86, s. 87, s. 88, s. 89
Delhi Police Act, 1978s. 46, s. 47, s. 48, s. 50

Subjects

ExternmentDelhi Police ActSection 47Procedural safeguardsNatural justiceSatisfaction of authorityPreventive detentionWrit petition

Judgment

.. LT. GOVERNOR, NCT AND ORS .
v.
A

VED PRAKASH @ VEDU

MAY 5, 2006

[S.B. SINHA AND P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN. JJ.] B

Delhi Police Act, 1978-Sections 47, 48 and 50-0rder ofexternment-
Proceedee challenging order by filing writ petition-Interference by courts-
Scope of-Held, order must demonstrate application of mind by statutory
authority and it should be based on material-Satisfaction ofauthority although
c
subjective should be based on objectivity-Sufficiency of material or possibility
of another view may not be a ground for interference-Court may examine
records to satisfy itself that all procedural safeguards have been followed and
also that witnesses have disclosed apprehensions about deposing in Court
because ofactivities of the proceedee-Court not to direct authority to disclose D
names of witnesses or the details of such cases-/n the facts, held, order of
,•
externment rightly passed and does not call for interference by Court.

Various criminal cases were instituted by the appellants against the
respondent. Appellants initiated externment proceeding against respondent
in terms of Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 on the ground that his E
movements and acts had been causing alarm, danger and harm to person
and property and also issued a supplementary notice in continuation of
the earlier notice under Section 50 of the 1978 Act. An order of externment
was passed against the respondent directing his removal beyond the limits
of the National Capital Territory of Delhi for a period of two years with F
I
effect from 13.4.2004. Respondent challenged order of externment by filing
writ petition. High Court allowed writ petition and set aside order of
externment on the ground that principles of natural justice had been
violated as the show cause notice did not disclose names of witnesses who
were said to be reluctant or did not come forward to depose against_ the
respondent on account of fear and also the appellants did not disclose the G
r
cases in which witnesses had not deposed against the respondent out of
fear or because of threat, etc.

-~
Allowing the appeal, the Court
927 H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006[ SUPP. I S.C.R.

A HELD : I. The law operating in the field is no longer res integra .,
which may hereinafter be noticed:

(i) in a proceeding under the Act all statutory and constitutional
requirements must he fulfilled.

B (ii) An externment proceeding having regard to the purport and
object thereof, cannot be equated with a preventive detention matter.

(iii) Before an order of externment is passed, the proceedee is entitled
to an opportunity of hearing.
c (iv) The test of procedural safeguards contained in the Act must be
scrupulously complied with.

(v) The satisfaction of the authority must be based on objective
criteria.
D
(vi) A proceeding under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act stands on
a different footing than the ordinary proceeding in the sense that whereas •.
in the latter the details of the evidence are required to be disclosed and,
thus, giving an opportunity to the proceedee to deal with them, in the
former, general allegations would serve the purpose. (938-A-El
E
2. An order of externment must always be restricted to the area of
illegal activities of the externee. The executive order must demonstrate
due application of mind on the part of the statutory authority. When the
validity of an order is questioned, what would be seen is the material on
F which the satisfaction of the authority is based. The satisfaction of the
authority although primarily subjective, should be based on objectivity.
But Sufficiency of material as such may not be gone into by the writ court
unless it is found that in passing the impugned order the authority has
failed to take into consideration the relevant facts or had based its decision
on irrelevant factors not germane therefor. Mere possibility of another
G view may not be a ground for interference. It is not a case where malice
was alleged against the third Appellant. [939-A-CI

State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev Alias Bittoo, (20051 5 SCC
181 and Gazi Saduddin v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., (200317 SCC 330,
H relied on.
LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. VED PRAKASH @ VEDU 929
!It 3.1. The High Court and this Court would undoubtedly jealously A
guard the fundamental rights of a citizen. While exercising the jurisdiction
rested in them invariably, the courts would make all attempts to uphold
the human right of the proceedee. The fundamental right under Article
' 21 of the Constitution of India undoubtedly must be safeguarded. But while
interpreting the provisions of a statute like the present one and in view of
the precedents operating in the field, the court may examine the records B
itself so as to satisfy its conscience not only for the purpose that the
procedural safeguards available to the proceedee have been provided but
also for the purpose that the witnesses have disclosed their apprehension
about deposing in court truthfully and fearlessly because of the activities
of the proceedee. Once such a satisfaction is arrived at, the superior court c
will normally not interfere with an order of externment. The court, in any
event, would not direct the authorities to either disclose the names of the
witnesses or the number of cases where such witnesses were examined for
the simple reason that they may lead to causing of further harm to them.
(939-C-F)
D
Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, State
of Maharashtra, AIR (1973) SC 630, State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Salem
Hasan Khan, AIR (1989) SC 1304 and Gazi Saduddin v. State of Maharashtra
and Anr., (2003) 7 SCC 330, relied on.
E
3.2. The High Court was not correct in coming to the finding that
the third Appellant was bound to disclose the cases in which the witnesses
had not deposed against the Respondent out of fear or because of threat,
v etc. If an attempt is made to communicate the cases in which witnesses
were not forthcoming due to the activities of the proceedee, the same would
.' violate the secrecy required to be maintained and would otherwise defeat
the purpose for which Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 had been
F

enacted. [938-G-H)

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 530
of 2006.
G
From the Judgment and final Order dated 4.4.2005 of the Delhi High
Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 442/2004.

) Mukta Gupta, T.A. Khan and Anil Katiyar for the Appellants .
• H
Harjinder Singh, Vandana Sharma and S.V. Deshpande for the
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S.8. SINHA, J. Leave granted.

B An extemment proceeding was initiated against the Respondent herein
in terms of Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978. The said proceeding
was initiated inter alia on the ground that his movements and acts had been
causing alarm, danger and harm to person and property. . I

It is not in dispute that the following criminal proceedings were instituted
C against the Appellant:
S.No FIR No. Date Section of Law Police
Station
I. 124 29.04.82 308/34 !PC Kalyan Puri
2. 123 02.03.84 452/324/34 !PC Kalyan Puri
D
3. 469 08.11.85 308/506/4271323/34 Kalyan Puri
!PC
4. 73 19.02.91 307 /506/34 IPC Kalyan Puri
5. 15 09.01.93 147/I 48/ 149/323 Trilok Puri
IPC
E
6. 480 10.08.93 304-A IPC Trilok Puri
7. 4 05.01.99 452/342/323/354/427/34 Trilok Puri
IPC
8. 309 11.09.99 354/509/323/506/34 IPC Trilok Puri
F 9. 310 12.09.09 452/308/34 IPC Trilok Puri
I •
10. 396 29.10.01 458/323/427/506 IPC Trilok Puri

Whereas the Respondent was convicted in relation to the instances and/
or the first information reports detailed at Sr. No. 4 and 9 hereof, in other
G cases, he was acquitted except in the cases detailed at Sr. Nos. I and I0 under
Sections 308/34 and 458/323/427 /506 of the Indian Penal Code respectively
which are said to be still pending.

In the show cause notice issued to the Respondent, it was alleged:
-
"That your movement and acts causing and calculated to cause alarm,
H
,_ LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. YEO PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, .I.) 931

danger hann to the person or property. There are reasonable grounds A
to believe that you engage or likely to engage in the commission of
offence punishable under Chapter XVI, XVI!, XXII or IPC. Is it a
fact that you were not involved in a single isolated incident but
indulged in criminal activities since 1982 and continued and dangerous
so as to render you being at large in Delhi or in any part thereof is
hazardous to the community. B

.. That the witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence
in public against you by reasons of apprehension on their part as
regards the safety of their person or property. There are reasonable
grounds to believe that you are likely to engage yourself in the
commission of offence like those in para (i) above.
c
' You are likely called upon to explain as to why an order for
externment out of the limits of the National Capital Territory of Delhi
for a period of two years in accordance with the provisions of Section
47 of Delhi Police Act, I978 be not passed against you." D
Respondent filed a show cause. He also examined witnesses on his own
behalf. According to him, he had been implicated in many false cases. As the
officials of the Delhi Police were inimically disposed towards his brother,
they had implicated him in many false cases without any just or sufficient
cause. E
On or about 31.12.2003, a supplementary notice was issued by Appellant
No. 3 purported to be under Section 50 of the Delhi Police Act in continuation
of the previous notice dated 7.8.2003.

'
On or about 7.4.2004 an order of externment was passed against the F
Respondent directing his removal beyond the limits of the National Capital
Territory of Delhi for a period of two years with effect from 13.4.2004.

Having regard to the: contentions raised at the bar, at the outset, we may
notice Sections 47, 48 and 50 of the Delhi Police Act read:
G
"47. Removal of persons about to commit offences.--'

Whenever it appears to the Commissioner of Police -
i
(a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or are
calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property; or H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20061 SUPP. I S.C.R.

A (b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person
is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence
involving force or violence or an offence punishable under Chapter
XII, Chapter XVI, Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of the Indian Penal
Code or under section 290 or sections 489A to 489E (both inclusive)
of that Code or in the ahetment of any such offence; or
B
(c) that such person -

(i) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large in . {

Delhi or in any part thereof hazardous to the community; or

C (ii) has been found habitually intimidating other persons by acts of
violence or by show of force; or

(iii) habitually commits affray or breach of peace or riot, or habitually
makes forcible collection of subscription or threatens people for illegal
pecuniary gain for himself or for others; or
D (iv) has been habitually passing indecent remarks on women and
girls, or teasing them by overtures;

and that in the opinion of the Commissioner of Police witnesses are
not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such
person by reason of apprehension on their part as regards the safety
E of their person or property, the Commissioner of Police may, by
order in writing duly served on such person, or by beat of drum or
otherwise as he thinks tit, direct such person to so conduct himself as
shall seem necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or to
remove himself outside Delhi or any part thereof, by such route and
F within such time as the Commissioner of Police may specify and not
to enter or return to Delhi or part thereof, as the case may be, from
which he was directed to remove himself.

Explanation.---A person who during a period within one year
immediately preceding the commencement of an action under this
G section has been found on not less than three occasions to have
committed or to have been involved in any of the acts referred to in
this section shall be deemed to have habitually committed that act.

48. Removal of persons convicted of certain offences.-

H If a person has been convicted -
LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. VED PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, J.] 933

-. (a) of an offence under Chapter XII, Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII A
of the Indian Penal Code; or

(b) of an offence under section 3 or section 4 of the Delhi Public
Gambling Act, I955, or under section 12 of that Act in so far as it
relates to satta gambling or on two or more occasions under any other
provision of that Act (including section 12 of that Act in so far as it B
does not relate to satta gambling); or
,,. (c) of any offence under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women
and Girls Act, 1956; or

(d) of any offence under section 25, section 26, section 27, section 28
or section 29 of the Arms Act, 1959; or
c
(e) of any offence under section 135 of the Customs Act, 1962; or

(f) of any offence under section 61, section 63 or section 66 of the
Punjab Excise Act, 1955, as in force in Delhi; or
D
(g) on two or more occasions of an offence under -

(i) the Opium Act, 1878; or

(ii) the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930; or

(iii) the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; or E

(iv) section 11 of the Bombay Prevention of Begging Act, 1959, as
in force in Delhi; or

(h) on three or more occasions of an offence under section I05 or
section I 07 of this Act, F
the Commissioner of Police may, if he has reason to believe that such
person is likely again to engage himself in the commission of any of
the offences referred to in this section, by order in writing, direct
such person to remove himself beyond the limits of Delhi or any part
thereof, by such route and within such time as the Commissioner of G
Police may specify and not to enter or return to Delhi or any part
thereof, as the case may be, from which he was directed to remove
)
himself.

50. Hearing to be given before order under section 46, 47 or.48 is
passed.- H
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.
f
A (I) Before an order under section 46, section 47 or section 48 is made
against any person, the Commissioner of Police shall by notice in
writing inform him of the general nature of the material allegations
against him and give him a reasonable opportunity of tendering an
explanation regarding them.

B (2) If such person makes an application for the examination of any
witness to be produced by him, the Commissioner of Police shall
grant such application and examine such witness, unless for reasons
to be recorded in writing, the Commissioner of Police is of opinion
that such application is made for the purpose of causing vexation or
delay.
c
(3) Any written explanation put in by such person shall be filed with
the record of the case.

(4) Such person shall be entitled to be represented in the proceeding
before the Commissioner of Police by a counsel.
D
(5) (a) The Commissioner of Police may for the purpose of securing
the attendance of any person against whom any order is proposed to
be made under section 46, section 47 or section 48 require such
person, by order in writing, to appear before him and to furnish a
security bond with or without sureties for attendance during the inquiry.
E
(b) The provisions of sections 119 to 124 (both inclusive) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so far as may be, apply in
relation to the order under clause {a) to furnish security bond.

(6) Without prejudice to the foregoing provisions, the Commissioner
F of Police, while issuing notice to any person under sub-section (2)
may issue a warrant for his arrest and the provisions of sections 70
to 89 (both inclusive) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall,
so far as may be, apply in relation to such warrant.

(7) The provisions of section 445, section 446, section 447 or section
G 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shall, so far as may be,
apply in relation to all bonds executed under this section."

The proposal to initiate an appropriate proceeding under the Act was
considered in the noting/proceeding dated 7th August, 2003 of Respondent
No. 3 herein, which reads as under:
H
LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. VED PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, J.] 935

"Two public witnesses appeared before Shri V.V. Chaudhary the then A
'• Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police/ East to depose against
Ved Prakash @ Vedu s/o Shri Prem Singh, r/o S-4, Pandav Nagar,
Delhi. Camera statements recorded. On the basis of the material placed
before me and after discussing the same with ACP Kalyan Puri and
S.H.O./ Pandav Nagar and after having gone through the statement of
camera witnesses, I am satisfied that sufficient grounds exist for B
proceeding against the respondent under Section 47, DP Act."

..• It is not in dispute that the provisions of Section 56 of the Bombay
Police Act is in pari materia with Section 45 of the Delhi Police Act.
Interpretation of the said provision of the Bombay Police Act came up for
consideration before a Bench of this Court in Pandharinath Shridhar
c
Rangnekar v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, State of Maharashtra, AIR ( 1973)
SC 630 wherein inter alia the following contentions were raised:

"(iii) The externing authority must pass a reasoned order or else the
right of appeal would become illusory. D
(iv) The State Government also ought to have given reasons in support
of the order dismissing the appeal. Its failure to state reasons shows
non-application of mind;"

Chandrachud, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, opined:
E
" ... An order of externment can be passed under clause (a) or (b) of
Section 56, and only if, the authority concerned is satisfied that
witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public
against the proposed externee by reason of apprehension on their part
as regards the safety of their person or property. A full and complete
F
~ disclosure of particulars such as is requisite in an open prosecution
will frustrate the very purpose of an externment proceeding. If the
show-cause notice were to furnish to the proposed externee concrete
data like specific dates of incidents or the names of persons involved
in those incidents, it would be easy enough to fix the identity of those
who out of fear of injury to their person or property are unwilling to G
depose in public. There is a brand of lawless element in society
which is impossible to bring to book by established methods of judicial
trial because in such trials there can be no conviction without legal
evidence. And legal evidence is impossible to obtain, because out of
)
fear of reprisals witnesses are unwilling to depose in public. That
H
936 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A explains why Section 59 of the Act imposes but a limited obligation
on the authorities to inform the proposed externee "of the general
nature of the material allegations against him". That obligation fixes
the limits of the co-relative right of the proposed externee. He is
entitled, before an order of externment is passed under Section 56, to
know the material allegations against him and the general nature of
B those allegations. He is not entitled to be informed of specific
particulars relating to the material allegations."

The Court referring to its earlier decision in Hari Khemu Gawali v. The
Deputy Commissioner of Police, Bombay and Anr.. [ 1956] SCR 506 and
••
C State of Gujarat v. Mehboob Khan Osman Khan, [1968] 3 SCR 746 rejected
the contention that the notice issued against the extemee was vague. As
regards points (iii) and (iv), as noticed hereinbefore, it was stated:

"14. The third and fourth point have the same answer as the second
point just dealt with by us. Precisely for the reasons for which the
D proposed extemee is only entitled to be informed of the general nature
of the material allegations, neither the externing authority nor the
State Government in appeal can be asked to write a reasoned order
in the nature of a judgment. If those authorities were to discuss the
evidence in the case, it would be easy to fix the identity of witnesses
who are unwilling to dispose in public against the proposed extemee.
E A reasoned order containing a discussion of the evidence led against
the externee would probably spark off another round of tyranny and
harassment."

In State of Maharashtra and Anr. v. Salem Hasan Khan, AIR (1989)
SC 1304, this Court followed the dicta in Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar
F (supra).

In State of NCT of Delhi and Anr.. v. Sanjeev Alias Bittoo, [2005] 5
SCC 181, this Court yet again held:

"25. As observed in Gazi Saduddin case satisfaction of the authority
G can be interfered with if the satisfaction recorded is demonstratively
perverse based on no evidence, misreading of evidence or which a
reasonable man could not form or that the person concerned was not
given due opportunity resulting in prejudice. To that extent, objectivity
is inbuilt in the subjective satisfaction of the authority.
LT. GOVERNOR. NCT v. VED PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, J.) 937

26. The material justifying externment can also throw light on options A
• to be exercised. If referring to the materials, the authority directing
externment also indicates the option it thinks to be proper and
appropriate, it cannot be said to be vitiated even though there is no
specific reference to the other options. It is a matter of legitimate
inference that when considering materials to adjudicate on the question
of desirability for externment, options are also considered and one of B
the three options can be adopted. There cannot be any hair-splitting
in such matters. A little play in the joints is certainly permissible
• while dealing with such matters."

The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment rejected the
contention raised on behalf of the Respondent that the show cause notice was
c
vague or unspecific stating:

" ... They do contain the general nature of the material allegations
against the petitioner. Details of the cases in which he was involved
are listed and a general allegation about his being a danger to person D
and property, has been levelled. The petitioner understood the drift of
these allegations and replied to them suitably. In the light of these, I
am of the opinion that the charges and grounds detailed in the show
cause notices are not vague or vitiated."

However, having held so, the learned Judge proceeded to consider the E
matter as to whether there existed any evidence in support of the allegations
made against the externee or not. It relied upon a Division Bench decision
of the High Court in Bhim Singh v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Anr., (2002) 2
JCC 1132 and opined that -in view of the fact that in the show cause notice
in regard to the criminal cases the names of the witnesses who were said to
be reluctant to or did not come forward to depose against the Respondent on F
account of fear, had not been disclosed, the principle, of natural justice have
been violated. It was further held that the authorities had not applied their
mind stating:

" ... This minimal requirement of objective material, as well as
application of mind to it is vitally necessary in opinion formation
G
under Section 47 of the Act. As the decision in /shaque suggests, the
record should clearly suggest or support the satisfaction and should
show in which cases the witnesses had declined to appear on account
) of apprehension to their safety. No doubt, a list of cases appears in
both the show cause notices. However, no attempt has been made in H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A the notices to connect as to in which of those cases witnesses were
not forthcoming due to the petitioner's activities ... "

The law operating in the field is no longer res integra which may
hen::inafter be noticed:

B (i) In a proceeding under the Act all statutory and constitutional
requirements must be fulfilled.
(ii) An externment proceeding having regard to the purport and object
thereof, cannot be equated with a preventive detention matter.
(iii) Before an order of externment is passed, the proceedee is entitled
c to an opportunity of hearing.
(iv) The test of procedural safeguards contained in the Act must be
scrupulously complied with.
(v) The satisfaction of the authority must be based on objective
c;riteria.
D
(vi) A proceeding under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act stands on
a different footing than the ordinary proceeding in the sense that
whereas in the latter the details of the evidence are required to
be disclosed and, thus, giving an opportunity to the proceedee to
deal with them, in the former, general allegations would serve
E the purpose.

The High Court ordinarily should insist production of the entire records
including the statement of the witnesses to express their intention ro keep
their identity in secret so as to arrive at a satisfaction that such statements are
F absolutely voluntary in nature and had not been procured by the police officers
themselves.

We have noticed hereinbefore, that the High Court itself held that the
allegations made in the notice satisfy the statutory requirement but, in our
opinion, the High Court was not correct in coming to the finding that the
G third Appellant was bound to disclose the cases in which the witnesses had
not deposed against the Respondent out of fear or because of threat, etc. If
an attempt is made to communicate the cases in which witnesses were not
forthcoming due to the adivities of the proceedee, the same would violate the
secrecy required to be maintained and would otherwise defeat the purpose for
which Section 47 of the Act had been enacted. '
H
LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. VED PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, J.] 939

An order of externment must always be restricted to the area of illegal A
activities of the externee. The executive order must demonstrate due application
of mind on the part of the statutory authority. When the validity of an order
is questioned, what would be seen is the material on which the satisfaction
of the authority is based. The satisfaction of the authority although primarily
subjective, should be based on objectivity. But Sufficiency of material as B
such may not be gone into by the writ court unless it is found that in passing
the impugned order the authority has failed to take into consideration the
relevant facts or had based its decision on irrelevant factors not germane
therefor. Mere possibility of another view may not be a ground for interference.
It is not a case where malice was alleged against the third Appellant.

The High Court and this Court would undoubtedly jealously guard the
c
fundamental rights of a citizen. While exercising the jurisdiction rested in
them invariably, the courts would make all attempts to uphold the human
right of the proceedee. The fundamental right under Article 2 I of the
Constitution oflndia undoubtedly must be safeguarded. But while interpreting
the provisions of a statute like the present one and in view of the precedents D
operating in the field, the court may examine the records itself so as to satisfy
its conscience not only for the purpose that the procedural safeguards available
to the proceedee have been provided but also for the purpose that the witnesses
have disclosed their apprehension about deposing in court truthfully and
fearlessly because of the activities of the proceedee. Once such a satisfaction E
is arrived at, the superior court will normally not interfere with an order of
externment. The court, in any event, would not direct the authorities to either
disclose the names of the witnesses or the number of cases where such
witnesses were examined for the simple reason that they may lead to causing
of further harm to them. In a given case, the number of prosecution witnesses
may not be many and the proceedee as an accused in the said case is expected F
to know who were the witnesses who had been examined on behalf of the
prosecution and, thus, the purpose of maintaining the secrecy as regards
identity of such persons may be defeated. The court must remind itself that
the law is not mere logic but is required to be applied on the basis of its
experience.
G
The High Court in support of its findings has placed strong reliance
upon a judgment of this Court in Gazi Saduddin v. State of Maharashtra and
Anr., [2003] 7 SCC 330 wherein this Court stated:

... "In view of the findings recorded by the High Court there is no need H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2006] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A for us to examine the case on facts but since the learned counsel for
~
the appellant persisted and took us through the entire evidence present
on the record including the statement of three witnesses recorded by
the police in-camera, we might record our findings on facts as well.
A perusal of the statements of three witnesses spells out that he had
threatened the witnesses with dire consequences for their failure to
B participate in the demonstration organised by him. It has been stated
by the witnesses that the appellant used to give threats and beating to
poor persons in the locality and had created a terror in the locality.
The appellant was instigating the residents on communal lines and
created disharmony amongst them. He was harassing the public in
"'
c general and disturbed the public tranquillity and security of the locality.
That the appellant had given beating to two of the witnesses and
snatched Rs 700 and Rs 300 respectively from them at the point of
a knife. The third witness has also stated that the appellant was in the
habit of beating people and threatening them as a result of which a
terror was created in the minds of the residents of Manjurpura, Harsh
D Nag·u and Lota Karanja areas. That he was communal and spreading
hatred amongst the communities. It was also stated by him that he
had given beating to him and threatened him that if he did not help ~.

him in teaching a lesson to the Hindu community then he would not
spare his life."
E It was further held:

" ... Primarily, the satisfaction has to be of the authority passing the
order. If the satisfaction recorded by the authority is objective and is
based on the material on record then the courts would not interfere
with the order passed by the authority only because another view
F
possibly can be taken. Such satisfaction of the authority can be I

interfered with only if the satisfaction recorded is either
demonstratively perverse based on no evidence, misreading of evidence
or which a reasonable person could not fonn or that the person
concerned was not given due opportunity resulting in prejudicing his
G rights under the Act."

Even in Sanjeev Alias Bittoo (supra), it was observed:

"Section 47 consists of two parts. First part relates to the satisfaction
of the Commissioner of Police or any authorised officer reaching a \

H conclusion that movements or acts of any person are causing alann 4-
LT. GOVERNOR, NCT v. VED PRAKASH@ VEDU [S.B. SINHA, J.] 941

and danger to person or property or that there are reasonable grounds A
.'<
for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged
in commission of enumerated offences or in the abetment of any such
offence or is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at
large hazardous to the community. Opinion of the officer concerned
has to be formed that witnesses are not willing to come forward in B
public to give evidence against such person by reason of apprehension
on their part as regards safety of person or property. After these
opinions are formed on the basis of materials forming foundation
therefor the Commissioner can pass an order adopting any of the
available options as provided in the provision itself. The three options
are: (I) to direct such person to so conduct himself as deemed C
necessary in order to prevent violence and alarm or (2) to direct him
to remove himself outside any part of Delhi or (3) to remove himself
outside the whole of Delhi."

Although it is not possible for us to lay down the law in precise terms
as the facts of each case are to be considered on their own merit, we have D
endeavoured to lay down the broad propositions of law. We would, therefore,
record our disagreement with the view of the High Court.

The period of externment has since expired. In that view of the matter,
we direct that the impugned order of the High Court need not be given effect
to. E

For the reasons aforementioned, this appeal is allowed and disposed of
with the aforementioned observations. There shall be no order as to costs.

A.K.T. Appeal allowed.