Holding

A landlord who is a member of a joint Hindu family and holds a share in family property is not disqualified from seeking eviction of a tenant from a non‑residential building that is his exclusive property under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.

Summary

The appellant, Lingala Kondala Rao, occupied a shop that had been gifted to the respondent, Vootukuri Nara Yana Rao, by his father through a registered deed of settlement. The respondent, a member of a joint Hindu family, sought eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, claiming a bona‑fide need to start his own business and that he did not occupy any other non‑residential premises of his own. The tenant argued that because the respondent held a share in the family’s jointly owned shops and was in occupation of those premises, he was not entitled to evict the tenant from his exclusive shop. The Court examined the meaning of "own or to the possession of which he is entitled" and held that a landlord’s share in joint family property does not disqualify him from seeking possession of a non‑residential building that is his exclusive property, provided the statutory conditions are met. The appeal was dismissed, with the tenant ordered to vacate within three months.

Issues considered

The interpretation of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 with respect to a landlord who is a member of a joint Hindu family and holds a share in family property.
Whether the landlord's occupation of other jointly owned non‑residential premises disqualifies him from invoking the eviction provision for his exclusively owned shop.

Subjects

evictionlandlord-tenantjoint Hindu familySection 10(3)(a)(iii)bona fide requirementexclusive ownershipdeed of settlementpossession entitlement

Judgment

LINGALA KONDALA RAO A
v.
VOOTUKURI NARA YANA RAO

NOVEMBER 2 I, 2002

[R.C. LAHOTI AND BRJJESH KUMAR, JJ.] B

A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960-
S./ 0(3)(a){iii)-Non-residential premises-Eviction of tenant from-landlord,
a member ofJoint Hindu family, having interest in joint family business and
the shops in occupation of the joint family-Exclusively owning a sho~
Filing eviction petition on ground of bona fide requirement to start his own
business in the said shop--Tenant contending that shops in occupation of
joint family were also owned by landlord and thus he is denied the right of
seeking eviction of tenant from the suit premises-Held, joint family premises
in which joint family business is being run and wherein the landlord too has
a share and interest and juridicial possession on account of being a member
' of the family would not disentitle the landlord from seeking recovery of
possession from tenant of a non-residential building exclusively owned by him
subject to his satisfying other requirements ofs.10(3)(a)(iii)-A non-residential
building owned by joint Hindu family and in its occupation would not be
included 1vithin the meaning of the expression "which is his own or to the
possession of which he is entitled"-The consistent view of the High Court
and of the authorities below rejecting tenant's contention and allowing
landlord's petition cannot be found fault with.

M Padmanabha Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty, (1966( 3 SCR 868 followed.

G. Kaushalya Devi (Smt.) v. Ghanshyamdas, (2000( 2 SCC 1, relied
on.

Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co., ( l 998] 5 SCC
572, referred to.

Smt. Vidya Bai and Anr. v. Shanker/al and Anr., AIR (1988) A.P. 184,
disapproved.

D. Devaji v. K. Sudarashana Rao, (1994( Supp. l SCC 72, cited.

319
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Rent and Eviction: .,..
Landlord and tenant matter-Registered document conferring title on
landlord-Motive behind execution of-Held, cannot be allowed to be gone
into in an eviction suit so long as the document has been executed and registered
in accordance with law-On facts, no member of the family adversely affected
B by the deed of settlement has chosen to lay any challenge to it-Deeds and
documents.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2313 of
1999.

C From the Judgment and Order dated 11.8.1998 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in Civil Revision Petition No. 2000 of 1995.

T.V. Ratnam and K. Subba Rao for the Appellant.

P.S. Narasimha, Ananga Bhattacharya and Sridhar P. for the Respondent.
D
The following Order of the Court was delivered by

A suit for eviction of tenant from non-residential premises based on the
ground available under sub-clause (iii) of Clause (a) of sub-section (3) of
Section 10 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960
E (hereinafter 'the Act', for short), has been decreed by the Controller, which
decree has been upheld in appeal, as also in revision by the High Court. The
tenant-appellant has filed this appeal by special leave.

The facts relevant and admitted or beyond the pale of controversy at
this stage are jejune. The father of the respondent was the owner of the suit
F property. He had let out the suit accommodation-non-residential in nature,
being a shop. The property was self-acquired property of the late father of the
respondent. The family consisted of the father of the resl?ondent, the mother
of the respondent and three sons including the respondent. On 24.6.1988, the
father 'executed a regist~red deed of settlement when~by the suit shop was
G gifted to the respondent. The execution and registration of the deed of
settlement is not in dispute. Consequent thereupon exclusive title in the suit
shop has come to vest in the respondent. In the year 1991, the father of the
respondent died. His other property which also has a few other shops devolved
upon the family consisting of three sons and their widow mother. The shops
other than the suit premises are in occupation of the joint family and also
H owned by it. So far as the suit shop is concerned, it is owned exclusively by
L. K. RAO v. V.N. RAO 321

the respondent and is in occupation of the appellant-tenant. A
The bonafide requirement of the respondent for the suit shop for
commencing his own business has been found proved by all the three Courts
concurrently. The sole question arising for decision in this appeal centres
around interpretation of Section I 0(3)(a)(iii) as to whether a landlord who is
entitled to a share in joint Hindu Family property in the shops which are in B
occupation of joint Hindu family wherein joint family business is being carried
on is denied the right of seeking eviction from an accommodation exclusively
owned by. him under the said provision.

Section I 0, in so far as relevant for the purpose of this appeal, reads C
as under :-

"10. Eviction of tenants:- (I) A tenant shall not be evicted whether
in execution of a decree or otherwise except in accordance with the
provisions of this Section or Sections 12 and 13:

xxx xxx xxx D
(2) xxx xxx xxx
(3) (a) A landlord may subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply
to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord
in possession of the building - E
(i) xxx xxx xxx
(ii) xxx xxx xxx

(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is
not occupying a non-residential building in the city, town or p
village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which
he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise."

The learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the shops in
the occupation of the joint Hindu family are as much owned by the respondent
as any other member of the family. The respondent shall also be deemed to G
be in occupation of the shops inasmuch as the joint family business which is
being carried on in those shops is as much the business of the respondent as
of any other member of the family. In any case, submitted the learned counsel,
the respondrnt is entitled to a share in the property and in view of his
juridicial occupation of other shops he would be disentitled from seeking
eviction of the tenant on the said ground. H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A To disentitle the landlord from claiming eviction under Section
10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act it must be shown t_hat the landlord is in occupation of
a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned and that such
building is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled under the Act
or otherwise. In case of occupation of property by members of joint Hindu
B family wherein the interest of a member remains fluctuating depending on
t~e increase or decrease in number of members of the family it cannot be said
that the landlord is in occupation. of a non-residential building which
expression, in the setting in which it as been used, would mean his own
occupation in his own right. On the same reasoning, the non-residential
building owned by joint Hindu family cannot be called a non-residential
C building "which is his own". The expression 'to the possession of which he
is entitled' has to be construed as an immediate entitlement to possession so
as to satisfy his requirement as stated in (a) and (b) part of sub-Clause (iii).
A landlord cannot be expected to d;~:udge the members of the joint family
from their possession over the joint family premises simply because the
landlord requires the premises for his own exclusive use. He is not "entitled"
D to possession over joint family premises unless he claims partition whereat
the suit premises are also allotted to him. In a partition he may or may not
be held entitled to possession over the non-residential building pointed out
by the tenant as an alternate accommodation and relied on by him for defeating
the claim of the landlord. Therefore, a non-residential building owned by
E joint Hindu family and in its occupation would not be included within the
meaning of the expression "which is his own or to the possess1on of which
he is entitled". A non-residential building said to be owned or being under
entitlement to possession by the landlord under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the
Act cannot be just any non-residential building without regard to other relevant
factors including the extent of the ownership of the landlord and the remoteness
F between his entitlement and the occurrence of event when he would actually
get possession. In taking this view, we find support from a few decisions of
this Court.

In M Pamanabha Setty v. K.P. Papiah Setty, (1966] 3 SCR 868, the
G Constitution Bench, interpreting the expression 'entitled to possession' in a
pari materia provision contained in a Mysore Act held that the expression
would not include another tenanted accommodation wherefrom the landlord
could evict the tenant by making out a ground for eviction nor would the
expressfoh include a building where the landlord has a right to stay till he is
evicted. The Constitution Bench held that the object of.the Act is to prevent
H unreasonable eviction of tenants. It cannot be said that the Legislature
L. K. RAO v. V.N. RAO 323
considered it unreasonable for a landlord to shift to his own premises while A
he is in occupation of tenanted premises over which he has not an absolute
right of posses;ion but only a right to remain possession.

-<
In Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah & Sons v. Pushpa Trading Co., [J 988] 5
SCC 572, this Court held that the aspect of quality, size and suitability of the
building cannot be totally put out of consideration else the purpose of the Act B
would be frustrated.

In G. Kaushalya Devi (Smt.) v. Ghanshyamdas, [2000] 2 SCC I it was
•held that the expression "to the possession of which he is entitled" would not
mean possession otherwise than as an owner or in that capacity. Tenanted C
premises in which the landlord was already having his business and hence of
which he was in possession and another shop purchased by the mother of the
landlord with the amount loaned by him were held not to be buildings which
could disentitle the landlord from seeking an order to be put in possession of
the tenanted building.
D
We hold that joint Hindu family premises in which joint family business
is being run and wherein the landlord too has a share and interest and juridicial
possession on account of bein3 a member of the family would not disentitle
the landlord from seeking recovery of possession from tenant of a non-
residential building exclusively owned by him subject to his satisfying other
requirements of Section 10(3}(a)(iii). E
., It was submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the
respondent's requirement cannot be said to be bona fide. It was submitted
that a Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court rendered its decisions in
Smt. Vidya Bai and Anr. v. Shanker/al and Anr., AIR (1988) A.P. 184 on
24.9.1987 wherein the Court took the view that availability of non-residential F
building belonging to joint family was a relevant factor for denying recovery
of possession by landlord under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and shortly
thereafter on 24.6.1988 the late father of the respondent executed and registered

• the deed of settlement conferring title on the respondent. In the year 1991,
the father of the respondent died and then the present proceedings were G
initiated by the landlord. This shows that exclusive ownership over the suit
premises vesting in the landlord-respondent is a manipulation pointing go out
to ma/a fides. Suffice it to observe that it is too far fetched an inference to
draw that the object behind execution of the registered deed of settlement
was the eviction of the tenant-appellant, more so, when there is no material
available on record to base such an inference. 'fhe execution and registration H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A of the deed of settlement is not disputed. In an eviction suit between the
landlord and the tenant the motive behind execution of the document conferring
title on the landlord cannot be allowed to be gone into so long as the document
has been executed and registered in accordance with law and the transaction
is otherwise legal. It is pertinent to note that no member of the family adversely
affected by the deed of settlement has chosen to lay any challenge to it.
B Incidentally, it may be noted t~at the full Bench decision in Smt. Vidya Bai's
case was cited with approval before a two-Judge Bench of this Court in D.
Devaji v. K. Sudarshana Rao, [1994] Supp. 1 SCC 729. However, the
correctness of the decision of this Court in D. Deva}i's case was doubted by
another two-Judge Bench see [1997] 8 SCC 108 whereafter the matter came
C to be considered by a three-Judge Bench in Boorgu Jagadeshwariah & Sons
v. Pushpa Trading Co., [1998] 5 SCC 572. In D. Devaji's case the view
taken by this Court was that the landlord should not be in possession of
another non-residential building or of which he is entitled to be in possession
. in the city, town or village concerned. The intentment of the Legislature was
that the landlord who is in occupation of a non-residential building which is
D his own or to the possession of which he is entitled to under the Act or any
other law should not be permitted to recover a possession of another non-
residential building belonging tg him by evicting the tenant therefrom. In
Boorgu Jagadeshwaraiah' case the three-Judge Bench held that the view so
taken in D. Devaji 's case was an extremely narrow and literal construction
E placed on the provision which had the effect of the scuttling the intention of
the Legislature. The view of the law taken by High Court of A.P. in Smt.
Vidya Bai's case becomes, therefore, of doubtful authority. ,...
No fault can be found with the view taken by the High Court. The
appeal is held devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. It is dismissed
F accordingly. However, the tenant-appellant is allowed three month' time for
vacating the suit premises subject to his filing usual undertaking within a
period of four weeks from today in the executing court.

R.P. Appeal dismissed.