LILAWATI AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS AND ORSversusSTATE OF JHARKHAND

                        [2008) 5 S.C.R. 1160


A       LILAWATI AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS AND ORS.
                                 II.
                      STATE OF JHARKHAND
                  (Civil Appeal No. 1363 of 2007)
                          APRIL 4, 2008
B
          [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.)

        Land Acquisition Act, 1894 -- ss.23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 -
  Claim under - Entitlement - s. 4 Notification issued on
c 21.4.1965 - s.6 Notification issued on 10.11.1966 -Award of
  collector made on 6.4.1972 - s.30 of Amendment Act, 1984
  made operative w.e.f. 24.9.1984 - Reference court decided
  reference on 30. 9. 1985 - High Court held that in view of
  decision in *Paripoornan case, claimant was not entitled to
  benefit under ss.23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 - On appeal, Held:
J
  Constitution Bench in **Raghubir case fixed two terminus
  points i.e. Award by Collector or decision of reference court
  must be made between 30.4. 1982 and 24. 9. 1984 - The three
  judge Bench in Paripoornan case observed that restrictive
  interpretation should not be given - Since three judge Bench
E gave an interpretation contrary to what was stated by
  Constitution Bench, matter referred to larger Bench to consider
  correctness of view expressed by three judge Bench - Land
  Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 - s.30.

F        K. S. Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a 1994(5) SCC 593;
    **Union of India v. Raghubir Singh 1989(2) SCC 754; *K.S.
    Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a 1995(1) SCC 367 - referred
                                                                    T
    to.
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
G 1363 of 2007.
         From 'the Judgment and final Order dated 19/2/2003 of
    the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi in Appeal from Original
    Decree No. 32 and 33/1986.

H                               1160
              LILAWATI AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS AND ORS. v.                 1161
               STATE OF JHARKHAND [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

                                         WITH                                     A

                 Civil Appeal Nos. 2468, 2469, 2470, and 2471/2008

                 Himanshu Munshi, Anip Sachthey, Mohit Paul, Gopal
            Prasad, Anil K. Jha, 8.8. Singh and Kumar Rajesh Singh for
            the appearing parties.                                                B
      ~


                 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

                  DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Leave granted in SLP(C) Nos.
            ··15653, 15657, 15683 and 20741 of 2004.
                                                                                  c
                 2. All these appeals involve identical questions and are
            therefore, taken up together for disposal. The basic issues
            involved in these appeals relate to entitlement of the claimants/
            appellants for benefits under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and
            Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the 'Act'). D
      _._
                  3. Factual position is almost undisputed and essentially
            as follows:

                  Notification under Section 4( 1) of the Act was issued on
            21.4.1965, Section 6 notification was issued on 10.11.1966 and        E
            the Land Acquisition Collector's Award was made on 6.4.1972.
            Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 (in
            short the 'Amendment Act') was introduced and made operative
            with effect from 24.9.1984.

                 The reference court decided reference on 30.9.1985, the          F
            High Court held that in view of the decision of this Court in K. S.
            Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a [1994(5) SCC 593] the appellant
            was not entitled to the benefit under Section 23(1-A), 23(2) and
            Section 28 of the Act.
                                                                                  G
                  4. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the
            benefit under Section 23(1-A) may not be available in view of
      ~




-""
            what has been stated in K.S. Paripoornan's case (hereinafter
            referred to as 'Paripuranan I') yet in view of the decision of this
            Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh [1989(2) SCC 754]
                                                                                  H
     1162       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2008] 5 S.C.R.


A and in KS. Paripoornan v. State of Kera/a [1995(1) SCC 367]
     (hereinafter referred to as 'Paripoornan II' )the benefit under
     Section 23(2) and Section 28 of the Act are available.
       5. Learned counsel for the respondent-State and Bharat
  Coking Coal Ltd. (in short the 'BCCL') the beneficiary for whose
B benefit the land was acquired submitted that the view in
  Paripuranan II is not correct as a three judge Bench had taken a       +
  view clearly contrary to what has been stated by the Constitution
  Bench in Raghubir Singh's case (supra).

c        6. By way of reply learned counsel for the appellant
     submitted that even recently in Panna Lal Ghosh v. Land
     Acquisition Collector [2004(1) SCC 467] this Court has
     adopted a view taken in Paripuranan /l's case (supra).
            7. In order to appreciate the rival submissions it is
D necessary to take note of what has been stated in Raghuveer
     Singh's case (supra) which is as follows:                           ........
            "31. In construing Section 30(2), it is just as well to be
            clear that the award made by the Collector referred to
            here is the award made by the Collector under Section 11
E           of the parent Act, and the award made by the Court is the
            award made by the Principal Civil Court of Original
            Jurisdiction under Section 23 of the parent Act on a
            reference made to it by the Collector under Section 19 of
r·
            the parent Act. There can be no doubt that the benefit of
I           the enhanced solatium is intended by Section 30(2} in
            resgect of an award made by the Collector between 30-
            4-1982 and 24-9-1984. Likewise the benefit of the
            enhanced solatium is extended by Section 30(2) to the
            case of an award made by the Court between 30-4-1982
G           and 24-9-1984, even though it be upon reference from an
            award made before 30-4-1982.
            34. Our attention was drawn to the order made in State of      -<
            Punjab v. Mohinder Singh [1986(1) SCC 365], but in the
            absence of a statement of the reasons which persuaded
H
               LILAWATI AGARWAL (DEAD) BY LRS AND ORS. v.               1163
                STATE OF JHARKHAND [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
      --:
                 the learned Judges to take the view they did we find it         A
                 difficult to endorse that decision. It received the appro:val
                 of the learned Judges who decided Bhag Singh v Union
                 Territory of Chandigarh [1985(3) SCC 737] but the
                 judgment in Bhag Singh's case (supra) as we have said
                 earlier, has omitted to give due significance to all the        B
       .-4.·     material provisions of Section 30(2), and consequently
         '
                 we find ourselves at variance with it. The learned Judges
                 proceeded to apply the principle that an appeal is a
                 continuation of the proceeding initiated before the Court
-·'              by way of reference under Section 18 but, in our opinion,
4
  I
                                                                                 c
                 the application of a general principle must yield to the
                 limiting terms of the statutory provision itself. Learned
                 counsel for the respondents has strenuously relied on the
                 general principle that the appeal is a rehearing of the
                 original matter, but we are not satisfied that he is on good
                                                                                 D
      ,.__       ground in invoking that principle. Learned counsel for the
                  respondents points out that the word 'or' has been used
                  in Section 30(2) as a disjunctive between the reference to
                 the award made by the Collector or the Court and on an
                 order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in
                 appeal and, he says, properly understood it must mean           E
                  that the period 30-4-1982 to 24-9-1984 is as much
                 applicable to the appellate order of the High Court or of
                 the Supreme Court as it is to the award made by the
                  Collector or the Court. We think that what Parliament
                  intends to say is that the benefit of Section 30(2) will be    F
       "T·        available to an award by the Collector or the Court made
                  between the aforesaid two dates or to an appellate order
                  of the High Court or of the Supreme Court which arises
                  out of an award of the Collector or the Court made between
                  the said two dates. The word 'or' is used with reference       G
                  to the stage at which the proceeding rests at the time
                  when the benefit under Section 30(2) is sought to be
                  extended. If the proceeding has terminated with the award
                  of the Collector or of the Court made between the
                  aforesaid two dates, the benefit of Section 30(2) will be      H
    1164       SUPREME COURT Rl:PORTS                (2008) 5 S.C.R.


A          ariplied to such award made between the aforesaid two
           dates If the proceeding has passed to the stage of appeal
           before the High Court or the Supreme Court, it is at that
           stage when the benefit of Section 30(2) will be applied.
           But in every case. the award of the Collector or of the
B          Court must have been made between 30-4-1982 and 24-
           9-1984.                      (underlined for emphasis)
        8. In Raghubir Singh's case (supra) two terminus points
  were fixed i.e. Award by the Collector or decision of the reference
  Court must have been taken between 30.4.1982 and 24.9.1984.
C :t has been clearly stated in the last line Jf para 34 that every     \
  case "must" have been decided between the ;:iforesaid terminus.
  In Paripuranan /l's case (supra) at para 4 it was observed that
  restrictive i.1terpretation should not be given. With great respect
  we a:e undble to sJbscribe to the view As a matter of fact a
D three judge Bench was trying to give an interpretation different
  from what was specifica!ly given by the Constitution Bench.
        9. Therefore, we think it appropridte to refer th:~ matter to
  a larger bench to consider correctness of the view expressed
  in para 4 in Paripurnan /l's case (supra) holding that a restricted
E interpretation should not be given, on the face of what has been
  stated in para 34 of Raghuveer Singh's case (supra). Records
  may be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India for
  necessary orders.
F   D.G.                                 Referred to larger Bench.