Holding

The Appellate Officer is a pre‑existing judicial authority, not a persona designata; thus the order is reviewable only under Article 227 and the Letters Patent Appeal is not maintainable.

Summary

The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) sought eviction of several respondents from a licensed premises under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971. The Estate Officer ordered eviction; the respondents appealed to the Appellate Officer, identified as the District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, who upheld the eviction. The respondents challenged this order in a writ petition before the Bombay High Court, invoking Articles 226 and 227; the Single Judge dismissed the petition. The respondents then filed a Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) before the Division Bench, which entertained the appeal and reversed the Single Judge’s findings. LIC appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that the Appellate Officer acted as a civil court, not a persona designata, making the LPA non‑maintainable. The Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme, the meaning of "appellate officer", and precedent on persona designata, concluding that the District Judge exercised judicial power as a pre‑existing court and therefore the order is subject only to Article 227 jurisdiction. Consequently, the Letters Patent Appeal was held not maintainable and set aside.

Issues considered

The nature of the Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971: whether he acts as a persona designata or as a civil court.
Whether a writ petition challenging the order of such Appellate Officer falls under Article 226, Article 227, or both of the Constitution.
The maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge in the writ petition.

Legislation cited

Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948s. 3, s. 7
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115, s. 24
Limitation Acts. 29(2), s. 5
Maharashtra Civil Courts Act, 1869s. 16, s. 17, s. 19, s. 5, s. 7, s. 8
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971s. 10, s. 15, s. 2(1)(b), s. 3, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

Letters Patent Appealpersona designataappellate officerPublic Premises ActArticle 226Article 227civil court jurisdictioneviction ordersubordinate court

Judgment

[2018] 2 S.C.R. 277 277

LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF INDIA A
v.
NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 15536 of 2017)
FEBRUARY 20, 2018 B
[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, AMITAVA ROY AND
A. M. KHANWILKAR, JJ.]
Letters Patent Appeal:
Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) against order passed in Writ C
petition u/Art. 226/227 – Maintainability of – Held: The Writ petition
against order of Appellate Officer (District Judge) under Public
Premises Act, was a petition against order of a civil judge – Such
order is amenable to scrutiny of High Court only in exercise of
jurisdiction u/Art. 227 and not u/Art. 226 – Therefore, LPA against D
order in Writ Petition u/Art. 227 was not maintainable – Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 – s. 9 –
Constitution of India – Arts. 226 and 227.
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act,
1971:
E
s.9 – Order of District Judge – In exercise of power u/s. 9 as
an Appellate Officer – Whether such order is passed in capacity of
a Civil Court or persona designata – Held: Power exercised by
Appellate Officer u/s. 9 is a judicial power and not executive
power – District Judge of the City Civil Court and other judicial
officers of these courts constitute a class and cannot be considered F
as persona designata – Legislative intent behind providing an appeal
u/s. 9 before Appellate Officer to be District Judge is indicative of
the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is
not in his capacity as a persona designate, but a judicial Officer –
Therefore, the Appellate Officer while exercising power u/s. 9 does
G
not act as a persona designata, but in his capacity as a pre-existing
judicial authority in the district i.e. District Judge.
Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 Sub-section (1) of Section 9 of Public Premises
(Eviction of Unatuhorised Occupants) Act, 1971 postulates that H
277
278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A an appeal shall lie from every order of the estate Officer, passed
under the Act, to an Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the
Appellate Officer, has also been specified in the same provision.
It predicates the District Judge of the district in which the public
premises are situated or such other judicial officer in that district
of not less than 10 years standing as the District Judge to be
B
designated for that purpose. The first part of the provision does
suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however,
it does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona
designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a
case of designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the
C concomitant would be entirely different. However, when the
Appellate Officer is either the District Judge of the district or
any another judicial officer in that district possessing necessary
qualification who could be designated by the District Judge, the
question of such investiture of power of an appellate authority in
the District Judge or Designated Judge would by no standards
D
acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona
designata. [Para 30] [317-A-D]
1.2 The power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer in
terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is quite
distinct from the executive power of the State. The District Judge
E or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within
his jurisdiction. As the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to
be a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of
a pre existing authority exercising judicial power of the State.
District Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra
F Civil Courts Act, 1869, who presides over a District Court
invariably consisting of more than one Judge in the concerned
district. [Para 30] [317-D-F]
1.3 On the similar lines, the Bombay City Civil Court has
been constituted under Section 3 of the Bombay City Civil Court
G Act, 1948, with jurisdiction to receive, try and dispose of all suits
and other proceedings of a civil nature arising within the Greater
Bombay except a suit or proceedings which are cognizable by
the High Court referred to therein and by Small Causes Court.
[Para 30] [318-B-C]

H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 279

1.4 The District Judge or Principal Judge exercises judicial A
power of the State and is an authority having its own hierarchy of
superior and inferior Courts, the law of procedure according to
which it would dispose of matters coming before it depending on
its nature and jurisdiction exercised by it, acting in judicial manner.
The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court is
B
the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description
from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge/
Principal Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get
transferred, his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the
proceedings under Section 9 of the 1971 Act from the stage where
it was left by his predecessor and can function as an appellate C
authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge of the City Civil
Court and other judicial officers of these Courts possessing
necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be
considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore,
has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of
D
Section 10 of 1971 Act. [Para 30] [318-D-G]
1.5 The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under
Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of
the concerned District Court in which the public premises are
situated or such other judicial officer in that district possessing
necessary qualification to be designated by the District Judge E
for that purpose, is indicative of the fact that the power to be
exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in his capacity as persona
designata but as a judicial officer of the pre existing Court. The
historical background of the 1971 Act would make no difference
to the aforementioned analysis. [Para 30] [318-G-H; 319-A] F
1.6 The expression used in Section 9 is “Appellate Officer”
and not “Appellate Authority” however, would neither make any
difference nor undermine the status of the District Judge or the
designated judicial officer so as to reckon their appointment as
persona designata. The thrust of Section 9(1) is to provide for G
remedy of an appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before
the District Judge who, undeniably, is a pre-existing authority
and head of the judiciary within the district, discharging judicial
power of the State including power to condone the delay in filing
of the appeal and to grant interim relief during the pendency of
H
280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A the appeal. Though described as an Appellate Officer, the District
Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can and is expected
to exercise the powers of the civil court. [Para 31] [319-B-D]
1.7 The expression “appellate officer” has not been defined
in the 1971 Act, unlike the definition of “estate officer” contained
B in Section 2(1)(b) of that Act. The appellate officer cannot be
considered as a statutory authority, as defined in the dictionary
clause in Section 2(1)(fa) of the 1971 Act. Even in respect of the
appeal under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of
the City Civil Court or District Judge is competent to hear the
appeal himself or designate some other judicial officer within his
C jurisdiction possessing requisite qualification. It is implicit in
Section 9 read with the provisions of the Acts constituting the
District Judiciary that the head of the district judiciary is the
District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and
Section 9 of the 1971 Act makes it explicit, by investing authority
D in the District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court,
to designate any other judicial officer within his jurisdiction
possessing essential qualifications, to hear such appeals. This is
a clear departure from the appointment of a District Judge as a
persona designata. The Additional District Judge or judicial officer
possessing essential qualification, therefore, is not an inferior
E appellate officer within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1971 Act.
There is enough indication in Section 9 of the 1971 Act to spell
out the legislative intent that the remedy of appeal before the
appellate officer is not before a persona designata but a pre-
existing judicial authority in the district concerned. [Para 39] [323-
F B-F]
1.8 The fact that there is no express indication in the 1971
Act about the procedure to be adopted or followed by the appellate
officer, it would not follow therefrom that the District Judge or
designated judicial officer who hears the appeals under Section
G 9, does so not as a Court but as a persona designata. In that
case, the procedure for hearing of the appeals will be governed
by the provisions under the 1971 Act and Rules framed
thereunder and including the enactment under which the judicial
authority has been created, such as Maharashtra Civil Courts
Act and City Civil Courts Act. Such a pre-existing judicial
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 281

authority, by implication, would be bound to follow the procedure A
underlying the said enactments and also observe the doctrine of
fairness in affording opportunity. [Para 41] [324-C-F]
1.9 Thus, the Appellate Officer while exercising power
under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona
designata but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in B
the district (being a District Judge or judicial officer possessing
essential qualification designated by the District Judge). Being
part of the district judiciary, the judge acts as a Court and the
order passed by him will be an order of the Subordinate Court
against which remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise of C
such jurisdiction. [Para 49] [328-C-D]
Thakur Das (Dead) by LRs v. State of M.P. & Anr. (1978)
1 SCC 27 : [1978] 1 SCR 732; Mukri Gopalan v.
Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker (1995) 5 SCC 5 :
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 1; Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka D
Prasad [1961] 3 SCR 495; Maharashtra State Financial
Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs & Pharmaceuticals (P)
Ltd. (1991) 2 SCC 637 : [1991] 1 SCR 480; Asnew
Drums (P) Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Finance
Corporation (1971) 3 SCC 602 : [1972] 1 SCR 351; E
Ram Chander Aggarwal & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh
& Anr. [1966] Supp. SCR 393; Balakrishna Udayar v.
Vasudeva Aiyar 44 IA 261;Shyam Sunder Agarwal and
Co. v. Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 132 – relied on.
Jinda Ram v. UOI (1999) 2 MP LJ 221; M. Papa Naik F
v. Commissioner City Municipal Council (1996) 3 Kant
LJ 86 – approved.
Nusli Neville Wadia v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.
2010 (2) Mh. L.J. 978; N.P. Berry v. Delhi Transport
Corporation 15 (1979) DLT 108; State of Mysore v. P. G
Shankaranarayana Rao (1975) 2 Kar. LJ 280;Ganga
Ram Dohrey v. State of U.P. AIR 2002 Allahabad 238;
M/s. Pitman’s Shorthand Academy v. M/s. B. Lila Ram
& Sons AIR (37) 1950 East Punjab 181 – not approved.
Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Co-
H
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A op Bank Ltd. [1967] 3 SCR 163; Brajnandan Sinha v.
Jyoti Narain [1955] 2 SCR 955; Virender Kumar
Satyawadi v. State of Punjab [1955] 2 SCR 1013;
Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corpn.
of India & Anr. 2012 (4) Bom. C.R.1.; Sizerali
Mohamedali Lodhia v. Gujarat State Road Transport
B
Corp. 2001 (2) Guj. L.R. 1120; M. Abdul Wahid Sahib
v. Dewanjee Abdul Khader Sahib AIR 1947 Madras
400; C.S. Balarama Iyer & Anr. v. Krishnan Kunchandi
AIR 1968 Kerala 240; Y. Mahabaleswarappa v.
M. Gopalasami Mudaliar AIR 1935 Madras 673;
C Keshav Ramchandra v. Municipal Borough, Jalgaon
& Ors. AIR 1946 Bombay 64; Jagmohan Surajmal
Marwadi v. Venkatesh Gopal Ranade AIR 1933
Bombay 105; Municipality of Sholapur v. Tuljaram
Krishnasa Chavan AIR 1931 Bombay 582; Thavasikani
Nadar v. The Election Commissioner (1974) II Madras
D
LJR 44; Bathula Krishna Brahman & Ors. v. Daram
Chenchi Reddy & Ors. AIR 1959 AP 129; Surindra
Mohan v. Dharam Chand Abrol AIR 1971 J & K 76;
Kiron Chandra Bose v. Kalidas Chatterji AIR 1943
Calcutta 247; P. Venkata Somaraji & Ors. v. Principal
E Munsif & Ors. AIR 1968 AP 22; S. Srinivas Rao v.
High Court of A. P. AIR 1989 AP 258; Collector,
Varanasi v. Gauri Shanker Misra & Ors. AIR 1968 SC
384; Hanskumar Kishanchand v. Union of India AIR
1958 SC 947; Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of
Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC; Gangadhar Bapurao Gadre
F
v. Hubli Municipality 1925 B.L.R. 519; Abid Ali v.
District Judge, Baharaich (1987 Allahabad Law Journal
179); Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao ILR
(1924) 47 Mad 369 – referred to.
2.1 An order passed by a Civil Court is amenable to scrutiny
G of the High Court only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
227 of the Constitution of India, which is different from Article
226 of the Constitution. No writ can be issued against the order
passed by the Civil Court and, therefore, no letters patent appeal
would be maintainable. [Para 53] [332-H; 333-A]
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 283

2.2 In the present case, the respondents had resorted to A
remedy of writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. In view of the conclusion that the order
passed by the District Judge as an Appellate Officer is an order
of the Subordinate Court, the challenge thereto must ordinarily
proceed only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
B
not under Article 226. Moreover, on a close scrutiny of the
decision of the Single Judge of the High Court, the true nature
and substance of the order of the Single Judge was to exercise
power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and there
is no indication of Court having exercised powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India as such. [Para 50] [328-D-G] C
2.3 The Division Bench apart from relying on Nusli Neville
Wadia case and Prakash Securities case, did not make any other
analysis, to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal, as to in what
manner the judgment of the Single Judge would come within the
purview of exercise of powers under Article 226 of the D
Constitution of India. Absent that analysis, the Division Bench
could not have assumed jurisdiction to entertain the Letters
Patent Appeal merely by referring to the earlier decisions. [Para
54] [333-B-C]
2.4 The Division Bench of the High Court ought to have E
dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the respondents as
not maintainable. In that event, it was not open to the Division
Bench to undertake analysis on the merits of the case. That was
impermissible and of no avail, being without jurisdiction. That
will leave the respondents with an adverse decision of the Single
Judge dismissing their writ petition, whereby the eviction order F
passed by the Estate Officer and confirmed by the City Civil Court
has been upheld. However, to subserve the ends of justice, the
respondents are given libertyto challenge the decision of the
learned Single Judge by way of appropriate remedy. [Paras 55,
56] [333-D-E, G] G
Radhey Shyam & Another v. Chabbi Nath & Ors. (2015)
5 SCC 423 : [2015] 3 SCR 197; Ram Kishan Fauji v.
State of Haryana (2017) 5 SCC 533; Jogendrasinghji

H
284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A Vijaysinghji v. State of Gujarat (2015) 9 SCC 1 : [2015]
6 SCR 504 – relied on.
Case Law Reference
[1978] 1 SCR 732 relied on Para 15
[1995] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 relied on Para 15
B
[1967] 3 SCR 163 referred to Para 15
[1961] 3 SCR 495 relied on Para 15
[1955] 2 SCR 955 referred to Para 15
[1955] 2 SCR 1013 referred to Para 15
C [1991] 1 SCR 480 relied on Para 15
[1972] 1 SCR 351 relied on Para 15
[2015] 3 SCR 197 relied on Para 15
[2015] 1 SCC 1 relied on Para 15
[1966] Supp. SCR 393 relied on Para 15
D
(2017) 5 SCC 533 relied on Para 15
[2015] 6 SCR 504 relied on Para 15
2010 (2) Mh. L.J. 978 not approved Para 16
2012 (4) Bom. C.R.1. referred to Para 16
E 15 (1979) DLT 108 not approved Para 16
(1975) 2 Kar. LJ 280 not approved Para 16
AIR 2002 Allahabad 238 not approved Para 16
2001 (2) Guj. L.R. 1120 referred to Para 16
AIR (37) 1950 East Punjab 181 not approved Para 17
F
AIR 1947 Madras 400 referred to Para 17
AIR 1968 Kerala 240 referred to Para 17
AIR 1935 Madras 673 referred to Para 17
AIR 1946 Bombay 64 referred to Para 17
G AIR 1933 Bombay 105 referred to Para 17
AIR 1931 Bombay 582 referred to Para 17
(1974) II Madras LJR 44 referred to Para 17
AIR 1959 AP 129 referred to Para 17
(1999) 2 MP LJ 221 approved Para 18
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 285

(1996) 3 Kant LJ 86 approved Para 18 A
AIR 1971 J&K 76 referred to Para 18
AIR 1943 Calcutta 247 referred to Para 18
AIR 1968 AP 22 referred to Para 18
AIR 1989 AP 258 referred to Para 18
B
AIR 1968 SC 384 referred to Para 18
AIR 1958 SC 947 referred to Para 18
AIR 1967 SC 1 referred to Para 18
44 IA 261 relied on Para 27
1925 B.L.R. 519 referred to Para 32 C
AIR 1931 Bombay 582 referred to Para 32
AIR 1956 SC 153 referred to Para 40
(1987 Allahabad Law Journal 179) referred to Para 45
(1996) 2 SCC 132 relied on Para 46
D
ILR (1924) 47 Mad 369 relied on Para 47
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 15536
of 2017.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.10.2012 by the Division
Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Letters E
Patent Appeal No. 181 of 2012.
Ranjit Kumar, SG, Mrs. Indra Sawhney, Aditya Shandilya,
Shashank Mishra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Ms. Sonal, Anupam Mishra, Harikumar V., Ms. Pooja Singh,
V. J. Francis, Advs. for the Respondents. F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The seminal question posed in
this appeal, by special leave, is whether the order passed by the City
Civil Court in exercise of power under Section 9 of the Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, as an Appellate Officer, G
is in the capacity of a Civil Court or persona designata?
2. When this special leave petition was listed for admission on
12.09.2017, the Court passed the following order:

H
286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A “Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General
appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Ms. Sonal, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents.
As the issue was to be debated with regard to the
maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal, learned Solicitor
B General has placed reliance on Radhey Shyam & Anr. vs.
Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 423 and Ram Kishan
Fauji vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2017) 5 SCC 533.
Ms. Sonal, learned counsel representing the respondents,
would contend that there is no quarrel about the proposition
C that when a challenge is made to the order passed by the
Civil Court in a writ proceeding, it has to be treated as a
proceeding under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
and, therefore, no Letters Patent Appeal would lie. But in a
case under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised
Occupants) Act, 1971, the Estate Officer cannot be
D considered as a Court and further the appellate forum would
decide the appeal under Section 9 of the Act as the appellate
officer and as per the decision rendered by the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia vs.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2010 (2) Mh.L.J.978, which
E has placed reliance on a judgment of the Delhi High Court
in N.P.Berry vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.
15(1979) DLT 108 (para 19), it is not a Civil Court and
therefore, the order passed by the said appellate forum can
be challenged under Sections 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India and in that event, an intra-court appeal
F would be maintainable.
List for further hearing on 21.09.2017.”
The hearing on admission of the special leave petition continued on
21.09.2017 when the Court passed the following order :
G “Leave granted.
Heard Mr.Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the
appellant and Ms.Sonal for the respondents.
In the course of hearing Mr.Ranjit Kumar, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that Letters
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 287
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Patent Appeal at the instance of the respondents before the A
High Court of Judicature at Bombay was not maintainable.
Ms.Sonal, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
has, per contra, argued that the appeal was maintainable.
As we have heard the matter at length with regard to
maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal before the B
Division Bench of the High Court, it is appropriate to render
a judgment.
In view of the aforesaid, judgment is reserved.
Learned counsel for the parties shall submit written
submissions by 3rd October, 2017.” C

3. By this judgment, we shall answer the preliminary issue as to
whether the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the contesting respondents
before the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against the decision of
the learned Single Judge rendered in a writ petition (purportedly filed
under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India), questioning the D
correctness and validity of the decision of the City Civil Court, Mumbai
in Miscellaneous Civil Appeal No.121 of 2011 dated 03.04.2012, which
was affirmed by the learned Single Judge, was maintainable.
4. We may now advert to the brief factual background giving rise
to this appeal: On or around 2nd May 2005, the appellant initiated eviction E
Case No. 21 and 21A of 2015 against the respondents before the Estate
Officer under Sections 5 and 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (for short “the Act”) for eviction of
the respondents from the licenced premises on 3rd floor, 49-55, Bombay
Samachar Marg, Fort, Mumbai 400023 admeasuring about 258 sq. ft. F
including a balcony of 38 sq. ft., recovery of damages and recovery of
arrears towards repairs and maintenance charges amounting to Rs.
1364/-. The eviction was sought on two grounds: (a) respondent No.1
had illegally and unauthorisedly sublet, assigned or transferred the licenced
premises or part thereof to a partnership firm (respondent No.2) and
three companies (respondent Nos. 3 to 5); and (b) respondent No. 1 G
was in arrears of repair and maintenance charges amounting to Rs.
1364/-.
5. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 filed their Reply, stating inter alia
that respondent No.1’s grandfather Shri P.T. Shah was the original tenant
of the premises since before 1937. At that time, the building in which H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A the premises are situated was owned by the predecessor-in-title of the
appellant. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 traced the devolution of rights in the
premises and pointed out that respondent No.2 was a partnership firm
of the daughter-in-law of the original tenant, her daughter (present
respondent No.1), Shri R.C. Vakharia and Shri K.C. Vakharia. It was
also pointed out that respondent No.3 was never incorporated and it
B
never came into existence. It was further pointed out that respondent
Nos.4 and 5 were private limited companies wholly owned by the family
members of the original tenant, in which the 100% shareholding and all
the directors were the daughter-in-law of the original tenant and her
immediate family members viz., the daughter-in-law of the original tenant,
C her daughter, her son-in-law and her grandson. Sub-letting, assignment
or transfer of the premises or any part thereof to respondent Nos.2 to 5
was denied. Respondent No.1 asserted that she was in occupation,
control and possession of the premises and regularly paid rent of Rs.
895/- per month to the appellant. It was also pointed out that respondent
No.1 was not in any arrears. The calculation of damages was seriously
D
disputed. Respondent Nos.3 to 5 did not appear before the Estate Officer.
Evidence was led before the Estate Officer by the appellant and
respondent Nos. 1 and 2.
6. By its Order dated 5th February 2011, the Estate Officer held
that respondent No.1 was not in arrears of repairs and maintenance
E charges as alleged by the appellant. However, it held that respondent
No.1 had unauthorisedly sub-let the premises to respondent Nos.2 to 5.
The Estate Officer also held that the appellant was entitled to damages
from the respondents at the rate of Rs.48,142/- per month from 1st
December, 2004 till restoration of possession with simple interest at the
F rate of 9% per annum.
7. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 challenged the aforesaid order of the
Estate Officer before the Appellate Officer under Section 9 of the Act,
being the designate of the Principal Judge of the City Civil Court at
Mumbai. The appellant did not challenge the finding of the Estate Officer
G insofar as he had held that respondent No.1 was not in arrears of repairs
and maintenance charges. The said finding has become final.
8. By its order dated 3rd April, 2012, the Appellate Officer held
that (a) there was no subletting to the partnership firm (respondent No.2),
as it was established that it was the firm of the original occupant and (b)
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 289
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

there was nothing to show that respondent Nos.3 to 5 also belonged to A
the original occupant as no document was produced showing their
constitution and hence, it amounted to subletting. The Appellate Officer
upheld the order of eviction passed by the Estate Officer and the order
for damages along with interest.
9. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 challenged the aforesaid orders of B
the Estate Officer and the Appellate Officer before the learned Single
Judge of the Bombay High Court by way of Writ Petition No.4337 of
2012. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 prayed for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari
or a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or
direction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India and to
set aside the Judgment and Orders of the Appellate Officer and the C
Estate Officer. The appellant did not challenge the finding of the Appellate
Officer insofar as it had held that there was no subletting by respondent
No.1 to the partnership firm (respondent No.2). The said finding has
become final.
10. By its order dated 14th August 2012, the learned Single Judge D
of the Bombay High Court dismissed the aforesaid Writ Petition filed by
respondent Nos.1 and 2 by holding that respondent Nos.3 to 5 are separate
legal entities; the authorities below had concurrently held that the appellant
had established its case in that behalf and that no material was produced
before it for taking a different view in the matter. E
11. Respondent Nos.1 and 2 challenged the aforesaid order of
the learned Single Judge before the Division Bench of the Bombay High
Court vide Letters Patent Appeal No.181 of 2012.
12. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court by its Order
dated 12th October, 2012, rejected the preliminary objection of the F
appellant that the Letters Patent Appeal was not maintainable against
the order of the learned Single Judge and also allowed the appeal on
merits holding that documents showing that 100% shareholding of
respondent Nos.4 and 5 belonged to the occupant and her immediate
family members and that all the directors of respondent Nos.4 and 5 G
were the occupants and immediate family members, were on record,
which fact has not been taken into consideration by the Appellate Officer.
The Division Bench held that by lifting the corporate veil, it can be seen
that the companies are alter egos of the occupant and that there is no
subletting to the Companies.
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A 13. On the question of maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal,
the Division Bench of the High Court answered the same in the following
words:
“13. Firstly we will deal with the contention regarding
maintainability of this Letters Patent Appeal. Learned counsel
B for the Respondents urged that earlier writ petitions
challenging the orders passed in proceedings under the
Public Premises Act were being entertained by the Division
Bench and after the decision of the Full Bench of this Court
in the case of M/s. Prakash Securities Private Limited V/s.
LIC of India [2012 (4) Bom. C.R.1] dated 26 April 2012,
C they are now being placed before the Single Judge. He
contended that if the appeal is entertained from the orders
passed by the learned Single Judge in such petitions, then
the object of amending rules for hearing of such petitions
by the Single Judge for expeditious disposal will be lost.
D Learned counsel for appellants on the other hand has drawn
our attention to the memo of the petition and the impugned
order of the learned Single Judge wherein it is mentioned
that the petition is filed and was entertained under Articles
226 & 227 of the Constitution of India, and contended that
therefore the appeal is maintainable.
E
14. It is true that the petitions arising out of the order passed
under the Public Premises Act were being heard by the
Division Bench. This was being done due to observation of
the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Nusli Neville
Wadia V/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Another [2010
F (4) Bom. C.R. 807]. However by an order dated 15 November
2011, another Division Bench of this Court expressed doubt
about the correctness of the observation made in the case of
Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) and referred the issue as to
whether the petitions arising out of the orders passed under
G the Public Premises Act should be heard by the Division Bench
or Single Judge, to the Full Bench for consideration. The
Full Bench in the case of Prakash Securities [2012 (4) Bom.
C.R. 1] (supra) found that clause 3 of the Rule 18 of Chapter
XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules 1960
was wide enough to include orders passed by any
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 291
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

quasijudicial authority under any enactment, even if such A
explanation is not covered by clause 1, 2, 4 to 43 of Rule
18. The Full Bench found that the order passed by
quasijudicial authority under the Public Premises Act is also
covered by Rule 18 (3) so as to indicate that the petitions
under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India
B
challenging such orders are to be heard and decided by the
Single Judge. Reference was accordingly disposed of by the
Full Bench by its judgment dated 26 April 2012. The Full
Bench held that the Appellate Side Rules as they stand,
provide that the petitions challenging the orders passed
under the Public Premises Act are required to be heard by C
the learned Single Judge and therefore the observations made
in the case of Nusli Neville Wadia (supra), were not correct.
The petitions relating to orders passed under Public Premises
Act were being entertained by the Division Bench when the
rules provided that they should be entertained by the Single
D
Judge. Therefore there was no conscious decision to remove
the petitions arising from orders passed under the Public
Premises, from Division Bench and to place them before
Single Judge. In fact Full Bench found that these petitions
were being wrongly entertained by the Division Bench.
15. In the judgment of the Full Bench there is no indication E
that Letters Patent Appeal arising out of the orders passed
by the Single Judge in proceedings under the Public Premises
Act will not be maintainable. If Letters Patent Appeals are
otherwise maintainable, judgment of the Full Bench does
not take away that right in respect of petitions challenging F
the orders passed under Public Premises Act. Therefore the
argument advanced by the learned counsel on maintainability
of the appeal on this ground cannot be accepted.
Maintainability was not contested on any other ground. In
the present case, the petitioner has invoked both Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge G
also has referred to the said Articles in the impugned order.
Furthermore, the Respondent Corporation is itself amenable
to writ jurisdiction of this Court, being a public corporation.
There is therefore no substance in the preliminary objection
H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A raised by the learned counsel for the Respondent that the
appeal is not maintainable and that it should be dismissed
at the threshold without looking at the merits of the matter.”
14. This appeal by the appellant assails the opinion expressed by
the Division Bench not only on maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal
B but also on merits, whereby the Division Bench reversed the finding of
fact recorded by the Estate Officer and affirmed by both, the City Civil
Court, being the Appellate Officer and the learned Single Judge, whilst
rejecting the writ petition filed by the respondents. However, the argument
presently is confined to the preliminary issue about the maintainability of
the Letters Patent Appeal and if that contention of the appellant was to
C be accepted, it would not be necessary for us to examine the other
matter raised in the appeal about the merits of the finding and conclusion
recorded by the Division Bench, being without jurisdiction. Instead, the
contesting respondents will have to be relegated to question the judgment
of the learned Single Judge in that behalf and if such appropriate remedy
D is resorted to by the contesting respondents, only then it would become
necessary to analyse the same in those proceedings.
15. According to the appellant, the interplay of Section 9 of the
1971 Act read with the other provisions in the same Act, such as Sections
3, 8 and 10, makes it amply clear that the jurisdiction exercised by the
E Appellate Officer, namely the City Civil Court Judge, in an appeal under
Section 9 of the Act, is in his capacity as a Civil Court and not persona
designata. If so, the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India alone could be availed in the fact situation of the present case and
not under Article 226, for issuance of a Writ of Certiorari. In the present
case, although the writ petition filed by the contesting respondents was
F labelled as one under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India,
considering the nature and substance of the challenge, reasoning and
nature of the order passed by the learned Single Judge it could be pursued
only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and not under Article
226 or for that matter under Article 226 read with Article 227 of the
G Constitution of India. Resultantly, the Division Bench committed manifest
error in entertaining the Letters Patent Appeal against the decision of
the learned Single Judge of the same High Court. To buttress the
contention that the District Judge/Judicial Officer, referred to in Section
9 of the 1971 Act, does not exercise powers as persona designata,
reliance has been placed on the exposition of this Court in Thakur Das
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 293
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

(Dead) by LRs Vs. State of M.P. & Anr.1 and in the cases of Mukri A
Gopalan Vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurayil Aboobacker2, Thakur Jugal
Kishore Sinha Vs. Sitamarhi Central Coop Bank Ltd. 3, Central
Talkies Ltd. Vs. Dwarka Prasad 4, Brajnandan Sinha Vs. Jyoti
Narain 5 , Virender Kumar Satyawadi Vs. State of Punjab 6 ,
Maharashtra State Financial Corporation Vs. Jaycee Drugs &
B
Pharmaceuticals (P) Ltd. 7 and Asnew Drums (P) Ltd. Vs.
Maharashtra State Finance Corporation 8. In support of the contention
that the order of the District Judge/Appellate Officer would be amenable
only to jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, reliance
has been placed on the decision of Radhey Shyam & Another Vs.
Chabbi Nath & Ors.9 and Ram Chander Aggarwal & Anr. Vs. State C
of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.10 This contention is further elaborated on the
basis of the exposition in the case of Ram Kishan Fauji Vs. State of
Haryana11 and Jogendrasinghji Vijaysinghji vs State of Gujarat12,
wherein the Court observed that the maintainability of Letters Patent
Appeal would depend on the pleadings in the writ petition, nature and
D
character of the order passed by the learned Single Judge and the type
of directions issued, regard being had to the jurisdictional perspective in
the constitutional context. The appellant invited our attention to the
judgment of the learned Single Judge wherein the submissions made on
behalf of the writ petitioners (contesting respondents) have been noted
in paragraphs 9 to 11 and 15 and that of the appellant in paragraphs 12 E
and 16, as also the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in
paragraphs 19 to 24. It was urged that the jurisdiction exercised by the
learned Single Judge was plainly ascribable to exercise of power of
superintendence under Article 227 and not of exercise of power to issue
a writ or in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution
F
of India. It was contended that the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the
1
1978 (1) SCC 27
2
1995 (5) SCC 5
3
1967 (3) SCR 163
4
1961 (3) SCR 495
5
1955 (2) SCR 955 G
6
1955 (2) SCR 1013
7
1991 (2) SCC 637
8
1971 (3) SCC 602
9
2015 (5) SCC 423
10
1966 Supp. SCR 393
11
2017(5) SCC 533
12
2015 (9) SCC 1 H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A contesting respondents before the Division Bench, therefore, was not
maintainable.
16. Per contra, the respondents would urge that the District Judge/
Appellate Officer exercises power under Section 9 of the 1971 Act as
persona designata and not as a Civil Court. Alluding to the decisions to
B which we will advert to a little later, the respondents contend that when
a special statute creates an Appellate Officer and where it refers to the
Presiding Judge and not to the Court to be such Appellate Officer, then
it can be said that the reference has been made to the Judge as persona
designata. It is also well known that where the authority is the creation
of a statute and is indicated or identified by a official designation or as
C one of a class, the provisions of statute would have to be looked into to
determine whether the intention was to single him out as persona
designata, his official designation being merely a further description of
him. The legislative scheme concerning the Act under consideration does
not indicate, in any manner, much less by necessary implication, that he
D can exercise powers of the Court for adjudication of the appeal. However,
the powers and jurisdiction to be exercised have been circumscribed by
the special law for which reason also he would be a persona designata.
Furthermore, the Act gives finality to the order passed by the appellate
officer in terms of Section 10, which is indicative of the fact that the
appellate officer acts as a persona designata and not as a Court. The
E provisions of the 1971 Act are a self-contained code delineating the
powers, jurisdiction and procedure different from general laws such as
Civil Procedure Code or Criminal Procedure Code. At the same time,
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts has been barred in respect of the
matters to be dealt with under the statute. It is submitted that keeping in
F mind the historical background of the 1971 Act, it is not permissible to
consider the appellate officer referred to in Section 9 of the Act as
discharging powers and jurisdiction of a Court. The appellate officer
referred to in Section 9 of the Act merely acts as a persona designata.
To buttress this contention, reliance has been placed on the decisions of
the High Courts dealing with this question, interpreting Section 9 of the
G 1971 Act and analogous provisions in the concerned State Public Premises
Act, namely; Nusli Neville Wadia Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.13;
Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Life Insurance Corp. of India &
Anr.14; N.P. Berry Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation15; State of
13
2010 (2) Mh. L.J. 978
14
2012 (4) Bom. C.R.1
H 15
15 (1979) DLT 108
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 295
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Mysore Vs. P. Shankaranarayana Rao16; Ganga Ram Dohrey Vs. A
State of U.P.17; and Sizerali Mohamedali Lodhia Vs. Gujarat State
Road Transport Corp.18.
17. Reliance has been placed also on the other decisions of the
High Courts dealing with the question as to when the appointment of an
appellate authority albeit a judicial officer has been treated as persona B
designata under laws other than Public Premises Act, namely, M/s.
Pitman’s Shorthand Academy Vs. M/s. B. Lila Ram & Sons19; M.
Abdul Wahid Sahib Vs. Dewanjee Abdul Khader Sahib20; C.S.
Balarama Iyer & Anr. Vs. Krishnan Kunchandi 21 ; Y.
Mahabaleswarappa Vs. M. Gopalasami Mudaliar 22 ; Keshav
Ramchandra Vs. Municipal Borough, Jalgaon & Ors.23; Jagmohan C
Surajmal Marwadi Vs. Venkatesh Gopal Ranade.24; Municipality
of Sholapur Vs. Tuljaram Krishnasa Chavan;25 Thavasikani Nadar
Vs. The Election Commissioner26; Bathula Krishna Brahman & Ors.
Vs. Daram Chenchi Reddy & Ors.27
18. Our attention has also been invited to other decisions taking D
the view that the appellate authority cannot be treated as persona
designata but as a Court while dealing with the provisions of Public
Premises Act and other laws, namely, Jinda Ram Vs. UOI28; M. Papa
Naik Vs. Commissioner City Municipal Council29; Surindra Mohan
Vs. Dharam Chand Abrol30; Kiron Chandra Bose Vs. Kalidas E
Chatterji31; P. Venkata Somaraji & Ors. Vs. Principal Munsif &
Ors.32 and S. Srinivas Rao Vs. High Court of A.P.33 Our attention is
16
(1975) 2 Kar. LJ 280
17
AIR 2002 Allahabad 238
18
2001 (2) Guj. L.R. 1120
19
AIR (37) 1950 East Punjab 181 F
20
AIR 1947 Madras 400
21
AIR 19 68 Kerala 240
22
AIR 19 35 Madras 673
23
AIR 1946 Bombay 64
24
AIR 1933 Bombay 105
25
AIR 1931 Bombay 582
26
(1974) II Madras LJR 44 G
27
AIR 1959 AP 129
28
(1999) 2 MP LJ 221
29
(1996) 3 Kant LJ 86
30
AIR 1971 J&K 76
31
AIR 1943 Calcutta 247
32
AIR 1968 AP 22
33
AIR 1989 AP 258 H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A also invited to the decisions of this Court in the case of Central Talkies
(supra); Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra); Collector, Varanasi Vs.
Gauri Shanker Misra & Ors.34; Thakur Das (supra); Hanskumar
Kishanchand Vs. Union of India35 and Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar
Vs. State of Maharashtra36.
B 19. The respondents have also relied on the definition of the
expression persona designata given in Osborn’s Concise Law
Dictionary, 2005 Edition and P. Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advance Law
Lexicon, 5th Edition. According to the respondents, therefore, the remedy
against the decision of the appellate officer available to the respondents
was only by way of writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the
C Constitution and the respondents, in fact, invoked the same by filing a
writ petition which was initially decided by the learned Single Judge
whose decision could be challenged by way of an intra-court letters
patent appeal before the Division Bench of the same High Court.
20. We have heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General
D appearing for the appellant and Ms. Sonal, learned counsel appearing
for the respondents.
21. Indubitably, in the context of provisions of the 1971 Act, the
question raised in the present appeal has not received the attention of
this Court thus far. The decisions of this Court pressed into service by
E both sides, which has had occasion to examine the purport of expression
persona designate, are in reference to the provisions of other Central
and State enactments. However, the exposition in those cases will have
bearing on the matter in issue before us. In that, the principle underlying
the exposition in those cases can be applied for answering the question
F under consideration in reference to the provisions of the 1971 Act and
Section 9 in particular. We, therefore, deem it apposite to advert to the
decisions of this Court before we proceed to analyse the legislative
scheme of the 1971 Act.
22. In the case of Thakur Das (supra) rendered by a three-
G Judge Bench, this Court examined two contentions in reference to the
purport of Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The first
question was whether the judicial authority constituted by the State

34
AIR 1968 SC 384
35
AIR 1958 SC 947
36
H AIR 1967 SC 1
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 297
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

Government under the said provision, to hear appeals against the order A
of confiscation that may be made by the licensing authority under Section
6A of the said Act, is not an inferior criminal court subordinate to the
High Court and amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court
under Section 435 read with Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure? The said contention required this Court to consider whether
B
the judicial authority appointed under Section 6C of the said Act would
be persona designata, despite the fortuitous circumstance that it
happens to be the Sessions Judge. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the reported
decision, this Court noted thus:
“7. If the Sessions Judge presiding over the Sessions Court
is the judicial authority, the question is: would it be an C
inferior criminal court subordinate to the High Court for
the purposes of Sections 435 and 439 of the Criminal
Procedure Code? At the one end of the spectrum the
submission is that the judicial authority appointed under
Section 6-C would be persona designata and that if by a D
fortuitous circumstance the appointed judicial authority
happens to be the Sessions Judge, while entertaining and
hearing an appeal under Section 6-C it would not be an
inferior criminal court subordinate to the High Court and,
therefore, no revision application can be entertained against
his order by the High Court. While conferring power on the E
State Government to appoint appellate forum, the Parliament
clearly manifested its intention as to who should be such
Appellate Authority. The expression “judicial” qualifying
the “authority” clearly indicates that that authority alone
can be appointed to entertain and hear appeals under Section F
6-C on which was conferred the judicial power of the State.
The expression “judicial power of the State” has to be
understood in contradistinction to executive power. The
framers of the Constitution clearly envisaged courts to be
the repository of the judicial power of the State. The Appellate
Authority under Section 6-C must be a judicial authority. By G
using the expression “judicial authority” it was clearly
indicated that the Appellate Authority must be one such pre-
existing authority which was exercising judicial power of
the State. If any other authority as persona designata was to
be constituted there was no purpose in qualifying the word H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A “authority” by the specific adjective “judicial”. A judicial
authority exercising judicial power of the State is an authority
having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior court, the
law of procedure according to which it would dispose of
matters coming before it depending upon the nature of
jurisdiction exercised by it acting in judicial manner. In using
B
the compact expression “judicial authority” the legislative
intention is clearly manifested that from amongst several
pre-existing authorities exercising judicial powers of the State
and discharging judicial functions, one such may be
appointed as would be competent to discharge the appellate
C functions as envisaged by Section 6-C. There is one in-built
suggestion indicating who could be appointed. In the concept
of appeal inheres hierarchy and the Appellate Authority
broadly speaking would be higher than the authority against
whose order the appeal can be entertained. Here the
Appellate Authority would entertain appeal against the order
D
of Collector, the highest revenue officer in a district. Sessions
Judge is the highest judicial officer in the district and this
situation would provide material for determining Appellate
Authority. In this connection the legislative history may throw
some light on what the legislature intended by using the
E expression “judicial authority”. The Defence of India Rules,
1962, conferred power on certain authorities to seize
essential commodities under certain circumstances. Against
the seizure an appeal was provided to the State Government
whose order was made final. By the Amending Act 25 of
1966 Sections 6-A to 6-D were introduced in the Act. This
F
introduced a basic change in one respect, namely, that an
order of confiscation being penal in character, the person
on whom penalty is imposed is given an opportunity of
approaching a judicial authority. Earlier appeal from
executive officer would lie to another executive forum. The
G change is appeal to judicial authority. Therefore, the
expression clearly envisages a pre-existing judicial authority
has to be appointed Appellate Authority under Section 6-C.
When the provision contained in Section 6-C is examined in
the background of another provision made in the order itself
it would become further distinctly clear that pre-existing
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 299
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

judicial authority was to be designated as Appellate Authority A
under Section 6-C. A seizure of essential commodity on the
allegation that the relevant licensing order is violated, would
incur three penalties: (1) cancellation of licence; (2)
forfeiture of security deposit; and (3) confiscation of seized
essential commodity, apart from any prosecution that may
B
be launched under Section 7. In respect of the first two
penalties an appeal lies to the State Government but in
respect of the third though prior to the introduction of Section
6-C an appeal would lie to the State Government, a distinct
departure is made in providing an appellate forum which
must qualify for the description and satisfy the test of judicial C
authority. Therefore, when the Sessions Judge was appointed
a judicial authority it could not be said that he was persona
designata and was not functioning as a court.”
“8. Sections 7 and 9 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898, envisage division of the State into various Sessions D
Divisions and setting up of Sessions Court for each such
division, and further provides for appointment of a Judge
to preside over that Court. The Sessions Judge gets his
designation as Sessions Judge as he presides over the
Sessions Court and thereby enjoys the powers and discharges
the functions conferred by the Code. Therefore, even if the E
judicial authority appointed under Section 6C is the Sessions
Judge it would only mean the Judge presiding over the
Sessions Court and discharging the functions of that Court.
If by the Sessions Judge is meant the Judge presiding over
the Sessions Court and that is the appointed appellate F
authority, the conclusion is inescapable that he was not
persona designata which expression is understood to mean
a person pointed out or described as an individual as opposed
to a person ascertained as a member of a class or as filling
a particular character (vide Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka
Prasad and Ram Chandra v. State of U.P.).” G
(emphasis supplied)
The Court also considered the cleavage of opinion amongst the High
Courts on the construction of the expression “judicial authority” used in
Section 6C of the Essential Commodities Act. In paragraphs 9 to 11, this
Court answered the same in the following words: H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A “9. Our attention was drawn to a cleavage of opinion amongst
High Courts on the construction of the expression “judicial
authority” used in Section 6-C. In State of Mysore v.
Pandurang P. Naik, the Mysore High Court was of the
opinion that though a District and Sessions Judge was
appointed as a judicial authority by the State Government
B
in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 6-C of the
Act in that capacity it would not be an inferior criminal court
within the meaning of Section 435. Same view was taken by
the Gujarat High Court in State of Gujarat v. C.M. Shah.
The exact specification of the Appellate Authority constituted
C by the notification could not be gathered from the judgment
but it appears that the appeal was heard by the Additional
Sessions Judge which would indicate that even if a District
and Sessions Judge was appointed as “judicial authority”
that expression would comprehend the Additional Sessions
Judge also or the Sessions Judge could transfer such appeal
D
pending before him to Additional Sessions Judge which was
a pointer that he was not a persona designata. After
referring to certain sections of the Code of Criminal
Procedure it has been held that the Additional Sessions Judge
hearing an appeal under Section 6-C is not an inferior
E criminal court within the meaning of Section 435(1). Our
attention was also drawn to State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Vasant Kumar. Only a short note on this judgment appears
in 1972 Jabalpur Law Journal 80 but it clearly transpires
that the point under discussion has not been dealt with by
the Court.
F
10. As against this, this very question was examined by a
Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public
Prosecutor (A.P.) v. L. Ramayya. Two questions were referred
to the Full Bench. The first was: whether the District and
Sessions Judge who is appointed judicial authority for
G hearing appeals under Section 6C is a persona designata
or an inferior Criminal Court, and the second was: whether
even if it is an inferior Criminal Court, a revision application
against the order of the appellate authority would lie to the
High Court? The Full Bench answered the first question in
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 301
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the affirmative. While summing up its conclusions, the Court A
held that when a judicial authority like an officer who
presides over a court is appointed to perform the functions,
to judge and decide in accordance with law and as nothing
has been mentioned about the finality or otherwise of the
decisions made by that authority, it is an indication that the
B
authority is to act as a court in which case it is not necessary
to mention whether they are final or not as all the incidents
of exercising jurisdiction as a court would necessarily follow.
We are in broad agreement with this conclusion.

C
11. We are accordingly of the opinion that even though the
State Government is authorised to appoint an Appellate
Authority under Section 6C, the Legislature clearly indicated
that such appellate authority must of necessity be a judicial
authority. Since under the Constitution the courts being the
repository of the judicial power and the officer presiding D
over the court derives his designation from the nomenclature
of the Court, even if the appointment is made by the
designation of the judicial officer the Appellate Authority
indicated is the Court over which he presides discharging
functions under the relevant Code and placed in the E
hierarchy of courts for the purposes of appeal and revision.
Viewed from this angle, the Sessions Judge, though appointed
and appellate authority by the notification, what the State
Government did was to constitute an appellate authority in
the Sessions Court over which the Sessions Judge presides.
The Sessions Court is constituted under the Code of Criminal F
Procedure and indisputably it is an inferior criminal court
in relation to High Court. Therefore, against the order made
in exercise of powers conferred by Section 6-C a revision
application would lie to the High Court and the High Court
would be entitled to entertain a revision application under G
Sections 435 and 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1898 which was in force at the relevant time and such revision
application would be competent.”
(emphasis supplied)
H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A 23. In paragraph 8 of the same judgment, this Court unambiguously
concluded that as the nomenclature ‘Sessions Judge’ means the Judge
presiding over the Sessions Court and that being the appointed appellate
authority, the conclusion is inescapable that he was not persona
designata, which expression is understood to mean a person pointed
out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as
B
a member of a class or as filling a particular character. These observations
are founded on the decision in the cases of Central Talkies Ltd. (supra)
and Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra).
24. Another instructive exposition is in Mukri Gopalan (supra)
(two Judges). In this case, the Court was called upon to consider the
C sweep of Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control)
Act, 1965. The same envisages that the power of the appellate authority
can be conferred by the Government on such officers and such authorities
not below the rank of Subordinate Judge. In paragraph 7, this Court
restated the well settled position that an authority can be styled to be
D persona designata if powers are conferred on a named person or
authority and such powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The
relevant extract of paragraph 7 of the reported decision reads thus:
“7. As noted earlier the appellate authority, namely the
District Judge, Thallassery has taken the view that since he
E is a persona designata he cannot resort to Section 5 of the
Limitation Act for condoning the delay in filing appeal before
him. So far as this reasoning of the appellate authority is
concerned Mr Nariman, learned counsel for respondent
fairly stated that he does not support this reasoning and it is
not his say that the appellate authority exercising powers
F under Section 18 of the Rent Act is a persona designata. In
our view the said fair stand taken by learned counsel for
respondent is fully justified. It is now well settled that an
authority can be styled to be persona designata if powers
are conferred on a named person or authority and such
G powers cannot be exercised by anyone else. The scheme of
the Act to which we have referred earlier contraindicates
such appellate authority to be a persona designata. It is
clear that the appellate authority constituted under Section
18(1) has to decide lis between parties in a judicial manner
and subject to the revision of its order, the decision would
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 303
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

remain final between the parties. Such an authority is A
constituted by designation as the District Judge of the district
having jurisdiction over the area over which the said Act
has been extended. It becomes obvious that even though the
District Judge concerned might retire or get transferred or
may otherwise cease to hold the office of the District Judge
B
his successor-in-office can pick up the thread of the
proceedings from the stage where it was left by his
predecessor and can function as an appellate authority under
Section 18. If the District Judge was constituted as an
appellate authority being a persona designata or as a named
person being the appellate authority as assumed in the C
present case, such a consequence, on the scheme of the Act
would not follow. In this connection, it is useful to refer to a
decision of this Court in the case of Central Talkies Ltd. v.
Dwarka Prasad. In that case Hidayatullah, J. speaking for
the Court had to consider whether Additional District
D
Magistrate empowered under Section 10(2) of Criminal
Procedure Code to exercise powers of District Magistrate
was a persona designata. Repelling the contention that he
was a persona designata the learned Judge made the
following pertinent observations:
‘… A persona designata is ‘a person who is pointed out or E
described as an individual, as opposed to a person
ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular
character’. In the words of Schwabe, C.J. in Parthasaradhi
Naidu v. Koteswara Rao, personae designatae are ‘persons
selected to act in their private capacity and not in their F
capacity as Judges’. The same consideration applies also to
a well-known officer like the District Magistrate named by
virtue of his office, and whose powers the Additional District
Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other
officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction
Act. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad case, with G
respect, was erroneous.’
Applying the said test to the facts of the present case it
becomes obvious that appellate authorities as constituted
under Section 18 of the Rent Act being the District Judges
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304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A they constituted a class and cannot be considered to be
persona designata. It is true that in this connection, the
majority decision of the High Court in Jokkim Fernandez v.
Amina Kunhi Umma also took a contrary view. But the said
view also does not stand scrutiny in the light of the statutory
scheme regarding constitution of appellate authority under
B
the Act and the powers conferred on and the decisions
rendered by it.”
(emphasis supplied)
It may be useful to advert to the exposition in paragraphs 8 and 13 of this
C decision, which reads thus:
“8. Once it is held that the appellate authority functioning
under Section 18 of the Rent Act is not a persona designata,
it becomes obvious that it functions as a court. In the present
case all the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas
D within which the provisions of the Rent Act have been
extended are constituted as appellate authorities under
Section 18 by the Govt. notification noted earlier. These
District Judges have been conferred the powers of the
appellate authorities. It becomes therefore, obvious that while
adjudicating upon the dispute between the landlord and
E tenant and while deciding the question whether the Rent
Control Court’s order is justified or not such appellate
authorities would be functioning as courts. The test for
determining whether the authority is functioning as a court
or not has been laid down by a series of decisions of this
F court. We may refer to one of them, in the case of Thakur
Jugal Kishore Sinha v. Sitamarhi Central Coop. Bank Ltd.
In that case this court was concerned with the question
whether the Assistant Registrar of Cooperative Societies
functioning under Section 48 of the Bihar and Orissa
Cooperative Societies Act, 1935 was a court subordinate to
G the High Court for the purpose of Contempt of Courts Act,
1952. While answering the question in the affirmative, a
division bench of this court speaking through Mitter, J placed
reliance amongst others on the observations found in the
case of Brajnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain wherein it was
H observed as under:-
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 305
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

‘It is clear, therefore, that in order to constitute a court in A
the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the
court should have, apart from having some of the trappings
of a judicial tribunal, power to give a decision or a definitive
judgment which has finality and authoritativeness which are
the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement.’
B
Reliance was also placed on another decision of this court
in the case of Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. The State of
Punjab. Following observations found at page 1018 therein
were pressed in service.
‘It may be stated broadly that what distinguishes a court C
from a quasi-judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a
duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declares
the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a
judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a
matter of right to be heard in support of their claim and to
adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an D
obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter
on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in
accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to
whether an authority created by an Act is a court as
distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be E
decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the
Act it possesses all the attributes of a court.’
When the aforesaid well settled tests for deciding whether
an authority is a court or not are applied to the powers and
functions of the appellate authority constituted under Section F
18 of the Rent Act, it becomes obvious that all the aforesaid
essential trappings to constitute such an authority as a court
are found to be present. In fact, Mr. Nariman learned
Counsel for respondent also fairly stated that these appellate
authorities would be courts and would not be persona
designata. But in his submission as they are not civil courts G
constituted and functioning under the Civil Procedure Code
as such, they are outside the sweep of Section 29(2) of the
Limitation Act. It is therefore, necessary for us to turn to the
aforesaid provision of the Limitation Act. It reads as under :
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306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A ‘29(2). Where any special or local law prescribes for any
suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different
from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions
of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period
prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of
determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
B
appeal or application by any special or local law, the
provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply
only insofar as, and to the extent to which, they are not
expressly excluded by such special or local law.’
A mere look at the aforesaid provision shows for its
C applicability to the facts of a given case and for importing
the machinery of the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24
of the Limitation Act the following two requirements have to
be satisfied by the authority invoking the said provision.
(i) There must be a provision for period of limitation under
D any special or local law in connection with any suit, appeal
or application.
(ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such
special or local law should be different from the period
prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act.”
E
(emphasis supplied)
“13. As per this sub-section, the provisions contained in
certain sections of the Limitation Act were applied
automatically to determine the periods under the special laws,
F and the provisions contained in other sections were stated to
apply only if they were not expressly excluded by the special
law. The provision (Section 5) relating to the power of the
court to condone delay in preferring appeals and making
applications came under the latter category. So if the power
to condone delay contained in Section 5 had to be exercised
G by the appellate body it had to be conferred by the special
law. That is why we find in a number of special laws a
provision to the effect that the provision contained in Section
5 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the proceeding under
the special law. The jurisdiction to entertain proceedings
under the special laws is sometimes given to the ordinary
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 307
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

courts, and sometimes given to separate tribunals constituted A
under the special law. When the special law provides that
the provision contained in Section 5 shall apply to the
proceedings under it, it is really a conferment of the power
of the court under Section 5 to the Tribunals under the special
law - whether these tribunals are courts or not. If these
B
tribunals under the special law should be courts in the
ordinary sense an express extension of the provision
contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act will become otiose
in cases where the special law has created separate tribunals
to adjudicate the rights of parties arising under the special
law. That is not the intension of the legislature.” C
(emphasis supplied)
25. Again in the case of Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), decided
by a three-Judge Bench, this Court considered the question whether an
appeal under Section 32(9) of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951,
was maintainable before the High Court. Section 31(1) of the said Act D
required the Board to apply to the District Judge within the limits of an
industrial concern which was carrying out the whole or a substantial
part of its business or for one or more of the reliefs specified. Such
application could be made inter alia for an order for the sale of the
property pledged, mortgaged or as security for the loan or advance or E
for an ad-interim for transfer or removing its machinery or plant or
equipment from the premises of the industrial concern with the permission
of the Board, where such removal is apprehended. The question
considered by this Court was whether by using the words “in the manner
provided in the CPC” in Section 32(8) of the concerned Act, the legislature
intended to include the provisions in the Code dealing with appeals. The F
Court after analyzing the provisions of the Act answered the same in the
following words:
“10. The question which really arises is whether by using
the words “in the manner provided in the CPC” in Section
32(8) the Legislature intended to include the provisions in G
the Code dealing with appeals. There is no doubt that under
the CPC an order setting aside or refusing to set aside a
sale in execution of a decree is appealable under Order XLIII
Rule 1 (j). It is difficult to understand why the scope of the
language should be cut down by not including appeals H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A provided under the CPC within the ambit of the words “in
the manner provided in the CPC”. “Manner” means method
of procedure and to provide for an appeal is to provide for a
mode of procedure. The State Financial Corporation lends
huge amounts and we cannot for a moment imagine that it
was the intention of the Legislature to make the order of
B
sale of property, passed by the District Judge, final and only
subject to an appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136,
of the Constitution.
11. The learned Counsel for the respondents contended that,
wherever the Legislature wanted to provide for an appeal to
C the High Court, it did so specifically. In this connection he
pointed out that Sub-section (9) of Section 32 provided that
“any party aggrieved by an order under Sub-section (5) or
Sub-section (7) may, within thirty days from the date of the
order, appeal to the High Court and upon such appeal the
D High Court may, after hearing the parties, pass such orders
thereon as it thinks proper.” It is true that an appeal has
been expressly provided in this case but the reason for this
is that if there had been no specific provision in Sub-section
(9), no appeal would lie otherwise because it is not provided
in Sub-section (5) or Sub-section (7) that the District Judge
E should proceed in the manner provided in the CPC.
12. We are not impressed by the argument that the Act confers
jurisdiction on the District Judge as persona designata
because Sub-section (11) of Section 32 provides that “the
functions of a district judge under this section shall be
F exercisable (a) in a presidency town, where there is a city
civil court having jurisdiction, by a judge of that court and
in the absence of such court, by the High Court; and (b)
elsewhere, also by an additional district Judge.” These
provisions clearly show that the District Judge is not a
G persona designata.
13. It was contended that the whole idea of the Act was to
have expeditious execution as otherwise large funds of the
State Financial Corporation would be locked up during
execution proceedings. If this was the intention of the
H Legislature, it would have expressly provided that no appeal
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 309
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

would lie against an order made under Sub-section (8) of A
Section 32.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Court opined that the legislative intent was amply clear that the
District Judge was not a persona designata.
B
26. Once again, in the case of Maharashtra State Financial
Corporation (supra), decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court,
while considering the provisions of State Financial Corporation, 1951,
following the decision of this Court in Central Talkies Ltd. (supra),
restated that the District Judge exercising jurisdiction under Sections 31
& 32 of the Act was not a persona designata but was a court of C
ordinary civil jurisdiction. This can be discerned from the dictum in
paragraph 26 of the judgment which reads thus:
“26. We may now state our reasons for holding that even if
Section 46B of the Act was not there the provisions of the
Code for the execution of a decree against a surety who had D
given only personal guarantee would, in the absence of any
provision to the contrary in the Act, be applicable. In view
of the decision of this Court in The Central Talkies Ltd.,
Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad, where it was held that a persona
designata is a person selected as an individual in his private E
capacity, and not in his capacity as filling a particular
character or office, since the term used in Section 31(1) of
the Act is “District Judge” it cannot be doubted that the
District Judge is not a persona designata but a court of
ordinary civil jurisdiction while exercising jurisdiction under
Sections 31 and 32 of the Act. In National Sewing Thread F
Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd. while repelling the
objection that an appeal under the Letters Patent against
the judgment of a Single Judge passed in an appeal against
the decision of the Registrar under Section 76(1) of the Trade
Marks Act, 1940 was not maintainable it was held at pages G
1033-34 of the Report: (SCR pp.1033-34)
‘Obviously after the appeal had reached the High Court it
has to be determined according to the rules of practice and
procedure of that Court and in accordance with the
provisions of the charter under which that Court is constituted
H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A and which confers on it power in respect to the method and
manner of exercising that jurisdiction. The rule is well settled
that when a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court
already established, then that appeal must be regulated by
the practice and procedure of that Court. This rule was very
succinctly stated by Viscount Haldane L.C. in National
B
Telephone Co., Ltd. v. Postmaster-General, in these terms:-
‘When a question is stated to be referred to an established
Court without more, it, in my opinion, imports that the ordinary
incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and
also that any general right of appeal from its decision
C likewise attaches.’
The same view was expressed by their Lordships of the Privy
Council in Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrasekhara
Thevar, wherein it was said:
D ‘Where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of
the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are
governed by the ordinary rules of procedure applicable
thereto and an appeal lies if authorised by such rules,
notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a
special statute which does not, in terms confer a right of
E appeal.’
Again in Secretary of State for India v. Chellikani Rama Rao,
when dealing with the case under the Madras Forest Act
their Lordships observed as follows:

F ‘It was contended on behalf of the appellant that all further
proceedings in Courts in India or by way of appeal were
incompetent, these being excluded by the terms of the statute
just quoted. In their Lordships’ opinion this objection is not
well-founded. Their view is that when proceedings of this
character reach the District Court, that Court is appealed to
G as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to
whose procedure, orders, and decrees the ordinary rules of
the Civil Procedure Code apply.’
Though the facts of the cases laying down the above rule
were not exactly similar to the facts of the present case, the
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 311
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

principle enunciated therein is one of general application A
and has an apposite application to the facts and
circumstances of the present case. Section 76 of the Trade
Marks Act confers a right of appeal to the High Court and
says nothing more about it. That being so, the High Court
being seized as such of the appellate jurisdiction conferred
B
by Section 76 it has to exercise that jurisdiction in the same
manner as it exercises its other appellate jurisdiction and
when such jurisdiction is exercised by a single Judge, his
judgment becomes subject to appeal under Clause 15 of the
Letters Patent there being nothing to the contrary in the Trade
Marks Act.” C
(emphasis supplied)
27. The question regarding the purport of expression persona
designata also arose for consideration in other cases decided by this
Court to which our attention has been invited. In the case of Ramchandra
Aggarwal (supra), this Court was called upon to consider whether the D
District Judge has jurisdiction under Section 24 of the Code of Civil
Procedure to transfer a reference made by a Magistrate to a particular
Civil Court under Section 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
another Civil Court, in relation to proceedings under Section 145 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure initiated before the Magistrate on the basis E
of a report of the police. The Court relied on its earlier decision in the
case of Balakrishna Udayar Vs. Vasudeva Aiyar,37 and observed in
paragraph 3 of the reported decision as follows:
“3. In Balakrishan Udayar v. Vasudeva Aiyar 44 I.A. 261,
Lord Atkinson has pointed out the difference between a F
persona designata and a legal tribunal. The difference is
this that the ‘determination of a persona designata are not
to be treated as judgments of a legal tribunal’. In the Central
Talkies Ltd. v. Dwarka Prasad, this Court has accepted the
meaning given to the expression persona designata in
Osborn’s Concise Law Dictionary, 4h edn. p. 263 as ‘a G
person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as
opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or
as filling a particular character.’ Section 146(1) Cr.P.C.
37
44 IA 261
H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A empowers a Magistrate to refer the question as to whether
any, and if so, which of the parties was in possession of the
subject-matter of dispute at the relevant point of time to a
civil court of competent jurisdiction. The power is not to refer
the matter to the presiding Judge of a particular civil court
but to a court. When a special or local law provides for an
B
adjudication to be made by a constituted court - that is, by a
court not created by a special or local law but to an existing
court - it in fact enlarges the ordinary jurisdiction of such a
court. Thus where a special or local statute refers to a
constituted court as a court and does not refer to the
C presiding officer of that court the reference cannot be said
to be a persona designata. This question is well settled. It is,
therefore, unnecessary to say anything more on this part of
the case except that cases dealing with the point have been
well summarised in the recent decision in Chatur Mohan v.
Ram Behari Dixit.”
D
(emphasis supplied)
28. Before we dilate on the matter in issue any further, it is apposite
to take note of the relevant provisions of the 1971 Act, as were in force
prior to 22nd June, 2015, applicable to the present case. The same read
E thus:
“2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires,-
1[***]

F (b) ‘estate officer’ means an officer appointed as such by
the Central Government under section 3;
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
(fa) ‘statutory authority’, in relation to the public premises
referred to in clause (e) of this section, means,-
G (i) in respect of the public premises placed under the control
of the Secretariat of either House of Parliament, the
Secretariat of the concerned House of Parliament,
(ii) in respect of the public premises referred to in item (i) of
sub-clause (2) and in item (iv) of sub-clause (3) of that clause,
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 313
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the company or the subsidiary company, as the case may be, A
referred to therein,
(iii) in respect of the public premises referred to in item (ii)
of sub-clause (2) of that clause, the corporation referred to
therein,
(iv) in respect of the public premises referred to, respectively, B
in items (iii), (iv), (vi) and (vii) of sub-clause (2) of that clause,
the University, Institute or Board, as the case may be referred
to therein, and
(v) in respect of the public premises referred to in sub-
clause (3) of that clause, the Council, Corporation or C
Corporations, Committee or Authority, as the case may be,
ref erred to in that sub-clause;”
“3. Appointment of estate officers.- The Central Government
may, by notification in the Official Gazette,-
D
(a) Appoint such persons, being gazetted officers of
Government or of the Government of any Union Territory
or officers of equivalent rank of the statutory authority, as
it thinks fit, to be estate officers for the purposes of this Act:
Provided that no officer or the Secretariat of the Rajya Sabha
E
shall be so appointed except after consultation with the
Chairman of the Rajya Sabha and no officer of the
Secretariat of the Lok Sabha shall be so appointed except
after consultation with Speaker of the Lok Sabha:
Provided further that an officer of a statutory authority shall
F
only be appointed as an estate officer in respect of the public
premises controlled by that authority; and
(b) define the local limits within which, or the categories of
public premises in respect of which, the estate officers shall
exercise the powers conferred, and perform the duties
imposed, on estate officers by or under this Act.” G

“8. Power of estate officers.- An estate officer shall, for the
purpose of holding any inquiry under this Act, have the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), when trying a suit in respect
of the following matters, namely:- H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person
and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents;
(c) any other matter which may be prescribed.”
B “9. Appeals.—(1) An appeal shall lie from every order of the
estate officer made in respect of any public premises under
section 5 or section 5B or section 5C or section 7 to an
appellate officer who shall be the district judge of the district
in which the public premises are situate or such other judicial
officer in that district of not less than ten years standing as
C the district judge may designate in this behalf.
(2) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be preferred,—
(a) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5.
[within twelve days] from the date of publication of the order
D under sub-section (1) of that section;
(b) in the case of an appeal from an order [under section
5B or section 7, within twelve days] from the date on which
the order is communicated to the appellant; [and]
(c) in the case of an appeal from an order under section 5C,
E within twelve days from the date of such order:
Provided that the appellate officer may entertain the appeal
after the expiry of the said period, if he is satisfied that the
appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing the
appeal in time.
F (3) Where an appeal is preferred from an order of the estate
officer, the appellate officer may stay the enforcement of
that order for such period and on such conditions as he deems
fit:
Provided that where the construction or erection of any
G building or other structure or fixture or execution of any
other work was not completed on the day on which an order
was made under section 5B for the demolition or removal of
such building or other structure or fixture, the appellate
officer shall not make any order for the stay of enforcement
H of such order, unless such security, as may be sufficient in
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 315
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the opinion of the appellate officer, has been given by the A
appellant for not proceeding with such construction, erection
or work pending the disposal of the appeal;
(4) Every appeal under this section shall be disposed of by
the appellate officer as expeditiously as possible.
(5) The costs of any appeal under this section shall be in the B
discretion of the appellate officer.
(6) For the purposes of this section, a presidency-town shall
be deemed to be a district and the chief judge or the principal
judge of the city civil court therein shall be deemed to be the
district judge of the district.” C

(emphasis supplied)
“10. Finality of orders.- Save as otherwise expressly provided
in this Act, every order made by an estate officer or appellate
officer under this Act shall be final and shall not be called D
in question in any original suit, application or execution
proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any court
or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be
taken in pursuance of any power conferred by or under this
Act.”
E
“15. Bar of jurisdiction.- No court shall have jurisdiction to
entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of-
(a) the eviction of any person who is in unauthorised
occupation of any public premises, or
(b) the removal of any building, structure or fixture or goods, F
cattle or other animal from any public premises under
section 5A, or
(c) the demolition of any building or other structure made,
or ordered to be made, under section 5B, or
(cc) the sealing of any erection or work or of any public G
premises under section 5C, or
(d) the arrears of rent payable under sub-section (1) of
section 7 or damages payable under sub-section (2),
or interest payable under sub-section (2A), of that
section, or H
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A (e) the recovery of –
(i) costs of removal of any building, structure or fixture
or goods, cattle or other animal under section 5A, or
(ii) expenses of demolition under section 5B, or
B (iii) costs awarded to the Central Government or statutory
authority under sub-section (5) of section 9, or
(iv) any portion of such rent, damages, costs of removal,
expenses of demolition or costs awarded to the Central
Government or the statutory authority.”
C We may now advert to the provisions in the Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorised Occupants) Rules, 1971.
“9. Procedure in appeals.- (1) An appeal preferred under
section 9 of the Act shall be in writing, shall set forth
concisely the grounds of objection to the order appealed
D against, and shall be accompanied by a copy of such order.
(2) On receipt of the appeal and after calling for and
perusing the record of the proceedings before the estate
officer, the appellate officer shall appoint a time and place
for the hearing of the appeal and shall give notice thereof
E to the estate officer against whose order the appeal is
preferred, to the appellant and to the head of the department
or authority in administrative control of the premises.”
29. The avowed purpose for enacting the 1971 Act was to provide
for a speedy remedy for taking possession of the public premises which
F were in unauthorized occupation. For achieving the said goal, an Estate
Officer is appointed under Section 3 of the Act who has been given
powers to issue notice of show cause and initiate proceedings for eviction
and recovery of outstanding rental dues and damages in respect of public
premises. Section 8 empowers the Estate Officer to exercise the same
powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure,
G 1908. We are not called upon to consider the question as to whether the
Estate Officer, while exercising powers invested in him, acts as a court
or has the trappings of a court. The only question that we have attempted
to answer is whether the appointment of the appellate officer referred
to in Section 9 of the Act before whom an appeal shall lie, is in the
H capacity of persona designata or as a court.
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 317
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

30. Sub-section (1) of Section 9 is the core provision to be kept in A
mind for answering the point in issue. It postulates that an appeal shall
lie from every order of the estate Officer, passed under the Act, to an
Appellate Officer. As to who shall be the Appellate Officer, has also
been specified in the same provision. It predicates the District Judge of
the district in which the public premises are situated or such other judicial
B
officer in that district of not less than 10 years standing as the District
Judge to be designated for that purpose. The first part of the provision
does suggest that the appeal shall lie to an Appellate Officer, however, it
does not follow therefrom that the Appellate Officer is persona
designata. Something more is required to hold so. Had it been a case of
designating a person by name as an Appellate Officer, the concomitant C
would be entirely different. However, when the Appellate Officer is
either the District Judge of the district or any another judicial officer in
that district possessing necessary qualification who could be designated
by the District Judge, the question of such investiture of power of an
appellate authority in the District Judge or Designated Judge would by
D
no standards acquire the colour or for that matter trappings of persona
designata. In the first place, the power to be exercised by the Appellate
Officer in terms of Section 9 is a judicial power of the State which is
quite distinct from the executive power of the State. Secondly, the District
Judge or designated judicial officer exercises judicial authority within his
jurisdiction. Thirdly, as the Act predicates the Appellate Officer is to be E
a District Judge or judicial officer, it is indicative of the fact of a pre
existing authority exercising judicial power of the State. Fourthly, District
Judge is the creature of Section 5 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act,
1869, who presides over a District Court invariably consisting of more
than one Judge in the concerned district. The District Court exercises
F
original and appellate jurisdiction by virtue of Sections 7 and 8 respectively,
of the 1869 Act and is the principal Court of original civil jurisdiction in
the district within the meaning of C.P.C., as per Section 7 of that Act. As
per Section 8 of the Act of 1869, the District Court is the Court of appeal
from all decrees and orders passed by the subordinate Courts from which
an appeal lies under any law for the time being in force. As per Section G
16 of that Act, the District Judge can refer to any Additional District
Judges subordinate to him, any original suits and proceedings of a civil
nature, applications or references under Special Acts and miscellaneous
applications. The Additional District Judges have jurisdiction to try such
suits and to dispose of such applications or references. Section 17 of
H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A that Act envisages that an Additional District Judge shall have jurisdiction
to try the appeals as may be referred to him by the District Judge. Section
19 of that Act, is a provision to invest power on the Additional District
Judges, with powers of District Judge. The hierarchy of judicial officers
of the District Court can be culled out from the 1869 Act. On the similar
lines, the Bombay City Civil Court has been constituted under Section 3
B
of the Bombay City Civil Court Act, 1948, with jurisdiction to receive,
try and dispose of all suits and other proceedings of a civil nature arising
within the Greater Bombay except a suit or proceedings which are
cognizable by the High Court referred to therein and by Small Causes
Court. Section 7 of this Act envisages that when the City Civil Court
C consists of more than one Judge, each of the Judges may exercise all or
any of the powers conferred on the Court by the said Act or any other
law for the time being in force. Clause (b) of Section 7 stipulates that the
State Government may appoint any one of the Judges to be the Principal
Judge and any two other Judges to be called the Additional Principal
Judges. The Principal Judge has been given authority to make such
D
arrangements as he may think fit for the distribution of the business of
the Court among the various Judges thereof. In other words, the District
Judge or Principal Judge exercises judicial power of the State and is an
authority having its own hierarchy of superior and inferior Courts, the
law of procedure according to which it would dispose of matters coming
E before it depending on its nature and jurisdiction exercised by it, acting in
judicial manner. The District Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil
Court is the officer presiding over the Court and derives his description
from the nomenclature of the Court. Even if the District Judge/Principal
Judge of the City Civil Court might retire or get transferred, his successor-
in-office can pick up the thread of the proceedings under Section 9 of
F
the 1971 Act from the stage where it was left by his predecessor and
can function as an appellate authority. The District Judge/Principal Judge
of the City Civil Court and other judicial officers of these Courts
possessing necessary qualifications constitute a class and cannot be
considered as persona designata. The Appellate Officer, therefore,
G has to function as a Court and his decision is final in terms of Section 10
of 1971 Act. The legislative intent behind providing an appeal under
Section 9 before the Appellate Officer to be the District Judge of the
concerned District Court in which the public premises are situated or
such other judicial officer in that district possessing necessary qualification
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 319
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

to be designated by the District Judge for that purpose, is indicative of A
the fact that the power to be exercised by the Appellate Officer is not in
his capacity as persona designata but as a judicial officer of the pre
existing Court. The historical background of the 1971 Act would make
no difference to the aforementioned analysis.
31. Indeed, the expression used in Section 9 is “Appellate Officer” B
and not “Appellate Authority” as has been used in Section 6C of the
Essential Commodities Act, 1955, considered by the Supreme Court in
the case of Thakur Das (supra). That, however, would neither make
any difference nor undermine the status of the District Judge or the
designated judicial officer so as to reckon their appointment as persona
designata. The thrust of Section 9(1) is to provide for remedy of an C
appeal against the order of the Estate Officer before the District Judge
who, undeniably, is a pre existing authority and head of the judiciary
within the district, discharging judicial power of the State including power
to condone the delay in filing of the appeal and to grant interim relief
during the pendency of the appeal. Though described as an Appellate D
Officer, the District Judge, for deciding an appeal under Section 9, can
and is expected to exercise the powers of the civil court.
32. In the case of Nusli Neville Wadia (supra) the Division Bench
was essentially called upon to answer the contention raised before it
that, considering Chapter XVII Rule 18 of the Bombay Appellate Side E
Rules, 1960, the petition in terms of Rule 18 must be heard by a learned
Single Judge of that Court or by the Division Bench and whether the
Division Bench has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the appeal against
the decision of the City Civil Court/District Court in proceedings arising
from the 1971 Act. The analysis by the Division Bench therefore, was
with reference to the said plea. Indeed, the Division Bench also adverted F
to the aspect as to whether the Principal Judge, City Civil Court was
acting as a Court or persona designata. It merely followed the decisions
in the case of N.P. Berry (supra) and Shri Mahesh N. Kothari and
Others Vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another in Writ
Petition No.6846 of 2005, decided on 05.10.2006, wherein it has been G
held that the legislature did not confer power on the District Judge or a
Principal Judge of the City Civil Court to hear the appeals as such but
has chosen to designate the authority as an Appellate Officer making it
clear, that the power was conferred in his capacity as persona designata.

H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A The Division Bench has also adverted to the decisions in Gangadhar
Bapurao Gadre Vs. Hubli Municipality38 dealing with Section 22 of
the Bombay District Municipality Act; Municipality of Sholapur Vs.
Tuljaram Krishnasa Chavan39 dealing with provisions of Bombay City
Municipalities Act; Keshav Ramchandra (supra), dealing with Section
15 of the provisions of Bombay Municipal Act and Jagmohan Surajmal
B
Marwadi (supra), and held that the District Judge exercised his power
as a persona designata.
33. We will therefore traverse through the decisions adverted to
in Nusli Neville Wadia’s case (supra). Before we examine those
decisions, it is apposite to take note of the Full Bench judgment of the
C Bombay High Court in the case of Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. (supra).
The question referred to the Full Bench, reads thus:
“Whether a writ petition arising out of order passed under
the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants)
Act, 1971 should be placed before a learned Single Judge
D of this Court in Accordance with Rule 18 (3) of the Chapter
XVII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960
or should be placed before a Division Bench?”
The Full Bench analysed the scheme of the Bombay High Court Appellate
Side Rules, 1960 and opined that the order passed by the quasi judicial
E authority under the Act of 1971 is also covered by Rule 18 (3) and writ
petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India against such
a decision must be heard and decided by the learned Single Judge of the
High Court. In paragraph 8, finally, the Full Bench observed thus:
“8. Since the Public Premises Act, 1971 is not an enactment
F made by Parliament in exercise of powers under Article 323-
B, the question of applying the above direction of the
Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar case cannot arise. We
are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the
Division Bench in Nusli Neville Wadia case (supra). It is
G clear that under the provisions of Rule 18(3) of Bombay High
Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960, a petition under Articles
226 and/or 227 of the Constitution challenging the order of
the Appellate Authority under the Public Premises Act, 1971
38
1925 B.L.R. 519
39
H AIR 1931 Bombay 582
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 321
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

will be required to be heard and decided by a learned Single A
Judge of this Court. The decision in Nusli Neville Wadia case
is, therefore, overruled in so far as the Division Bench in
Nusli Neville Wadia case has taken a view that when the
order is passed by a Tribunal under a legislation relating to
any subject referable to Article 323-B(2) of the Constitution,
B
the petitions challenging such orders will have to be
necessarily heard by the Division Bench. It is clarified that
the directions given by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra
Kumar case will apply only when the Tribunal is established
under a law which is specifically made by the appropriate
legislature in exercise of powers conferred by Articles 323- C
A or 323-B. Merely because a legislation, existing in future,
deals with a subject referable to any sub-clause in Clause
(2) of Article 323-B of the Constitution, such legislation does
not by itself become a legislation under Article 323-B of the
Constitution.”
D
34. Indubitably, the Full Bench was “not” called upon to examine
the issue as to whether the remedy of an appeal under Section 9 of the
Act, 1971 before the Appellate Officer, is before an authority exercising
powers in his capacity as a persona designata or as a Civil Court.
35. We may now turn to the decision of the Delhi High Court in E
N.P. Berry (supra), on which reliance has been placed by the Bombay
High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia’s case (supra). The main point
considered by the Delhi High Court was about the distinction between a
“Judge” acting as a persona designata and that as a “Court”, in the
context of an order passed by an additional district judge of Delhi acting
as an Appellate Officer under Section 9 of 1971 Act. F

36. We may reiterate that, in the present case, we are not
concerned with the question as to whether the Estate Officer functions
as a Court whilst exercising powers under the 1971 Act, an issue which
was also considered by the Delhi High Court. It also dealt with the
question as to whether the Appellate Officer defined in Section 9 of the G
1971 Act, acts as a persona designata and not as a Court. The Delhi
High Court opined that the mere fact that the Appellate Officer is a
District Judge is not conclusive to hold that he has to act as a Court. It
went on to observe that if that had been the intention of the legislature,
Section 9 would have empowered either the Court of a District Judge or H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A at any rate, the District Judge as such to hear the appeals. This view
expressed by the Delhi High Court, in our opinion, is untenable, keeping
in mind the exposition in the case of Thakur Das (supra) and Mukri
Gopalan (supra) in particular.
37. Indeed, the Delhi High Court could not have noticed the
B aforementioned decisions of this Court, wherein it has been observed
that a persona designata is a person who is pointed out or described as
an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class,
or as filling a particular character. We are conscious of the fact that the
decision in Thakur Das (supra) was in relation to the purport of Section
6C of the Essential Commodities Act and the decision in Mukri Gopalan
C (supra) was in respect of Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and
Rent Control) Act, 1955. As noted earlier, Section 6C of the Essential
Commodities Act refers to the “judicial authority” appointed by the State
Government concerned and Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease
and Rent Control) Act refers to such officers and authorities not below
D the rank of Subordinate Judge to exercise the powers of the appellate
authority. However, the principle underlying these enunciations will apply
on all fours to the dispensation stipulated in the 1971 Act. For, it predicates
that the Appellate Officer shall be the District Judge of the district in
which the premises are situated or such other judicial officer designated
by the District Judge.
E
38. The Bombay High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia’s case largely
relied upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in N.P. Berry’s case.
We are bound by the dictum in the case of Thakur Das (supra) decided
by a three-Judge Bench of this Court wherein it is observed that the
expression “judicial” qualifying the “authority” clearly indicates that that
F authority alone can be appointed to intervene and hear the appeals on
which was conferred the judicial powers of the State. By a reference to
judicial authority, it is indicative of the fact that the appellate authority
must be one such pre-existing authority which was exercising judicial
powers of the State and if any authority as persona designata was to
G be constituted, there was no purpose in qualifying the word “authority”
by the specific adjective “judicial”. The thrust of the exposition is that
the “judicial authority” which is a pre-existing authority exercising judicial
power of the State, is a strong indication of legislative intent to depart
from the dispensation of persona designata when a person is pointed
out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 323
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

a member of a class, or as filling a particular character. That view has A
been reiterated even in Mukri Gopalan (supra).
39. Notably, the expression “appellate officer” has not been defined
in the 1971 Act, unlike the definition of “estate officer” contained in
Section 2(1)(b) of that Act. The appellate officer cannot be considered
as a statutory authority, as defined in the dictionary clause in Section B
2(1)(fa) of the 1971 Act. In the case of Thakur Das (supra), in paragraph
9, while analyzing the cleavage of opinion of the High Courts, it is noticed
that the expression “judicial authority” would comprehend the Additional
Sessions Judge or the Sessions Judge could transfer such appeal pending
before him to Additional Sessions Judge which was a pointer to the fact
that he was not a persona designata. Even in respect of the appeal C
under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, the Principal Judge of the City Civil
Court or District Judge is competent to hear the appeal himself or designate
some other judicial officer within his jurisdiction possessing requisite
qualification. It will be useful to advert to Section 7 of the City Civil
Courts Act and Sections 3, 5 & 7 of the Maharashtra Civil Courts Act. D
It is implicit in Section 9 read with the provisions of the Acts constituting
the District Judiciary that the head of the district judiciary is the District
Judge or Principal Judge of the City Civil Court and Section 9 of the
1971 Act makes it explicit, by investing authority in the District Judge or
Principal Judge of the City Civil Court, to designate any other judicial
officer within his jurisdiction possessing essential qualifications, to hear E
such appeals. This is a clear departure from the appointment of a District
Judge as a persona designata. The Additional District Judge or judicial
officer possessing essential qualification, therefore, is not an inferior
appellate officer within the meaning of Section 9 of the 1971 Act. In our
opinion, there is enough indication in Section 9 of the 1971 Act to spell F
out the legislative intent that the remedy of appeal before the appellate
officer is not before a persona designata but a pre-existing judicial
authority in the district concerned.
40. The Delhi High Court also considered the question as to
whether the power exercised by the appellate officer is in his capacity G
of a Court or otherwise. Relying on Mulla’s Code of Civil Procedure,
13th Edition Volume I, Page 500, it has been observed that where the
word used in the enactment giving the special jurisdiction is not “Court”
but “judge”, the entire enactment is to be looked into to find out whether
the matter is to be decided by him as a Court or in his personal capacity.
H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A It went on to observe that no authority is forthcoming to show that when
the word “Court” is not used at all, the District Judge or a Subordinate
Judge functioning under a statute is held to be a Court even when the
statute itself shows that he is to function as an appellate officer or with
some designation other than that of a Court, and further when CPC has
not been applied as a procedure to be followed by the judge and when
B
there is no indication that the judge is to function as a Court. It then
observed that the Court is a creation of a statute either under CPC or
Punjab Courts Act. In the final analysis, the Delhi High Court concluded
that the appellate officer cannot be regarded as a Court and must,
therefore, be regarded as a persona designata.
C 41. The fact that there is no express indication in the 1971 Act
about the procedure to be adopted or followed by the appellate officer, it
would not follow therefrom that the District Judge or designated judicial
officer who hears the appeals under Section 9, does so not as a Court
but as a persona designata. For the reasons already alluded to we
D have no hesitation in holding that the remedy of appeal under Section 9
before the Appellate Officer is not as a persona designata but to a
pre-existing judicial authority. In that case, the procedure for hearing of
the appeals will be governed by the provisions under the 1971 Act and
Rules framed thereunder and including the enactment under which the
judicial authority has been created, such as Maharashtra Civil Courts
E Act and City Civil Courts Act. [See para 26 of Maharashtra State
Financial Corporation (supra), reproduced in earlier part of this
judgment in para 26]. Such a pre-existing judicial authority, by implication,
would be bound to follow the procedure underlying the said enactments
and also observe the doctrine of fairness in affording opportunity. Since
F the edifice on which the conclusions reached by the Delhi High Court,
that an appellate officer is persona designata and not a Court, cannot
be countenanced in law, the Bombay High Court decisions in Nusli
Neville Wadia’s case (supra) and also Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd.
(supra), cannot hold the field to that extent for the same logic.
G 42. Our attention was invited to yet another decision in the case
of State of Mysore Vs. P. Shankaranarayana Rao (supra). The learned
Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court examined the question under
consideration as to whether the District Judge who is constituted as an
appellate officer under Section 10 of the Karnataka Public Premises
(Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1961, acts as a Court or as a
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 325
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

persona designata? The decision in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi Vs. A
State of Punjab40 was referred to, wherein it was observed that what
distinguishes a Court from a quasi-judicial authority is that it is charged
with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare rights of
parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves
that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to be heard in support of
B
their claim and to adduce evidence in support of it. Further, it also imports
an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a
consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. The
distinction between the Court and quasi-judicial tribunal has to be decided
having regard to the provisions of the Act and if it possesses all the
attributes of a Court. Referring to Section 10 of the Karnataka Act, C
which provides that an appeal shall lie from every order of the competent
officer made in respect of any public premises, to an appellate officer
who shall be “only” the District Judge having jurisdiction over the area,
the Court eventually concluded that the intention of enacting the term
“appellate officer” in Section 10 is indicative of the fact that the District
D
Judge must act as appellate officer with limited jurisdiction to dispose of
the appeal in the manner set out by the provisions of Section 10 itself,
which means that he cannot exercise the general powers of the District
Court. It went on to observe that a finality is attached to the order of the
District Judge in terms of Section 11 of the Karnataka Act is a further
indication that a judge must act only as a persona designata and not as E
a Court. In the 1971 Act, however, the appeal under Section 9 can be
heard and decided not only by the District Judge himself but by any
other judicial officer of the District Court possessing requisite
qualifications designated for that purpose.
43. In the case of Sizerali Mohamedali Lodhia (supra), the F
provisions of Section 9 of the Gujarat Public Premises (Eviction of
Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1972, came up for scrutiny. The Gujarat
High Court was essentially concerned with the question as to whether
the remedy of revision against the order passed by the appellate officer
in an appeal preferred under Section 9 of the Gujarat Public Premises
Act (which is analogous to Section 9 of the 1971 Act), was maintainable G
before the High Court. The argument before the Gujarat High Court
was that even if it is taken that the appellate officer is not persona
designata but a Court, the question arises as to whether the order passed
by the appellate officer under Section 9 of the Gujarat Public Premises
40
AIR 1956 SC 153 H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A Act is such against which remedy under Section 115 of the CPC lies.
After analyzing the decisions noted in paragraph 11 of the judgment,
including the cases of Thakur Das and Mukri Gopalan (supra), the
Court went on to observe that since the order of the appellate officer
has been made final in terms of Section 10 of the State Act, it cannot be
assailed under Section 115 of the CPC before the High Court in its
B
revisional jurisdiction. It finally concluded in paragraph 15 that assuming
for the sake of argument that the remedy of revision lies, it would not be
an efficacious alternative remedy so as to throw out the petition under
Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The High
Court, therefore, examined the issue on merits.
C 44. The next case commended to us is the decision of Full Bench
of East Punjab High Court in M/s. Pitman’s Shorthand Academy
(supra), rendered in Civil Revision Application filed under Section 115 of
CPC, against the decision of the Subordinate Court in rent proceedings
arising from Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1947. The Court
D analysed the provisions of the State Rent Act and opined that the functions
of the Controllers and Appellate Authorities under the Act did not indicate
any attribute of a Court of law. In other words, the legislative intent
behind appointing the Controllers and Appellate Authorities was to appoint
them as persona designata and not as Court. This decision need not
detain us for the reasons already alluded to in the earlier part of the
E judgment which are founded on the principles underlying the exposition
of this Court in Thakur Das and Mukri Gopalan, in particular.
45. In case of Ganga Ram Dohrey (supra), the question
considered was whether there is a specific provision given in the U.P.
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1972, to
F transfer the appeal and since there is no provision in the Act by which
Section 24 of CPC has been made applicable whether the application
under Section 24 of CPC for transfer of case was maintainable? The
Court relying on the decision in the case of Abid Ali Vs. District Judge,
Baharaich,41 concluded that application under Section 24 of CPC was
G not maintainable, for, the proceedings before the District Judge under
Section 9 of the U.P. Public Premises Act were not other proceedings
under the Code of Civil Procedure as envisaged by Section 24 of CPC.
46. In the Case of Jinda Ram (supra), the Division Bench of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court was called upon to consider the
H 41
(1987 Allahabad Law Journal 179)
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 327
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

maintainability of revision application under Section 115 of Civil Procedure A
Code against an order passed by the District Judge as an Appellate
Officer under Section 9 of the 1971 Act. After considering the conflicting
decisions of the same High Court on the point, the Division Bench held
that an order passed by the Appellate Officer under Section 9 is amenable
to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of Civil
B
Procedure Code. The Court relied upon the exposition of this Court in
the case of Mukri Gopalan (supra) wherein it has been observed that
the appellate authorities constituted under the enactment constitute a
class and cannot be considered as a persona designata. Further, the
appellate authority functions as a Court. The Court also referred to
another decision of this Court in Shyam Sunder Agarwal and Co. Vs. C
Union of India42 wherein it has been held that appellate order having
been passed by a Civil Court, constituted under a special statute
subordinate to the High Court though made final under the Act, it is
amenable to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court relied upon other decisions of
D
this Court to buttress the conclusion that the remedy of revision under
Section 115 of C.P.C. was available against an order passed by the
District Judge on an appeal under Section 9 of the Act. Be that as it may,
we are certain that remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India
is availed against the decision of the Appellate Officer.
47. In the case of M. Papa Naik (supra) the Court was called E
upon to examine the purport of Section 9 of the Karnataka Public
Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1974. Even in this
case the question was whether a remedy of revision or writ petition
would lie against the order passed by the District Judge on an appeal
preferred under Section 10 of the State Act. The Court concluded that F
the order passed by the District Judge as an appellate authority under
Section 9 of the State Act does not cease to be a Court subordinate to
the High Court and any order passed by him is amenable to the jurisdiction
of the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C.. In support of this conclusion,
the learned Single Judge relied upon the exposition in the case of Central
Talkies Ltd. (supra) and Parthasaradhi Naidu Vs. Koteswara Rao.43 G

48. Even though the respondents have invited our attention to
other decisions of High Courts and also of Supreme Court which have
42
(1996) 2 SCC 132
43
ILR (1924) 47 Mad 369 H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A analysed the provisions of other legislations, it is unnecessary to dilate
on those decisions as we intend to apply the principles underlying the
decisions of three-Judge Bench of this Court in Thakur Das (supra),
Asnew Drums Pvt. Ltd. (supra), Maharashtra State Financial
Corporation (supra), Ram Chander Aggarwal (supra) and Mukri
Gopalan (supra), in particular, to conclude that the Appellate Officer
B
referred to in Section 9 of the 1971 Act, is not a persona designata but
acts as a civil court.
49. In other words, the Appellate Officer while exercising power
under Section 9 of the 1971 Act, does not act as a persona designata
but in his capacity as a pre existing judicial authority in the district (being
C a District Judge or judicial officer possessing essential qualification
designated by the District Judge). Being part of the district judiciary, the
judge acts as a Court and the order passed by him will be an order of the
Subordinate Court against which remedy under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India can be availed on the matters delineated for exercise
D of such jurisdiction.
50. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the respondents
had resorted to remedy of writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India. In view of our conclusion that the order passed by
the District Judge (in this case, Judge, Bombay City Civil Court at
E Mumbai) as an Appellate Officer is an order of the Subordinate Court,
the challenge thereto must ordinarily proceed only under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India and not under Article 226. Moreover, on a close
scrutiny of the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High
Court dated 14.08.2012 we have no hesitation in taking the view that the
true nature and substance of the order of the learned Single Judge was
F to exercise power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India; and
there is no indication of Court having exercised powers under Article
226 of the Constitution of India as such. Indeed, the learned Single Judge
has opened the judgment by fairly noting the fact that the writ petition
filed by the respondents was under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution
G of India. However, keeping in mind the exposition of this Court in the
case of Ram Kishan Fauji (supra) wherein it has been explicated that
in determining whether an order of learned Single Judge is in exercise of
powers under Article 226 or 227 the vital factor is the nature of jurisdiction
invoked by a party and the true nature and character of the order passed
and the directions issued by the learned Single Judge. In paragraph 40 of
H
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 329
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

the reported decision, the Court adverting to its earlier decision observed A
thus:
“40. xxx xxx xxx Whether the learned Single
Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under Article 226 or
Under Article 227 or both, would depend upon various
aspects. There can be orders passed by the learned Single B
Judge which can be construed as an order under both the
articles in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide
and imbricate. It was reiterated that it would depend upon
the nature, contour and character of the order and it will be
the obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent
appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been C
passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction
Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The
two-Judge Bench further clarified that the Division Bench
would also be required to scrutinise whether the facts of the
case justify the assertions made in the petition to invoke the D
jurisdiction under both the articles and the relief prayed on
that foundation. The delineation with regard to necessary
party not being relevant in the present case, the said aspect
need not be adverted to.”
Again in paragraphs 41 and 42, which may be useful for answering the E
matter in issue, the Court observed thus:
“41. We have referred to these decisions only to highlight
that it is beyond any shadow of doubt that the order of civil
court can only be challenged Under Article 227 of the
Constitution and from such challenge, no intra-court appeal
would lie and in other cases, it will depend upon the other F
factors as have been enumerated therein.
42. At this stage, it is extremely necessary to cull out the
conclusions which are deducible from the aforesaid
pronouncements. They are:
42.1 An appeal shall lie from the judgment of a Single Judge G
to a Division Bench of the High Court if it is so permitted
within the ambit and sweep of the Letters Patent.
42.2 The power conferred on the High Court by the Letters
Patent can be abolished or curtailed by the competent
legislature by bringing appropriate legislation. H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A 42.3 A writ petition which assails the order of a civil court in
the High Court has to be understood, in all circumstances,
to be a challenge Under Article 227 of the Constitution and
determination by the High Court under the said Article and,
hence, no intra-court appeal is entertainable.
B 42.4 The tenability of intra-court appeal will depend upon
the Bench adjudicating the lis as to how it understands and
appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge.
There cannot be a straitjacket formula for the same.”
(emphasis supplied)
C 51. In the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) decided by a three-
Judge Bench, this Court after analyzing all the earlier decisions on the
point, restated the legal position that in cases where judicial order violated
the fundamental right, the challenge thereto would lie by way of an appeal
or revision or under Article 227, and not by way of writ under Article
D 226 and Article 32. The dictum in paragraphs 25, 27 and 29 of this decision
is instructive. The same read thus:
“25. It is true that this Court has laid down that technicalities
associated with the prerogative writs in England have no
role to play under our constitutional scheme. There is no
E parallel system of King’s Court in India and of all other
courts having limited jurisdiction subject to supervision of
King’s Court. Courts are set up under the Constitution or
the laws. All courts in the jurisdiction of a High Court are
subordinate to it and subject to its control and supervision
Under Article 227. Writ jurisdiction is constitutionally
F conferred on all High Courts. Broad principles of writ
jurisdiction followed in England are applicable to India and
a writ of certiorari lies against patently erroneous or without
jurisdiction orders of Tribunals or authorities or courts other
than judicial courts. There are no precedents in India for
G the High Courts to issue writs to subordinate courts. Control
of working of subordinate courts in dealing with their judicial
orders is exercised by way of appellate or revisional powers
or power of superintendence Under Article 227. Orders of
civil court stand on different footing from the orders of
authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil
H courts. While appellate or revisional jurisdiction is regulated
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 331
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

by statutes, power of superintendence Under Article 227 is A
constitutional. The expression “inferior court” is not
referable to judicial courts, as rightly observed in the
referring order in paras 26 and 27 quoted above.
26. XXX XXX XXX
27. Thus, we are of the view that judicial orders of civil courts B
are not amenable to a writ of certiorari Under Article 226.
We are also in agreement with the view of the referring Bench
that a writ of mandamus does not lie against a private person
not discharging any public duty. Scope of Article 227 is
different from Article 226. C
28. XXX XXX XXX
29. Accordingly, we answer the question referred as follows:
29.1 Judicial orders of civil court are not amenable to writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution; D
29.2 Jurisdiction Under Article 227 is distinct from
jurisdiction Under Article 226.
29.3 Contrary view in Surya Dev Rai is overruled.”
(emphasis supplied)
E
52. Similar view has been expressed in Jogendrasinghji (supra).
In this decision, it has been held that the order passed by the Civil Court
is amenable to scrutiny only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227
of the Constitution of India and no intra court appeal is maintainable
from the decision of a Single Judge. In paragraph 30 of the reported
decision, the Court observed thus: F

“30. From the aforesaid pronouncements, it is graphically
clear that maintainability of a letters patent appeal would
depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, the nature
and character of the order passed by the learned Single
Judge, the type of directions issued regard being had to the G
jurisdictional perspectives in the constitutional context.
Barring the civil court, from which order as held by the three-
Judge Bench in Radhey Shyam (supra) that a writ petition
can lie only Under Article 227 of the Constitution, orders
from tribunals cannot always be regarded for all purposes H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A to be Under Article 227 of the Constitution. Whether the
learned Single Judge has exercised the jurisdiction Under
Article 226 or Under Article 227 or both, needless to
emphasise, would depend upon various aspects that have
been emphasised in the aforestated authorities of this Court.
There can be orders passed by the learned Single Judge
B
which can be construed as an order under both the articles
in a composite manner, for they can co-exist, coincide and
imbricate. We reiterate it would depend upon the nature,
contour and character of the order and it will be the
obligation of the Division Bench hearing the letters patent
C appeal to discern and decide whether the order has been
passed by the learned Single Judge in exercise of jurisdiction
Under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution or both. The
Division Bench would also be required to scrutinize whether
the facts of the case justify the assertions made in the petition
to invoke the jurisdiction under both the articles and the
D
relief prayed on that foundation. Be it stated, one of the
conclusions recorded by the High Court in the impugned
judgment pertains to demand and payment of court fees. We
do not intend to comment on the same as that would depend
upon the rules framed by the High Court.”
E In the concluding part of the reported judgment in paragraph 44, the
Court observed thus:
“44. We have stated in the beginning that three issues arise despite
the High Court framing number of issues and answering it at various
levels. It is to be borne in mind how the jurisdiction under the letters
F patent appeal is to be exercised cannot exhaustively be stated. It
will depend upon the Bench adjudicating the lis how it understands
and appreciates the order passed by the learned Single Judge. There
cannot be a straight-jacket formula for the same. Needless to say,
the High Court while exercising jurisdiction Under Article 227 of
G the Constitution has to be guided by the parameters laid down by
this Court and some of the judgments that have been referred to in
Radhey Shyam (supra).”
53. In paragraph 45.2 of the same judgment, the Court
authoritatively concluded that an order passed by a Civil Court is amenable
H to scrutiny of the High Court only in exercise of jurisdiction under Article
LIC OF INDIA v. NANDINI J. SHAH & ORS. 333
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.]

227 of the Constitution of India, which is different from Article 226 of A
the Constitution and as per the pronouncement in Radhey Shyam (supra),
no writ can be issued against the order passed by the Civil Court and,
therefore, no letters patent appeal would be maintainable.
54. In the impugned judgment, the Division Bench merely went
by the decisions of the Delhi High Court and its own Court in Nusli B
Neville Wadia (supra) and Prakash Securities Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We
do not find any other analysis made by the Division Bench to entertain
the Letters Patent Appeal, as to in what manner the judgment of the
learned Single Judge would come within the purview of exercise of
powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Absent that
analysis, the Division Bench could not have assumed jurisdiction to C
entertain the Letters Patent Appeal merely by referring to the earlier
decisions of the same High Court in Nusli Neville Wadia and Prakash
Securities Pvt. Ltd.
55. In other words, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court
ought to have dismissed the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the respondents D
as not maintainable. In that event, it was not open to the Division Bench
to undertake analysis on the merits of the case as has been done in the
impugned judgment. That was impermissible and of no avail, being without
jurisdiction. Indeed, that will leave the respondents with an adverse
decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing their writ petition No.4337 E
of 2012 vide judgment dated 14.08.2012, whereby the eviction order
passed by the Estate Officer dated 05.12.2011 and confirmed by the
City Civil Court on 03.04.2012 has been upheld.
56. As we have held that the Division Bench, in the facts of the
present case, could not have entertained the Letters Patent Appeal against F
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, it is not necessary for us to
examine the merits of the eviction order passed against the respondents
by the Estate Officer and confirmed by the City Civil Court and the
Single Judge of the High Court. In any case, that cannot be done in the
appeal filed by the owner of the public premises, namely, the appellant.
We may, however, to subserve the ends of justice, give liberty to the G
respondents to challenge the decision of the learned Single Judge by
way of appropriate remedy, if so advised. That shall be done within six
weeks from today failing which the appellant will be free to proceed in
the matter in furtherance of the eviction order passed by the Estate
Officer and confirmed right until the High Court, in accordance with law. H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R.

A 57. We once again clarify that we are not expressing any opinion
either way on the merits of the eviction order passed by the Estate
Officer and the order of the City Civil Court and of the learned Single
Judge of the High Court confirming the same. As the preliminary issue
regarding the maintainability of the Letters Patent Appeal has been
answered in favour of the appellant, this appeal must succeed.
B
58. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms.
As a consequence, the judgment and order passed by the Division Bench
of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 12.10.2012 in Letters
Patent Appeal No.181/2012 in C.W.P. No.4337/2012 is set aside and
the said Letters Patent Appeal stands dismissed as not maintainable. No
C order as to costs.

Kalpana K. Tripathy Appeal allowed.

D

E

F

G

H