Supreme Court of India
LEILA DAVIDversusSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
- Citation
- 2009 INSC 373
- Decided
- 20 March 2009
- Disposal
- Matter referred to larger bench
- Bench
- ARIJIT PASAYAT
Holding
Imprisonment for contempt committed in the face of the Supreme Court cannot be ordered unless the mandatory procedural safeguards of Section 14(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are strictly complied with.
Summary
During the hearing of a writ petition, four individuals shouted abusive language, threatened judges and one even threw a chappal at the bench in the presence of the Solicitor General and senior counsel. Justice Pasayat ordered their immediate detention and three months' simple imprisonment for contempt of court without following the procedural safeguards mandated by Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Justice Ganguli held that the mandatory steps of informing the accused in writing, giving them an opportunity to be heard, and conducting a proper inquiry cannot be bypassed, even under the Supreme Court's inherent powers under Articles 129 and 142. He emphasized that these statutory requirements give effect to the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21. Consequently, the order of imprisonment was set aside and the matter was referred to the Chief Justice for further consideration, with the accused remaining in custody pending a proper hearing.
Issues considered
- Whether the Supreme Court can impose imprisonment for contempt committed in its presence without complying with the procedural requirements of Section 14(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Whether the Court's inherent powers under Articles 129 and 142 can override the statutory safeguards protecting personal liberty under Article 21.
Legislation cited
- Constitution of Indias. Article 129, s. Article 142, s. Article 21, s. Article 215
- Contempt of Courts Act, 1971s. 14
Subjects
contempt of courtSection 14procedural safeguardsArticle 21Supreme Courtimprisonmentdue process
Judgment
[2009] 4 S.C.R. 1171
LEILA DAVID A
v
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.
Writ Petition No. (D 22040 of 2008)
MARCH 20, 2009 B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND ASOK Kl,JMAR
GANGULY, JJ.]
CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 :
s. 14 - Contempt in the face of Supreme Court - During C
the hearing of a case four litigants committed contempt in the
face of the Court - Held : Per Pasayat. J - Conduct of the
contemnors is contemptuous - There is no need to issue
notice, as contemnors stated in open Court that they stood by
what they had said and done in Court - Registrar would take D
the contemnors into custody - The contemnors shall suffer
three months' simple imprisonment - Per Ganquly, J- This is
prima facie an incident when provision of s. 14 of the Act can
be invoked - The four steps enumerated in clauses (a) to (d) of
s. 14(1) are mandatory in nature - Under s. 14 though Court E
may temporarily cause the alleged contemnor to be detained in
custody but it cannot imprison him by way of punishment without
following the safeguards u/s 14(1) which give effect to
fundamental guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution -
Court's power is under Article 142 of Constitution is to be F
exercised in its jurisdiction - Constitution of India, 1950 -Article
21, 129 and 142.
Dr. LP Misra vs. State of UP (1998) 7 SCC 379- relied on.
B.K. vs. TheQueen(1996) 129DLR(4th)500-referredto. G
"Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt Second Edn.
1999 paragraph 14 - 106" - referred to.
By the Court : In view of the difference about the
1171 H
1172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 4 S.C.R.
A procedure to be adopted matters to be placed before CJ/ - In
the meantime, contemnors to remain in custody till the matter
is heard by an appropriate Bench.
Case Law Reference
B (1996) 129 DLR (4th) 500 referred to para 20
(1998) 1 sec 379 relied on para 21
Criminal Original Jurisdiction : Writ Petition (Crl.) 0. No
(S) (022040/2008) ................ Of 2009
c UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
WITH
Writ Petition (Crl.) No .......................... of 2009
(02428112008)
D
Writ Petition (Crl.) No ....................... Of 2009 (025985/
2008)
Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No. 3/2008 @ Writ
Petition (Crl.) Nos ...................... Of 2009 (022040, 24281
E & 25985/2008)
Suo Motu Cont. Pet. © No.225/2008 in SLP(C) 8573/
2006 ..
Suo Motu Cont. Pet.© No.226/2008 in SLP(C) 9434/2006
F Suo Motu Cont. Pet. © 228/2008 in SLP(Crl.)
....... CRLMP553/2007
G.E. Vahanvati, SGI (A.C.), Petitioner-in-Person, for the
Petitioner.
G Respondent in Person.
The orders of the Court was delivered by
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J.
"Today when these matters were taken up suddenly the
H
LEILA DAVID V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 1173
DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT J
contemnors started shouting and used very offensive, A
intemperate and abusive language and even one had gone to
the extent of saying that the Judges should be jailed for having
initiated proceedings against them. They said that Judges are
not interferring with orders by various Judges of the Bombay
8
High Court, are to be punished for not taking care of their so-
called fundamental rights. Even one of them threw a chappal at
the Judges. This happened in the presence of the learned
Solicitor General of India, two learned Additional Solicitor
General and a large number of learned counsel including the c
President of the Supreme Court Advocate of Record
Association.
This conduct is contemptuous. There is no need for issuing
any notice as the contemnors stated in open Court that they
0
stand by what they have said and did in Court. The Registrar is
directed to take the following four persons into custody from the
Court premises:
1. Annette Kotian D/o A. Kotian, Rio 1. Madhav Baug,
Brahim Society, Naupada Thana - 400602; (aged E
23 years) ·
2. Dr, Sarita Parikh D/o Kishore Bansilal R/o F.16, Juhu
Apartments, Juhu Road, Juhu Mumbai -49; (aged
31 years) F
"
3. Leila David W/o Neil David R/o 22, West View 151
Pastalane, Colaba, Mumbai -5; (aged 75 years)
4. Pavithra Murali D/o Murli R/o Jeevan Akash Forjett
Street, Tardev, Mumbai -36 ( aged 23 years) G
They shall suffer three months simple imprisonment.
Rest of the matters shall be listed after three weeks."
H
1174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.
A ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J.
Today in open Court when Item No. 37 was called on, the
petitioners appeared in person. Several ladies appeared along
with a gentleman and they addressed the Court in very
B intemperate and offensive language. The address was more
against the Members of the Bench than on the merits of the
case. To say the least, this is unfortunate. The persons who
appeared, became very agitated and one of them threw a
footwear at the Bench. At the time the learned Solicitor General 1
C of India was present in Court and two other learned Additional
Solicitors General were also present along with a large number
of advocates. Ultimately, those agitated persons were actually
taken out of the Court by some other Advocates and by security
personnel.
D To my mind this is prima facie an incident where provisions "
of Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter
the Act) can be invoked.
Learned Justice Pasaya! called for the Registrar (Judi.) of
this Court and was pleased to pass an order to the following
E effect:
"Today when these matters were taken up suddenly the
contemnors started shouting and used very offensive, ,..
intemperate and abusive language and even one had gone
F to the extent of saying that the Judges should be jailed for
having initiated proceedings against them. They said that
Judges are not interferring with orders by various Judges
of the Bombay High Court, are to be punished for not
taking care of their so-called fundamental rights. Even
G one of them threw a chappal at the Judges. This happened
~
in the presence of the learned Solicitor General of India,
two learned Additional Solicitor General and a large
number of learned counsel including the President of the
Supreme Court Advocate of Record Association.
H This conduct 1s contemptuous. There is no need for issuing
LEILA DAVID V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 1175
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J]
.. any notice as the contemnors stated in open Court that A
they stand by what they have said and did in Court. The
Registrar is directed to take the following four persons
into custody from the Court premises:
1. Annette Kotian D/o A. Kotian, R/o 1. Madhav Baug,
B
Brahim Society, Naupada Thana - 400602; (aged
23 years)
'lo 2. Dr, Sarita Parikh D/o Kishore Bansilal R/o F.16, Juhu
Apartments, Juhu Road, Juhu Mumbai -49; (aged
31 years) c
3. Leila David W/o Neil David R/o 22, West View 1st
Pastalane, Colaba, Mumbai -5; (aged 75 years)
4. Pavithra Murali D/o Murli R/o Jeevan Akash Forjett
" Street, Tardev, Mumbai -36 ( aged 23 years) D
They shall suffer three months simple imprisonment.
Rest of the matters shall be listed after three weeks."
His Lordship by this order directed the Registrar (Judi.) to
E
send persons named above to prison, as according to His
Lordship, they have acted in an indecent manner which is
•i>
apparently contumacious in the face of the Court. His Lordship
thus also sentenced them as above.
Just before that, the learned Solicitor General has F
addressed the Court and suggested that instead of taking those
persons into custody, the Court may restrain them from entering
any Court premises except in cases where they have to answer
any charge or defend themselves. In support of the said
-. contention the learned Solicitor General of India relied on G
Arlidge, Eady and Smith on Contempt, Second Edn. 1999
paragraph 14- 106:
"14-106: Against that background, the Vice- Chancellor
concluded that it would be quite inappropriate to deal with H
1176 SUPRErvlE COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.
A the matter by way of imprisonment, the purpose of which
in such a case "would be to mark the displeasure of the
Court about the contempt that had been committed and to
punish the perpetrator"". He said that a person suffering
from the mental infirmity in question did not require
B punishment, and the Court's displeasure had been
connoted by the judgments the Vice- Chancellor had given.
He focused therefore rather upon the need to protect court
officials in the future, both in the High Court and in county
~
courts generally, and granted injunctions restraining the
c bringing of any action of making any claim in an action
already brought except by a next friend, the persons were
also restrained by injunction from "entering any court
premises save as may be necessary to answer sub-
poenas."
D To that suggestion of the learned Solicitor General, I ,/<
pointed out in open Court that in our country the law of contempt
is not dependent solely on Common law principles, but the
exercise of contempt jurisdiction in India is regulated in
accordance with the provisions of the said Act. It is of course
E true that the Supreme Court has its inherent power. Apart from
the power conferred on it under the said Act, it has inherent
power under Art. 129 of the Constitution to punish for contempt
of itself. This Court also has power under Article 142 of the
••
Constitution.
F
In matters of initiating a contempt proceeding against
erring litigants and where contempt takes place in the face of
the court, the procedure has been statutorily prescribed under
Section 14 of the said Act. The said Section is based on the
G
Recommendation of the Sanyal Committee and paragraph 4
of the Recommendation on which Section 14 has been modelled ..
may be very instructive and is set out hereunder:
"4. From what we have stated, it is clear that 1t is not wise
to modify in any manner the summary powers of Courts to
deal with contempts committed in their presence. We,
H
LEILA DAVID V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 1177
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J]
therefore, feel that the Court should, in cases of criminal A
contempt committed in its presence, be able to deal with
the contempt forthwith or at any time convenient to it after
informing the person charged with contempt orally of the
charge against him and after giving him an opportunity
to make his defence to the charge, pending determi- 8
nation of the charge, the person charged with contempt
may be detained in such custody as the Court deems fit.
Wherever the matter is not disposed of forthwith, we also
feel that the person charged should be enlarged on bail
pending determination on the execution of a bond for due c
appearance for such sum and with or without sureties as
the Court considers proper. We are happy to note that this
is generally the practice."
(emphasis supplied)
D
The relevant provisions of Section 14(1) of the Said Act
run as under:
"S. 14. Procedure where cotempt is in the face of the
Supreme Court or a High Court. - (1) when it is alleged,
or appears to the Supreme Court or the High Court upon E
its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt
committed in its presence or hearing, the court may cause
such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time
before the rising of the court, on the same day, or as early
as possible thereafter, shall- F
(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt
with which he is charged;
(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the
charge; G
(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or
as may be offered by such person and after hearing
him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment,
to determine the matter of the charge; and
H
1178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R.
A (d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of
such person as may be just."'
It is clear from a perusal of Section 14( 1) of the said Act
that in initiating a contempt proceeding and when contempt is
allegedly committed in the face of the Court, the Court has to
B
inform the alleged contemnors in writing the charge of contempt
and then afford them an opportunity to make their defence to
the charge and thereafter on taking such evidence as may be
necessary or as may be offered by the persons and after hearing
them, proceed either forthwith or after adjournment to determine
c the matter of the charge and may make such order for the
punishment or discharge of such persons as may be just.
These four steps provided under Section 14(1) of the Act
are mandatory in nature.
D These steps have been engrafted under the Statute
.
following Common Law traditions in other countries and also
possibly keeping in view the age old principle that in contempt
proceedings, the Court acts both as Judge and an accuser,
rolled into one, and the Court must act with utmost restraint and
E caution and must follow all the procedural requirements since
the liberty of persons is involved.
Under Section 14(4) of the Act, the Court may temporarily
take the alleged contemnor in custody but it cannot imprison
him/her by way of punishment without following the safeguards
F
under sub-section 14(1) of the Act.
Mere unilateral recording in the order that the contemnors
stand by what they said in Court is not a substitute for compliance
with the aforesaid mandatory statutory requirement.
G Apart from that at that time when the alleged offending acts
~
were committed by those persons the Court's atmosphere was
so surcharged that no such offer could be validly made.
In other Common law jurisdictions where such clear
H statutory provisions are not there, same principles of caution
LEILA DAVID V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 1179
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J]
which is akin to Section 14 of the said Act have been judicially A
evolved while dealing with a case of contempt in the face of the
Court Reference in this connection may be made to the decision
of the High Court of Australia where in a case it has been laid
down:
8
"It is we/I-recognised principle of law that no person ought
to be punished for cotempt of Court unless the specific
charge against him be distinctly stated and an opportunity
of answering is given to him ........ The gist of the
accusation must be made clear to the person charged,
though it is not always necessary to formulate the charge C
in a series of specific allegations. The charge having been
made sufficiently explicit, the person accused must then
be allowed a reasonable opportunity of being heard in his
own defence, that is to say a reasonable opportunity of
placing before the court any explanation or amplifications D
of his evidence and any submissions of fact of law, which
he may wish the Court to consider as bearing either upon
the charge itself or upon the question of punishment
Resting as it does upon accepted notions of elementary
justice, this principle must be rigorously insisted upon. E
(Coward V Stapleton (1953) 90 CLR 573, 579-80).
Similar principles have been laid down by the Supreme
Court of Canada in B.K. Vs. The Queen:
"There is no doubt in my mind that he was amply justified F
in initiating the summary contempt procedures. I,
however, find no justification for foregoing the usual steps,
required by natural justice, of putting the witness on notice
that he or she must show cause why they would not be
i found in contempt of court, followed by an adjournment G
which need be no longer than that required to offer the
witness an opportunity to be advised by counsel and, if he
or she chooses, to be represented by counsel. In addition,
upon a finding of contempt there should be an opportunity
to have representations made as to what would be an H
1180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 4 S.C.R
A appropriate sentence. This was not done and there was
no need to forego all these steps.''
( 1996) 129 DLR (4th) 500)
Reference in this connection may be made to a decision
B of this Court in Dr.L.P. Misra Vs. State of U.P. reported in (1998)
7 sec 379.
A somewhat similar incident, may be of a graver import,
happened in Allahabad High Court on 15. 7. 1994 when a group
of Advocates entered the Court room, shouting slogans and
C asking the Court to stop its proceedings. As the Court continued,
the advocates went on to the dais and tried to manhandle the
Judges and uttered very abusive language against one of the
Members of the Bench. The abusive utterances were:
"Tum sale with jaao nahien to jann se maar daalenge.
D Tumne Chief Justice se kaha hai ki Lucknow ke Judges •
5000 rupya lekar stay grant karte hain aur stay extend
karte hain. Aaj 2 baje tak agar tum apan boriya bistar
lekar yahan se nahien bhag jaate ho to tumhe jann se
maar daalenge."
E
The learned Judges retired to their Chambers and then
re-assembled and passed an order holding the Advocates guilty
by imposing sentence of imprisonment and fine. In doing so,
the learned Judges invoked the High Court's power under Article
215 of the Constitution. Against that order, an appeal was filed
F to this Court.
It may be noted that power of the High Court under Article
215 of the Constitution is in similar terms as the power of the
Supreme Court under Article 129 of the Constitution.
G The learned three Judge Bench of this Court in L.P. Misra
(supra) set aside the order of Allahabad High Court as the same
was passed without following the procedure prescribed under
the law. In doing so the learned Judges referred to Section 14
of the said Act and the rules of Allahabad High Court Rules (pe>ra
6 page 381 of the report). Those rules and the provisions of
H
LEILA DAVID V STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 1181
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULI, J.]
.. Section 14 (1)(a)(b)(c)(d) of the said Act are almost similar in A
•
terms. This Court also held that the power of the High Court
under Article 215 has to be exercised in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law (Para 12 page 382 of the repo.rt).
The safeguards statutorily engrafted under Section 14 of
the Act are basically reiterating the fundamental guarantee given B
under Article 21 of the Constitution. This guarantee which
possibly protects the most precious fundamental right rs against
.. deprivation of one's personal liberty "except according to
procedure established by law". This Court, being the guardian
c
of this right, cannot do anything by which that right is taken away
or even abridged and especially when the Court is acting suo
motu.
For these reasons in the instant case, with great respect
to His Lordship Justice Pasayat, I cannot agree with His
' Lordship's view of sending these persons to prison for having D
allegedly committed contempt in the face of the Court without
following the mandate of Law under Section 14(1) (a) (b) (c)
and (d) of the Act.
I am of the view that this Court's power under Article 142
of the Constitution is not meant to circumvent clear statutory E
requirements.
The opening words of Article 142 shows that the Supreme
I, Court shall exercise its power under the said Article "in exercise
of its jurisdiction". Therefore, the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court in initiating proceeding for contempt under Section 14 of F
the said Act must be exercised following the statutory
dispensation. In other words, Supreme Court cannot, while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142, render salutary
provisions of Statute nugatory and otiose. These provisions as
~ noted above give effect to the fundamental guarantee under G
Article 21 of the Constitution.
Therefore, in this view of the matter, I cannot agree with
the view expressed in the order of His Lordship, Justice Pasayat,
for sending the alleged contemnors to prison for allegedly
committing the contempt in the face of the Court without following H
1182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 4 S.C.R.
A the mandate of the Statute under Section 14. I, therefore, cannot
at all agree with His Lordship's order by which sentence has
been imposed. I am of the view that the liberty of those persons
cannot be affected in this manner without proceeding against
them under Section 14 of the Act. In my opinion Section 14 is in
B consonance with a person's fundamental right under Article 21.
By the Court: In view of the ditterence about the procedure
to be adopted the matters may be placed before the Hon'ble
the Chief Justice of India. In the meantime the contemnors to
remain in custody till the matter is heard by an appropriate Bench.
c
R.P. Referred to larger Bench
•''
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