Holding

Minor, trivial contradictions in eye‑witness accounts do not render the testimony unreliable, and the conviction under Sections 302 IPC and 27 Arms Act stands.

Summary

The accused Om Prakash was charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act for shooting Maman Ram during a village dispute. The trial court convicted him based on eye‑witness testimony, ballistic evidence and the post‑mortem report, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The Punjab & Haryana High Court acquitted the accused, holding that discrepancies in the witnesses' accounts of the number of shots fired contradicted the medical evidence. The Supreme Court held that trivial inconsistencies in eye‑witness statements do not destroy their credibility, that interested witnesses retain evidentiary value unless discredited, and that the ballistic expert report and corroboration by the sarpanch were reliable. It further ruled that procedural irregularities in investigation cannot by themselves defeat the prosecution case. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s acquittal, restored the conviction and ordered the accused to surrender.

Issues considered

The effect of minor discrepancies in eye‑witness testimony on the credibility of the evidence
Whether the son and brother‑in‑law of the deceased, as interested witnesses, lose evidentiary value
The weight to be given to ballistic expert reports in gun‑shot cases
Whether irregularities or illegality in the investigation can invalidate the prosecution case
Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused on the basis of the above points

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 27
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162, s. 313
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 145, s. 155, s. 162
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302

Subjects

murdereye‑witness testimonycredibility of witnessesballistic evidenceinterested witnessprocedural irregularitiesconvictionappellate reviewIndian Penal CodeArms Act

Judgment

LEELA RAM (D) THROUGH DULi CHAND A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ANR.

OCTOBER 6, 1999

[K.T. THOMAS AND U.C. BANERJEE, JJ.) B

Indian Penal Code, 1860-S.302-Murder---Eye- witnesses-Apprecia-
tion of evidence--Conviction and sentence by Trial Court-On appeal, High
Court. acquitting the accused holding that there were discrepancies in the
evidence of eye-witnesses regarding number of shots fired by 'accused:-Validity C
of-Held, minor embellishment and trivial discrepancies do not render the.
evidence of eye-witnesses un-believable-Whether there was one shot or two
shots was immaterial in assessing the culpability of the accused-High Court
not justified in acquitting the accused relying upon minor contradictions be-
tween the witnesses. • D
Evidence Act, 1872 :

Witnesses-Appreciation of evidence--Conduct of witnesses-Held, dif-
ferent witnesses react differently and there cannot be any set pattern or
unifonn rule of human reaction-Thus, a piece of evidence cannot be dis-
carded on the ground that it was not failing within a set pattern. E
Witnesses-Interested witnesse~videntiary value of-Murder-Tes-
timony of son and brother-in-law of deceased that accused fired shots--Held,
does notloses its efficacy or evidentiary value as interested witnesses unless
something is brought on record to discredit the creditworthiness of the wit-
nesses. F
S-45--Appreciation of evidence--Ballistic expert's report-Evidentiary
value of-Held, a valuable material of evidence which can not be brushed
aside.

_, Criminal Trial : G
Investigation-lmgularity or illegality-Effect of

Accused was prosecuted for an offence under S.302 of the Indian
Penal Code and S. 27 of the Arms Act. The prosecution case was that
accused wanted to dig a khal forcibly through the field of 'M' which was H
435
436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A objected to. For resolving the dispute amicably, a team consisting of PWs 1,
2, 4 and 'R' alongwith 'M' and few other proceeded towards the field of the
accused. While on their way, accused came out from the field with a double
barrel gun and on seeing 'M' raised a Lalkara ''pani na dene ka maza
chakhata hun". He then fired two shots at 'M' and ran away. FIR was lodged
B by'L', son of'M'. Post-mortem was conducted by PW3. Police recovered two
empty cartridges from the place of occurrence. Subsequently, accused was
arrested and from his possession only DBBL gun alongwith 3 Iive cartridges
were recovered. The empty cartridges alongwith the gun were sent to Ballis-
tic expert, who gave a report that the said cartridges matched with the
injury. Trial Court relying upon the testimony of eye-witnesses convicted
C the accused and sentenced him to life imprisonment. However, on appeal,
High Court acquitted the accused holding that the eye-witnesses account
regarding the number of shots fired by accused stands contradicted by
medical evidence. Hence the present appeal.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside th~ order of High Court the
D Court

HELD : 1.1. Testimony of witnesses before the Trial Court, without ,
any major contradiction unmistakably point to the guilt of the accused and
the appreciation of evidence by the High Court is wholly unwarranted,
E improper and unimaginative. The High Court was not justified in acquit-
ting the accused relying upon some minor contradictions between the wit-
nesses. [448-H-499-A]

1.2. The High Court is within its jurisdiction being the first appellate
F court to re-appraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular
account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility
of the evidence of the witnesses. There is bound to be some discrepancy _
between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details,
and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should
not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corrobora-
G tion of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal ' --
cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason there-
for should not render the evidence of eye-witnesses unbelievable. Trivial
discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. The
evidence is to be considered from the point of view of trustworthiness-If
H this element is satisfied, they ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the
LEELA RAM v. STATE 437
438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A be interested in settlement of the dispute. As such his presence during
parley cannot be termed unnatural. Similar was the situation as regards the
presence of PW 2, brother-in-law of the deceased, who has lodged a com-
plaint to the Panchayat. If he had also accompanied the Panchayat mem-
bers for the amicable settlement of the dispute, there is nothing unnatural
B about it. Evidence of both the eye-witnesses stand fully corroborated by the
Sarpanch who is an independent witness. The High Court has doubted the
veracity of Sarpanch's evidence on too feeble a ground that the brother of
the accused once lost election against him. The core of his testimony
remains reliable and no good reason can be traced out to reject it. [449-C-F]

C 5. Any irregularity or even an illegality during investigation ought
not to be treated as a ground to reject the prosecution case. [442-C-D]

State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, AIR (1996) SC 3035, relied on.
I

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
D 297 of 1992.

From the Judgment and Order dated 4.11.85 of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in Crl.A. No. 124-DB of 1985.

K.K. Mohan for the Appellant.
E
Uma Datta, Tarun Sharma and Kishan Datta for the Respon-
dent No. 2.

Ms. Shikha Rai Pabi for Prem Malhotra for the Respondent No. 1.

F The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

BANERJEE, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against an
order of acquittal passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chan-
digarh, reversing the order of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment
G passed by the learned Sessions Judge under Section 302 IPC and Section
27 of the Arms Act.
'
The occurrence dates back to 16th July, 1983 at about 12.00 noon in
a village called Alipur Barota. The prosecution case as made out, depicts
that the accused wanted to dig a khal forcibly through the field of one
H Maman Ram, which was objected to. and the local Sarpanch was also
LEELARAMv. STATE(BANERJEE,J.] 439

informed accordingly. At a meeting, calle~ by the Sarpanch, it was decided A
that the matter ought to be resolved amicably and by reason therefor the
Panchayat consisting of Kurra Ram (PW2), Leela Ram (PWl), Ram
Kumar Panch and Bhim Sen (PW4) alongwith deceased Maman Ram and
a few other persons proceeded towards the field of the accused. The
Maman Ram, the deceased, was few paces ahead of the other members.
When however the deceased Maman Ram, was near the field of ·Kundan
B
Singh, the accused came out of the field with a double barrel gun and on
seeing Maman Ram, raised a Lalkara to the effect "pani na dene ka maza
chakhata hun" '. The accused thereafter fired a shot from his gun, striking
on the chest of the deceased Maman Ram. The other members of the
group on hearing the gun shot,. stopped there and immediately thereafter C
the second shot was fired by the accused and who then left the place
running with his gun towards village Aharwan. The Sarpanch arrived there
a little later and he and Kurra Ram remained at the place whereas Leela
Ram (son of the deceased) went to the Police Station, Fatehabad and gave
the first information statement being recorded as Exh. PA before the tril'.l D
court. Upon compliance with the formalities, Sub-Inspector Devi Dutt
along with Leela Ram went to the place of occurrence and prepared the
inquest report (Ex. PG) and despatched the dead body to Civil Hospital,
Fatehabad for post-mortem examination. Blood stained earth and two
empty cartridges were also taken into custody. All these recoveries were
effected in the presence of Kurra Ram and Bhim Sen. E

The post-mortem examination on the body of Maman Ram was
conducted by Dr. A.S. Chaudhary (PW3) at Fatehabad on 16th July, 1983
at 6.00 p.m. and he had found the following ante-mortem injuries on the
body;
F
1. "There was a lacerated wound 1-1/2" diametre with inverted
margins showing blackening at edges, situated at front of
lower and of sternum over ziphi-sternum. On further explora-
tion of wound, it led towards the left side obliquely upward
and laterally, causing laceration of the heart, the left lung had G
passed through another wound with averted margins on
lateral side of left chest wall just below left arm-pit measuring
2-112" x 2-1/2" shown in the diagram."

2. A lacerated wound with inverted mar.gins measuring 6 x 2" H
440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A on the medial and upper and of left upper arm. On dissection,
there were laceration of muscles, vessel, nerves and humerus
bone was badly, fractured in pieces. The wound passed on
lateral side of upper left arm, with averted margins, resulting
in injury no. 4 measuring 7" x 2-1/2". There was skin tag
hanging between injuries nos. 3 and 4 in front, there were
B corresponding holes in the left sleeve of the shirt.

3. There were four bulges and four lacerated ,wounds situated
on the back between and of scapula in mid-line in an area of
about 6" in diametre. Wounds were of averted margins of size
c about 1/2" x 1/2" in oval shape, on dissection of the bulges,
four pellets and 3 pieces of card board with marking "Tiger"
were recovered and sealed in a bottle. On further exploration
.
'

of ribs nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 at their junction with the vertabrae
were fractured in piece.s on left side. There were holes in the
body of the vertabrae nos. 2, 5 and 6 left side with fracture
D of traneverse processes and laceration of the spinal cord
corresponding to the hole in the verterbrae. There were
corresponding holes in the shirt on the back side.

Stomach contained semi digested food material. Semen discharged
E at urithral end".

In his opinion Dr. Chaudhary recorded that the cause of death was
shock and haemorrhage and the injuries were sufficient to cause death in
the ordinary course of nature.

F Without much of a factual detail, be it noted that on 18th July, 1983,
the accused was arrested and from his possession one DBBL gun along
with 3 live cartridges of 12 bore and a licence in his name were recovered.
The empty cartridges along with the gun were sent to the Ballistic expert
on 21st July, 1983 and who in no uncertain recorded that empty cartridges
G has been fired from the gun belonging to the accused. The prosecution
examined nine witnesses in all, and in the statement under Section 313 of ' .

the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused alleged false implication in
the case at the instance of Bhim Sen Sarpanch by reason of his brother

H
Ramji Lal having contested an election against Bhim Sen.

The reason recorded by the High Court in the support of acquittal
-
-- LEELA RAM v. STATE (BANERJEE, J.] 441

is that the eye witnesses' account regarding the number of shots fired by A
the appellant on the deceased stand contradicted by medical evidence. In
this context the High Court observed :

"The positive case of the prosecution as set up by Leela Ram
and Ram Kumar, eye-witnesses is that two shots were fired by Om
B
Prakash, appellant at Maman (deceased). They do not seem to be
clear about the site of the first injury. In examination-in-chief they
stated that the first gunshot had hit on the left side of the chest of
Maman, but during cross-examination both of them stated consis-
tently that it was on the left upper arm. According to Leela Ram,
it has hit on the left shoulder and Kurra Ram's position was that c
it had hit the left upper arm, near the arm pit. The injury had been
described by the doctor as injury No. 3. The injury was on the
medial and upper end of left upper arm and its exit was on the
lateral side. To describe in a more simple language, the wound of
entry was on the inner side of the left arm. The exit wound was D
just opposite, that is outer side of the arm. The injury was from 12
bore gun. We cannot imagine any situation in which the appellant
could cause injury No. 3 to Maman from any angle. We asked the
learned State counsel to caricature any position in which a man
can strike such an injury with a 12 bore gun, as was injury No. 3
Maman, without causing injury on another part of the body. This E
injury is simply impossible and cannot be caused from any angle.
The circumstances of the case suggest that all the injuries were the
result of the gunshot, noted as injury No. 1. PW 1 Dr. A.S.
Chaudhary, during cross-examination, had also to agree to this
position. The shot which was from a close range had entered the F
chest of Maman (deceased) at the point of strike, after encounter-
ing the bony resistence, it appears, the pellets got scattered into
two groups; one group which was forcing the overshot cardboard
the point which was noted as injury No. 5 by Dr. Chaudhary. The
other group, after bony resistence, split from the main charge and
traveled to the left side. After puncturing the heart, it went out at · G
point No. 2 and re-entered the left arm under the arm-pit to make
an exit on the lateral side of the left arm. The route of the scattered
pellets is almost in line from the point of entry till the point of exit
on the lateral side of the left arm. We are, therefore, satisfied that
these injuries on the dead body of Maman were the result of one H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A gunshot and not of two shots, as stated by the eye-witnesses."

This longish quotation probably could have been avoided but we
thought it fit to reproduce it verbatim so as to assess the situation in the
proper perspective, more so when there is an order of acquittal by the High
--
~

Court in reversal of the conviction and sentence for life imprisonment
B passed by the trial Court. Apart from the comment on the method of
investigation, the High Court mainly proceeded on two counts. On the first,
the learned Judges commented that the discrepancies and contradictions
between the witnesses do not inspire confidence and on the second count
they noted that there was fabrication of evidence by the investigating .
c agency.

Before however, proceeding with the matter on two counts as above,
it would be convenient to note another aspect of the matter, namely, the
observations pertaining to the investigation by the Investigating Agency. It
D is now a well settled principle that any irregularity or even an illegality
during investigation ought not to be treated as a ground to reject the
prosecution case and we need not dilate on the issue excepting referring a
decision of this Court (vide State of Rajasthan v. Kishore, AIR (1996) SC
3035).
E
Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction being the
first appellate court to re-appraise the evidence, but the discrepancies
found in the ocular account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot
affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There is bound to be
F some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they
speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension,
the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety.
Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot
be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but
variations by. reason therefor should not render the evidence of eye
G witnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an
otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to
the decision of this Court in the State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony, AlR (1985)
SC 48. In paragraph 10 of the report, this Court observed :

H "While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach
LEELA RAM v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 443

must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole A
appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, ·
it is undoubtedly necessary for the Court to scrutinise the evidence
more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and
infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate
them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the
evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation
B
of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor
discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case,
hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context
here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some
technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to c
the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the
evidence as a whole. If the Court before whom the witness gives
evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general
tenor of evidence give~ by the witness, the appellate court which ·
had not this benefit.will have to attach due weight to the apprecia- D
tion of evidence by the trial Court and unless there are reasons
weighty .and formidable it would not be proper to reject the
evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the
matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may
differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power
of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals." E

In a very recent decision in Criminal Appeal No. 61 of 1999 (Rammi
alias Rameshwar v. State of Madhya Pradesh) with Criminal Appeal No. 33
of 1999 (Bhura Alias Sajjan Kumar v. State of Madhya Pradesh) this Court
observed: F

"When eye-witness is examined at ,length it is quite possible for
him· to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly
escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue
witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony G
totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is
only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incom-
patible with the credibility of his version that the Court is justified
in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted
on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two state-
ments of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial
scrutiny".

This Court further observed :

B "It is a common practice in trial courts to make out contradictions
from previous statement of a witness for confronting him during
cross-examination. Merely because there is inconsistency in
evidence it is not sufficient to impair the credit of the witness.
No doubt Sectiqn 155 of the Evidence Act provides scope for
c impeaching the credit of a witness by proof of inconsistent
former statement. But a reading of the Section would indicate
that all inconsistent statements are not sufficient to impeach the
credit of the witness. The material portion of the Section is
extracted below :

D "155. Impeaching credit of witness. The credit of a witness may
be impeached in the following ways by the adverse party, or,
with the consent of the Court, by the party who calls him .....

(3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part
of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted."
E
A former statement though seemingly inconsistent with the
evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to amount to contradic-
tion. Only such of the inconsistent statement which is liable to be
"contradicted" would affect the credit of the witness. Section 145
F of the Evidence Act also enables the cross-examiner to use any
former statement of the witness, but it cautions that if it intended
to "contradict" the witness the cross-examiner is enjoined to com-
ply with the formality pre.scribed therein. Section 162 of Code also
permits the cross-examiner to use the previous statement of the
witness (recorded under Section 161 of the Code) for the only
G limited purpose, i.e. to "contradict" the witness.

To contradict a witness, therefore, must be to discredit the par-
ticular version of the witness. Unless the former statement has the
potency to discredit the present statement, even if the latter is at
H variance with the former to some extent it would not be helpful to
LEELA RAM v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 445
contradict that witness, (vide Tahsildar Singh and Anr. v. State of A

- U.P., AIR (1959) SC 1012)".

The court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react
differently under different situations : whereas some become speechless,
some start wailing some others run away from the scene and yet there are
some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that the B
wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals
and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human
reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction
not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise.

It is indeed necessary to note that hardly one comes across a witness
c
whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishments -
sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment
and sometimes in their over anxiety they may give slightly exaggerated
account. The Court can sift the chaff from the corn and find out the truth
from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is D
unnecessary. The evidence is to be considered from the point of view of
trustworthiness - If this element is satisfied, they ought to inspire con-
fidence in the mind of the Court to accept the stated evidence though not
however in the absence of the same.

In this context, refer:mce may be made to the decision of this Court
E
in the case of Appabhai and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR (1988) SC
696 wherein this Court in paragraph 11 of the report observed :

"Experience reminds us that civilized people are generally insen-
sitive when a crime is committed even in their presence. They F
withdraw both from the victim and the vigilante. They keep them-
selves away from the Court unless it is inevitable. They think that
crime like civil dispute is between two individuals or parties and
they should not involve themselves. This kind of apathy of the
general public is indeed unfortunate, but it is there everywhere
whether in village life, towns or cities. One cannot ignore this G
handicap with which the investigating agency has to discharge its
duties. The Court, therefore, instead of doubting the prosecution
case for want of independent witness must consider the broad
spectrum of the prosecution version and then search for the nugget
of truth with due regard to probability, if any, suggested by the H ·
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R. -
A accused. The Court, however, must bear in mind that witnesses to
a serious crime may not react in a normal manner. Nor do they
react uniformly. The horror stricken witnesses at a dastardly crime
or an act of egregious nature may react differently. Their course
of conduct may not be of ordinary type in the normal circumstan·
ces. The Court, therefore, cannot reject their evidence merely
B because they have behaved or reacted in an unusual manner."

In paragraph 13 of the report this Court further observed :

"The Court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue
c importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do
not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be dis·
carded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of
perception or observation should not be given importance. The
errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The
D Court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in
different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by
excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a
doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the
proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root
of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The
E
witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version
perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the Court.
The courts, however should not disbelieve the evidence of such
witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy."

F The basic reason for non-acceptance of prosecution case so far as
the High Court is concerned is the contradiction said to have effected by
not being clear about the side of the first injury on the body of the deceased
Maman in so far as the evidence of Leela Ram (PW 1) is concerned. Be
it noted, Leela Ram is the son of deceased Maman. In his examination in
G Chief he stated :

"My father was 7/8 paces ahead of me. When my father reached .
the field of Kundan Singh, then the accused came out from the
field of Kundan Singh, he was having a double barrel gun. The
H field of Kundan Singh was having charri crop. The accused uttered
LEELA RAM v. STATE (BANERJEE, J.] 447

the words 'Pani Na Dene Ka Maza Chakhata Hun.' The accused A
fired a gun shot at my father which struck him on the upper part
of the chest to the left side. On receiving this shot, my father fell
down on the ground. The second gun shot fired by the accused
struck my father on his chest. After this, myself, Kurra Ram and
Ram Kumar, Member Panchayat ran back. In the meanwhile, the B
Panchayat had reached the canal bridge. I told the Sarpanch that
Om Prakash accused had fired at my father, who was running
towards village Aharwan with his weapon."

In cross-examination however, the evidence records as below :
c
"I was at a distance of 5 karams when the accused fired the firsf
shot at my father. The accused had fired first shot on my father
from the left side hitting him on the chest on the left side. Again
said on the left shoulder. My father fell down on receipt of that
shot. He fell down with his face towards the sky. The head of my D
father was towards the bridge. The second shot was fired by the
accused while standing towards the side of his feet. I cannot tell
the distance between the feet of my father and the accused, where
he was standing. He was at a distance of a few feet from the feet
my father, when he fired the second shot · I remained at the place E .
where I was when the first shot was fired. When the second shot
was fired then I ran backward by two paces. Kurda also went
backwards by 2/3 paces. After the firing of two shots, I ran towards
the Panchayat. I had raised noise when the two fires were shot at
my father. When I was retreating backwards, then the second shot F
was frred."

It is the above evidence which has prompted the High Court to ask
· the learned Advocate appearing for the prosecution "to caricature any
position in which a man can strike such an injury with a .12 bore gun ....... "
Where there was one shot or two shots, can it not be termed to be G
immaterial in the matter of assessing the culpability of the accused. The
son who saw his father has been shot at and thereafter fell dead • total
stunning effect on the son and it is on this score that mere hair splitting on
the available evidence ought not to be undertaken and instead the totality
of the situation ought to have been reviewed. The empty cartridges were H
''
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.

A found and the ballistic expert's report that the cartridges ma~l::h with the
injury. The High Court ascribes this to be an immaterial piece of evidence.
We, however, do not think so. Ballistic expert's evidence cannot be brushed
aside since that is in the normal course of events, a valuable material
vis-a-vis the use of the gun and the injury. The High Court went on to
B record the contradiction from the medical evidence but unfortunately the
same does not find support from the evidence on record. Dr. A.S. Chaud-
hary having done the post-mortem examination on the deceased Maman,
has stated in his evidence that : "Injuries Nos. 2, 4 and 5 are the exit
wounds. Injuries Nos. 1 and 3 are the entry wounds". Dr. Chaudhary
further said that "Injury No. 1 is an entry wound of point blank range".
C The doctor has been subjected to cross examination and he at the end of
it all said that : "It can be said that the injuries on the person of the
deceased were the result of one shot". It is on this count, High Court
recorded that Dr. Chaudhary "had also to agree to this position" (emphasis
supplied). Needless to say that the Doctor probably has not been able to
D match ·the cross-examining lawyer and there was thus an unequal duel
between the medical man and a refined lawyer. Can it be said; that by
reason of the evidence of Dr. Chaudhary the contradictions are galore in
nature, so far as the evidence of Leela Ram is concerned - the High Court
upon consideration of the factum of such a contradiction answers the same
E on a positive note. This however; is not acceptable to this Court the
discrepancy does not seem to be of such a nature so as to effect the
creditworthiness or the trustworthiness of the witness. As as matter of fact
it does not so do by reason of the fact that Maman fell a victim of gun shot
injuries and died; it is immaterial as to whether one or two gun shots were
fired - the contradiction at its highest cannot but be stated to be in regard
F to a minor incident and does not travel to the root of the nature of the
offence. The other piece of evidence is that the Sarpanch and the members
of the village panchayat saw the accused running away towards the village
Aharwan just after firing with his gun.

G Incidentally, the Sarpanch also stated that there were two gun shots
sounds which he heard. Then there is ballistic expert report as noticed
above-these pbces of evidence as available on record cannot be ascribed
to be untrustworthy neither can be that they do not inspire confidence.
There is thus no discrepancy about the totality of the situation and
H witnesses without any major contradiction deposed before the Court of
LEELA RAM v. STATE [BANERJEE, J.] 449

Session with an unbiased mind and in a manner which m our view A
unmistakably point to the guilt of the accused and the appreciation of
evidence by the High Court, in our view is wholly unwarranted, improper
and unimaginative in the contextual facts.

Admittedly, there was some dispute pertaining to digging of a water
course though the land of the deceased Maman. There is such an evidence
B
that the Sarpanch of the village was going to resolve the dispute between
the parties and it was at this juncture this gruesome murder took place:
motive therefore, cannot be ruled out. The High Court has proceeded on
the basis that two eye witnesses being the son and brother-in-law of the
deceased are interested witnesses, and hence their evidence ought not to c
be relied upon, we are unable to concur therewith. The ocular account
though may have been given by the son and the brother-in-law does not by
itself loses its efficacy or its evidentiary value unless some other factor is
brought on record to discredit the creditworthiness of the witnesses: On
the facts of the matter under consideration, the presence of Leela Ram D
being the son of the deceased appears to be quite natural by reason of the
fact that the father had a land dispute with someone else i:nd the son in
the normal way could be interested in settlement of the dispute. As such
his presence during parley cannot be termed unna~ural. Similar was the
situation as regards the presence of Kurra Ram, brother-in-law of the
deceased, who has lodged a complaint to the Panchayat. If Kurra Ram, E
also accompanied the Panchayat members for the amicable settlement of
the dispute,'4,i our view there is nothing unnatural about it. Evidence of
both the eye-witnesses stand fully corroborated by the Sarpartch who is an
independent witness. The High Court has doubted the veracity of his
evidence only on the ground that the brother of the accused once lost
F
election against the witness. We consider that as too feeble a ground to
doubt the evidence of the Sarpanch. The core of his testimony remains
reliable and no good reason can be traced out to reject it.

In our view the High Court relying upon some minor contradictions
fell into a clear error in passing the order of the acquittal of the accused. G
According to us the learned Sessions Judge has reached the conclusion
correctly and such a well merited conviction should not have been so lightly
interfered with.

We therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of the H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A High Court. The conviction and sentence passed by the Session Judge shall
stand restored. The accused is hereby directed to surrender before the trial
court. We direct the Sessions Judge concerned to take prompt steps to put
the accused back in jail to undergo the sentence imposed on him.

S.V.K. Appeal allmyed.

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