Supreme Court of India
LEE KUN HEE & ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P. & ORS.
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 61
- Decided
- 1 February 2012
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- A K GANGULY
Holding
The competent court at Ghaziabad has jurisdiction to try the offences and the summoning order is valid.
Summary
The appellant companies, foreign nationals who were ultimate beneficiaries of a bill of exchange, were summoned by a Ghaziabad magistrate on a criminal complaint alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust and related offences under the IPC. The complaint arose from a commercial transaction in which goods were supplied from India to Dubai and the bill of exchange was held in Ghaziabad, but the foreign parties denied payment. The appellants argued that Indian courts lacked jurisdiction because the alleged acts occurred abroad and they were not present in India. The Supreme Court held that under CrPC sections 179, 181(4) and 182, the court in Ghaziabad had jurisdiction because the supply of goods, the holding of the bill of exchange and the communications occurred in India and the consequences ensued there. The Court also rejected the contention that foreign nationality barred liability under IPC section 2, relying on earlier precedents. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the summoning order upheld.
Issues considered
- The territorial jurisdiction of Indian courts over foreign nationals for offences alleged to have been committed outside India.
- Interpretation of CrPC sections 179, 181(4) and 182 in determining jurisdiction.
- Whether a civil suit for the same transaction bars the initiation of criminal proceedings.
- Whether the summoning order could be quashed under Section 482 of the CrPC.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 179, s. 181(4), s. 182, s. 200, s. 4, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 1208, s. 120B, s. 2, s. 34, s. 403, s. 405, s. 415, s. 418, s. 420, s. 423
Subjects
territorial jurisdictionforeign nationalsCriminal Procedure CodeIndian Penal Codebill of exchangecheatingcriminal breach of trustSection 179Section 181Section 182Section 482corporate liabilitycivil and criminal liability
Judgment
[2012] 4 S.C.R. 287
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. A
V.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
(Criminal Appeal No. 304 of 2012)
FEBRUARY 1, 2012
B
[ASOK KUMAR GANGULY AND JAGDISH SINGH
KHEHAR, JJ.]
Penal Code, 1860 - ss. 2, 403, 405, 415, 418, 420 and
423 r/w ss. 1208 and 34: c
Territorial jurisdiction of courts in India - Agreement
between intermediary buyer (based abroad) and seller (based
in Delhi, India) to purchase certain products which were to be
further transferred by the intermediary buyer to ultimate
beneficiary (foreign company, based in Dubai) - Upon supply D
of the product, the ultimate beneficiary was to issue a Bill of
Exchange in favour of the intermediary buyer who was to
further endorse the same to the seller towards payment of
goods which were supplied by the seller from Ghaziabad -
Ultimate beneficiary not honouring its commitment under the E
bill of exchange - Issuance of legal notice by seller to the
ultimate beneficiary - However, the ultimate beneficiary not
making payment - Criminal complaint by seller ulss. 403,
405, 415, 418, 420 and 423 r/w ss. 1208 and 34 before the
Magistrate at Ghaziabad against appellants-the ultimate F
beneficiary and the foreign parties (officials allegedly
connected with the offence) - Summoning order ulss. 403,
405, 420 and 423 r/w ss. 1208 and 34 - Challenged by the
appellants on the ground that courts in India had no
jurisdiction to entertain the criminal complaint filed by the G
seller against the appellants - Held: The competent court at
Ghaziabad has the jurisdiction to entertain the complaint in
the matter uls. 179, 181(4) and 182 Cr.P.C. - The factum of
287 H
288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 4 S.C.R.
A supply of goods from Ghaziabad (in India) to Dubai (in the
United Arab Emirates), as an essential component of the
offences allegedly committed by the accused, is relatable to
the words "anything which has been done" used in s. 179 -
Since the complainant-seller allegedly held the bill of
B exchange at Ghaziabad in India, the consequence emerging
out of the said denial of encashment of the bill of exchange,
'ensued' at Ghaziabad in India - Bill of exchange issued by
the ultimate beneficiary was received and is allegedly being
held by seller at Ghaziabad in India - Ultimate beneficiary by
C a letter denied its liability towards seller under the bill of
exchange and the said response on behalf of ultimate
beneficiary was received by seller at Ghaziabad in India -
Thus, it cannot be said that the actions attributed by the seller
to the appellants have no connectivity to territorial jurisdiction
in India - Submission of the appellants about their foreign
0
nationality, their residence outside India, and the fact that they
were not present in India when the offence(s) was/were
allegedly committed, of no consequence - They would not be
protected uls. 2 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 179,
181 and 182 - Jurisdiction.
E
Summoning order u/ss. 403, 405, 420 and 423 r/w ss.
1208 and 34 - Challenge to - On the ground that the
appellants- ultimate beneficiary and the foreign parties
(officials allegedly connected with the offence) were not privy
F to contract/agreement thus, could not be proceeded against
for breach of the agreement - Held: Pleadings prima facie
demonstrate connectivity of the appellants with the
foundational basis expressed in the complaint - One of the
accused also supported the accusation - Thus, at this stage
G it is not desirable to exculpate the appellants from
proceedings initiated by the complainant before the
Magistrate - Said issue may be re-agitated after production
of evidence by rival parties before the trial court.
Summoning order ulss. 403, 405, 420 and 423 r/w ss.
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 289
1208 and 34 - Challenge to - On the ground that the charges A
not made out against the appellants-ultimate beneficiary and
the foreign parties (officials allegedly connected with the
offence); that the appellants being functionaries of a company
per se could not be made vicariously liable for offences
emerging out of actions taken in discharge of their B
responsibilities towards the company; and that the appellants
had no concern with the allegations leveled by the
complainant - Held: Statement of the complainant uls. 200
Cr.P. C. categorically asserted that the appellants were jointly
and severally liable to honour the bill of exchange endorsed c
in the favour of the buyer - Acts of omission and commission
presented by the complainant specific and categoric -
Allegations leveled by the complainant fully incorporate all
the basic facts necessary to make out the offences
whereunder the summoning order was P.assed - Also, instant
0
case does not suffer from any of the impairments referred in
Iridium Telecom Limited's case - Appellants granted liberty
to raise the legal issues before the trial court.
Complaint under, for dishonour of bill of exchange by the
accused - Order of summoning under the Sections - Civil E
suit already filed at the behest of the complainant, based on
the alleged breach of the agreement - Maintainability of the
criminal proceedings - Held: In offences of the nature
contemplated under the summoning order, there can be civil
liability coupled with criminal culpability - It cannot be said F
that since a civil claim has been raised by the complainant it
can be prevented from initiating proceedings for penal
consequences for the alleged offences committed by the
accused under the Penal Code.
G
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - ss. 179, 181(4) and
182 - Jurisdiction of courts in India for trial of a case -
Determination of - Explained.
In terms of the agreement, the seller (based in Delhi,
H
290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 4 S.C.R.
A India) supplied certain products to the intermediary buyer
(based abroad) which was further transferred to ultimate
beneficiary (foreign Company). The ultimate- beneficiary
executed a bill of exchange in favour of the intermediary
buyer and the intermediary buyer endorsed the bill of
B exchange in favour of the seller, towards payment for
products. The ultimate beneficiary did not honour its
commitment under the bill of exchange. The seller issued
legal notice to the ultimate beneficiary calling them to
make the payment to the seller within the stipulated
C period. Despite repeated demands, the ultimate
beneficiary denied its liability. The seller carrying its
business activities either in Delhi or Ghaziabad, through
its sole proprietor filed a criminal complaint u/ss. 403, 405,
415, 418, 420 and 423 read with Sections 1208 and 34 IPC
o before the Magistrate at Ghaziabad, against the ultimate
beneficiary and the parties who were allegedly involved
in the matter (appellant no. 1 to 5 and others). The
Magistrate passed an order summoning the accused
under Sections 403, 405, 420 and 423 read with Sections
E 1208 and 34 IPC. The five appellants challenged the order
before the High Court and the same was disposed of.
Thus, the appellants filed the instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court
F HELD: 1.1. The two phrases of Section 179 Cr.P .C.
"anything which has been done", with reference to the
offence and "consequence which has ensued"
substantially enlarge and magnify the scope of
jurisdiction contemplated under Section 179, so as to
G extend the same over areas contemplated by the two
phrases. In the instant case, the offence(s) alleged in the
complaint emerge from the fact, that even though the
complainant faithfully performed its obligations under the
agreement/contract, the accused dishonestly/
H fraudulently/falsely denied/avoided the reciprocal
-
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 291
obligation(s) which they were obliged to perform A
thereunder. The words "anything which has been done",
would extend to anything which has been done in
furtherance of the execution of the agreement. The facts
constituting the performance of obligations by the
complainant, actually constitute the foundational basis B
for the criminal accusation levelled against the accused
(in refusing to honour the corresponding obligation). The
instant foundational basis for establishing the
commission of the offence, would fall within the ambit of
the words "anything which has been done" used in the c
said provision. In the absence of the instant affirmation
of the factual position, the culpability of the accused
cannot be established. In the complaint it is asserted, that
the contracted goods/product were/was supplied by JCE
Consultancy (seller) from Ghaziabad in India. The factum
0
of having supplied the goods/product to 'S' Company in
Dubai (the ultimate beneficiary) through 'SI' Company
(intermediary buyer), is sought to be established not only
through a delivery receipt dated 28.1.2002 (issued by the
intermediary buyer-'SI' Company, but also, on the basis E
of the bill of exchange executed by 'S' Company in Dubai
(the ultimate beneficiary), constituting the payment for the
goods/product purchased. The factum of supply of goods
from Ghaziabad (in India) to Dubai (in the United Arab
Emirates), as an essential component of the offence(s)
allegedly committed by the accused, is relatable to the F
words "anything which has been done" used in Section
179. This factual position, is sufficient to vest jurisdiction
under Section 179 Cr.P.C.; with a competent Court at
- Ghaziabad. [Para 12] [312-G-H; 313-A-G]
1.2. Under Section 179 Cr.P.C., even the place(s)
G
wherein the consequence (of the criminal act) "ensues",
would i;~ relevant to determine the court of competent
jurisdiction. Therefore, even the courts within whose local
jurisdiction, the repercus~ion/effect of the criminal act H
292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 4 S.C.R.
A occurs, would have jurisdiction in the matter. The
reciprocal consideration, flowing out of the agreement, is
comprised of a monetary payback. The said monetary
payback was allegedly transmitted by the recipient of
goods ('S' Company in Dubai) to the intermediary buyer
B ('SI' Limited), by way of a bill of exchange valued at US$
14,32,745, on 1.2.2002. The said bill of exchange was then
endorsed by 'SI' Limited to the complainant-JCE
Consultancy. JCE Consultancy maintains that it holds the
said bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India. The execution
c of the bill of exchange by 'S' Company in Dubai and its
endorsement by 'SI' Limited is in consonance with the
terms and conditions of the agreement. Upon alleged
denial of payment to JCE Consultancy (under the bill of
exchange), a legal notice was issued demanding
0 payment. In its response, 'S' Company in Dubai, allegedly
dishonestly/fraudulently/falsely denied liability/
responsibility. Since the complainant is allegedly holding
the bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India, the
consequence emerging out of the said denial of
E encashment of the bill of exchange, would be deemed to
"ensue" at Ghaziabad in India. Thus, the competent Court
at Ghaziabad in India, would have jurisdiction in the
matter under Section 179 Cr.P.C. [Para 13) [313-H; 314-
A-F]
F 1.3. A perusal of Section 181 Cr.P .C. leaves no room
for any doubt that in offences of the nature as are subject
matter of consideration, the court within whose local
jurisdiction, the whole or a part of the consideration
" ... were required to be returned or accounted for ... "
G would have jurisdiction in the matter. In the instant case,
a bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002 was issued on behalf
of 'S' Company in Dubai, to 'SI' Company Limited; 'SI'
Company, in terms of the agreement, endors.'::ld the said
bill of exchange in favour of tb.ie complainant-'JCE'
H Company; JCE Company cl.eim1s to be holding the said
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 293
bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India. Being holder of A
the bill of exchange, JCE Company demanded the right
of payment thereunder, which is being denied by the
accused. Since the bill of exchange issued by 'S'
Company in Dubai for US$14,32,745 was received, and
is allegedly being held by 'JCE"Company at Ghaizabad B
in India; the said bill of exchange, according to the
complainant, has to be honoured/realized at the place
where it is held (i.e. at Ghaziabad, in India). In the instant
alleged factual background of the matter, the competent
court at Ghaziabad in India, would have jurisdiction to c
hold the trial of the complaint under Section 181 (4)
Cr.P.C. (Para 14] (315-D-H]
1.4. A perusal of Section 182 Cr.P.C. reveals that the
said provision can be invoked to determine jurisdiction
in respect of a number of offences which include D
cheating as a component. When acts of fraud/dishonesty/
deception, relatable to the offence(s), contemplated u/s.
182 emerge from communications/messages/letters etc.,
the place(s) from where the communications/messages/
letters etc. were sent, as also, the places at which the E
same were received, would be relevant to determine the
court of competent jurisdiction. The allegations contained
in the complaint reveal, that the complainant-JCE
Company addressed a legal notice to 'S' Company in
Dubai, calling upon 'S' Company in Dubai, to honour its F
reciprocal commitment of the monetary payback
contemplated under the agreement. In its response, 'S'
Company in Dubai, denied liability, by asserting that 'S'
Company in Dubai, had no commitment/responsibility
towards JCE Company under the bill of exchange dated G
1.2.2002. The said denial according to the complainant,
constitutes the basis of the criminal complaint filed
against the accused. The place at which the said
response on behalf of 'S' Company in Dubai, was
received, would be relevant to determine the court of H
294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A competent jurisdiction, under Section 182 Cr.P.C. Even
if the response was received by the counsel for JCE
Consultancy in a place other than Ghaziabad (though in
India), still the competent court at Ghaziabad in India,
would be vested with jurisdiction, as under Section 178
B (d) Cr.P.C., in cases where an offence consists of several
acts carried out under different jurisdictions, a court
having jurisdiction where any one of such acts was
committed, would be competent to try the same. [Para 15]
(316-F-H; 317-A-D]
c 1.5. In view of the said deliberations, it is not
legitimate for the appellants to contend, that the actions
attributed by JCE Consultancy to the accused, have no
connectivity to territorial jurisdiction in India. Section 179
Cr.P.C. vests jurisdiction for inquiry and trial in a court,
D within whose jurisdiction anything has been done with
reference to an alleged crime, and also, where the
consequence of the criminal action ensues. Section
181(4) Cr.P.C. leaves no room for any doubt, that
culpability is relatable even to the place at which
E consideration is required to be returned or accounted for.
Finally, Section 182 Cr.P.C. postulates that for offences
of which cheating is a component, if the alleged act of
deception is shown to have been committed, through
communications/letters/messages, the court within
F whose jurisdiction the said communications/letters/
messages were sent (were received), would be competent
to inquire into and try the same. Thus, viewed, it is not
justified for the appellants to contend, that the allegations
levelled by the complainant against the accused, specially
G in respect of the five appellants, are not relatable to
territorial jurisdiction in India, under the provisions of the
Code of Criminal Procedure. [Para 16) (317-E-H; 318-A]
1.6. All components of the submissions advanced by
the appellants, more particularly their foreign nationality,
H their residence outside India, and the fact that they were
'
I
LEE KUN H~E & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 295
not present in India when the offence(s) was/were A
allegedly committed, are of no consequence. They would
not be protected u/s. 2 IPC. There is no merit in the first
contention that the Magistrate could not have entertained
the complaint filed by JCE Consultancy against the
appellants. [Para 17] [324-F-H; 325-A] B
Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The State of Bombay (1958)
SCR 328 - relied on.
2. It was submitted that that the complaint lodged by
JCE Consultancy was based on an agreement between C
JCE Consultancy and 'SI" Company; that the appellants
were not privy to the said contract/agreement, and as
such the grievance of the complainant, if any could have
been raised only as against 'SI' Company; and that the
appellants having no role to play under the contract/ o
agreement were wrongfully involved in the controversy
by the complainant. In the complaint filed by JCE
Consultancy, it was expressly averred that all the
appellants were involved in "each and every act done by
the company" ('S' Company in Dubai). In the statement E
recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the complainant
deposed that the appellants were individually and jointly
liable for the commission of offences emerging from the
complaint. How they were liable (if at all), is a question of
evidence, which would emerge only after evidence is F
recorded by the trial court But what is interesting is, that
'SI' Company though an accused in the complaint filed
by JCE Company totally supported the accusation(s)
levelled by the complainant against the appellants. In a
detailed response to the culpability of the appellants 'SI' G
Company adopted a firm stance. Even the pleadings,
prima facie demonstrate the connectivity of the
appellants, with the foundational basis expressed in the
complaint. It is undesirable to exculpate the appellants
from the proceedings initiated by 'JCE' Company before
the Magistrate, Ghaziabad. The issue under reference H
296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A may be re-agitated, after evidence has been produced by
the rival parties before the trial court. [Paras 20, 21] [326-
C-D, E-G; 327-A-D; 329-G-H; 330-A]
3. Through the complaint, as also, in the statement
8 of the complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C.,
JCE Consultancy categorically asserted that the
appellants were jointly or severally liable to honour the
bill of exchange, which had been endorsed in its (JCE
Consultancy's) favour. In order to demonstrate the
C appellant's liability, a series of documents were also
placed before the trial court. The Magistrate having
considered the said material, issued the summoning
order. The culpability of the appellants would obviously
depend upon the evidence produced before the
jurisdictional court. It can definitely be stated from the
D pleadings before this Court, that one of the accused,
namely, 'SI' Company totally supported the cause of the
complainant-JCE Consultancy, through its written reply.
The factual details emerging from the evidence to be
produced by the rival parties, would be necessary to
E project a clear picture. It is only thereafter, that a rightful
decision on this issue canvassed would be possible. The
factual foundation/background of the acts of omission
and commission presented by the complainant is specific
and categoric. The allegations levelled by the
F complainant, fully incorporate all the basic facts which are
necessary to make out the offences whereunder the
impugned summoning order was passed. The instant
case does not suffer from any impairments referred in
lridum India Telecom Limited Case. It is left open to the
G appellants to canvass the legal issues, before the trial
court. After the rival parties have led their evidence, the
trial court would return its finding thereon, in accordance
with law, without being influenced by any observations
made on the merits of the controversy. [Para 23] [336-H;
H 337-A-H]
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 297
Iridium India Telecom Limited vs. Motorola Incorporated A
and Ors. (2011) 1 SCC 74: 2010 (14) SCR 591; Haryana vs.
Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335: 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR
259; M.N. Ojha vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav (2009) 9 SCC 682:
2009 (13) SCR 444 - referred to.
B
4. In offences of the nature contemplated under the
summoning order, there can be civil liability coupled with
criminal culpability. What a party has been deprived of by
an act of cheating, can be claimed through a civil action.
The same deprivation based on denial by way of
deception, emerging from an act of cheating, would also C
attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal
prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal
relief, for the actions of the accused. As in the instant
case, the monetary consideration under the bill of
exchange, cannot be claimed in the criminal proceedings, D
for that relief the remedy would be only through a civil
suit. Therefore, it is not possible to accept, that since a
civil claim was raised by the complainant-JCE
Consultancy, based on the alleged breach of the
agreement, it can be prevented from initiating E
proceedings for penal consequences for the alleged
offences committed by the accused under the Penal
Code. It would not be appropriate to delve into the
culpability of the appellants at the instant juncture, on the
basis of the factual position projected by the rival parties. F
The culpability (if at all) would emerge only after evidence
is adduced by the rival parties before the trial court. Even
on the basis of the submission it is not possible to quash
the summoning order at this stage. Thus, it is left open
to the appellants to raise their objections, if they are so G
advised, before the trial court. [Para 26] [341-A-F]
Case Law Reference:
(1958) SCR 328 Relied on. Para 17
H
298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 2010 (14) SCR 591 Referred to. Para 22
1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 Referred to. Para 22
2009 (13) SCR 444 Referred to. Para 22
B CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 304 of 2012.
From the Judgment & Order dated 13.11.2009 of the High
Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Application
No. 11404 of 2006.
c
Ram Jethmalani, Joy Basu, Neeraj Singh, Bikas Kargupta,
Meenakshi Midha, Karan Kalia, Avijit Bhattacharjee, Pranav
Diesh, Pratik Datta for the Appellants.
S.S. Gandhi, R.K. Dash, Prashant Chandra, Sanjay
D Sareen Rahul Sharma, P.N. Puri, Pooja M. Saigal, T.N. Singh,
Rajeev Dubey, Kamlendra Mishra, S.K. Dwivedi, M.S. Vinaik,
Ajay Kumar Talesara for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. Leave granted.
2. Sky lmpex Limited (as buyer) entered into an
agreement with JCE Consultancy (as seller) on 1.12.2001. The
sale consideration for the products to be supplied by JCE
F Consultancy was determined at US$13,70,000 (approximately
Rs.9 crores). The product was to be delivered no later than
30.1.2002. The buyer was to confirm receipt and certify quality
and quantity. As per the agreement, the product was to be
further transferred by the buyer (Sky lmpex Limited) to
G Samsung Gulf Electronics, Dubai (hereafter referred to as
"Samsung, Dubai"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Samsung
Corporation, South Korea (hereinafter referred to as
"Samsung, South Korea). Consequent upon supply of the
product under the contract/agreement dated 1.12.2001,
H Samsung Dubai was to issue a bill of exchange valued at
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 299
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
US$14,32,000, in favour of the buyer Sky lmpex Limited. Sky A
lmpex Limited was to further endorse the bill of exchange in
favour of the seller (JCE Consultancy). Within 72 hours
wherefrom the seller was required to transfer to Sky lmpex
Limited US$62,000 as commission. Alternatively, the buyer
(Sky lmpex Limited) could transfer, upon delivery, a sum of B
US$13, 70,000, as sale consideration for the product. It was also
provided in the agreement, that after endorsement of bill of
exchange, the liability of the buyer towards the seller would stand
exhausted. Thereupon, the seller would hold the bill of
exchange, in due course, and get vested with the authority under c
the Negotiable Instrument Act, to claim value, directly from
Samsung, Dubai. Importantly, the agreement dated 1.12.2001
provided that the contract would be governed by the laws of
India. The agreement dated 1.12.2001 being of substantial
relevance in the present controversy, is being extracted D
herein under:-
"Sky lmpex Limited BVI
Agreement No.SA/100/019
This agreement is made this day December the 1st 2001
between M/s. Sky lmpex Ltd., having its registered office E
at Omer Hodge Bldg., 2nd Floor, Wickham's Cay1, P.O.
Box-985, Road Town, Tortola, British Virgin Islands, herein·
referred to as the 'the Buyer' and Mis. J.C.E. Consultancy
a proprietorship Company having its office at 108, Rohini
Complex, WA-121, Shakarpur, Delhi-110092, India, herein F
referred to as 'the Seller'.
The Agreement between the two parties constitute the
following:
1. The buyer has agreed to purchase Coke Calcination G
packages from the Seller to the value of USD 1,370,000
as per order sheet dated November, 25th, 2001 and duly
acknowledge by the Seller.
2. The above packages will be delivered by the Seller to H
300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 4 S.C.R.
A the Buyer, no later than January, 30th 2002. The packages
shall be handed over by the Seller to the Buyer's
representative as per communication in writing to be sent
by the Buyer to the Seller.
3. The Buyer should provide a Performance Certificate to
B
the Seller, confirming that the above packages are in
accordance with the order placed and thereafter the Buyer
shall not have any claims against the Seller in respect to
the quality of the packages and quantity ordered.
c 4. it is understood by the Seller that the said packages are
to be further transferred by the Buyer to M/s. Samsung Gulf
Electronics, Dubai, a company registered under the laws
of Dubai, UAE and which is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Samsung Corporation, South Korea.
D
5. The Buyer shall receive from Samsung Gulf Electronics,
Dubai a Bill of Exchange for the value of approx. USD
1,432,000 due for payment of July, 2002 and shall endorse
the same to the seller as consideration for the sale of the
packages to the Buyer. Within 72 hours of receiving
E
settlement of the said Bill of Exchange the Seller shall
transfer to the Buyer the amount of USO 62,000 to the
nominated account of the Buyer as his commission.
Alternatively the Buyer shall transfer to the Seller the sum
of USO 1,370,000 against delivery of goods to a Bank
F account that shall be nominated by the Seller.
6. After endorsement of the said Bill of Exchange, the
liability of the Buyer towards the Seller ceases and the
Seller shall become holder in due course of the Bill of
G Exchange with all the rights as per the Negotiable
Instrument Act to claim value directly from the Samsung
Gulf Electronics, Dubai.
7. The Buyer, however, in good faith shall follow up with
Samsung Gulf Electronics, for payment of the said Bill of
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 301
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
Exchange at maturity expected in July, 2002 and shall in A
good faith keep the Seller informed of any development
in respect of settlement of the Bill.
8. This contract is governed by the Laws of India."
3. Through a delivery receipt dated 28.1.2002, Sky lmpex B
Limited confirmed having received the product valued at
US$13,70,000 under the contract/agreement dated 1.12.2001.
The buyer neither complained about quality nor quantity. There
was also no protest that the goods/product was not received
in time. The aforesaid receipt of goods implies the delivery of C
the product by JCE Consultancy to Sky lmpex Limited. On
1.2.2002, Samsung, Dubai executed a bill of exchange valued
at US$14,32,745 in favour of the buyer Sky lmpex Limited. This
implies further delivery of goods/product from Sky lmpex
Limited to Samsung, Dubai. The said bill of exchange was then D
endorsed in favour of the seller JCE Consultancy, in terms of
agreement dated 1.12.2001.
4. Allegedly, on account of Samsung, Dubai not honouring
its commitment under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002, a E
legal notice dated 20.12.2004 was issued by JCE Consultancy
(the seller) through counsel, on instructions from M.A. Packir
(Shaikh Allauddin Paker Maiddin - sole proprietor of JCE
Consultancy) to Samsung, Dubai. Through the aforesaid notice
Samsung, Dubai, was called upon to make payment of
US$14,32,000 to JCE Consultancy within 48 hours, either by F
way of bank draft or other smart investment. Samsung, Dubai,
was warned, that in case of non-receipt of payment, JCE
Consultancy would be constrained to take recourse to legal
remedies, both civil and criminal. The legal notice issued by
JCE Consultancy dated 20.12.2004 was responded to by G
Samsung., Dubai, through counsel on 21.12.2004. In response,
it was inter alia asserted:
" ... that a Credit Note was already been issued by the
beneficiary for the Bill of Exchange, Sky lmpex Limited on H
302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 22 June 2002 and before the due date of payment.
Therefore, our client has no commitment or responsibility
to pay your client any amount in relating to the above
mentioned Bill of Exchange and your client can simply
demand the amount of the Bill of Exchange from Sky
B lmpex Limited, who mislead your client. .. "
It is therefore apparent, that in its response Samsung, Dubai,
acknowledged execution of a bill of exchange valued at
US$14,32,000, in favour of Sky lmpex Limited, and thereby, its
liability under the contract dated 1.12.2001. lnspite thereof
C Samsung, Dubai, as a matter of defence, in order to avoid
liability, took up the position, that the bill of exchange executed
by it in favour of Sky lmpex Limited had been satisfied, and the
beneficiary (Sky lmpex Limited) had already issued a credit
note in its (Samsung, Dubai) favour on 22.6.2002.
D
5. JCE Consultancy filed a criminal complaint (complaint
no.30 of 2005) under Sections 403, 405, 415, 418, 420 and
423 read with Sections 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code
before the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,
E Ghaziabad. In the complaint filed by Shaikh Allauddin Pakir
Maiddin - the sole proprietor of JCE Cc.~:'.Jltancy, Samsung,
Dubai, was impleaded as accused no.1 (appellant no. 5,
herein); Byung Woo Lee, Managing Director of Samsung,
Dubai, was impleaded as accused no.2 (appellant no.3, herein);
F L.ee Kun Hee, President, Samsung Corporation, was
impleaded as accused no.3 (appellant no.1, herein); Yon Jung
Yung, Vice President and Chief Executive Officer, Samsung
Corporation, was impleaded as accused no.4 (appellant no. 2,
herein); Dong Kwon Byon, Ex. Managing Director, Samsung,
Dubai, was impleaded as accused no.5 (appellant No. 4,
G herein); S.C. Baek, ex. Financial Advisor, Samsung, Dubai, was
impleaded as accused no.6; Sky lmpex Limited, was
impleaded as accused no.7; and the Chairman of Sky lmpex
Limited, was impleaded as accused no.8. Since the contents
of the complaint are of substantial relevance to the present
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 303
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
controversy, the same are being extracted hereunder: A
"1. That the complainant company is dealing in consultancy
in the Engineering Field and Sh.Sheikh Allauddin Pakir
Maddin is its sole Prop. Who has been authorized on
behalf of the company to sign, verify and present the
B
complaint and is empowered to do all the acts.
2. That the accused no.1 is a Multi National Company who
have business in Foreign Countries and is reputed.
Accused No.2 is the Managing Director of accused No.1,
Accused No.3 the President, Accused No.4 the Vice C
President and Chief Executive Officer, Accused No.5 the
Ex. Managing Director, Accused No.6 the Ex-Financial
Controller, who are being officers of the company and are
responsible each and every done by the company.
D
3. That on dated 25.11.2011, the Accused no. 7 placed
order for supply of Coke Calcination package with
complainant company and was told to make supply of the
said items to accused no.1 which paper is Annexure K-1.
In this regard an agreement (contract) between Accused E
No. 7 and the complainant company was executed vide
L.A./100/019 dt.1.12.01 which was signed by the Accused
No. 7 and the authorized signatory of the complainant
company which paper is Annexure K-2.
4. That in compliance of the order dt.25.11.01 complainant F
company supplied the ordered goods to Accused No. 7 the
acknowledgement receipt was given by Accused No.7 vide
letter dt.28.1.02 which paper is Annexure K-3.
5. That the Accused No. 7 handed over the supplied goods G
by the complainant company to Accused No.1 and the
handig over - taking over receipt was acknowledged by
the Accused No.1 vide letter dt.1.2.02 in favour of the
Accused no.7 which paper is Annexure K-4.
H
304 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 6. That as per the clause No.5 of the agreement executed
between the complainant company and the Accused no.7
the due payment of the received goods was to be made
by the Accused No.1 in the form of Bi!I of Exchange
through Accused No.7. The accused No.7 was to endorse
B the bill of Exchange in favour of the complainant company
so received by the Accused No.7.
7. That the Accused No.1 in its Board Meeting of the
company passed a resolution on 15.8.01 by virtue of which
Accused No.6 in addition to other works was also
c authorized to sign Bill of Exchange. The said resolution has
been signed by Accused No.5 in the capacity of Director
and Secretary, the same is Annexure K-5.
8. That in accordance with aforesaid resolution, Accused
D No.1 intimated their Bank Manager vide their letter
dt.26.1.02 informing that Accused No.6 is authorized to
issue Bill of Exchange on behalf of Accused No.1 and the
signatures of the Accused No.6 were also attested vide
the abovesaid letter. The signature of Accused no.6 have
E been attested by the Bank Officer of Accused No.1 which
is Annexure K-6.
9. That Accused no.6 for and on behalf of Accused No.1
issued Bill of Exchange No.S.M.l.C. dt:1.2.02 for
Rs.14,32, 745/- American Dollars under his signature in
F favour of Accused No. 7 after having received the ordered
goods and on being satisfied of its quality, the same was
endorsed by the Accused No. 7 in favour of the complainant
company in view of the agreement executed between him
and the complainant company which is Annexure K-7.
G
10. That the complainant company made demand of
payment from the Accused No.1 against the Bill of
Exchange issued in favour of the Accused No.7 and
endorsement thereon which the Accused No.1 did not pay
H despite repeated demands from time to time. The
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 305
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
complainant company sent a legal demand notice dt: A
20.12.04 through their Advocate to Accused No.1 on not
receiving the due payment which is Annexure K-8, and a
reply to the same was sent by Accused No.1 on 21.12.04
through their Advocate stating therein that the payment of
the alleged Bill of Exchange has already been made in B
favour of Accused No.7 on 22.6.02, they, therefore, have
no liability to discharge with regard to payment. The reply
to notice is Annexure K-9.
11. That the aforesaid statement of Accused No.1 is illegal
and contrary to law. The complainant company is the real C
holder of the Bill of Exchange. Till the demand for payment
against the Bill of Exchange is made there is no question
of payment of the same. Only the holder is entitled to
receive the payment, therefore, the Accused No.1 along
with Accused No.7 do not want to make the payment to D
the complainant company and they want to misappropriate
the same.
12. That the complainant company is entitled to receive the
payment against the supplied goods which amounts to E
14,32,745/- American Dollars from the Accused no.1
personally and jointly and the accused persons have
deliberately not paid the same.
13. That the accused persons have committed the above
offence punishable under Sec.403, 405, 415, 418, 420, F
423, 120B, 34 Indian Penal Code.
It is therefore prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to summon the accused persons and on proof
they be punished." G
Shaikh Allauddin Pakir Maiddin - the sole proprietor of JCE
Consultancy, examined himself under Section 200 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure before the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate on 7.1.2005. In his testimony he, inter alia, asserted H
306 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 4 S.C.R.
A that accused nos.2 to 6 were individually and jointly liable/
responsible for the activities of accused no.1 (Samsung,
Dubai). He deposed that on 25.11.2001 accused no. 7 Sky
lmpex Limited had placed an order with the complainant,
whereupon an agreement dated 1.12.2001 was executed
B between Sky lmpex Limited (as buyer) and the complainant -
JCE Consultancy (as seller). He maintained, that the
complainant delivered the contracted goods to accused no. 7
(Sky lmpex Limited), who further delivered the contracted
goods to accused no.1 (Samsung, Dubai). He affirmed, that a
C receipt of the goods was also issued by accused no.7 (Sky
lmpex Limited) vide a letter dated 1.2.2002. It was maintained,
in the statement of Shaikh Allauddin Pakir Maiddin, that
accused no.1, in a Board meeting, approved the proposal to
authorize accused no.6 (S.C. Baek, ex.-Financial Advisor,
D Samsung, Dubai) to sign and issue bills of exchange, for and
on behalf of Samsung, Dubai. He also asserted, that a bill of
exchange for US$14,32,745 was signed and issued by
accused no.6 on behalf of Samsung, Dubai, to accused no.7
(Sky lmplex Limited). He also deposed, that the said bill of
exchange was endorsed in favour of the complainant - JCE
E Consultancy, by accused no.7 (Sky lmpex Limited). Shaikh
Allauddin Pakir Maiddin averred, in his statement, that despite
repeated demands made to accused no.1, to honour the bill
of exchange dated 1.2.2002, no payment came to be made by
accused no. 1 to the complainant. Resultantly, on 20.12.2004
F the complainant sent a legal notice, through counsel, to accused
no.1. In its response dated 21.12.2004, through counsel, it was
stated on behalf of the accused (Samsung, Dubai), that the
amount of the said bill of exchange had already been made
over to accused no. 7 on 22.6.2002. He also asserted, that in
G reply to the notice, the accused adopted the position of no
liability towards the complainant under the bill of exchange
dated 1.2.2002. Shaikh Allauddin Pakir Maiddin, in his
statement under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, contested the stance adopted by the accused in
H response to the legal notice, by testifying that the complainant
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 307
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
company was the holder of the bill of exchange, consequent A
upon an endorsement made thereupon by Sky lmpex Limited.
As such, the complainant - JCE Consultancy maintained, that
it was entitled to payment under the bill of exchange. He also
averred, that accused no.1 (Samsung, Dubai), in collusion with
accused no.7 (Sky lmpex Limited), in order to deny payment B
to the complainant, had adopted the aforesaid position. He
asserted, that the complainant - JCE Consultancy was entitled
to recover payment under the bill of exchange, individually and
jointly from the accused. Besides recording his statement under
Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Shaikh C
Allauddin Pakir Maiddin also tendered copies of the order
sheet dated 2.11.2001, the agreement dated 1.12.2001, the
delivery receipt dated 28.1.2002, the perforriance certificate
dated 1.2.2002, proceedings of the Board meeting of accused
no.1 approving the proposal to authorize accused no.6, the letter
0
dated 26.1.2002 (issued by accused no.1 to its banker,
informing its banker that accused no.6 was its authorized
signatory), the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002 in the sum of
US$14,32,745 (issued in favour of Sky lmpex Limited, duly
endorsed to JCE Consultancy), the legal notice dated
20.12.2004 and its reply dated 21.12.2004. E
6. Based on the aforesaid criminal complaint, the
statement of Shaikh Allauddin Pakir Maiddin under Section 200
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as also, the supporting
documents, the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, F
Ghaziabad passed an order dated 12.1.2005 summoning the
accused under Sections 403, 405, 420 and 423 read with
Sections 120B and 34 of the Indian Penal Code for 3.2.2005.
The order passed by the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial
~agistrate, Ghaziabad was first assailed by the five appellants G
herein before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by filing
Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 11404 of 2006. The
aforesaid Criminal Miscellaneous Application was disposed of
on 13.11.2009. Through the instant appeal the appellants have
assailed the order passed by the High Court on 13.11.2009. H
308 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 7. The primary contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel representing the five appellants before this
Court was based on an admitted sequence of facts. It was
submitted, that none of the appellants is an Indian citizen. It was
also submitted, that none of the appellants have resided in India,
B either before, or after the execution of the agreement dated
1.12.2001, nor during its implementation. It was submitted, that
neither the criminal complaint nor the pre-summoning evidence
recorded under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
attributes any act of omission/commission, within the territorial
C jurisdiction of India, to any of the five appellants herein. As such,
according to learned counsel, the provisions of the Indian Penal
Code cannot be relied upon to determine the culpability of the
appellants. In order to substantiate the instant contention, our
attention was invited by the learned counsel for the appellants,
to Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code, which reads as under:
0
"2. Punishment of offences committed within India -
Every person shall be liable to punishment under this Code
and not otherwise for every act or omission contrary to the
provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty within India.·
E
Based on the Section 2 of the Indian Penal Code, it was sought
to be emphasized, that culpability of an accused under Section
2 of the Indian Penal Code can only be relatable to an act" ... of
which he shall be guilty within India". Based on aforesaid legal
F and factual position, it was sought to be emphasized, that the
appellants having not committed any act within the territorial
jurisdiction of India, cannot be blamed of being guilty of an act
"within India", and as such, cannot be proceeded against in a
Court in India for facing prosecution under the provisions of the
Indian Penal Code.
G
8. In order to support the aforesaid primary contention, it
was also emphasized, that appellant nos. 1 to 4 are all foreign
citizens, whereas, appellant no. 5 is a foreign company
incorporated in Dubai. Appellant no. 1, we are told, was
H Chairman and Director of Samsung, South Korea. It is
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 309
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
contended, that he has had nothing to do with Samsung, Dubai. A
We are informed, that he lives in South Korea. Appellant no.
2, we are informed, was a former Vice Chairman and CEO of
Samsung, South Korea. He also has had nothing to do with
Samsung, Dubai. He too lives in South Korea. Learned counsel
for the appellant contends, that on the date of the execution of B
the agreement dated 1.12.2001, appellant no. 3 was the
Managing Director, of Samsung, Dubai. He is no longer so. He
too now resides in South Korea. Likewise, according to learned
counsel, appellant no. 4, on the date of execution of the
agreement dated 1.12.2001, was ex-Managing Director of c
Samsung, Dubai. He also resides in South Korea. Appellant
no. 5, we were told, is a foreign company incorporated in Dubai
(in the United Arab Emirates). It has its registered office at
Dubai. It is also asserted, that the five appellants herein, have
no concern with the other accused, in the criminal complaint D
filed by JCE Consultancy.
9. Additionally, it was submitted, that respondent no. 2-JCE
Consultancy, is a proprietary concern under the sole ownership
of Shaikh Allauddin Pakir Maiddin. The aforesaid concern
according to the appellants carries on its business activities E
either in Delhi or at Ghaziabad, in India. It was contended on
behalf of the appellants, that as per the averments made in the
complaint, it was Sky lmpex Limited which had placed an order
with JCE Consultancy under the agreement dated 1.12.2001.
Sky lmpex Limited, according to the learned counsel for the F
appellants, is a foreign company registered in the British Virgin
Islands. It was submitted, that the complainant has not disclosed
where and how the agreement was executed. It was submitted,
that there is no averment at the hands of the complainant, that
the agreement dated 1.12.2001 was executed in India. It was G
asserted, that even according to the averments made in the
complaint, the goods were supplied to Sky lmpex Limited, and
not to any one or more of the appellants herein. It was pointed
out, that the complaint does not even narrate how or from where
the goods were exported from India. Or how, and from where, H
310 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A delivery was taken by Sky lmpex Limited. It was contended, that
the complainant has merely asserted, that the goods were
delivered by Sky lmpex Limited to Samsung, Dubai. It is
pointed out, that the complaint does not disclose how and
where, the delivery of goods was made by Sky lmpex Limited
B to Samsung, Dubai.
10. We shall now endeavour to deal with the primary
contention advanced on behalf of the appellant. The instant
contention has a jurisdictional flavour. We shall deal with the
C matter, firstly on the basis of an analysis of some of the
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For the instant
purpose reference may first of all be made to Section 4 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure which is reproduced hereunder :
4. Trial of offense under the Indian Penal Code and
D other laws-
1. All offences under the Indian Penal Code (45 of
2860) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and
otherwise dealt with according to the provisions
E hereinafter contained.
2. All offences under any other law shall be
investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise
dealt with according to the same provisions, but
subject to any enactment for the time being in force
F regulating the manner or place of investigating,
inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such
offences."
It is apparent, from a perusal of Section 4, that inquiry and trial
G of offences contemplated under the Indian Penal Code, are to
be conducted in the manner stipulated under the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The offences in this case, as noticed
above, have been framed under sections 403 (dishonest-:
misappropriation), 405 (criminal breach of trust), 420 (cheating)
H and 423 (dishonest/fraudulent execution of an instrument
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 311
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
containing a false statement relating to consideration) of the A
Indian Penal Code. The denial of liability by the accused under
the agreement dated 1.12.2001 is allegedly the basis of the
criminal complaint lodged by JCE Consultancy. The place
where the agreement was executed, as well as, the places
where different constituents of the agreement were carried out, B
are material factors to determine the relevant court(s) which
would/could have jurisdiction in the matter. The place where the
consequence of the criminal action (alleged in the complaint)
ensues, may also be relevant for the said purpose. And finally,
place(s) of receipt and dispatch of communications exchanged c
by the rival parties, revealing deception as an ingredient of
cheating alleged by the complainant, can also be relevant to
identify the court(s) having jurisdiction in the matter. The
aforesaid relevance becomes apparent from Sections 179,
181 and 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which we shall o
presently examine.
11. The aforesaid examination has to be based on certain
salient facts, which we may first recapitulate. The complaint
alleges the execution of a contract dated 1.12.2001, wherein
consideration in the form of goods/product produced in India, E
by the seller (JCE Consultancy) stationed in India, were to be
supplied to the buyer (Sky lmpex Ltd.), in Dubai. The reciprocal
consideration in the agreement was in the form of a monetary
payback, by the eventual recipient of goods (Samsung, Dubai},
to the seller in India (JCE Consultancy). The complaint narrates F
a circuitous passage of the goods from the seller (JCE
Consultancy) to the eventual buyer (Samsung, Dubai}, as also,
the return consideration from the said buyer (Samsung, Dubai)
to the seller. Both the aforesaid transactions, according to the
complainant, passed through an intermediary - Sky lmpex G
Limited. The agreement, according to the complainant, also
contemplates commission for the intermediary (Sky lmpex Ltd.).
There is definiteness in the complainant's allegations of the
transfer of goods from India, as also, the receipt of monetary
consideration in India. The complainant has supported his H
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A allegations on the basis of documents, wherein each document
connects the passing of goods from the seller, and of the
reciprocal monetary consideration from the eventual buyer
(Samsung, Dubai) to the seller (JCE Consultancy) through a fine
unbroken chain of events. The foundation of the complaint has
B been laid on the basis of the agreement dated 1.12.2001,
whereby the complainant wishes to establish the corresponding
obligations of the rival parties. Through the delivery receipt
dated 28.1.2002, the complainant desires to demonstrate
communication of the goods by the seller, as also, their receipt
c by the buyer. Based on the execution of the bill of exchange
on 1.2.2002 by, the authorized signatory of Samsung, Dubai,
and the endorsement of the bill of exchange on 1.2.2002 itself
by Sky lmpex Limited, in favour of the complainant JCE
Consultancy as reciprocal consideration; exactly in the manner
D contemplated under the agreement dated 1.12.2001; the
complainant desires to establish the liability of Samsung,
Dubai, under the agreement dated 1.12.2001.
12. On the question of jurisdiction, based on the factual
position indicated above, reference may first be made to
E Section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code which is being
reproduced hereunder:-
" 179. Offence triable where act is done or
consequence ensues: When an act is an offence by
F reasons of anything which has been done and of a
consequence which has ensued, the offence may be
inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction such thing has been done or such
consequence has ensued."
G In Section 179 aforesaid, two phrases need to be noticed.
Firstly, "anything which has been done", with reference to the
offence. And secondly, "consequence which has ensued", also
with reference to the offence. Both the aforesaid phrases
substantially enlarge and magnify the scope of jurisdiction
H contemplated under Section 179 aforesaid, so as to extend the
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 313
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
same over areas contemplated by the two phrases. In so far A
as the present controversy is concerned, the offence(s) alleged
in the complaint emerge from the fact, that even though the
complainant faithfully performed its obligations under the
agreement/contract dated 1.12.2001, the accused dishonestly/
fraudulently/falsely denied/avoided the reciprocal obligation(s) 8
which they were obliged to perform thereunder. In our view, the
words "anything which has been done", for the present
controversy, would extend to anything which has been done in
furtherance of the execution of the agreement dated 1.12.2001.
The facts constituting the performance of obligations by the C
complainant, actually. constitute the foundational basis for the
criminal accusation levelled against the accused (in refusing to
honour the corresponding obligation). The instant foundational
basis for establishing the commission of the offence, in our
view, would fall within the ambit of the words "anything which D
has been done" used in the aforesaid provision. In the absence
of the instant affirmation of the factual position, in the present
controversy, the culpability of the accused cannot be
established. In the complaint it is asserted, that the contracted
goods/product were/was supplied by JCE Consultancy from
Ghaziabad in India. The factum of having supplied the goods/ E
product to Samsung, Dubai through Sky lmpex Limited, is
sought to be established not only through a delivery receipt
dated 28.1.2002 (issued by the intermediary buyer - Sky lmpex
Limited), but also, on the basis of the bill of exchange executed
on 1.2.2002 by Samsung, Dubai (the ultimate beneficiary), F
constituting the payment for the goods/product purchased. The
factum of supply of goods from Ghaziabad (in India) to Dubai
(in the United Arab Emirates), as an essential component of
the offence(s) allegedly committed by the accused, in our view,
is relatable to the words "anything which has been done" used G
in Section 179 aforesaid. This factual position, in our view, is
sufficient to vest jurisdiction under Section 179 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, with a competent Court at Ghaziabad.
13. Besides the aforesaid, under Section 179 of the Code H
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A of Criminal Procedure, even the place(s) wherein the
consequence (of the criminal act) "ensues", would be relevant
to determine the court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore,
even the courts within whose local jurisdiction, the repercussion/
effect of the criminal act occurs, would have jurisdiction in the
B matter. The reciprocal consideration, flowing out of the
agreement dated 1.12.2001, is comprised of a monetary
payback. The aforesaid monetary payback was allegedly
transmitted by the recipient of goods (Samsung, Dubai) to the
intermediary buyer (Sky lmpex Limited), by way of a bill of
C exchange valued at US$ 14,32,745, on 1.2.2002. The aforesaid
bill of exchange was then endorsed by Sky lmpex Limited, to
the complainant-JCE Consultancy. JCE Consultancy maintains,
that it holds the said bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India. The
execution of the bill of exchange (by Samsung, Dubai) and its
D endorsement (by Sky lmpex Limited) is in consonance with the
terms and conditions of the agreement dated 1.12.2001. Upon
alleged denial of payment to JCE Consultancy (under the bill
of exchange dated 1.2.2002), a legal notice dated 20.12.2004
came to be issued demanding payment. In its response dated
21.12.2004, Samsung, Dubai, allegedly dishonestly/
E fraudulently/falsely denied liability/responsibility. Since the
complainant is allegedly holding the bill of exchange dated
1.2.2001 at Ghaziabad in India, the consequence emerging out
of the said denial of encashment of the bill of exchange, in our
view, would be deemed to "ensue" at Ghaziabad in India. In the
F instant view of the matter, the competent Court at Ghaziabad
in India, in our view, would have jurisdiction in the matter under
Section 179 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
14. Insofar as Section 181 of the Code of Criminal
G Procedure is concerned, while inviting our attention to the
same, learned counsel for the complainant-JCE Consultancy,
in order to emphasize the issue of jurisdiction, brought to our
notice sub-section (4) thereof. Section 181(4) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure is being extracted hereunder:-
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 315
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
181. Place of trial in case of certain offences - A
(1) ................... .
(2) ............... ·····
(3) ................... . B
(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal
breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court
within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed
or any part of the property which is the subject of the C
offence was received or retained, or was required to be
returned or accounted for, by the accused person.
A perusal of the aforesaid provision leaves no room for any
doubt, that in offences of the nature as are subject matter of
consideration in the present controversy, the court within whose D
local jurisdiction, the whole or a part of the consideration
" ... were required to be returned or accounted for ... " would have
jurisdiction in the matter. In the present case, a bill of exchange
dated 1.2.2002 was issued on behalf of Samsung, Dubai, to
Sky lmpex Limited; Sky lmpex Limited, in terms of the E
agreement dated 1.12.2001, endorsed the aforesaid bill of
exchange in favour of the complainant-JCE Consultancy; JCE
Consultancy claims to be holding the aforesaid bill of exchange
at Ghaziabad in India. Being holder of the bill of exchange
dated 1.2.2002, JCE Consultancy demanded the right of F
payment thereunder, which is being denied by the accused.
Since the bill of exchange issued by Samsung, Dubai, dated
1.2.2002 for US$14,32,745 was received, and is allegedly
being held by JCE Consultancy at Ghaizabad in India; the
aforesaid bill of exchange, according to the complainant, has G
to be honoured/realized at the place where it is held (i.e. at
Ghaziabad, in India). In the instant alleged factual background
of the matter, we are of the view, that the competent court at
Ghaziabad in India, would have jurisdiction to hold the trial of
the complaint under Section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal H
Procedure.
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 15. Lastly, reference may be made to section 182 of the
Criminal Procedure Code which is being reproduced
hereunder:-
182. Offences committed by letters, etc. -
B (1) Any offence which includes cheating may, if the
deception is practiced by means of letters or
telecommunication messages, be inquired into or tried by
any Court within whose local jurisdiction such letters or
messages were sent or were received; and any offence
c of cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property
may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local
jurisdiction the property was delivered by the person
deceived or was received by the accused person.
D (2) Any offence punishable under section 494 or section
495 of the Indian Penal Code (45of1860) may be inquired
into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the
offence was committed or the offender last resided with
his or her spouse by the first marriage, or the wife by first
marriage has taken up permanent residence after the
E
commission of offence."
A perusal of section 182 (extracted above) reveals that the said
provision can be invoked to determine jurisdiction in respect
of a number of offences which include cheating as a
F component. When acts of fraud/dishonesty/deception, relatable
to the offence(s), contemplated under Section 182
aforementioned, emerge from communications/messages/
letters etc., the place(s) from where the communications/
messages/letters etc. were sent, as also, the places at which
G the same were received, would be relevant to determine the
court of competent jurisdiction. The allegations contained in the
complaint reveal, that the complainant-JCE Consultancy,
addressed a legal notice dated 20.12.2004 to Samsung,
Dubai, calling upon Samsung, Dubai, to honour its reciprocal
H commitment of the monetary payback contemplated under the
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 317
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
agreement dated 1.12.2001. In its response dated 21.12.2004, A
Samsung, Dubai, denied liability, by asserting that Samsung,
Dubai, had no commitment/responsibility towards JCE
Consultancy, under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002. The
aforesaid denial according to the complainant, constitutes the
basis of the criminal complaint filed against the accused. The B
place at which the said response on behalf of Samsung, Dubai,
was received, in our view, would be rele\(ant to determine the
Court of competent jurisdiction, under Section 182 of the
Criminal Procedure Code. Even if the response was received
by the counsel for JCE Consultancy in a place other than c
Ghaziabad (though in India), still the competent court at
Ghaziabad in India, in our view, would be vested with
jurisdiction, as under Section 178 (d) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, in cases where an offence consists of several acts
carried out under different jurisdictions, a court having
0
jurisdiction where any one of such acts was committed, will be
competent to try the same.
16. In view of the aforesaid deliberations, it is not legitimate
for the appellants to contend, that the actions attributed by JCE
Consultancy to the accused, have no connectivity to territorial E
jurisdiction in India. Section 179 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure vests jurisdiction for inquiry and trial in a Court, within
whose jurisdiction anything has been done with reference to an
alleged crime, and also, where the consequence of the criminal
action ensues. Section 181(4) of the Code of Criminal F
Procedure leaves no room for any doubt, that culpability is
relatable even to the place at which consideration is required
to be returned or accounted for. Finally, Section 182 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure postulates that for offences of
which cheating is a component, if the alleged act of deception G
is shown to have been committed, through communications/
letters/messages, the court within whose jurisdiction the said
communications/letters/messages were sent (were received),
would be competent to inquire into and try the same. Thus
viewed, it is not justified for the appellants to contend, that the H
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 4 S.C.R.
A allegations levelled by the complainant against the accused,
specially in respect of the five appellants herein, are not
relatable to territorial jurisdiction in India, under the provisions
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
B 17. Our deliberations in the preceding paragraphs are
based on the facts of the present case, as also, the offences
which have been incorporated in the impugned summoning
order. We would have had to examine the scope of Section 2
of the Indian Penal Code, which constitutes the plank on which
C submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants rest. But that
may not really be necessary, as our research lead us to the
decision rendered by this Court in Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The
State of Bombay (1958) SCR 328. This Court in the aforesaid
judgment held as under:-
D "(24) It would be desirable at this stage to notice certain
well-recognised concepts of International Law bearing on
such a situation. Wheaton in his book on Elements of
International Law (Fourth Edition) at page 183, dealing with
criminal jurisdiction states as follows:
E
"By the Common Law of England, which has been
adopted, in this respect, in the United States, criminal
offences are considered as altogether local, and are
justiciable only by the courts of that country where the
offence is committed."
F
At page 182 thereof it is stated as follows :
"The judicial power of every independent State,
extends (with the qualifications mentioned earlier) to the
G punishment of all offences against the municipal laws of the
State, by whomsoever committed, within the territory."
In Hackworth's Digest of International Law (1941 Edition),
Vol.II, at page 188 there is reference to opinions of certain
eminent American Judges. It is enough to quote the
H following dictum of Holmes J. noticed therein :
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 319
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to A
produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify
a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had
been present at the effect, if the State should succeed in
getting him within its power."
B
In Hyde's International Law (Second Edition), Vol.I, at page
798, the following quotation from the judgment of the
permanent Court of International Justice dated September
7, 1927, in the case relating to S.S. Lotus (Publications,
Permanent Court of International Justice, Series A, Nos.10,
23) is very instructive : C
"It is certain; that the courts of many countries, even
of countries which have given their criminal legislation a
strictly territorial character, interpret criminal law in the
sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment D
of commission are in the territory of another State, are
nevertheless to be regarded as having been committed
in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements
of the offence, and more especially its effects, have taken
place there." E
This quotation is also noticed in Openheim's International
Law (Eighth Ed.), Vol.I at page 332 in the footnote. In
noticing the provisions of International Law in this context
we are conscious that what we have to deal with in the
present case is a question merely of municipal law and not F
of any International Law. But as is seen above, the
principles recognized in International Law in this behalf are
virtually based on the recognition of those principles in the
municipal law of various countries and is really part of the
general jurisprudence relating to criminal responsibility G
under municipal law. No doubt some of the above dicta
have reference to offences actually committed outside
the State by foreigners and treated as offences committed
within the State by specific legislation. But the principle
H
320 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A emerging therefrom is clear that once it is treated as
committed within the State, the fact that he is a foreigner
corporeally present outside at the time of such
commission is no objection to the exercise of municipal
jurisdiction under the Municipal law. This emphasizes the
B principle that exercise of criminal jurisdiction depends on
the locality of the offence and not on the nationality of the
alleged offender (except in a few specified cases such as
Ambassadors, Princes etc.).
25. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied on various
c passages in the judgment of Cockburn, C. J., in the well-
known case The Queen v. Keyn (Franconia's case)
[(1876) 2 Ex D 63]. Fourteen learned Judges participated
in that case and the case appears to have been argued
twice. Eight of them including Cockburn, C. J., formed the
D majority. Undoubtedly there are various passages in the
judgment of Cockburn, C. J., which prima facie seem
capable of being urged in favour of the appellant's
contention. In particular the following passage at p. 235
may be noticed:
E
"The question is not whether the death of the
deceased, which no doubt took place in a British ship, was
the act of the defendant in such ship, but whether the
defendant, at the time the act was done, was himself within
F British jurisdiction."
The learned Chief Justice, however, recognized at p. 237
that there were certain American decisions to the contrary.
Now the main debate in that case was whether the sea
upto three mile limit from the shore is part of British territory
G or whether in respect of such three mile limit only limited
and defined extraterritorial British jurisdiction extended
which did not include the particular criminal jurisdiction
under consideration. In respect of this question, as a result
of the judgment, the Parliament had to enact the Territorial
H Waters Jurisdiction Act, 1878 (41 & 42 Viet., c. 73) which
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 321
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
in substance overruled the view of the majority and of the A
learned Chief Justice on this point. The main principle of
criminal jurisdiction, however, relevant for our purpose was
enunciated in the minority judgment of Amphlett, J. A., at
p. 118, that "it is the locality of the offence that determines
the jurisdiction" implying by contrast that it is not the B
nationality of the offender.
26. The question, however, that still remains for
consideration is whether there is anything in the language
of the sections of the Indian Penal Code relating to the C
general scheme of the Code which compels the
construction that the various sections of the Penal Code
are not intended to apply to a foreigner who has committed
an offence in India while not being corporeally present
therein at the time. For this purpose we are not concerned
with such of the sections of the Penal Code, if any, which D
indicate the actual presence of the culprit as a necessary
ingredient of the offence. Of course, for such offences a
foreigner ex hypothesi not present at the time in India
cannot be guilty. The only general sections of the Indian
Penal Code which indicate its scheme in this behalf are E
Sections 2, 3, and 4 and as they stand at present, they are
as follows:
"2. Every person shall be liable to punishment under
this Code and not other.vise for every act or omission F
contrary to the provisions thereof, of which he shall be guilty
within India.
3. Any person liable, by any Indian Law, to be tried
for an offence committed beyond India shall be dealt with
according to the provisions of this Code for any act G
committed beyond India in the same manner as if such act
had been committed within India.
4.. The provisions of this Code apply also to any
offence committed by- H
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A (1) any citizen of India in any place without and
beyond India;
(2) any person on any ship or aircraft registered in
India wherever it may be.
B
Explanation:- In this section the word 'offence'
includes every act committed outside India which, if
committed in India, would be punishable under this Code."
Sections 3 and 4 deal with offences committed beyond the
c territorial limits of India and Section 2 obviously and by
contrast refers to offences committed within India. It
appears clear that it is Section 2 that has to be looked to
determine the liability and punishment of persons who
have committed offences within India. The section
D asserts categorically that every person shall be liable to
punishment under the Code for evety act or omission
contrary to the provisions of the Code and of which he
shall be guilty within India. This recognises the general
principle of criminal jurisdiction over persons with
E reference to the locality of the offence committed by them,
being within India. The use of the phrase "evety person"
in Section 2 as contrasted with the use of the phrase "any
person" in Section 3 as well as Section 4 (2) of the Code
is indicative of the idea that to the extent that the guilt for
an offence committed within India can be attributed to a
F
person, evety such person without exception is liable for
punishment under the Code. Learned counsel for the
appellant suggests that the phrase "within India" towards
the end of Section 2 must be read with the phrase "every
person" at the commencement thereof. But this is far-
G
fetched and untenable. The plain meaning of the phrase
"every person" is that it comprehends all persons without
limitation and irrespective of nationality, allegiance, rank,
status, caste, colour or creed. This section must be
understood as comprehending every pers·on without
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 323
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
exception barring such as may be specially exempt from A
criminal proceedings or punishment thereunder by virtue
of the Constitution (See Article 361 (2) of the Constitution)
or any statutory provisions or some well-recognised
principle of international law, such as foreign sovereigns,
ambassadors, diplomatic agents and so forth, accepted B
in the municipal law.
27. Learned counsel drew our attention to a number of
sections in the Penal Code, viz., Sections 108-A, 177, 203,
212, 216, 216-A and 236. The argument based on
reference to these sections is that wherever the legislature C
in framing the Penal Code wanted to legislate about
anything that has reference to something done outside
India it has specifically said so and that therefore it may
be expected that if it was intended that the Penal Code
would refer to a person actually present outside India at D
the time of the commission of the offence, it would have
specifically said so. We are unable to accept this
argument. These sections have reference to particular
difficulties which arose with reference to what may be
called, a related offence being committed in India in the E
context of the principal offence itself having been
committed outside India - that is for instance, abetment,
giving false information and harbouring within India in
respect of offences outside India. Questions arose in such
cases as to whether any criminal liability would arise with F
reference to the related offence, the principal offence itself
not being punishable in India and these sections were
intended to rectify the lacunae. On the other hand, a
reference to Section 3 of the Code clearly indicates that it
is implicit therein that a foreigner who commits an offence G
within India is guilty and can be punished as such without
any limitation as to his corporeal presence in India at the
time. For if it were not so, the legal fiction implicit in the
phrase "as if such act had been committed within India" in
Section 3 would not have been limited to the supposition H
324 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A that such act had been committed within India, but would
have extended also to a fiction as to his physical presence
at the time in India.
28. In the argument before us, there has been some
debate as to what exactly is the implication of the clause
B
"of which he shall be guilty within India" in Section 2 of
the Code. It is unnecessary to come to any definite
conclusion in respect thereto. But it is clear that it does
not support the contention of the appellant's counsel. We
have, therefore, no doubt that on a plain readif!g of
c Section 2 of the Penal Code, the Code does apply to a
foreigner who has committed an offence within India
notwithstanding that he was corporeally present outside.
D
32. After giving our careful consideration to the questions
raised before us, we are clearly of the opinion that even
on the assumption that the appellant has ceased to be
an Indian citizen and was a Pakistani national at the time
of the commission of the offence, he must be held guilty
E
and punished under the Indian Penal Code
notwithstanding his not being corporeally present in India
at the time." (emphasis is ours)
We are in respectful agreement with the conclusion drawn in
F Mobarik Ali Ahmed's case (supra). It is unnecessary for us to
again repeat the same. In view of the above, we are satisfied
that all components of the submissions advanced on behalf of
the appellants, more particularly their foreign nationality, their
residence outside India, and the fact that they were not present
G in India when the offence(s) was/were allegedly committed, are
of no consequence, in view of the aforesaid decision rendered
by this Court. We, therefore, find no merit in the first contention
advanced on behalf of the appellants in the instant case, that
the Court of the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate could
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 325
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
not have entertained the complaint filed by JCE Consultancy A
against the appellants.
18. Another allied submission (the second submission),
advanced on the same lines as the first contention was, that
consequent upon the passing of goods/product to Samsung, B
Dubai, S.C. Baek (accused no. 7) is said to have paid the
consideration amount through a bill of exchange. It was
submitted, that even as per the averments made by the
complainant-JCE Consultancy, the aforesaid bill of exchange
was executed by S.C. Baek in Dubai. And as such, that liability
under the aforesaid bill of exchange would ensue only at Dubai. C
It was also contended, that the aforesaid bill of exchange was
allegedly drawn on behalf of Samsung, Dubai, which is a
company registered at Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates).
According to the learned counsel representing the appellants
herein, even the consideration, as per the averments made in D
the complaint, was liable to pass from Samsung, Dubai, to Sky
lmpex Limited at Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates). It is
submitted, that thereafter the said bill of exchange came to be
settled between the executor thereof (Samsung, Dubai) and the
beneficiary thereunder (Sky lmpex Limited), inasmuch as, Sky E
lmpex Limited, consequent upon the settlement of the said bill
of exchange, allegedly executed a credit note in favour of
Samsung, Dubai on 22.6.2002. This credit note was also
allegedly executed at Dubai. It is further submitted, that the
aforesaid bill of exchange was stated to have been endorsed F
in favour of the complainant by Sky lmpex Limited. This
endorsement, according to the learned counsel for the
appellants, was also made at Dubai (in the United Arab
Emirates). As such, it was contended by the learned counsel
for the appellants, that even the passing of consideration in G
furtherance of the alleged contract dated 1.12.2001, took place
beyond the territorial barriers of India. It was, therefore, asserted
on behalf of the appellants, that Courts in India, by no stretch
of imagination, can have jurisdiction over the matter.
H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A 19. It is not necessary for us to re-examine the issue
projected at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellants,
in terms of the factual position noticed in the foregoing
paragraph, because the instant submission, is in sum and
substance, exactly akin to the one raised on behalf of the
B appellants as their primary submission. Having threadbare
examined the primary contention, we are satisfied in rejecting
the instant contention of the appellants, for exactly the same
reasons which had weighed with us while dealing with the
primary contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
c 20. The third submission advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants was, that the complaint
lodged by JCE Consultancy was based on an agreement dated
1.12.2001. The aforesaid agreement was between JCE
Consultancy and Sky lmpex Limited. It was submitted, that the
D appellants herein are not privy to the aforesaid contract/
agreement. Accordingly, it was contended, that the grievance
of the complainant, if any, could have been raised only as
against Sky lmpex Limited. It was asserted, that the appellants
are independent of the persons who are privy to the agreement
E dated 1.12.2001. It is asserted, that only such persons who are
privy to the contract/agreement dated 1.12.2001, can be
proceeded against for breach of the same. Stated differently,
it is contended , that even if the parties to the contract/
agreement dated 1.12.2001 had breached the same, the
F appellants could not be held liable therefor. Accordingly, it is
asserted, that the appellants herein having no role to play under
the contract/agreement dated 1.12.2001, have been wrongfully
involved in the controversy by the complainant-JCE
Consultancy.
G
21. Having perused the pleadings filed before this Court,
and having heard the learned counsel for the complainant-JCE
Consultancy, as also, Sky lmpex Limited, it becomes necessary
for us to record their respective stances in respect of the
H involvement of the five appellants, with the allegations made by
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 327
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
JCE Consultancy. First and foremost, it is necessary to A
mention, that in the complaint filed by JCE Consultancy, it was
expressly averred in paragraph 1, that all the appellants herein
were involved in "each and every act done by the company"
(Samsung, Dubai). In the statement recorded under Section
200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Shaikh Allauddin Paker B
Maiddin on 7.1.2005 deposed, that the appellants herein were
individually and jointly liable for the commission of offences
emerging from the complaint. How they were liable (if at all), is
a question of evidence, which would emerge only after evidence
is recorded by the trial court. But what is interesting is, that Sky C
lmpex Limited, though an accused in the complaint filed by JCE
Consultancy, has totally supported the accusation(s) levelled by
the complainant against the appellants. In a detailed response
to the culpability of the appellants herein, Sky lmpex Limited has
adopted a firm stance, wherein it has averred as under:-
D
"10. It is submitted that the applicant, through other group
companies Sky lmpex Isle of Man, had been conducting
business with petitioner/accused since the year 1999.
Various other bills of exchange had been drawn by the
applicant and accepted by S.C. Baek-accused with E
complete authority vested in him via Board resolutions
issued by petitioner/accused and substantiated by
petitioner/accused through Board resolution of their parent
company in South Korea.
F
11. It is further pertinent to mention here that the applicant
also had been involved in a bonafide discounting of bill
numbers SM 4B for USO 2,550,432 (Rs.11 crores approx.)
and SM 3B for USO 2,448,340 (Rs.11 crores approx.)
maturing July 20th, 2002 with Bankhaus Wolbern in G
Germany and HSBC Bank (Hong Kong and Shangai
Bank) in London/Dubai, which bills had been duly accepted
by petitioner/accused with full knowledge of petitioner/
accused, based at the head office in South Korea. It is
submitted that in one of the cases, on July 24, 2002
H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A Bankhaus Wolbern a bank in Germany, to whom the bills
were endorsed by the applicant in 2002 made a demand
for payment of bill numbers SM 4B and SM 38 to the office
of petitioner/accused in South Korea as petitioner/
accused was trying to renegade on their bonafide
B obligation to discharge the bills in their capacity as the
acceptor. The bank after making their investigations
concluded that operational control of these transactions
were vested with the offices of the petitioner/accused in
Seoul, South Korea and accordingly issued threat for legal
action to the petitioner/accused at their Head Office in
c Seoul, to black list the Samsung Group. A true copy of the
said letter dated July 24th, 2002 is being filed as Annexure
A-8. It is submitted that within a short time span of
receiving the said letters from Bankhaus Wolbern, USO
3.6 million (Rs.16.2 crores) the bills were paid by accused
D No. 1 through Emirates International Bank transfer signed
jointly by accused no. 5 and to Bankhaus Wolbern on Aug.
14, 2002. A true copy of said transaction is being filed as
Annexure A-9 ...... .
E 12. It is submitted that in Nov. 2003 HSBC Bank Dubai
was paid USO 4.85 million (approx. 21.8 crores) by
accused no. 1 through bani< transfer from Emirates Bank
International instructions to discharge bill numbers SM 2A
for USO 2,440,925 (approx. 11 crores) - drawn July 8th,
F 2002, No. SM 17 for USO 1,038, 725 (approx. 4.6 crores)
drawn July 14th, 2002 and No. SM 18 for USO 1,095,070
(approx. 5 crores) drawn July 14, 2002. It is submitted that
these bills of exchange were from the same series as the
bill of exchange drawn by the applicant and accepted by
G Mr. S.C. Baek (accused no. 6) that is now the subject of
the criminal case filed at Ghaziabad by the complainant/
respondent. These bills were endorsed to HSBC Bank in
London and were duly and legally paid by accused number
1 under instructions from the office of the petitioner/
accused under whose orders other set of bills amounting
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 329
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
to USO 3.6 million (16.2 crores) had been paid by A
accused no. 1 as indicated in para 11 above. The transfer
instructions were duly signed jointly by accused no. 5, the
Managing Director of accused no. 1 alongside accused
Mr. S.C. Baek. The documents including the bills of
exchange, and the instructions to remit are money are B
collectively filed and marked as Annexure A-
10 .................... .
It is quiet apparent that had the bills really been part of a
criminal enterprise, as alleged, no corporation big or small C
would voluntarily pay out without protest or demur, these
sums to the tune of approximately 18 crores to Bankhaus
Wolbern in Germany and 21.8 crores to HSBC in Dubai.
It would be pertinent to mention here that the bills to
Bankhaus Wolbern were paid in August 2002 almost 18
months before the police complaint was filed in Dubai on D
January 7th, 2004 against the applicant and accused no.
6, Mr. S.C. Baek who continued in his job as Financial
Controller with accused no. 1 right until Dec. 2003 i.e.
sixteen (16) months after the bills were paid to Bankhaus
Wolbern by accused no. 5 the Managing Director of E
accused no. 1." (the term applicant in the extract, is a
reference to Sky lmpex Limited; and the term petitioner/
accused, is a reference to the appellants).
Even though it was wholly unnecessary for us to examine, at F
the present juncture, the involvement or the culpability of the
appellants herein, in the background of the accusations levelled
by JCE Consultancy, and the supporting stance of Sky lmpex
Limited, we are of the view, that even the pleadings before us,
prima facie demonstrate the connectivity of the appellants, with G
the foundational basis expressed in the complaint. We are,
therefore, satisfied, at the present juncture, that it is undesirable
to exculpate the appellants from the proceedings initiated by
JCE Consultancy before the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ghaziabad. Needless to mention, that the issue H
330 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A under reference may be reagitated, after evidence has been
produced by the rival parties before the trial court.
22. The fourth contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants was aimed at demonstrating;
firstly, that the charges, as have been depicted in the
8
summoning order, were not made out; secondly, that the
appellants herein were functionaries of a company, and
therefore, per se could not be made vicariously liable for
offences emerging out of actions allegedly taken in furtherance
C of the discharge of their responsibilities towards the company;
and thirdly, that none of the appellants had any concern
whatsoever (even as functionaries of the concerned company),
with the allegations levelled by the complainant. To the credit
of the learned counsel representing the appellants, we must
place on record, that reliance was placed on legal precedent,
D to substantiate the aforesaid submissions. We are however of
the view, that it is not necessary for us at the present juncture
to deal with any of the aforesaid submissions, in view of the
legal position expressed by this Court in its recent judgment in
Iridium India Telecom Limited vs. Motorola Incorporated and
E others, (2011) 1 SCC 74, wherein while examining a matter
similar to the one in hand, this Court examined at great length,
not only the scope of interference under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (including that under Articles 226
and 227 of the Constitution of India), but also, the culpability of
F a body corporate/company, including its functionaries, in
respect of criminal charges. The only difference between the
present controversy, and the one adjudicated upon by this
Court in Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra) is, that
while in the present controversy the accused have approached
G this Court, consequent upon the denial of reliefs sought from
the High Court; in Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra)
the claim raised by the accused had been accepted by the High
Court, whereupon, the complainant had approached this Court.
The submissions which came to be dealt with by this Court in
H Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra), at the behest of
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 331
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the complainant party, are summarized in paragraph 23, which A
is being reproduced hereunder:-
"23. The submissions made by Mr Jethmalani although
very elaborate, may be summed up as follows:
(1) The power to quash a criminal complaint that too B
at the stage of cognizance, is an extreme power, which
must be exercised very sparingly and with abundant
caution; that too in the rarest of rare cases.
(i1) In exercise of its power under Section 482, the c
High Court has to consider the complaint as a whole,
without examining the merits of the allegations i.e.
genuineness of the allegations is not to be examined at
this stage.
(iii) The complaint is not required to verbatim
D
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence. If the
necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint,
proceedings should not be quashed.
(iv) Quashing of a complaint is warranted only where E
the complaint is so bereft of even basic facts which are
absolutely necessary for making out an offence; that it
would be a miscarriage of justice to permit the
proceedings to continue.
F
(v) In support of the aforesaid submissions, Mr
Jethmalani has relied on the following judgments of this
Court: Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi
(1976) 3 SCC 736, MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi (1983)
1 SCC 1, Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar 1990
Supp. SCC 686 and State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 G
Supp.(1) sec 335."
In paragraphs 24 to 30, this Court in Iridium India Telecom
Limited's case (supra) noticed the facts pertaining to the
controversy, and the emerging legal technicalities canvassed H
332 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A at the hands of the appellants. In paragraph 31 to 37, this Court
recorded the response thereto, at the behest of the accused.
Thereupon, this Court in Iridium India Telecom Limited's case
(supra) made the following observations in paragraph 38 :-
"38. We have considered the submissions made by the
B
learned Senior Counsel. A bare perusal of the submissions
would be sufficient to amply demonstrate that this cannot
be said to be an "open and shut" case for either of the
parties. There is much to be said on both sides. The entire
scenario painted by both the sides is circumscribed by "ifs"
c and "buts". A mere reading of the 1992 PPM would not
be sufficient to conclude that the entire information has
been given to the prospective investors. Similarly, merely
because there may have been some gaps in the
information provided in the PPM would not be sufficient to
D conclude that the respondents have made deliberate
misrepresentations. In such circumstances, we have to
examine whether it was appropriate for the High Court to
exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to quash
the proceedings at the stage when the Magistrate had
E merely issued process against the respondents."
In paragraphs 39 to 51, this Court examined the parameters,
of the scope of exercise of jurisdiction in proceedings initiated
to quash criminal charges/proceedings, under Section 482 of
F the Code of Criminal Procedure (and/or under Articles 226 or
227 of the Constitution of India). In this behalf, reliance was
placed on past precedent including the decision rendered by
this Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp.(1)
SCC 335, wherein this Court inter alia held as under:-
G "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
H Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 333
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
reproduced above, we give the following categories of A
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible B
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
( 1) Where the allegations made in the first c·
information report or the complaint, even if they are taken
at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not
prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case
against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information D
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the
Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the
purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. E
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of
the same do not disclose the commission of any offence
and make out a case against the accused.
F
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable
offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer
without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under
Section 155(2) of the Code. G
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding H
334 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the
institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or
B
where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act
concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance
of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
c attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him
due to private and personal grudge.
D 103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be
exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that
too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be
justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability
or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
E
FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent
powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court
to act according to its whim or caprice."
While dealing with the various judgments rendered by this Court
F on the subject, reference was also made to the decision in M.N.
Ojha vs. Alok Kumar Srivastav, (2009) 9 SCC 682. In M.N.
Ojha's case (supra) similar views as in Bhajan Lat's case
0
(supra) came to be recorded in the following words:
G "25. Had the learned SDJM applied his mind to the facts
and circumstances and sequence of events and as well as
the documents filed by the complainant himself along with
the complaint, surely he would have dismissed the
complaint. He would have realised that the complaint was
only a counterblast to the FIR lodged by the Bank against
H
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 335
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the complainant and others with regard to the same A
transaction.
***
27. The case on hand is a classic illustration of non-
application of mind by the learned Magistrate. The learned B
Magistrate did not scrutinise even the contents of the
complaint, leave aside the material documents available
on record. The learned Magistrate truly was a silent
spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence
before summoning the appellants. C
28. The High Court committed a manifest error in
disposing of the petition filed by the appellants under
Section 482 of the Code without even adverting to the
basic facts which were placed before it for its 0
consideration.
29. lt is true that the Court in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure cannot go into \he truth or otherwise of the
allegations and appreciate the evidence if any available E
on record. Normally, the High Court would not intervene in
the criminal proceedings at the preliminary stage/when the
investigation/enquiry is pending.
30. Interference by the High Court in exercise of its F
jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure can only be where a clear case for such
interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled for
interference even at the preliminary stage by the High
Court may result in causing obstruction in the progress of G
the inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in the public
interest. But at the same time the High Court cannot refuse
to exercise its jurisdiction if the interest of justice so
required where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the H
336 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A basis of which no fair-minded and informed observer can
ever reach a just and proper conclusion as to the existence
of sufficient grounds for proceeding. In such cases refusal
to exercise the jurisdiction may equally result in injustice
more particularly in cases where the complainant sets the
B criminal law in motion with a view to exert pressure and
harass the persons arrayed as accused in the complaint."
In dealing with the issue under reference, this Court in Iridium
India Telecom Limited's case (supra) also examined the scope
of a body corporate/company being proceeded against in
C criminal cases, on the canvassed premise, that no mens rea
could be attributed to them, and as such, criminal action could
not be taken against them. For the said purpose reference was
made to the legal position on the subject prevailing in the
United Kingdom, the United States of America and Canada,
D and thereupon, this Court dealt with the declaration of the legal
position on the subject, at the hands of this Court. Whereupon,
its conclusion was recorded in pa1agraph 66 as under:
"66. These observations leave no manner of doubt that a
E company/corporation cannot escape liability for a criminal
offence merely because the punishment prescribed is that
of imprisonment and fine. We are of the considered
opinion that in view of the aforesaid judgment of this Court,
the conclusion reached by the High Court that the
F respondent could not have the necessary mens rea is
clearly erroneous."
In sum and substance, all the pleas canvassed on behalf of the
complainant (already extracted above) were upheld by this
Court in Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra).
G
23. Through the complaint, as also, in the statement of
Shaikh Allauddin Paker Maiddin recorded under Section 200
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, JCE Consultancy has
categorically asserted, that the appellants herein were jointly or
H severally liable to honour the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002,
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 337
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
which had been endorsed in its (JCE Consultancy's) favour. In A
order to demonstrate the appellant's liability, a series of
documents were also placed before the Trial Court. The Vllth
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, having considered the
said material, issued the summoning order. The culpability of
the appellants herein would obviously depend upon the B
evidence produced before the jurisdictional Court. It can
definitely be stated from the pleadings before this Court, that
one of the accused, namely, Sky lmpex Limited, has totally
supported the cause of the complainant-JCE Consultancy,
through its written reply. Relevant extracts of the said reply have c
already been reproduced hereinabove (during our deliberations
on the third contention). The situation which emerges, in the
case in hand, is similar to the one encountered by this Court in
Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra), wherein, this
Court on being confronted with the factual and legal position 0
was constrained to record, that the scenario painted by both
the sides is circumscribed by "ifs" and "buts". Herein also,
factual details emerging from the evidence to be produced by
the rival parties, would be necessary to project a clear picture.
It is only thereafter, that a rightful decision on this issue E
canvassed will be possible. As of now we are satisfied, that
the factual foundation/background of the acts of omission and
commission presented by the complainant is specific and
categoric. We are also satisfied that the allegations levelled by
the complainant, fully incorporate all the basic facts which are
necessary to make out the offences whereunder the impugned F
summoning order dated 12.1.2005 has been passed. The
instant controversy does not suffer from any of the impairments
referred in Iridium India Telecom Limited's case (supra).
Accordingly, we leave it open to the appellants to canvass the
legal issues, as were canvassed before us, before the trial G
court. After the rival parties have led their evidence, the trial
court will return its finding thereon, in accordance with law,
without being influenced by any observations made on the
merits of the controversy hereinabove, or hereafter.
H
338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 4 S.C.R.
A 24. The last contention advanced at the hands of the
learned counsel for the appellants, was based on the assertion,
that the complainant - JCE Consultancy had filed a civil suit
bearing Commercial Action No.482 of 2005 before the Court
of First Instance, Dubai, praying for the recovery of the amount
B depicted in the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002. It was
submitted, that in the pleadings of the aforesaid civil suit, there
was no allegation against the appellant~ tierein, depicting their
criminal involvement. It was the contention of the learned counsel
for the appellants, based on the averments mach:, in ground D
c (of the petition for special leave to appeal) filed before this
Court, that JCE Consultancy had lead evidence in the aforesaid
civil suit, whereupon, the said civil suit was dismissed on
24.9.2008. It is further asserted, that the Court of First Instance,
Dubai, while dismissing the civil suit had held, that the bill of
D exchange dated 1.2.2002 had nothing to do with the alleged
supply of goods, by the complainant-JCE Consultancy to Sky
lmpex Limited. It was also sought to be asserted, that the said
bill of exchange was merely an accommodation bill, to enable
the complainant-JCE Consultancy "to raise money, and to use
the bill of exchange as a collateral". It was further submitted,
E on behalf of the appellants, that the liability emerging out of the
bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002, can either have civil
consequences or criminal liability. The fact that the aforesaid
civil suit came to be filed at the behest of JCE Consultancy,
according to learned counsel, is an acknowledgement at the
F hands of the complainant (JCE Consultancy), that the liability
emerging out of the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002 was civil
in nature. As such, it was asserted at the hands of the learned
counsel for the appellants, that the very initiation of criminal
proceedings by the complainant, against the appellants herein,
G was misconceived. It is also contended, that the filing of the
criminal complaint by JCE Consultancy, must be deemed to be
an act emerging out of extraneous considerations, so as to
browbeat the appellants herein, and thereby, compel them to
succumb to the illegal demands of the complainant-JCE
H Consultancy. Additionally, it was submitted by the learned
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 339
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
counsel for the appellants, that in the civil claim raised by JCE A
Consultancy before the Court of First Instance, Dubai, from
amongst the appellants, only Samsung, Dubai, was impleaded
as a defendant, whereas, no action was initiated even for the
recovery of the dues under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002,
against the other four appellants herein. Based on the B
aforesaid factual and legal submissions, it was the contention
of the learned counsel for the appellants, that criminal
prosecution initiated by the complainant-JCE Consultancy
against the appellants herein, is liable to be quashed.
25. In response to the aforesaid averments made on C
behalf of the appellants, it was the contention of the learned
counsel for the respondents that the civil proceeding initiated
by JCE Consultancy in the Court of First Instance, Dubai, is still
pending in appeal. In this behalf, it was pointed out, that the
Dubai Appeals Court passed an order dated 21. 7 .2010 D
directing the reattachment of assets of the defendants in the
aforesaid civil suit, in the sum of Dhs.30 million (approximately
Rs.45 crores). A copy of the aforesaid order dated 21. 7.2010
has been appended to the reply filed by Sky lmpex Limited (to
the averments made in the petition for special leave to appeal) E
as Annexure A-11. It was submitted, that consequent upon the
passing of the order dated 21.7.2010, the Dubai Judicial
Administration executed the attachment of Dhs.30 million. In
order to substantiate the aforesaid factual position, Sky lmpex
Limited has appended to its reply Annexure A-12, a bank F
guarantee dated 22.9.2010, issued by Emirates Bank
International, on behalf of Samsung Dubai, in favour of JCE
Consultancy. It is also pointed out by the learned counsel for
the respondents, that an act of omission or commission at the
hands of a party, may lead to civil, as well as, criminal G
consequences. In this behalf, learned counsel for the
respondents also invited our attention to the order passed by
the Dubai Appeals Court dated 21.7.2010, wherein, it was
pointed out, that there was no connection between the criminal
action brought out by JCE Consultancy (in the proceedings H
340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R.
A initiated by it, before the Vllth Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Ghaziabad) and the civil suit filed by JCE
Consultancy (before the Court of First Instance, Dubai). It was
also the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents,
that the civil liability, in the instant case, was raised as against
B the eventual purchaser of the goods/product (Samsung, Dubai),
in lieu of the goods/product supplied by the complainant-JCE
Consultancy, which had passed onto the purchasers under the
agreement dated 1.12.2001. Accordingly, the civil liability was
only raised as against Samsung, Dubai. However, insofar as
C the criminal liability is concerned, Samsung Dubai being one
of the subsidiary companies of Samsung, South Korea, it was
allegedly under the overall control exercised by Samsung,
South Korea. Samsung, South Korea, according to the
complainant, was instrumental in the eventual decision taken
D by Samsung, Dubai, to deny the passing of the reciprocal
monetary consideration, for the goods supplied under the
agreement dated 1.12.2001. This, according to the
respondents, has been the categorical stance of JCE
Consultancy in the criminal complaint, as al$o, in the pre-
summoning evidence recorded before the Vllth Additional Chief
E Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad under Section 200 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure. These allegations made by JCE
Consultancy, are supported by documents furnished to the
summoning court. The aforesaid factual position has also been
endorsed by Sky lmpex Limited, before this Court. According
F to the learned counsel for the respondents, the culpability of the
appellants before this Court, in a series of similar actions,
clearly emerges even from documents placed on record of the
instant case, by Sky lmpex Limited. As such, it is submitted,
that the respondents have per se repudiated all the
G submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant, obviously
subject to the evidence which rival parties will be at liberty to
adduce before the trial court.
26. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the last
H contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for
LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 341
[JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J.]
the appellants. We are of the considered view, that in offences A
of the nature contemplated under the summoning order, there
can be civil liability coupled with criminal culpability. What a
party has been deprived of by an act of cheating, can be
claimed through a civil action. The same deprivation based on
denial by way of deception, emerging from an act of cheating, B
would also attract criminal liability. In the course of criminal
prosecution, a complainant cannot seek a reciprocal relief, for
the actions of the accused. As in the instant case, the monetary
consideration under the bill of exchange dated 1.2.2001, cannot
be claimed in the criminal proceedings, for that relief the c
remedy would be only through a civil suit. It is therefore not
possible for us to accept, that since a civil claim has been
raised by the complainant-JCE Consultancy, based on the
alleged breach of the agreement dated 1.12.2001, it can be
prevented from initiating proceedings for penal consequences
0
for the alleged offences committed by the accused under the
Indian Penal Code. It would not be appropriate for us, to delve
into the culpability of the appellants at the present juncture, on
the basis of the factual position projected by the rival parties
before us. The culpability (if at all) would emerge only after
evidence is adduced by the rival parties before the trial court. E
The only conclusion that needs to be drawn, at the present
juncture is, that even on the basis of the last submission
canvassed on behalf of the appellants, it is not possible to
quash the summoning order at this stage. In the aforesaid view
of the matter, it is left open to the appellants to raise their F
objections, if they are so advised, before the trial court. The trial
court shall, as it ought to, adjudicate upon the same in
consonance with law, after allowing the rival parties to lead
evidence to substantiate their respective positions.
G
27. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no
merit in the instant appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
H
Search Indian case law
Ask in plain English, not just keywords. 25,000 AI words free, no card.
Try "territorial jurisdiction"Sign in to search