Holding

Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, as it stood before its 1984 amendment, is a substantive provision that limits a court’s award to not exceed the claimant’s claimed amount and is not retrospective; therefore the amendment does not apply and compensation cannot exceed the claim.

Summary

The land of the respondents was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; the Collector awarded Rs 11,000 per acre while the claimants demanded Rs 30,000‑30,000 per acre. A reference court fixed the market value at Rs 75,000 per acre but, relying on the pre‑1984 Section 25, limited compensation to the amount claimed. The Andhra Pradesh High Court Division Bench held Section 25 to be procedural, applied the post‑1984 amendment and enhanced compensation to Rs 1,00,000 per acre. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether Section 25 is procedural or substantive and whether the amendment applies retrospectively. It held that the pre‑amendment Section 25 is a substantive provision that caps the court’s award at the claimant’s claim and is not retrospective; consequently the amendment does not apply. The Court set aside the High Court’s award, limited compensation to Rs 30,000 per acre, allowed the civil appeals and dismissed the writ petition under Article 32.

Issues considered

Whether Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (pre‑amendment) is a procedural or substantive provision.
Whether the amended provision of Section 25 (post‑Act 68 of 1984) applies retrospectively to cases where the Collector’s award predates the amendment.
Whether the decision in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal is correct.
Whether the Supreme Court should lay down the law yet refrain from interfering with the High Court’s judgment on compensation.
Whether a petition under Article 32 can be entertained to challenge the validity of the unamended Section 25.

Legislation cited

Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 25, s. 30(2), s. 9

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationSection 25Substantive provisionProcedural provisionRetrospective legislationAmendmentArticle 32ValuationCourt jurisdiction

Judgment

LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P.
v.
B.V. REDDY AND SONS

FEBRUARY 14, 2002

[G.B. PATTANAIK, S.N. PHUKAN AND S.N. VARIAVA, JJ.] B

land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 25 (as it stood prior lo its amendment
by Act 68 of I 984).

Land Acquisition-Amount ofcompensation-Maximum limit-Held, The c
compensation cannot be in excess of the amount claimed by the claimant but
in no case would it be less than that awarded by the Collector under S.9.

Section 25-Nature of-Procedural or substantive-Held, ls substantive
in nature.
D
Interpretation of Statutes:

Substantive provision -Prospective or retrospective-Held, A substantive
provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself so
indicates.

The land belonging to the respondents was acquired and compensation E
paid at a certain amount per acre, which was less than that claimed by the
respondents-daimants. The Reference Court determined the market value of
the acquired land at much higher amount but restricted the quantum of
compensation to the extent claimed by the respondents in view of Section 25
of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as it stood prior to its amendment by Act F
68 of 1984. A Single Judge of the High Court upheld the decision of the
• Reference Court But the Division Bench enhanced the compensation to the
market value on the ground that Section 25 of the Act being procedural in
nature there was no bar for awarding compensation more than the amount
claimed by the respondent-claimant. Hence this appeal.
G
On behalf of the appellant it was contended that Section 25 of the Act
was substantive in nature and not procedural and that the High Court erred
in applying the amended provision of Section 25 of the Act in awarding
compensation more than the amount claimed.

On behalf of the respondents it was contended that this Court while H
1041
1042 SUPREME COliRT REPORTS (2001] I <;.C.R.

A declaring the law and pointing out the error in the judgment of the High Court
should not interfere with the High Court's judgment in the inter~~t of justice.
~
......
The following question of law arose before this Court:

(1) Can the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894
B be construed to be procedural in nature or is substantive?

(2) If it is held to be substantive in nature, then can the amended
provisions of Section 25 of the Act would apply to a case where the award of
the Land Acquisition Collector had been made much prior to the amendment
~
in question?
c (3) Whether the judgment of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti 's
case can be held to be correctly decided?

(4) Whether at all it would be appropriate for this Court to lay down
the law and yet not to interfere with the judgment of the Division Bench of
D the High Court with regard to the quantum of compensation awarded?

(S) Whether the petition under Article 32 can be entertained for deciding
the validity of the unamended provisions of Section 25? •
Allowing the 11ppeals, the Court

E HELD : t. t. On a plain reading of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition
Act, 1894 it is difficult to hold that it is procedural in nature. On the other
hand, it unequivocally limit~ the power of the Court on a reference beine made
to award compensation, more than the amount claimed by the claimants and
less than the amount awarded by the Collector. In other words, the substantive
right of a claimant who has made a claim to the compensation, pursuant to
F a notice under Section 9, cannot be more than the amount claimed and under •
any circumstances, ·would not be less than the amount which the Land
Acquisition Collector has awarded under Section 11, since that award of the
Collector is the offer that is made to the claimant. [1049-B-CJ

1.2. Section 25(5) of the Act contemplates a situation where the claimant
G
for sufficient reason had omitted to make a claim and the Reference Court
.on being satisfied about the same may permit the claim~nt to make a claim. )
But the unambiguous and clear language of Section 25(1), as it stood prior to .
... the amendment, makes it explicitly clear that if the c;aimant bas made a claim
pursuant to a notice under Section 9, then the Court would be incompetent
H to award any amount exceeding the said claim. (1049-E-FJ
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P. v. B.V. REDDY 1043
1.3. The provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is A
substantive in nature. [1050-AI

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal, [2000] 7 SCC 756, affirmed.

2.1. It is a well settled principle of construction that a substantive
provision cannot be retrospective in nature unless the provision itself indicates B
the same. The amended provision of Section 25 nowhere indicates that the
same would have any retrospective effect. Consequently, therefore, it would
apply to all acquisitions made subsequent to 24-9-1984, the date on which Act
68/1984 came into force. [1050-B]
2.2. The question of applicability of the amended provisions of Section C
25 of the Act to an award of the Collector made earlier to the amendment
and the matter was pending in appeal does not arise. The amended provisions
of Sertion 25 of the Act, not being retrospective in nature, the case in hand
would be governed by the unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act.
[1050-F)
D
Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, held inapplicable.

3. The amended provision of Section 25 of the Act under which there is
• no restriction that the award would only be up to the amount claimed by the
claimant would not be applicable. Section 30(2) of the Act has absolutely no
relevance or connection with the provisions of Section 25 of the Land E
Acquisition Act. [1050-Hl

Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhiya Lal, [2000] 7 SCC 756,
disapproved.

Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989] 2 SCC 754, relied on.
F
4.1. On the date the land was notified for acquisition under Section 4(1)
of the Act, the unamended provision of Section 25 was in force and it was
made known to all concerned that the Reference Court will have no power
to award the amount in excess of the amount claimed by the claimants. Not
only the language of the Statue was clear and unambiguous, but also the G
question was not res integra. [1051-DI

Dadoo Yogendrenath Singh v. Collector, AIR (1977) SC 1128, relied on.

4.2. Until the statutory rigour contained in Section 25(1) stood
obliterated by the amended provisions of Section 25 and until all restraints
and embargoes placed for the Court stood totally liberated the Reference H
1044 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A Court had no jurisdiction to award the amount in excess of the amount
claimed by the claimant. [1051-EJ

4.3. The High Court had no jurisdiction on the law as it stood to award
any amount in excess of the amount claimed and, therefore, it is not possible
to accept the contention of the respondent that it would not be in the interest
B of justice to interfere with the judgment of the High Court. (1051-G)

Teherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad, [1999) 2 SCC 635, held
inapplicable.

5. The validity of the unamended provision of Section 25 of the Land
Acquisition Act which was there on the statute book since inception cannot
C at all be examined at a point of time when that provision no longer subsists
since 24-9-1984, the date on which Act 68/1984 came into force. Hence, the
petition under Article 32 at the behest of the claimants cannot be entertained.
[1052-AI
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9521-22
D of 1995.
From the Judgment and Order dated 16.4.90 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in L.P.A. Nos. 351 and 352 of 1989.
•
WITH
E W.P. (CJ No. 349 of 2001.
Guntur Prabhakar for the Appellant.

P.P. Rao, Rajani K. Prasad and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
F PATTANAIK, J. These appeals are directed against the judgment of
Andhra Pradesh High Court in Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 351 and 352 of
1989. The land in question measuring 3.42 acres was acquired for construction
of houses for Tribals and Harijans by issuance of notification under Section
4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, published on 9.6.1976. A second Notification
G was issued under said Section 4 to acquire an extent of 1.06 acres by
publication of Notification dated 27.12.1976. The Land Acquisition Officer
determined the market value of the acquired land @ Rs. 11,000 per acre by
his award dated 31.2.1977. Before the Land Acquisition Officer. the land
owners had daimed compensation@ Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 30,000 per acre. On
a reference being made under Section 18 of the Act, the Civil Court determined
H the market value of the acquired land at Rs. 75,000 per acre, but granted
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P. v. BV. REDDY [PA TTANAIK, J.] } 045

compensation @ Rs. 30,000 per acre in view of Section 25 of the Act, as it A
stood prior to its amendment in the year 1984 and as the owners had claimed
@ Rs. 30,000 per acre. On appeal being carried, the learned Single Judge
also came to the conclusion that the market value of the land would be Rs.
75,000 per acre, but did not enhance the compensation in view of the un-
amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act and in view of the fact that the B
owners had claimed only Rs. 30,000 per acre before the Land Acquisition
Officer. The matter being carried to the Division Bench in Letters Patent
Appeal, the Division Bench came to the conclusion that Section 25 being
procedural in nature and the amendment having been made while the appeal
was pending, the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition
Act would apply and since under the amended provisions, there is no bar for C
awarding compensation more than the amount claimed by the claimants and
the only embargo being that the amount shall not be awarded less than the
amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, the Court would be
justified in enhancing the compensation if the market value is determined at
a higher rate. On the question of determination of market value, the Division
Bench, taking into consideration Exhibits B-3, B-4 and B-7, came to hold D
that the market value of the acquired land would be Rs. one lakh per acre.
The appeals having been allowed with the aforesaid conclusions, .the State is
in appeal before this Court.
Mr. Guntur Prabhakar, the kamed counsel appearing for the appellant
contended that the Division Bench of the High Court committed serious error E
in holding that Section 25 is procedural in nature and thereby applying the
amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act. According to him, the provisions
of Section 25 mandates the parameters within which the Court is required to
determine the amount of compensation and the act of awarding of
compensation or curtailing, restricting or adding to such right can never be F
held to be procedural in nature. According to the learned counsel the language
itself reveals that it is substantive in nature and it has been so held by this
-. Court in the case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti v. Kanhaiya Lal and Ors.,
Vol. (2000] 7 SCC 756. That being the position, the substantive right of the
party would be governed by the un-amended provisions of Section 25 of the
Act. Consequently, it is urged that the claimants having claimed only G
Rs. 30,000 per acre, the Court will not be entitled to grant compensation
beyond the amount claimed. According to Mr. Prabhakar, the Division Bench
of the Andhra Pradesh High Court committed serious error of law, which has
vitiated the ultimate conclusion.
Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned senior counsel appearing for the claimants- H
1046 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S C.R.

' A respondents on the other hand contended that the lawyer for the claimants
without any authority from the claimants, made the application, even before
the notice had been served on the claimants and in such an application,
mentioned the claim at the rate of Rs. 30,000 per acre and such a claim
cannot be held to be a claim made by the claimants, within the ambit of the
B un-amended provisions of Section 25( I) of the Act. Mr. Rao further contended
that the very fact, the Parliament amended Section 25 of the Act and took
away the earlier embargo with regard to the quantum of compensation, limiting
the same to the amount claimed by the claimants is indicative of the legislative
intent. That being the position and the Court having determined the market
value of the acquired land at Rs. one ~akh per acre, there is no justification
C to deny that amount to the claimants, since under Article 31 of the Constitution,
no person can be deprived of his property, save by the authority of law. Mr.
Rao further submitted that the unamended provisions of Section 25 is ultra
vires and such a prayer has been made in the writ petition filed by the
claimants under Article 32 of the Constitution. Mr. Rao lastly submitted that
in the peculiar facts of this case, even if this Court may detlare the law and
D point out the error in the Division Bench Judgment of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court, yet ends of justice would not require interference with the
judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in exercise of power under •
Article 136 of the Constitution. In support of this contention. reliance was
placed on the decision of this Court in Taherakhatoon v. Salambin Mohammad,
E [1999] 2 sec 635.

Before embarking upon an inquiry as to the correctness of the contentions
raised, it would be appropriate to not11:e the provision~ of Section 25 of the
• Land Acquisition Act, as it stood prior to its amendment and the provisions
of the Land Acquisition Act, as it stand subseque1.t to the amendment.
F
"Section 25, prior to its amendment by Act 68 of 1984:

'25. Rules a~ to amount of Compensation- O) When the applicant has
made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given under
Section 9, the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not exceed
G the amount so claimed or be less than the amount awarded by the
Collector under Section 11.
)

(4) When the applicant has refused to make such claim or has omitted
without sufficient reason (to be allowed by the Judge) to make such
claim, the amount awarded by the Court shall in no case exceed the
H amount awarded by the Collector.
LAND ACQUISITl0N OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, AP v. B.Y. REDDY [PATTANAIK, J] JQ47

(5) When th.: applicant has omitted for a sufficient reason (to be A
allowed by the Judge) to make such claim, the amount awarded to
him by the Court shall not be less than, and may exceed the amount
awarded by the Collector."

Section 25 after the amendment:-
B
"Section 25. Amount of compensation by Court not be lower than the
amount awarded by the Collector:- The amount of compensation
awarded by the Court shall not be less than the amount awarded by
the Collector under Section 11."

At this stage it would be proper to notice the scheme of the Act itself. After c
publication of preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Act and causing
pubic notice of the substance of such notification by the Collector, objections
are entertained and heard, as provided under Section SA of the Act. The
Appropriate Government then becomes satisfied that the land is needed for
public purpose and a declaration to that effect is made under Section 6 of the
Act Such declaration is the conclusive evidence that the land is needed for D
a public purpose. The Appropriate Government or the officer authorised by
• the Appropriate Government directs the Collector to take order for the
acquisition of the land, as provided under Section 7 and the Collector then
cause the land to be marked and measured and also he is supposed to make
a plan of the same. The Collector thereafter cause public notice to be given E
at convenient places on or near the land, stating that the Government intends
to take possession of the land and that claims to compensation for all interests
in such land may be made to him, as provided under Section 9. The notice
under Section 9(1 ) must state the necessary particulars, as provided under
sub-section (2) of said Section and the Collector then serves notice on the
occupier of the land as well as on all such persons known or believed to be F
interested therein or would be entitled to act for persons so interested, or
agents authorised to receive service on their behalf within the revenue district
in which the land is situate. In case the person interested resides elsewhere
and has no such agent, the notice is required to be sent to him by post in a
letter addressed to him at his last known address, under sub-section (4) of
G
Section 9. Section 11 confers power on the Collector to hold an inquiry with
'>I regard to the measurements made as well as inquiry to the valuation of the
land on the date of Notification under Section 4(1) and thereafter it shall
make an Award under his hand. Such Award of the Collector is required to
be filed in the Collector's Office and under law is held to be final and
conclusive evidence, as between the Collector and the persons interested on H
1048 SUPREME COURT RHORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A the question of true area and value of the land and apportionment of the
compensation among the persons interested. We are not concerned with other
provisions except Section 18 and Section 25. Section 18 entitles the person
interested who has not accepted the award to make a written application to
the Collector, requiring that the matter of determination of compensation be
B referred to a competent Court. Section 25 however, as it stood prior to its
amendment by Act 68 of 1984, puts an embargo to the effect that if an
applicant has made a claim to compensation, pursuant to any notice given
under Section 9, then the amount awarded to him by the Court shall not
exceed the amount so claimed and shall not be less than the amount awarded
by the Collector under Section 11. The aforesaid provision contained in sub-
C section (I) of Section 25, thus limits the power of the reference Court on a
reference being made under Section 18 to the quantum of compensation
which could be awarded.

When these appeals had been listed before a Bench of two learned
Judges of this Court, the decision of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi
D Samiti, (2000) 7 SCC 756, had been placed before the Bench and it was
contended that since the award in the case in hand is between 30th of
September, 1982 and 24th of September, 1984, the compensation could be •
awarded under the amended provisions of Section 25. Since that decision
prima facie supported the contention of the claimants-respondents and the
E Bench was of the view that the said decision requires re-consideration, the
matter had been referred to a Bench of three learned Judges and that is how
the matter has been placed before us. On the rival submissions made by the
counsel for the parties, the following questions arise for our consideration:

(I) Can the provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act be
F construed to be procedural in nature or is substantive?

(2) If it is held to be substantive in nature, then can the amended
provisions of Section 25 of the Act would apply to a case where
the award of the Land Acquisition Collector had been made much
prior to the amendment in question?
G (3) Whether the Judgment of this Court in Krishi Utpadan Mandi ' -
Sam1ti's case can be held to be correctly decided? .,,
(4) Whether at all it would be appropriate for this Court to lay down
the law and yet not to interfere with the judgment of the Division
Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court with regard to the quantum
H of compensation awarded?
LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P. v. B.V. REDDY [PATTANAIK, J.] } 049

(5) Whether the petition under Article 32 can be entertained for A
deciding the validity of un-amended provisions of Section 25?

So far as the first question is concerned, on a plain reading of the same, it
is difficult for us to hold that it is procedural in nature. On the other hand,
it unequivocally limits the power of the Court on a reference being made to
award compensation, more than the amount claimed by the claimants and ll
less than the amount awarded by the Collector. In other words, the substantive
right of a claimant who has made a claim to the compensation, pursuant to
a notice under Section 9, cannot be more than the amount claimed and under
any circumstances, would not be less than the amount which the Land
Acquisition Collector has awarded under Section 11, since that award of the C
Collector is the offer that is made to the claimant. In course of the arguments,
Mr. Rao, the learned counsel for the claimants submitted before us that sub-
section (5) of Section 25, as it stood prior to its amendment gives sufficient
power to the reference Court to entertain a claim if the claimant had omitted
to make such claim pursuant to notice issued under Section 9 and determine
the compensation on that. Consequently, Mr. Rao contends that there should D
not be any embargo on the power of the Court even if the claimant makes
a claim pursuant to the notice issued under Section 9. We are unable to
accept this submission inasmuch as sub-section (5) of Section 25 contemplates
a situation where the claimant for sufficient reason had omitted to make a
claim and the reference Court on being satisfied about the same may permit E
the claimant to make a claim. But the unambiguous and clear language of
sub-section (I) of Section 25, as it stood prior to the amendment, makes it
explicitly clear that if the claimant has made a claim pursuant to a notice
under Section 9, then the Court would be incompetent to award any amount
exceeding the said claim. In our considered opinion, sub-section (5) of Section
25 will be of no assistance to the claimants-respondents in the present case. F
lncidently, we may deal with the submission of Mr. Rao that the amount
claimed was by the lawyer and not by the claimant himself and therefore,
cannot be held to be claim by the claimants, pursuant to notice under Section
9 of the Act. On examining the records of the case, we do not find any
justification to entertain this submission, inasmuch even in the application G
made for reforence under Section 18, the claimant had not taken such a stand.
It would, therefore, be futile for us to entertain this contention and hold that
the claim made by the claimants through his lawyer cannot be held to be a
claim by the claimants. This Court in the very case of Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti, [2000] 7 SCC 756, on which the learned counsel for the respondents
had placed reliance, considered the provisions of Section 25 and held that the H
1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C R.

A said provision can never be held to be procedural and it is substantive in
nature. We approve of the said conclusion and hold that the provision of
Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act is substantive in nature.

Coming to the second question, it is a well settled principle of
construction that a substantive provision cannot be retrospective in nature
B unless the provision itself indicates the same. The amended provision of
Section 25 nowhere indicates that the same would have any retrospective
effect. Consequently, therefore, it would apply to all acquisitions made
subsequent to 24.9.84, the date on whii:h Act 68/1984 came into force. The
Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill of 1982 was introduced in Parliament on
C 30th of April, 1982 and came into operation with effect from 24th of
September, 1984. Under the amendment in question, the provisions of Section
23(2) dealing with solatium was amended and Section 30(2) of the amended
Act provided that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the
Principal Act as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 shall apply and shall
be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to any award made by the
D Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme
Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the principal
Act, after the 30th April, 1982 and before the commencement of the Act. It
is because of the aforesaid provision, the question cropped up as to whether
in respect of an award passed by the Collector between the two dates, the
E amended provision will have an application or not and that question has been
answered by this Court in the Constitution Bench decision in Union of India
and Anr. v Raghubir Singh, [ 1989] 2 S.C.C. 754. Sub-section (2) of Section
30 has at all no reference to the provisions of Section 25 of the Act. In that
view of the matter, question of applicability of the amended provisions of
Section 25 of the Act to an award of the Collector made earlier to the
F amendment and the matter was pending in appeal, does not arise. In our
considered opinion, the amended provisions of Section 25 of the Act, not
being retrospective in nature, the case in hand would be governed by the
unamended provisions of Section 25 of the Act.

G Coming to the third question, we find that on a review application
being filed, this court relying upon the case of Union of India v. Raghubir
Singh, [1989] 2 SCC 754, held that the amended provisions would be
applicable under which there is no restriction that the award would only be
upto the amount claimed by the claimant. In Raghubir Singh's case, the
Constitution Bench was dealing with sub-section (2) of Section 30 which had
H got absolutely no relevance or connection with the provisions of Section 25
LAND ACQUISITlON OFFICER-CUM-DSWO, A.P. v. B. V. REDDY [PATTANAIK. l.j I 05 J

of the Land Acquisition Act. For the reasons aln:ady indicatt:d, we have no A
hesitation to come to the conclusion that the enunciation of law made by this
Court in 11.rishi Utpadan Mandi Sam1ti 's case, in para ( 17) of the Judgment
relying upon the case of Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, is not correct and
to that extent the aforesaid case must be held not to have been correctly
decided.
B
Coming to the next question as to whether this Court would interfere
with the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the Anahra Pradesh
High Court or not, the answer would depend on the provision of law which
was under consideration and whether there was any ambiguity in the law
which is being decided for the first time. It is no doubt true that in C
Teherakhatuun V. Salambin Mohammad, [ 1999] 2 sec 635, this Court has
held that even if the special leave has been granted under Article 136, unless
and until, it is shown that a substantial and grave injustice will be caused if
no interference is made out, the Court may refuse to interfere with the judgment
under challenge. This principle would mainly depend upon the facts of each
case which comes up for decision before the Court. To the case iii hand, it D
is difficult for us to apply the aforesaid principle. On the date the land was
notified for acquisition under Section 4( I) of the Act, the un-amended
provision of Section 25 was in force and it was made known to all concerned
that the reference Court will have no power to award the amount in excess·
of the amount claimed by the claimants. Not only the language of the Statute E
was clear and unambiguous, but also the question was not res- integra, in
view of the decision of this Court in Dadoo Yugendrenath Singh v. The
Cu//er;tur, AIR (1977) SC 1128. Until the statutory rigour contained in sub-
section (I) of Section 25 stood obliterated by the amended provisions of
Section 25 and until all restraints and embargoes placed for the Court stood
totally liberated, the reference Court had no jurisdiction to award the amount F
in excess of the amount claimed by the claimant. Such being the position of
law. we are unable to persuade ourselves to agree with the submission of Mr.
Rao to hold that it would not be in the interest of justice to interfere with the
judgment of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. In our
considered opinion, the High Court had no jurisdiction on the law as it stood, G
to award any amount in excess of the amount claimed and in the case in hand
in excess of Rs. 30,000 per acre and, therefore, the principles enunciated in
the decision of this l'ourt in Teheru!..hatoon v. Salambin Mohammad, (1999)
2 sec 63'i, cannot be applied to the case in hand.

So far as the last submission is concerned, we are afraid that the validity H
1052 SCPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] I S.C.R.

A of unamended provision of Section 25 of the Land Acquisition Act which
was there on the statute book since inception can at all be examined at a point
of time when that provision no longer subsists since, 24.9.84, the date on
which Act 68/1984 came into force. We, therefore, decline to entertain the
petition under Article 32 at the behest of the claimants. In the net result,
B therefore, these civil appeals are allowed. The Judgment of the Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is set aside and it is held that the
claimants-respondents would be entitled to compensation for the acquired
land @ Rs. 30,000 per acre, which they claimed pursuant to service of notice
under Section 9. The writ petition filed by the claimants stands dismissed.

v.s.s. Appeals allowed and Petition dismissed.

•