LALJI & ORS.versusSTATE OF U.P.

                              LALJI & ORS.
A
                                    v.
                              STATE OF U.P.

                            JANUARY 17, 1989

B         [K. JAGANNA1HA SHETTY AND K.N. SAIKIA, JJ.]

          Indian Penal Code 1860: Sections 141, 149/302.

          Unlawful Assembly-What is-Common object-Ascertainment               ;,,.->
    of.
c         Distinct offence created by section 149-Imposes constructive or
    vicarious criminal liability-Offence committed in prosecution of
    common object-Corroboration as to participation of individual mem-
    bers of unlawful assembly-Not necessary-Prosecution is not obliged
    to prove overt Act of each member.
0
          Criminal Trial: Court cannot afford to be charitable in undeserv-
    ing cases-Essentiality for peace and order in society.

        The four appellants along with seven other accused were tried ~
  under Sections 147, 148 and 302 read with 149 of the Indian Penal
E Code. The trial Court convicted the eight accused, including the four
  appellants, under section 302/149 I.P.C. and awarded life imprison-
  ment. Appellants Nos. 1, 2 & 4 were also convicted under Section 147               ,.
  I.P.C. and each awarded one years R.I. Appellant No. 3 was also con-
  victed under Section 148 I.P.C. and awarded two years R.I. The
                                                                                     \.
  remaining three accused were acquitted by the Trial Court for want of ~.
F corroboration. On appeal by the eight convicted persons the High
  Court upheld the conviction of only four appellants on all the counts
  and allowed the appeal of the other four co-accused for want of
  corroboration.

        In this appeal by special leave it was contended that appellants
G No. 3 and 4 should also be acquitted for want of corroboration as the
  Trial Court has acquitted three accused and the High Court, on appeal,
  has further acquitted four accused for want of corroboration.                >-:
        The appeal was contested on behalf of the State contending that in
  case of conviction under section 302 read with section 149 of the I.P.C.
H corroboration in case of individual accused was not necessary and there
                                      130
                        LALJI v. STATE OF U.P.                      131

was enough corroboration on record to prove that the accused were          A
members of the unlawful assembly at the time of commission of offence.

      Dismissing the appeal,

      HELD: 1. Section 149 creates a specific and distinct offence. It
imposes constructive or vicarious criminal liability of the members of     B
the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the
common object by any other member of the assembly. [135B J

      1.1. It is not necessary that all persons forming an unlawful as-
sembly must do some overt acts. The section makes a member of the
unlawfuil assembly responsible as a principal for the acts of each, and
all, merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. While          c
overt acts and active participation may indicate common intention of
the persons perpetrating the crime, the mere presence in the unlawful
assembly may fasten vicarious criminal liability under the section.
The basis of the constructive guilt under section 149 is mere
membership of the unlawful assembly, with requisite common object or       D
knowledge. lt35E-F]

      1.2. The tWo essentials of the section are the commission of an
offence by any member of an unlawful assembly and that such offence
must have been committed in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly or must be such as the members of that assembly knew to           E
be likely to be committed. The common object of the assembly must be
one of the five objects mentioned in section 141 of the Indian Penal
Code. (134G-H]

      2. In an appeal by the persons .convicted under section 302 with
the aid of section 149 I.P.C. the question whether a particular person     F
was a member of the unlawful assembly at the relevant time may be
examined; and if it is found from the evidence on record that he was not
a member of the unlawful assembly, he could not be convicted with the
aid of section 149. (136F-G]

     2.1. But once the Court holds that certain accused persons            G
formed an unlawful assembly and an offence is committed by any
member of that assembly in prosecution of the common object of that
assembly or such as the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be
committed in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of
committing that offence was a member of the same assembly is to be
held guilty of that offence. After such a finding it is not open to the    H
    132                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1989] 1 S.C.R.

A   Court to see as to who actually did the offensive act. The prosecution is   ._.\-·
    not obliged to prove which specific overt act was done by which of the
    accused. [13SG-H; 136AJ

          2.2. From the evidence on record it has been satisfactorily
    established that appellants No. 3 and 4 were members of the unlawful
B   assembly at the relevant time. Both the Courts below have held them to
    have been members of the unlawful assembly. The fact that they were
    not active participants and whether any specific injury could individu-
    ally be attributed to tl:em or not are not at all material. [136D-E]

          2.3. In the instant case the High Court having held that the appel-
    lants formed an unlawful assembly carrying dangerous weapons with
c   the common object of resorting to violence and committed an offence
    punishable with the aid of Section 149 I.P.C. erred in acquitting some
    of the members on the ground that they themselves did not perform any
    violent act or that there was no corroboration of their participation.
    Doing So would amount to forgetting the very nature and essence of the
D   offence created by Section 149. [136B-D]

          2.4 The Court in undeserving cases cannot afford to be charitable
    in the administration of criminal justice which is so vital for peace and
    order in the society. [I36D]                                                .J.
E        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 227of1983.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 19.8.1982 of the Allahabad
    High Court in Cr!. Appeal No. 680 of 1976.

F         R.L. Kohli and Shakil Ahmed Syed for the Appellants.

          Prithvi Raj and Dalveer Bhandari for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

G         K.N. SAIKIA, J. This appeal by special leave is from the judg-
    ment of the High Court of 1·udicature at Allahabad in c~;minal Appeal
    No. 680 of 1976 dismissing the appeal of the four instant appellants           )r
    namely, Lalji, Mansa, Milkhi and Bhagwati, · nd upholding their con-
    viction and sentence of life imprisonment under Sections 302/149 and
    also the conviction of Milkhi with sentence of two years R. I. under
H   section 148 J.P.C and of the other three appellants under Section 147
    I.I'.C. with sentence of one year R.l.
                     LALJI v. STATE OF U.P. [SAI.KIA, J.]             133

          The facts are simple. On 24.6.1975 at noon Manju, son of          A
    Girdhari Lal, man-handled Chhotey Lal and Mansa, nephews of
    Minister Lal, after they gave him (Manju) a push. The prosecution
    version was that Minister Lal with a cane in hand, Chhotey Lal with a
    Kanta, Milkhi and Chainu with spears and others with lathis arrived
    near Girdhari Lal's house and after an altercation started assaulting
    Girdhari and Siddhu.                                                    B

           The alarm attracted Ram Avtar and Man ju who came there. The
    appellants party started assaulting them also whereupon they retreated
    to their house but were followed by Minister Lal, Lalji and others of
    the party. Girdhari Lal and Siddhu died in consequence of the assault.
    Ram Avtar picked up the loaded gun of his father Girdhari and fired a C
    shot at Minister Lal who fell down dead and by another shot he injured
    Lalji.

          The defence version was that Girdhari Lal summoned Minister
    Lal to his house and the accused persons came with or after Minister
    Lal. This resulted in a cross case on Lalji's F.l.R. (Ex. Ka-19). It has D
    admittedly resulted in acquittal.

           The present case was registered under F.l.R. (Ex. Ka-1) upon
    the information lodged by Babu Ram son of Siddhu at P.S. Maigal-
    ganj. Altogether eleven persons, including the appellants herein faced
    trial. The learned trial court relying on the evidence of the three eye E
    witnesses convicted eight and acquitted three of them, namely, Ram
    Lotan, Kripa Dayal and Barkau. The eight convicted persons were
    appellants before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 680 of 1976.
    Out of them conviction of four appellants was upheld, while the other
)   four, namely, Shiv Kumar, Chottey Lal, Munna and Chainu were
I   acquitted by the High Court.                                            F

          The learned counsel for the appellants Mr. R.L. Kohli, Sr.
    Advocate submits that as out of the eleven persons three were acquit-
    ted by the trial court and four were acquitted by the High Court as
    there was no corroboration in their cases, the position of two of the
    appellants, namely, Milkhi and Bhagwati remains the same and they       G
    must also be similarly acquitted for want of corroboration.

          The learned counsel for the State Mr. Prithvi Raj, Sr. Advocate
    counters submitting that when the appeallants have been convicted
    under section 302/149 I.P.C the question of corroboration in case of
    individual appellants would not arise; and there is enough corrobora-   H
    134                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [1989) 1 S.C.R.

    tion in the evidence including medical evidence on record to prove that
A
    they were members of the unlawful assembly when the offence was
    committed.

          The precise question to be decided in this appeal, therefore, is
    whether in view of death caused to Girdhari and Siddhu by the unlaw-
B   ful assembly which is punishable under section 302 with the aid of
    Section 149 l.P.C. the corroboration as to participation of each indi-
    vidual member of the assembly would be necessary, and if so, whether
    in the instant case there is such corroboration.

        Section 149 I.P.C. provides that if an offence is committed by
c any  member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common
  object of that assembly, or such as the members of the assembly knew
  to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every
  person, who at the time of committing of that offence is a member of
  the same assembly, is guilty of that offence. As has been defined in
  Section 141 l.P.C., an assembly of five or more persons is designated
D an 'Unlawful Assembly', if the common object of the persons compos-
  ing that assembly is to do any act or acts stated in clauses 'First',
  'Second', 'Third', 'Fourth', and 'Fifth' of that section. An assembly, as
  the explanation to the section says, which was not unlawful when it
  assembled, may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. Whoever
  being aware of facts which render any assembly an unlawful assembly
E intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a
  member of an unlawful assembly. Thus, whenever so many as five or
  more persons meet together to support each other, even against
  opposition, in carrying out the common object which is likely to
  involve violence or to produce in the minds of rational and firm men
  any reasonable apprehension of violence, then even though they ulti-
F mately depart without doing anything whatever towards carrying out
  their common object, the mere fact of their having thus met will con-
  stitute an offence. Of course, the alarm must not be merely such as
  would frighten any foolish or timid person, but must be such as would
  alarm person of reasonable firmness and courage. The two essentials
  of the section are the commission of an offence by any member of an
G unlawful assembly and that such offence must have been committed in
  prosecution of the common object of that assembly or must be such as
  the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed. Not
  every person is necessarily guilty but only those who share in the
  common object. The common object of the assembly must be one of
  the five objects mentioned in Section 141 I.P.C. Common object of the
H unlawful assembly can be gathered from the nature of the assembly,
                             LALll·v. STATE OF U.P. [SAIKIA, J.]                135

  f        arms used by them and the behaviour of the assembly at or before            A
           scene of occurrence. It is an inference to be deduced from the facts
           and circumstances of each case.

                 Section 149 makes every member of an unlawful assembly at the
           time of committing of the offence guilty of that offence. Thus this
           section created a specific and distinct offence. In other wrods, it         B
           created a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the
           unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the
           common object by any other member of that assembly. However, the
           vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly extends




f
           only to the acts done in pursuance of the common object of the unlaw-
           ful assembly, or to suclr offences as the members of the unlawful
           assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
                                                                                       c
           object. Once the case of a person falls within the ingredients of the
           section the question that he did nothing with his oym hands would be
           immaterial. He cannot put forward the defence that he did not with his
           own hands commit the offence committed in prosecution of the com-
           mon object of the unlawful assembly or such as the members of the           D
           assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
           object. Everyone must be taken to have. intended the probable and
           natllral results of the combination of the acts in which he joined. It is
  ,l       not necessary that all the persons forming an unlawful assembly must
           do some overt act. When the accused persons assembled together,
           armed with lathis, and were parties to the assault on the complainant       E
           party, the prosecution is not obliged to prove which specific overt act
           was done by which of the accused. This section makes a member of the
           unlawful assembly responsible as a principal for the acts of each, and
           all, merely because he is a member of an unlawful assembly. While
J          overt act and active participation may indicate common intention of
           the person perpetrating the crime. the mere presence in the unlawful        F
           assembly may fasten vicariously criminal liability under section 149. It
           must be noted that the basis of the constructive guilt under section 149
           is mere membership of the unlawful assembly, with the requisite com-
           moo object or knowledge.

                 Thus, once the Court hold that certain accused persons formed         G
           in unlawful assembly and an offeric·e is committed by any member of
-..;..__   that assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly,
           or such as the members ofthe assembly knew to be likely to be com-
           milted in prosecution of that object, every person who at the time of
           committing of that offence was a member of the same assembly is to be
           held guilty of that offence. After such a finding it would not be open to   H
    136                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS            11989] 1 S.C.R.

A   the Court to see as to who actually did the offensive act or require the
    prosecution to prove which of the members did which of the offensive
    acts. The prosecution would have no obligation to prove it.

          In the instant case after having held that the appellants formed
    anunlawful assembly carrying dangerous weapons with the common
B   object of resorting to violence (as described in the charge) it was not     )
    open to the High Court to acquit some of the members on the ground
    that they themselves did not perform any violent act, or that there was
    no corroboration of their participation. In other words, having held
    that they formed an unlawful assembly and committed an offence
    punishable wit.h the aid of section 1491.P.C., the High Court erred in
    examining which of the members only did actively participate and in
c   acquitting those who, according to the Court, did not so participate.
    Doing so would amount to forgetting the very nature and essence of
    the offence created by section 149 1.P.C The Court in undeserving
    cases cannot afford to be charitable in the administration of criminal
    justice which is so vital for peace and order in the society.
D
           On the basis of the evidence on record Milkhi and Bhagwati's
    membership of the unlawful assembly at the relevant time has been
    satisfactorily established. Both the courts below having held them to
    have been members of the unlawful assembly, the mere fact that they
    were not active participants, would be of no avail. It is not open to the
E   court to scrutinise as to whether any member of the unlawful assembly
    actively participated.

          In an appeal by persons convicted under Section 302 with the aid
    of 149 1.P.C., the question whether a particular person was a member
    of that unlawful assembly at the relevant time may of course be             A
F   examined; and if it is found from the evidence on record that he was
    not a member of the unlawful assembly, he could not be convicted with
    the aid of section 149. The question to be examined by us in the instant
    case is whether Milkhi and Bhagwati were members of the unlawful
    assembly at the relevant time and not whether there was enough cor-
    roboration for their individual participation in the commission of the
G   offence.

          It has not been denied that the names of Milkhi and Bhagwati were
    mentioned in the F.I.R. (Ex. Ka-1). P.W. 2 Manju son of Girdhari,
    whose presence at the place of occurrence has not been challenged,
    mentioned Milkhi and Bhagwati among the accused persons with their
H   relationship. He categorically stated that the two, amongst others,
                       LAUT v. STAIB OF U.P. (SAIKIA, J.]                137
j-   were present at his house beating his father and uncle and chasing him
                                                                             A
     and Ram Avtar. Milkhi according to him had a spear in his hand.
     Man ju denied the suggestion that Milkhi and Bhagwati were standing
     there on the side of the witnesses. P.W. 3 Smt. Ram Devi clearly
     corroborated Milkhi's participation. P.W. 1 Babu Ram while giving
     vivid description of the occurrence stated that Milkhi was there in the
     assembly with spear and Bhagwati with a lathi and that all the persons B
     present beat Girdhari and Siddhu. Milkhi also assisted in carrying
     Minister Lal after he was shot. In reply to the question who beat
     Manju he clearly stated that Mansa and Bhagwati beat him with lathi
     when he was entering the house. D.W. 2 Lalji stated that at the time of
     the occurrence Puran, Bhagwati, Kripal etc. had also come. In the
     F.l.R. (Ex. Ka-19/C.1) lodged by Lalji on the same occurrence pre- C
     sence of Milkhi and Bhagwati was admitted by him. The submission
     that they were mere spectators couid not be believed.

           From the above evidence on record it could not be held that
     Milkhi and Bhagwati were not members of the unlawful assembly at
     the the relevant time. Whether any specific injury could individually D
     be attributed to them or not could not at all be material. The submis-
     sion that the two be acquitted on ground of lack of corroboration has,
     therefore, to be rejected.

          In the facts and circumstances of the case it is not open to this
     Court to apply the reasoning of the High Court to acquit members of E
     the unlawful assembly for lack of corroboration as to their partici-
     pation.

J.        No other submission was made for the other appellants.

           In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal and hence it F
     is dismissed.

          Appellant Mansa is on bail. He shall surrender to serve out his
     sentence.

     T.N.A.                                              Appeal dismissed. G