LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS.versusS. P. SRIVASTAVA (D) THR. LRS.
- Citation
- 2016 INSC 1147
- Decided
- 15 December 2016
- Disposal
- Remitted to Lower Court
- Bench
- R K AGRAWAL
Holding
A first appellate court must state points for determination, consider evidence of all parties, and afford newly impleaded parties a hearing; failure to do so invalidates its judgment.
Summary
The plaintiff Shailendra Prasad Srivastava filed a suit for declaration of title over certain lands against Baidya Nath Prasad Verma, which the trial court dismissed. The High Court, acting as the first appellate court, reversed the trial court's decision and decreed in favour of the plaintiff, but it neither framed specific points for determination nor considered the evidence of the defendant, and it failed to give the newly impleaded purchasers (appellants) an opportunity to present evidence. The Supreme Court held that under Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC, a first appellate court must state the points for determination, record reasons based on evidence of both parties, and afford newly impleaded parties a chance to be heard, especially when reversing findings. Since the High Court omitted these duties, its judgment was vitiated. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decree and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law. The Court did not express any view on the merits of the title dispute.
Issues considered
- The duty of a first appellate court under Order XLI Rule 31 CPC to frame points for determination and record reasons based on evidence of both parties.
- Whether the High Court erred by not considering the defendant's evidence and by not giving the newly impleaded appellants an opportunity to adduce evidence.
- The maintainability of a suit for declaration of title under the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order I Rule 10, s. Order XI Rule 27, s. Order XLI Rule 31
- Hindu Succession Acts. Section 15(1)(b), s. Section 15(2)
- Specific Relief Act, 1963s. Section 34
Subjects
Judgment
[2016) 11 S.C.R. I
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. A
v.
S. P. SRIVASTAVA (D) THR. LRS.
(Civil Appeal No. 4426of2011)
DECEMBER 15,2016 B
(R. K. AGRAWAL AND R. BANUMATHI, JJ.)
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Or. XL/, n: 31, 27 -
Judgment in appeal - Duty of appellate court - Suit by first
respondent-plaintiff against second respondent-defendant for
c
declaration of title, dismissed by trial court - Appellants, purchasers
of various extent. of plots in the suit property from the second
responde11t, impleaded in High Court in first appeal - Suit decreed
by High Court, reversing the findings of trial court, without giving
appellants an opportu11ity to adduce any evide11ce or make a11y
submission - On appeal, held: A11 appellate court is the final court D
of facts - First appellate court ought to state the points for
determinatio11, the decision thereon and the reasons for such
decision - Further, when the first appellate court reverses the findi11gs
of the trial court, it must record the findi11gs in clear terms explaining
how the reasoni11g of the trial court was erroneous - In the instant
E
case, High Court neither framed the points for determination nor
discussed the evidence adduced by the defendant and considered
011ly the evidence adduced by Plaintiff - Being the first appellate
court, it should have co11sidered the evidence adduced by both
Plaintiff as well as Defenda11t - Before the trial court, only the
second respondent-Defendant was the party - However, having· F
impleaded the appellants as parties in the first appeal, High Court
ought to have given an opportunity to the appellants to adduce
additional evidence to substantiate their claim that they were bona
fide purchasers for value - Matter remitted back to High Court for
fresh consideration 011 merits - Specific Relief Act, 1963 - s.34.
G
Remitting the matter back to the High Court, the Court
HELD: 1.1 As per Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, the judgment
of the first appellate court must explicitly set out the points for
determination, record its reasons thereon and to give its
reasonings based on evidence. It is well settled that the first H
I
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016] 1I S.C.R.
A appellate court shall state the points for determination, the
decision thereon and the reasons for decision. However, it is
equally well settled that mere omission to frame point/points for
determination does not vitiate the judgment of the first appellate
court provided that the first appellate court records its reasons
based on evidence adduced by both the parties. [Para 11][8-A-D)
B
1.2 An appellate court is the final court of facts. The
judgment of the appellate court must therefore reflect court's
application of mind and record its findings supported by reasons.
The points which arise for determination by a court of first appeal
must cover all important questions involved in the case and they
c should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court
would be justified in taking a different view on question of fact
that should be done after adverting to the reasons given by the
trial judge in arriving at the finding in question. When appellate
court agrees with the views of the trial court on evidence, it need
D not restate effect of evidence or reiterate reasons given by trial
court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by
trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when the first
appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must
record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings
of the trial court is erroneous. [ Paras 12, 13] [8-D-E; 10-G-H;
E 11-A-B)
Vinod Kumar v. Gangadhar (2015) 1 SCC 391: 2014
(10) SCR 1050 - relied on.
1.3 In the light of the above, when the present case is
F considered, it is found that in terms of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC,
the High Court has neither framed the points for determination
nor discussed the evidence adduced by the defendants. The
documentary evidence adduced by the first respondent-Plaintiff
was refuted by the second respondent-Defendant. To support
his defence plea, second respondent-Defendant had adduced oral
G evidence by examining number of witnesses. That apart, second
respondent-Defendant mainly relied upon the admission of first
respondent-Plaintiff. [Paral4) [11-B-D]
1.4 The High Court did not seem to have examined the
above admission of the first respondent-Plaintiff relied on by
H second-respondent-defendant nor considered the oral evidence·
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 3
(D) THR. LRS.
adduced by the second respondent-Defendant. Being the first A
appellate court, the final court on facts, it should have considered
the evidence adduced by both Plaintiff as well as Defendant. But
it seems to have considered only the evidence adduced by the
first respondent-Plaintiff and not the evidence adduced by the
second respondent-Defendant and the alleged inherent
B
contradictions in the statement of first respondent-Plaintiff. (Para
14) (11-F-H)
1.5 The appellants are the purchasers of various extent of
plots in the suit property from the second respondent-Defendant.
After the appellants were impleaded as parties in the appeal, they .
were not given any opportunity to adduce any evidence or make c
their submission. The High Court had only referred to the
evidence adduced by the first respondent-Plaintiff and simply held
that failure on the part of second respondent-Defendant to
establish his title over the suit properties precluded the appellants
from claiming any title or interest over the suit scheduled D
properties, as they had derived the title from the defendants.
Having impleaded the appellants as parties to the first appeal, it
was inappropriate to record such a finding without affording an
opportunity to the appellants and without examining the claim of
the present appellants. (Para 16) (12-E, F-H)
Case Law Reference E
2014 (10) SCR 1050 relied on Para 12
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4426
of201 I.
From the Judgment and Order dated 05.01.2011 of the High Court
F
of Judicature at Patna in First Appeal No. 230 of2007.
S. K. Bhattacharya, Suresh Bharti, Pramod Kr., Advs. for the
Appellants.
R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Amit Pawan, Abhishek Amritanshu, Anand
Nandan, Gyan Prakash Srivastava, S. K. Verma, Advs. for the
Respondents. G
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
R. BANUMATHI, J. This appeal arises out of the judgment of
High Court of Patna in First Appeal No. 230 of2007 dated 30.07.2007
reversing the judgment of the trial court and thereby decreeing first
respondent-Plaintiff's suit for declaration of title. H
4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 11 S.C.R.
A 2. Genealogy of the first respondent-Plaintiff and Tarawati Devi
are as under:-
Mahabir Prasad
Tej Pratap Narayan Jagadambi Prasad
B I
Rudra Mahendra Kanta Kanji Girish ChLdra Prasad (I 960)
Narayan Prasad Prasad Tarawati rvi (died in 1985)
Prar died issueless died issucless
Shailendra Prasad Suresh Chandra Prasad ( 1942)
PlaintitI
c I
Deoki Devi Sita Devi Umashanker Prasad ( 1970)
Died died issueless (died unmaJTicd)
The genealogy of parental side ofTarawati Devi is as under:-
Dhanukdhari Sahay
D
Tarawati Devi Laxmi Devi Raxn Devi
I
Baidya Nath (Defendant)
3. The fir5t respondent-PlaintiffShailendra Prasad Srivastava filed
E a suit praying for declaration of his title with respect to suit property in
Khasra No. 123, 124, 269, 274, 997 and 959 ofKhata No. 31 of village
Bairiya and village Koloha Pagambarpur Schedule I and Schedule II
properties respectively against the second respondent-Defendant Baidya
Nath Prasad Verma alleging that the suit property detailed in Schedule I
and II belonged to Girish Chandra Prasad. Case of the plaintiff is that in
F
the Revisional Survey of Records, Tarawati Devi, the widow ofGirish
Chandra Prasad gotthe property recorded in the name of her grandson
Umashanker Prasad. The said Umashanker Prasad died during the
lifetime ofTarawati Devi in the year 1965. The first respondent-Plaintiff
further alleged that he, being the only male member of the family, used
G to stay with Tarawati Devi and did all the ceremonies after her death.
Further case of the first respondent-Plaintiff is that when he was working
at Bhillai, he learnt that the second respondent-Defendant is trying to
obtain revenue receipt in collusion with Anchal Karmachari. The first
respondent-Plaintiff went to the office of the Circle Office Kanti and
got cancellation of revenue receipt in the name of defendant. The second
H
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 5
(D) THR. LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
respondent-Defendant Baidya Nath Prasad filed mutation appeal. When A
the first respondent-Plaintiff came to know that the second respondent-
Defendant is trying to claim title over the suit property through Tarawati
Devi alleging that the suit prope11y belonged to Tarawati Devi, the first
respondent-Plaintiff being the agnate ofTarawati Devi filed a suit for
declaration of his title.
8
4. Resisting the suit, second respondent-Defendant filed a written
statement refuting all claims of the first respondent-Plaintiff and
contending that the disputed property belonged to one Mr. Dhanukdhari
Sahay. The said Dhanukdhari Sahay had one son named Mr. Vasudev
Prasad, who further had a son and three daughters, namely, Ms. Tarawati
Devi, Ms. Lakshmi Devi and Ms. Ranjan Devi. Ms. Ranjan Devi died' c
during the lifetime of her father. Second respondent-Defendant further
pleaded that the suit property has been sold to various parties and the
suit filed by the first respondent-Plaintiff against the second respondent-
Defendant is liable to be dismissed. After the death of son Vasudev
Prasad and others, the disputed property came to be vested in Ms. D
Tarawati Devi's name. The second respondent-Defendant was the
closest legal heir of Dhanukdhari Sahay and after the death of Ms.
Tarawati Devi in 1985, as per Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession
Act, the property devolved upon second respondent-Defendant by
succession and mutation was effected in his name and he started paying
revenue in respect of the suit property which was mutated in his name. E
5. On the above pleadings, nine issues were framed in the trial
court. Number of wit11esses were examined on the side of the first
respondent-Plaintiff as well as second respondent-Defendant. Upon
consideration of oral and documentary evidence, the trial court held that
the first respondent-Plaintiff has not produced any documents to show F
that the property belonged to the family ofTej Pratap Narayan. The trial
court held that after the death of her father Dhanukdhari Sahay, Tarawati
Devi became the sole legal heir of d1e disputed property and as per
Section 15( l )(b) of Hindu Succession Act, if the deceased woman has
acquired the property from her parents, it will be inherited by the G
successors of the parents of the deceased. It was further held that there
is no record to show that Tarawati Devi got the disputed property from
her husband or father-in-law. The trial court dismissed the suit holding
that the first respondent-Plaintiff has not produced the necessary
documents to prove his title to the suit property.
H
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2016] 11 S.C.R.
A 6. On appeal, the High Court reversed the findings of the trial
court and held that as per the Revisional Survey Record of Right, prope11y
was recorded in the name of Umashanker Prasad, grandson of Girish
Chandra Prasad and on the death ofGirish Chandra Prasad, his widow
Tarawati Devi became the absolute owner of the property and on her
death in 1985, the property devolved on her agnate-the first respondent-
B
Plaintiff. After referring to oral evidence and also the rent receipts
produced by the first respondent-Plaintiff in his name and in the name of
Girish Chandra Prasad (Ex.1-1/J and Ex. 1/K-1/M), it was held that the
first respondent-Plaintiff's case about his agnate relationship with Girish
Chandra Prasad stood proved and thus the Plaintiff proved his title to
c the suit property. On those reasonings, the High Court reversed the findings
of the trial court and allowed the first appeal and decreed the Plaintiff's
suit.
7. Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that though the
suit filed by the first respondent-Plaintiff was for declaration of title, no
D documents of title pertaining to the suit property had been produced
before the court and the documents produced were merely rent receipts
and mutation record and on these documents, there could be no
presumption of title and while so, the High Court was not right by treating
those documents as if they were documents of title and reversing the
judgment of the trial court. It was submitted that in his cross-examination,
E
first respondent-Plaintiff (PW-3) admitted that Tarawati Devi had
purchased the suit property two acres and fifteen decimals of land and
this admission made by the first respondent-Plaintiff was not properly
appreciated by the High Court. Further contention of the appellants is
that the High Court failed to appreciate that in view of proviso to Section
F 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the suit for declaration of title without any
consequential relief of possession was not maintainable. Main contention
of the appellants is that while the High Court impleaded the appellants
as parties in the first appeal, the High Court being the first appellate
court, ought to have afforded an opportunity to the appellants to file their
documents and submissions and the judgment of the High Court is in
G violation of principles of natural justice in not giving opportunity to the
appellants who are bona fide purchasers for consideration.
8. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the first respondent-
Plaintiff submitted that the record of rights (Ex. 13 series) stood in the
name of Umashanker Prasad, the grandson of Girish Chandra Prasad
H and this record of right was corroborated by the rent receipts which
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 7
(D) THR. LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
were in the name of Girish Chandra Prasad as well as the first A
respondent-Plaintiff himself. It was further submitted that apart from
the documentary evidence, the oral evidence of PW-3, PW-4, PW-10,
PW-13 and PW-14 established that the suit property belonged to Girish
Chandra Prasad. It was contended that Girish Chandra Prasad was the
owner of the property and as per Section 15 of the Hindu Succession
B
Act, first respondent-Plaintiff, being the agnate of Tarawati Devi,
inherited the suit prope11y and upon appreciation of oral and documentmy
evidence, High Court rightly declared the first respondent-Plaintiff's title
by reversing the judgment of trial court. It was further contended that in
spite of opportunities afforded, the second respondent-Defendant did
not produce the sale deeds executed by him in favour of the appellants c
which clearly shows that the appellants are not bona fide purchasers
for value and the High Court rightly held that the appellants cannot have
a better title than that of the second respondent-Defendant.
9. The question falling for consideration is whether the property
belonged to Girish Chandra Prasad and after his death, his wife-Tarawati D
Devi succeeded to the property of her husband and after her death
devolves upon her agnate first respondent-Plaintiff; or whether it belonged
to Dhanukdhari Sahay, father of Tarawati Devi from whom Tarawati
Devi inherited and as per Section 15(2) of the Hindu Succession Act
whether the second respondent-Defendant is entitled to succeed to the
same. E
10. The High Court has specifically dealt with two core issues:-
one relating to the genuineness of the genealogical table contained in the
plaint and the other relates to ascertainment of title of the first respondent-
Plaintiff over the suit scheduled property by the documents-record of
rights and rent receipts filed by the first respondent-Plaintiff. Contention F
of the appellants is that the High Court, while arriving at the conclusion,
. did not properly analyse the materials on record, in particular, the evidence
adduced by the second respondent-Defendant. Further contention of
the appellants is that the High Court being the first appellate court, being
the final court of facts, was bound to analyse the evidence and record its G
reasonings, especially while it reversed the findings of the trial court.
11. As per Order XL! Rule 31 CPC, the judgment of the first
appellate court must explicitly set out the points for determination, record
its reasons thereon and to give its reasonings based on evidence. Order
XL! Rule 31 CPC reads as under:
H
8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2016] 11 S.C.R.
A "Order XLI Rule 31: Contents, date and signature of
judgment. - The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in
writing and shall state -
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
B
(c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied,
the relief to which the appellant is entitled;
and shall at the time that it is propounded be signed and dated by
C the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein."
It is well settled that the first appellate court shall state the points for
determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for decision.
However, it is equally well settled that mere omission to frame point/
points for determination does not vitiate the judgment ofthe first appellate
D court provided that the first appellate court records its reasons based on
evidence adduced by both the parties.
12. An appellate court is the final court of facts. The judgment of
the appellate court must therefore reflect court's application of mind
and record its findings supported by reasons. The law relating to powers
E and duties of the first appellate court is well fortified by the legal provisions
and judicial pronouncements. Considering the nature and scope of duty
of first appellate court, in Vinod Kumar v. G011gad/1ar (2015) I SCC
391, it was held as under:-
"12. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (200 I) 3 SCC
F 179, this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 188-89, para 15)
"15 .... The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm
the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of
the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein
open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The
G judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its
conscious application of mind and record findings supported
by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions
put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate
court.... while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court
must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by
H
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 9
(D) THR. LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a A
different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further
appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty
expected of it."
The above view has been followed by a three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Madhukar v. Sangram (2001) 4 SCC B
756, wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal,
it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the
evidence led by the parties before recording its findings.
13. In H.K.N. Swami v. lrshad Basith (2005) 10 SCC 243, this
Court stated as under: (SCC p. 244, para 3) c
"3. The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on
law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both
on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate
court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the
case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Comt, in the D
present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on
law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the
High Court to deal with all the issues· and the evidence led by
the parties before recording the finding regarding title."
14. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa (2005) 12 SCC 303, while E
considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 303,
para 2)
15. Again in B.V. Nagesh v. H.V. Sreenivasa Murthy (2010) 13
SCC 530, this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of
F
this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these
words: (SCC pp. 530-31, paras 3-5)
"3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the
appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Comt
in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from
G
original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 3 1 mandates
that the judgment of the appellate court shall state:
(a) the points for determination;
(b) the decision thereon;
H
IO SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 11 S.C.R.
A (c) the reasons for the decision; and
(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the
relief to which the appellant is entitled.
4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the
findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of
B the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein
open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment
of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious
application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on
all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and
c pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting
as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to
deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before
recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the
parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on
facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to
D all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in
support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam
Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179, SCC p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v.
San gram (200 I) 4 SCC 756 SCC p. 758, para 5.)
5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the
E impugned judgment, we feel that the High Comt has failed to
discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate cou1t. In
our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the
relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been
decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the
F judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls shmt of
considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal.
Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both
parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the
High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court
for its fresh disposal in accordance with law."
G
13. The points which arise for determination by a court of first
appeal must cover all important questions involved in the case and they
should not be general and vague. Even though the appellate court would
be justified in taking a different view on question of fact that should be
done after adverting to the reasons given by the trial judge in arriving at
H the finding in question. When appellate comt agrees with the views of
LALITESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 11
(D) THR. LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
the trial court on evidence, it need not restate effect of evidence or A
reiterate reasons given by trial court; expression of general agreement
with reasons given by trial court would ordinarily suffice. However, when
the first appellate court reverses the findings of the trial court, it must
record the findings in clear terms explaining how the reasonings of the
trial court is erroneous.
B
14. In the light of the above, when we consider the present case,
we find that in terms of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC, the High Court has
neither framed the points for determination nor discussed the evidence
adduced by the defendants. The High Court seemed to have only
considered two aspects:- (i) genealogical table produced by the first
respondent-Plaintiff; (ii) documentary evidence adduced by the first
c
respondent-Plaintiff that is Exhibit 13 series-entry in Survey Record of
Rights and Rent receipts (Ex. 1/J and Ex. l/K to 1/M) filed by the first
respondent-Plaintiff. The documentary evidence adduced by the first
respondent-Plaintiff has been refuted by the second respondent-
Defendant. To support his defence plea, second respondent-Defendant D
has adduced oral evidence by examining number of witnesses. That
apart, second respondent-Defendant mainly relied upon the following
evidence of first respondent-Plaintiff(PW-3):-
"Tarawati Devi had purchased total two acres and fifteen decimals
of land. I cannot tel I the number of sale deeds. I don't have the E
knowledge about the resignation of her name on the said land.
Till the time of her death, the land purchased by her remained
with Tarawati Devi. The land in dispute in two acre.and fifteen
decimals in area. The land in dispute in the present suit is the
land purchased by Tarawati Devi."
F
The High Court does not seem to have examii:ied the above admission
of the first respondent-Plaintiff nor considered the oral evidence adduced
by the second respondent-Defendant. Being the first appellate couti,
the final court on facts, the High Court should have considered the
evidence adduced by the first respondent-Plaintiff as well as the evidence
adduced by the second respondent-Defendant. But the High Court seems G
to have considered only the evidence adduced by the first rcspondent-
Plaintiff and not the evidence adduced by the second respondent~
Defendant and the alleged inherent contradictions in the statement of
first respondent-Plaintiff.
H
12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 11 S.C.R.
A 15. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that yet
another issue that arose for consideration was the maintainability of the
suit in view of the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the suit had been filed
by the first respondent-Plaintiff for declaration of title to the suit properties
which belonged to Tarawati Devi without any fm1her consequential relief
B
for possession or injunction and the suit was barred in view of the proviso
to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Proviso to Section 34 of
the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is as under:-
"Provided that no com1 shall make any such declaration where
the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief than a mere
c declaration of title, omits to do so."
Drawing our attention to the above proviso to Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that
on this plea, issue No. 6 was specifically framed by the trial court and
even though the trial court decided the issue in favour of the first
D respondent-Plaintiff and the same being raised in the first appellate court,
the High Court should have considered the arguments advanced by the
appellants on the maintainability of the suit.
16. The appellants are the purchasers of various extent of plots in
the suit property from the second respondent-Defendant under various
E sale deeds dated 22.11.19958, 29.09.1995, 29.03.1996, 07.08.1995,
20.11.2008 and 03.07.2007. The appellants moved I.A. No. 5250/20 I 0
in F.A. No. 230/2007 before the High Court for their impleadmcnt under
Order I Rule I 0 of CPC and the said application was allowed by the
High Court vide order dated 02.08.2010. After the appellants were
F impleaded as parties in the appeal, the appellants were not given any
opportunity to adduce any evidence or make their submission. The High
Court has only referred to the evidence adduced by the first respondent-
Plaintiff and simply held that failure on the part of second respondent-
Defendant to establish his title over the suit properties precludes the
appellants from claiming any title or interest over the suit scheduled
G properties, as they had derived the title from the defendants. We are of
the view that having imp leaded the appellants as parties to the first appeal,
it seems inappropriate to record such a finding without affording an
opportunity to the appellants and without examining the claim of the
present appellants. After impleading them as parties, without affording
an opportunity to the appellants, the High Court skirted the claim of the
H
LAUTESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ORS. v. S. P. SRIVASTAVA 13
(D) THR. LRS. [R. BANUMATHI, J.]
appellants by observing that the appellants having purchased the suit . A
property subsequent to filing of the suit and ifthe second respondent-
Defendant had no title then there is no question of transferring any title
or interest or possession by the second respondent-Defendant to the
transferee arises. We find substance in the contention of the appellants
that having been impleaded as parties in the High Court, they ought to
B
have been given an opportunity to adduce additional evidence and make
their submission to substantiate their claim that they are bona fide
purchasers for value. In our v.iew, having impleaded the appellants, in
terms of Order XU Rule 27 CPC, the High Court ought to have given
an opportunity to the appellants to adduce additional evidence and make
their submission. c
17. Learned senior counsel for the first respondent-Plaintiff
submitted that the second respondent-Defendant has stated in paragraph
(15) of the written statement that he had sold different portions of the
suit land to different persons. It was submitted that on application filed
by the first respondent-Plaintiff, the trial court passed an order on D
27 .10.2005 directing the second respondent-Defendant to produce the
sale deeds in question within fifteen days or otherwise he would have no
right to produce the same. The learned Senior counsel for the plaintiffs
submitted that in spite of the said order, second respondent-Defendant
did not produce any of the sale deeds and while so, the appellants are
precluded from raising the plea of non-affording of opportunity to the E
appellants and the High Couti rightly held that the appellants cannot
claim a better title than that of the second respondent-Defendant. Before
the trial court, only the second respondent-Defe11dant was the party.
Any order passed by the trial court against the second respondent-
Defendaih cannot preclude the appellants from putting forth their plea F
by filing additional documents.
18. As discussed earlier, the High Court has not considered the
evidence adduced by the defendants. Having impleaded the appellants
as parties in the first appeal, in terms of Order XU Rule 27, the High
Court ought to have afforded an opportunity to the appellants to adduce G
oral and documentary evidence and make their submissions.
19. In the result, the impugned judgment of the High Court in First
Appeal No. 230 of2007 dated 30.07.2007 is set aside and the matter is
remitted back to the High Court for consideration of the matter afresh.
First respondent-Plaintiff, being the appellant before the High Court, is
H
14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 11 S.C.R.
A directed to take steps for impleading the legal representatives of the
deceased second respondent-Defendant. The High Court shall afford
sufficient opportunity to both the parties to adduce additional evidence,
both oral and documentary and further afford sufficient opportunity of
hearing to both the parties. Since the suit is of the year 1994, we request
the High Court to dispose the appeal expeditiously in accordance with
B
law. We make it clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the
merits of the matter. ··
Divya Pand~y Malter remitted I .ick to High Court.
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