Holding

The disciplinary authority was justified in relying on the handwriting expert’s report, and the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 is limited to judicial review, not appellate re‑appraisal of evidence, so the dismissal stands.

Summary

Lalit Popli, a clerk of Canara Bank, was dismissed after an internal enquiry found him guilty of forgery and unauthorized withdrawal of Rs.1.07 lakh, relying heavily on a handwriting expert’s report. The employee challenged the dismissal, arguing that the expert’s evidence was inadmissible, that adverse remarks about the expert undermined its credibility, and that he was denied procedural fairness. The Delhi High Court Single Judge held the expert’s testimony to be no evidence and set aside the dismissal, but the Division Bench reversed, emphasizing the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226. The Supreme Court affirmed the Division Bench, stating that expert opinion under Sections 45, 47 and 73 of the Evidence Act need not be corroborated and that the High Court cannot act as an appellate body to re‑appraise disciplinary findings. Consequently, the dismissal was upheld.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 can act as an appellate authority and interfere with the findings of a disciplinary enquiry.
Whether the testimony of a handwriting expert, without corroboration, is admissible and sufficient in disciplinary proceedings.
Whether adverse remarks about the expert’s past credibility render his evidence irrelevant.
Whether the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings differs from that in criminal trials.
Whether the employee was denied natural justice by being denied representation and cross‑examination.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 45, s. 47, s. 73

Subjects

disciplinary proceedingsexpert evidencehandwriting analysisjudicial reviewArticle 226burden of proofbank forgeryservice lawnatural justice

Judgment

A LALIT POPLI ..
v.
CANARA BANK AND ORS.

FEBRUARY 18, 2003

B [SHIVARAJ V. PATIL AND ARIJIT PASAYAT, JJ.]

Service· Law:

Disciplinary proceedings-Charge offorgery against bank employee-
C Dismissal from service on the basis of evidence of Handwriting Expert-
Adverse remarks against the expert in the past-Plea of lack ofcriminal intent
by delinquent-However, carelessness in transaction admitted-Dismissal
upheld by disciplinary and appellate authorities-Single Judge of High Court
did not rely on the expert opinion and held the dismissal order illegal-
D Division Bench in view of limited scope ofjudicial review under Article 226
of the Constitution, did not interfere with order of disciplinary authority and
upheld the dismissal-On appeal: Held the authorities were justified in drawing
adverse remarks-Report of Handwriting expert has clearly proved the
delinquent as author offorgery-A bank employee deals with public money-
The nature of the work demands vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act
E carefully-Any carelessness invites action.

Criminal proceeding and Disciplinary proceeding-Distinction between.

Constitution of India, 1950:

Article 226-Judicial RevieW-Scope and ambit of in disciplinary
F
proceedings-Held, in exercise of the power under, Court does not act as
appellate authority-Its. jurisdiction is circumscribed bJi limits ofjudicial review
to correct errors of law or procedural errors heading to manifest injustice or
violation of principles of natural justice-It is not akin to adjudication on
merits.
G
Evidence Act, 1872:

Sections 45, 47 and 73-Expert opinion-Handwriting Expert-Reliability
on in absence of corroboration-Held, evidence of Handwriting Expert need
not invariably be corroborated-It is for the Court to decide whether to accept
H such uncorroborated evidence.
100
\
~

LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK 101
.,. Doctrines: A
Doctrine of "proof beyond doubt"-Applicability of

Appellant-a bank employee was charged for forgery and unauthorized
withdrawal of. money from a customer's account. He was charge sheeted
along with imputations of miscondu~t. Employee accepted that there was B
some lapse on his part, but he pleaded lack of criminal intent. Inquiry officer
on the basis of witnesses including the evidence of Handwriting Expert held
him guilty of misconduct and thereafter order of his dismissal from servic;)
was passed. Disciplinary authority concurred with the findings of inquiry
officer. Appeal before the appellate authority was also rejected. In writ
petition Single Judge of High Court held that evidence of Handwriting Expert C
is no evidence at all and thus the order of disciplinary authority was held to
be illegal. In appeal Division Bench held that High Court in exercise of the
power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not act as an
appellate authority and, therefore, Single Judge was not justified in interfering
with the conclusions arrived at by the disciplinary authority. D
In appeal to this Court appellant-employee contended that there was
no material to con11ect the appellant to the alleged forgery which was the
foundation for the disciplinary action; that the report of the Handwriting
Expert, about whose credibility serious remarks-were made in the past had
no evidentiary value and thus he was not competent w.itness; that Forensic E
Science Laboratory did not find any material against employee; and that
report of the Handwriting Expert was full of"inconsistencies.

Respondents contended that Division Bench rightly considered the scope
and ambit of judicial review in the matter of disciplinary proceedings; that
it cannot be said that Han.dwriting Expert's report cannot be accepted without p
further corroboration as the report was clear and cogent and had clearly
spelt out how employee was the author of forgery.

Dis111issing the appeal, the Court

HELD: I.I. The authorities were justified in drawing adverse remarks.
The report of the handwriting expert is clear and cogent and has clearly spelt G
·out the areas of similarities in the disputed document and the admitted
writings to highlight as to how employee was the author of forgery. The
employee himself had accepted that he committed careless mistakes, but took
the plea that there was no criminal intent. The authorities have analysed
the job requirements of the post which the employee held and discussed H
I
1-
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2003] 2 S.C.R.

A at great length as to how the requisite care and caution were not exercised.
An employee of the bank is required to be vigilant and any abnormality
should have been noticed. The unusual features should have aroused
suspicion. A bank employee deals with public money. The nature of his
work demands vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act carefully. Any
B carelessness invites action. 1108-E; 108-C, D; 111-D)
1.2. The approach of Single Judge· as regards evidence of
Handwriting Expert is clearly erroneous. Even if there were adverse
remarks (which related to 1958-59) that did not affect the credibility of
his evidence to treat it as totally irrelevant and to be no evidence in the
eye of law. Nothing could be shown to the Court as to how the report in
C this particular case suffers from any infirmity. There is no finding
recorded by Single Judge to that effect. On that score alone the Division
Bench was justified in upsetting Single Judge's decision. [108-F-H)

1.3. Evidence of the identity of handwriting is dealt with in three
Sections of the Evidence Act. They are Sections 45, 47 and 73. Under
D Sections 45 and 47, the Court has to take a view on the opinion of others,
whereas under Section 73, the Court by its own comparison of writings
can form its opinion. In the former case it is by a scientific comparison
and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent
observ11tions and experiences. In both, the cases, the Court is required to
E satisfy itself by such means as are open to conclude that the opinion may
be act.ed upon. Ordinarily, Section's 45 and 73 are complementary to each
other. Evidence of Handwriting Expert need not be invariably
corroborated. It is for the Court to decide whether to accept such an
uncorroborated evidence or not. Even when expert's evidence is not there,
Court has power to compare the writings and d~cide the matter.
F [109-C-E)

Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 11980) I SCC 704, referred
to.

1.4. It cannot be said that Handwriting Expert's report is not worthy
G of acceptance in view of Forensic Science Laboratory Report. Forensic
Science Laboratory only says that no definite opinion can be formed. That
itself is an indication that a clean chit was not given as claimed by the
employee. [109-G)

2. The approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the
H disciplinary proceedings'are altogether distinct and different. In the
\

::>-
"' LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK [ARJJIT PASAYAT, J.] 103
disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee A
is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him: whereas in
criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered
against him are established and if established what sentence should be
imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the
rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. In case
of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application .
B
•
The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance
of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at
the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.
(109-G, H; 110-A, BJ

State ofRajasthan v. B.K Meena and Ors., [1996J 6 SCC 417, referred to.
c
3.1. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its
jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors
of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of D
principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of
the case on merits as an appellate authority. (110-C, DJ

B.C. Chaturvediv. Union cJjlndia and Ors., [1996) 6 SCC 749 and R.S.
Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors., (1999) 8 SCC 90, relied on.
E
3.2. Considering the limited scope of judicial review, the Division
Bench was right in upholding the order of dismissal l;>y setting aside the
J.
Single Judge's order by which interference was made with it. (111-F)
- CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3961 of2001.

. From the Judgment and Order dated 29.9.2000 of the Delhi High Court
F
in L.P.A. No. 465 of 1998.

R. Venkataramani, Inderjit Sharma, Rajan Shanna and Satya Mitra Garg
for the Appellant.

Sudhir Chandra Agarwal, S. Ravindra Bhat and Naveen R. Nath for the G
Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

_._ ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Order of dismissal from service having been
restored by Division Bench of Delhi High Court setting aside judgment of the H
I
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R. ....::
A learned Single Judge, this appeal has been filed.
Factual background filtering out unnecessary details is as follows:

Appellant (hereinafter referred to as 'the employee') joined services of The
Lakshmi Commercial Bank in 1976 as a Clerk. The said bank was merged with
B Canara Bank (hereinafter referred to as 'the employer') in October, 1985. As a
consequence, services of the employee stood transferred to the employer-Bank. y

He was posted as a Clerk in Deen Dayal Upadhyay Marg, New Delhi Branch and
was deputed to work at AIWC extension of the said branch.

One customer of the Bank i.e. S.V. Deshpande, advocate lodged a
c complaint with the police stating that there has been unauthorized withdrawal
of Rs.1.07 lakhs froni his account in the Bank. An internal investigation was
also undertaken by the employer in respect of the complaint. Report of the
preliminary investigation was submitted and the employee was served with
charge sheet along with imputations of misconduct to the effect that the
employee was responsible for the unauthorized withdrawal from the customer's
D account.

Enquiry Officer was appointed to hold the enquiry and along with other
witnesses the evidence of Handwriting expert Shri V.K. Sakhuja was tendered.
The proceedings in the enquiry were concluded on 29.4.1993. Both the parties
were asked to submit their written submissions. At this stage, the employee
E filed an application for further cross-examination of an Handwriting expert.
Said prayer was rejected on 10th May, 1993. The Enquiry Officer submitted ...
his report and the employee was also furnished with a copy to make his
submissions as regards the findings. The written submissions were submitted
on 24th June, 1995. Findings of the Enquiry Officer were recorded. Thereafter
F order of dismissal was passed.
The Disciplinary Authority concurred with findings of the Enquiry
Officer after taking into account the submissions made by the employee. The
charge-sheet contained the following allegations:

G "On the I Ith of May, 1992, a charge-sheet was issued to the
petitioner in the following terms:-

Whereas, there are prima facie grounds for believing that you
have committed gross misconduct, the particulars whereof are given

H
below, this charge sheet has been drawn up against you and you are
required to submit me within 15 days of receipt of this charge sheet --
LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK [ARJJIT PASAYAT, J.] 105
a statement in writing setting forth your defence, if any and showing A
cause as to why suitable action should not be taken against you.

CHARGE:

You have been working at Canara Bank, DOU Marg, New Delhi
Branch since 7.3.1986. B
One Shri S.V. Deshpande, Advocate, Supreme Court of India is
maintaining his SB ale No.4272 with AIWC Extn. counter of DOU
Marg, New Delhi Branch. On 23.12.1991 a cheque book authorized
to be issued in S.B. ale no. 4272 to one Sri Mohinder Kumar on the
strength of a purported letter in violation of the laid down procedure C
of the bank. Thereafter, a total of Rs. 1,07,000 was withdrawn from
his account by utilizing 5 cheques out of the above said cheque book,
details which are given below:

Date Cheque No. Amount

26.12.91 460827 Rs. 15,000 D
28.12.91 460823 Rs. 15,000
31.12.91 460821 Rs. 15,000
31.12.91 460822 Rs. 14,000
E
31.12.91 460826 Rs. 50,000.

The account holder as complained/disputed the above said
withdrawals as well as issuance of the cheque book No. 460821 to
460830. The purported letter on the basis of which the above said
cheque book had been issued had also not been found on records. p
The handwriting expert has confirmed that the signatures appearing
on the above said cheque are not that of Shri S.V. Deshpande, the
account holder and they are forged.

The cheque No. 460826 for Rs. 50,000 was posted by you in the
relative ledger on 31.12.91 though there was fictitious endorse!Ilent G
on the reverse of the cheque to give creditability to the transaction.

,Handwriting expert has opined after examining your handwriting
with that of the disputed instruments in question that the signatures
of the account holder appearing on the above said 5 cheques and the
endorsement on the back of the cheque No. 460826 for Rs. 50,00Q is H
106 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] f S.C.R.

A in your handwriting.
From the above, it is evident that you by misusing your official
position, in collusion with someone else, got the above said cheque
book issued in S.B. Ale No. 4272, utilised the cheque leaves in question
by forging the signature of the account holder and got the same
B presented to encash the cheques fraudulently.
By your above said fraudulent acts you have caused damage to
the property of the bank thereby committed a gross misconduct within
the meaning of Chapter-XI, Regulation 3 Clause G) of Canara Bank
Service Code.
c Your above said acts are also prejudicial to the interests of the
bank thereby you have committed a gross misconduct within the
meaning of Chapter-XI, Regulation 3 Clause G) of Canara Bank
Service Code.
Your above said acts are also prejudicial to the interests of the
D bank thereby you have committed a gross misconduct within the
meaning of the Chapter-XI, Regulation 3 Clause (m) of Canara Bank
Service Code".
An appeal was preferred by the employee before the prescribed appellate
authority who rejected the appeal. The employee challenged the findings
E culminating in his order of dismissal by filing a writ petition before the High
Court.

The main plea which was advanced before the learned Single Judge
was that the Enquiry Officer should not have rested his decision on the
opinion of the Handwriting Expert. The entire case rested on suspicion and
F there was no material to connect him with the alleged misconduct. Learned
Single Judge referring to the evidence recorded during the enquiry proceedings
came to hold that the conclusions arrived at by the Enquiry Officer were
erroneous and no credence should have been attached to the evidence of V.K.
Sakhuja and his evidence is no evidence at all. It was also held that the
G charges framed by the Bank do not have sustainability in law. These
observations came to be made by learned Single Judge because of some
adverse remarks made against V.K. Sakhuja in three cases. The conclusions
of learned Single Judge in paragraph 17 so far as relevant read as follows:

"The fact that the Courts had made very strong stricture against
H the handwriting expert is not disputed. In my view, Mr. Sakhuja is
- LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK [ARIJJT PASA YAT, J.] 107
not a person who is competent to speak about the handwriting or A
finger prints. His evidence is no evidence at all. Consequently, the
charge issued by the bank is not sustainable in law. The findings by
the inquiry officer against the petitioner are not based on any evidence
and, thus, the order passed by the disciplinary authority cannot be
sustained. In law there is, no evidence against the petitioner. Thus,
." the order of the disciplinary authority is wholly illegal and it cannot
B
be sustained."

In appeal, the Division Bench observed that the High Court in exercise
of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short
'the Constitution') does not act as an appellate authority and, therefore, the
learned Single Judge was not justified in interfering with the conclusions
c
arrived at by the disciplinary authority. This judgment of the High Court is
under challenge.

Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-employee submitted that
there has been denial of fair play. There is no material to connect the appellant
D
with alleged forgery which was the foundation for the disciplinary action.
Report of the Handwriting expert about whose credibility serious remarks
were made has no evidentiary value, and he is not a competent witness and
his report which forms the foundation for disciplinary action has to be ignored
and if that is kept out of consideration, there is no other material on which
the allegations of misconduct could be substantiated. It is pointed out that E
when investigat.ion was done initially, a report was submitted by the Forensic
Science Laboratory which did not find any material against the employee and
others. The employee was also denied an adequate opportunity to submit his
reply as regards the enquiry report. The charges related to two transactions.
One was posting of the cheque and the other related to forgery. Report of the
F
Handwriting expert is full of inconsistencies and the conclusion about similarity
in hand-writing in the disputed document and the admitted signatures has
been drawn erroneously. To prove his innocence the employee had requested
the authorities to hand over the enquiry to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
This request was made as the employee was convinced that the authorities
were bent upon removing him from service for union activities. Further, G
request was made for being represented by an advocate which was turned
down. The employee had requested for supply of certain documents which
were not acceded to causing thereby prejudice.

·~
/
Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submitted that
the Division Bench rightly considered the scope and ambit of judicial review H
108 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003) 2 S.C.R.

A in the matter of disciplinary proceedings. The stand that the Handwriting
expert's report cannot be accepted without further corroboration is not the
correct proposition in law. Denial of the representation by an advocate was
also just~fied because the presenting officer was not an advocate or a person
with law background. The only area of dispute related to acceptability of the
Handwriting expert's report. The employee who claimed to be a trade union
B activist is well versed with various aspects relating to service jurisprudence,
has cross-examined at length and quite effectively the management witnesses.
Therefore, there is no substance in the plea that there was prejudice by
refusal of pennission to be represented by an advocate. It was further submitted
that no argument was advanced before the High Court (either before learned
C Single Judge or the Division Bench) regarding prejudice. It is also pointed
out that the employee himself had accepted that he committed careless
mistakes, but took the plea that there was no criminal intent. The authorities
have analysed the job requirements of the post which the employee held and
discussed at great length as to how the requisite care and caution were not
exercised. A bare look at the endorsement on the back side of the cheque
D would have aroused suspicion. The plea that many transactions took place
that day is clearly without substance because an employee of the bank is
required to be vigilant and any abnormality shou.ld have been noticed. The
customer was an advocate and he could not have mis-spelt the word 'signature'
as appears on the reverse side of the cheque in question in the endorse!Dent.
E There was an unusual endorsement and withdrawal of Rs. 50,000 by a bearer
cheque. The unusual features should have aroused suspicion. That being so,
the authorities were justified in drawing adverse remarks. The report of the
Handwriting expert is clear and cogent and has clearly spelt out the areas of
similarities in the disputed document and the admitted writings to highlight
as to how employee was the author of forgery.
F
To start with the approach of the learned Single Judge as regards
evidence of V.K. Sakhuja is clearly erroneous. Even if there were adverse
remarks (which we find related to 1958-59) that did not affect the credibility
of his evidence to treat it as totally irrelevant and to be no evidence in the
G eye of law. What was required was a careful analysis of evidence, if it was
brought to the notice of the authorities that his evidence has been doubted in
the past. Nothing could be shown t<? us as to how the report in this particular
case suffers from any infirmity. There is no finding recorded by learned
Single Judge to that effect. On that score alone the Division Bench was
justified in upsetting the learned Single Judge's decision.
H
- LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK [ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

Sections 45 and 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, l872 (in short 'the
109

A
) Evidence Act') deal with opinion of experts and comparison of signature,
writing or seal with others admitted or proved. Section 45 itself provides that
the opinions are relevant facts. It is a general rule that the opinion of witnesses
possessing peculiar skill is admissible. There was no challenge to the expertise
of V.K. Sakhuja. He deposed to have testified in about ten thousand cases B
relating to disputed documents. Though the employee highlighted certain
adverse remarks, it cannot be lost sight of that they were about four decades
back. But we need not go into that aspect in detail as no infirmity in the
report acted upon by the authority in the present case was noticed or could
be pointed out.

It is to be noted that under Sections 45 and 47 cf the Evidence Act, the
c
Court has to take a view on the opinion of others, whereas under Section 73
of the s!lid Act, the Court by its own comparison of writings can form its
opinion. Evidence of the identity of handwriting is dealt with in three Sections
of the Evidence Act. They are Sections 45, 47 and 73. Both under Sections
• 45 and 47 the evidence is an opinion. In the former case it is by a scientific D
comparison and in the latter on the basis of familiarity resulting from frequent
observations and experiences. In both the cases, the Court is required to
satisfy itself by such means as are open to conclude that the opinion may be
acted upon. Irrespective of an opinion of the Handwriting Expert, the Court
can compare the admitted writing with disputed writing and come to its own E
independent conclusion. Such exercise of comparison is permissible under
Section 73 of the Evidence Act. Ordinarily, Sections 45 and 73 are
complementary to each other. Evidence of Handwriting Expert need not be
invariably corroborated. It is for the Court to decide whether to accept such
an uncorroborated evidence or not. It is clear that even when experts' evidence
is not there, Court has power to compare the writings and decide the matter. F
[See Murari Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh. [1980] I SCC 704].

In the instant case, the Enquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority
took pains to carefully consider the Handwriting expert's report and also
looked at the documents to arrive at their own conclusions.
G
Great emphasis was laid on the Forensic Science Laboratory's report to
say that the Handwriting Expert's report is not worthy of acceptance. We
have looked at the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory. It only says
that no definite opinion can be formed. That itself is an indication that a clean
chit was not given as claimed by the employee.
H
110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2003] 2 S.C.R.

A It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal
proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and
different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether
the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him;
whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered
B against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed
upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing
the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. [See State of Rajasthan v.
B.K. Meena and Ors., [1996] 6 SCC 417]. In case of disciplinary enquiry the
technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond
doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material
C on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the
delinquent has committed misconduct.

While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the
High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is
circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural
D errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice.
Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an Appellate
Authority

In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 749 the
scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the Court is
E of decision making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority
are based on some evidence, the Court or the Tribunal cannot re-appreciate
the evidence and substitute its own finding.

As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab and Ors., [1999) 8 SCC
F 90) in paragraphs 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and
has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows:

"16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding
want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of
mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while
exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring
G
authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is
insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the
conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the
court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent
finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long
H as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the
\~

LALIT POPLI v. CANARA BANK [ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.~ 111
adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be A
permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.

17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority
for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the
inquiring has based its conclusions on materials available on record
after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these B
decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner
and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority
cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material
nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on
the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise the High Court has looked C
--· into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the
conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226
of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of
the High Court in this regard."

As noted above, the employee accepted that there was some lapse on D
his part but he pleaded lack of criminal intent. A bank employee deals with
public money. The nature of his work demands vigilance with the inbuilt
requirement to act carefully. Any carelessness invites action.

As has been rightly submitted by learned counsel for the respondents-
Bank, even to the naked eye the mistakes in spelling of "signature" are E
visible and should not have escaped the eyes of a bank employee who is
supposed to be trained and equipped to notice such glaring mistakes. The
Enquiry Officer has noticed t~e similarities highlighted by the Handwriting
,,.- expert in the disputed document and the admitted signatures of the employee
to show how the similarity is visible and even any layman can notice the
similarity. These were factual conclusions. F
Considering the limited scope of judicial review, the Division Bench
was right in upholding the order of dismissal by setting aside the learned
Single Judge's order by which interference was made with it. We find no
reason to differ from the conclusions of the Division Bench. The appeal is G
without merit and is dismissed accordingly.

K.K.T. Appeal dismissed.