Holding

Market value for land acquisition must be determined on the basis of contemporaneous sale deeds of the same village, with an appropriate deduction for development, and cannot be derived from DDA allotment rates, circle rates, or outdated escalation methods.

Summary

The case concerned the determination of market value for lands in Rithala village, Delhi, acquired under four notifications of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Delhi High Court had based compensation on Delhi Development Authority (DDA) allotment rates and limited sale deed evidence, awarding Rs.67,536 per bigha for three acquisitions and Rs.73,584 per bigha for a fourth. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that DDA brochure rates, circle rates and the 1961 acquisition value with a 12% escalation are irrelevant for free‑hold market value of undeveloped agricultural land. The Court emphasized that contemporaneous sale deeds from the same village are the proper evidence, that certified copies may be admitted under Section 51A but may be rejected if unreliable, and that a deduction for development (40% in this case) must be made. Accordingly, the compensation was increased to Rs.30,500 per bigha for the December 1981 acquisition and to Rs.28,000 per bigha for the earlier three acquisitions, with statutory benefits and interest left untouched.

Issues considered

The relevance of DDA brochure allotment rates for determining market value under the Land Acquisition Act.
The admissibility and weight of circle rates/guideline values in market‑value assessment.
The proper use of sale deeds from the same village, including assessment of undervaluation or distress sales, under Section 51A of the LA Act.
The applicability of a 1961 acquisition award with 12% per annum escalation to the 1981 acquisitions.
The correctness of the High Court's methodology in fixing market value and rejecting certain sale deeds.
The maintainability of cross‑objections filed by the DDA seeking reduction of compensation.

Legislation cited

Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957s. 507(a)
Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Indian Stamp Act, 1899s. 47A
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 23, s. 25, s. 4(1), s. 51, s. 51A

Subjects

Land acquisitionMarket value determinationCompensationLand Acquisition ActSection 51ASale deedsDevelopment factorCircle ratesGuideline valuesDelhi Development Authority

Judgment

[2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 622

A LAL CHAND
v.
UNION OF INDIA & ANOTHER
(Civil Appeal No. 4945 of 2006)
AUGUST 12, 2009
B
[R.V. ffAVEENDRAN AND B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894: 't

c Sections 4(1 ), 23, 25 - Acquisition of lands in Rithala
village on the outskirts of Delhi - Compensation -
Determination of - ODA plots in the acquired lands - Rates
of allotment shown by DOA in its Brochure for the Scheme in
that area - Cannot form the basis - Criteria for compensation
and acceptance of sale deeds therefore - Discussed -
...
D
Compensation enhanced - Evidence Act, 1872 - Stamp Act, \_

S.47A.

Sections 51, 51 A - Scope of - Discussed.

E The appeals relate to determination of market value
in regard to lands situated at village Rithala on the
outskirts of Delhi acquired for different purposes under
four different Notifications.

The awards of the Reference Court were. challenged
F before the High Court and it awarded Rs.67,536/- per
bigha in regard to the first three acquisitions and Rs.73,
584/- per bigha in respect of the last acquisition, relying
upon the allotment rates of Delhi Development Authority
for plots shown in its Brochure issued in respect of
G Rohini Residential Scheme (Phase-I) formed by acquiring
part of Rithala village and surrounding villages. f- ..
On appeal by the claimants as also the Union of
India, the Court set aside the judgment of the High Court
H 622
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 623

and remanded the matter back to it for determination of A
the market value afresh. It was observed that the lease
premium in respect of fully developed plots (which was
given in the DOA Brochure) could not be the basis for
determining the freehold market value of undeveloped
land, that the sale deeds pertaining to the acquired lands B
or nearby lands would be the most relevant piece of
evidence, and that the claim of the land owners that the
~ value should be determined on the basis of acquisition
of the year 1961 in the same village by increasing the
award price of Rs.7000/- per bigha at the rate of 12% p.a. c
for 20 years was unacceptable.

The High Court after hearing the parties and
accepting two documents of sale for Rs.19,000/- and
Rs.35,000/- per bigha, taking an average, determined the
value at Rs.27,000/- in respect of the land covered by the D
last Notification and at Rs.25,000/- in respect of the lands
covered by the first three _Notifications, on the ground that
the acquisitions were made about 10 to 11 months prior
to the last Notification. Hence the appeals.
E
Partly allowing the appeals of the claimants for
increase and dismissing the appeals filed by DOA for
reduction in compensation, the Court

HELD: 1. The allotment rates of plots adopted by
Development Authorities like DOA cannot form the basis F
for award of compensation for acquisition of
undeveloped lands for several reasons. Firstly market
value has to be determined with reference to large tracts
of undeveloped agricultural lands in a rural area, whereas
the allotment rates of development authorities are with G
reference to small plots in a developed lay out falling
within Urban areas. Secondly, DOA and other statutory
authorities adopt different rates for plots in the same area
with reference to the economic capacity of the buyer,
H
624 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A making it difficult to ascertain the real market value, ·~

whereas market value determination for acquisitions is
uniform and does not depend
I
upon the economic status
of the land loser. Thirdly_, the Court is concerned with
market value of freehold land, whereas the allotment
8 "rates" in the ODA Brochure refer to the initial premium
payable on allotment of plots on leasehold basis. [Para
7] [639-A-D]

Ranvir Singh v. Union of India 2005 (12) SCC 59 and
Cement Corporation of India Ltd. V. Purya 2004 (8) SCC 270,
c referred to.
2.1. As contrasted from the assessment of market
value contained in non-statutory Basic Value Registers,
the position may be different, where the guideline market ~!

D values are determined by Expert Committees constituted
under the State Stamp Law, by following the detailed *
procedure laid down under the relevant rules, and are
published in the State Gazette. Such state stamp Acts
and the Rules thereunder, provide for scientific and
E methodical assessment of market value in different areas
by Expert Committees. These statute_s provide that such
committees will be constituted with officers from the
Department of Revenue, Public Works, Survey &
Settlement, Local Authority and an expert in the field of ~

F valuation of properties, with the sub-registrar of the sub-
registration district as the member secretary. They also
provide for different methods of valuation for lands, plots,
houses and other buildings. They require determination
of the market value of agricultural lands by classifying
them with reference to soil, rate of revenue assessment,
G
value of lands in the vicinity and locality, nature of crop
yield for specified number of years, and situation (with ;I. ...
reference to roads, markets etc.). The rates assessed by
the committee are required to be published inviting
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 625

objections/suggestions from the members of public. A
After considering such objections/suggestions, the final
rates are published in the Gazette. Such published rates
are revised and updated periodically. When the guideline
market values, that is, minimum rates for registration of
properties, are so evaluated and determined by expert B
committees as per statutory procedure, there is no
reason why such rates should not be a relevant piece of
evidence for determination of market value. One of the
-J
recognised methods for determination of market value is
with reference to opinion of experts. The estimation of c
market value by such statutorily constituted expert
committees, as expert evidence can therefore form the
basis for determining the market value in land acquisition

... -J
cases, as a relevant piece of evidence. It will be however
open to either party to place evidence to dislodge the
presumption that may flow from such guideline market
D
value. The guideline market value can be a relevant piece
of evidence only if they are assessed by statutorily
appointed Expert Committees, in accordance with the
prescribed assessment procedure (either street-wise, or
road-wise, or area-wise, or village-wise) and finalised after E
inviting objections and published in the Gazette. [Para 16]
[646-C-H; 647-A-D]

2.2. In the instant case, there is nothing to show the
circle rates have been determined by any statutorily F
appointed committee by adopting scientific basis. Hence,
the principle in Jawajee Naganatham will apply and they
will not be of any assistance for determining the market
value. Further, they do not purport to be the market value
for lands in rural areas on the outskirts of Delhi, nor the G
-I market values relating to Rithala village. The circle rates
~ relate to urban/city areas in Delhi and are wholly
irrelevant. [Para 17] [647 -E-G]

H
626 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue Divisional Officer 1994
(4) SCC 595; Land Acquisition Officer, E/uru vs. Jasti Rohini -~

1995 (1) SCC 717; U.P.Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its
Chairman vs Mis. Katra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow 1996 (3)
SCC 124; Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Sahaswan v.. Bipin
B Kumar 2004 (2) SCC 283; Ramesh Chand Bansal v. District
Magistrate/Collector, Ghaziabad 1999 (5) SCC 62 and R. Sai
Bharathi v. J. Jaya/alitha 2004 (2) SCC 9, referred to.

3. Even if the relied upon transaction is only two to ~
three years prior to the acquisition, court should, before
c adopting a standard escalation, satisfy that there were no
adverse circumstances. For example, if the acquisition is
of the year 2009, it may not be possible to determine the
market value, based on the 2007 or 2008 prices, by
providing an increase of 12% or 15% per year, as the· ~
D newspaper reports show that the price of immovable
properties in most areas of the country came down by ~

more than 40% to 50% from the 2007 rates. Caution is
therefore necessary before increasing the price with
reference to the old transactions. The award made in
E regard to a 1961 acquisition will not be of any use for
determining the market value for a 1981 acquisition. [Para
19] [649-A-C]

General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v.
~·
F Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel 2008 (11) SCALE 637, referred
to.

· 4. The reasons assigned by the High Court for :
rejecting Ex. A2, 3, A10 to A13 and Ex R3 to R7 are not
sound. All ·the sale deeds related to Rithala village and
G were of the year of acquisition, namely 1981. They were
prior to the acquisition under notification dated \--
31.12.1981, which is the largest of the four acquisitions. ... ..
The difficulty arises because of the marked difference in
value, disclosed by the sale deeds exhibited by the
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 627

respondents (Ex.R3 to R7) and the sale deeds exhibited A
• by the appellants (Ex.A1 to A3 and A10 to A13). The sale
deeds produced by the respondents (Ex. R3 to R7) which
are of the period between 9.2.1981 to 28.11.1981 disclose
a value of Rs.9028 to Rs.10791 per bigha, that is an
average of Rs.10000 per bigha. On the other hand the sale B
deeds, produced by the appellant (Ex. A1 to A3 and A10
to A13) which are the period 9.4.1981 to 1.12.1981 show
market values of Rs.35000/-, Rs.49000/- and Rs.68371/- per
bigha, the average being Rs.50790/- per bigha 7 The
'""'
variation between the sale deeds relied upon by the c
respondents and appellants is as much as 400%. [Para
24] [652-F-H; 653-A-B]
5.1. Courts may accept and act upon certified copies
of sale deeds exhibited without examining the vendor or
( vendee. They may not be relied upon if there is other D
-# acceptable evidence which throw a doubt about the
correctness of the sale price shown therein. [Para 26]
(655-G]

5.2. The evidence to reject an exemplar sale deed as E
not relevant, may be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The
statement of a witness describing the advantageous or
disadvantageous features of the land which is the
subject matter of such document will be extrinsic
evidence. An absurdly low or high freakish value when F
compared to the prevailing price disclosed by other
., contemporaneous transactions may also be an extrinsic
evidence. Where the sale deed recites the financial
difficulties of the vendor and the urgent need to find
~

money as reasons for the sale, that will be an intrinsic
"'"""- .. evidence of a distress sale. Therefore, though a certified
G

.<
~
copy of a sale deed may be received in evidence and
exhibited even without examining the vendor and
vendee, and accepted as proof of the transaction to
which it relates, the courts have the discretion to rely
H
628 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A upon it or reject it as unreliable or unacceptable for
reasons to be recorded. [Para 27] [655-H; 656-A-C] J.

5.3. What Narsaiah and Cement Corporation of India
clarified was that a certified copy of a sale deed could be
B marked as an exhibit and its contents may be relied upon
as evidence of the sale transaction, even without
examining either the vendor or the vendee, in view of the
enabling provision in Section 5~ of the LA Act. If the
acquisition is in regard to a large area of agricultural
~
lands in a village, and the exemplar sale deed is also in
c respect of an agricultural land in the same village, it may
be possible to rely upon the sate deed as prima facie
evidence of the prevailing market value, even if such land
is at the other end of the village at a distance of one or
two kilometres. But the same may not be the position
D where the acquisition relates to plots in a town or city ~

where every locality or road has a different value. [Para
28] [656-0-F] "
5.4. There would be lesser likelihood of rejection of
E a sale deed exhibited to prove the market value, if some
witness speaks about the property which is the subject
matter of the exemplar sale deed and explains its
situation, potential, as also about the similarities or
dissimilarities with the acquired land. The distance
F between the two properties, the nature and situation of
the property, proximity to the village or a road and several
other factors may all be relevant in determining the market I

value. Mere production of some exemplar deeds without
'connecting' the subject matter of the instrument, to the t
G acquired lands will be of little assistance in determining ...
the market·value. Section 51A of the LA Act only exempts _....,.,
the production of the original sale deed and examination
of the vendor or vendee. [Para 29] [657-C-E] }.- ~

Cement Corporation of India v. Purya 2004 (8) SCC 270
H and Land Acquisition Officer and Manda/ Revenue Officer vs.
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 629

Narasaiah 2001 (3) SCC 530, relied on. A

6.1 When the respondents rely upon certain sale
deeds ~justify the value determined by the Land
Acquisition Collector or to show that the market value
was less than what is claimed by the claimants, and if the 8
claimants produce satisfactory evidence (which may be
either with referenc" to contemporaneous sale deeds or
awards made in respect of acquisition of comparable
land or by other acceptable evidence) to show that the
market value was much higher, the sale deed relied upon C
by the respondents showing a lesser value may be
inferred to be undervalued; or not showing the true value.
Such deeds have to be excluded from consideration as
being unreliable evidence. A document which is found to
be undervalued cannot be used as evidence. [Para 30]
[657-F-H] D

- ~ 6.2. In some recent cases, where a court accepts the
sale deed exhibited by the claimants as the basis for
ascertaining the market value. There has been a
disturbing trend of courts accepting a contention of the E
claimants that the general tendency of members of public
is not to show the real value, but show a lesser value to
avoid tax/stamp duty and therefore the sale deeds
produced and relied on by them, should be assumed to
+ be under valued. On such assumption, some courts have F
been adding some fancied percentage to the value
shown by the sale deeds to arrive at what they consider
to be 'realistic market value'. The addition so made may
vary from 10% to 100% depending upon the whims,
fancies, and the perception of the Judge as to what is the G
general extent of suppression of the price in sale deeds.
Such increase, in the market value disclosed by the sale
deeds, on the assumption that all sale deeds show a
'depressed' market value instead of the real value, is
impermissible. The Court can either accept the document H
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

•
A as showing the prevailing market value, in which event
it has to be acted upon. Or the Court may find a
document to be undervalued in which it should be
rejected straightaway as not reliable. There is no third way
of accepting a document, by adding to the market value
B disclosed by the document, some percentage to off-set
the under-valuation. There is no legal basis to proceed
on a general assumption that parties, without exception,
fail to reflect the true consideration in the sale deeds, that
there is always underval.uation or suppression of the true
c price and that consequently, all sale deeds reflect a
depressed value and not the real market value a.nd
therefore, some percentage should be added to arrive at
the real value. Such a course also amounts to branding
all vendors and purchasers as dishonest persons
without any evidence and without hearing them. It
D I
ignore,s the fact that government has fixed minimum
guideline values and whenever a registering authority is ,\_~
'\
of the view that a sale deed is undervalued, proceedings
are initiated for determination of the true market value. It ..
also ignores the fact that a large number of sale deeds
E
are accepted by the registering authorities as disclosing
the current market value. [Para 31] [658-A-H; 659-A]

7.1. The existence of several other sale deeds
showing a much higher value and the fact that the Land t
F Acquisition Collector chose to award a higher rate in
regard to some of the acquired lands, leads to an
inevitable inference that Ex.R3 to R7 were either
undervalued or were distress sales. Whatever be the
reason, they are liable to be excluded from consideration.
G The sale transactions under Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to A13
relate to plots used for residential or other non-
agricultural purposes. Though these sale deeds describe
the lands sold as agricultural lands, having regard to the
prevailing land reforms laws, the size of the plots show
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 631

that they were not used for agricultural purposes. It is A
evident the plots which were the subject matter of these
I
" sale deeds were sold as semi-urban land for residential
' or other non-residential purposes. There is no evidence
or material to show that they were nominal or sham
• documents intended to create evidence of a higher 8
market value. The variation in price between Rs.35000 to
Rs.68571 may possibly be on account of several factors.
It is possible that some plots were nearer while others
were far away from roads or developed areas. In the
absence of the evidence of vendors/vendees of these c
documents, it is proposed to take average of these
transactions, which is approximately Rs.50,790/- per
bigha, as the market value of small plots sold for
residential or non-agricultural purposes. [Paras 32 and
33] [659-8-H; 660-A] D
'i 7 .2. The evidence shows that the acquired lands
were at the relevant time (1981) in a rural area on the
-.
"- outskirts of Delhi, with access to roads and services
nearby. In fact the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, within
a few months after the acquisition, issued a notification E
dated 23/4/1982, under section 507(a) of Delhi Municipal
Corporation Act, 1957 declaring that Rithala in the
northern zone of Delhi shall cease to be a rural area. The
t
appellants have also let in evidence to show that the
acquired lands were situated in an area having a potential F
for development for residential use. The policy resolution
dated 27.12.1980 of Delhi Development Authority in
regard to development of Zones H7 and HS (Rohini
Scheme) in North-West Delhi shows that the area was
earmarked for fast urban development. Some facilities like G
roads, water, electricity had reached the area in a limited
"":: ~
manner. Therefore, the appropriate deduction towards
development, needs to be only 40% instead of the higher
standard percentage of 60% to 70%. [Para 34] [660-8-E]
H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 7.3. On deduction of 40% from Rs.50790/- per bigha
.I\_
which the market value of small plots, the market value
for the large tracts of lands acquired in December, 1981
would be Rs.30,474/- (rounded off to Rs.30500/-) per
bigha. As the earlier three acquisitions were of the same
B year, but were in February and March (that is on
13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981) which are about 10 to
11 months earlier, the compensation in regard to the
three earlier acquisitions is determined as Rs.28000/- per
bigha. To this extent, the award of the High Court
c requires to be modified. [Para 35] [660-F-G]

8.1. It is now well settled that sale transactions or
awards relating to neighbouring village will not be relied
on when acceptable evidence by way of
contemporaneous sale transactions or awards are
D available in regard to the very village where the
acquisition took place. Where there are no
contemporaneous sale deeds or awards relating to the
same village, then the sale transactions or awards of the
same period relating to the neighbouring village can be
E considered provided there is evidence to show that the
acquired lands and the lands covered by the exemplar
deeds of the neighbouring· village are similarly situated.
[Para .36] [661-G-H; 662-A]

F 8.2. In the absence of any evidence, this Court
cannot assume that acquired lands in Rithala and lands
acquired in Poothkalan were similarly situated. [Para 36]
(662·0]
8.3. Ram Phoo/ was not a posmve determination of
G market value of Poothkalan lands, but the rejection of a
determination of a higher value by High Court for want
of acceptable evidence. [Para 36] [662-F-G] .... -
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 633

;.. Union of India vs. Ram Phoo/ 2003 (10) SCC 167, A
referred to.

9. Accordingly, the compensation in regard to
acquisition dated 31.12.1981 is increased from Rs.27000/
- to Rs.30,500/- per bigha. The compensation in regard to
B
the acquisition dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981
is also increased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.28,000/- per
bigha. The statutory benefits and interest awarded are not
disturbed. [Para 37] [662-H; 663-A]

Case Law Reference: c
2005 (12) sec 59 referred to Para 3
~
2004 (8) sec 210 referred to Para 3

1994 (4) sec 595 referred to Para 13
D
1995 (1) sec 111 referred to Para13

- 1996 (3) sec 124
2004 (2) sec 283
referred to

referred to
Para13
Para 13
E
1999 (5) sec 62 referred to Para 14

2004 (2) sec 9 referred to Para 15

2008 (11) SCALE 637 referred to Para 19

2001 (3) sec 530 relied on Para 26 F
2003 (10) sec 167 referred to Para 36

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.

..
4945 of 2005.
G
_. From the Judgment & Order dtaed 27.4.2006 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in R.F.A. No. 265 of 1998.

WITH
H
. '\.

634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A CA Nos.4946, 4947, 4948, 4949, 4950, 4951, 4952, 4953,
4954,4955,4956,4957,4958,4959,4960,4961,4962,4963,
4964,4965,4966,4967,4968,4969,4970,4971,4972,4973,
4974, 4976, 4977, 5134, 5135, 5136, 5351, and 5890 of 2006.

WITH
B
CA Nos.23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37,38, 39,40,41,42,465,603, 886,887,888,889,890,891,
1228, 1229, 1230, 1231, 1232, 1233, 1295, 1300, 1301, 1302,
1303, 1304, 1305, 1307, 1308, 1309, 1310, 1311, 1976, 1977,
c 1979, 1980, 1982, 1984,2461,2679,2721, 2722,2723,3990,
and 4693 of 2007
~
R. Venkataramani, Basava Prabhu S. Patil, Avtar Singh,
. Aljo K. Joseph, Raj Singh Rana, K.S. Rana, Santosh Kumar,
Dr. Kailash Chand, Naresh Kaushik, Sanjeev K. Bhardwaj,
D ~
Rupesh Kaushik, Lalita Kaushik, Rana Ranjit Singh, Prem

E
Malhotra, Ambrish Kumar, Balraj Dewan, Chander Shekhar
Ashri, Vishnu B. Saharya, (for Saharya & Co.), Rekha Pandey,
Sadhna Sandhu, Anil Katiyar, D.S. Mahra and Jitendra Mohan
Sharma for the appearing parties.
-/

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R. V. RAVEENDRAN, J. 1. This batch of appeals arise
out a common judgment dated 27.4.2006 of the High Court of
F Delhi in RFA No.751/1994 (Jas Rath vs. Union of India) and
other connected cases. They relate to determination of market
value in regard to lands situated at village Rithala on the
outskirts· of Delhi, acquired for (i) construction of a
supplementary drain; (ii) construction of sewage treatment plant; ·-
G (iii) re-modelling of Nangloi drain; and (iv) planned development
of Delhi. The said four acquisitions were initiated under
notifications dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 13.3.1981 and
31.12.1981 issued under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition
;_ ...
Act, 1894 ("LA Act' for short). The extent of lands acquired and

H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 635
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

compensation awarded are as under: A

Rate awarded per Bigha (Unit of 1008 sq. yds.)
Date of Extent By LAO By Reference By High Court
notification notified Court (impugned B
under Bighas- judgment)
Sec.4(1) Biswas (In Rupees) (In Rupees) (In Rupees)
13.2.1981 829 - 00 2600 (Block B) 20,000 25,000
3800 (Block A)
20.2.1981 883 - 08 2600 (Block B) 20,000 25,000 c
3800 (Block A)
13.3.1981 78 - 16 6500 10,800 25000
31.12.1981 5947 - 00 7000 (Block C) 21,000 27,000
9000 (Block B)
D
10840 (Block A)

2. The awards of the reference court were challenged by
the landowners. The appeals were decided by the Delhi High
Court by judgment dated 4.9.2001 awarding Rs.67000 per E
bigha in regard to lands covered by notifications dated
13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 and Rs.73,584 per bigha
in regard to lands covered by notification dated 31.12.1981.
r For arriving at the said market value, the High Court relied upon
the allotment rates of Delhi Development Authority for plots F
shown in its Brochure issued on 9.2.1981 in respect of Rohini
Residential Scheme (Phase-I), formed by acquiring part of
Rithala village and surrounding villages. The provisional rates
of allotment given in the said brochure were Rs.100, Rs.125,
Rs.150, and Rs.200 per sq. m. respectively for plots of the size G
of 26,32,48,60 and 90 sq. m. The High Court took the average
-4 of those allotment rates as Rs.150 per sq. m. Having regard
to the fact that the said rate was the premium for allotment on
leasehold basis, the High Court inferred that the freehold market
value of the said plots would be at least double, that is Rs.300
H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A per sq. m. Taking note of the fact that considerable expenditure
would have been involved for developing the plots,. the High
"
Court took the wholesale price of freehold plots as Rs.200 per
sq. m. and after deducting 60% towards the cost of
development and area required for roads etc., determined the
B market price at Rs.80 per sq. m. (or Rs.67/- per sq. yd.). The
said rate was awarded as compensation for the first three·
acquisitions. In regard to land acquired under the last
)--
notification (dated 31.12.1981) it provided an increase of 12%
per annum and arrived at the market value as Rs. 73 per sq.
c yd. This worked out to Rs.67,536 per bigha in regard to the first
three acquisitions and Rs.73,584 per bigha in regard to the last
acquisition.

3. Feeling aggrieved the claimants as well as the Union of
India filed appeals before this Court. This court by a common
D judgment dated 7.9.2005 (reported in Ranvir Singh v. Union .
of India - 2005 (12) SCC 59) allowed the appeals, set aside
the judgment of the High Court and remanded the matter to the
High Court for determination of the market value afresh. This
Court held:
E
(a) The lease premium in respect of fully developed plots
(which was given in the ODA brochure) could not be the
basis for determining the freehold market value of
undeveloped land, though the undeveloped land may be
F situated adjacent to the developed plots. Therefore the
DPA brochure rates were not of assistance.
'" (b) The sale deeds pertaining to the acquired lands or
nearby lands would be the most relevant pieces of
evidence and the High Court ought not to have ignored the
G sale deeds exhibited by the parties on the ground that
/.
,._
neither the vendors nor the purchasers relating to the said
deeds were examined as witnesses, having regard to the
decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Cement
Corporation of India Ltd. V. Purya [2004 (8) SCC 270].
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 637
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

(c) The claim of the land owners that the market value of A
J...
the acquired lands s.hould be determined on the basis of
acquisition of the year 1961 in ·the same village, by
increasing the award price of Rs. 7,000 per bigha at the
rate of 12% per annum for 20 years, was una.cceptable.
B.
4. After remand, parties let in further evidence. The High
Court examin.ed various pieces of evidence placed before it. It
rejected the· entire documentary evidence placed by both
-.,J.,
parties, except two documents· for determining the
compensation. The first is a sale deed (Ex. PW-1/1) dated 41
11.4.1980 under which land was sold. in Rithala village for
c
Rs.19,000/- per bigha. The second is an.other sale deed (Ex.
A1) dated 9.4.1981 under which .. one bigha of land was sold
for Rs.35,000/-. The average of the said two sale. deeds, namely
_..... Rs.27,000/- per bigha was determined as the market value in
" regard to the lands acquired under notifications dated D
~
31.12.1981. 1.n regard to the lands that were acquired under
notifications dated 13'.2.1981, 20.2.1981and13'.3.1981, having
regard to the fact that the said acquisitions were about 11 to
10 months prior to the acquisition of 31.12.1981, it determined
the market value as Rs.25,000/- per bigha. E

5. Not being satisfied with the amount awarded the
appellants have filed these appeals. According to them, the
compensation awarded is low and it ought to have been higher.
They contend thatthe High court was not Justified in rejecting F
the following documents from consideration :

(i) Ex. X-1 {DOA brochure relating to Rohini Residential
Scheme) issued in 1981 showing an average premium of
Rs.150/-: per sq. m. in respect of ODA plots for allotment.
G
(ii) The circle rates dated 21.1.1989 issued by the Land
-- ..\ Division of Government of India showing a market value
of Rs.400/- per square yard for residential plots (and
Rs.800/- per sq. yd. for commercial plots).
H
I
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A (iii) Award relating to the acquisition of land at Rithala A
under notification dated 24.10.1961 at Rs.7,000 per Bigha
which when increased at a compound rate of 12% per
annum for twenty years, would give a market value of
Rs.67,525/- per bigha in 1981.
B
(iv) Sale deeds marked as A-2, A-3, A-10 to A-13 all of
the year 1981, showing a market value ranging from
Rs.35000/~ per bigha to Rs.68570/- per bigha.

The appellants contend that by taking those documents into
C account, the High Court ought to have determined the market
value as at least Rs.49000/- per Bigha. The DOA has filed
cross-objections in several appeals for reducing the
compensation to what was awarded by the reference court.

0 Whether DOA brochure is relevant evidence?
6. The DOA brochure (Ex.X1) dated 9.2.1981 is an
invitation seeking applications from members of public for
allotment of plots on lease basis under Rohini Residential
Housing Scheme. The Brochure stated that the plots were in a
E layout formed/to be formed in Rithala and the surrounding
villages. The brochure gives the following provisional rates for
allotment of plots on leasehold basis :

S.No. Plot size Category Rate (Per Sq.m.)
F
1. 26 sqm Economically weaker sections(EWS) Rs. 100/-

2. 32 sqm Low Income Group(LIG) Rs. 125/-

3. 48 sqm Low Income Group (LIG) Rs. 150/-
G
4. 60 sqm Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/-

5. 90 sqm Middle Income Group (MIG) Rs. 200/-

The appellants contend that Rs.150/- per sq. m. which is the
H average of the said provisional rates, should be taken as
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 639
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

• indicative of the ruling market price. A

7. On careful consideration, we are of the view that such
allotment rates of plots adopted by Development Authorities like
ODA cannot form the basis for award of compensation for
acquisition of undeveloped lands for several reasons. Firstly
8
market value has to be determined with reference to large tracts
of undeveloped agricultural lands in a rural area, whereas the
-.... allotment rates of development authorities are with reference
to small plots in a developed lay out falling within Urban area.
Secondly ODA and other statutory authorities adopt different
rates tot plots in the same area with reference to the economic C
capacity of the buyer, making it difficult to ascertain the real
market value, whereas market value determination for
acquisitions is uniform and does not depend upon the
economic status of the land loser. Thirdly we are concerned
-..: with market value of freehold land, whereas the allotment "rates" D
in the ODA Brochure refer to the initial premium payable on
allotment of plots on leasehold basis. We may elaborate on
these three factors.

8. First factor: The percentage of 'deduction for E
development' to be made to arrive at the market value of large
tracts of undeveloped agricultural land (with potential for
*development), with reference to the sale price of small
developed plots, varies between 20% to 75% of the price of
such developed plots, the percentage depending upon the F
nature of development of the lay out in which the exemplar plots
are situated. The 'deduction for development' consists of two
components. The first is with reference to the area required to
be utilised for developmental works and the second is the cost

-
of the development works. For example if a residential layout G
~is formed by DOA or similar statutory authority, it may utilise
around 40% of the land area in the layout, for roads, drains,
parks, play grounds and civic amenities (community facilities)
etc. The Development Authority will also incur considerable
expenditure for development of undeveloped land into a H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A developed layout, which includes the cost of leve1Hng the land,
cost of providing roads, underground drainage and sewage
..
,

facilities, laying waterlines, electricity lines and developing parks
and civil amenities, which would be about 35% of the value of
the developed plot. The two factors taken together would be
B the 'deduction for development' and can account for as much
as 75% of the cost of the developed plot. On the other hand, if
the residential plot is in an unauthorised private residential
layout, the percentage of 'deduction for development' may be
)---
far less. This is because in an un-authorized lay outs, usually
c no land will be set apart for parks, play grounds and community
facilities. Even if any land is set apart, it is likely to be minimal.
The roads and drains will also be narrower, just adequate for
movement of vehicles. The amount spent on development work
would also be comparatively less and minimal. Thus the
deduction on account of the two factors in respect of plots in '-ff-
D
unauthorised layouts, would be only about 20% plus 20% in all
40% as against 75% in regard to DOA plots. The 'deduction x
for development' with references to prices of plots in authorised
private residential layouts may range between 50% to 65%
depending upon the standards and quality of the layout. The
E position with reference to industrial layouts will be different. As
the industrial plots will be large (say of the size of one or two
acres or more as contrasted with the size of residential plots
measuring100 sq.m. to 200 sq.m.), and as there will be very
limited civic amenities and no playgrounds, the area to be set ~
F apart for development (for roads, parks, playgrounds and civic
amenities) will be far less; and the cost to be incurred for
development will also be marginally less, with the result the
deduction to be made from the cost of a industrial plot may
range only between 45% to 55% as contrasted from 65 to 75%
G for residential plots. If the acquired land is in a semi-developed
urban area, and not an undeveloped rural area, then the
deduction for development may be as much less, that is, as little l
as 25% to 40%, as some basic infrastructure will already be
..
available. (Note: The percentages mentioned above are
H tentative standards and subject to proof to the contrary).
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 641
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

9. Therefore the deduction for the 'development factor' to A
"·· be made with reference to the price of a small plot in a
developed lay out, to arrive at the cost of undeveloped land,
will be for more than the deduction with reference to the price
of a small plot in an unauthorized private lay out or an industrial
layout. It is also well known that the development cost incurred B
by statutory agencies is much higher than the cost incurred by
private developers, having regard to higher overheads and
,___. expenditure. Even among the layouts formed by DDA, the
percentage of land utilized for roads, civic amenities, parks and
play grounds may vary with reference to the nature of layout - c
whether it is residential, residential-cum-commercial or
industrial; and even among residential layouts, the percentage
will differ having regard to the size of the plots, width of the
roads, extent of community facilities, parks and play grounds
)o-L
provided. Some of the layouts formed by statutory Development
... Authorities may have large areas earmarked for water/sewage D
'.,;

treatment plants, water tanks, electrical sub-stations etc. in
addition to the usual areas earmarked for roads, drains, parks,
playgrounds and community/civic amenities. The purpose of the
aforesaid examples is only to show that the 'deduction for
E
development' factor is a variable percentage and the range of
percentage itself being very wide from 20% to 75%.

~. 10. Second factor: DOA and other statutory development
· ~ authorities adopt different rates for allotment, plots in the same
layout, depending upon the economic status of the allottees, F
classifying them as high income group, middle income group,
low income group, and economically weaker sections. As a
consequence, in the same layout, plots-may be earmarked for
persons belonging to economically weaker section at a price/
premium of Rs. 100/- sq.m, whereas the price/premium G
charged may be Rs.150/- per sq.m for members of low income
" ~ group, Rs.200/- per sq.m for persons belonging to middle
income group and Rs. 250/- per sq. m. for persons belonging
I.
to High income groups. The ratio of sites in a layout reserved
for HIG, MIG, LIG and EWS may also vary. All these varying H

=rt
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A factors reflect in the rates for allotment. It will be illogical to take
the average of the allotment rates, as the 'market value' of those .~·
plots, does not depend upon the cost incurred by ODA statutory
authority, but upon the paying ·capacity of the applicants for
allotment.
B
11. Third factor: Some development authorities allot plots
on freehold basis, that is by way of absolute sale. Some
development authorities like DOA allot plots on leasehold basis.
Some have premium which is almost equal to sale price, with >-r
C a nominal annual rent, whereas others have lesser premium,
and more substantial annual rent. There are standard methods
for determining the annual rental value with reference to the
value of a freehold property. There are also standard methods
for determining the value of freehold (ownership) rights with
reference to the annual rental income in regular leases. But it
D is very difficult to arrive at the market value of a freehold
property with reference to the premium for a leasehold plot .. ~
allotted by DOA. As the period of lease is long, the rent is very
nominal, some times there is ·a tendency among public to
equate the lease premium rate (allotment price) charged by
E ODA, as being equal to the mark~t value of the property.
However, in view of the difficulties referred to above, it is not
safe or advisable to rely upon the allotment rates/auction rates
in regard to the plots formed by ODA in a developed layout, in
determining the market value. of the adjoining undeveloped ,~
F freehold lands. The DOA brochure price has therefore to be 4
excluded as being not relevant.

Whether the circle rates/guideline value rates can be
relied upon to determine the market value?

G 12. The appellant relied upon the notification dated
21.1.1981 issued by the Land Division of Government of India,
Ministry of Works and Housing, notifying the Schedule of Market
Rates of land in different parts of Delhi and various outlying
areas - showing the minimum rates Rs.400/- per sq. yard for
H~ residential and Rs.800/- sq. yard for non-residential plots. The
...
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 643
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

~.
question is whether the same could be relied upon for A
.. determination of market value in regard to land acquisition .
When the matter came up before this Court in the earlier round,
the counsel for the appellant had conceded that such rates could
not form the basis for determining the market value of the
acquired lands. In spite of it, the learned counsel for appellant B
submitted before us that though the said circle rates cannot be
the basis for determining the market value, it may be taken note
...... ~ of as one of the relevant pieces of evidence indicative of the
market value. There is some confusion as to whether such
basic rates/guideline value/minimum registration value rates c
could form the basis for determining the market value.

13. This Court in Jawajee Nagnatham v. Revenue

- .....
Divisional Officer [1994 (4) sec 595] and several cases
following it, including Land Acquisition Officer, Eluru vs Jasti
Rohini [1995 (1) SCC 717], U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through D
its Chainnan vs Mis. Katra Properties (P) Ltd. Lucknow [1996
(3) SCC 124j and Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Sahaswan v.
Bipin Kumar [2004 (2) SCC 283] held that maket value under
section 23 of LA Act cannot be fixed on the basis of the rates
mentioned in the Basic Valuation Registers' maintained for the E
purpose of detection of undervaluation and collection of proper
stamp duty.

4- .. (13.1.) In Jawajee Nagnatham, the land owners had
.; appealed to the Andhra Pradesh High Court against the order F
of Reference Court, claiming increase, relying up on the market
value entered in the Basic Valuation Register maintained by the
Revenue Authorities under the Stamp Act. The High Court
rejected the claim based on the Basic Valuation Register, as
such Register had no evidentiary value or statutory basis. In
G
appeals by the land owners, this Court held that the Basic
...~ Valuation Register was maintained for the purpose of collecting
stamp duty under Section 47A of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899
(as amended in Andhra Pradesh); that Section 47A conferred
no express power to the Government to determine the market
H
'
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS. [2009] 13' (ADDL.) S. C.R.

A value. of the lands. prevailing in ~ particular area, village, block, ,,.~

district or region and to maintain Basic Valuation Register for
levy of stamp duty in regard to instruments presented for
registration; that there was no other statutory .provision or rule
having statutory force providing for maintaining such Valuation
B 'Register; and therefore, such. Register prepared and
maintained for the purpose o~ cpllecting stamp duty had no
statutory base or force and ca·nnot forrT)· the ~asis 'to determine
the marke.t value of any acquired land underS~ctipn 23 of the ')l'°'f ·,
LA Act. Jasti Rohini also arose from Andhra Pradesh and
c followed Jawajee Naganatham and held· that the Basic
Valuation Register had no statutory basis. · ·
.. ·
\·

(13.2.) The case of U.P. Jal Nigam arose from Uttara
Pradesh. In that case, the land owner filed a writ petition
seeking a direction to U.P. Jal Nigam to pay compensation in ~

D regard to lands acquired on the basis of market value
assessed by the Collector, Lucknow. The High Court allowed
.. ~

the petition and directed the U.P. Jal Nigam to pay
compensation at the rate determined, by the ColleCtor, on the
basis of the basic valuation circulars issued for purposes of
E stamp duty. This Court reversed the decision' of the High Court
following its earlier· decision in· Jawajee Naganatham and held
that the Collector committed an error in dete.rmining the market
value on the basis of Basic Value cfrculars. Jawajee
~ ">·
Naganatham was ag~in ·followed in· Bipin Kumar, which is
F another case from Uttar Pradesh.
.. '

(13.3.) All the four decisions rejected the value entered in
the Basic Valuation Registers, on the ..ground th~t they had no
statutory basis having regard to the provisions of stamp law
applicable in the respective States (Andhra.Pradesh and Uttar
G
Pradesh) and cannot be the basis for de~er'minati~n of market
value under Section 23 of LA Act. i-
""'
14. There are also another set of decisions considering
such circle rates could be considered.as prima facie basis, for
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 645
[R.V. RAVEENDR~N, J.]

~
purposes of ascertaining the market value and determining A
whether there was any undervaluation of the instrument for
purposes of stamp duty, which is a revenue collection exercise.
We may refer to one of those cases, that is Ramesh Chand
Bansal v. District Magistrate/Collector, Ghaziabad [1999 (5)
SCC 62], wherein this Court held : B
"Reading S. 47-A with the aforesaid R. 340-A it is ·ciear
that the circle rate fixed by the Collector is not final but is
.,.._'(
only a prima facie determination of rate of an area
concerned only to give guidance to the .Registering
Authority to test prinia. facie whether the instrument has c
properly described the value of the properfy. The circle rate
under this Rule is neither final for the authority nor to one
subjeted to pay the stamp duty. So far sub-sections (1) and
(2) it is very limited in its application as it only directs the
,.~
Registering Authority to refer to the Collector for D
determination in case property is under-valued in such

... instrument. The circle rate does not take away the right of
such person to show that the property in question is
correctly valued as he gets an opportunity in case of under- .
'

valuation to prove it before the Collector after reference is E
made."

15. In R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jaya/alitha [2004 (2) SCC
4" .. 9], while examining the issue in the context of a case relating
to disproportionate assets, this Court held : F
)

"The guideline value is a rate fixed _by authorities under the
Stamp Act for purposes of. determining the true market
value of the property disclosed in an instrument requiring
payment of stamp duty. Thus the guideline value fixed is.
not final but only a prima facie rate prevailing in an area. G
,.. --=, It is open to the registering authority as well as 'the person
seeking registration to prove the actual market value of
property. The· authorities cannot regard the guideline
valuation as the last.word on the subject of market value.
x x x x This scheme of the enactment and the Rul~s H
646 SUPRE.ME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A contemplate that guideline value will only afford a prima ',.,,-l
facie basis to ascertain the true or correct market value.
Undue emphasis on the guideline value without reference
'.
to the setting in which it is to be viewed will obscure the
issue for consideration. It is clear, therefore, that guideline
value is not sacrosant as urged on behalf of the appellants, ,...
B
but only a factor to be taken note of, if at all available in
respect of an area in which the property transferred lies."

16. It should however be noted that as contrasted from the
,. .......

assessment of market value contained in non-statutory Basic
c Value Registers, the position may be different, where the
guideline market values a:e determined by Expert Committees
corstituted under the State Stamp Law, by following the
detailed procedure laid down under the relevant rules, and a~e
published in the State Gazette. Such state stamp Acts and the ,_,
D Rules thereunder, provide for scientific and methodical

..
)o'>r
assessment of market value in different areas by Expert
Committees. These statutes provide that such committees will
be constituted with officers from the Department of Revenue,
Public Works, Survey & Settlement, Local Authority and an
E expert in the field of valuation of properties, with the sub-
registrar of the sub-registration district as the member
secretary. They also provide for different methods of valuation
for lands, plots, houses and other buildings. They require
determination of the market value of agricultural lands ·by 4 -~
F classifying them with reference to soil, rate of revenue ::
assessment, value of lands in the vicinity and locality, nature of
crop yield for specified number of years, and situation {with
reference to roads, markets etc.). The rates assessed by the

G
committee are required to be published inviting objections/
suggestions from the members of public. After considering such
objections/suggestions, the final rates are published in the
--
Gazette. Such published rates are revised and updated ~"": -
periodically. When the guideline market values, that is,
minimum rates for registration of properties, a\e so evaluated
and determineef by expert committees as per statutory
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 647
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

procedure, there is no reason why such rates should not be a A
relevant piece of evidence for determination of market value.
One of the recognised methods for determination of market
value is with reference to opinion of experts. The estimation of
1 market value by such statutorily constituted expert committees,
' as expert evidence can therefore form the basis for B
f determining the market value in land acquisition cases, as a
relevant piece of evidence. It will be however open to either
o\
party to place evidence to dislodge the presumption that may
~ flow from such guideline market value. We however hasten to
add that the guideline market value can be a relevant piece of c
evidence only if they are assessed by statutorily appointed
Expert Committees, in accordance with the prescribed
assessment procedure (either street-wise, or road-wise, or
c area-wise, or village-wise) and finalised after inviting objections
and published in the Gazette. Be that as it may. We have
D
referred to this aspect only to show that there are different
." categories of Basic Valuation Registers in different states and
what is stated with reference to the stamp law in Andhra
Pradesh or Uttar Pradesh, may not apply with reference to other
states where state stamp laws have .prescribed the procedure
for determination of market value, referred to above. E

17. In this case, there is nothing to show the circle rates
have been determined by any statutorily appointed committee

"'.... by adopting scientific basis. Hence, the principle in Jawajee
Naganatham will apply and they will not be of any assistance F
for determining the market value. Further, they do not purport
to be the market value for lands in rural areas on the outskirts
of Delhi, nor the market values relating to Rithala village. The
circle rates relate to urban/city areas in Delhi and are wholly
irrelevant. G
Whether the award relating to acguisition on 24.10.1961
'"\ is relevant.

18. The appellants contend that some lands in Rithala were
H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A acquired under section 4(1) notification dated 24.10.1961 for /~
the planned development of Delhi and compensation was
awarded at the rate of Rs. 7000 per big ha. Their contention is
that as the present acquisition is in the year 1981, the market
value of the acquired land should be determined with reference
B to the market value determined for the 1961 acquisition by
providing an appropriate increase at the cumulative/
.compounded rate of 12% per annum.
~.
19. 'This Court had occasion to examine this issue recently.
In The General Manager, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.
c v. Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel [2008 (11) SCALE 637], this
court held : .

"Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of determining
the market value by providing appropriate escalation over
0 the proved market value of nearby lands in previous years
(as evidenced by sale transactions or acquisition), where ./'-
there is no evidence of any contemporaneous sale
transactions or acquisitions of comparable lands in the
neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably safe where
E the relied-on-sale transactions/acquisitions precedes the
subject acquisition by only a few years, that is upto four to
five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even if it relates
to a neighbouring land. What may be a reliable standard
if the gap is only a few years, may become unsafe and -+ 'lo-
unreliable standard where the gap is larger. For example,
F
for determining the market value of a land acquired in
1992, adopting the annual increase method with reference
t~ a sale or acquisition in 1970 or 1980 may have many
pitfalls. This is because, over the course of years, the 'rate'
of annual increase may itself undergo drastic change apart
G from the likelihood of occurrence of varying periods of
stagnation in prices or sudden spurts in prices affecting f
the very standard of increase."

(emphasis supplied)
H
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 649
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

Even if the relied upon transaction is only two to three years A
~
prior to the acquisition, court should, before adopting a
standard escalation, satisfy that there were no adverse
circumstances. For example, if the acquisition is of this year
2009, it may not be possible to determine the market value,
•...,..
I
based on the 2007 or 2008 prices, by providing an increase
of 12% or 15% per year, as the newspaper reports disclose
B

·~
that the price of immovable properties in most areas of the
country came down by more than 40% to 50% from the 2007
h rates. Caution is therefore necessary before increasing the
price with reference to the old transactions. Be that as it may. c
It is clear that the award made in regard to a 1961 acquisition
will not be of any use for determining the market value for a
1981 acquisition.

__, Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the sale
deeds {Ex.A-2 to A-3 and A-10 to A-13 and Ex.R3 to R7} D
~

..
from consideration?

20. The appellants have relied upon A-2, A-3 and A-10 to
A-13 relating to sale of land in Rithala village, the details of
which are as under: E
s. Ex. No. Date of Sale Extent Rate pe1
No. execution consider- sold big ha
ration

1. A-1 09.4.1981 35000 1 bigha 35000 F
2. A-2 15.9.1981 35000 1 bigha 35000

3. A-13 15.9.1981 3·5000 1 bigha 35000
.... . 4. A-3 27.7.1981 49000 1 bigha 49000
G
5. A-10 03.11.1981 24000 7 biswas 68571

6. A-11 03.11.1981 24000 7 biswas 68571

7. A-12 01.12.1981 49000 1 bigha 49000
H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A 21. On the other hand, the respondents relied upon Ex.R3
to R7 relating to sale of land in Rithala Village, the details of
which are as under:

s. Ex. Extent Date of Sale Rate per
No. No. of land Execution considerration Big ha
B

1. RS· 1- 3 09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/- Rs.9,391/-

2. R7 1 -.3 09.2.1981 Rs.10,800/- Rs.9391/-
c
3. R4 3 - 12 05.6.1981 Rs.32,500/- Rs.9028/-

4. R6 3-3 17.7.1981 Rs.34,000/- Rs.10, 793/-
D ~
5. R3 4 - 12 28.11.1981 Rs.46,000/- Rs.10000/-

22. The High Court, as noticed above, determined the
E market value as Rs.27000/- per bigha by taking the average
of the prices disclosed by Ex.A1 dated 9.4.1981 (Rs.35000/-)
and Ex. PW1/1 dated 4/11.4.1980 (Rs.19000/-). It rejected Ex.
A2, A3 and A 10 to A 13 on the ground that they were post- _. .,.
notification sales with reference to acquisitions dated
F 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981. Then it examined
whether the said sale deeds were of any relevance to
determine the market value in regard to the acquisition under
notification dated 13.12.1981. It was of the view that Ex. A10
to A 12 related to small bits of land and therefore were not of
G any assistance. It referred to the fact that the sales on 3. 11.1981
(Ex. A 10 and A 11) were at a price of Rs.68571 per bigha and
sales on 27.7.1981and1.12.1981 (Ex.A3 and A12) were at a
price of Rs.49,000/-, whereas the market price on 9.4.1981 (Ex.
A1) was only Rs.35000 per bigha, thereby showing a steep
H increase in seven months. The High Court was of the view that
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 651
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
...,,,. the increase of nearly 95% in a period of 7 months or even a A
40% increase in four/eight months demonstrated that they were
not bonafide transactions and therefore, they should be ignored.
The High Court did not consider the possibility that the steep
increase may be a genuine increase on account of the rapid
urbanisation of the area, or on account of the acquisitions in B
February and March, 1981 and/or on account of the locational
advantage (such as nearness to road or nearness to developed
h,.. area).

23. The High Court also rejected Ex.R3 to R7 relied upon
by the respondents, solely on the ground that the prices therein
c
were lower than the market value offered by Land Acquisition
Collector and therefore, they had to be excluded under section
25 of the LA Act. Section 25 provides that the amount of
compensation awarded by a reference court shall not be less
~.
than the amount awarded by the Collector under section 11. We D
"' fail to see how the said section has any relevance in regard to
determination of market value as contrasted from award of
compensation. If the sale deeds relied on by the respondents
showed a particular market value, they cannot be ignored merely
because the Collector had awarded compensation at a higher E
rate in regard to the acquired land. All that section 25 requires
is that courts should not award an amount which is less than
what is awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector, even if the
·t ..
evidence may show a lesser market value. So, the bar under
section 25 of the LA Act is not in regard to determination of a F
market value, which is less t~an what was awarded by the LAO.
The bar is only upon the reference court (or any higher court)
reducing the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition
Collector. The fact that the Land Acquisition Collector has
awarded compensation at a particular rate does not mean that G
the sale deeds which are otherwise reliable, cannot be relied
~ upon to find out what was the real market value. Further the very
assumption that all awards made by the Collector were at a rate
higher than what was disclosed by the sale deeds (Ex.R3 to
R7) is also not correct. The Land Acquisition Collector awarded H

t
I

652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

, .
·-
'
'

A a sum of Rs.2600 to Rs.3800 per, bigha in regard to
acquisitions under notifications d~ted 13.2.1981 and·
20.2.1981, Rs.6500 in regard ·to acquisi~i9n under notification .
? "
...
I
,~

dated 13.3.1981. These amounts were certainly lower than the
market value shown by E_x.R3 to R.7. Even in regard to.the
B acq·uisition under· notification dated 13. 12_.1981, .the award by.
the Collector at Rs.7,000/- and Rs.9000/-were lower than the
value disclosed by Ex.R3 to R7. As noticed 'above, these sale
deeds show that the market value was around Rs. 9000 per-· y-4· .,
bigha in February to June 1981 and 10,000 to 11,000 per bigha
c between July, 1981 and November, 1-981. The Land
Acquisition Officer awarded Rs. 10,840 (which is more than the·
price shown by Ex.R3 to R7) in regard to only SO!l}e lands
acquired under the December, 1981 acquisition. Be that as it ,1
I--
may. As the sale deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) relate to sales of lands
in Rithala Village, they cannot be excluded fro_m consideration
D
merely on the ground that what has been awarded by the Land · ~ ·
?r
Acquisition Collector was higher in regard to some of the
acquired lands. We accordingly find that the ground on which
the High Court excluded the sale deeds Ex.R3 to R7 is not
sound. The question whether these deeds (Ex.R3 to R7) should
E be excluded on any other relevant ground will be considered
-
later.
..
24. We are therefore of the considered view that the
reasons assigned by the High Cou.rt for rejecting Ex. A2,3, A 10. -1 't-·
F to A13 and Ex R3 to R7 are not sound. All the sale deeds
related to Rithala village and were of the year of acquisition,
namely 1981. They were prior to the acquisition under
notification dated 31 ..12.1981, which is the largest of the four . ·
acquisitions. The difficulty arises because of the marked ,
G difference in value, disclosed by the sale deeds exhibited by
the respondents (Ex.R3 to R7) and the sale deeqs. exhibited·.
· by the ·appellants (Ex.A1 to A3 and A10 to A13). The sale
deeds produced by the respondents (Ex. R3 to R.7) whic~ are;
of the period between 9.2.1981to28.11.1981 disclose a value
.'H of Rs.9028 to Rs.10791 per bigha, that is ·an average of
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 653
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

Rs.10000 per bigha. On the other hand the sale deeds, A
........
produced by the appellant (Ex. A 1 to A3 and A 10 to A 13) which
are the period 9.4.1981 to 1.12.1981 show market values of
Rs.35000/-, Rs.49000/- and Rs.68371/- per bigha, the average
being Rs.50790/- per bigha. The variation between the sale
deeds relied upon by the respondents and appellants is as B
much as 400%. The question then is which set of sale deeds
should be accepted, for determination of the market value of
the acquired lands.
~
25. The appellants contend that the sale transactions as
per Ex.R3 to R7 relied upon by the respondents, showing an
c
average value of Rs.10000 per bigha, should be excluded from
consideration as they do not reflect the true market value and

--
as they were obviously undervalued transactions where only a
part of sale price was shown in the document, the balance
having been suppressed either to evade capital gains tax and D

"" stamp duty, or to invest black money. Alternatively, it is
submitted that they may be distress sales. On the other hand
the respondents submitted that the sale deeds exhibited by
them represent the true market value as they showed a
consistent price range whereas the sale deeds exhibited by the E
appellants (Ex. A 1 to A3 and A 10 to A 13) showed prices with
a large variation demonstrating that they were got up to show
artificially increased value and that it should be inferred that
.f .... they were created only for the purpose of providing proof in
support of the claim for higher compensation. It is submitted F
that they do not represent bona fide transactions. It is pointed
out that the residents of the locality knew in the year 1980 itself,
or at least by February, 1981 that there will be further acquisition
of lands in Rithala village for development of existing Rohini
Scheme and related purposes and therefore, these documents G
were brought into e_xistence to create evidence of a higher than
' ~'.i real market price. It is submitted that there is no explanation
regarding the large variance in the price disclosed by Ex.A1
" to A3 and A 10 to A 13. This necessitates consideration of effect
of section 51A of the LA Act and the relevance of undervalued H
654 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A documents.

What is the effect of section 51A of LA Act?

26. Before the amendment to the LA Act, introducing
section 51A, it was necessary to examine either the vendor or
B a vendee to exhibit a sale deed and prove its contents. If the
vendor or vendee was so examined, it was possible to cross-
examine them so as to ascertain whether the transaction
reflected by the exhibited instrument was a genuine transaction ~
or a transaction showing a depressed value or a boosted
C value. But with the insertion of section 51A, certified copies of
registered sale deeds could be tendered as evidence without
examining the vendor or vendee thereof and the court is
enabled to accept them as evidence of the transaction
recorded therein. The scope of section 51A was explained by
D a Constitution Bench of this Court in Cement Corporation of
India v. Purya [2004 (8) SCC 270] thus : "r
-
"But when the statute enables a court to accept a sale
"\
deed on the records evidencing a transaction, nothing I

further is required to be done .......... Even the vendor or
E
vendee thereof is not required to examine themselves for
proving the contents thereof. This, however, would not
mean that the contents of the transaction as evidenced
by the registered sale deed would automatically be
accepted. The legislature has advisedly used the word
F 'may'. A discretion, therefore, has been conferred upon a
court to be exercised judicially, i.e. upon taking into
consideration the relevant factors.

The submission of Mr. G. Chandrasekhar to the effect that
G the contents of a sale deed should be a conclusive proof
as regard the transaction contained therein or the court
must raise a mandatory presumption in.relation thereto in
terms of Section 51 of the Act cannot be accepted as the
Court may or may not receive a certified copy of sale
H deed in evidence. It is discretionary in nature. Only
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 655
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]
~
because a document is admissible in evidence, as would A
appear from the discussions made hereinbefore, the
same by itself would not mean that the contents thereof
stand proved. Secondly, having regard to the other
materials brought on record, the court may not accept the
evidence contained in a deed of sale. When materials are 8
brought on record by the parties to the lis, the court is
·~ entitled to appreciate the evidence brought on records for
determining the issues raised before it and in the said
process, may accept one piece of evidence and reject the
other." c
[emphasis supplied]

-
1\.
The following view expressed earlier in Land Acquisition Officer
and Manda/ Revenue Officer vs. Narasaiah (2001 (3) SCC
530], was approved in Cemen.t Corporation of India (supra) D
and is extracted below :

"The words "may be accepted as evidence" in the Section
indicate that there is no compulsion on the court to accept
such transaction as evidence, but it is open to the court to
E
treat them as evidence. Merely accepting them as evidence
does not mean that the court is bound to treat them as
-1' ,. reliable evidence. What is sought to be achieved is that
the transactions recorded in the documents may be treated
. as evidence, just like any other evidence, and it is for the
court to weigh all the pros and cons to decide whether such
F
transaction can be relied on for understanding the real
price of the land concerned".

Therefore, courts may accept and act Ul_)On certified copies of
sale deeds exhibited without examining the vendor or vendee. G
~ They may not be relied upon if there is other acceptable
evidence which throw a doubt about the correctness of the sale
price shown therein.

27. The evidence to reject an exemplar sale deed as not
H
656 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A relevant, may be either extrinsic or intrinsic. The statement of ~
a witness describing the advantageous or disadvantageous
fratures of the land which is the subject matter of such document
will be extrinsic evidence. An absurdly low or high freakish value
when compared to the prevailing price disclosed by other
B contemporaneous transactions may also be an extrinsic
evidence. Where the sale deed recites the financial difficulties
of the vendor and the urgent need to find money as reasons
for the sale, that will be an intrinsic evidence of a distress sale. ~-
Therefore, though a certified copy of a sale deed may be
c received in evidence and exhibited even without examining the
vendor and vendee, and accepted as proof of the transaction
to which it relates, the courts have the discretion to rely upon it
or reject it as unreliable or unacceptable for reasons to be

D
recorded.

28. But a word of caution. What Narsaiah and Cement )>\'
Corporation of India clarified was that a certified copy of a sale
, -
deed could be marked as an exhibit and its contents may be -
relied upon as evidence of the sale transaction, even without
examining either the vendor or the vendee, in view of the
E enabling provision in Section 51 of the LA Act. If the acquisition
is in regard to a large area of agricultural lands in a village, and
the exemplar sale deed is also in respect of an agricultural land
in the same village, it may be possible to rely upon the sale
deed as prima facie evidence of the prevailing market value, -( 'f-
F even if such land is at the other end of the village at a distance
of one or two kilometres. But the same may not be the position
where the acquisition relates to plots in a town or city where
every locality or road has a different value. For example in a
place like Delhi there are some areas where the plot value is
G many times more than the value of plots in a neighbouring
middle class locality which in turn may be many time more than
(
the value of plot in a neighbouring slum area. Or the price of a
property on a main road may be many times more than the price
of a proT>erty on a parallel smaller road, though the two
properties may be situated ba~k to back. It cannot be said that
H

,.
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 657
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

merely because two properties adjoin each other or touch each A
other the value applicable to the property facing a main road,
should be applied to the property to its rear facing a service
road. Therefore, while a distance of about a kilometre may not
make a difference for purposes of market value in a rural
village, even a distance of 50 metre may make a huge B
difference in market value in urban properties.

29. There would be lesser likelihood of rejection of a sale
deed exhibited to prove the market value, if some witness
speaks about the property which is the subject matter of the C
exemplar sale deed and explains its situation, potential, as also
about the similarities or dissimilarities with the acquired land.
The distance between the two properties, the nature and
situation of the property, proximity to the village or a road and
several other factors may all be relevant in determining the
market value. Mere production of some exemplar deeds without D
'connecting' the subject matter of the instrument, to the acquired
lands will be of little assistance in determining the market value.
Section 51A of the LA Act only exempts the production of the
original sale deed and examination of the vendor or vendee.
E
What is the utility or relevance of under-valued sale deeds
in determine market price?

30. This takes us to the value of "undervalued" sale deeds.
When the respondents rely upon certain sale deeds to justify
F
the value determined by the Land Acquisition Collector or to
show that the market value was less than what is claimed by
the claimants, and if the claimants produce satisfactory
evidence (which may be either with reference to
contemporaneous sale deeds or awards made in respect of
acquisition of comparable land or by other acceptable G
evidence) to show that the market value was much higher, the
sa.!_e deed relied upon by the respondents showing a lesser
value may be inferred .to be undervalued, or not showing the
true value. Such deeds have to be excluded from consideration
as being unreliable evidence. A document which is found to be H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A undervalued cannot be used as evidence.
...
..,..
31. But we have noticed a disturbing trend in some recent
cases, where a court accepts the sale deed exhibited by the
claimants as the basis for ascertaining the market value. But
then, it also accepts a contention of the claimants that the
B
general tendency of members of public !is not to show the real
value, but show a lesser value to avoid tax/stamp duty and
therefore the sale deeds produced and relied on by them,
should be assumed to be under valued. On such assumption,
some courts have been adding some fancied percentage to
c the value shown by the sale deeds to arrive at what they
consider to be 'realistic market value'. The addition so made
may vary from 10% to 100% depending upon the whims,
fancies, and the perception of the learned Judge as to what is
the general extent of suppression of the price in sale deeds.
D Such increase, in the market value disclosed by the sale deeds, .-
on the assumption that all sale deeds show a 'depressed' ;'k
market value instead of the real value, is impermissible. The
Court can either accept the document as showing the prevailing
'•
market value, in which event it has to be acted upon. Or the
E Court may find a document to be undervalued in which it should
be rejected straightaway as not reliable. There is no third way
of accepting a document, by adding to the market value
disclosed by the document, some percentage to off-set the
under-valuation. There is no legal basis to proceed on a general
-( 't-
F assumption that parties, without exception, fail to reflect the true
consideration in the sale deeds, that there is always
undervaluation or suppression of the true price and that
consequently, all sale deeds reflect a depressed value and not
the real market value and therefore, some percentage.should
G be added to arrive at the real value. Such a course also
amounts to branding all vendors and purchasers as dishonest
persons without any evidence and without hearing them. It
ignores the fact that government has fixed minimum guideline
t
values and whenever a registering authority is of the view that
H a sale deed is undervalued, proceedings are initiated for
f

LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 659
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

~ determination of the true market value. It also ignores the fact A
that a large number of sale deeds are accepte~ by the
registering authorities as disclosing the current market value.
Be that as it may.

Whether valuation by the High Court is proper? B
32. The existence of several other sale deeds showing a
..._ much higher value and the fact that the Land Acquisition
Collector chose to award a higher rate in regard to some of
the acquired lands, leads to an inevitable inference that Ex.R3
to R7 were either undervalued or were distress sales. Whatever C
be the reason, they are liable to be excluded from
consideration.

33. The sale transactions under Ex. A1 to A3 and A10 to
A 13 relate to plots used for residential or other non-agricultural o
'K.. purposes. Though these sale deeds describe the lands sold
as agricultural lands, having regard to the prevailing land
reforms laws, the size of the plots show that they were not used
for agricultural purposes. For example, two of the sale deeds '.'"
Exs. A 10 and A 11, relate to 7 biswas of land each (about 350 E
sq. yds. each) and the purchaser is a business firm (M/s. Sant
& Co.). Obviously, the land was not sold for agricultural
purpose, as it is not possible to imagine plots measuring only
• ~ 350 sq. yards being sold for agricultural purposes. Significantly,
the other sale deeds, each of which relate to an area of one
bigha and show a price of Rs.35000/- per bigha ('three deeds)
F
and Rs.49000/- per bigha (two deeds). It is evident the plots
which were the subject matter of these sale deeds were sold
as semi-urban land for residential or other non-residential
purposes. There is no evidence or material to show that they
were nominal or sham documents intended to create evidence G
"'l of a higher market value. The variation in price between
Rs.35000 to Rs.68571 may possibly be on account of several
factors. It is possible that some plots were nearer while others
were far away from roads or developed areas. In the absence
of the evidence of vendors/vendees of these documents, we H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009} 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A propose to take average of these transactions, which is . ,.,...
approximately Rs.50,790/- per bigha, as the market value of
small plots sold for residential or non-agricultural purposes.

34. But when the market value of such small plots intended
for non-agricultural purposes is made the basis for determining
B
the market value of large tracts of agricultural lands, it is ,
necessary to make an appropriate deduction towards
'development' factor. The evidence shows that the acquired ..,,4·
lands were at the relevant time (1981) in a rural area on the
outskirts of Delhi, with access to roads and services nearby.
c In fact the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, within a few months
after the acquisition, issued a notification dated 23/4/1982,
under section 507(a) of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957
declaring that Rithala in the northern zone of Delhi shall cease
~
to be a rural area. The appellants have also let in evide·nce to
D show that the acquired lands were situated in an area having
?'
a potential for development for residential use. The policy
resolution dated 27 .12.1980 of Delhi Development Authority in
rega~d to development of Zones H7 and HS (Rohini Scheme)
in North-West Delh shows that the area was earmarked for fast
E urban development. Some facilities like roads, water, electricity
had reached the area in a limited manner. Therefore, the
appropriate deduction towards development, needs to be only
40% instead of the higher standard percentage of 60% to 70%.
~·
,..
F 35. On deduction of 40% from Rs.50790/- per bigha which
the market value of small plots, the market value for the large
tracts of lands acquired in December, 1981 would be
Rs.30,474/- (rounded off to Rs.30500/-) per bigha. As the
earlier three acquisitions were of the same year, but were in
February and March (that is on 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and
G
13.3.1981) which are about 10 to 11 months earlier, the
compensation in regard to the three earlier acquisitions is ~
determined as Rs.28000/- per bigha. To this extent, the award
of the High Court requires to be modified.

H 36. The learned counsel for DDA contended that market
'
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 661
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

r~ value determined by the High Court required to be reduced with A
reference to the market value of the acquired lands in the
neighbouring village. He relied upon the decision of this Court
in Union of India vs. Ram Phool- 2003 (10) SCC 167, which
related to acquisition of 5484 bighas of land in revenue village
~

(
Poothkalan on the outskirts of Delhi, in regard to which the B
preliminary notification was issued on 11.12.1981. The
reference court had, after referring to several sale transactions,
-~ determined the market value as Rs·.15, 700/- per bigha in one
case and Rs.18,500/- per bigha in another case. On appeal
by the claimants, the High Court excluded several sale c
transactions relied upon by the reference court as not inspiring
confidence, and on the basis of a solitary transaction dat~d
10.9.1981 in regard to a small area of one bigha, increased
the market value to Rs.30,000/- per bigha. This Court held that
the High Court erred in relying upon a single sale deed relating
D
~ to a small extent of one bigha to determine the market value of
a large extent of 5484 bighas. It further held that if that sale
deed was excluded, there was no other evidence to support
the increase in compensation made by the High Court.
Consequently, this Court set aside the increase awarded by the
High Court and restored the market value determined by the E
reference court. The learned counsel for ODA.submitted that a
rate in that range (Rs.15700 to Rs.18500 per bigha) should
·-( '). therefore be adopted for the Rithala lands also. But that
decision relating to Poothkalan is not of any assistance with
reference to the Rithala acquisitions for the following reasons: F

(i) It is now well settled that sale transactions or awards
relating to neighbouring village will not be relied on when
acceptable evidence by way of contemporaneous sale
transactions or awards are available in regard to the very G
village where the acquisition took place. (Where there are
no contemporaneous sale deeds or awards relating to the
same village, then the.sale transactions or awards of the
same period relating to the neighbouring village can be
considered provided there is evidence to show that the H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A acquired lands and the lands covered by the exemplar
deeds of the neighbouring village are similarly situated).

(ii) The decision in Ram Phoo/ itself lays down as follows:
'Contemporaneous award no doubt is a useful guide for
every court to determine the market value but that award
B
must be taken into evidence in accordance with law by
giving an opportunity to the otherside for rebutting the
same and that has not been done in the case on hand.' In
this case while the learned counsel for respondents
contended that the lands at Rithala and Poothkalan were
c similar, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted
that the acquired lands in Rithala were far more valuable
than the lands in Poothkalan and that Rithala was nearer
to the city when compared to ·Poothkalan. Neither stand
is supported by any evidence or material on record. In the
D absence of any evidence, we cannot assume that acquired
lands in Rithala and lands acquired in Poothkalan were
. similarly situated.

(iii) In Ram Phool, this Court set aside the decision of the
E High Court and restored the award of reference court, not
because it came to the conclusion that the market value
was only Rs.15,700/-/Rs.18,500/- as decided by the
reference court, but because the only piece of evidence
that was relied on by the High Court to fix the market value
of Rs.30,000/- was found to be not reliable and no other
F
evidence was available. Therefore, decision of this Court
in Ram Phool was not a positive determination of market
value of Poothkalan lands, but the rejection of a
determination of a higher value by High Court for want of
acceptable evidence.
G
Conclusion:
37. We accordingly increase the compensation, in regard
to acquisition dated 31.12.1981 from Rs.27000/-to Rs.30,500/
H '
- per bigha. We also increase the compensation in regard to
1
LAL CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 663
[R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J.]

the acquisition dated 13.2.1981, 20.2.1981 and 13.3.1981 A
from R~.25,000/- to Rs.28,000/- per bigha. The statutory
benefits and interest awarded are not disturbed.

38. The appeals by the claimants are partly allowed
increasing the compensation as per para 37 above. As a
8
consequence, the cross objections by DOA seeking reduction
of the compensation are rejected without going into the
question whether such cross objections are maintainable.
Parties to bear their respective costs.

G.N. Appeals disposed of. C