LAKHVIR SINGH ETCversusTHE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.

                          [2021] 1 S.C.R. 269                              269


                      LAKHVIR SINGH ETC.                                   A
                                   v.
                 THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.
                (Criminal Appeal Nos. 47-48 of 2021)
                         JANUARY 19, 2021                                  B
  [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
      Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: Object of legislation –
Held: To give the benefit of release of offenders on probation of
good conduct instead of sentencing them to imprisonment – Thus,
                                                                           C
increasing emphasis on the reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders as useful and self-reliant members of society without
subjecting them to deleterious effects of jail life is what is sought to
be subserved.
      Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: s.6 – Appellants were
                                                                           D
convicted by trial court for offence under s.397 IPC and sentenced
to undergo rigorous imprisonment of seven years each – High Court
dismissed the appeal against the conviction by trial court –
Appellants filed special leave petition and annexed compromise deed
arrived at between the complainant and the appellants in terms
whereof the complainant had stated that he did not want to pursue          E
any action against the appellants and has no objection to their
release on bail on acquittal – Appellants have already served about
50% of their sentence while in custody – The prosecution however
objected that the minimum sentence provided by the statute under
s.397 IPC is seven years and the same cannot be reduced below
                                                                           F
that period – On this submission, the appellants-convicts sought
benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act – Held: Appellants
were below 21 years of age as on the date of offence – The benefit
of probation under the Act is not excluded by the provisions of the
mandatory minimum sentence under s.397 of IPC, the offence in
the present case – Appellants have not served out the minimum              G
sentence of seven years though they have served about half the
sentences – They were aged under 19 and 21 years of age as on the
date of offence but not on the date of sentence – The redeeming
feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to
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                                  269
270            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     have forgiven them, possibly with the passage of time – No adverse
      report has been brought to notice against them about their conduct
      in jail – Fit case to extend benefit of probation to the appellants
      under the Act in view of the provisions of s.4 of the Act on completion
      of half the sentence – Appellants are released on probation of good
      conduct under s.4 of the Act on their completion of half the sentence
B
      and on their entering into a bond with two sureties each to ensure
      that they will maintain peace and good behaviour for the remaining
      part of their sentence, failing which they can be called upon to
      serve that part of the sentence – Penal Code, 1860 – s.397.
             Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: s.4 – Essential feature of
C     – Held: “notwithstanding” contained in s.4 permits, despite anything
      contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court to
      release a person on bond, with or without sureties, for a period of
      three years instead of sentencing him in order to ensure that he
      keeps peace and good behaviour – In this regard, under sub-section
D     (2), before making any order under sub-section (1), the court is
      required to take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation
      officer concerned in relation to the case.
            Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: s.6 – Determining factors
      while giving benefit under – Held: The relevant aspects while giving
E     benefit under s.6 of the Act are: the nature of offence, the character
      of the offender, and the surrounding circumstances as recorded in
      the probation officer’s report.
            Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: s.4 and s.6 – Distinction
      between – Held: s.4 is distinct from s.6 as it is discretionary in nature
F     while s.6 provides that a court “must not” sentence a person under
      the age of 21 years to imprisonment unless sufficient reasons for
      the same are recorded, based on due consideration of the probation
      officer’s report.
             Probation of Offenders Act, 1958: s.6 – Applicability of –
G     Held: Appellants were under 21 years of age on the date of the
      offence and not on the date of conviction, s.6 would not come to
      their aid.
            Disposing of the appeals, the Court
           HELD: 1. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the
H     said Act explains the rationale for the enactment and its
  LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                     271


amendments: to give the benefit of release of offenders on             A
probation of good conduct instead of sentencing them to
imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis on the reformation
and rehabilitation of offenders as useful and self-reliant members
of society without subjecting them to the deleterious effects of
jail life is what is sought to be subserved. Section 6 of the said
                                                                       B
Act, as per its own title, provides for restrictions on imprisonment
of offenders under twenty-one years of age. [Para 6][275-B-D]
      State of Madhya Pradesh v. Vikram Das (2019) 4 SCC
      125: [2019] 3 SCR 691 – relied on.
      2. The rationale is that the underlying purpose of the           C
provision being reformative – Section 6 being a special provision
enacted to prevent the confinement of young persons under 21
years of age in jail, to protect them from the pernicious influence
of hardened criminals. In the facts of the present case, the
appellants are stated to be below 21 years of age as on the date
of offence. The sentencing order was passed by the trial Court         D
noting that the appellants committed an offence of serious nature
against a poor person and were thus disentitled from the benefits
under the said Act or under Section 360 Cr.P.C. [Para 7]
[276-D-E]
      3. In the case of the appellants, Section 3 would have no        E
application taking into consideration nature of offence. However,
Section 4 could come to the aid of the appellants as the offence
committed, of which they have been found guilty, is not punishable
with death or imprisonment for life. However, the trial court
opined against the appellants. Also the “notwithstanding”              F
contained in Section 4 permits, despite anything contained in any
other law for the time being in force, the court to release a person
on bond, with or without sureties, for a period of 3 years instead
of sentencing him in order to ensure that he keeps peace and
good behaviour. In this regard, under sub-section (2), before
making any order under sub-section (1), the court is required to       G
take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer
concerned in relation to the case. [Para 8][278-D-G]
      Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar (1972) 3 SCC 350
      – relied on.
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272            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A           4. Section 4 is distinct from Section 6 as it is discretionary
      in nature while Section 6 provides that a court “must not”
      sentence a person under the age of 21 years to imprisonment
      unless sufficient reasons for the same are recorded, based on
      due consideration of the probation officer’s report. The relevant
      aspects while giving benefit under Section 6 of the Act are: the
B
      nature of offence, the character of the offender, and the
      surrounding circumstances as recorded in the probation officer’s
      report. [Para 9][278-G-H; 279-A]
            5. The appellants who were under 21 years of age on the
      date of the offence and not on the date of conviction, Section 6
C     would not come to their aid. The benefit of probation under the
      said Act is not excluded by the provisions of the mandatory
      minimum sentence under Section 397 of IPC. [Paras 10, 13]
      [279-A-B; 280-C-D]
            Ramji Missar vs. State of Bihar AIR 1963 SC 1088 :
D           [1963] Suppl. SCR 745 ; Ishar Das vs. State of Punjab
            (1973) 2 SCC 65 : [1972] 3 SCR 312 ; Joginder Singh
            vs. State of Punjab ILR (1981) P&H 1 – relied on.
            6. The facts of the present case are that the appellants have
      not served out the minimum sentence of 7 years though they
E     have served about half the sentences. They were aged under 19
      & 21 years of age as on the date of offence but not on the date of
      sentence. The redeeming feature in their case is that the person
      who suffered, appears to have forgiven them, possibly with the
      passage of time. No adverse report has been brought to notice
F     against them about their conduct in jail. This is a fit case that the
      benefit of probation can be extended to the appellants under the
      said act in view of the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act on
      completion of half the sentence. The appellants are released on
      probation of good conduct under Section 4 of the said Act on
      their completion of half the sentence and on their entering into a
G     bond with two sureties each to ensure that they maintain peace
      and good behaviour for the remaining part of their sentence, failing
      which they can be called upon to serve that part of the sentence.
      [Paras 14, 15][280-E-G; 281-A]

H
     LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                     273


          Masarullah v. State of Tamil Nadu (1982) 3 SCC 458 ;            A
          Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand (2008) 3 SCC
          111 : [2008] 2 SCR 146 ; CCE vs. Bahubali (1979) 2
          SCC 279 : [1979] 1 SCR 1104 ; State vs. Ratan Lal
          Arora, (2004) 4 SCC 590 : [2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 631
          – referred to.
                                                                          B
                               Case Law Reference
[2019] 3 SCR 691                              relied on     Para 5
[1963] Suppl. SCR 745                         relied on     Para 7
(1982) 3 SCC 458                              referred to   Para 7        C
[2008] 2 SCR 146                              referred to   Para 7
(1972) 3 SCC 350                              relied on     Para 7
[1972] 3 SCR 312                              relied on     Para 11
[1979] 1 SCR1104                              referred to   Para 13       D
[2004] 1 Suppl. SCR 631                       referred to   Para 13
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
Nos. 47-48 of 2021.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 24.10.2019 of the High Court      E
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRA-S-372-SB-2005 & CRA-
S–717-SB-2005.
      Ms. Isha Aggarwal, Anirudh Sanganeria, Ms. Jaspreet Gogia,
Karanvir Gogia, Ms. Shivangi Singhal, Pardhuman Garg, Abhishek Kumar
Singh, Advs. for the appearing parties.                                   F
          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
          SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
       1. The appellants were youngsters aged 20 and 19 years when
they fell foul of the law. On 14.02.2003, at around 7.30 p.m., the
appellants alongwith co-accused Gurpreet Singh1 approached the            G
complainant – PW1 to hire a taxi to go to a village. Enroute, when at
their behest the car was stopped, Gurpreet Singh caught hold of the
complainant and the appellant Jagdeep Singh took a dagger and inflicted
1
    He faced trial before a Juvenile Court.
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274               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     6-7 injuries on PW1’s forehead. Appellant Lakhvir Singh inflicted 2-3
      injuries on his abdomen and 1 injury on his neck using a knife. The
      complainant was thrown out of his taxi and the three people fled with
      the taxi. In pursuance to the reporting of the crime by complainant, an
      FIR was registered on 15.02.2003 under Section 382 and Section 307
      read with Section 34 IPC. Knife and dagger were recovered alongwith
B
      the taxi and the trial Court framed charges under Section 397 IPC. Post
      trial, the appellants were convicted by the trial Court vide judgment dated
      8.1.2005 and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment of 7 years
      each.
            2. The appeal preferred by the appellants has been dismissed by
C     the impugned judgment dated 24.10.2019.
             3. The appellants approached this Court by a special leave petition.
      Annexed thereto, the compromise deed arrived at between the
      complainant Amrik Singh and the appellants before us, in terms whereof
      the complainant has stated that he did not want to pursue any action
D     against the appellants and has no objection to their release on bail or
      acquittal. The appellants have already served about 50% of their sentence
      while in custody.
             4. On 3.12.2020, this Court while recording the aforesaid plea,
      issued notice on the SLP and on the prayer for interim relief of bail while
E     simultaneously impleading the complainant as the 2nd respondent. On
      18.12.2020, counsel for the State and respondent no. 2 entered
      appearance and counsel for respondent no.2 confirmed that the dispute
      had been amicably resolved. However, counsel for respondent no.1
      submitted that the minimum sentence provided by the statute under
F     Section 397 is 7 years and the same cannot be reduced below that period.
      On this submission, learned counsel for the appellants sought benefit
      under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as
      ‘the Act’. It is on the limited conspectus of the aforesaid aspect that on
      11.01.2021, we granted leave and reserved the judgment upon conclusion
      of arguments and the parties having filed their respective synopsis.
G
               The legal position
            5. The plea of the learned counsel for the State respondent no.1 is
      based on the judgment of this Court in the case of State of Madhya
      Pradesh v. Vikram Das2opining that the courts cannot impose less than
      2
H         (2019) 4 SCC 125.
     LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                             275
                [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

the minimum sentence prescribed by the statute. He thus seeks continuing          A
detention of the appellants to serve out the remaining sentence. On the
other hand, learned counsel for the appellants has sought the benefit
under the said Act in view of the age of the appellants when the offence
was committed.
       6. We may notice that the Statement of Objects and Reasons of              B
the said Act explains the rationale for the enactment and its amendments:
to give the benefit of release of offenders on probation of good conduct
instead of sentencing them to imprisonment. Thus, increasing emphasis
on the reformation and rehabilitation of offenders as useful and self-
reliant members of society without subjecting them to the deleterious
effects of jail life is what is sought to be subserved. Section 6 of the said     C
Act, as per its own title, provides for restrictions on imprisonment of
offenders under twenty-one years of age. The said provision reads as
under:
         “6. Restrictions on imprisonment of offenders under twenty-
         one years of age.—(1) When any person under twenty-one years             D
         of age is found guilty of having committed an offence punishable
         with imprisonment (but not with imprisonment for life), the court
         by which the person is found guilty shall not sentence him to
         imprisonment unless it is satisfied that, having regard to the
         circumstances of the case including the nature of the offence and        E
         the character of the offender, it would not be desirable to deal
         with him under section 3 or section 4, and if the court passes any
         sentence of imprisonment on the offender, it shall record its reasons
         for doing so.
           (2) For the purpose of satisfying itself whether it would not be       F
         desirable to deal under section 3 or section 4 with an offender
         referred to in sub-section (1), the court shall call for a report from
         the probation officer and consider the report, if any, and any other
         information available to it relating to the character and physical
         and mental condition of the offender.”
                                                                                  G
      7. A view was taken by a 4-judge bench of this Court in Ramji
Missar vs. State of Bihar,3while seeking to apply the said provision to
offenders who were under the age of 21 years on the date of sentencing
and not on the date of commission of offence. In Masarullah v. State
3
    AIR 1963 SC 1088.
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276              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     of Tamil Nadu4 there are observations to the effect that “in case of an
      offender under the age of twenty one years on the date of commission
      of the offence, the Court is expected ordinarily to give benefit of the
      provisions of the Act and there is an embargo on the power of the Court
      to award sentence unless the Court considers otherwise, ‘having regard
      to the circumstances of the case including nature of the offence and the
B
      character of the offender’, and reasons for awarding sentence have to
      be recorded. Considerations relevant to the adjudication of this aspect
      are, circumstances of the case, nature- of the offence and character of
      the offender. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in view the afore-
      mentioned three aspects while deciding whether the appellant should be
C     granted the benefit of the provisions of the Act.” But in the subsequent
      judgment in Sudesh Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand5 the judgment of
      the four Judge Bench in Ramji Missar (supra) was noted as possibly
      having escaped attention. Thus, the legal position was clarified as the
      one being reflected in Ramji Missar (supra). The rationale is that the
      underlying purpose of the provision being reformative – Section 6 being
D
      a special provision enacted to prevent the confinement of young persons
      under 21 years of age in jail, to protect them from the pernicious influence
      of hardened criminals.6 In the facts of the present case, the appellants
      are stated to be below 21 years of age as on the date of offence. The
      sentencing order was passed by the trial Court noting that the appellants
E     committed an offence of serious nature against a poor person and were
      thus disentitled from the benefits under the said Act or under Section
      360 Cr.P.C.
             8. In Satyabhan Kishore v. State of Bihar,7this Court had noted
      the distinction between Section 6, which is in the nature of an injunction
F     for courts to follow as distinct from Section 3 or 4 of the Act; which are
      discretionary in nature. The relevant provisions read as under:
                “3. Power of court to release certain offenders after
             admonition.—When any person is found guilty of having
             committed an offence punishable under section 379 or section
G            380 or section 381 or section 404 or section 420 of the Indian
             Penal Code, (45 of 1860) or any offence punishable with
             imprisonment for not more than two years, or with fine, or with
      4
        (1982) 3 SCC 458
      5
        (2008) 3 SCC 111
      6
        Ishar Das v. State of Punjab, (1973) 2 SCC 65, pr.7
      7
H       (1972) 3 SCC 350.
LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                              277
           [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

   both, under the Indian Penal Code or any other law, and no previous        A
   conviction is proved against him and the court by which the person
   is found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances
   of the case including the nature of the offence, and the character
   of the offender, it is expedient so to do, then, notwithstanding
   anything contained in any other law for the time being in force,
                                                                              B
   the court may, instead of sentencing him to any punishment or
   releasing him on probation of good conduct under section 4, release
   him after due admonition.
      Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, previous
   conviction against a person shall include any previous order made
   against him under this section or section 4.                               C

       4. Power of court to release certain offenders on
   probation of good conduct.—(1) When any person is found
   guilty of having committed an offence not punishable with death
   or imprisonment for life and the court by which the person is
   found guilty is of opinion that, having regard to the circumstances        D
   of the case including the nature of the offence and the character
   of the offender, it is expedient to release him on probation of good
   conduct, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other
   law for the time being in force, the court may, instead of sentencing
   him at once to any punishment direct that he be released on his            E
   entering into a bond, with or without sureties, to appear and receive
   sentence when called upon during such period, not exceeding three
   years, as the court may direct, and in the meantime to keep the
   peace and be of good behaviour:
      Provided that the court shall not direct such release of an             F
   offender unless it is satisfied that the offender or his surety, if any,
   has a fixed place of abode or regular occupation in the place over
   which the court exercises jurisdiction or in which the offender is
   likely to live during the period for which he enters into the bond.
      (2) Before making any order under sub-section (1), the court            G
   shall take into consideration the report, if any, of the probation
   officer concerned in relation to the case.
      (3) When an order under sub-section (1) is made, the court
   may, if it is of opinion that in the interests of the offender and of
   the public it is expedient so to do, in addition pass a supervision
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278             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A           order directing that the offender shall remain under the supervision
            of a probation officer named in the order during such period, not
            being less than one year, as may be specified therein, and may in
            such supervision order impose such conditions as it deems
            necessary for the due supervision of the offender.
B                (4) The court making a supervision order under sub-section
            (3) shall require the offender, before he is released, to enter into a
            bond, with or without sureties, to observe the conditions specified
            in such order and such additional conditions with respect to
            residence, abstention from intoxicants or any other matter as the
            court may, having regard to the particular circumstances, consider
C           fit to impose for preventing a repetition of the same offence or a
            commission of other offences by the offender.
               (5) The court making a supervision order under sub-section
            (3) shall explain to the offender the terms and conditions of the
            order and shall forthwith furnish one copy of the supervision order
D           to each of the offenders, the sureties, if any, and the probation
            officer concerned.”
              In the case of the appellants, Section 3 would have no application
      taking into consideration nature of offence. However, Section 4 could
      come to the aid of the appellants as the offence committed, of which
E     they have been found guilty, is not punishable with death or imprisonment
      for life. However, the trial court opined against the appellants. We may
      also note that the “notwithstanding” contained in Section 4 permits, despite
      anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the court
      to release a person on bond, with or without sureties, for a period of 3
F     years instead of sentencing him in order to ensure that he keeps peace
      and good behaviour. In this regard, under sub-section (2), before making
      any order under sub-section (1), the court is required to take into
      consideration the report, if any, of the probation officer concerned in
      relation to the case.

G            9. We may note that the aforesaid is distinct from Section 6 as it
      is discretionary in nature while Section 6 provides that a court “must
      not” sentence a person under the age of 21 years to imprisonment unless
      sufficient reasons for the same are recorded, based on due consideration
      of the probation officer’s report. The relevant aspects while giving benefit
      under Section 6 of the Act are: the nature of offence, the character of
H
    LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                           279
               [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

the offender, and the surrounding circumstances as recorded in the             A
probation officer’s report.8
       10. We may notice that since we are concerned with the appellants
who were under 21 years of age on the date of the offence and not on
the date of conviction, Section 6 would not come to their aid. In a
subsequent judgment of this Court9, it was noted that in Masarullah            B
(supra), this Court had calculated the age of the convict as on the date
of commission of the offence incorrectly and there has been no discussion
of the potential tension between grant of probation under the Act and
the mandatory minimum sentence of 7 years under Section 397 of the
IPC.
                                                                               C
       11. The legal position insofar as invocation of Section 4 is
concerned has been analysed in Ishar Das vs. State of
Punjab10elucidating that non-obstante clause in Section 4 of the Act
reflected the legislative intent that provisions of the Act have effect
notwithstanding any other law in force at that time. The observation in
Ramji Missar (supra) was cited with approval to the effect that in case        D
of any ambiguity, the beneficial provisions of the Act should receive
wide interpretation and should not be read in a restricted sense.
     12. The aforesaid aspect is confirmed by the wording of the said
Act which reads as under:
                                                                               E
       “18. Saving of operation of certain enactments. —Nothing in
       this Act shall affect the provisions of section 31 of the Reformatory
       Schools Act, 1897 (8 of 1897), or sub-section (2) of section 5 of
       the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (2 of 1947), or of any law
       in force in any State relating to juvenile offenders or Borstal
       Schools.”                                                               F
      13. Even though, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the PC Act’) prescribes a minimum
sentence of imprisonment for not less than 1 year, an exception was
carved out keeping in mind the application of the Act. In Ishar
Das(supra), this Court noted that if the object of the legislature was that    G
the Act does not apply to all cases where a minimum sentence of
imprisonment is prescribed, there was no reason to specifically provide
8
  Masarullah vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1982 3 SCC 458, pr.6.
9
  Sudesh Kumar vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2008) 3 SCC 111.
10
   (1973) 2 SCC 65.                                                            H
280              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2021] 1 S.C.R.


A     an exception for Section 5(2) of the PC Act. The fact that Section 18 of
      the Act does not include any other such offences where a mandatory
      minimum sentence has been prescribed suggests that the Act may be
      invoked in such other offences. A more nuanced interpretation on this
      aspect was given in CCE vs. Bahubali11. It was opined that the Act
      may not apply in cases where a specific law enacted after 1958 prescribes
B
      a mandatory minimum sentence, and the law contains a non-obstante
      clause. Thus, the benefits of the Act did not apply in case of mandatory
      minimum sentences prescribed by special legislation enacted after the
      Act.12 It is in this context, it was observed in State of Madhya Pradesh
      vs. Vikram Das (Supra) that the court cannot award a sentence less
C     than the mandatory sentence prescribed by the statute. We are of the
      view that the corollary to the aforesaid legal decisions ends with a
      conclusion that the benefit of probation under the said Act is not excluded
      by the provisions of the mandatory minimum sentence under Section
      397 of IPC, the offence in the present case. In fact, the observation
      made in Joginder Singh vs. State of Punjab13 are in the same context.
D
             The factual position
             14. The facts of the present case are that the appellants have not
      served out the minimum sentence of 7 years though they have served
      about half the sentences. They were aged under 19 & 21 years of age
E     as on the date of offence but not on the date of sentence. The redeeming
      feature in their case is that the person who suffered, appears to have
      forgiven them, possibly with the passage of time. There is no adverse
      report against them about their conduct in jail otherwise the same would
      have been brought to our notice by learned counsel for the State. Faced
      with the aforesaid legal position, this is a fit case that the benefit of
F     probation can be extended to the appellants under the said act in view of
      the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act on completion of half the
      sentence.
            15. We, thus, release the appellants on probation of good conduct
      under Section 4 of the said Act on their completion of half the sentence
G     and on their entering into a bond with two sureties each to ensure that
      they maintain peace and good behaviour for the remaining part of their

      11
         (1979) 2 SCC 279.
      12
         State vs. Ratan Lal Arora, (2004) 4 SCC 590.
      13
H        ILR (1981) P&H 1
  LAKHVIR SINGH ETC. v. THE STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.                             281
             [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.]

sentence, failing which they can be called upon to serve that part of the      A
sentence.
       16. The appeals are disposed of in the aforesaid terms leaving the
parties to bear their own costs.

                                                                               B
Devika Gujral                                            Appeals diposed of.




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