Holding

Accused who were under 18 at the time of the offence are deemed juveniles under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, and life sentences must be set aside.

Summary

Lakhan Lal and Pappu Lal were convicted of murder under IPC s.302 read with s.34 and sentenced to life imprisonment. At the time of the offence (9 May 1985) they were about 16 years old, i.e., minors under the age of 18. The Supreme Court examined whether they could be treated as juveniles under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000, even though they were not juveniles under the earlier 1986 Act. It held that the relevant date for determining juvenile status is the date of the offence, and that persons who were under 18 on that date are covered by the 2000 Act even if the claim is raised after they turn 18 before the Act’s commencement. Consequently, the life sentences exceeded the maximum three‑year term permissible under the 2000 Act and were set aside, with the appellants ordered to be released. The appeal was partly allowed.

Issues considered

The appropriate date for determining juvenile status under the Juvenile Justice statutes.
Whether a person who was under 18 at the time of the offence but not a juvenile under the 1986 Act is covered by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000.
Whether the benefit and protection of the 2000 Act apply to pending cases initiated before its commencement.
Whether sentences exceeding the maximum term prescribed under the 2000 Act must be set aside.

Legislation cited

Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986s. 63
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000s. 15, s. 20, s. 2(1), s. 2(k), s. 49, s. 7A
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007s. 12, s. 98

Subjects

Juvenile JusticeJuvenile statusAge of criminal responsibilityLife imprisonmentSection 302 IPCSection 34 IPCSpecial leave petitionSentencingAppeal

Judgment

[2011) 1 S.C.R. 770

A LAKHAN LAL
v.
STATE OF BIHAR
(Criminal Appeal No. 573 of 2005)
JANUARY 14, 2011
B
(B. SUDERSHAN REDDY AND SURINDER SINGH
NIJJAR, JJ.J

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, >
c 2000- s. 2(k), 2(1), 7A, 20 and 49- Juvenile - Determination
of - Commission of offence punishable u/s. 302134 /PC, in
the year 1985 - Accused not juvenile within the meaning of
the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 when offence was committed,
but had not completed 18 years of age when offence was
D committed - Benefit and protection under the provisions of
the 2000 Act whereby Juvenile' is a person who h,as not 't' .
completed eighteen years of age - Held: Accused entitled to
the benefit of the 2000 Act - Accused would be treated as
juveniles even if the claim of juveni/ity is raised after they
E have attained the age of eighteen years on or before the date
of the commencement of the Act of 2000 - Both the accused
-have ·crossed the age of 18 years, yet for the purposes of
hearing of the said appeal ,continued to be Juvenile' - _..___ .
Accused have undergone sentence of more than three years
F the maximum period provided under the 2000 Act, thus,
sentences of life imprisonment awarded to them are set aside
- Sentence/Sentencing - Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 -
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules,
2007 - rr. 12, 98 - Penal Code, 1860 - s. 302134.
G The appellants were convicted for the offence
punishable uls. 302134 IPC for committing murder of 'S' +
and sentenced to life imprisonment by the courts below.
On the date of occurrence of the crime, i.e. 09.05.1985, the

H 770
..... LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 771

~ppellant'L' was aged about 16 years 10 months and the A
.-J-· appellant 'P' was aged about 16 years 5 months.
The present matters have been filed by the appellants
contending that since they were 'juvenile' within the
meaning of Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and B
Protection of Children) Act, 2000, on the date of
occurrence of the crime, the order of sentence passed
against .them be set aside .
.....(.
Partly allowing the appeals, the Court
c
HELD: 1.1 Tile relevant date for determining the age
of a person who claims to be a juvenile/child would be
the date on which the offence has been committed and
not the date when he is produced before the authority or
in the court. [Para 9) [776-G-H; 777-A] D
, '"(
Pratap Singh vs. State of Jharkhand and Anr. (2005) 3
sec 551 - followed.
1.2 The Bihar Children's Act that was in operation as
on the date of the incident i.e. 09.05.1985. The Juvenile E
Justice Act, 1986 came into operation on 3rd December,
1986. The said Act which defines·a 'juvenile' as a boy who
has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has
not attained the age of eighteen years. Section 63 of the
1986 Act provides "Repeal and savings" that, if F
immediately before the date on which the Act comes into
force in any State, there is in force in that State, any law
corresponding to the Act, that law shall stand repealed
on the said date. The said provision further states that

. +
any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, G
accrued or incurred under any law so repealed; or any
penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred ill respect of
any offence committed against any law so repealed; and
the legal proceedings in respect of any such right,
H
772 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.
,_
A privilege, obligation would continue as if the 1986 Act had
not been passed. [Para 10) [777-B-E]

1.3 The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of
Children) Act, 2000 came into force w.e.f. 1st April, 2001.
B Section 2(k) of the 2000 Act provides that 'juvenile' or
'child' means a person who has not completed
eighteenth year of age and Section 2(1) says that 'juvenile
in conflict with law' means a juveni!9-who is alleged to
have committed an offence and"'has not completed .~
eighteen years of age as on the date of commission of
C such offence. It is manifest from a conjoint reading of
Sections 2(k), 291), 7A, 20 and 49 of the Act of 2000, read
with Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 that all persons who
are below the age of eighteen years on the-date of
D commission of the offence even prior to 1st April 2001
would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of ~•
juvenility is raised after they have attained the age of
eighteen years on or before the date /
of the
commencement of the Act of 2000 and were undergoing
E sentences upon being convicted. [Paras 12, 13 and 15]
[777~F-H; 779-F-G; 780-G-H; 181-A]

2.1 Neither in the decision of the Court of Sessions
it was noted that the appellants were aged about 20
F years which could imply that they were under the age of
18 at the time of commission of the offence, nor in the
High Court judgment as to the plea of 'juvenile' was
discussed. [Para 11] [777-E-F]
2.2 In the instant .case, when the inquiry was initiated
G against the appellants, they were admittedly not 'juvenile'
under the provisions of 1986 Act but the said issue was + •
ignored by the trial court and as well as the appellate
court. There is no dispute whatsoever that both the
appellants have crossed the age of 18 years, yet both the
H appellants, for the purposes of hearing of the said appeal
•
...
LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 773

continued as if they were to be 'juvenile'. [Para 15] [780- A
C-D]
Dharambir vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2010) 5
SCC 344; Umesh Singh and Anr. vs. State of Bihar (2000) 6
sec 89; - relied on. B
Bhola Bhagat vs. State of Bihar (1997) 8 SCC 720;
Gopinath Ghosh vs. State of WB. 1984 Supp. SCC 228;
-(.
Bhoop Ram vs. State of U.P. (1989) 3 SCC 1 - referred to.

3. As regards the order and sentence to be passed c
against the appellants for the offences committed by
them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, both
the appellants have crossed the· age of 40 years as at
present and,· therefore, it would not be conducive to the
environment in the special home and at any rate, they D
/'"( have undergone an actual period of sentence of more
than three years the maximum period provided under
Section 15 of the 2000 Act. In the circumstances, while
sustaining the conviction of the appellants for the
offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section E
34 IPC, the sentences awarded to them are set aside.
They are accordingly directed to be released forthwith, if
_.... not required in any other case. [Paras 18 and 19] [782-G-
H; 783-A-C]
Dharambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr. (2010) 5 F
sec 344 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:

- -+·
(2005) 3 sec 551
(201 o) 5 sec ·344
(2000) s sec .89
Followed
Referred- to
Relied on
Paras 9, 14
Paras 15, 18
Para 17
G

(1997) 8 sec 120 Referred to Para 17
1984 Supp. sec 228 Referred to Para 17 H
., ....
774 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 1 S.C.R.
...
A (1989) 3 sec 1 Referred to Para 17

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 573 of 2005.

From the Judgment & Order dated 27.4.2010 of the High
B Court of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal No. 14of1988.

WITH
Crl. A. No. 138 of 2011, Crl. M.P. No. 1049 of 20·11.
c K.V. Vishwanathan, Abhijit Sinha, Ashwani Kumar,
Niranjana Singh for the Appellant.

Manish Kumar (for Gopal Singh) for the Respondent.

·The Judgment of the Court was delivered· by
D
Y'
B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, ·J. 1. Criminal Miscellaneous '
Petition in Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4724 of 2004 has
been taken up and allowed. The Special Leave Petition shall
stand restored to the file. Leave granted.
E
2. These appeals are directed against the common
judgment and order dated 27th April, 2004 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in Criminal Appeal Nos. 649 of 1987 _._ ,,
and 14of1988 whereby the High Court dismissed the Criminal
F Appeals filed by the appellants, confirmed their conviction for
the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34
of l.P.C. for .committing murder of one Surender Choudhary and
accordingly sentenced them to undergo life imprisonment.

3. When the matter came up for hearing, Shri K.V.
G Vishwanathan, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant Lakhan Lal, submitted that since at the time of
--+-- ..
commission of the said offence, the appellant had not
completed 18 years of age, he was a 'juvenile' within the
meaning of Section 2(k) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
H Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as "the
LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 775
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
2000 Act") and therefore, the order of sentence passed against A
the appellant for the offence committed by him under Section
302 read with Section 34, IPC is to be set aside,

4. We find that the conviction of the appellants is based
upon the evidence of Malti Devi (PW1), wife, Sumitra Devi
B
{PW2), mother and Lakhan Choudhary {informant) {PW3), father
of the deceased Surender Choudhary who were all
-.( eyewitnesses to the incident and there is absolutely no reason
to disbelieve their evidence. Dr. R.P. Jaiswal {PW5) who
conducted the postmortem examination over the dead body of
Surender Choudhary found ante mortem injuries on his person
c
and according to him, the. cause of death was shock and
hemorrhage as a result of the injuries caused by sharp cutting
penetrating substance such as chuffa {dagger). Those injuries
were attributed to have been ·caused by the appellants Pappu
-~- Lal who was armed with a churra and Lakhan Lal who was D
armed with a country made pistol. These facts need not detain
us any further since the conviction of the appellants for the
offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34,
IPC is not in issue.
E
5. Sofaras Pappu Lal @ Manoj Kumar Srivastava, the
appellant in SLP {crl) No. 4724 <?_f 2004 is concerned, the
--+
special leave petition preferred by him was dismissed by this
Court on 8th April, 2005 with the following order:

"It is admitted that neither The Juvenile Justice {Care and F
Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (56 of 2000) nor the
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 nor the Bihar Childrens Act
would apply as on the date of the occurrence the appellant
was 16 years and 10 months old. On merits we see no
. -+ reason to interfere. Accordingly, the petition shall stand G
dismissed".

In fact, on the date of occurrence, that is to say 9.5.1985, the
appellant was aged about 16 years and 5 months as the same
• is evident from the certificate dated 6.8.1983 of the Bihar H
776 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 1 S.C.R.

A School Education Board wherein the date of birth of Pappu Lal
is recorded as 9.12.1968. This certificate is made available for
the perusal of the court.

6. The appellant Pappu Lal, relying on the judgment of this
Court in Dharambir Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr. 1 filed an
B
application to recall the order dated 8th April, 2005 passed by
this Court dismissing his Special Leave Petition and to restore
the special leave petition to its original number. The-application
is ordered accordingly and that is how we have taken up both
the appeals for hearing.
c
7. There is no dispute whatsoever before us as it is fairly
conceded by the learned counsel Shri Manish Kumarr
appearing for Shri Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the State
of Bihar that both the appellants were minors as on the date of
D incident i.e., 9th May, 1985. The appellant Lakhan Lal was aged ~-
about 16 years 10 months/and the other appellant Pappu Lal
was aged about 16 years 5 months as on the date of
occurrence of the crime. Thus the claim made by the appellants
that they were 'juveniles' as on the date of occurrence of the
E crime remains free from any controversy.
8. The question that arises for our consideration is whether _..__
or not the appellants who were admittedly not 'juvenile' within
the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 {for short "the
1986 Act") when the offences were committed but had not
F completed 18 years of age on that date are entitled for the
booefit and protection under the provisions of the 2000 Act?
Whether they are entitled to be declar.ed as 'juvenile' in relation
to the offences committed by them?

9. The issue with regard to the date, relevant for + ~
G
determining the applicability of either of the two Acts is no '
longer res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap
Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand & Anr. 2 in its authoritative
1. c2010) 5 sec 344.
H 2. (2005) 3 sec 551 ..
· LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 777
[B. ~UDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
pronouncement held that the relevant date for determining the A
age of a person who claims to be a juvenile/child would be the
date on which the offence has been committed and not the date
when he is produced before the authority or in the Court.

10. The Act that was in operation as on the date of the 8
incident was Bihar Children's Act. The Act of 1986 came into
operation on 3rd December, 1986. The said Act which defines
·.-( a 'juvenile' as a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen
years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years.
Section 63 of the 1986 Act provides "Repeal and savings" that,
if immediately before the date on which the Act comes into force
c
in any State, there is in force in that State, any law
corresponding to the Act, that law shall stand repealed on the
said date. The said provision further states that any right,
privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred
'l" under any law so repealed; or any penalty, forfeiture or D
punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed
against any law so repealed; and the legal proceedings in
respect of any such right, privilege, obligation will continue as
if the 1986 'Act had not been passed.
. : E
11. The fact remains neither in the decision of the
(_...__ Sessions Court dated 9.12.1987 which noted that the
appellants were aged about 20 years which could imply that
they were under the age of 18 at the time of commission of the
offence, nor in the High Court judgment as to the plea of F
'juvenile' has been discussed.

12. The 2000 Act came into for~ w.e.f. 1st April, 2001. It
is an act to consolidate and amend the law relating to juveniles
T
.. in conflict with law and children in need of care and protection,
by providing for proper care, protection and treatment by G
catering to their development needs, and by adopting a child-
friendly approach in the adjudication and disposition of matters
in the best interest of children and for their ultimate rehabilitation
and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. It will
H
778 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A be useful to have a look at the Statement of Objects and
Reasons:

A review of the working of the Juvenile Act, 1986 (53 of
· 1986) would indicate that much greater attention is
required to be given to children in conflict with law or those
B
in need of care and protection. The justice system as
available for adults is not considered suitable for being
applied to a juvenile or the child or any one on their behalf
including the police, voluntary organizations, social workers,
or parents and guardians, throughout the country. There is
c also an urgent need for creating adequate infrastructure
necessary for the implementation of the proposed
1'81slation with a larger involvement of informal systems
s~cially the family, the voluntary organizations and the
community.
D
In this context, the following further proposals have been
made-

(i) to lay down the basic principles for administering
justice to a juvenile or the child in the Bill;
E
(ii) to make the juvenile system meant for a juvenile or
the child more appreciative of the developmental _......
needs in comparison to criminal justice system as
applicable to adults;
F
{iii) to bring the juvenile law in conformity with the United
Convention on the Rights of the Child;

(iv) to prescribe a uniform age of eighteen years for
both boys and girls;
G
{v) to ensure speedy disposal of cases by the
authorities envisaged under this Bill regarding
.·juvenile or· the child within a time limit of four months;

H (vi) to spell out the role of the State as a facilitator rather
- LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR
' '
779
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
than doer by involving voluntary organizations and A
local bodies in the implementation of the proposed
legislation;

(vii} to create special juvenile police units with a humane
approach through sensitization and training of police B
personnel;

(viii} to enable increased accessibility to a juvenile or the
child by establishing Juvenile Justice Boards and
Child Welfare Committees and Homes in each
district or group of districts; C

(ix} to minimize the stigma and in keeping with the
developmental needs of the juvenile or the child, to
separate the Bill into two parts-one for juveniles
·in conflict with law and the other for the juvenile or o
the child in need of care and protection;

(x} to provide for effective provisions and various
alternatives for rehabilitation and social
reintegration such as adoption, foster care,
sponsorship and aftercare of abandoned, destitute, E
neglected and delinquent juvenile and child.

The Bill seeks to r.epeal and re-enact the Juvenile Justice
Act, 1986 with a view to achieving the above objects.
F
13. Section 2(k} of the 2000 Act provides that 'juvenile' or
'child' means a person who has not completed eighteenth year
-0f age and Section 2(1) says that 'juvenile in conflict with law'
means a juvenile who is alleged to have committed an offence
and has not completed eighteenth year of age as on the date G
of commission of such offence.

14. In Pratap Singh (supra), the Constitution Bench taking
into consideration the provisions of Sections 3 and 20 and the
relevant definitions of 'juvenile' in Section 2(1<} of the 2000 Act,
held that'the 2000 Act wollid be applicable in a pending H
780 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 1 S.C.R.

A proceeding in any Court/Authority initiated under the 1986 Act
and is pending when the 2000 Act came into force and the
person concerned has not completed 18 years of age as on
1.4.2001. It is further held • ... even where an inquiry has been
initiated and the juvenile ceases to be a juvenile i.e. crosses
B t~ age of 18 years, the inquiry must be con.tinued and orders
made in respect of such person as if such person had continued
to be a juvenile".

15. In the present case, when the inquiry has been initiated
C against the appellants herein, they were admittedly 'juvenile'
even under the provisions of 1986 Act but this issue has been ·
ignored by the trial Court and as well as the appellate Court.
There is no dispute whatsoever that both the appellants have
crossed the age of 18 years, yet both the appellants, for the
purposes of hearing of this appeal continued as if they were to
D be 'juvenile'. In Dharambir (supra) this Court took the view:

"It is plain from the language of the Explanation to Section
20 that in all pending cases, which would include not only
trials but even subsequent proceedings by way of revision
E or appeal, etc., the determination of juvenility of a juvenile
has to be in terms of Clause (I) of Section 2, even if the
juvenile ceases to be a juvenile on or before 1st April,
2001, when the Act of 2000 came into force, and the
provisions of the Act would apply as if the said provision
F had been in force for all purposes and for all materiartimes
when the alleged offence was committed".

It is further held:
\
"It is, thus, manifest from a conjoint reading of Sections
G 2(k), W. 7A, 20 and 49 of the Act of 2000, read with +
Rules 12 and 98 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 that all persons who
were below the age of eighteen years on the date of
commission of the offence even prior to 1st April, 2001
H would be treated as juveniles even if the claim of juvenility
LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 781
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
is raise,.d after fhey have attained the age of eighteen years A
ane>r before the date of the commencement of the Act of
2000 and were undergoing sentences upon being
convicted. In the view we have taken, we are fortified by
the dictum of this Court in a recent decision in Hari Ram
v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. (2009) 13 SCC 211". .B
16. Thus this is the complete answer for the determination
of the issues that have arisen for our consideration.
~
17. The fact remains that the issue as to whether the
appellants were juvenile did not conie up for consideration for c
whatever reason, before the Courts below. The question is
whether the same could be considered by this Court at this
stage of the proceedings. A somewhat similar situation had
arisen in Umesh Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Bihar wherein this
Court relying upon the earlier decisions in Bhola Bhagat Vs. D
" ...,,. State of Bihar4, Gopinath Ghosh Vs. State of WB. and Bhoop
Ram Vs. State of U.P. 6 while sustaining the conviction of the
appellant therein under all the charges, held that the sentences
awarded to them need to be set aside. It was also a case
where the appellant therein was aged below 18 years and was E
a child for the purposes of the Bihar Children Act, 1970 on the
date of the occurrence. The relevant paragraph reads as under:
- _,....
'•
"So far as Arvind Singh, appellant in Crl.A.No.659/99, is
concerned, his case stands on a different footing. On the
F
evidence on record, the learned counsel for the appellant
.
was not in a position to point out any infirmity in the
conviction recorded by the trial court as affirmed by the
appellate court. The only contention put forward before the
court is that the appellant is born on 1.1.67 while the date
of the incident is 14.12.1980 and on that date he was G
T
3. c2000) a sec 89.
4, (1997) 8 sec 120.
5. 1984 Supp sec 220.
6. (1989) 3 sec 1. HI
782 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 1 S.C.R.

A hardly 13 years old. We called for report of experts being
placed before the court as to the age of the appellant,
Arvind Singh. The report made to the court clearly
indicates that on the date of the incident he may be 13
years old. This fact is also supported by the school
B certificate as well as matriculation certificate produced
before this court which indicate that his date of birth is
1.1.67. On this basis, the contentioh put forward before the
court is that although the appellant is aged below 18 years
and is a child for the purpose of the Bihar Children Act, >
c 1970 on the date of the occurrence, his trial having been
conducted along with other accused who are not children
is not in accordance with law. However, this contention had
not been raised either befo(e the trial court or before
the High Court. In such circumstances, this Court in Bhola
Bhagat vs. State of Bihar, 1997(8)" SCC 720, following the
D
earlier decisions in Gopinath Ghosh vs. State of West
T'-
Bengal, 1984 Supp.sec 228 and Bhoop Ram vs. State
-0f U.P. 1989(3) SCC 1 and Pradeep Kumar vs. State of
U.P., 1995 Supp(4) SCC 419, while sustaining the
conviction of the appellant under all the charges, held that
E the sentences awarded to them need to be set aside. In
view of the exhaustive discussion of the law on the matter
in Bhola Bhagat case [supra], we are obviated of the duty
to examine the same but following the same, with respect, -..- _,
we pass similar orders in the present case. Conviction of
F the appellant, Arvind Singh, is confirmed but the sentence
imposed upon him stand set aside: He is, therefore, set
at liberty, if not required in any other case".
18. The next question for our consideration is as to what
G order and sentence is to be passed against the appellants for
the offences committed by them under Section 302 read with -r-
Section 34 of the IPC? Both the appellants have crossed the
age of 40 years as at present and therefore it will not be
; .. conducive to the environment in the special home and at any
H rate, they have undergone an actual period of sentence of more
LAKHAN LAL v. STATE OF BIHAR 783
[B. SUDERSHAN REDDY, J.]
than three years the maximum period provided under Section A
___... 15 of the 2000 Act. In the circumstances, while sustaining the
conviction of the appellants for the offences punishable under
Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, the sentences
awarded to them are set aside. They are accordingly directed
to be released forthwith. This view of ours to set aside the B
sentence is supported by the decision of this Court in
Dharambir (supra).

~ 19. The appellants are directed to be released forthwith if
not required in any other case. The appeals are partly allowed
accordingly. c
.;
20. We place on record our appreciation for the invaluable
and dispassionate assistance rendered by Shri Manish Kumar,
Advocate, appearing for Shri Gopal Singh, learned counsel for
the State of Bihar. D
~-r
N.J. Appeals partly allowed.