Holding

The word 'sons' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act does not include step‑sons; step‑sons are heirs of the husband under clause (b).

Summary

The case concerned the devolution of property of Khem Kaur, a Hindu female who died intestate. Kirpa Singh, her son by her second husband, claimed the entire estate, arguing that as the sole "son" he was entitled to the whole share under section 15(1)(a) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Lachman Singh, the son of Khem Kaur’s first husband, along with Amarjit Singh and Gurbax Kaur, contended that Kirpa Singh was only entitled to one‑third, the remaining one‑thirds belonging to the other heirs, and that the term "sons" did not include step‑sons. The Supreme Court examined the statutory language, legislative intent, and prior case law, concluding that "sons" in clause (a) of section 15(1) refers only to biological or adopted children of the female and excludes step‑sons, who fall under clause (b) as heirs of the husband. Consequently, the High Court’s decree in favour of Kirpa Singh was affirmed and the Special Leave Petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the term 'sons' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 includes step‑sons of a female Hindu dying intestate
Whether a step‑son is entitled to a share in the deceased female's property simultaneously with her biological son

Legislation cited

Hindu Succession Act, 1956s. 15(1), s. 15(2), s. 16, s. 3(j)

Subjects

Hindu Succession Actsection 15step‑sonintestate successionstatutory interpretationheirshipfamily law

Judgment

LACHMAN SINGH
A
v.
KIRPA SINGH & OTHERS

APRIL 14, 1987

[E.S. VENKATARAMIAH AND K.N. SINGH, JJ.] B

Hindu Succession Act, 195~ss. 3(j) & 15(1)-Hindu female-
Dying intestate-Whether her 'step-son' entitled to claim share in her
-~ property simultaneously with her 'son'.

- )"-L Words & Phrases-

'Son-,-' Step-son'-Meaning of.
c

Battan Singh had two wives, namely, Mahan Kaur and Khem
-~ Kaur. Mahan Kaur died during his lifetime after giving birth to two
sons, Lachman Singh (petitioner) and Gurdas Singh. Gurdas Singh D
pre-deceased Battan Singh leaving behind his widow Gurbax Kaur and
his son Amarjit Singh. Respondent No. 1, Kirpa Singh is the son of the
Battan Singh and Khem Kaur. Battan Singh died intestate after the
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and his property devolved
on his heirs including his second wife Khem Kaur. On her death, Kirpa
Singh claimed her entire property on the ground that he was her only E
---\ son. Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbax Kaur claimed that

- Kirpa Singh was entitled to only 1/3rd share in the property of Khem
Kaur, Lachman Singh was entitled to 1/3rd share and Amarjit Singh
was entitled to the remaining 1/3rd share.

)J, Kirpa Singh filed a suit for declaration that he was entitled to the F
entire property belonging to Khem Kaur against Lachman Singh,
J Amarjit Singh and Gurbax Kaur. The trial Court decreed the suit. The
appeals filed by Lachman Singh before the Additional District Judge·
and in the High Court were dismissed.

Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, G

HELD: 1. Ordinprily laws of succession to property follow the
.· ---( natural inclinations of men and women. [938C-D I

2. The list of heirs ins. 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is
enumerated having regard to the current notions about the propinquity H

933
934 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

or nearness of relationship. The words 'son' and 'step-son' are not
A defined in the Act. [938C-D]
'f
3. Under the Act, a son of a female by her first marriage will not
succeed to the estate of her 'second husband' on.his dying intestate. In
the case of a woman it is natural that a step son, that is, the son of her
B husband by his another wife is a step away from the son who has come
out of her own womb. But under the Act a step-son of a female dying
intestate is an heir and that is so because the family headed by a male is )--.
considered as a social unit. If a step-son does not fall within the scope of
the expression 'sons' in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fall
under cl. (b) thereof being an heir of the husband. [9380-F]
--"". ..
c 4. The word 'sons' in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of the Act includes: (i) sons
born out of the womb of a female by same husband or by different ';...,
husbands Including illegitimate sons too in view of s. 3(j) of the Act, and
(ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inherita-
nee. [938F~GJ
D
5. Under the Hindu law as it stood prior to the coming into force
of the Act, a step-son, i.e. a son of the husband of a female by another
wife did not simultaneously succeed to the stridhana of the female on
her dying intestate. In that case the the son born out of her womb had
~
precedence over a step-son. Parliament would have made express provi-
E sion in the Act if it intended that there should be such a radical de-
parture from the past. [938G-H; 939A]
6. The word 'sons' in cl. (a) of s. 15(1) of Act does not include '
'v,

'step-sons' and that step-sons fall in the category of the heirs of the ..,,11;,:,,
husband referred to in cl. (b) thereof. [939A-B]
,ll.,
F Ma/lappa Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others v. Shivappa ~
and another, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 140; Rama Ananda Patil v. Appa
Bhima Redekar and Others, A.I.R. 1969 Bombay 205; Gurnam Singh
v. Smt. Ass Kaur and Others, A.l.R. 1977 P & H 103 and Smt. Kishori
Bala Monda! v. Tribhanga Monda/ & Others, A.I.R. 1980 Calcutta 334
approved.
G
Ram Katori v. Prakash Nati L.L.R., [1968] 1 Allahabad 697, ~~
overruled.
'
7. The rule of devolution in s. 15 of the Act applies to all kinds of
properties left behind by a female Hindu except those dealt with by els.
H (a) and (b) of s. 15(2) which make a distinction as regards the property
:-
LACHMAN SINGH v. KIRPA SINGH [VENKATARAMIAH, J.I 935

inherited by her from her parents and the property inherited from her huS· A
band or father-in-law and that too when she leaves no sons and daughters
(including children of predeceased sons and daughters). [941B-C]

8. When once a property becomes the absolute property of a female
Hindu it shall devolve first on her children (including children of the prede·
ceased sons and daughter) as provided ins. 15(1)(a) of the Act and pten on B
other heirs subject only to the limited change introduced in s. 15(2) of the
Act. The step-sons or step-daughters will come in as heirs only under cl.
(b) ofs. 15(1) or under cl. (b) ors. 15(2) of the Act. [941E-F]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition
(Civil) No. 2730 of 1987.
c
•
From the Judgment and Order dated 8.12.1986 of the Punjab
• --{ and Haryana High Court in R.S.A No. 1773 of 1986 (0 & M).

K.G. Bhagat and Sunil K. Jain for the Appellants.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATARAMIAH, J. The short question which arises for
consideration in this case is whether under the provisions of the Hindu
--,..4. Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the·Act') a step-son
of a female dying intestate is entitled to claim a share in her property E
simultaneously with her son. In other words the question involved is
whether the word 'sons' in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 15 of
the Act includes 'step-sons' also.

The facts involved in this Special Leave Petition are thus. One
Ballan Singh who was also known as Badan Singh had two wives, F
namely, Mahan Kaur and Khem Kaur. Mahan Kaur died during his
life time after giving birth to two sons Lachman Singh (petitioner) and
Gurdas Singh from the Joins of Ballan Singh. Respondent No. 1 Kirpa
Singh is the son of Battan Singh and Khem Kaur. Gurdas Singh died
during the life time of Ballan Singh leaving behind his widow Gurbux
Kaur and his son Amarjit Singh. Battan Singh died intestate after the G
Act came into force. On his death his property devolved on his heirs
including his second wife Khem Kaur in accordance with the provi·
sions of the Act. Thereafter Khem Kaur died. On her death dispute
arose between her son Kirpa Singh on the one side and Lachman
Singh, Amarjit Singh and Gurbux Kaur on the other. Kirpa Singh
claimed the entire property left behind by Khem Kaur on the ground H
936 . SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1987] 2 S.C.R.

that he was the only son of Khem Kaur. Lachman Singh, Amarjit
A Singh and Gurbux Kaur claimed that Kirpa Singh was entitled to only
one-third share in the property of Khem Kaur, Lachman Singh was
entitled to one-third share and Amarjit Singh, who was the son of
Gurdas Singh, was entitled to the remaining one-third share. Both the
parties relied upon clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act. While Kirpa
B Singh.contended that the word 'sons' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act
meant only sons born of the body of the Hindu female dying intestate
the others contended that the word 'sons' in that clause included step-
sons also. In view of the above dispute Kirpa Singh filed a suit on the
file of the Sub-Judge Ist Class, Nakodar in the District of Jalandhar ··--"'
inter alia for a declaration that he was entitled to the entire property
belonging to Khem Kaur against Lachman Singh, Amarjit Singh and
C Gurbux Kaur who contested the suit. The trial court vide its judgment
dated February 18, 1984 decreed the suit declaring that Kirpa Singh
was entitled to the property belonging to Khem Kaur. Lachman Singh
preferred an appeal against the decree of the trial court in R.C.A. No.
202 of 1985 on the file of the learned Additional District Judge,
D Jalandhar. That appeal was dismissed on February 19, 1986. The
second appeal filed by him against the judgment of the Additional
District Judge, Jalandhar, in R.S.A. No. 1773 of 1986 on the file of the
High Court of Punjab & Haryana was also dismissed in limine on
December 8, 1986. Aggrieved by the judgment of the High Court
Lachman Singh has filed this petition for special leave under Article
E 136 of the Constitution of India.

Section 15 of the Act, which is relevant for purposes of this case,
reads thus:

"15(1). The property of a female Hindu dying intestate
F shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16-

(a) firsily, upon the sons and daughters (including
the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the
husband;

G (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;

( c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and

H (e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
LACHMAN SINGH v. KIRPA SINGH [VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 937

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec- A
lion (1),-

(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from
her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any
son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of
any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs B
referred to in sub-section (1) in the order specified therein,
but upon the heirs of the father; and

- (b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from
her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the
absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including
the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon C
the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) in the order
specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.

Section 15 of the Act deals with the general rules of succession in the
case of female Hindus. Sub-section ( 1) of section 15 provides that the D
property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to
the rules set out in section 16 of the Act firstly, upon the sons and
daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter)
and the husband; secondly, upon the heirs of the husband; thirdly,
upon the mother and father; fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
lastly, upon the heirs of the mother. Sub-section (2) of section 15 of E
the Act arises for consideration only when a female Hindu dies in-
testate leaving property without leaving behind her any son or daughter
\'"(including the children of any predeceased son or daughterY and in that
~event any property inherited by her from her father .or mother shall
devolve not upon the other heirs referred to in sub-section (1) of
section 15 of the Act in the order specified therein but upon the heirs F
of the father and any property inherited by her from her husband or
from her father-in-law shall devolve not upon the other heirs referred
to in sub-section (1) of section 15 in the order specified therein, but
upon the heirs of the husband, Rule 1 of section 16 provides that
among the heirs specified in sub-section (1) of section 15 those in one
entry shall be preferred to those in the succeeding entry and those G
included in the same entry shall take simultaneously. It is not neces·
sary to refer to rule (2) and Rule (3) of section 16 of the Act for
purposes of this case.

The only question which is to be determined here is whether the
expression 'sons' in clause (2) of section 15(1) of the Act includes H
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

A step-sons also, i.e., sons of the husband of the deceased by another
wife. In order to decide it, it is necessary to refer to some of the +"
provisions of the Act. Section 3(j) of the Act defines 'related' as re-
lated by legitimate kinship but the proviso thereto states that illegiti-
mate children shall be deemed to be related to their mother and to one
another, and their legitimate descendants shall be deemed to be re-
B lated to them and to one another and that any word expressing rela-
tionship or denoting a relative shall be construed accordingly. Section
1
6 and section 7 of the Act respectively deal with devolution of interest r-
in coparcenary property and devolution of interest in the property of a
tarwad, tavazhi, kutumba, kavaru and illom. Sections 8 to 13 of the Act ~.
deal with rules of succession to the property of a male Hindu dying
intestate. We are concerned in this case with the rules of succession to
C the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. Sections 15 and 16 of
the Act are material for our purpose. Ordinarily laws of succession to .~ •
property follow the natural inclinations of men and women. The list of
heirs in section;l5(1) of the Act is enumerated having regard to the
current notions about propinquity or nearness of relationship. The
D words 'son' and 'stop-son' are not defined in the Act. According to
Collins English Dictionary a 'son' means a male offspring and 'step
son' means a son of one's husband or wife by a former union. Under
the Act a son of a female by her first marriage will not succeed to the
estate of her 'second husband' on his dying intestate. In the case of a ~
woman it is natural that a step son, that is, the son of her husband by
E his another wife is a step away from the son who has coine out of her
own womb. But under the Act a step-son of a female dying intestate is
an heir and that is so because the family headed by a male is con-
sidered as a social unit. If a step-son does not fall within the scope of
the expression 'sons' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act, he is sure)..._
to fall under clause (b) thereof being an heir of the husband. The word !
F 'sons' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act includes (i) sons born out ~
of the womb of a female by the same husband or by different husbands
including illegitimate sons too in view of section 3(j) of the Act and (ii)
adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inheritance.
Children of any predeceased son or adopted son also fall within the
meaning of the expression 'sons'. If Parliament had felt that the word
G 'sons' should include 'step-sons' also it would have said so in express
terms. We should remember that under the Hindu law as it stood prior )--
to the coming into force of the Act, a step-son, i.e., a son of the
husband of a female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed to
the stridhana of the female on her dying intestate. In that case the son
born out of her womb had precedence over a step-son. Parliament
H would have made express provision in the Act if it intended that there
LACHMAN SINGH v. KIRPA SINGH (VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 939

should be such a redical departure from the past. We are of the view
A
that the word 'sons' in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act does not
"+ include 'step-sons' and that step-sons fall in the category of the heirs of
the husband referred to in clause (b) thereof.

The decisiqn of the Mysore (Kamataka) High Court in Mallappa
Fakirappa Sanna Nagashetti and Others v. Shivappa and another, B
A.l.R. 1962 Mysore 140; takes the view which we have expressed
-~\ above. According to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Rama
Ananda Patil v. Appa Bhima Redekar and Others, A.LR. 1969
Bombay 205 the emphasis in clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act is on
• -~ the aspect that the sons or the daughters are of her own body and not
so much on the husband who was responsible for their birth and that
therefore children of a female though by different husbands inherit her
c
estate simultaneously. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has in
·~ Gurnam Singh v. Smt. Ass Kaur and Others, A.LR. 1977 P & H 103
following the observations in the decisions of the Mysore and Bombay
High Courts, referred to above, held that the word 'sons' in section
15(I)(a) of the Act docs not include a 'step-son'. The High Court of D
Calcutta has also taken the same view in Smt. Kishori Bala Monda/ v.
Tribhanga Monda/ & Others, A.LR. 1980 Calcutta 334.

It is true tbat the Allahabad High Court has taken a contrary
·'-1 view in Ram Katori v. Prakash Wati, I.LR. 1968 (!)Allahabad 697. In
that case the facts were however slightly different, but the point in- E
... volved was almost the same. The facts of the case were as follows. One
Chandu Lal had married a woman. She died during the life time of
Chandu Lal leaving behind her a daughter by Ram Katori. Thereafter
)i Chandu Lal married a second woman by name Ram Kali through
whom he got a daughter by name Prakashwati. Chandu Lal died in
.J 1920 and on his death Ram Kali being his widow succeeded to his F
estate as a limited owner. After the coming into force of the Act in
1956 her limited estate ripened into absolute estate and she became
the full owner of the estate inherited by her from her husband. Ram
Kali died thereafter. On her death Ram Ka tori, the daughter of
Chandu Lal by his first wife contended that she was entitled to succeed
simultaneously with Prakashwati to the estate of Ram Kali which origi- G
nally belonged to her father and claimed one-half share in it. Her claim
was resisted by Prakashwati stating that the word 'daughters' in section
l5(1)(a) of the Act did not include 'step-daughters' and that Ram
Katori would fall under the category of the heirs of the husband and
would be entitled to succeed either under clause (b) of section 15( I) or
under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the Act and that too in the absence of H
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 2 S.C.R.

sons and daughters of Ram kali (including children of predeceased
A sons and daughters). It was further contended by Prakashwati that the
fact that the property in question had formerly belonged to the
v
husband of Ram Kali did not matter at all because Ram Kali had left
behind her who was a daughter of her own body entitled to succeed
under section 15(1)(a), and that Ram Katori being a step-daughter
B could not claim under section 15(1)(a) of the Act. The High Court of
Allahabad felt that there was a distinction between clause (a) of
section 15( 1) and clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) of the Act in that ~
whereas in section 15(1)(a) the words 'sons and daughters' were un-
qualified, the words 'son or daughter' in clauses (a) and (b) of section •
15(2) were qualified by the words 'of the deceased' and therefore ~-·
conclusion was irresistible that the unqualified words 'sons and <laugh-
c ters' in section 15(1)(a) of the Act indicated that they included also the
children of her husband by another wife. The High Court also appears
to have been moved by the consideration that .the opposite construe-
-;... .
tion would be patently unfair to the children by her husband's another
wife since they would be deprived of their share in the property which
D originally belonged to their father. We feel that neither of these
reasons is correct. The words 'sons and daughters ..... and the
husband' in clause (a) of section 15(1) only mean 'sons and daughters
...... and the husband' of the deceased. They cannot be 'sons and
daughters ...... and the husband' of any body else. All relatives
named in the different clauses in sub-section (1) of section 15 of the .~
E Act are those who are related to the deceased in the manner specified
~
therein. They are sons, daughters, husband, heirs of the husband,
mother and father, heirs of the father and heirs of the mother of the
deceased. The use of the words 'of the deceased' following 'son or
daughter' in clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the ~
Act makes no difference. The words 'son or daughter of the deceased
F (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter)' in clauses )...,
(a) and (b) of section 15(2) of the Act refer to the entire body of heirs
falling under clause" (a) of section 15(1) of the Act except the husband.
What clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (2) of section 15 of the Act do
is that they make a distinction between devolution of the property
inherited by a female Hindu dying intestate from her father or mother
G on the one hand and the property inherited by her from her husband
and from her father-in-law on the other. In the absence of any son or
daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased
son or daughter), in a case falling under clause (a) of section 15(2) of
the Act the property devolves upon the heirs of the father of the
deceased and in a case falling under clause (b) of section 15(2) of the
H Act the property devolves upon the heirs of the husband of the
LACHMAN SINGH v. KIRPA SINGH (VENKATARAMIAH, J.] 941

deceased. The distinction made by the High Court of Allahabad on the A
.~· ground of the absence or the presence of the words 'of the deceased' in
sub·section ( I) and sub·section (2) of section 15 of the Act appears to
be hyper·technical and the High Court has tried to make a distinction
where it does not actually exist. The second reason, namely, that
exclusion of 'step·sons' and 'step·daughters' from clause (a) of section
B
15(1) of the Act would be unfair as they would thereby be deprived of

-\-. a share in the property of their father is again not well·founded. The
rule of devolution in section 15 of the Act applies to all kinds of

- ' properties left behind by a female Hindu except those dealt with by
clauses (a) and (b) of section 15(2) which make a distinction as regards
the property inh~rited by her from her parents and the property in·
herited from her husband or father·in·law and that too when she leaves c
no sons and daughters (including children of predeceased sons and
.----' daughters). 1f the construction placed by the High Court of Allahabad
is accepted then the property earned by the female Hindu herself or
purchased or acquired by her would devolve on step·sons and step·
daughters also along with her sons and daughters. Is it just and proper
D
to construe that under clause (a) of section 15(1) of the Act her step·
sons and step·daughters, i.e., children of the husband by another wife
will be entitled to a share along with her own children when the Act
does not expressly says so? We do not think that the view expressed by
,-4 the High Court of Allahabad represents the true intent of the law.
When once a property becomes the absolute property of a female
E
~ Hindu it shall devolve first on her children (including children of the
predeceased son and daughter) as provided in section 15(1)(a) of the
Act and then on other heirs subject only to the limited change intro·
duced in section 15(2) of the Act. The step·sons or step·daughters will
>'
, come in as heirs only under clause (b) of section 15(1) or under clause
.J (b) of section 15(2) of the Act. We do not, therefore, agree with the
reasons given by the Allahabad High Court in support of its decision.
F
We disagree with this decision.

In the circumstances, we hold that the High Court of Punjab and
Haryana against whose decision this petition is filed was right in
affirming the decree passed in favour of Kirpal Singh, Respondent G
·~ No. J herein.
'
The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, dismissed.

A.P.J. Petition dismissed.
H