Holding

The Court held that the established circumstantial evidence proved the authenticity of the signatures and the advocate's misconduct, obviating the need for a handwriting expert, and accordingly reduced the suspension to two and a half years subject to refund and costs.

Summary

The appellant, a practising advocate, received Rs.25,102 from the respondent as court fees for filing a suit but failed to deposit the amount and later issued a cheque of Rs.38,000 to refund the fees with interest, which bounced due to insufficient funds. The Bar Council of India, after examining the receipts and the cheque, found the advocate guilty of professional misconduct and suspended his licence for five years under Section 18 of the Advocates Act, 1961. The advocate appealed, contending that his signatures on the documents were forged and that a handwriting expert should have been consulted, and also denying receipt of the fees. The Supreme Court held that the circumstantial evidence was patent, establishing the authenticity of the signatures and the misconduct, rendering a handwriting expert unnecessary. Consequently, the Court reduced the suspension to two and a half years, conditioned on the refund of the amount with interest and payment of costs, and allowed the appeal in part.

Issues considered

Whether the Bar Council was required to obtain a handwriting expert opinion to determine the genuineness of the signatures on the receipts and cheque.
Whether the advocate's conduct amounted to professional misconduct under Section 18 of the Advocates Act, 1961.
Whether the five‑year suspension imposed by the Bar Council was appropriate or should be modified.
Whether the advocate is liable to refund the misappropriated amount with interest and to pay costs.

Legislation cited

Advocates Act, 1961s. 18, s. 18A

Subjects

professional misconductadvocates actbar council disciplinary proceedingssuspension of licencemisappropriation of court feeshandwriting expertappeal under Section 18legal profession

Judgment

A L.C. GOYAL
v.
MRS. SURESH JOSHI AND ORS.

MARCH 12, 1999
B
[DR. AS. ANAND CT. AND V.N. KHARE, J.) r-

Advocates Act, 1961-Section 18-Appeal against order passed by Bar
Council of India-Amount deposited towards court fee misappropriated by
C Advocate-Cheque issued to refund amount to client dishonoured for insuf-
ficient funds-Advocate denied signature on the cheque--i.icence to practice
suspended for 5 years as professional misconduct proved-On appeal Held,
legal profession is known as a noble profession having high traditions and if
a member of the profession falls from such standards, he deserves punishment
commensurate with gravity of the misconduct-Opinion of a handwriting ex-
D pert was not needed for finding out the genuineness of the signature in view
of the patent circumstantial evidence-No inteiference needed in the order but
on undertaking that the Advocate would confonn to standards of the profes-
sion, period of suspension reduced to two- and-a-half years subject to refund
of the amount with interest-Costs of appeal in addition to the costs awarded
E by the Bar Council to be deposited-Directions issued.

Appellant, a practicing Advocate, received Rs. 25,102 towards court
fees in addition to certain other amounts for filing a snit before High
Court. Respondent having come to know that the said amount had been
misappropriated and no steps had been taken in her case. On being so told
F by the respondent the appellant issued a cheque for Rs. 38,000 favouring
the employees union represented by the respondent, in order to refund the
court fees with interest. This cheque was dishonoured twice for insufficient
funds. On a complaint, the Bar Council of India, after examining the
respondent and various exhibits produced found the appellant guilty of
G professional misconduct. His licence to practice was suspended for a period
of five years. Hence this appeal.

The appellant contended before this court that when signatures on
the receipts and the cheque had been denied by him it became incumbent
upon the Bar Council of India to seek opinion of a handwriting expert; and
H that the said court fees had never been paid to him.
1018
L.C. GOYAL v. SURESHJOSHI 1019

Allowing the appeal, this Court A

HELD : 1. The legal profession is known as a noble profession having
high traditions and has been catering to the need of the society for very
long time past. Thus the membe.-s of this profession are expected to uphold
those traditions and serve the society with sincerity and honesty. If such
B
are the expectations from a noble profession, its members must conduct
themselves, which may be worthy of emulation. By doing any act which is
contrary to the accepted norms and standards of this profession, a mem-
ber of the profession not only discredits himself, but also brings disrepute
to the profession to which he belongs. By such acts the credibility and
reputation of the profession as a whole comes under cloud. If any member c
of the profession falls from such standards, he deserves punishment
commensurate with the gravity of misconduct. [1026-C-D]

2.1. Professional misconduct is established by the circumstances that
valuation of the suit originally filed was purposely kept vague which was D
subsequently amended without the knowledge of the respondent; that the
cheque was dishonoured due to insufficient funds; that the respondent was
not the beneficiary of the cheque, therefore there was no reason to forge
the signature; that no reply was given to the notices sent by the respondent;
that no FIR was lodged with regard to theft of the cheque book, and that
there was a striking similarity between the appellant's admitted signature E
and the one on the cheque. [1022-D; 1024-A]

2.2. Circumstances established in the present case speak for them-
selves and candidly point towards the misconduct committed by the appel-
lant. When the established circumstantial evidence is so patent that it F
leads to only one conclusion that the signature was not forged and thus
there was no need for an opinion of a handwriting expert for finding out
the genuineness of the signature. [1025-G]

3. Since the appellant's counsel undertook on behalf of the appellant
to the effect that the appellant would conform to standards of the legal G
profession the order suspending his licence to practice for a period of five
years is modified by reducing it to two and a half years, pnivided interest
on the amount till date of payment of money @ Rs. 9% per annum is also
deposited. The cost awarded by the Bar Council as well as the costs of this
appeal shall also be deposited by the appellant. [1021-H; 1027-A] H
1020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999] 1 S.C.R.
A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2271 of
1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.3.98 of the Disciplinary
Committee of the Bar Council of India, in B.C.I. T.R. Ca:;e No. 44 of 1995.

B R.K. Jain, Aseem Mehrotra, Ms. Surita Bamezai and {Ashok K.
Mahajan), {NP) for the Appellant. •'-

Pranab Kumar Mullick for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
c
V.N. KHARE, J. This appeal under Section 18 of the Advocates Act
1961 {hereinafter referred to as the "Act") at the instance of the appellant
who is a practicing Advocate of the High Court of Delhi as well as an
Advocate on Record of this Court is directed against the order dated
2.3.1998 passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
D on a complaint filed by the respondent (hereinafter referred to as com- ....
plain ant) whereby the Bar Council of India after having found that the
appellant has committed professional misconduct, suspended his licence to
practice for a period of five years.

The facts that emerge out of the complaint filed by the complainant
E
are these:

Some time in September 1989, the complainant engaged the appel-
!ant for filing a suit for injunction on the Original Side of the High Court
of Delhi. The appellant filed the suit. The appellant is alleged to have
F charged Rs. 25,102 towards. payment of court fee and also Rs. 389 for k··
miscellaneous charges total amounting to Rs. 25,491, and also a further sum
of Rs.6,500 out of which Rs. 3,500 was paid through cheque and a sum of
Rs. 3,000 in cash. The appellant gave receipt dated 6.10.89 for a sum of
Rs. 6,500 as well as receipt dated 6.10.89 for a sum of Rs. 25,102. Some
time in 1992 the complainant came to know that the appellant has not
G deposited the process fee and also did not press the application for interim
injunction filed in the suit. The complainant on an enquiry fom;id that the
appellant has misappropriated a· sum of Rs. 25, 102 and also did not take
any steps towards the progress of the case. On being so told by the
complainant the appellant after realising his mistake issued a cheque dated
H 31.3.93 for a sum of Rs. 38,000 on account of refund of court fee amount
L.C. GOYAL v. SURESH JOSHI [V.N. KHARE, J.] 1021

along with interest. The said cheque was drawn on UCO Bank and the A
same was deposited in the account of the Union, namely, M/s. Siemens
Employees' Union, New Delhi with the Central Bank of India. The said
cheque bounced due to insufficient funds. Later on when the complainant
approached the appellant informing him that the cheque has bounced the
appellant asked the complainant to deposit the cheque again with an
B
assurance that this time the cheque would be honoured but again the
cheque when it was deposited on 15.5.93 was dishonored with the remarks
"insufficient funds". The complainant then sent a notice dated 9.6.93 which
remained unreplied. Under such circumstances the complainant filed a
complaint before the Delhi Bar Council. Since the said complaint could
not be decided within the stipulated time it stood transferred to Bar c
Council of India. Before the Bar Council of India the complainant ex-
amined herself as well as got exhibited various documents, namely, Ext.C-1
- receipt dated 6.10.89 for a sum of Rs.6,500 ; Ext.C-2 - another receipt
dated 6.10.89 which was in respect of a sum of Rs.25,102 ; Ext.C-3 - case
file of the civil suit filed before the High Court of Delhi; Ext.C-4 - cheque D
issued by the appellant dated 31.3.93 for a sum of Rs.38,000 ; Ext C-5 &
C-6. Memos of Central Bank and UCO Bank respectively with respect to
presentation of cheque and its dishonoring on account of insufficient funds;
Ext.C-7 and C-8 - memos of Central Bank and UCO Bank with respect to
first pres~ntation of cheque and its dishonoring due to insufficient funds
E
in the account of the appellant; Ext.C-9 - counter foil of deposit of cheque
in the account of Siemens Employees' Union; Ext.C-14 the certificate
issued by the S.H.O., Police Station, Tilak Marg, New Delhi dated 28.7.95
to the effect that no complaint was received from the appellant regarding
theft of cheque book at Police Station, Tilak Marg. Besides that the original
file of the civil suit No.2688/89 was summoned by the Bar Council. The F
appellant denied the allegations that he has received a sum of Rs.25,102
towards payment of court fee and also denied his signatures on Ext.C-1,
C-2 and C-4 alleging that his signatures were forged by the respondent
herself. The Bar Council after considering the entire material found that
the appellant had received a sum of Rs.25,102 from the respondent towards G
payment of court fee which he never deposited in the Court and Ext.C-4
bears the signature of the appellant. Consequently, the Bar Council after
having arrived at the conclusion that the appellant has committed profes-
sional misconduct, suspended his licence to practice for a period of 5 years.
That is how the matter has come before us.
H
1022 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1999) 1 S.C.R.
A Sh. R.K. Jain, learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant
advanced two submissions. The first submission is that the appellant having
denied his signatures on Exts. C-1, C-2 and C-4 it was incumbent upon the
Bar Council to have sought an opinion of a hand-writing expert for finding
out the genuineness of the signatures on those exhibits. He contended that
B the failure on the part of the Bar Council to summon a hand-writing expert
has resulted in grave injustice to the appellant. The second submission is
that the appellant has never received a sum of Rs.25,102 towards payment
of court fee and the finding r;:corded by the Bar Council contrary to it is
totally per verse. Since both the submissions of learned counsel are over-
lapping, we propose to deal both the submissions together.
c After we heard the matter and perused the record, we find five
established circumstances against the appellant which are stated
hereinafter.

(1) The valuation of the suit given in the plaint originally filed was
D purposely kept vague which was subsequently amended without the knowledge
of the complainant.

The suit was filed in 1989. However, the Registry of the High Court
returned the plaint for removing the following defects:

E (i) That the prayer clause was not proper;

(ii) That exact value for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction
were not mentioned; and

(iii) claim made and the court fee amount paid should also be -*"
F stated.

On 26.9.89 the plaint was re-filed and a new para 50 was added.
Prayer clause was also amended. Clarification of the court fee amount was
also made and paras 39, 40, 42 and 43 of the plaint were also amended. In
paragraphs 39, 40, 42 and 43 of the plaint the words "fixed court fee of
G Rs.20 is affixed on the plaint" were added. In paragraph 50 which was a
new paragraph at page 20 of the plaint, the value of each prayer has been
tentatively fixed at Rs.200 and the court fee of Rs.20 on each prayer has
been affixed on the plaint were mentioned. Pages 20, 21 and 22 of the plaint
did not bear the signatures of the complainant although all other pages of
H the plaint were signed by the complainant. Thus it shows that initially no
L.C. GOYAL v. SUR ESH JOSHI [V .N. KHARE, J. J 1023

··- valuation was given in the plaint but subsequently without any knowledge A
of the complainant pages 20 to 22 of the plaint were substituted under the
signatures of the appellant. Had the respondent been informed about the
substitution of these 3 pages of the plaint the same would have contained
the signatures of the complainant. When the plaint was originally filed the
figures stated herein were not in the plaint which facts are borne out from
the report of the Registry of the Delhi High Court. The amount mentioned
B
-)

in paras 39, 40, 42, 43 and addition of para 50 with respect to court fee
was done by the appellant as the same were not in existence when the plaint
was filed at the first instance. The aforesaid facts show that the valuation
of the suit was purposely kept vague when the plaint was filed for the first
time so that the respondent- complainant may not able to know as to the c
actual amount of court fee affixed on the plaint. The original plaint was
summoned by the Bar Council and after examining it the Bar Council
recorded the following findings :

"A prima facie look at this makes it clear that in column No.5
stamp paper towards court-fees column has been left blank and
D
no figure has been mentioned therein. At S.No.1 against the memo
of parties, figure of Rs.140 has been mentioned and over vakalat-
nama Rs.2.75 has been mentioned. It is further apparent that
alignment of the a,mount of Rs.140 court fees paid for parties was
not typed at the same time as the alignment of the type clearly E
shows that particulars and objects mentioned at the top of the
column horizontally same alignment whereas figure of Rs.140 is
slightly below which clearly indicates that this was put sub-
sequently. Similarly, figure of Rs.2.75 at S.No.3 appears to have
been mentioned subsequently as vakalatnama and figure of 22
F
appears to have been typed at the same time and Rs.2.75 is
somewhat on lower level whereas, had all these figures been typed
at the same time, they would have been in the same line and
alignment. Thus, it appears that figure of Rs.140 and Rs.2.75 have
been typed subsequently."
G
We are in agreement with the aforesaid finding recorded by the Bar
Council and are of the view that the aforesaid established circumstances
clearly show that exact amount of court fee to be paid on the plaint was •
purposely kept vague and subsequently three pages were substituted so that
the complainant may not able to know the exact amount of court fee paid H
1024 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.
r
A on the plaint.

(2) Dishonoring of the cheque issued by the appellant Ex. C/4 by the
bank on account of insufficient fund in the account of the appellant.

The complainant alleged that when the appellant realized that the
B complainant has come to know that he has misappropriated a sum of Rs.
25,491 , he gave a cheque for a sum of Rs. 38,000 which is Ext.C-4. The
said cheque was drawn on UCO Bank and the same was deposited in the
Central Bank of India in the account of Union, viz., Siemens' Employees
Union, New Delhi. But the s<!id cheque was dishonored due to insufficient
C funds. The appellant denied his signature on Ext. C-4 and contended that
his signature was forged by the complainant. It is in this context that it was
urged before the Bar Council of India that some hand- writing expert be
examined in order to find out the genuineness of the signature on Ext. C-4.
As stated above, the cheque bounced not on account of the fact that the
D signature on Ext. C-4 was not tallying with the specimen signature of the
appellant kept with the Bank, but on account of insufficient funds. Had the
signature on Ext. C-4 been different, the bank would have returned the
same with the remark that the signature on Ext. C-4 was not tallying with
the appellant's specimen signature kept with the bank. The memos Ext. C-6
and Ext. C-8 issued by the bank clearly show that signature of the appellant
E on Ext. C-4 was not· objected to by the bar..k, but the same was returned
with the remark "insufficient fund". This circumstance shows that the
signature on Ext. C-4 was that of the appellant.

(3) The complainant was not beneficiary of Ex. C/4.
F
As seen earlier the cheque Ext. C-4, issued by the appellant was in
favour of M/s. Siemens' Employees Union, New Delhi. The account payee
cheque obviously was not issued in the name of the complainant. By the
aforesaid cheque the complainant was not going to gain anything out of it.
The amount normally would have been credited in the account of Mis.
G Siemens' Employees Union, New Delhi. Thus, this circumstance also shows
that there was no reason for the complainant to forge the signature of the
appellant on Exts. C-1, C-2 and C-4.

• 4) No reply to the notices (Exts.C-12 and C-13) dated 9.6.93 and
H 11.1.93, respectively.
L.C. GOYAL v. SURESHJOSHI [V.N. KHARE,J.] 1025

The complainant sent two notices on behalf of M/s Siemens' Union A
to the appellant wherein she inter alia alleged, that a sum of Rs. 25,102
was misappropriated by the appellant under the pretext of payment of the
court fee for the suit filed by the plaintiffs, that the appellant did not press
the application for injunction, and that the appellant misled the com-
plainant as regards the progress of the case. These notices were not replied
B
to by the appellant which is a material circumstance against the appellant
when, receipt of the notices sent to him have been admitted.

(5) No FIR lodged with regard to theft of the cheque book.

The case set up by the appellant before the Bar Council was that, in c
fact, the complainant somehow managed to get his cheque book and she
after forging his signature on one of the leaf presented the same to the
bank for payment. If it was true, why did the appellant not lodge any FIR
with the Tilak Marg Police Station regarding theft of the cheque book.
However, it was subsequently explained by the appellant that he did send D
a letter to the SHO of the said Police Station. But, in normal course, FIR
is not lodged by letter at the first instance. Moreover, SHO, Tilak Marg
Police Station gave a certificate Ext. C-14, to the effect that he did not
receive any registered letter or report from the appellant regarding theft
of his cheque book.
E
These established circumstances stated above, clearly show that the
signature on Exts. C-1, C-2 and C-4 were that of the appellant himself.
Moreover, during the course of hearing of the case, we ourselves examined
and compared the admitted signature of the appellant with that of Ext. C-4
leaving nothing to chance lest any injustice is caused to the appellant. On F
comparison, we found striking similarity between the admitted signature
and that of the disputed one and there is no reason to doubt the genuine-
ness of the signature on Ext. C-4. The circumstances established in the
present case speak for themselves and candidly point out towards the
misconduct committed by the appellant. When the established circumstan-
tial evidence is so patent that it leads to only one conclusion that· the G
signature on Ext. C-4 was not forged; there was no need for an opinion of
a hand writing expert. We are, therefore, satisfied that the established
circumstantial evidence as well as the documentary evidence in the present
case show that the allegations of the complainant were well substantiated
and in such circumstances of the case, the Bar Council of India was H
,,
1026 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] 1 S.C.R.

A justified in declining to summon a hand-writing expert for finding out the
genuineness of the signature on Ext. C-4.

Shri R.K.J ain, learned senior counsel, while concluding his argument
prayed that we may take a lenient view of the matter in view of the fact
that the appellant has deposited the entire money covered by Ext. C-4. The
B learned counsel also gave an undertaking on behalf of the appellant that
he would not repeat such a conduct. ,-

The legal profession is known as a noble profession having high
traditions and has been catering to the need of the society for a very long
C time past. Thus the members of this profession are expected to uphold
those traditions and serve the society with sincerity and honestly. If such
are the expectations from a noble profession, its members must conduct
themselves which may be worthy of emulation. By doing any act which is
contrary to the accepted norms and standards of this profession, a member
D of the profession not only discredits himself, but also brings disrepute to
the profession to which he belongs. By such acts the credibility and
reputation of the profession as a whole comes under cloud. If any member
of the profession falls from such standards, he deserves punishment com-
mensurate with the gravity of misconduct. Initid!ly, we were l}Ot inclined to
interfere with the order under appeal. However, since the appellant'~
E counsel has given an undertaking on behalf of the appellant to the effect
that the appellant would conform to the standards of the legal profession
and further, he has deposited a sum of Rs. 40,000 to be paid to the
plaintiffs of the suit, we modify the order of the Disciplinary Committee,
Bar Council of India of suspending the appellant's licence to practice for
F a period five years by reducing it to two and a half years, provided the
appellant also deposits interest on Rs. 38,000 w.e.f 31.3.93 till the date of
payment of money to the plaintiffs @ Rs. 9% per annum. The appellant
has already deposited a sum of Rs. 40,000 in the Court which has been
invested in a fixed deposit of a nationalised bank. The amount over and
above Rs. 38,000 deposited by the appellant in this Court and an interest
G accrued on the fixed deposit shall be adjusted towards interest payable by
the appellant. The balance amount, if any, shall be paid by the appellant
within one month from the date of this judgment. In case the appellant fails
to deposit the aforestated amount within the stipulated period, our order
reducing the suspension period of the appellant's licence to practice would
H stand recalled and all the consequences provided in the order under appeal
L.C.GOYALv.SURESHJOSHI [V.N.KHARE,J.) 1027

shall come into effect. The appellant shall also deposit the cost as awarded A
by the Bar Council of India, as well as the costs of this appeal.

The appeal is, therefore, allowed in part. The appellant shall pay cost
to the claimant which we quantify at Rs. 5,000 .

A.O. Appeal partly allowed. B