Holding

The Supreme Court held that the writ petition was not maintainable because Article 243ZG(b) bars judicial interference in municipal elections, and the High Court erred in deciding the factual caste issue, leading to the appeal being allowed and the writ dismissed.

Summary

Kurapati Maria Das was elected as a councilor and subsequently as chairperson of Bapatla Municipal Council, a seat reserved for the Scheduled Caste (Mala). Petitioners alleged that he was not a Scheduled Caste member but a Christian belonging to a Backward Class and that he had obtained caste certificates fraudulently. They filed a writ of quo warranto in the High Court, which set aside his election and ordered his removal. The Supreme Court held that the bar under Article 243ZG(b) of the Constitution is absolute, meaning that challenges to municipal elections must be made only by an election petition, not by a writ under Article 226. The Court also ruled that the High Court had exceeded its jurisdiction by enquiring into the disputed factual question of the appellant's caste status and by relying on service records, which amounted to a roving enquiry prohibited under the 1993 Act. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgments, and dismissed the writ petition.

Issues considered

The writ petition under Article 226 challenging the election to a reserved municipal seat is maintainable despite the bar in Article 243ZG(b).
Whether the High Court could adjudicate the factual dispute regarding the appellant's caste status and the validity of his caste certificates under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh (SC, ST & BC) Regulation of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993.
Whether conversion to Christianity affects the appellant's Scheduled Caste status.
Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by conducting a roving enquiry into the appellant's caste.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. Article 226, s. Article 243ZG(b)
Right to Information Act, 2005

Subjects

municipal electionreservationScheduled Castequo warrantoArticle 226Article 243ZGcaste certificateconversionjurisdiction

Judgment

[2009] 6 S.C.R. 498

A KURAPATI MARIA DAS
v.
DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA SAMAJAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2617 of 2009)
APRIL 17, 2009
B
[TARUN CHATIERJEE AND V.S. SIRPURKAR, JJ.]
Al
Writ jurisdiction: Writ of quo warranto - Challenging the
election of appellant as Councilor/Chairperson on the ground
.....
c that the office of Councilor/Chairperson was reserved for
Scheduled Caste and appellant got himself elected by
making false claim of being member of Scheduled Caste -
High Court allowed the writ petition - On appeal, held: It was
not for High Court to enter into the disputed question of fact
D regarding the caste status of appellant - The two caste
certificates obtained by appellant were valid and genuine and
were not cancelled under section 5 of 1993 Act- High Court
exceeded its jurisdiction in relying on the service records of
the appellants and in calling the files of the Electricity Board
E where the appellant was previously working - This amounted
to a roving enquiry into caste of appellant which was certainly
not permissible in writ jurisdiction and also in the wake of
Section 5 of 1993 Act- Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes,
Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue
F of Community Certificates Act, 1993 - s.5 - Andhra Pradesh
Municipalities (Decision on Election Disputes) Rules, 1967
- r.1 - Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 243ZG(b) -
Election laws.

The appellant was elected as a councillor in the
G election. Later on he was elected as the chairperson of
the council by all the elected councilors. The office of
•
councilor/chairperson was reserved for the Scheduled
Castes. Appellant claimed that he belonged to the
Scheduled Caste namely 'Mala'. After 6 months of election
H 498
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 499
SAMAJAN & ORS.
-\
of appellant as chairperson, a representation was filed A
before the Superintendent of Police for initiation of action
against the appellant on the ground that he got himself
elected by making false claim of being a member of
Scheduled Caste. Similar representation was made to
Andhra Pradesh State Commission for Scheduled Caste B
/Tribes. A complaint was made before the District
Collector under section 5 r.w. section 12 of the Andhra
Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and
Backward Classes) Regulation of Issue of Community
Certificates Act, 1993. c
A writ of quo warranto was filed praying for direction
to the appellant to vacate the office of chairperson. An
application was also filed praying the Court to receive a
copy of the report of the Inspector of Police giving the
details of the representations. Along with the writ petition, D
the first respondent also filed a copy of service records
of appellant maintained by previous employer, the State
Electricity Board. It was pointed that in these documents
the appellant was described as the Christian Mala
belonging to the Backward Class 'C' category. It was E
averred that appellant converted to Christianity and that
he had obtained employment in the State Electricity
Board.
~.

The High Court allowed the writ petition holding that F
it was a case of play of fraud on the Constitution
depriving the Scheduled Caste category persons from
being elected to the respective offices though the said
respective offices were reserved for the said category and
it was a fit case where the appellant could not be
G
permitted any longer to occupy the respective offices.
+ Hence the appeal.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The bar to interference by courts in H
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A electoral matters contained in Article 243ZG(b) of the
Constitution of India, 1950 is absolute. Normally when
such a bar is expressed in a negative language as is the
case here, it has to be held that the tone of clause (b) is
mandatory and the bar created therein is absolute. There
B is no dispute that Rule 1 of the Andhra Pradesh
Municipalities (Decision on Election Disputes) Rules,
1967, specifically provides for challenging the election of
Councillor or Chairman. The writ petition filed before the
High Co~rt clearly suggested that what was challenge~
c was the election. The affidavit in support of the petition
specifically suggested that Ward No. 8 was reserved for
the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes from
where the appellant contested the election representing
himself to be a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste.
Paragraph 9 speaks about the election of the appellant
0
as the Chairperson. Paragraph 30 also suggests that the
complaint was made against the appellant that he had
usurped the public office by falsely claiming himself to
be a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore,
though apparently it is suggested that the writ petition
E was only for the writ of quo warranto, what was prayed for
was the setting aside of the election of the appellant on
the ground that he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste.
[Paras 17] [512-B-G]

F K. Venkatacha/am v. A. Swamickan & Anr. (1999) 4 SCC
526, held inapplicable.

Jaspa/ singh Arora v. State of M.P. and Ors. (1998) 9
SCC 594;Gurdeep Singh Dhillon v. Satpal and Ors. (2006)
G 10 SCC 616 and Election Commission of India v. Saka
Venkata Rao .AIR (1953) SC 210, referred to.

2. The continuance of the appellant as the
Chairperson was not dependent upon something which
was posterior to the appellant's election as Chairperson.
H
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 501
SAMAJAN & ORS.
It was not as if some event took place after the election A
of the appellant which created a disqualification in
appellant to continue as the Chairperson. The
continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson
depended directly on his election, firstly, as a Ward
member and secondly as the Chairperson which election B
was available only to the person belonging to the
Scheduled Caste. In the eventuality when a person who
is elected as a Scheduled Caste candidate, renounces
his caste after the elect!ons by conversion to some other
religion, a valid writ petition for quo warranto could c
certainly lie because then it is not the election of such
person which would be in challenge but his
subsequently continuing in his capacity as a person
belonging to a particular caste. The question of caste and
the election are so inextricably connected that they . D
cannot be separated. [Para 22] [515-E-H; 516-A-C]

3. There is no dispute that the appellant was given
two caste certificates within the definition of Section 2(b)
of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled Castes, Scheduled
Tribes and Backward Classes) Act, 1993 and that these E
community certificates were valid and genuine
certificates. The certificates were never cancelled under
Section 5 of the 1993 Act. The said certificates could be
cancelled only under Section 5 after a full-fledged enquiry
by the authority named in that Section. Under such F
circumstances, the High Court could not have decided
that question of fact which was very seriously disputed
by the appellant. The High Court has gone out of its way,
firstly in relying on the Xerox copies of the service
records of the appellants and then at the appellate stage, G
in calling the files of the Electricity Board where the
appellant was working. This amounted to a roving
enquiry into the caste of the appellant which was
certainly not permissible in writ jurisdiction and also in
H
502 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009] 6 S.C.R.

I-
A the wake of Section 5 of 1993 Act. [Para 25] [517-A-D]

4. Merely because the appellant was described as
being a Christian in the service records did not mean that ,.
the appellant was actually a i-erson professing Christian
religion. It was not after all known as to who had given
B
those details and further as to whether the details, in
reality, were truthful or not. It would ::.ie unneccesary to
go into the aspect whether the petitioner in reality is a
"
Christian for the simple reason that this issue was never
raised at the time of his election. If it was not for High
c Court to enter into the disputed question of fact regarding
the caste status of the appellant, the findings recorded
by it on that question would lose all its relevance and
importance. It was nobody's case that the petitioner ever
was converted nor was it anybody's case as to when
D such conversion took place, if at all it took place. All the
. .

observations by the Single Judge regarding the 1

conversion of the appellant to Christianity were,
therefore, without any basis, more particularly, in view of
.
._

the strong denial by the appellant that he never converted
E to Christianity. [Para 26) [517-E-H]

5. Application was filed on 18.04.2006 and various
representations were also made to various authorities.
However, if an application under Section 5 of the 1993 Act ;

F was made to the proper authority it was bound to be
enquired into. However, taking the advantage that it was
not decided for four months, the writ petitioners could not
have rushed with the writ petition. At the most, the writ
petitioners could have asked for a direction to the said
authority for deciding that application one way or the
G
other. That was not done. [Para 27) [518-0-F]
•
6. The High Court clearly erred firstly, entertaining the
writ petition, secondly in going into the disputed question
of fact regarding the caste status, thirdly, in holding that
H
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 503
SAMAJAN & ORS.
the appellant did not belong to the Scheduled Caste and A
fourthly, in allowing the writ petition. [Para 28) [518-H;
519-A]

Case Law Reference:

(1999) 4 sec 526 held inapplicable Para 13 B
(1998) 9 sec 594 referred to Para 15

(2006) 10 sec 616 referred to Para 16

AIR (1953) SC 210 referred to Para 18
c
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2617 of 2009.

From the Judgment & Order dated 25.07.2007 of the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in Writ Appeal No. 1 of 2007.
D
• L.N. Rao, Siddhartha Dave, Jemtiben Ao and Vibha Datta
Makhija, for the Appellants.

R. Sundaravaradhan, Gagan Gupta; D. Bharathi Reddy,
Ramesh N. Keshwani, Ramlal Roy, Sumeera Raheja and G.N. E
Reddy for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

V.S. SIRPURKAR, J. 1. Leave granted.

2. The order of the Division Bench of the High Court F
confirming the judgment of the learned Single Judge is in
challenge before us. The learned Single Judge had allowed the
writ petition filed on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 10
• challenging the election as well as the continuation of the
appellant herein as the Chairperson of the Baptla Municipal G
Council.

3. The following facts will highlight the controversy:

The appellant herein contested the election from Ward No.8 H
504 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A of Bapatla as a Councilor in the election held on 24.09.2005.
He was declared elected. Later on he was elected as the
Chairperson of the Council by all the elected Councilors. The
said Ward was reserved for Scheduled Castes and the office
of the Chairperson of Bapatla Municipal Council was also
8 reserved for the Scheduled Castes by a Notification dated
18.08.2005 issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh. The
appellant herein claimed that he belonged to the Scheduled
Caste, namely, "Mala", which is one of the castes specified in
the Constitution.

C 4. After about six months of the election of the appellant
as the Chairperson, a representation came to be filed by the
1st respondent on 22.03.2006 to the Superintendent of Police, )

Guntur to investigate into the issue relating to appellant's
community status. A further representation came to be made
D on 14.04.2006 for initiation of action against the appellant as
he had got himself elected by making false claim of being a
member of the Scheduled Caste. Similar representation was
made to Andhra Pradesh State Commission for Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes. A complaint was made on
E 18.04.2006 before the District Collector, Guntur under Section
5 read with Section 12 of the Andhra Pradesh (Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes) Regulation
of Issue of Community Certificates Act, 1993 (hereinafter
referred to as 'the 1993 Act' for short). An applicatio;nvas also
F filed under the Right to Information Act, 200S for supply of
documents such as the application filed by the appellant in the
month of August, 2005 for issuing the caste certificate and the
documents annexed to such application for substantiating his
claim of belonging to the Scheduled Caste, the previous
G certificate, if any, issued to the appellant and the caste
certificate issued to him pursuant to his application made in the
month of August. 2005. Ultimately, on 20.8.2006, a writ petition
came to be filed before the Andhra Pradesh High Court
purportedly for the writ of quo warranto. In the said writ petition,
H the following prayers were made:
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 505
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
"For the said reasons, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court A
may be pleased to issue a writ or order or direction more
particularly one in the nature of Writ of Quo Warranto
against the 9th respondent.

(a) directing the 9th respondent to disclose the authority 8
under which he is holding the office of the
Chairperson and the office of the Councilor of the
Bapatla Municipal Council, Guntur District
(representing Ward No.8).

• (b) directing the 9th respondent to vacate the offices C
of the Chairperson and the Councilor of the Bapatla
Municipal Council, Guntur District (representing
Ward No.8), or,

(c) removing the 9th respondent from the office of the D
Chairperson and from the office of the Councilor of
the Bapatla Municipal Council, Guntur District
(representing Ward No. 8)

and
E
(d) to pass such other order or orders as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.

For the said reasons, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court F
m!3y be pleased to issue an interim injunction restraining
the 9th respondent from functioning as the Chairperson and
as the member of the Bapatla Municipal Council, Guntur
District representing Ward No.8 thereof pending disposal
of the writ petition and pass such other order or orders as G
this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case."

5. In the said writ petition, one application being WPMP
23998/06 was also filed praying the Court to receive a copy of
the report of the Inspector of Police dated 21.08.2006 giving H
506 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A the details of the representations made by the respondent No.1.
Along with the writ petition, the 1st respondent had also filed
copy of Service Rules of the present appellant maintained by
In-charge of the Establishment of the office of Assistant
Engineers operation Bapatla, Andhra Pradesh, State Electricity
B Board and seniority list of the Assistant Lineman prepared by
the Southern Power Distribution Company of Andhra Pradesh
Ltd. Operation Division, Tenali which was the successor of
Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board. It was pointed that in
these documents the appell~nt was described as the Christian
c Mala belonging to the Backward Class 'C' category. Even in
the Affidavit, in support of the writ petition, it was averred that
the 1st respondent Association and the other respondents had
came to know that appellant belonged to the backward class
'C' category as he was a Mala converted to Christianity and
D that he had obtained employment in the Andhra Pradesh State
Electricity Board and continued in service till his retirement. In
paragraph 11 of the affidavit in support of the petition, the
petitioners had relied on the documents regarding the service
. record of the appellant.

E 6. The appellant denied all these claims and further
claimed specifically that he had never converted to Christianity
and did not belong to backward class 'C' category. He asserted
that he was born at Pedavadlapudi, a village at Manda!
Mangalaguri in the District Guntur in the family· of the caste Mala
F belonging to Hindu religion and his father is one Sliri Sangeeta
Rao and family of his parents and ancestors belonged to Hindu
Mala community and he never followed Christianity and was
never baptized to Christianity. He relied on the Caste Certificate
issued by Manda! Revenue Officer in August, 2005 and other
G certificate issued by the Manda! Revenue Officer in the year
2004 showing that he belonged to Hindu Mala category. In
short, he categorically disputed the claim of the writ petitioners
(respondents herein) that he was not a Hindu Mala Scheduled
Caste but was a Christian.
H
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 507
SAMAJAN & ORS. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
7. He also pointed out that firstly his nomination and his A
election as a Ward member which he had contested as a
Scheduled Caste candidate, was never challenged by way of
an Election Petition though there is a specific remedy provided
in the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities (Decision on Election
Disputes) Rules, 1967. He also pointed out that the caste B
certificates issued by the authorities in the year 2004-05 were
still intact and not cancelled. He also pointed out that this was
nothing but an indirect way of challenging his election as a
~ouncilor and, thereafter, as the Chairperson by way of a writ
petition without filing any Election Petition which was specifically c
barred under Article 243 ZG of the Constitution of India. He,
therefore, averred that the petitioners before the High Court who
are respondents herein had bypassed the specific remedy
provided under the Andhra Pradesh Municipalities (Decision
on Election Disputes) Rules, 1967, challenging the election by D
way of an Election Petition and have resorted to the filing of
writ petition raising the disputed questions of factand, thus, the
writ petition was not maintainable.

8. The learned Single Judge of the High Court took note
of the efforts made by the respondents by their representations E
to the various authorities as also their complaint made under
Section 5 of the 1993 Act. The learned Single Judge after
noting the rival contentions, extensively quoted and relied on
the documents filed by the writ petitioners (respondent herein)
relating to the service record of the appellant as also the F
representations filed by the writ petitioners. The Learned Single
Judge held that the authenticity of the service record and the
entries produced before the High Court could not be doubted
in view of the stand taken by the appellant in his counter
affidavit. He held that the said stand against these documents G
was unsatisfactory. He therefore, came to the following factual
findings in paragraph 23 of his judgment:

"23. On a careful analysis of the whole material available
on record, the following aspects emerged:-
H
508 SUPREME COURT REPORTS
.,
[2009] 6 S.C.R. \..,

t
A (1) The fact that the 9th respondent worked in
A.P. Electricity Board is not in serious
dispute. The fact that he retired from service
also is not in serious dispute. The Service
Book, the Entries, authenticity thereof also
B cannot be in serious dispute, especially in
the light of the nature of the stand taken by
the 9th respondent in the counter affidavit.

(2) The Caste Certificates were obtained by the
9th respondent after retirement claiming to be
c of the Scheduled Caste community;

(3) The stand taken by the 9th respondent is not
one of re-conversion into Hinduism again but
the stand is that he was never Baptized and
D the family continues to be a Hindu family only
belonging to Scheduled Caste; ,
(4) It is pertinent to note that the petitioners had
taken a specific stand that for about two
generations the family of the 9th respondent
E
had embraced Christianity and continues to
have the Christian faith;

(5) The conduct of the 9th respondent in seeing
that the document are not furnished as
F reflected from the orders also would go to
show that the stand taken by him is not bona
fide; and

(6) In the light of the whole material available on
record, this is a case of play of fraud on the
G
Constitution depriving the Scheduled Caste
category persons from being elected to tr.e
respective offices though the said respective
offices are reserved for the said category.
H In the light of the above facts, this court is of the
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 509
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.)
i
considered opinion that this is a fit case where the 9th A
respondent cannot be permitted any longer to occupy the
respective offices claiming benefits under the category of
Scheduled Caste, taking shelter under the false Scheduled
Caste Certificate obtained by him for the purpose of
election or otherwise after retirement. On a careful analysis B
of the whole episode, this is only irresistible conclusion at
which this Court can arrive at, since no other conclusion
is possible to be drawn." /

9. Ultimately, on this basis he came to the conclusion that
the writ petition was not only maintainable but was also liable
c
to be allowed. In that manner he allowed the writ petition.

10. An appeal came to be filed against this judgment
before· the Division Bench. However, the Division Bench
dismissed the said appeal. Thatis how the appellant is before D
us.

11. It is urged by Shri N. Nageshwar Rao, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant that the High
Court has erred in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 E
of the Constitution, in view of a clear bar in the Constitution under
Article 243 ZG (b). He further claims that firstly no objection was
raised to the nomination papers of the appellant herein when
he contested the election as a Scheduled Caste candidate
·(
from W_ard No.8 of Baptla Municipal Council which was
F
reserved for the Scheduled Caste Candidates. He further
pointed out that the election of the appellant from that Ward and
the subsequent election as Chairperson could have been
challenged by Election Peffiion but even that was not done. He
pointed out that there is a specific provision under Section 5
of the 1993 Act for the determination of the validity of the caste G
certificate issue. He pointed out that though such application
was made, yet, without waiting for the proceedings to be
completed under that Act, the writ petitioner rushed to the High
Court which was not permissible.
H
510 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A 12. The learned counsel argues that the necessary result
is that the caste certificate of the appellant still remains intact
and, therefore, it is a prima facie proof in support of the plea
of the appellant that he belongs to the Scheduled Caste
community. Lastly, learned counsel contends that the High Court
s has gone into the fact finding exercise which was not
permissible and has come to the erroneous conclusion that the
appellant had converted to the Christianity, which plea was
never raised by the writ petitioner. Learned counsel further
buttresse~ his arguments by saying that the service record of.
c the petitioner was wholly irrelevant for the purpose of deciding
as to the caste he belongs to. Learned counsel furthermore
argued that under Article 226, the High Court could not have
gone out of its way to invite the files of the Department and then
come to the conclusion that the petitioner did not belong to the
Scheduled Caste as he had become Christian. By way of his
0
last contention, learned Senior Counsel urged that even if the
appellant had converted to Christianity, that did not result in
loosing the Scheduled Caste status on the part of the appellant.
''
Shri R. Sundarvardhan, learned Senior Counsel arguing for the
State Government also supports the argument of the appellant
E and contends that the High Court could not have gone into the
disputed questions in a writ petition which itself was not tenable
owing to the specific bar under Article 243 ZG (b).

13. As against this, Shri Gagan Gupta learned counsel
F appearing on behalf of the respondents herein argues that it
would be a travesty to allow the appellant to continue as a
Councilor or, as the case may be, as the Chairperson of the
Municipal Council, particularly, when that post was only meant
for a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste and where it
G was proved that the appellant-petitioner did not belong to the
Scheduled Caste. Regarding the bar of jurisdiction under
Article 243 ZG (b), learned counsel submitted that the decision
relied upon by the High Court reported as K. Venkatachalam
v. A Swamickan & Anr. [1999 (4) SCC 526], was applicable
H and, therefore, it could not be said that there was a bar to the
'
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 511
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
"'
"' entertainment of the writ petition under Article 226. Learned A
counsel supported the factual findings recorded by the High
Court to the effect that the appellant was a Christian and,
therefore, could not claim the status of a person belonging to
the Scheduled Caste, more particularly, caste "Mala".
B
14. In the first place, it would be better to consider as to
whether the bar under Article 243 ZG (b) is an absolute bar.
The Article reads as thus:

"243ZG (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called
in question except by an election petition presented to c
such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or
under any law made by the Legislature of a State".

15. At least from the language of clause (b), it is clear that
the bar is absolute. Normally, where such a bar is expressed D
in a negative language as is the case here, it has to be held
·- that the tone of clause (b) is mandatory and the bar created
~ therein is absolute. This Court in its recent decisions has held
the bar to be absolute. First such decision is reported as Jaspal
Singh Arora v. State of M.P. & Ors.[1998 (9) SCC 594]. In this
E
case the election of the petitioner as the President of the
Municipal Council' was challenged by a writ petition under
Article 226, which was allowed setting aside the election of the
petitioner. In paragraph 3 of this judgment, the Court observed:
<,
"it is clear that the election could not be called in question F
except by an election petition as provided under that Act.
The bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters
contained under Article 243 ZG of the Constitution was
apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the writ
petition. Apart from the bar under Article 243 ZG, on settled G
principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution
for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality
was not called for because of the statutory provision for
election petition ......... "
H
512 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A 16. The second such decision is reported as Gurdeep
Singh Dhillon v. Satpa/ & Ors. 2006 (10) SCC 616]. In that
decision, after quoting Article 243 ZG (b) the Court observed
that the shortcut of filing the writ petition and invoking
Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/
B 227 was not permissible and the only remedy available to
challenge the election was by. raising the election dispute under
the local statute.

17. There is no dispute that R~le 1 of the Andhra Pradesh
Municipalities (Decision on Election Disputes) Rules, 1967,
C specifically provides for challenging the election of Councillor
or Chairman. It was tried to be feebly argued that this was a
petition for quo warranto and not only for challenging the election
of the appellant herein. This contention is clearly incorrect.
When we see the writ petition filed before the High Court, it
D clearly suggests that what is challenged is the election. In fact
the prayer clauses (b) and (c) are very clear to suggest that it
is the election of the appellant which is in challenge. Even when
we see the affidavit in support of the petition in paragraph 8, it
specifically suggested that the Ward No. 8 was reserved for
E the persons belonging to the Scheduled Castes from where the
appellant contested the election representing himself to be a
person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Paragraph 9 speaks
about the election of the appellant as the Chairperson.
Paragraph 30 also suggests that the complaint has been made
F against the appellant that he had usurped the public office by
falsely claiming himself to be a person belonging to the
Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 33, it is contended that the first
petitioner had no remedy to question the election of the 9th
respondent by way of an election petition. Therefore, though
G apparently it is suggested in the writ petition was only for the
writ of quo warranto, what is prayed for is the setting aside of
the election of the appellant herein on the ground that he did
not belong to the Scheduled Caste. It is further clear from the
writ petition that the writ-petitioners were themselves aware of
H the situation that the writ of quo-warranto could have been
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 513
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
;
prayed for only oil invalidation or quashing of the election of the A
appellant, firstly as a Councillor and secondly, as a Chairman
and that was possible only by an Election Petition. The two
decisions quoted above, in our opinion, are sufficient to hold
that a writ petition of the nature was not tenable though
apparently the writ petition has been couched in a safe B
language and it has been represented as if it is for the purpose
of a writ of quo warranto.
A
18. Learned counsel Shri Gupta, however, invited our
attention to some other decisions of this Court reported as K.
Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan & Anr. [1999 (4) SCC 526]
c
where a writ of quo warranto was sought against the member
of the Legislative Assembly on the ground that his name was
not found in the voters' list of that particular constituency from
where he was elected. Our attention was invited to paragraphs
27 and 28. In paragraph 27 after referring to the decision of D
the Election Commission of India v. Saka Venkata Rao [AIR
1953 SC 210] and considering the Article 192, the Court
observed that Article 226 is couched in widest possible
language and unless there is a clear bar to the jurisdiction of
the High Court, its powers under Article 226 can be exercised E
when there is any act which is against any provision of law or
vioative of constitutional provisions and when the recourse
cannot be had to the provisions of the Act for appropriate relief.
Then the Court observed:
F
"In circumstances like the present one, bar Under Article
329 (b) will not come into play when the case falls under
Articles 191 and 193 and the whole process of election is
over. Consider the case where a person elected is not a
citizen of India. Would the court allow the foreign citizen to
G
sit and vote in the Legislative Assembly and not exercise
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution?"

In paragraph 28, the Court went on to hold that the High
Court had rightly exercised its jurisdiction in entertaining the writ
petition under Article 226. This case has been very heavily H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A relied on in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench. •
19. Shri N. Nageshwar Rao further points out that the factual
scenario in that case was different. That was a case where
admittedly the name of the elected candidate was not in the
B voters' list and the elected candidate had tried to use similar
name in the voters' list which was admittedly not that of the
elected candidate. There was no necessity of any proof, as a
voter list was an admitted document and it clearly displayed that ,
the name of the Legislator was not included in the list. Therefore,
the Court observed in that case in paragraph 27 which we have
c quoted above to the effect:

"In circumstances like the present one, bar Under Article
329 (b) will not come into play when the case false under
Articles 191 and 193 and the whole process of election is
D over." (emphasis supplied)

20. We are afraid, we are not in position to agree with the ·
contention that the case of K. Venkatacha/am v. A Swamickan
& Anr. [1999 (4) SCC 526] is applicable to the present
E situation. Here the appellant had very specifically asserted in
his counter affidavit that he did not belong to the Christian
religion and that he further asserted that he was a person
belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore, the Caste status
of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon
the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v.
F
A Swamickan & Anr. [1999 (4) SCC 526]. Every case is an
authority for what is actually decided in that. We do not find any
general proposition that even where there is a specific remedy
of filing an Election Petition and even when there is a disputed
question of fact regarding the caste of a person who has been
G elected from the reserved constituency still remedy of writ
petition under Article 226 would be available.

21. Again as we have stated earlier, there was no dispute
and no challenge to the findings of the High Court that K.
H Venkatachalam, the petitioner in case of K. Venkatachalam
-~·

KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 515
, SAMAJAN & ORS. [VS. SIRPURKAR, J.]
v. A Swamickan & Anr. [1999 (4) SCC 526] v.-as not a A
Legislator in electoral roll of the constituency for the general
elections for December, 1984 and he blatantly and fraudulently
represented himself to be a Legislator of the constituency using
the similarity with the name of another person. The situation in
the present case is, however, entirely different in the sense that B
here the petitioner very seriously asserted that firstly, he was
not a Christian and, secondly, that he belongs to the Scheduled
''
)
Caste.

22. Shri Gupta, however, further argued that in the present
case what was prayed for was a writ of quo warranto and in c
fact the election of the appellant was not called in question. It
was argued that since the writ petitioners came to know about
the appellant not belonging to the Scheduled Caste and since
the post of the Chairperson was reserved only for the Scheduled
caste, therefore, the High Court was justified in entering into D
\
that question as to whether he really belongs to Scheduled
Caste. In short, the learned counsel argued that independent
of the election of the appellant as a Ward member or as a
Chairperson, his caste itself was qyestioned in the writ petition
only with the objective to see whether he could continue as the E
-- Chairperson. This argument is clearly incorrect as the
continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson was not
dependent upon something which was posterior to the
appellant's election as Chairperson. It is not as if some event
had taken place after the election of the appellant which created F
a disqualification in appellant to continue as the Chairperson.
The continuance of the appellant as the Chairperson depended
.... directly on his election, firstly, as a Ward member and secondly
as the Chairperson which election was available only to the
person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. It is an admitted G
i position that Ward No.8 was reserved for Scheduled Cast and
• so also the Post of Chairperson. Therefore, though indirectly
worded, what was in challenge in reality was the validity of the
election of the appellant. According to the writ petitioners, firstly
the appellant could not have been elected as a Ward member H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A nor could he be elected as the Chairperson as he did not
belong to the Scheduled Caste. We can understand the
eventuality where a person who is elected as a Scheduled
Caste candidate, renounces his caste after the elections by
conversion to some other religion. Then a valid writ petition for
B quo warranto could certainly lie because then it is not the
election of such person which would be in challenge but his
subsequently continuing in his capacity as a person belonging
to a particular caste. The Counsel for the appellant rightly urged ;
that the question of caste and the ~lection are so inextricably
c connected that they cannot be separated. Therefore, when the
writ petitioners challenged the continuation of the appellant on
the ground of his not belonging to a particular caste what they
in fact challenged is the validity of the election of the appellant,
though apparently the petition is for the writ of quo warranto.

D 23. There is yet another distinguishing feature in case of
K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan &Anr. (1999 (4) SCC 526].
In that case there is a clear finding t_hat the elected person
therein played a fraud with the Constitution inasmuch as that
he knew that his name was not in Electoral Roll of that
E constituency and he impersonated for some other person
taking the advantage of the similarity of names. The appellant
herein asserts on the basis of his Caste Certificate that he still
belongs to Scheduled Caste. We are, therefore, of the clear
-
opinion that the case of K. Venkatacha/am v. A Swamickan &
F Anr. [1999 (4) sec 526] is not applicable to the present case
and the High Court erred in relying upon that decision.

24. Once it is held that the aforementioned case was of
no help to the respondents, the only other necessary inference
G which emerges is that the bar under Article 243 ZG would spring
in action.

25. Shri Gupta, however, pointed out that it.was specifically
proved that the appellant was a Christian and as such he did
not belong to the "Mala" caste which was a Scheduled Caste.
H Now there is no dispute that the appellant was given two caste
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 517
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
Iii
certificates within the definition of Section 2 (b) of ~~e 1993 Act. A
There is also no dispute that these community certificates were
obtained by the appellant and they were valid and genuine
certificates. It is also an admitted position that the certificates
were never cancelled under Section 5 of the 1993 Act. The said
certificates could be cancelled only under Section 5 after a full- B
fledged enquiry by the authority named in that Section. Under
such circumstances we do not think that the High Court could
~ have decided that question of fact which was very seriously
disputed. by the appellant. It seems that in this case, the Hig~
Court has gone out of its way, firstly in relying on the Xerox c
copies of the service records of the appellants and then at the
appellate stage, in calling the files of the Electricity Board
where the appellant was working. This amounted to a roving
enquiry into the caste of the appellant which was certainly not
permissible in writ jurisdiction and also in the wake of Section D
5 of 1993 Act.
~
26. Again merely because the appellant was described as
being a Christian in the service records did not mean that the
appellant was actually a person· professing Christian religion.
It was not after all known as to who had given th~e details and E
... further as to whether the details, in reality, were truthful or not.
It would be unneccesary for us to go into the aspect whether
,' the petitioner in reality is a Christian for the simple reason that
this issue was never raised at the time of his election. Again
the appellant still holds the valid caste certificates in his favour F
declaring him to be belonging to Scheduled Caste and further
the appellant's status as the Scheduled Caste was never
cancelled before the authority under the 1993 Act which alone
had the jurisdiction to do the same. If it was not for High Court
to enter into the disputed question of fact regarding the caste G
-. status of the appellant, the findings recorded by it on that
question would lose all its relevance and importance. There is
one more peculiar fact which we must note. It has come in the
judgment of the learned Single Judge as also in the Division
Bench that the appellant "converted" to Christianity. Now it was H
...
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 6 S.C.R.

A nobody's case that the petitioner ever was converted nor was
it anybody's case as to when such conversion took place, if at
all it took place. All the observations by the learned Single
Judge regarding the conversion of the appellant to Christianity
are, therefore, without any basis, more particularly, in view of
B the strong denial by the appellant that he never converted to
Christianity. Again the question whether the petitioner loses his
status as Scheduled Caste because of his conversion is also
not free from doubt in view of a few pronouncements of this
Court on this issue. Howe"'.er, we will not go into that question
c as it is not necessary for us to go into that question in the facts
of this case.

27. Shri Gupta then contended that there was no
opportunity for the writ petitioners to challenge the caste as the
application filed by them for cancellation of the Caste before
D the authority under 1993 Act was never decided. It was pointed
out that such application was filed on 18.04.2006 and various
representations were also made to various authorities. We are
not concerned with the various representations made to any
other authority. However, if an application under Section 5 of
E the 1993 Act was made to the proper authority it was bound to
be enquired into. However, taking the advantage that it was not
decided for four months, the writ petitioners could not have
rushed with the writ petition. At the most, the writ petitioners
could have asked for a direction to the said authority for
F deciding that application one way or the other. That was not
done. If that application had been decided upon and the
concerned authority had found that the appellant's caste
certificate itself was false and fraudulent and he did not
genuinely belong to the Scheduled Caste then that itself could
G have been enough for the appellant to lose the post that he was
elected to. In our opinion, it is necessary to get examined the •
Caste certificates of all the elected persons from reserved
constituencies within a time frame to avoid such controversies.

28. Be that as it may, in our opinion, the High Court clearly
H
KURAPATI MARIA DAS v. DR. AMBEDKAR SEVA 519
SAMAJAN & ORS. [V.S. SIRPURKAR, J.]
erred firstly, entertaining the writ petition, secondly in going into A
the disputed question of fact regarding the caste status, thirdly,
in holding that the appellant did not belong to the Scheduled
Caste and fourthly, in allowing the writ petition.

29. We. therefore, allow this appeal by setting aside two 8
judgments rne of the learned Single Judge and the other of the
, Division Bench of the High Court filed in appeal and direct the
dismissal of the writ petition. The counsel's fee is assessed at
Rs. 25,000/-. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned
·directions.
c
D.G. Appeal dismissed.