KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKEversusSHRI PANDURANG NARAYAN GANDHEWAR THROUGH LRS. & ORS.

                          [2019] 7 S.C.R. 941                            941


           KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE                                  A
                                  v.
  SHRI PANDURANG NARAYAN GANDHEWAR THROUGH
                  LRS. & ORS.
                   (Civil Appeal No. 4873 of 2019)                       B
                           MAY 10, 2019
    [UDAY UMESH LALIT AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]
       C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order,
1949 – Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-
                                                                         C
development) Act, 1971 – s.22 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 –
s.108 – Appellant-landlord sought permission to evict the respondent
– Slum Authority granted the permission – Appeal preferred by the
respondent, was dismissed by the Appellate Authority – After
securing permission from the slum Authority, a civil suit was filed
by the appellant seeking eviction of the respondent – Suit was           D
dismissed by the trial court – However, regular civil appeal was
allowed by the Appellate Court – Decree passed by the Appellate
Court attained finality – In the meantime, respondent filed writ
petition challenging the permission granted by the Slum Authority
as confirmed by the Appellate Authority – Writ petition was allowed
                                                                         E
by the High Court – On appeal, held: The Slum Authority granted
the permission to evict the respondent – In appeal, matter was
dismissed by the Appellate Authority – Thereafter, civil suit seeking
eviction also attained finality – In the circumstances, there was no
reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction u/Art.227
of the Constitution as the respondent had opportunity at every stage     F
to present his case and whether the requirements of s.22(4) of the
Act, 1971 stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with
by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail – Thus, judgment and
order of the Appellate Authority restored – Maharashtra Rent
Control Act, 1989.
                                                                         G
      Allowing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra,
before the enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989,
there had to be two rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant.
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                                 941
942            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 7 S.C.R.


A     The first round had to be before the Rent Controller seeking
      permission to issue a quit notice under Section 108 of the Transfer
      of Property Act, 1882. If such permission was granted, then only
      the landlord could issue a notice of termination of tenancy and
      file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present case
      the first round before the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona
B
      fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an
      additional facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant
      has any alternative accommodation or not. In any case, the matter
      had attained finality. The permission was granted by the Rent
      Controller and the civil suit was filed only thereafter in which an
C     objection was taken that the premises being governed by the
      provisions of the Act, the requisite permission of the Slum
      Authority was mandatory. [Para 8] [945-C-F]
             2. In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted
      that permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue
D     whether the requirements under Section 22(4) of the Maharashtra
      Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act,
      1971 stood satisfied or not was also considered by the Appellate
      Authority. It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking
      eviction also attained finality. [Para 9] [945-F-G]
E           3. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the
      High Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at
      every stage to present his case and whether the requirements of
      Section 22(4) of the Act, 1971 stood satisfied or not was a matter
      which was dealt with by the Appellate Authority in sufficient detail.
      In the circumstances there was no reason for the High Court to
F     interfere in its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution
      of India.[Para 10] [945-G-H; 946-A]
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4873
      of 2019.

G           From the Judgment and Order dated 19.06.2014 of the High Court
      of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in Writ Petition
      No. 2199 of 2003.
            Dr. A. Rajeev B. Masodkar, Ms. Anuradha Mutatkar, Advs. for
      the Appellant.
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    KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE v. SHRI PANDURANG                            943
             NARAYAN GANDHEWAR THR. LRS.


     Kishor Lambat, M/S. Lambat And Associates, Advs. for the                 A
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. 1. Leave granted.
      2. This appeal arises out of Judgment and Order dated 19.06.2014        B
passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur
in Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003.
       3. The appellant, landlord of the premises in question sought
permission of the Rent Controller under the provisions of C.P. and Berar
Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 seeking eviction of the        C
respondent on the grounds that he bona fide required the premises and
that the respondent was habitual defaulter in paying rent to the appellant.
After the Rent controller granted the permission, the appellant terminated
the tenancy by issuing notice under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 1882. Thereafter, he filed Civil Suit No.334 of 1996 seeking eviction
of the respondent. However, an objection was taken by the respondent          D
that the premises were governed by the Maharashtra Slum Areas
(Improvement, clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971 (hereinafter
referred to as, ‘the Act’) and as such the requisite permission of the
Slum Authority under Section 22 had to be obtained. The suit was therefore
withdrawn by the appellant, and application was preferred by him before       E
the Slum Authority seeking required permission.
      4. The Slum Authority vide its order dated 28.11.2000 granted the
permission. In an appeal arising therefrom, an order of remand was
passed by the Appellate Authority. The matter was gone into by the
Slum Authority afresh and by its order dated 30.05.2002 the permission        F
was granted to the appellant to file the suit for eviction. The appeal
preferred by the respondent challenging the order passed by the Slum
Authority was dismissed by the Appellate Authority on 31.10.2002 after
giving opportunity to the parties and after scrutinising the material on
record. While considering the submission made on behalf of the
respondent as regards alternative accommodation, it was observed by           G
the Appellate Authority as under:
      “5-4. U/s 22 (4) of Maharashtra Slum (Improvement & Re-
      development Act, 1971 the competent authority should have seen
      that whether the alternative accommodation is available to the
      occupied within his means it does not mean that the competent           H
944            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 7 S.C.R.


A           Authority should search the accommodation. The wife of appellant
            as in service in mentioned in para 15 of written notes of arguments.
            Under the circumstances whether alternative accommodation is
            available and can be made available, the burden of proof lies with
            the appellant. However, the appellant failed to prove the same
            and hence there is no substance in the point.
B
            6. On the basis of above discussion and verifying the record of
            lower court and provisions of Maharashtra Slum (Improvement
            & Re-development) Act, 1971, therefore I come to the conclusion
            that no substantial proof is presented by the appellant to interfere
            with the finding of lower court & hence I pass the following order.
C
                                         ORDER
            The appeal is rejected and the order passed by lower court dt.30th
            May, 2002 is confirmed.”
             5. Having secured the permission from the Slum Authority, Civil
D     Suit No.113 of 2003 was filed by the appellant seeking decree of eviction
      of the respondent. The suit was however dismissed by the Trial Court
      on 27.09.2007. Regular Civil Appeal No.444 of 2007 arising therefrom
      was allowed by the Appellate Court and by its judgment and order dated
      17.08.2010 it passed decree for eviction of the respondent and also passed
E     order as regards payment of arrears. It is undisputed that the decree
      passed by the Appellate Court was not challenged in any manner and
      has attained finality.
             6. In the meantime, Writ Petition No.2199 of 2003 was filed by
      the respondent challenging the permission granted by the Slum Authority
F     as confirmed by the Appellate Authority vide its order dated 31.10.2002.
      This Writ Petition was allowed by the High Court by its judgment and
      order dated 19.06.2014. It was observed that the Slum Authority had
      not considered the relevant factors enumerated in Clauses (a) to (c) of
      Section 22(4) of the Slum Act, 1971 and consideration of those factors
      by the Appellate Authority would not legalize the absence of such
G     consideration by the competent authority. It was observed as under:-
            “7. In the present case, it is undisputed that he competent authority
            has not applied its mind and has not taken into consideration the
            relevant factors enumerated in clause (a) to (c) of section 22(4)
            of the Slum Act, 1971. The consideration of these factors by the
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     KUMUD W/O MAHADEORAO SALUNKE v. SHRI PANDURANG                            945
     NARAYAN GANDHEWAR THR. LRS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.]


      appellate authority does not legalize the order passed by the            A
      competent authority. It is settled law that if anything has to be
      done according to the provisions of law, then it should be done in
      that manner only. The competent authority has passed the cryptic
      order. The appellate order cannot substitute its reasoning to legalize
      the order passed by the fact-finding authority.”
                                                                               B
       With this view, the writ petition was allowed and the matter was
again remitted to the authority for inquiry.
      7. We heard Dr. A. Rajeev B. Masodkar, learned Advocate in
support of the appeal and Mr. Kishor Lambat, learned Advocate for the
respondents.                                                                   C
       8. In Vidarbha part of the State of Maharashtra, before the
enactment of Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1989, there had to be two
rounds of litigation to seek eviction of a tenant. The first round had to be
before the Rent Controller seeking permission to issue a quit notice under
Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. If such permission was            D
granted, then only the landlord could issue a notice of termination of
tenancy and file a civil suit seeking eviction of a tenant. In the present
case the first round before the Rent Controller was gone into. Bona
fide need as a ground for eviction may, in a given case, have an additional
facet of comparative hardship and whether the tenant has any alternative
accommodation or not. In any case, the matter had attained finality.           E
The permission was granted by the Rent Controller and the civil suit
was filed only thereafter in which an objection was taken that the
premises being governed by the provisions of the Act, the requisite
permission of the Slum Authority was mandatory.
       9. In the proceedings so initiated the Slum Authority granted that      F
permission. The matter was carried in appeal and the issue whether the
requirements under Section 22(4) of the Act stood satisfied or not was
also considered by the Appellate Authority.
       It must also be noted that the Civil Suit seeking eviction also
attained finality.                                                             G
       10. In the circumstances, the view that weighed with the High
Court was not correct. The respondent had opportunity at every stage
to present his case and whether the requirements of Section 22(4) of the
Act stood satisfied or not was a matter which was dealt with by the
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946                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 7 S.C.R.


A     Appellate Authority in sufficient detail. In the circumstances there was
      no reason for the High Court to interfere in its jurisdiction under Article
      227 of the Constitution of India.
             11. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and
      order dated 19.06.2014 passed by the High Court in Writ Petition No.2199
B     of 2003 and restore the order dated 31.10.2002 passed by the Appellate
      Authority.
            12. This appeal stands allowed. No order as to costs.


      Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeal allowed.
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