Holding

A contractual tenant’s tenancy is inheritable by all his heirs, and the ordinary‑residence condition in Section 2(h) applies only to heirs of a statutory tenant, not to heirs of a contractual tenant.

Summary

Mrs. Sira Menan was a contractual tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. After her death, the respondent claimed to be her daughter and asserted that she inherited the tenancy. The trial court rejected her claim, holding that even if she were the daughter she was not a tenant because she did not ordinarily reside with the deceased; the High Court reversed this finding. The Supreme Court examined the amended definition of "tenant" in Section 2(h) and held that a contractual tenant possesses an estate and the tenancy devolves on all his heirs, irrespective of ordinary residence. The phrase "in the event of such person's death" was interpreted to apply only to a statutory tenant, not to a contractual tenant, and therefore the respondent inherited the tenancy. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the High Court's decision.

Issues considered

Whether a daughter/heir of a contractual tenant can inherit the tenancy under Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 as amended.
Whether the requirement of ordinary residence with the deceased applies to heirs of a contractual tenant.
Interpretation of the phrase "in the event of such person's death" in the amended definition of "tenant".

Legislation cited

West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956s. 2(h)

Subjects

tenancyinheritancecontractual tenantstatutory tenantWest Bengal Premises Tenancy ActSection 2(h)heirordinary residencestatutory interpretation

Judgment

A KUMAR JAGDISH CHANDRA SINHA AND ORS.
v.
MRS. EILEEN K. PATRICIA D'ROZARIE

NOVEMBER IO, 1994

B [S. MOHAN AND M.K. MUKHERJEE, JJ.)

Jlfest Bengal Premises Tenancy ;4.ct, 1956-Section 2 (h)-Contractual
Tenant-All heirs ofsuch a tenant, on his death, inherit the tenancy-Claim
ofdaughter ofdeceased tenant to be 'tenant u!s 2 (h) -Allowed-Question
as to whether the heir was ordinarily residing with such a tenant at the time
c ofhis death not relevant.

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES-Statement of Objects and
Reasons-Use of

One S was a tenant under the appellants in respect of a flat. Her
0- tenancy was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
After her death, respondent, claiming to be her daughter had entered
into the flat with her family and was residing therein since then.
According to the appellants such claim of the respondent was false one
as the tenant had all along lived in the flat alone and the respondent
was never seen to visit her. Appellants filed the suit for recovery of the
E flat on the declaration that the respondent was a rank trespasser and
liable to be evicted therefrom.

The respondent asserted that she was the daughter of the deceased
tenant and had been living in the flat since the inception of the tenancy.
Consequently, she claimed, that upon her mother's death she, as her
F sole heir, became a tenant under the appellants.

The trial Court while decreeing the suit held that the respondent
was not the daughte.r of the deiceased and even if it was assumed that
she was, she would not be a 'tenant' within the meaning of section 2 (h)
of the Act as she was not ordinarily residing with her mother at the
G time of her death. In appeal, the High Court disagreed with both the
findings of the trial court and dismissed the suit. This appeal by special
leave has been filed against the judgment of ihe High Court.

The question for consideration was whether the respondent, as
daughter of the deceas«)d tenant can claim herself to be 'tenant' u/s 2
H (h) of the Act.
440
KR. J. C. SINHA v. E. K. P. D'ROZARIE 441

. The appellants submitted that from the definition 'tenant' as A
appearing in section 2 (h) of the Act, only those heirs of the tenant -
whether contractual or statutory- who were ordinarily residing with
him at the time of his death would only succeed as a tenant and not all
the heirs. According to the appellants the words' in the event of such
person's death in section 2 (h) relate not only to persons whose tenancy
subsists but also to those who are continuing in possession after the B
termination of the tenancy.

According to the respondent, the words 'such person' appearing in
the phrase in the event of such person's death in section 2 (h) refer only
to the person who is continuing in possession after the termination of
his tenancy and do not and cannot refer also to a contractual tenant, C
for he has an estate or interest in the subject matter of the tenancy and
heritability being an .incidence of the tenancy it will devolve upon all
the heirs and will not be limited to only those heirs who were residing
with him at the time of his death.
D
Dismissing the appeal, this Court

HELD : 1.1. A contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the
subject matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incidence of such
tenancy. In the absence of any provision in the West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act to the contrary, all the heirs of such a tenant would E
therefore, on his death, step in his shoes. (443-G)

1.2. In the amended definition of 'tenant' in section 2 (h) of the Act,
protection has been provided not only to the statutory tenant but also
to such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him in the demised
premises at the time of his death. The words 'in the event of such F
person's death' in section 2 (h) refer only to the death of the person
who was continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy
and not also to the person, namely, the contractual tenant. (446-F-G)
... Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji, AIR (1965) SC 414; Relied on only
to the extent it relates to interpretation of Section 2 (h) of: the West G
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.

2. It is undoubtedly true that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to ascertain the true
meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the legislation, but it
can certainly be pressed into service for the limited purpose of H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs and the
object the legislation sought to achieve. (446-E)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1954 of
1992.

B From the Judgment and Order dated 8.8.90 of the Calcutta High Court
in A.O.D. No. 353 of 1984.

Dr. Shankar Ghosh, R. Mukherjee and Goodwill Indeever for the
Appellants.

D.N. Mukherjee and N.R. Chaudhary for the Respondent.
c
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M.K. MUKHERJEE, J. l. I.A. No. 2 of 1994 allowed.

2. At all. material times one Mrs. Sira Menan was a tenant under the
D appellants in respect of a flat in premises No. 23, Lindsay Street, Calcutta.
After her death on August 12, 1970, the appellants filed the suit, out of
which the instant appeal arises, alleging that the respondent, claiming
herself to be the daughter of the deceased, had entered into the flat on
August 16, 1970 with her family and was residing therein since then.
According to the appellants such claim of the.respondent was a false one as
E Mrs. Menan had all along lived in the flat alone and the respondent was
never seen to visit her, much less live therein. By filing the suit the
appellants, therefore, prayed for recovery of the flat on a declaration that
the respondent was a rank trespasser and liable to be evicted therefrom.

In contesting the suit the respondent asserted that she was the daughter
F
of the deceased tenant and had been living in the flat since the inception of
the tenancy. Consequently, she claimed, that upon her mother's death she,
as her sole heir, became a tenant under the appellants.

In the context of the respective stands of the parties and in view of the
G admitted fact that the tenancy of Mrs. Menan was gov~med by the West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 ('Act' for short) the two questions that
fell for determination before the trial Court were (i) whether the respondent
was the daughter of the deceased tenant and, if so (ii) whether she was
entitled to inherit the tenancy. On consideration of the evidence adduced by
the parties the trial Court held that the respondent was not the daughter of
H the deceased and even if it was assumed that she was, she would not be a
KR. J. C. SINHA v. E. K. P. D'ROZARIE [MUKHERJEE, J.) 443

'tenant' within the meaning of Section 2 (h) of the Act as she was not A
ordinarily residing with her mother at the time of her death. Resultantly, the
trial Court granted the reliefs sought for by the appellants. In appeal by the
respondent the High Court disagreed with both the findings of the trial
Court and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by special leave.

Having perused the evidence on record we are in complete agreement B .
with the High Court that the trial Court was not at all justified in holding
that the respondent was not the daughter of the deceased tenant. Besides,
the above finding of the High Court was not assailed by the appellants
before us. The only question, therefore, that survives for our consideration
in this appeal is whether the respondent, as daughter of the deceased tenant, ·
can claim herself to be 'tenant' under Section 2 (h) of the Act. C
Dr. Ghose, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted
that from the definition of the 'tenant' as appearing in Section 2 (h) of the
Act it would be patently clear that only those heirs of the tenant - whether
contractual or statutory - who were ordinarily residing with him at the time
of his death would only succeed as a tenant and not all the heirs. According D
to Dr. Ghose the words "in the event of such person's death" in Section 2
(h) relate not only to persons whose tenancy subsists but also to those who
are continuing in possession after the termination of the tenim9': gr. Ghose
contended that once Section 2 (h) was so interpreted - M i! sltoul4 l>e - the
appellant was bound to succeed for the finding of the High Court that the E
respondent was ordinarily residing with the erstwhile tenant at the time of
her death was patently wrong and opposed to the evidence on record.

Both the above contentions of Dr. Ghose were resisted by Mr.
Mukherji, appearing. on behalf of the respondent. According to Mr.
Mukherji, the words 'such person' appearing in the phrase "in the event of F
such person's death" in Section 2 (h) refer. only to the person· who is
continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and do not and
a
cannot refer also to contractual tenant, for he has an estate or interest in
the subject matter of the tenancy and heritability being an incidence of the
tenancy it will devolve upon all the heirs and will not be limited to only G
those heirs who were residing with him at the time of his death. Mr.
Mukherji lastly contended that even if Section 2 (h) was interpreted in the
manner suggested by Dr. Ghose, this Court would .not be justified in
disturbing the finding of the High Court that the respondent was ordinarily
residing with her mother at .the time of her death as the same was one of
fact, based upon a proper appreciation and appraisal of evidence. H
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

· A To appreciate the respective contentions of the learned counsel for tht:
parties it will be necessary at this stage to first refer to Section 2 (h) of the
Act, as it stood prior to its amendment in 1965. It read as under:

"'Tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account
or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special
B contract would be, payable and also any person continuing
in possession after the termination of the tenancy but shall
not include any person against whom any decree or. order
for eviction has been made by a Court of competent
jurisdiction."
(emphasi~ supplied)
c
Under the above defmition therefore there were only tvyo classes of
tenant; namely, person occupying any premises under a subsisting tenancy
and person continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy. While
the former is called a 'contractual tenant' the latter is commonly called -
D talcing a due from English Rent Acts - a 'statutory tenant'. In Anand Nivas
(P) Ltd v. Anandji, AIR (1965) SC 414 the question of heritability of!"
'statutory tenancy' vis-a-vis 'contractual tenancy' came up for
consideration before this Court in the context of Section 14 of the Bombay
Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as amended in
1959, which related to the right of a 'statutory tenant', to sublet the
E premises. The majority view of the Bench comprising three learned Judges
was that a 'statutory tenant' had no power of_sub-letting. In expressing that
view, Shah J. (as he then was) spealcing for the majority observed:

"A person remaining in occupation of the premises let to
him after the determination of or expiry of the period of
F tenancy is commonly though in law not accurately, called a
"a statutory tenant". Such a person is not a tenant at all; he
has no estate or interest in the premises occupied by him.
He has merely the protection ofthe statute in that he cannot
be turned out so long as he pays the standard rent and
permitted increases, if any, and performs the other
G
conditions of the tenancy. His right to remain in possession
after the termination of the contractual tenancy is personal;
it is not capabl; of being transferred or assigned, and
devolves on his death only in the manner provided by the
statute. The right of a lessee from a landlord' on the other
H hand is an estate or interest in the premises and in the
KR. J. C. SINHA v. E. K. P. D'ROZARIE [MUKHERJEE, J.] 445

absence of a contract to the contrary is transferable and the A
premises may be sublet by him."
(emphasis supplied)

Undisputably a contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the subject
matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incidence of such tenancy. In the B
absence of any provision in the Act to the contrary, all the heirs of such a
tenant would therefore, on his death, step in his shoes. The same could not
however be said about the statutory tenant in view of the law laid down 'in
Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. (supra) as quoted above and the plain and
unambiguous language of Section 2 (h), as it then stood. In othe!' words, the
heirs of a statutory tenant had no right to the tenancy as such a right was C
personal and the Act did not make any provision regarding the manner in
which such right was to devolve.

It appears that following Anand Nivas (P) Ltd's case the Governor of
West Bengal issued an Ordinance on August 24, 1965 amending, inter alia,
Section 2 (h) of the Act. After that Amendment Section 2 (h) reads as D
under:-

"Tenant' means any person by whom or on whose account
or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for a special
contract would be, payable and include any person
continuing in possession after the termination ofhis tenancy E 1
or in the event of such person 's death, such of his heirs as
were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death,
but shall not include any person against whom any decree
or order for eviction has been made by a Court of
competent jurisdiction." f
(emphasis supplied)

The purpose behind such amendment (besides the other amendments)
can be gathered from the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying
the Bill which when enacted· became The West Bengal Premises Tenancy G
(Amendment) Act, 1965, and replaced the Ordinance. The Statement of
Objects and Reasons, to the extent it is relevant for our purposes, reads as
follows:-

"The West Bengal Premises Tenancy A<ct, 1956 (West Ben.
Act XII of 1956) was amended bY the West Bengal H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. S S.C.R.

A Premises Tenancy (Amendment) Ordinance, 1965 (West
Ben. Ord. VI of 1965, for the following purposes, namely:-

(a) ............................................................................. .

(b) giving right to the heirs of a statutory tenant to retain
B possession ofpremises after his death;

(c) ............................................................................. .

(d) ............................................................................ .

(e) ............................................................................. .
c
(f) ............................................................................. .

2. It is necessary to enact the provisions of the Ordinance.

3. The Bill has been framed with the above object in view."
D
It is undoubtedly true that the Statement of Objects and Reasons
accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to ascertain the true
meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the legislation, but it
can certainly be pressed into service for the limited purpose of
unden'tanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs and the object
E the legislation sought to achieve. If the substitution of the words "include
any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or
in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as :were ordinarily
residing with him at the time of his death", in the amended definition of.
'tenant' in Section 2 (h) of the Act is read in the context of the aforesaid
Statement of Objects and Reasons and the proximity between the date of
F delivery of judgment in Anand Nivas (P) Ltd's case and the issuance of the
Ordinance, there cannot be any manner of doubt that the amendment was
brought in to give protection not only to the statutory tenant but also to such
of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him in the demised premises at
the time of his death. That r.ecessarily means that the words "in the event of
G such person's death" in Section 2 (h) refer only to the death of the person
who was continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy and
not also to the person referred to in its earlier clause, namely, the
contractual tenant.

The matter can be viewed from another angle also. If the words "such
H person's qeath" are to reter to both the clauses relating to contractual tenant
KR. J.C. SINHA v. E. K. P. D'ROZARIE [MUKHERJEE, J.) 447

and statutory tenant as suggested by Dr. Ghose it would mean that the right A
of tenancy, which, before the amendment of Section 2 (h) was to devolve
upon all the heirs of a contractual tenant would, after the amendment, be
limited to those heirs who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of
his death and not all. Such an extravagant interpretation would militate
against the purpose, spirit and letter of the amendment.
B
For the foregoing discussion and in view of the admitted fact that Mrs.
Menan was a contractual tenant at the time of her death, it must therefore be'
held that the respondent inherited the tenancy as her heir. Consequently, the
question as to whether she was ordinarily residing with her mother at the
time of her death becomes redundant. We therefore dismiss the appeal but
without any order as to costs. ·C

Before parting with this judgment we would like to keep an record that
our reference to and reliance upon Anand Nivas (P) Ltd's case was for the
limited purpose of interpreting Section 2 (h) of the West Bengal Premises ·
Tenancy Act, 1956 for, the principle enunciated therein relating to
inheritance of 'statutory tenancy' stands overruled by a Bench of five D
learned Judges in Gian Devi v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR (1985) SC 796.

A.G. Appeal dismissed.