KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGAversusLT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.

    58

                        KULJIT SINGH ALIAS RANGA
                                              v.
                     LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS.

                                   January 20, 1982
B
             (Y.V. CHANDRACHUD, C.J., 0. CHINNAPPA REDDY AND
                             A.P. SEN, JJ.]

         Clemency jurisdiction-Power of President to grant pardon etc. and to
    suspend, remit or commute sentences in certain cases-Constitution of India, 19,01
C   Article 72, scope of the power.

         Dismissing the petition, the Court

           HELD : I. Whatever be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the
    power conferred by Article 72 of the Constitution, the only sentence which can
    ·J)ossibJy be imposed upon the petitioner i_n the instant case, is that of death and
D   no circumstances exi~ for interference with that sentence. Not even the most
    liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction could have persuaded the P~esident to inter-
    fere with the sentence of death imposed upon the petitioner in view particularly·
    ot the considerations mentioned in K.S. Rattga v. Union of India and Anr., [1981]
    3 S.C R. 512. Therefore, in refusing to commute· the sentence the death imposed
    upon the petitioner into a lesser sentence the President has not in any aiaoner
    transgressed his discretionary power under Article 72. [59 D-E 1 60 B·C)
E
          2. Undoubtedly, the President has the power in aii appropriate case to
    commute any sentence imposed by a Court into a lesser sentence. But the
    question as to whether the case is appropriate for ithe exercise of the power con-
    ferred by Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti..
    cular case. [59 E, CiJ.
F          3. After all the power conferred by Article 72 can be used only for the
    purpose of reducing the sentence, not for enhancing tit. Therefore, no uaeful
    purpose will be achieved by the petitioner by ensuring the imposition of any
    seve1'e, judicially evolved constraints on the wholesome power of the President
    to use it as the justice of a case may require. [59. H, 60 A]

         James Shewan & Sons v. United States, 69 L. Ed. 527 at 535, referred to.
G
            ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ           Petition (Crl.) No. 8193A ,of
    1981.

            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
H
            R. K. Garg, V. J. Frqncis, Suni/ Kumar Jain and D. K. Garg for
    fh~ Petition~r-,,-Rang~,
                 '   .... .,.
              KUUIT SINGH v. LT. GOVERNOR (Chandrachud,      c. J.)      59

            R. K. Jain and P. K. Jain for the Petitioner-Billa.               A
            N. C. Talukdar and R. N. Poddar for Respondent No. 1.

            L. N. Sinha, Attorney General and Miss A. Subhashini for
      Attorney General.
                                                                              B
           K. Parasaran, Solicitor General, M. K. Banerji, Additional
     Solicitor General and Miss A. Subhashini for Union of India.
1.         N. Nettar for the State of K~rnataka.

           Raju Ramachandran        for   Applicant/intervener-Chhaganlal_
      Aggarwal.                                                               c
           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

              CHANDRACHUD C. J. The question as regards the scope of
       the power of the President under article 72 of the Constitution to
       commute a sentence of death into a lesser sentence may have to
                                                                              D
      await examination on an appropriate occasion. This clearly is not
      that occasion because in so far as this case is concerned, whatever
      be the guidelines observed for the exercise of the power conferred
      by article 72, the only sentence which can possibly be imposed upon'
      the petitioner is that of death and no circumstances exist for inter-
                                                                              E
      ference with that sentence. Therefore we see no justification for
 '
.I    saying that in refusing to commute the sentence of death imposed
      upon tb,e petitioner into a lesser sentence, the President has in any
      manner . transgressed his discretionary power under article 72.
      Undoubtedly, the President has the power in an appropriate case to
      commute any sentence imposed by a· .court into a lesser sentence        F
      ayd as said by Chief Justice Taft in James Shewan & Sons v United
      States('), the "executive clemency exists to afford relief from undue
      harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of
      the criminal law" and that the administration of justice by the
      courts is not necessarily or certainly considerate of circumstances
      which may properly mitigate guilt. But the question as to whether       G
      the case is appropriate for the exercise of the power conferred by
      Article 72 depends upon the facts and circumstances of each parti-
     .c:ular case. The necessity or the justification for exercising that
      power has therefore to be judged from ¢a~e to case. In fact, we do
     not see what useful purpose will be 11i;qieved by tqe petitioner by      H
         (I) 69 L Ed. 527 at 535.
      60                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS        (1982) 3 S.C.R.

A      ensuring the imposition of any severe, judicially evolved constraints
       oo the wholesome power of the President to use it as the justice of
       a case may require. After all, the power conferred by Article 72
      can be used only for the purpose of reducing the sentence, not for
      enhancing it. We need.not, however, go into that question elabo-
      rately because in so far as this case is concerned, we are quite
B     clear that not even the most liberal use of his mercy jurisdiction
      could have persuaded the President to interefere with the sentence
      of death imposed upon the ·petitioner, in view )larticularly of the
      considerations mentioned by us in our judgment in Kuljeet Singh @
       Ranga v. Union of India & Anr.('). We may recall what we said in
      th~t judgment that "the death of the Chopra children was cau.sed
c     by the petitioner and his companion Billa after a savage planning
    . which bears a professional stamp", that the "survival of an orderly
      society demands the extinction of the life of per'°ns like Ranga
      and Billa who are a menace to social order and security'', and that
      "they are professional murderers and deserve no sympathy even in
      terms of the evolving standards of decency of a mature society".

             The petition is accordingly dismissed.               •

           We have heard Shri R. K. Jain as amicus on behalf of the
     accused Billa. We see no substance in Shri Jain's contentions
     also.
E
          The order of stay of execution of the death sentence which we
    had passed in favour o.f the accused Ranga and Billa as also the
    general order of stay are hereby vacated. If in any specific case or
    cases there is an express crder of stay, it will not be affected by the
    order which we are passing today.
F

     S,R.                                               Petition dismissed.




           (1) [1981) 3 S.C.R. sq.