Holding

A gift is not a transfer for adequate consideration and is therefore excluded from the protection of clause (b) of the proviso, so the gift must be ignored under Section 5(6) of the Act.

Summary

The appellant, Sonia Bhatia, claimed ownership of 80 bighas of land gifted to her by her grandfather on 28 January 1972, after the statutory cut‑off date of 24 January 1971 under the Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960. The Prescribed Authority ignored the gift under Section 5(6), treating it as a transfer that should not be counted towards the ceiling. The District Judge held the gift bona fide, but the Allahabad High Court reversed, holding that a gift is not a "transfer for adequate consideration" and therefore falls outside the exception in clause (b) of the proviso. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined the meaning of "transfer", "consideration" and "adequate consideration", applying ordinary statutory construction and definitions in the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act. It concluded that a gift, being a gratuitous transfer without consideration, is expressly excluded by the qualification "adequate consideration" and must be ignored for ceiling purposes. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The meaning of "transfer for adequate consideration" in clause (b) of the proviso to Section 5(6) of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act.
Whether a gratuitous gift, lacking consideration, falls within the exception provided in clause (b) of the proviso.
The proper interpretation of the terms "transfer", "consideration" and "adequate consideration" in the context of the Act.

Legislation cited

Income Tax Acts. 16(3)(b)
Indian Contract Acts. 2(d)
Transfer of Property Acts. 122
Uttar Pradesh Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960s. 5(6), s. Explanation I, s. Explanation II

Subjects

gifttransferadequate considerationland ceilingstatutory interpretationU.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings ActTransfer of Property Actland holding ceiling

Judgment

239
A
KU. SONIA BHATIA
v.
STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

March 17, 1981
B
[S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, A. VARADARAJAN AND
V. BALAKRISHNA ERADI, JJ.J
U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act 1960-Section 5(6)-Scope
of-Gift of property for love and affection--!! could be said to be a transfer for
consideration.
c
Words and phrases·-"Consideration.''-'·Adequate''-"Gift"-"Transfer"-
Meaning of.

Interpretation-Words of everyday use-How interpreted.

Sub-section 6 of section 5 of the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Hold- D
ings Act, 1960 as it stood at the relevant time provided that in determining the
ceiling area any transfer of land made after January, 24, 1971 should be
ignored and not taken into account. Clause (b) of the proviso to sub:section 6
which carves out an exception states that . the sub-section shall not apply to a
transfer proved to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority to be in good faith
and for adequate consideration u·nder an irrevocable instrument. Explanation II
to this proviso places the burden of proof that a case fell within clause {b) of the E
proviso is on the party claming its benefit.

On January 28, 1972 the donor gifted away certain lands in favour of his
grand-daughter, the appellant, daughter of a pre-deceased son.

The gift having been made after the prescribed date, the Prescribed Autho-
rity ignored the gift for purposes of section 5 {6) of the Act. F. ·
On appeal, the District Judge gave a finding in favour of the appellant
holding t.hat the gift was bona fide having regard to the circumstances in which
it was made and that it could not b~ held invalid merely because it was.executed
after the due date of January 24, 197 J.

Purporting to follow one of its earlier decisions, the High Court held that a G
gift not being a transfer for consideration, had to be ignored under the provi-
si.ons of the Act and that a gift being a gratuitous transfer made out of love and
affection fell outside the purview of clause (b) of the proviso.

On behalf of the appellant it was contended that a gift could not be said H
to be a transfer witbaut consideration because even love and affection may
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 3 S.C.R.

A provide sufficient consideration and hence the condition regarding adequate
consideration would not apply to a gift.

Dismissing the appeal

HELD : It is a well settled rule of construction of statutes that where the
definition of a word has not been given in an enactment it must be construed in
its popular sense if it is a word of every day use, that is, the sense in which
people conversant with the subject-matter wiih which it deals would attribute to
it. Similarly if the language used is clear and explicit, the provision cannot be
reduced tg a nullity by reading into it a meaning which it does not carry. [246B]

In the instant case therefore, the word "transfer" being a term of well-
known legal significance with well ascertained incidents the legislature did not
c consider it necessary to define it separately. It is used in the sense in which it is
used in the Transfer of Property Act. [245 G]

C.I.T., Andhra Pra.iesh v. M(s. Taj Mahal Hotel, Secunderahad [1972) t.
S.C.R. 168 and Union of India v. Sankal Chand Himatlal Sheth and Anr. [19fs] 1
S.C.R. 423 applied.

D ·Keats v. Lewis [1911) A.C. 641 referred to.

A conspectus of the meaning of the term "gift" is that it is a transfer which
does not contain an element of consideration in any shape or form. Where
in respect of a gift there is a benefit measurable in terms of money the
transaction ceases to be a gift and assumes a different colour. Yet another
salient feature of a gift is that love, affection and many other . factors may
E constitute the motive for the gift and may enter into the intention of
the donor making a gift, but none of these can be held to be legal considera-
tion, as undestood by law. [251 G-H; 252F]

"Consideration" means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit
passed on by the promisor to the promi8ee or by the transferor to the transferee.
When the term consideration is qualified by the word "adequate" it makes it
F sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, circumstances and necessities
of the case. [251 Fl

The word "transfer for adequate consideration" used in clause (b) of the
proviso excludes a transaction, which is in the nature of a gift and which is with-
out consideration. [252 E]

G The argument that if the legislature intended to exclude gifts clause (b) of
the pr.oviso would have expressly said so and by not excluding it must be deemed
to have included a gift is without force particularly .in the face of the clear and
unambiguous language of the proviso. Every legislature has its own technical
device to express its inlendment. Express exclusion is not the only method of
conveying the legislative intent there may be other methods or devices by
H which a legislature expresses its intent; namely, by using expressions, which would
exclude a particular transaction by necessary intendment. This is what is done
in enacting clause (b) of the proviso. [252 G-H]
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 241

The legislature has made its intention clear that a gift is excluded by A
qualifying the word "consideration" with the adjective "adequate". [252 H]

By using the word "adequate" to qualify the word '·consideration" the
legislature has ruled out gifts from the ambit of clause (b) of the pro·
viso. [253 CJ

The words "adequate consideration" Clearly postulate that consideration B
must be capable of being measured in terms of money, having regard to the
market price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold, the value of
similar lands situate in the vicinity and so on. [253 BJ

The argument that since in the case of a gift there is no question of consi-
deration, the words for "adequate consideration" in the 3rd part of clause (b) of
the proviso are inapplicable and should, therefore, be ignored is opposed to the C
well known rule of interpretation that Courts, while interpreting statutes, must
not legislate. A legislature does not use words without any intention and
every word used by the legislature must be given its due import. The intention
of the legislature in using the words "adequate consideration" is to exclude
any transaction which is not for adequate ~onsideration. Even if a sale is bona
fide if to but consideration is inadequate, the transaction would fall beyond the
protection of clause (b) of the proviso. [253 E-F] ~ D
Debi Saran Koiri and Anr. v. Nandlal Chaubey and Ors. A.I.R. 1929 Patna
591 and Kulasekaraperumal v. Pathakutty Thalevanar and Ors. A.LR. 1961
Madras 405 approved,

The words "adequate consideration" carry a well-known legal significance
and, therefore, convey the same meaning and import in whichever statute they E
are used unless a contrary intent ion appears from the language .employed by the
legislature in a particular Act. [256 E-F]

Tulsidas Ki/achand v. The Commissioner of Income-tax Bombay City I,
[1961] 3 S.C.R. 351, referred to

Fateh Mohammed v. District Judge [Civil Writ Petition No. 915 of 1975, F
decided on 10-7-78] overruled.

An explanation merely widens the scopo of the main section and is not
meant to carve out a particular exception to the main section. The words
admission, acknowledgment, relinquishment or declaration used in Explanation I,
do not absolve the party concerned from proving that the transfer should be
executed in good faith and for adequate consideration. [256 E-F] G
However laudable the object of the donor in gifting the property to his
grand-daughter (partictllarly in the circumstances of this case) may be and what-
ever hardship might ensue to the donee by applying the· provision, the gift fails
if it does not fulfil the other essential requirements of the section. The act was
enacted to implement one of the Directives contained in Part IV of the Constitu- H
tion and if in this process afew individuals suffer that cannot be helped, for, indi-
vidual interests must yield to the larger interests of the community. [258 D-F]
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S.C.R.

A CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 775 of 1981.

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
21.12.78 of the High Court of Allahabad in C.M.W.P. No. 12602/77.

S. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.
B
0. P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
FAZAL Au, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against
a judgment dated December 21, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court
c allowing the writ petition filed by the State of U.P. before the Court.

The case arose out of an order Pf!SSed by the Prescribed ~
Authority under the U.P. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings
Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act'), as amended uptodate,
by which the said Authority rejected the claim of the petitioners on
D ,. the basis of a gift which had been executed by her grandfather by a
registered document dated January 28, 1972. The Act was passed
as far back as 1960 but by virtue of an amendment, being U.P. Act
No. 18 of 1973, section 5 was introduced which placed a ceiling
on any tenure holder to hold land in excess of the ceiling a:rea fixed
under the Act. Section 5 contained various· sub-sections but in the
E instant case we are concerned only with sub-section (6) as also clause
(b) of the proviso to the said sub-section. By another amendment,
being U.P. Act No. 2 of 1975, which was given retrospeetive opera-
tion with effect from 8.6.1973 Explanation I, alongwith its sub·
clauses, was added to sub-section (6) of section 5.

F The decision in the present case turns upon the interpretation
of sub-section (6) of s. 5 and the proviso therein in order to deter-
mine the validity of the deed of gift said to have been executed by
Chunni Lal Bhatiya, the grandfather of the petitioner Sonia and
respondent No. 4 before the District Judge.

G To begin with, we might like to state here that the facts of the
case undoubtedly reveal that if the provisions of the said sub-section
(6) were to apply it would work serious hardship to the petitioner
but as we are concerned with interpretation of an important statute
the mere fact that a correct interpretation may lead to hardship
H would not be a valid consideration for distorting the language of the
statutory provisions.
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 243

Before we proceed to examine the relevant provisions, it may A
be necessary to give a resume of the facts of the case. Chunni Lal
Bhatiya had two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh and a daughter Smt.
Sarla, On 14.9.1%9 Chunni Lal executed a registered deed of gift in
respect of 110 bighas in favour of his son, Sudesh. A month later,
another deed of gift was executed in favour of his son, Sudhir. So
. far as these two gifts are concerned, as they were made before the B
amendment of the Ceiling Act, their validity was beyond question
and they are not the subject-matter of any dispute in the present
case. On January 28, 1972 Chunni Lal executed a gift in respeet of 80
bighas in favour of his grand-daughter, Sonia (daughter of Mahesh.)
It appears that a serious misfortune had befallen Chunni Lal in that
he lost his two sons, Sudesh and Mahesh, who were serving in the c
Air Force and died in two different air crashes. As Chunni Lal
wanted to make sufficient provision for his grandsons and grand-
daughter, he executed the three gifts.

The gif, executed in favour .of Sonia is the subject-matter of
the dispute in the instant case. The Prescribed Authority held that D
as the gift was made after the due date, i.e. 24.1.1971, as prescribed
by sub-section (6) of s. 5, the transfer would have to be ignored.
Against the decision of the Prescribed Authority, the appellant filed
an appeal before the District Judge being the Appellate Authority,
and assailed the finding of the Prescribed Authority. The District
Judge, after hearing the parties, came to a clear finding that the gift E
'''T was a bona fide one having regard to the circumstances in which the
transfer was made and merely because it was executed after the due
date (24.1.1971) it could not be held to be invalid. Thereafter, the
State of U.P. filed a writ petition in the High Court which was
allowed· following a Division Bench decision of its Court in Fat eh
Mohammad v. District Judge( 1 ) which had held that a deed of gift F
not being a transfer for consideration had to be ignored under the
provisions of the Act. Hence, this appeal before us.

The finding of the District Judge that the gift was a bona fide
one has not been challenged by Mr. Rana, appearing for the respon-
dent, who however argued that the said gift itself was not covered
G
· by the Explanations laid down in the proviso to the said sub-section
(6) of s. 5 of the Act. Thus the only question for determination in
the instant case is the legal effect of the prohibition contained
in sub-section (6) and clause (b) of its proviso. In order to
H
(I) Civil Writ Petition No. 915of1975 (deeided on 10.7.78)
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S.C.R.

A understand the scope and ambit of sub-section (6) and its proviso,
it may be necessary to extract the relevant portions of sub-section
(6} and Explanations concerned :-

"6. In determining tne ceiling area applicable to a
tenure-holder, any transfer of land made after the twenty-
B fourth day of January, 1971, which but for the transfer
would have been declared surplus land under this Act, shall
be ignored and not taken into account :

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply
to:-
C ~

"(b} a transfer approved to the satisfaction of the .,_
prescribed authority to be in good faith and for adequate
consideration and under an irrevocable instrument not
being a benami transaction or for immediate or deferred
D benefit of the tenure-holder or other members of his family.

Explanation I - For the purposes of this sub-section,
the expression transfer of land made after the twenty
fourth day of January, 1971, includes:-

(a) a declaration of a person as a co-tenure made after the
E twenty-fourth day of January, 1971 in a suit or pro-
ceeding irrespective of whether such suit or proceeding
was pending on or was instituted after the twenty-
fourth day of January, 1971;

(b) any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment or
F declaration in favour of a person to the like effect,
made in any other deed or instrument or in any other
n1anner."

"Explanation II-The burden of proving that a case
falls within clause (b) of the proviso shall rest with the --of-
G party claiming its benefit."

The substantive provision which is contained in sub-section
(6) clearly provides that any transfer after the 24th of January 1971
would have to be ignored and not taken into account in determining
H the surplus area. Clause (b) of the proviso to sub-section (6} (here-
inafter referred to as 'clause (b) of the proviso') however, carves out
an exception to the general rule contained in sub-section (6) and
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 245

Explanation II places the burden of proving the fact, that the case A
falls within the protection of clause (b) of the proviso, on the party
relying on the transfer and claiming its benefit. A careful analysis
of clause (b) of the proviso would reveal that it requires the follow-
ing conditions to be fulfilled before a transfer can seek its protection:

(I) that the transfer must be in good faith, B
(2) that it must be proved to be in good faith to the satisfac-
tion of the Prescribed Auth9rity,

(3) that it should be for adequate consideration and under an
irrevocable instrument, and c
(4) that it should not be in the nature of a benami transaction
for immediate or deferred benefit of the tenure holder or
other members of his family.

It is manifest that if these conditions are satisfied and proved
D
to the satisfaction of the Prescribed Authority then the burden which
lies on the claimant under Explanation II would have been discharged
and the transfer would not be ignored but would fall under the
protective umbrella contained in clause (b) of the proviso. It may
be noticed that the legislature in its wisdom has neither defined the
word 'transfer' in any of the definitions of the Act nor has clarified
E
it. The primary object of the Act is to prevent the tenure holders
from evading the Law of Ceiling by making fictitious transfers even
by registered· documents either before or after the due date so as to
evade the provisions of the Act and thus frustrate the very object
and the sccial purpose for which the Act had been passed. In these
circumstances, therefore, the word 'transfer' has obviously been used
F
by the legislature in the general sense of the term as defined in the
Transfer of Property Act, which is the statute that governs all trans-
fers of movable or immovable properties. In other words, the word
'transfer' being a term of well-known legal significance having well
ascertained incidents, the legislature did not think it necessary to
define the term 'transfer' separately. Similarly, the word 'consider- G
ation' also being a term commonly used to denote contracts, sales
and transactions, has been used in the same sense, that is to say, as
defined by s. 2( d)" of the Contract Act. .

It is well settled that whenever the the legislature uses certain H
terms or expressions of well-known legal significance or connotation ·
the courts must interpret them as used or understood in the popular
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981) 3 S.C.R.

A sense. In the case of C.I T. Andhra Pradesh v. M/s. Taj Mahal
Hotel, Secundrabad(1) this Court while laying down guidelines for
holding how a particular expression has been. defined, observed as
follows:-

"Now it is well settled that where the definition of a
B word has not been given, it must be construed in its
popular sense if it is a word of every day use. Popular
sense means "that sense which people conversant with
the subject matter with which the statute is dealing, would
attribute to it".

c Lord Atkinson in Keats v. Lewis(2) observed as follows :

"Jn the construction of a statute it is, of course,
at all times and under all circumstances permissible to
have regard to the state of things existing at the time
the statute was passed, and to the evils, which as appears
D from its provisions, it was designed to remedy. If the
words are capable of one meaning alone then it must be
adopted, but if they are susceptible of wider import, we
have to pay regard to what the statute or the particular
piece of legislation had in view."

E These observations are fully applicable to the present Act
which has for its object remedying the evil of evading the ceiling
law by the large landholders by executing saledeeds or other instru-
ments so as to escape the consequences of the law. Jn Union of
India v. Sanko/ Chand Himatlal Sheth & Anr.(3) Chandrachud, J.,
as he then was, observed as follows :-
•
F
"The normal rule of interpretation is that the words
used by the legislature are generally a safe guide to its
intention. Lord Reid in Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Zang
(1966 A.C. 182) observed that "no principle of interpreta-
tion of statutes is more firmly settled than the rule that the
G Court must deduce the intention of Parliament from the
words used in the Act." Applying such a rule, this Court
observed in S. Narayanaswami v. G. Panneerselvam (AIR

(2) [1972) I S.C.R. 168
H (I) [1911) A.C. 641.
(3) [1978) I S.C.R. 423.
SONIA BHATIA v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 247

1972 SC 2284 at 2290) that "where the statute's meaning A
is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated."

"But, if the provision is clear and explicit, it cannot be
reduced to a nullity by reading into it a meaning which it B
does not carry."

Against this background we have now to consider the real
intention of the words "transfer for adequate consideration" as
used in clause (b) of the proviso. The High Court has held that
although the deed of gift is a transfer but as it is a transfer without
any consideration, therefore such a transfer does not fulfil one of
c
the essential ingredients mentioned in clause (b) of the proviso,
namely, that it should be for consideration. The High Court has
further held that its view is reinforced by the word 'adequate' which
qualifies the word 'consideration' which completely rules out a
transfer in the nature of a gift. The High Court was of the view D
that a transfer of property by way of a gift being a purely gratui-
tous transfer made out of love and· affection _or for the spiritual
benefit of the donor, falls completely beyond the ambit of clause
(b) of the proviso and, therefore, has to be ignored under the pro-
visions of the said sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act.
E
Mr. Kacker, appearing for the appellant, assailed the view
taken by the High Court on the ground that the High Court has
given a very restricted.meaning to the term 'transfer for adequate
consideration' by limiting the import of the word 'consideration'.
He argued in the first place that a gift cannot be said to be a trans-
fer without consideration because even love and affection, spiritual F
benetit or other factors of similar nature may provide sufficient
consideration for the gift. Secondly, it was argued that even if a
gift was a transfer without consideration and was intended to be
excluded by clause (b) of the proviso, then there should have been
an express indication of the same in the provisions of clause (b) of
the proviso by expressly excluding gifts. Another facet of this G
argument advanced before us by Mr. Kacker was that as gift has
not been expressly excluded by clause (b) of the proviso, we should
be persuaded to hold that the conditions regarding adequate con-
sideration would . not apply to a gift as a gift, was a transfer
without consideration and if other conditions were satisfied a gift H
would also fall within the purview of clause (b) of the proviso. We
have given our anxious consideration to the arguments put forward
248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 s.c.R.

A by Mr. Kacker and although the arguments are extremely attractive
yet we find ourselves unable to agree with the same.

To begin with, it may be necessary to dwell on the concept of
gift as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act and as defined
in.various legal dictionaries and books. To start with, Black's Law
B Dic:tionary (Fourth Edition) defines gift thus :-

"A voluntary transfer of personal property without
consideration. A parting by owner with property without
pecuniary consideration. A voluntary conveyance of land,
or transfer of goods, from one person to another made
c gratuitously, and not upon any consideration of blood or
money."

A similar definition has been given in Webster's Third New
International Dictionary (Unabridged) where the anther defines gift
thus:
D
"Something that is voluntarily transferred by one
person to another without compensation: a voluntary trans-
fer of real or personal property without any consideration or
without a valuable consideration-distinguished from sale."

(Emphasis ours)
E
Volume 18 of Words & Phrases (Permanent Edition) defines
gift thus :

"A 'gift" is a voluntary transfer of property without
compensation or any considera1io11. A 'gift' means a volun-
F tary transfer of property from one person to another
without consideration or compensation."

(Emphasis ours)

In HalsburY's Laws of England (Third Edition-Volume 18) while
detailing the nature and kinds of gift, the following statement is
G made:

"A gift inter vivas (a) may be defined shortly as the
transfer of any property from one person to another gra-
tuitously. Gifts then, or grants, which are the eighth
H method of transferring personal property, are thus to be
distinguished from each other, that gifts are always gratui-
t0us, grants are upon some consideration or equivalent."
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 249

Thus, according to Lord Halsbury's statement the essential A
distinction between a gift and a grant is that whereas a gift is
absolutely gratuitous, grant is based on some consideration or
equivalent. Similarly in Volume 38 of Corpus Juris Secundum, it
has been clearly stated that a gift is a transfer without consideration
and in this connection while defining the nature and character of a
gift the author states as follows : B
"A gift is commonly defined as a voluntary transfer of
property by one to another, without any consideration or
compensation therefor. Any piece of property which is
voluntarily transferred by one person to another without
compensation or consideration. A gift is a gratuity, and
an act of generosity, and not only does not require a con-
c
sideration but there can be none; if there is a consideration
for the transaction it is not a gift."

It is, therefore, clear from the statement made in this book
that the concept of gift is diametrically opposed to the presence of
any consideration or compensation. A gift has aptly been described D
as a gratuity and an act of generosity and stress has been laid on
the fact that if there is any consideration then the transaction ceases
to be a gift. Before closing this aspect of the matter we might also
refer to the definition of consideration given in various books.
Black's Law Dictionary defines 'consideration' thus :
E
"Consideration" is not to be confounded with motive.
Consideration means something which is of value in the
eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff, either of benefit
to the plaintiff or of detriment to the defendant"."
This is the view expressed in 2 Q.B. 851. Similarly, at p.61 in F
the same volume, the words 'adequate consideration' have been
defined thus:-

"One which is equal, or reasonably proportioned, to
the value of that for which it is given. Fair and reasonable
under circumstances."
(Emphasis ours) G
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged)
defines, ,consideration' thus:

"Something that is legally regarded as the equivalent H
or return given or suffered by one for the act or. promise
of another·"
250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981) 3 s.c.R

A And the word 'adequate' has been defined in the same volume
at page 25 thus:

"Legally sufficient: such as is lawfully and reasona-
bly sufficient"

B Similarly, in words and Phrases (Permanent Edition-volume 2) the
word 'adequate' has been defined at p.545 thus:

'Adequate' means fuily equal to requirments or occa-
sions, commensurate, but in its primary and more popular
significance nothing can be said to be 'adequate' which is
c not equal to what is required, suitable to the case or occa-
sion, fully sufficient, proportionate, and satisfactory."

And when used to qualify consideration, it has been defined thus :
in the same volume at p.545:

D
"Fair consideration in money or money 's worth" is
consideration which under all circumstances is honest,
reasonable, and free from suspicion, whether or not strictly
'adequate' or 'full'."

E (Emphasis supplied)

'Adequate Consideration' has been further defined as follows in the
same volume at p. 553 :-

"Adequate consideration" generally is one which is a
fair equivalent in value for benefit obtained ......
F ,.. '

'Adequate consideration' required in action for specific
performance merely means that contract price must be
substantially just and fair valuation under all circumstan-
ces.''
G
(Emphasis supplied)
...
In Volume 17 of Corpus Juris Secundum (p. 420-421 and 425)
the import of 'consideration' has been described thus :-
H
"Various definitions of consideration are to be found in
the textbooks and judicial opinfons. A sufficient one, as
'
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 251

stated in Corpus Juris and which has been quoted and A
cited with approval is, "a benefit to the party promising,
or a loss or detriment to the party to whom the promise is
made ..... .

At common law every contract not under seal requires
a consideration to support it, that is, as shown in the deli- B
nition · above, some benefit to the · promisor, or some
detriment to the promisee ......
There is a sufficient consideration for a promise if there
is any benefit to the promisor or any detriment to the
promisee ...... It may be laid down as a general rule, in
accordance with the definition given above, that there is a
c
sufficient consideration for a promise if there is any benefit
to the promisor or any loss or detriment to the promisee."
Tl'e gist of the term 'consideration' and its legal significance
has been clearly summed up in s. 2(d) of the Contract Act which
defines 'consideration' thus : D
' "When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or
any other person has done or abstained from doing, or does
or abstrains from doing, or promises to do or to abstain
from doing, something,.such act or abstinence or promise
is called a consideration for the promise." E
From a conspectus, therefore, of the definitions contained in
the dictionaries and the books regarding a gift or an adequate
consideration, the inescapable conclusion that follows is that 'con-
sideration' means a reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit
passed on by the promisor to the promisee or by the transferor to F
the transferee. Similarly, when the word' 'consideration' is qualified
by the word 'adequate', it makes consideration stronger so as to
make it sufficient and valuable having regard to the facts, circum-
stances and necessities of the case. It has also been seen from the
discussions of the various authorities mentioned above that a gift is
undoubtedly a transfer which does not contain any element of G
consideration in any shape or form. In fact, where there is any
equivalent or benefit measured in terms of money in respect of a
gift the transaction ceases to be a gift and assumes a different
colour. It has been rightly pointed out in one of the books referred
to above that we should not try to confuse the motive or the purpose H
of making a gift with the consideration which is the subject matter
of the gift. Love, affection, spiritual benefit and many other
252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1981] 3 S.C.R.

A factors may enter in the intention of the donor to make a gift but
these filial considerations cannot be called or held to be legal con-
siderations as understood by law. It is manifest, therefore, that
the passing of monetary consideration is completely foreign to the
concept of a gift having regard to the nature, character and the
circumstances under which such a transfer takes place. Furthermore,
B when the legislature has used the word 'transfer' it at once invokes
the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Under section 122
of the Transfer of Property Act, gift is defined thus :

" 'Gift' is the transfer of certain existing movable or
c immovable property made voluntarily and without consi-
deration, by one person, called the donor, to another,
called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the
donee.

Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of
the donor and while he is still capable of giving.
D
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void."

Thus, s. 122 of the Transfer of Property· Act clearly postulates
that a gift must have two essential characteristics-( l) that it must
be made voluntarily, and (2) that it should be without considera-
E tion. This is apart from the other ingredients like acceptance, etc.
Against the background of these facts and the undisputed position
of law, the words, 'transfer for adequate consideration' used in
clause (b) of the proviso clearly and expressly exclude a transaction
which is in the nature of a gift and which is without consideration.
Love and affection, etc., may be motive for making a gift but is not
F a consideration in the legal sense of the term. As regards the
argument of Mr. Kacker that if the legislature intended to exclude
gifts, clause (b) of the proviso should have expressly said so; the
answer is very simple. Every legislature bas its own technical or
legal device to express its intendment. Some legislatures may have
chosen to expressly exclude gift as Mr. Kacker says but that is not
G the only method of conveying the legislative intent. There may be
other methods or devices by which the legislative intent can be
expressed, namely, by using such expressions which would expressly
or by necessary intendment exclude a particular transaction. This
me'thod seems to have been adopted by the legislature in enacting
ff clause (b) of the proviso. In fact, the legislature has made its
intention clear that gift is excluded by qualifying the word 'consider-
ation' by the adjective 'adequate'. Assuming that love and affec-
SONIA BHATIA v. u. p, STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 253

tion, spiritual benefit or similar other factors may amount. to a
A
consideration for the gift, the word 'adequate' is wholly inapplicable
to and inconsistent with the concept of a gift because it is impossible
to measure love and affection, the sentiments or feelings of the donor
by any standard yardstick or barometer. The words 'adequate
consideration' clearly postulate that consideration must be capable
of being measured in terms of money value having regard to the
B
market price of the property, the value that it may fetch if sold,
the value of similar lands situated in the vicinity, so on and so
forth. In the instant case, therefore, in our opinion, the legislature
by using the word 'adequate' to qualify the word 'consideration'
has completely ruled out and excluded gift from the ambit of
clause (b) of the proviso. In these circumstances, therefore, the
argument of Mr. Kacker that by not expressly excluding gift,
c
clause (b) of the proviso includes gift cannot be accepted particularly
in the face of the clear and unambiguous language used by clause (b)
of the proviso in describing the nature of the transaction as one for
adequate consideration.
D
We now deal with the second limb of the argument of Mr.
Kacker that as in the case of a gift there is no question of a con-
sideration, we should hold that the 3rd part of clause (b) of the
proviso which contains the words 'for adequate consideration' is
inapplicable and ignore the same. This argument is diametrically
opposed to the well-known rule of interpretation that courts in inter-
E
preting statutes must not interpolate or legislate. It is well settled
that a legislature does not waste words without any intention, and
every word that is used by the legislature must be given its due
import and significance. In the instant case, the words !'adequate
consideration' have undoubtedly a §weH recognised concept and, as
indicated above, the intention was to exclude any transaction which
is not for adequate consideration. Not to speak of a gift but even
F
if a sale is found to be bona fide but the consideration is inadequate,
for instance, where the property has been sold for a nominal price
or below the market value, the transaction would fall beyond the
protection given by clause (b) of the proviso. Our attention
G
has been drawn by Mr. Kacker to a single Bench decision by
Banerji, J, in Fateh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors(1 ) where
the learned Judge had taken the view that the definition of a transfer
given in clause (b) of the proviso included a gift because a gift also
could not be said to be a transfer without consideration even though H
(!) [1977] 3 All. L.R. 690.
254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ( 198 l] 3 S.C.R.

A consideration may not be weighed in terms of money. The learned
Judge in taking this view had obviously fallen into error of con-
fusing what was the motive or the reason for the gift as being a legal
consideration of it. It has already been pointed out that in con-
sidering the nature of a gift one should not confuse the motive,
which may be love and affection, or spiritual benefit, with valuable
B consideration which has to be either in the shape of a money com-
pensation or equivalent of the same. It is true that in every gift
the donor has a particular motive and objective or a reason to part
with his property in favour of . the donee, the reason being, in some
cases, love and affection where th~ gift is in favour of a relation
or friend, or spiritual benefit in other cases but this will be the
c immediate motive for making the gift and cannot be regarded as a
consideration for the gift because the very concept of gift is based
·on a purely gratuitous consideration. The Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Conrt in the case referred to above has rightly
overruled the view of Banerji, J,, on this count. In fact the matter
has been considered by other High Courts who have consistently
D taken the view that a gift is a transfer without consideration, love
and affection being only the motive for making the transfer. In
Debi Saran Koiri & Anr. v. Nandalal Clnubey and Ors.(1) while
elucidating the nature and character of a gift Sahay, J. made the
following observations :

"Now, S. 122, T.P. Act defines "gift" as a transfer of
E
certain existing movable or immovable property made
volnntarily and without consideration, by one person, called
the donor, to anoiher, called the donee, and accepted by
or on behalf of the donee."
''To my mind consideration in S.. 122, T.P. Act, means
F valuable consideration and not consideration in the shape
of conferring spiritual benefit to the donor. If valuable
consideration be not the consideration referred to in S. 122,
I fail to understand how any gift can be made without con-
sideration at all. There must be some sort of consideration
in every gift, for instance, a consideration of an expectation
G of spiritual or moral benefit or consideration of love and
affection. Such considerations are not considerations con-
templated in S. 122. The consideration there contrn1plated
must be ;GJuable consideration, that is consideration either
of money or of money's worth."
H (Emphasis supplied)

(I) AIR 1929 Patna 591
SONIA BHATIA v. U.P. STATE (Fazal Ali, J.) 255

In Kulasekaraperumal v. Pathakutty Thalevanar & Ors.(1) A
Jagadisan, J. made the classic observations which may be extracted
thus:--
y ' A gift is essentially a gratuitous transfer. Complete
absence of consideration marks the transfer as a gift and
differentiates it from a grant."
The learned Judge has rightly pointed out that complete
B
absence of consideration is the main hallmark which distinguishes
a gift from a grant or for that matter other transactions which may
b~ for valuable or adequate consideration. We find ourselves in
complete agreement with the observations made by Jagdisan' J. in
Kulasekarapirumal's case (supra) and Sahay, J. in Debi Saran's case
(supra) which correctly represent the character and nature of the
c
gift as contemplated by law. Banerji, J. in Fat eh Singh' s case (supra)
seems to have relied heavily on Explanation I of sub-section (6) of
s. (5) of the Act which refers to a declaration of a tenure holder
made in a suit or any admission, acknowledgement, relinquishment,
etc., made in any other deed or instrument in order to reinforce his D
conclusion that clause (b) of the proviso did not exclude a gift. With
due respect, here the learned Judge completely failed to appreciate
the scope of clause (b) of the provisio and Explanation I. It is well
settled that an Explanation merely widens the scope of the main
section and is not meant to carve out a particular exception to the
contents of the main section. Thus, even if the words 'relinquish- E
ment, admission or declaration' are used in Explanation I, the use
of such words do not absolve the party concerned from proving the
essential ingredients laid down in clause (b) of the proviso, namely,
- that the transfer should be executed in good faith and should be for
adequate consideration. Whatever be the nature of the declaration,
acknowledgement, relinquishment, adequacy of consideration has F
to be proved in any case. Thus, in our view, the Division Bench
was fully justified in overruling the view of Banerji, J. in regard to
the interpretation of the Explanation also.
Finally, we would like to mention that the matter is no longer
res integra but is fully covered in principle by a decision of this G
Court in Tulstdas Kilachand v. The Commission-er of Income-tax,
Bombay City !,(') where Hidayatullah J, speaking for the Court
observed as follows :-
"It remains to consider whether there was a adequ-
ate consideration for the transfer. Reliance has been placed
H
(I) A.LR. 1961 Madras 405.
(2) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 351.
256 SUPREME COURT REPORT (1981] 3 S.C.R.

A only upon love and affection. The words "adequate con-
sideration" denote consideration other than mere love and
affection which, in the case of a wife, may be presumed.
When the law insists that there should be "adequate con-
sideration" and not "good consideration", it excludes mere
love and affection. They may be good consideration to
B support a contract, but adequate consideration to avoid
tax is quite a different thing. To insist on the other mean-
ing is really to say that consideration must only be looked
for, when love and affection cease to exist."

(Emphasis supplied)
c
It would thus, appear that this Court clearly held that the
words 'adequate consideration' completely exclude the concept of
love and affection and this decision appears to be on all fours with
the facts of the present case. Realising this predicament Mr. Kacker
submitted that the words 'adequate consideration' used in the
D Income Tax Act ·denote a different texture. Mr. Kacker argued
that it is not permissible to interpret or use an expression in one Act
as having the same meaning in another Act which is of a different
kind. Of course, there can be no dispute with this proposition but
then the Act as also the Income Tax Act have both used the words
'adequate consideration' which, as we have already held, are terms
E of well-known legal significance having a well recognised popular
sense and hence they. would convey the same meaning and import
whenever used in other statutes unless a contrary intention appears
from the language employed by the legislature in the statute.
Moreover, the object of the Income Tax Act as also the present Act
seems to te more or less identical. Whereas the object of the
F Income Tax Act in enacting s. 16(3)(b) which is extracted below,
is to circumvent and ·prevent a growing tendency on the part of the
assessees to avoid or reduce tax liability by means of settlements :

"16(3) ..... .
G
(a) ---;·
(b) so much of the income of any person or association of
persons as arises from assets transferred otherwise
than for adequate consideration to the person or asso-
ciation by such individual for the benefit of his wife
H or a minor child or both."
SONIA BHATIA v. u. P. STATE (Pazal Ali, J.) 257

In the instant case also the avowed object of sub-seetion ( 6) of A
section S of the Act is to prevent the large landholders from evad-
ing the ceiling Jaw by executing transfers, instruments or gifts so as
to reduce their surplus area. Where the two statutes have a common
and identical object then the legal terms used in· one statute must be
given the same meaning in the other. It cannot be said that the
words 'adequate consideration' appearing in sub-section (6) of s. S B
of the Act do not take their colour from the context but are in
conformity with the main object of the Act, to prevent evasion of
the ceiling Jaw by large tenure holders in anticipation of the passing
of the Ceiling Law. For these reasons, therefore, the argument of
Mr. Kacker on this score must be rejected. We, therefore, hold
that in view of the interpretation p~aced by this Court on the words c
'adequate consideration' which fully applies to the present case and
to the same language employed in sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act,
a gift is not only impliedly but expressly excluded by the Act.

In the Division Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court D
referred to above, after a consideration of a large number of autho-
rities the following observations were made :

"The Legislature while.enacting the U.P. Imposition of
Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, was alive to the provisions
of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the transfer of E
immovable property. The terms 'transfer', sale, 'mortgage'
and 'lease' have not been defined in the Act. Therefore,
these terms must have been used only in the sense in which
they have been used in Transfer of Property Act. If the
Legislature intended to use those terms in a different sense
and with a different connotation, it would have defined F
those terms in the Act. But that has not been done ...

The legislature, however, thought that there may be
genuine and bona fide transfers for consideration. To
protect such tenure holders and other transfers, pro-
viso (b) to sub-section (6) of section S of the Act was G
enacted. It saved transfers for adequate consideration.
Gift is a gratuitous transfer and there is no considera-
tion which obviously means valuable consideration. If
transfer for love and affection is taken to be a transfer
for consideration then the purpose of the Act would be H
258 SIJPREME COURT REPORTS (1981] 3 S.C.R

A completely defeated as the tenure holders would transfer
their land by gift after 24th January J 971."

We fully endorse the observations made by the Division
Bench which lay down the correct law on the subject and we
overrule the decision of Banerji, J. in Fateh Singh's case (supra).
B
Lastly, it was urged by Mr: Kacker that this is an extremely
hard case where the grand-father of the donee wanted to make a
beneficial provision for his grand-daughter after having lost his two
sons in the prime of their life due to air crash accidents while
serving in the Air Force. It is true that the District Judge has come
c to a clear finding that the gift in question is bona fide and has been
executed in good faith but as the gift does not fulfil the other
I
ingredients of the.section, namely, that it is not for adequate con-
sideration, we are afraid, however laudable. the object of the donor
may have been, the gift has to fail because the genuine attempt of
the donor to benefit his granddaughter seems to have been thwarted
D by the intervention of sub-section (6) of s. 5 of the Act. This is
undoubtedly a serious hardship hut it cannot be helped. We must
remember that the Act is a valuable piece of social legislation with
the avowed object of ensuring equitable distribution of the land by
taking away land from large tenure holders and distributing the
same among landless tenants or using· the same for public utility
E schemes which is in the larger interest of the community at large.
The Act seems to implement one of the most important constitu-
tional directives contained in Part IV of the Constitution of India.
If in this process a few individuals suffer severe hardship that cannot
be helped, for· individual interests must yield to the larger interests
of the community or the country as indeed every noble cause claims
F its martyr.

As this was the only point raised before us, we find no merit J.f
in the same.
For the reasons given above, we hold that the High Court was
G right in allowing the writ petition in respect of the gift in question.
The appeal fails and is accordingly dismissed but without any order
as to costs.

P.B.R. Appeal dismissqd,