KRISHNAVENI RAIversusPANKAJ RAI & ANR.

682                       [2020]
               SUPREME COURT     1 S.C.R. 682
                              REPORTS                      [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A                            KRISHNAVENI RAI
                                       v.
                            PANKAJ RAI & ANR.
                       (Criminal Appeal No. 321 of 2020)
B                            FEBRUARY 19, 2020
               [INDIRA BANERJEE AND M.R. SHAH, JJ.]
      Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: ss.5, 11, 15 – Claim for maintenance
      by appellant-wife – Plea of respondent-husband that appellant was
C     not entitled to maintenance since their marriage was a nullity having
      taken place while an appeal by appellant against decree of divorce
      against her first husband was still pending – The said appeal by
      wife against first husband was filed almost one year after the expiry
      of limitation period – Whether second marriage performed during
      the pendency of an appeal from a decree of divorce a nullity, even
D     though there were no stay of operation of the decree – Held: s.15
      specifies that when a marriage has been dissolved by a decree of
      divorce, and there is no right of appeal against the decree, or if
      there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired
      without an appeal having been preferred, or an appeal has been
E     presented but the same has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for
      either party to the marriage to marry again – It could never have
      been the legislative intent that a marriage validly contracted after
      the divorce and after expiry of the period of limitation to file an
      appeal from the decree of divorce should rendered void on the filing
      of a belated appeal – The bar of s.15 is not at all attracted in the
F     facts and circumstances of this case, where the appeal from the
      decree of divorce had been filed almost a year after expiry of the
      period of limitation for filing an appeal – Maintenance application
      remitted to the Family Court for determination of maintenance
      amount – In the meanwhile, respondent directed to pay Rs.20,000
G     as was directed by the Family Court.
            Allowing the appeal, the Court
           HELD: 1. A careful reading of Sections 5, 11 and 15 makes
      it amply clear that while Section 5 specifies the conditions on
      which a marriage may be solemnized between two Hindus, only
H
                                      682
          KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                          683


contravention of some of those conditions render a marriage void.       A
Marriage in contravention of Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, that is, where either party or both have a spouse living at
the time of marriage is void. [Paras 28-29] [690-B-C]
       2. Section 15 clarifies that when a marriage has been
dissolved by a decree of divorce, and there is no right of appeal       B
against the decree, or if there is such a right of appeal, the time
for appealing has expired without an appeal having been preferred,
or an appeal has been presented but the same has been dismissed,
it shall be lawful for either party to the marriage to marry again.
The bar of Section 15 is not at all attracted in the facts and
circumstances of this case, where the appeal from the decree of         C
divorce had been filed almost a year after expiry of the period of
limitation for filing an appeal. The bar, if any, under Section 15 of
the Hindu Marriage Act applies only if there is an appeal filed
within the period of limitation, and not afterwards upon
condonation of delay in filing an appeal unless of course, the decree   D
of divorce is stayed or there is an interim order of Court,
restraining the parties or any of them from remarrying during
the pendency of the appeal. The appeal was infructuous for all
practical purposes, from the inception, since the Appellant’s ex-
husband had lawfully remarried after expiry of the period of
limitation for filing an appeal, there being no appeal till then.       E
[Paras 31, 34-36][690-E-F; 692-D, F-G]
      Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra Mittal (2018) 9 SCC
      691 : [2018] 10 SCR 123; Leela Gupta v. Laxmi Narain
      & Ors. (1978) 3 SCC 258 : [1978] 3 SCR 922 –
      referred to                                                       F

      3. It could never have been the legislative intent that a
marriage validly contracted after the divorce and after expiry of
the period of limitation to file an appeal from the decree of divorce
should be rendered void on the filing of a belated appeal. If the
marriage of the Appellant’s ex-husband in 2006 was a valid              G
marriage in law recognizing that he had no living spouse, the
subsequent re-marriage of the Appellant could also not be void.
The maintenance application is remitted to the appropriate Court
having jurisdiction for determination of the Appellant’s claim to
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684            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     maintenance. In the meanwhile, the Respondent No.1 shall pay
      to the Appellant maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month, as
      directed by the Family Court without prejudice to the rights and
      contentions of either party, until further orders of the appropriate
      Court/Family Court in the application under Section 125 of the
      Cr.P.C., or in the suit. [Paras 37, 40][692-H; 693-A, E-F]
B
                              Case Law Reference
      [2018] 10 SCR 123                 referred to              Para 32
      [1978] 3 SCR 922                  referred to              Para 33

C           CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
      321 of 2020.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 09.04.2019 of the High Court
      for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in Criminal Revision Case No.
      2587 of 2017.
D           Srinivas C., S. S. Joshi, Mrs. Bela Maheshwari, Advs. for the
      Appellant.
            Respondent-in-person.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E           INDIRA BANERJEE, J.
            1. Leave granted.
             2. This appeal is against a judgment and order dated 9.4.2019
      passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana, dismissing Criminal
      Revision Case No. 2587 of 2017 filed by the Appellant under Section
F     397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C”),
      challenging the order dated 7.8.2017 passed by the Additional Metropolitan
      Sessions Judge, Fast Track Jubilee Hills Bomb Blast Case(JHBBC)-
      cum-Additional Family Judge at Hyderabad, dismissing the application
      of the Appellant under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. for maintenance, on
G     the purported ground that the marriage between the Appellant and the
      Respondent No.1 was a nullity.
            3. On or about 11.09.1989, the Appellant married one Arvind
      Chenjee in accordance with Hindu rites and customs. The marriage of
      the Appellant with the said Arvind Chenjee was, however, dissolved by
H
           KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                                 685
                  [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

a decree of divorce dated 28.06.2005, passed by the Family Judge,               A
Hyderabad in O.P. No. 847 of 2000.
      4. According to the Appellant, the period of limitation for filing an
appeal against the decree of divorce passed on 28.06.2005, expired on
26.09.2005. No appeal was filed either by the Appellant or by the said
Arvind Chenjee, within the period of limitation.                                B
       5. In August, 2006, almost a year after expiry of the period of
limitation, the Appellant filed an appeal against the said order dated
26.8.2005. The delay in filing the appeal was condoned by an order
dated 13.7.2007. The operation of the decree does not appear to have
been stayed.                                                                    C
      6. In the meanwhile, in 2006 the said Arvind Chenjee had remarried
Shipra Chenjee. The appeal filed by the Appellant against the decree of
divorce was, from the inception, infructuous. The appeal was, however,
formally dismissed as withdrawn on 02.09.2016.
      7. On 13.12.2014, over 9 years after the Appellant’s first marriage       D
with the said Arvind Chenjee was dissolved and long 8 years after the
Appellant’s ex-husband had re-married, the Appellant married the
Respondent No. 1.
      8. Unfortunately, the Appellant’s second marriage also did not
work. The Appellant has alleged that the Respondent No.1 subjected              E
the Appellant to harassment and cruelty and even threw her out of the
matrimonial home.
       9. The Appellant lodged a complaint against the Respondent No.1
at the Banjara Hills Police Station, under Sections 406, 498A and 500 of
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’) which was            F
registered as FIR No.470/2015.
      10. Claiming that she did not have any independent source of
income, the Appellant filed an application being M.C. No. 152 of 2015 in
the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Fast Track
Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast Case (JHCBBC)-cum-Additional Family                G
Judge, Hyderabad, under Section 125 the Code of Criminal Procedure
(Cr.P.C.) for maintenance.
      11. The Respondent No.1, on the other hand, filed a suit being
O.P. No. 475 of 2015 in the Additional Family Court, Hyderabad, for
declaration of nullity of his marriage with the Appellant, inter alia, on the   H
686             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A     ground that the marriage had been solemnized during the pendency of
      an appeal from the decree of dissolution of the appellant’s marriage with
      her first husband. According to the Appellant, the suit was a counterblast
      to the application for maintenance. We are informed that the suit is pending
      trial.
B           12. On or about 28.5.2015, the Appellant filed a complaint before
      the IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad seeking relief against the
      respondent No.1 under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence
      Act, 2005.
            13. On or about 22.3.2016, Charge sheet was filed in the
C     proceedings against the Respondent No.1 inter alia under Sections 406,
      498A & 500 of the IPC, pursuant to FIR No.470/2015.
            14. On or about 15.3.2017, the Respondent No.1 filed an application
      u/s 239 for Cr.P.C for discharge, from the proceedings initiated pursuant
      to FIR No.470/2015, which was dismissed by the XIIIth Addl. Chief
D     Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad by an order dated 15.3.2017.
             15. The Respondent No.1 filed a criminal Revision Petition No.192/
      2017 in the Court of the Metropolitan Sessions Judge, challenging the
      aforesaid order dated 15.3.2017 of the XIII th Additional Chief
      Metropolitan Magistrate, rejecting the application of the Respondent No.1
E     for discharge.
             16. By an order dated 23.1.2018, the Metropolitan Sessions Judge,
      Hyderabad allowed the Criminal Revision Petition No.127/2017 and
      discharged the Respondent No.1 from the proceedings under Section
      406, 498A and 500 of the IPC. The Appellant contends that the order
F     dated 23.1.2018 discharging the Respondent No.1, was passed without
      notice to the Appellant.
             17. In the meanwhile, by an order dated 7.8.2017, the Additional
      Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Fast Track Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast
      Case (JHCBBC)-cum-Additional Family Judge, Hyderabad, dismissed
      the application filed by the Appellant, claiming maintenance under Section
G
      125 CrPC.
            18. The Appellant filed a Criminal Revision Petition being Crl.
      R.P. No.149 of 2019 in the High Court of Telangana inter alia challenging
      the order dated 23.1.2018 discharging the Respondent No.1 from the
      proceeding under Sections 406, 498A and 500 of the IPC and also made
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           KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                                687
                  [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

an application being I.A. No.8 of 2019 for suspension of the said order        A
of discharge. By an order dated 15.2.2019, the High Court suspended
the said order of discharge.
       19. The Appellant also filed a Criminal Revision Case No.2587 of
2017 before the High Court challenging the order dated 7.8.2017 passed
by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Fast Track Jubilee Hills        B
Car Bomb Blast Case (JHCBBC)-cum-Additional Family Judge,
Hyderabad, dismissing the application being M.C. No.152 of 2015 of the
Appellant for maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
       20. The Appellant filed a Criminal Revision Petition No.2587
challenging the aforesaid order dated 7.8.2017. The Respondent No.1,           C
on the other hand, filed a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., for
quashing of the criminal proceedings against him under Sections 406,
498A and 506 of the IPC. By an order dated 9.4.2019 the said criminal
proceedings were quashed on the ground that the marriage of the
Appellant with the Respondent No.1, solemnised during the pendency
of an appeal from the decree of dissolution of the appellant’s marriage        D
with her first husband, was null and void.
       21. An application for pendente lite maintenance being IA No.1192
of 2017 filed by the Appellant in the Court of the 1st Additional Family
Judge, Hyderabad in O.P. No. 475 of 2015 being the pending suit of the
Respondent No.1 for declaration of nullity of the marriage between the         E
Appellant and the Respondent No.1, was allowed by an order dated
19.12.2018 whereby the Respondent No.1 was directed to pay
Rs. 20,000/- per month from the date of the application, that is, 30.11.2017
and an additional Rs.20,000/- towards litigation expenses.
      22. A Civil Revision Petition No.242 of 2019 filed by the Respondent     F
No.1, challenging the aforesaid order dated 19.12.2018 passed by the
Family Court has been dismissed by a Single Bench of the High Court
by a well-reasoned judgment and order dated 19.03.2019.
      23. The Criminal Revision Petition No.2587 of 2017 filed by the
Appellant against the order dated 7.8.2017 passed by the Additional            G
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Fast Track Jubilee Hills Car Bomb Blast
Case (JHCBBC)-cum-Additional Family Judge, Hyderabad dismissing
the application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. was also dismissed by
an order dated 9.4.2019, on the same ground on which the Criminal
proceedings against the Respondent No.1 had been quashed.
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688            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A            24. As recorded by the High Court, it is not in dispute that the
      Appellant and the Respondent No.1 had got married as per prevailing
      customs on 13.12.2014. The short question in this appeal is, whether the
      Appellant could have been denied maintenance under Section 125 of the
      Cr.P.C. on the ground that her marriage with the Respondent No.1 was
      a nullity, just because the marriage had taken place while an appeal filed
B
      by the Appellant against a decree of dissolution of marriage with her
      first husband was still pending. In other words, is a second marriage
      performed during the pendency of an appeal from a decree of divorce a
      nullity, even though there were no stay of operation of the decree.
             25. Sections 5, 11 and 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, relevant
C     to this appeal are set out hereinbelow for convenience: -
            “5. Conditions for a Hindu Marriage.- A marriage may be
            solemnized between any two Hindus, if the following
            conditions are fulfilled, namely:-
D           (i) neither party has a spouse living at the time of the marriage;
            (ii) at the time of the marriage, neither party,-
                (a)   is incapable of giving a valid consent to it in
                      consequence of unsoundness of mind; or
                (b)   though capable of giving a valid consent, has been
E
                      suffering from mental disorder of such a kind or to
                      such an extent as to be unfit for marriage and the
                      procreation of children; or
                (c)   has been subject to recurrent attacks of insanity or
                      epilepsy;
F
                (iii) the bridegroom has completed the age of twenty-one
                      years and the bride, the age of eighteen years at the
                      time of the marriage;
                (iv) the parties are not within the degrees of prohibited
G                    relationship, unless the custom or usage governing
                     each of them permits of a marriage between the two;
                (v)   the parties are not sapindas of each other, unless
                      the custom or usage governing each of them permits
                      of a marriage between the two;
H                      xxx                      xxx                       xxx
            KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                             689
                   [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

      11. Void marriages.- Any marriage solemnized after the                 A
      commencement of this Act shall be null and void and may, on
      a petition presented by either party thereto, against the other
      party be so declared by a decree of nullity if it contravenes
      any one of the conditions specified in clauses (i), (iv) and (v)
      of Section 5.
                                                                             B
                xxx              xxx               xxx
      15. Divorced persons when may marry again.- When a
      marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce and either
      there is no right of appeal against the decree or, if there is
      such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired             C
      without an appeal having been presented, or an appeal has
      been presented but has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for
      either party to the marriage to marry again.”
      26. It is well settled that a marriage which is null and void is no
marriage in the eye of law. Where the marriage is a nullity application      D
for maintenance is liable to be set aside on that ground alone. Under
Section 5 of the Hindu Marriage Act, a marriage may validly be
solemnized between any two Hindus, subject to the following conditions:-
      (i)   Neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage
            [(Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act];                       E
      (ii) Neither party was incapable of giving valid consent of the
           marriage in circumstances specified in Section 5(ii) of the
           Hindu Marriage Act;
      (iii) The parties to the marriage are of requisite age, that is, the
            bridegroom should have completed 21 years of age and the         F
            bride 18 years of age, at the time of marriage [Section 5(iii)
            of the Hindu Marriage Act];
      (iv) The parties should not be within the degree of prohibited
           relationship unless the custom or usage governing each of
           them permits such marriage [(Section 5(iv) of the Hindu           G
           Marriage Act];
      (v) Parties are not sapindas of each other unless the custom or
          usage governing each of them permits between two. [(Section
          5 (v) of the Hindu Marriage Act];
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690             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A            27. Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act provides that any
      marriage solemnized after the commencement of this Act shall be null
      and void and may on a petition presented by either party thereto, against
      the other party, be so declared by a decree of nullity, if it contravenes
      any of the conditions in Clauses (i), (iv) and (v) of the Section 5.
B            28. A careful reading of Sections 5, 11 and 15 makes it amply
      clear that while Section 5 specifies the conditions on which a marriage
      may be solemnized between two Hindus, only contravention of some of
      those conditions render a marriage void.
             29. Marriage in contravention of Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage
C     Act, that is, where either party or both have a spouse living at the time of
      marriage is void. Similarly, a marriage is void if the parties to the marriage
      are within the degrees of prohibited relationship unless the custom or
      usage governing each of them permits of such marriage, or if the parties
      are sapindas of each other unless, again, the custom or usage governing
      each of them permits marriage between the two. [Sections 5(iv) and
D     5(v)]
             30. Contravention of Sections 5(ii) or 5(iii) of the Hindu marriage
      Act does not render the marriage null and void. In such a case, the
      marriage is voidable at the option of the underaged party to the marriage
      or the party who could not have validly consented to the marriage.
E
              31. Section 15 clarifies that when a marriage has been dissolved
      by a decree of divorce, and there is no right of appeal against the decree,
      or if there is such a right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired
      without an appeal having been preferred, or an appeal has been presented
      but the same has been dismissed, it shall be lawful for either party to the
F     marriage to marry again. Had it been the legislative intent that a marriage
      during the pendency of an appeal should be declared void, Section 11
      would expressly have provided so.
             32. As held by this Court in Anurag Mittal v. Shaily Mishra
      Mittal reported in (2018) 9 SCC 691, the object of Section 15 is to
G     provide protection to the person who had filed an appeal against the
      decree of dissolution of marriage and to ensure that such appeal was not
      frustrated. The protection afforded by Section 15 is primarily to a person
      contesting the decree of divorce. As observed by Bobde, J. in his
      concurring judgment in Anurag Mittal (supra):-
H
         KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                                 691
                [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

     “I am in agreement with the view taken by Nageswara Rao, J.              A
     but it is necessary to state how the question before us has already
     been settled by the decision in Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain [Lila
     Gupta v. Laxmi Narain, (1978) 3 SCC 258] . Even when the words
     of the proviso were found to be prohibitory in clear negative terms
     — “it shall not be lawful”, etc., this Court held that the incapacity
                                                                              B
     to marry imposed by the proviso did not lead to an inference of
     nullity, vide para 9 of Lila Gupta [Lila Gupta v. Laxmi Narain,
     (1978) 3 SCC 258] . It is all the more difficult to infer nullity when
     there is no prohibition; where there are no negative words but on
     the other hand positive words like “it shall be lawful”. Assuming
     that a marriage contracted before it became lawful to do so was          C
     unlawful and the words create a disability, it is not possible to
     infer a nullity or voidness vide paras 9 and 10 of Lila Gupta case…
     “………. What is held in essence is that if a provision of law
     prescribes an incapacity to marry and yet the person marries while
     under that incapacity, the marriage would not be void in the absence     D
     of an express provision that declares nullity. Quae incapacity
     imposed by statute, there is no difference between an incapacity
     imposed by negative language such as “it shall not be lawful” or
     an incapacity imposed by positive language like “it shall be lawful
     (in certain conditions, in the absence of which it is impliedly
     unlawful)”. It would thus appear that the law is already settled by      E
     this Court that a marriage contracted during a prescribed period
     will not be void because it was contracted under an incapacity.
     Obviously, this would have no bearing on the other conditions of a
     valid marriage. The decision in Lila Gupta case thus covers the
     present case on law.”                                                    F
     33. In Leela Gupta v. Laxmi Narain & Ors. reported in (1978)
3 SCC 258, this Court held:
     “…..the interdict of law is that it shall not be lawful for a certain
     party to do a certain thing which would mean that if that act is
     done it would be unlawful. But whenever a statute prohibits a            G
     certain thing being done thereby making it unlawful, without
     providing consequence for the breach,it is not legitimate to
     say that such a thing when done is void because that would
     tantamount to saying that every unlawful act is void.” (Paragraph
     10).                                                                     H
692             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 1 S.C.R.


A           “….Merely because each one of them is prohibited from
            contracting a second marriage for a certain period, it could not
            be said that despite there being a decree of divorce for certain
            purposes the first marriage subsists or is presumed to subsist……..
            An incapacity for second marriage for a certain period does not
            have effect of treating the former marriage as subsisting…..”
B
            (paragraph 13).
            “Thus, examining the matter from all possible angles and keeping
            in view the fact that the scheme of the Act provides for treating
            certain marriages void and simultaneously some marriages which
            are made punishable yet not void and no consequences having
C           been provided for in respect of the marriage in contravention of
            the proviso to Section 15, it cannot be said that such marriage
            would be void” (paragraph 20)”
             34. In any case, the bar of Section 15 is not at all attracted in the
      facts and circumstances of this case, where the appeal from the decree
D     of divorce had been filed almost a year after expiry of the period of
      limitation for filing an appeal. Section 15 permits a marriage after
      dissolution of a marriage if there is no right of appeal against the decree,
      or even if there is such a right to appeal, the time of appealing has
      expired without an appeal having been presented, or the appeal has been
E     presented but has been dismissed. In this case no appeal had been
      presented with the period prescribed by limitation.
             35. The bar, if any, under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act
      applies only if there is an appeal filed within the period of limitation, and
      not afterwards upon condonation of delay in filing an appeal unless of
F     course, the decree of divorce is stayed or there is an interim order of
      Court, restraining the parties or any of them from remarrying during the
      pendency of the appeal.
            36. As observed above, the appeal was infructuous for all practical
      purposes, from the inception, since the Appellant’s ex-husband had
G     lawfully remarried after expiry of the period of limitation for filing an
      appeal, there being no appeal till then.
             37. It could never have been the legislative intent that a marriage
      validly contracted after the divorce and after expiry of the period of
      limitation to file an appeal from the decree of divorce should rendered
      void on the filing of a belated appeal. If the marriage of the Appellant’s
H
            KRISHNAVENI RAI v. PANKAJ RAI & ANR.                               693
                   [INDIRA BANERJEE, J.]

ex-husband in 2006 was a valid marriage in law recognizing that he had         A
no living spouse, the subsequent re-marriage of the Appellant could also
not be void. We are in full agreement with the view of this Court in
Leela Gupta (supra) that the effect of the prohibition against one of the
parties from contracting a second marriage for a certain period is not to
nullify the divorce and continue the dissolved marriage, as if the same
                                                                               B
were subsisting.
       38. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant has
also argued that maintenance cannot be refused on the ground of nullity
of marriage, until there is a declaration of nullity of marriage by a
competent Court, in appropriate proceedings under Section 11 of the
Hindu Marriage Act. We need not go into this question in view of our           C
finding that a marriage contracted during the pendency of an appeal
from a decree is not ab initio void, and certainly not when such an
appeal is filed after expiry of the period of limitation.
       39. The judgment and order under appeal confirming the order
dated 7.8.2017 by relying on the order in Criminal Petition 14188 of 2015      D
cannot be sustained. The order dated 02.09.2016 of dismissal of the
appeal was only a formality.
       40. The appeal is allowed. The order under appeal and the order
dated 7.8.2017 of the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Hyderabad
dismissing M.C No.152 of 2015 are set aside. The application being             E
M.C. No. 152 of 2015 is remitted to the appropriate Court having
jurisdiction for determination of the Appellant’s claim to maintenance.
In the meanwhile, the Respondent No.1 shall pay to the Appellant
maintenance of Rs.20,000/- per month, as directed by the Family Court
by its order dated 19.12.2018, without prejudice to the rights and             F
contentions of either party, until further orders of the appropriate Court/
Family Court in the application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C., or in
the suit being O.P. No. 475 of 2015. The Respondent No.1 shall also pay
the Appellant a lump sum amount of Rs.1,00,000/- towards arrears of
maintenance within four weeks from date, which may later be adjusted
towards arrears of maintenance as may be determined by the appropriate         G
Court/Family Court.


Devika Gujral                                                Appeal allowed.

                                                                               H