Holding

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench’s order upholding NCTE’s condition was lawful and not violative of Article 14, and therefore no interference was warranted.

Summary

The Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust applied to the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) for recognition to run a teacher‑training course for the 2004‑05 academic year, but submitted its application without the required No‑Objection Certificate (NOC) from the State Government. The NOC was obtained only on 30 January 2004 and filed with NCTE after the statutory cut‑off date of 31 December 2003. NCTE granted recognition but conditioned it to be effective only from the 2005‑06 session. The Madras High Court’s single judge set aside the condition, directing NCTE to admit students for 2004‑05; the Division Bench reversed that order. The Trust appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the condition was arbitrary, violated Article 14 and that the State Government’s delay should not be blamed. The Court held that NCTE acted within its statutory powers, the condition was neither illegal nor unreasonable, and the Division Bench’s order was consistent with law. Consequently, the appeals were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether NCTE’s condition that recognition be effective only from the 2005‑06 academic year, due to belated submission of the NOC, is illegal, arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
Whether the delay in granting the NOC by the State Government can be attributed to the applicant and justify relief.
Whether the decision in Sabari Education Society’s case compels a similar outcome for the present appellant.
Whether NCTE is required to consider applications for recognition in the absence of an NOC.

Legislation cited

National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993s. 14, s. 15, s. 32

Subjects

teacher educationNCTE recognitionNo‑Objection CertificateArticle 14administrative lawregulationstime limitSupreme Court

Judgment

KRISHNASAMY REDDIAR EDUCATIONAL TRUST A
v.

- MEMBER SECY., NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR TEACHERS
EDUCATION AND ANR.

MARCH 16, 2005
B
[RUMA PAL AND C.K. THAKKER, JJ.]

Education:

National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993-Sections 14, 15 C
. and 32-National Council for Teacher Education (Form of Application for
recognition, the time limit of submission of application, Determination of
norms and standards for recognition of teacher education programmes and
permission to start new course or training) Regulations, 2002-Regulation ,
;, 6-Appellant-Trust appliedfor recognition to offer training in teacher education D
for the academic year 2004-05 without the requisite NOC from the State
Government-The NOC was belatedly submitted after the cut-off date for ·
submission of the app/ication-NCTE granted recognition, but for the ensuing
academic year-Validity of-Held: On facts, NCTE cannot be said to have
acted i//ega//y, arbitrarily or unreasonably-Hence cannot be interfered with
under Article l 4 of the Constitution, even if an order is passed in favour of · E
any other institution in similar circumstances-Constitution of India, 1950-
Article 14.

Appellant filed application before respondent-NCTE oa 30th
December, 2003 for recognition to offer training in teacher education for
the academic year 2004-05. The application was submitted without the F
requisite NOC from the State Government. Appellant had applied for the
NOC on October 31, 2003 and was granted the same on January 30, 2004.
It submitted the NOC to NCTE on 2nd February, 2004, pursuant whereto
NCTE granted recognition, but imposed a condition that it would be
operative for the ensuing academic year 2005-06 since the Appellant had G
submitted the NOC belatedly, i.e. after 31st December, 2003, the cut-off
date for submission of applications, and hence, the application was
incomplete as on 31st December, 2003.

Single Judge of High Court allowed the writ petition filed by
937 II
938 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A appellant and directed the respondent to consider the claim of the
appellant 'positively' and 'permit' the students in the academic year 2004-
05. But Division Bench set aside the order of Single Judge and held that
since appellant and other institutions had not submitted their applications
within time and there was delay on their part in making such applications,
B the condition imposed by respondent and the recognition granted for
academic year 2005-06 could not be said to be illegal, contrary to law or ,'

otherwise unlawful. Hence, the present appeal.

Appellant contended that it had filed the application within the time
prescribed; that it had applied to the State Government for grant of NOC,
C but there was delay on the part of the State Government in taking a
decision one way or the other; and that once the NOC was granted,
immediately thereafter action was taken by the appellant in moving the
NCTE.

Appellant further contended that in a similar situation, an order was
D ·passed by NCTE in favour of one Sabari Education Society, where also,
NCTE granted recognition from 2005-06 but a Writ Petition against the
said condition was allowed and the institution was granted recognition
from 2004-05; that an appeal against the said crder was dismissed by the
Division Bench; that even an SLP has been dismissed by this Court and
that the case of the appellant being similar to Sabari Education Society,
E appellant deserved similar treatment.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD : 1. The orders passed by Division Bench of the High Court
are in consonance with law and no interference is called for. [944-C]
F 2. The respondents are right in submitting that ~here was delay on
the part of the appellants. The applications were submitted without NOC
from the St~te Government. The NOC was applied belatedly. The ~tate
Government could not be blamed for not taking a decision on ·the
applications of the appellants as under Regulation 6 as amended in 2003,
G it was required to dispose of such applications within six months of the
last date of receipt of applications. Eyen prior to the amended Regulation
6, it was expected to take decision within "reasonable time" (four months)
as held in St. Johns Teacher Training Institute. In that case, this Court stated
that the State Government must take a decision on application by an
institution for grant of NOC within a "reasonable time", and that if the
H State Government does not take a decision within reasonable time, it would
K.R. EDU. TRUST1·. MEM. SECY .• NATIONALCOUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. 939

defeat the right of the institution. The Court, in the light of the fact that A
there was no provision in the National Council for Teacher Regulations
regarding time-limit, observed that it would be appropriate that the
Council frames regulations fixing the time limit within which such a
decision is taken by the State Government on the application moved by
an institution for grant of NOC. When St. Johns Teachers Training Institute B
came to be decided by this Court, there was no such provision and the
Court stated that till such regulations are made, the decision should be
taken by the State Government within four months from the date of the
application failing which it would be deemed that NOC l:ad been granted.
(948-E-F; 946-D-EJ

St. Johns Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National
c
Council for Teacher Education and Anr., [20031 3 SCC 321, distinguished.

3. As the appellants applied for NOC in the last week of October,
2003, they cannot make a complaint that the State Government delayed
the matter. Admittedly, NOCs were submitted to the respondent after the. D
last date of application. If in the above facts and circumstances, recognition
has been granted by the respondent on October 28, 2004 by imposing a
condition that it would be operative from academic year 2005-06, it cannot
be said that the respondent had acted illegally, arbitrarily or otherwise
unreasonably. [948-F-G)
E
4. Regarding the order passed in the case of Sabari Education Society,
apart from distinguishing features as pointed out by the respondent, a
review application has also been filed and is pending. Moreover, once it
is held that the action of the respondent in imposing condition is legal and
valid, even if an order is passed in favour of any other institution, the
appellant cannot invoke Article 14. That is not the sweep of Article 14 of F
the Constitution. [948-H; 949-AI

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1776 of2005.

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.12.2004 of the Madras High
Court in W.A. No. 4112 of 2004. G
WITH
C.A. Nos. 1777 and 1778 of 2005.

K.V. Viswanathan, R. Nedumaran, B. Ragunath and Rabu Manoharan
for the Appellant. H
•1
940 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 2 S.C.R.
;
A Sanjay Parikh, Ms. Anitha Shenoy and A.M. Singh for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

THAKKER, J. Leave granted.

B In all these matters, orders passed by a Division Bench of the High
Court of Madras dated December 13, 2004, have been challenged. By the
said orders, the Division Bench allowed the ,appeals filed by the respondent- ----
Regional Director, Southern Regional Committee, National Council for
Teacher Education, (NCTE) Bangalore, set aside the orders passed by the
learned Single Judge and upheld the condition imposed on the appellants to
c start new course in teacher-training education and admit students from the
academic year 2005-06.

In all the three cases, the facts are more or less similar. We, therefore,
refer to the first matter (Krishnasamy Reddiar Educational Trust v. Member
D Secretary, N.C. T.E. and Anr., SLP (c) No. 2911 of2005). The appellant-trust
made an application for recognition on 30th December, 2003 to the respondent
for offering training in teacher education and for starting Elementary Teachers
Training Course for the academic year 2004-2005. The application was
submitted on December 30, 2004 in accordance with Section 14 of the National
Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as "the
E Act") and the National Council for Teacher Education (Form of application
for recognition, the time limit of submission of application, determination of
norms and standards for recognition of teacher education programmes and
permission to start new course or training) Regulations, 2002 (hereiuafter
referred to as 'the Regulations"). The application, however was submitted
F without "No Objection Certificate" ("NOC" for short) from the State
Government. rt was the case of the appellant that it applied for NOC on
October 31, 2003. The Government, however, did not take any decision for
sufficient long time. Only on December 26, 2003 the decision was taken by
the Cabinet to grant NOC to the appellant. NOC was, however, actually
granted as late as on January 30, 2004. NOC was submitted to the respondent
G on 2nd February, 2004, 31st January, 2004 and 1st February, 2004 being
public holidays. It is the case of the appellant that no action was taken by the
respondent on the application of the appellant. The appellant, therefore, was
constrained to file a petition being Writ Petition No. 18107 of 2004 and an
order was passed by the High Court on 13th June, 2004 to carry out inspection.
H Inspection was accordingly carried out on September 20, 2004 and by an

I
K.R. EDU. TRUST''· MEM. SECY., NA TI ON AL COUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. [THAKKER, J.] 94 J

order dated October 28, 2004, recognition was granted by the respondent A
under Section 14 of the Act on the terms and conditions mentioned in the
said order.

Condition No. 3 of the order is material and reads thus :

"Further SRC also noted that the institution has submitted the NOC B
belatedly on 2nd February, 2004 i.e. after 3 lst December, 2003 the
cut off date for submission of applications./: s p.::r NCTE regulations,
only completed applications submitted before 31st December will be
considered for recognition fo~ the ensuing academic year. The
application of Krishnasamy Teacher Training Institute was incomplete ,C
-
'
as on 31st December 2003 and hence recognition is being granted
from the session 2005-2006." (emphasis supplied)

Condition No. 3 was clear and stated that the application of the appellant
institution for recognition was granted by NCTE from the academic session
2005-06. The appellant was aggrieved by the said condition and hence it D
instituted a petition being Writ Petition No. 31913 of 2004. The learned
single Judge, by an order dated November 08, 2004, allowed the petition and
directed the respondent to consider the claim of the appellant-petitioner
'positively' and 'permit' the students in the academic year 2004-05 and thus
allowed the petition. For passing the said order, the learned single Judge
observed that the appellant-petitioner had submitted the application prior to E
the cut-off date. It was also observed that a similar order was passed in Writ
Petition No. 28280 of 2004 on 5th October, 2004 and the respondents were
directed to pennit the students for the academic year 2004-05 and against
that order, no appeal had been filed by the respondents.
F
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned single Judge directing
the NCTE to grant permission and admit students for the academie year
2004-05, the NCTE filed an intra-court appeal, being Writ Appeal No. 4112
of 2004. The Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the
learned single Judge and restored the order passed by the respondent herein
upholding the condition No. 3 extracted hereinabove. In other words, the G
condition which was imposed by the respondent on the appellant institution
that the recognition had been granted from the year 2005-06 has been retained.
The Division Bench considered the relevant provisions of the Act and the
Regulations as amended from time to time. The Division Bench stated that
the Regulations, 2002 were clear on the point. As per Regulation 3 read with H
'· \

\
942 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 2 S.C.R.

A Appendices IA, 18, IC and ID, applications were required to be made in the
manner provided therein. Since the appellant and other institutions had not
submitted their applications within time and there was delay on their part in
making such applications, the condition imposed by the respondent and
recognition granted for academic year 2005-06 could not be said to be illegal,
B contrary to law or otherwise unlawful.

Dealing with the contention of the appellant that the action was
discriminatory inasmuch as in respect of other institutions, such permission
was granted from academic year 2004-05 and the orders passed by the
respondent granting permission from 2005-06 had been set aside by the High
C Court and such condition was held invalid, the Division Bench observed that
when the action was legal and valid, it could not be interfered with by the
Court. It also noted that the validity of those orders was challenged by the
NCTE and, hence, the appellant could not claim benefit of Article 14 of the
Constitution. The appeal was accordingly allowed and the order passed by
the learned single Judge was set aside. It is that order which is challenged in
D the present appeal.

We may state that in the other two cases also, the facts are almost
similar. In both the cases, orders have been passed by the respondent granting
recognition from 2005-06. In both the cases, the learned single Judge quashed
E the condition and directed the respondent to grant permission from 2004-05.
In both the matters, Writ Appeals filed by the respondent herein were allowed
and hence both the institutes have also approached this Court.

We have heard learned counsel for the parties. The learned counsel for
the appellants contended that applications were made by the appellants within
F the time prescribed. It is no doubt true that the applications were made
without NOC from the State Government but it was not the fault of ,the
appellants in not submitting NOC. The appellants did everything what was
required to be done by them. They had applied to the State Government for
grant of NOC. In the first matter, such application was made on 31st October,
2003. The delay was on the part of the State Government in taking a decision
G one way or the other. It was also submitted that the Cabinet took a decision
on December 28, 2003 but NOC was granted on January 30, 2004. Immediately
thereafter an action was taken by the appellant in moving the respondent
NCTE. It was stated that NOC was granted on January 30, 2004, and it was
submitted to the respondent-on 2nd February, 2004. 31st January; 2004 and
H 1st February, 2004 were public holidays and, therefore, NOC was submitted r
I
........_ KR. EDU. TRUSTv. MEM. SECY., NATIONALCOUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. [THAKKER.J] 943
_.J
immediately on the next working day. It was, therefore, urged that the A
respondent was wholly wrong in imposing condition No. 3. The counsel also
urged that submission of NOC is not strictly necessary. Even if NOC is not
granted by the State Government, an application could be made by the
applicant and it was obligatory on NCTE to consider such application and
take appropriate decision on merits. It was, hence, not open to NCTE to insist
B
- on NOC by the State Government or not to consider the application till ther.
Finally, it was submitted that in a similar situation, an order was passed by
the respondent in favour of one Sabari Education Society. There also, NCTE
granted recognition from 2005-06 but a Writ Petition was filed against the
said condition and the petition was allowed and the institution was grant¢d I
recognition from 2004-05. An appeal against said order was dismissed by the c
Division Bench. Even SLP (c) No. 2512 of 2005 has been dismissed by th:is
Court recently on 14th February, 2005. A copy of the order passed by this
Court has also been produced by the appellant. It was submitted that the case
of the appellant is similar to Sabari Education Society and similar treatment
ought to have been shown to the appellant institute. By not doing so, the
respondent has acted arbitrarily as well as unreasonably. The action is violative D
of Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution and deserves to be set aside. The
_appeal deserves to be allowed and the order passed by the Division Bench is
liable to be set aside restoring the order of learned single Judge.

The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, supported
the order passed by the Division Bench. A counter affidavit has been filed
E
by the Regional Director of NCTE, Southern Region Committee, Bangalore,
wherein it was stated that considering the application filed by the appellant
and keeping in view the relevant provisions of law, recognition had been
granted to the appellant but since the institution had submitted NOC belatedly
on 2nd February, 2004 i.e. after 31st December, 2003 which was the cut-off F
date for submission of application under the Regulations, the recognition was
granted for the ensuing academic year 2005-06. The action was strictly in
accordance with law and could not be objected. It was also submitted that the
point has been finally concluded by a decision of this Court in St. Johns
Teachers Training Institute v. Regional Director, National Council for Teacher
Education and Anr., (2003] 3 SCC 321, and as per the law laid down, an
G
...., action has been taken. The case of Sabari Education Society is sought to be
distinguished on the ground that in that case, as per the order of the High
Court, the inspection of the institution had ordered by the High Court and the
Division Bench extended the time to carry out inspection on the request made
by the counsel of NCTE and that action was taken as ''constructive res H
944 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005) 2 S.C.R.

A judicata" by the Court. Regarding dismissal of SLP by this Court, it was
[_
submitted that such dismissal would not constitute final decision on merits or
the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
Moreover, NCTE has filed application to recall/clarify the order passed by
this Court. It was, therefore, submitted that there is no substance in the appeal
B and since the order passed by the Division Bench is in conformity with law,
the appeals deserve to be dismissed.

Having heard the learned counsei for the parties, we are of the opinion
that orders passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras are
in consonance with law and no interference is called for. In our view, the
C learned counsel for the respondent is right in relying on the decision of this
Court in St. Johns Teachers Training Institute. In that case, constitutional
validity and vires of certain Regulations were challenged. The Court after
considering the scheme of the Act and the Regulations held that the power
conferred on NCTE to recognize institutions could not be held arbitrary or
unchannelled. It also held that the guidelines issued to the State Government
D by NCTE for issuance of NOC dealt with the matters to be taken into
consideration under Section 14(3) of the Act and they had direct nexus with
the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The Court also stated that refusal
to grant NOC may entitle the institution to challenge such decision but the
provision as fo requirement of NOC would not vitiate the Regulations. The
E Court emphasized that the purpose of the Act is to achieve planned and
coordinated development of teacher education system and regulation and
proper maintenance of norms and standards in such education. According to
the Court, the role of State Government is indeed important for supplying the
requisite data essential for formation of opinion by the Regional Committee
in taking an appropriate decision and no objection can be taken against such
F action.

Referring to Sections 14, 15 and 32 of the Act and the Regulations, the
Court observed;

"A perusal of the guidelines would show that while considering an
G application for grant of an NOC the State Government or the Union
Territory has to confine itself to the matters enumerated therein like
assessed need for trained teachers, preference to such institutions
which lay emphasis on preparation of teachers for subjects like Science,
Mathematics, English etc. for which trained teachers are in short
supply and institutions which propose to concern themselves with
H
K.R. EDU. TRUSTv. MEM. SECY., NATIONALCOUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. [THAKKER,J.) 945

new and emerging specialities like computer education, use of A
electronic media etc. and also for speciality education for the disabled
and vocational education etc. It also lays emphasis on establishment
of institutions in tribal and hilly regions which find it difficult to get
qualified and trained teachers and locations which have catchment
area in terms of schools of different levels where student teachers can
be exposed to demonstration lessons and can undertake practice .B
teaching. Para 8 of the guidelines deals with financial resources,
accommodation, library and other infrastructure of the institution which
is desirous of starting a course of training and teacher education. The
guidelines clearly pertain to the matters enumerated in sub-section
(3) of Section 14 of the Act which have to be taken into consideration C
by the Regional Committee while considering the application for
granting recognition to an institution which wants to start a course for ,
training in teacher education. The guidelines have also direct nexus
to the object of the Act, namely, planned and coordinated developments
of teach education system and proper maintenance of norms and
standards. It cannot, therefore, be urged that the power conferred on D
the State Government or Union Territory while considering an
application for grant of an NOC, is an arbitrary or unchannelled
power. The State Government or the Union Territory has to necessarily
confine itself to the guidelines issued by the Council while considering
the application for grant of an NOC. In case the State Government E
does not take into consideration the relevant factors enumerated in
sub-section (3) of Section 14 of the Act and the guidelines issued by
the Council or takes into consideration factors which are not relevant
and rejects the application for grant of an NOC, it will be open to the
institution concerned to challenge the same in accordance with law.
But, that by itself, cannot be a ground to hold that the Regulations F
which require an NOC from the State Government or the Union
Territory are ultra Vires or invalid."

Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on
the following observations;
G
"Regulation 6(ii) of these Regulations provides that the endorsement
of the State Government/Union Territory Administration in regard to
issue of NOC will be considered by the Regional Committee while
taking a decision on the application for recognition. This provision
shows that even if the NOC is not granted by the State Government
H
946 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S:C.R.

A or Union Territory concerned and the same is refused, the entire
matter will be examined by the Regional Committee while taking a
decision on the application for recognition. Therefore, the grant or
refusal of an NOC by the State Government or Union Territory is not
conclusive or binding and the views expressed by the State
Government will be considered by the Regional Committee while
B taking the decision on the application for grant of recognition. In
view of these new Regulations the challenge raised to the validity of
Regulations 5(e) and (f) has been further whittled down. The role of
the State Government is certainly important for supplying the requisite
date which is essential for formation of opinion by the Regional
c Committee while taking a decision under sub-section (3) of Section
14 of the Act. Therefore no exception can be taken to such a course
of action.''.

At the same time, however, the Court proceeded to state that the State
Government must take a decision on the application by an institution for
D grant of NOC within a "reasonable time". If the State Government does not
take a decision within reasonable time, it would defeat the right of the
institution. 'fhe Court, in the light of the fact that there was no provision in
the Regulations regarding time-limit, observed that it would be appropriate
that the Council frames regulations fixing the time limit within which such
E a decision is taken by the State Government on the application moved by an
institution for grant of NOC. When St. Johns Teachers Training Institute
came to be decided by this Court, there was no such provision and the Court
stated that till such regulations are made, the decision should be taken by the
State Government within four months from the date of the application failing
which it would be deemed that NOC had been granted.
F
The learned counsel for the respondent stated that after the above
decision, the respondent considered the matter and issued a notification on
June 06, 2003. In the notification, it was stated that in exercise of powers
conferred under Clauses (f) and (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 32 of the
Act, NCTE has amended the Regulations prescribing the time limit of
G submission of application, determination of norms and standards for
recognition of teacher education programmes and permission to start new
course or training.

Regulation 6 was accordingly substituted. Clause (ii) thereof reads as
under:
H
K.R. EDU. TRUST 1·. MEM. SECY., NAT)ONAL COUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. [THAKKER, J.] 94 7

"Every State Government/UT Administration shall endeavour to A
dispose of the application of the Institution seeking NOC for starting
a course or training in teacher education or seeking permission to
start a new course or training and/or increase in intake, as expeditiously
as possible, and shall provide its NOC/endorsement within six months
of the last date of receipt of application for grant of NOC fixed by B
the concerned State Government/UT."

Our attention was also invited by the learned counsel for the respondent
to a notification dated 1st January, 2004 and particularly, Clauses (x) and (xi)
which have been inserted after Clause (ix) of Regulation 6. The amended part
reads thus : -
c
"(i) In the NCTE (Form of application for recognition, the time limit
of submission of application, determination of norms and standards
for recognition of teacher education programmes and permission to
start new course or training) Regulations, 2002 dated 13th November,
2002 as amended by Regulations dated 6th June, 2003 after sub- D
clause (ix) of Para 6 the following sub-clauses shall be added :
(x) The requirement of NOC shall not apply to institutions already
recognized by NCTE for running a B.Ed. course and seeking
recognition to start a course or training in Elementary Teacher
Education or from an existing elementary teacher education E
institution seeking permission to increase in intake in such a course
for a period of three years from the date of notification of these
regulations in the Official Gazette.
(xi) The requirement of NOC shall not apply to institution seeking
recognition to start a course or training in Pre-School Teacher F
Education/Nursery Teacher Education or from an existing
institution seeking permission to increase in intake in such a course,
for a period ·of three years from the date of notification of these
regulations in the Official Gazette.

(ii) In accordance with the revised provisions relating to requirement G
of NOC prescribed at (i) above, the last date for submission of
application prescribed in para 7 of NCTE (Form of application for
recognition, the time limit of submission of application, determination
of norms and standards for recognition of teacher education
programmes and permission to start new course or training)
Regulations, 2002 dated 13th November, 2002 shall be the 31st H
948 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2005] 2 S.C.R.

A January, 2004 only for the academic session 2004-2005."

It was submitted. that in the present matters, all the appellants were
applying for the first time and as such they were required to follow the
Regulations in force, operative and applicable to fresh applications. In such
cases, Notes (I) and (2) of Appendix lB (List of essential documents) will
B apply.

Notes (I) and (2) read thus;

"(I) If the application is found incomplete i.e. with all the essential
documents, the institution may be asked to make good deficiencies in
C the application on or before the last date prescribed in the regulations.

(2) In the event when deficiencies in an application get removed only
after the last date, the application of institution shall be carried forward
by the Regional Committee for consideration for the subsequent
academic year i.e. for the course that would be offered one year
D later."

In ·our view, the respondents are right in submitting that there was
delay on the part of the appellants. In all the three cases, applications were
submitted without NOC from the State Government. It has come on record
that NOC was applied belatedly. The State Government could not be blamed
E for not taking a decision on the applications of the appellants as under
Regulation 6 as amended in 2003, it was required t9 dispose of such
applications within six months of the last date of receipt of applications.
Even prior to the amended Reg.ulation 6, it was expected to take decision
within "reasonable time" (four months) as held in St. Johns Teacher Training
F Institute. As the appellants applied for NOC in the last week of October,
2003, they cannot make complaint that the State Government delayed the
matter. Admittedly, NOCs were submitted to the respondent after the last
date ·of application. If in the above facts and circumstances, recognition has
been granted by the respondent on October 28, 2004 by imposing a condition
that it would be operative from academic year 2005-06, it cannot be said that
G the respondent had acted illegally, arbitrarily or otherwise unreasonably.

·Regarding the order passed in Sabari Education "Society, apart from
distinguishing features as pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent,
a review application has also be.en filed and is pending, as stated by the
learned counsel for NCTE. Moreover, once it is held that the action of the
H respondent in imposing condition is legal and valid, even if an order is
K.R. EDU. TRUSTv. MEM. SECY., NATIONALCOUN. FOR TEACH. EDU. [THAKKER,J.] 949

passed in favour of any other institution, the appellant cannot invoke Article A
14. In our considered opinion, that is not the sweep of Article 14 of the
Constitution.

For the foregoing reasons, all the three appeals deserve to be dismissed
and are accordingly dismissed, however without any order as to costs.
B
B.B.B. Appeals dismissed.